1. Adasa v. v. Abalos, G.R. No. 168617, February 19, 2007. FACTS: - The instant case emanated from the two complaints-a"davits filed by respondent Cecille S. Abalos on 18 January 2001 before the O"ce of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, City, against petitioner Bernadette Ber nadette L. Adasa for Estafa - Respondent alleged in the complaints-a"davits that petitioner, through deceit, received and encashed two checks issued in the name of respondent without respondent’s knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the latter, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. - 23 March 2001, petitioner filed a counter-a"davit: it was a certain Bebie Correa who received the two checks then left the country after misappropriating the proceeds of the checks - The trial court then issued an order directing the O"ce of the City Prosecutor to conduct are investigation. Afterwards, they issued a resolution a"rming the finding of probable cause against petitioner. - Petition for Review before the DOJ, with regard to the findings of the O"ce of the CityProsecutor. DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution and directed the O"ce of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. Said O"ced filed a “Motion toWithdraw Information” - Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that “DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Sec. 7 of DOJ Circular NO. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright.” CA reversed. ISSUE: Can the DOJ give due course to an appeal or petition for review despite its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned? RULING: - NO. Petition of CA a"rmed. - Court cites the rule that “when a statute or rules is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to”. Since Sec. 7 clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary 2. Ejercito v. Comelec, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014. *separate doc*
3. PLDT v. PSC, G.R. No. 26762, August 31, 1970. In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc (FACI) (FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise to build radio stations (later construed as to include telephony). FACI later changed its name to Express Telecommunications Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted by the National Telecommunications Commission a provisional authority to build a telephone system in some parts of Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it avers, among others, that ETCI is not qualified because its franchise has already been invalidated when it failed to exercise it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987, the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of ETCI’s shares of stocks, transferred said stocks to the the new stockholders stockholders (Cellcom, Inc.? Inc.? – not specified in the the case); that that such transfer involving more than 40% shares of stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise
which is void because the authorization of Congress was not obtained. The NTC denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the NTC. ISSUE: Whether or not PLDT’s petition should prosper. HELD: No. PLDT cannot attack ETCI’s franchise in a petition for certiorari. It cannot be collaterally attacked. It should be directly attacked through a petition for quo warranto which is the correct procedure. A franchise is a property right and cannot be revoked or forfeited without due process of law. The determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto. Further, for any violation of the franchise, it should be the government who should be filing a quo warranto proceeding because it was the government who granted it in the first place. The transfer of more than 40% of the shares of stocks is not tantamount to a transfer of franchise. There is a distinction here. There is no need to obtain authorization of Congress for the mere transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders can transfer their shares to anyone. The only limitation is that if the transfer involves more than 40% of the corporation’s stocks, it should be approved by the NTC. The transfer in this case was shown to have been approved by the NTC. What requires authorization from Congress is the transfer of franchise; and the person who shall obtain the authorization is the grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or transfer of which requires Congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise. In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation, as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of the shares. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of each stockholder. It has the right of continuity or perpetual succession. 4. De Castro v. JBC, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010. *notebook* 5. Unabia v. City Mayor, G.R. No. L-8759. May 25, 1956. FACTS: Petitioner was a foreman, Group Disposal, O"ce of the City Health O"cer, Cebu City, at P3.90 per day. On June 16, 1953, the City Mayor removed him from the service and his place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter by Pedro E. Gonzales. Before June 16, 1953, the Group Disposal Division, including personnel, was transferred from the City Health Department to the O"ce of the City Engineer. In April, 1954, Petitioner sought to be reinstated but his petition was not heeded by the Respondents. On the basis of the above facts, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held that Petitioner is a person in the Philippine Civil Service, pertaining to the unclassified service (section 670, Revised Administrative Code as amended), and his removal from his position is a violation of section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
It is also contended that the use of capitals in the words “Civil Service” in section 1 and 4 of Article XII of the Constitution and the use of small letters for the same words, “civil service,” in section 670, Revised Administrative Code, indicates that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected in the above-mentioned sections of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether the use of capital in the words "Civil Service" in the Constitution and the use of small letters for the "civil service" in the Revised Administrative code indicates that the protection only pertains to the classified service. DECISION: We see no validity in this argument. Capital “C” and “S” in the words “Civil Service” were used in the Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. We see no di$erence between the use of capitals in the former and of small letters in the latter. There is no reason for excluding persons in the unclassified service from the benefits extended to those belonging to the classified service. Both are expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service; chan Hence, Hence, the same rights and privileges should be accorded to both. Persons in the unclassified service are so designated because the nature of their work and qualifications are not subject to classification, which is not true of those appointed to the classified service. This cannot be a valid reason for denying privileges to the former that are granted the latter. As the removal of Petitioner was made without investigation and without cause, said removal is null and void and Petitioner is entitled to be reinstated to the position from which he was removed. (Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 O$. Gaz. [4], 1778). There is, however, an additional objection to the reinstatement raised in the memorandum submitted by the attorneys for the Respondents in lieu of oral argument. This is the fact that as Petitioner was removed on June 16, 1953 and only filed his petition on July 1, 1954, or after a delay of one year and 15 days, Petitioner should no longer be allowed to claim the remedy, he being considered as having abandoned his o"ce.
6. Funa v. villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012. Facts: On February 15, 2001, Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7 years. Carague’s term of o"ce started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7, 2004, Villar was appointed as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his o"ce as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011.
Issue 1: W/N a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same o"ce (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a di$erent position or o"ce (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. Issue 2: W/N the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made vacant by the expiration of term of the predecessor is valid No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-year term. Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there can be no unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villar’s appointment to a full term is not valid as he will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would e$ectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of o"ce of 7 years.
