BARICUATRO vs CA G.R. No. 105902. February 9, 2000 ______________________________ Quieting of Title
FACTS In 1968, deceased Baricuatro, Jr., substituted by his legal heirs, bought 2 lots on installment from Galeos. After the sale, petitioner introduced i ntroduced improvements and started to reside in 1970. At the time the action for quieting of title was filed fil ed in the trial court, petitioner had an unpaid balance. However, 2 months from the sale, respondent sold the entire subdivision, including the 2 lots to 2nd buyer. buyer. After the sale of the entire subdivision, the 2nd buyer allegedly took possession and developed the same for residential purposes. He registered the deed of sale covering the subdivision, secured TCT, TCT, subdivided, and acquired individual titles. In 1974, he sold the 2 lots to 3rd buyers who caused the TCT and tax declarations in their names, then demanded from petitioner to vacate the said lots but the latter refused. RTC declared the 3rd buyers as the owners. CA a#rmed decision. Petitioner argues that the general principles on trust must be applied and not Article 1544. Respondent buyers assert that Torrens system should be upheld and that an innocent i nnocent purchaser for value, relying solely on an unencumbered title, should be protected. ISSUE
Whether or not the 3rd buyers - and not the petitioner - are the owners who bought the lots in good faith. HELD
NO. The petitioners are owners. Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property; "...not only to place things in their proper place, to make the
one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property dissipated (Art 476). The 3rd buyers are not in good faith, on the basis of the letter which the latter sent to the petitioner, petitioner, reminding the petitioner of his overdue account and warning him that if he could not come up with the proper solution, it would be his last chance. "ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to di$erent vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith . . “ Uraca vs. Court of Appeals: "xxx xxx the prior registration of the disputed property by the second buyer does not by itself confer ownership or a better right over the property. property. Article 1544 requires that such registration must be coupled with good faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that "(t)he governing principle is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except where the second buyer registers in good faith the second sale ahead of the first.” While 3rd buyers bought the disputed lots from 2nd buyers in 1974, they registered the deeds only in 1976. On cross, 3rd buyer admitted he visited petitioners residencein 1975. Thus, 3rd buyers cannot claim good faith. The registration by them was done in bad faith, hence, it amounted to no "inscription" at all. Phil Stock Exchange vs. CA: ”[A] holder in bad faith of a certificate of title is not entitled to the protection of the law, for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds.
NATIONAL GRAINS AUTH. vs IAC G.R. No. L-68741 January 28, 1988 __________________________________ The fact that the exact number of objects to be delivered has not been determined does not a!ect the perfection of the contract.
FACTS Leon Sorano (seller), o$ered to sell palay grains to NGA (buyer), now NFA through its provincial manager. Seller submitted the documents required by the buyer NFA for pre-qualifying as a seller. After processing documents, the seller was given a quota of 2640 cavans of palay. Seller delivered 630 cavans. They were not rebagged, classified, and weighed. When seller demanded payment, he was informed that it would be held in abeyance because: (1) manager was still investigating an information he received that seller was not a bona fide farmer; and (2) the palay delivered was not produced from seller’s farmland but was taken from a warehouse of a rice trader. Buyer NFA then wrote seller advising him to withdraw the cavans because it was found that he is not a bona fide farmer. Instead of withdrawing, the seller demanded payment. He then filed a complaint for specific performance and/or collection of money with damages. CFI and CA ruled in favor of the seller. Buyer NFA contends: % The cavans of palay delivered by the seller was made for the purpose of having it o$ered for sale; % Under the procedures, rebagging is the initial operative act signifying acceptance, and acceptance will be considered complete after preparing the Warehouse Stock Receipt. Since the delivered cavans did not undergo such procedure, there was not acceptance of the o$er. Hence, no consent. ISSUE
Whether or not there was a contract of sale.
HELD
YES. The seller initially o$ered to sell palay to NFA. When buyer NFA accepted the o$er by noting in the Farmer's Information Sheet a quota of 2,640 cavans, there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties, the object being the palay grains and the cause is NFA’s payment, depending upon its quality. Art 1349 provides: "The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between the parties." In this case, there was no need for NFA and seller to enter into a new contract to determine the exact number to be sold. The seller can deliver so much of his produce as long as it does not exceed 2,640 cavans. The contention that there was no acceptance, therefore consent is absent is incorrect. Sale is a consensual contract; there is perfection when there is consent upon the subject matter and price, even if neither is delivered. This is provided by Art 1475. The acceptance referred to by Art 1475 which determines consent is the acceptance of the one party by the other and not of the goods delivered as contended by petitioners. From the moment the contract of sale is perfected, it is incumbent upon the parties to comply with their mutual obligations or “may reciprocally demand performance.”
HEIRS OF UBERAS vs. CFI of Negros Occidental G.R. No. L-48268 October 30, 1978 ______________________________ Imprescriptibility of an action to Quiet
FACTS Uberas siblings inherited a parcel of land from their parents. Petitioners (children and successors in interest of Segundo and Albino) filed a complaint against respondents (surviving spouse and children of Pedro and Alejandra Uberas) for quieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership, partition, and reconveyance with damages of the property in suit. Defendants sought for dismissal on the ground that the action is barred by prescription. But plaintiffs argued that the action is imprescriptible because it is to quiet the title to the property in question, for partition, and for declaring heirship and deed of sale executed by defendants as void ab initio. RTC dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, holding that the action is essentially for reconveyance based upon an implied trust resulting from fraud. In this case, plaintiffs aver that Pedro Uberas executed the declaration of heirship with malice and bad faith to deprive the compulsory heirs. ISSUE Whether or not the case at bar is one for quieting of title and therefore imprescriptible. HELD YES. This case is an action for quieting of title which is imprescriptible. Faja vs. CA applies, that is, an action to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff is imprescriptible and that where there are material facts to be inquired into and resolved on the basis of evidence adduced by the parties which will determine the legal precepts to be applied, as in this case, the complaining party should be
given full opportunity to prove his case. RTC should not have summarily dismissed the case on the alleged ground of prescription notwithstanding contrary factual averments in the complaint which would clearly rule out prescription. The SC set aside respondent court’s order of dismissal and remanded the case to respondent court for trial and determination on the merits.
GALLAR vs HUSAIN G.R. No. L-20954 May 24, 1967 ___________________________________ Imprescriptibility of an action to Quiet
FACTS Teodoro Husain sold the land under dispute for 30 pesos to Serapio Chichirita with the right to repurchase within 6 years. Teodoro transferred his right to his sister, Graciana Husain. Graciana paid the redemption price and later sold the land to Elias Gallar for a cattle. Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same occasion to Gallar, who since then has been in possession of the land. A couple of years after, Gallar filed this suit in CFI in 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so that he could get a TCT. He also asked for damages. The Husains countered by saying that Graciana already paid the redemption price thus their father had already reacquired ownership over the same. They also claim that the action of Elias has already PRESCRIBED. ISSUES (1) Whether or not ownership was transferred to Gallar. (2) Whether or not the action has already prescribed.
HELD (1) YES. The ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have been transferred. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with Gallar.
(2)
NO. The action is imprescriptible. This action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor. And, as plainti$-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing such actions.