7. CIR v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 183505, February 26, 2010. FACTS: In a number of CTA cases, the BIR sent SM Prime and First Asia a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) for VAT deficiency on cinema ticket sales for taxable year 2000 (SM), 1999 (First Asia), 2000 (First Asia), 2002 (First Asia), and 2003 (First Asia). SM and First Asia filed for protest but the BIR just denied them and sent them a Letter of Demand subsequently. All the PANs were subjected to a Petition for Review filed by SM and First Asia to the CTA. The CTA First Division ruled that there should only be one business tax applicable to theater and movie houses, the 30% amusement tax. Hence, the CIR is wrong in collecting VAT from the ticket sales. CIR appealed the case to the CTA En Banc.
The CTA En Banc a"rmed the ruling of the CTA First Division. ISSUE: Whether the cinema ticket sales are subject to VAT and thus included in the meaning of “Sale or Exchange of Services”? RULING: NO! When VAT was enacted it replaced the tax on original and subsequent sales tax and percentage tax on certain services. When the VAT law was implemented, it exempted persons subject to amusement tax under the NIRC from the coverage of VAT. When the Local Tax Code was repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the local government continued to impose amusement tax on admission tax on ticket sales. The following amendments to the VAT law have been consistent that those subject to amusement tax is no liable under VAT. Only lessors or distributors of cinematographic films are included in the coverage of VAT. It can be seen from the foregoing that the legislative intent was not to impose VAT on persons already covered by the amusement tax. To hold otherwise would impose an unreasonable burden on cinema/theater houses operators and proprietors, who would be paying an additional 10% VAT on top of the 30% amusement tax. **Yung susunod the discussion ay yung sinabi ng court bago nila inalam yung legislative intent na nakamention sa itaas** Sec. 108 of the NIRC provides that, there shall be levied, assessed and collected, a VAT equivalent to 10% of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties. The phrase “sale or exchange of services” means the performance of all kinds of services in the Philippines for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those…….lessors or distributors of cinematographic films……..and similar services regardless of whether or not the performance thereof calls for the exercise or use of the physical or mental faculties. The phrase “sale or exchange of services” shall likewise include: (7) lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs. A reading of the foregoing provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the “sale or exchange of services” subject to VAT is not exhaustive. The words, “including,” “similar services,” and “shall likewise include,” indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only.
! 8. Oxales v. United Laboratories Inc. G.R. No. 152991, July 21, 2008. 9. Feliciano v. Aquino, G.R. No L-10201, September 23, 1957. FACTS Respondent was proclaimed as elected mayor of Concepcion Tarlac. 4 days after the proclamation, petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings challenging Petitioner’s eligibility on the ground that respondent was not yet 23 years old at the time of his election. Respondent claimed that age requirement only refers to the age of the time of assumption of o"ce. He appealed the existence of a semi-colon, converted into a comma in the 1951 Revised Administrative Code does not require him to possess the remaining qualifications at the time of election but rather at the time of assumption of o "ce provided that he had fulfilled the 1st 2 requirements. Lower Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Hence the petition.
ISSUE Whether or not the proclamation of respondent as elected mayor is correct RULING: The primary rule of statutory construction that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to do to the contrary. Punctuation marks are aids of law degree in interpreting the language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words. No reason is shown why, after plainly and unequivocally requiring that candidates for all other elective o"ces should possess the age qualification "at the time of the election", the law should suddenly change the requirement in the case of municipal o"cers. No argument is needed to show that where the candidate is mentioned as eligible or ineligible in the said section taking part in the election is meant, not capacity to assume o"ce. Decision of the lower court is a"rmed and the election of respondent is declared unlawful and illegal. 10. Teves v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009. FACTS: 1. Edgar Teves was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections 2. respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify Edgar on the ground that he was convicted of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under the LGC a. the crime involves a crime of moral turpitude 3. COMELEC first division disqualified Edgar and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy 4. COMELEC en banc denied the petition for review filed by Edgar for being moot since he lost in the elections ISSUE: Whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in Teves v. Sandiganbayan1 involved moral turpitude. HELD: 1. Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general. 2. Edgar was convicted under Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019: Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxxx (h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest. a. The elements of such violation are: i. The accused is a public officer; ii. he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; iii. he either: a) intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest, or b) is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or by law.
b. 2 modes by which a public officer who has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction may violate Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019. i. when the public officer intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with his financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction. ii. when he is prohibited from having such an interest by the Constitution or by law. 1. Edgar was convicted under this mode for having pecuniary or financial interest in a cockpit which is prohibited under Sec. 89(2) of the Local Government Code of 1991. 2. Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 3. Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991, which reads: Section 89. Prohibited Business and Pecuniary Interest. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any local government official or employee, directly or indirectly, to: xxxx (2) Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games licensed by a local government unit…. [Emphasis supplied]. 3. conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same involved moral turpitude a. moral turpitude does not include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited, as in the instant case. 4. Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections: Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." a. must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being positively prohibited." 5. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. a. whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. 6. all the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s conviction and found that the same does not involve moral turpitude. a. there is neither merit nor factual basis in COMELEC’s finding that petitioner used his official capacity in connection with his interest in the cockpit and that he hid the same by transferring the management to his wife, in violation of the trust reposed on him by the people. b. while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently immoral. i. Court took judicial notice of the fact that mere possession of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions enumerated in Section 41 thereof c. Gambling is not illegal per se. the Congress through its enacted laws did not declare cockfighting as illegal.
11. Cariño v. CHR, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991. On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial. 12. Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010. FACT: E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the O"ce of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public o"cers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that. It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public o"ce and appropriate funds for its operation; The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the O"ce of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and e"ciency does not include the power to create an entirely new o "ce was inexistent like the Truth Commission; The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the O"ce of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. It violates the equal protection clause ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive o"cials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not a$ected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the o"ces and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry
