etwee >etween n two constru constructi ctions, ons, one of which which would would dimini diminish sh or restri restrict ct fundamental right of people and the other of which would not do so, the latter construction must 'e adopted.
o, Respondents may not terminate contract with Petitioners and award the contract to other 'idders. 2he discretion of Respondent *PH to terminate or rescind the contract comes into play only in the event the contractor shall have incurred a negative slippage of 15C or more, according to P.*. 1E7+ and *PH &ircular o. 1+). 2he intent intent of the law in allowi allowing ng the governmen governmentt to ta"e ta"e over over delaye delayed d construction construction pro!ects pro!ects with negative slippage slippage of 15C or more is primarily primarily to save money and to avoid dislocation of the financial pro!ections and0or cash flow of the government.$ government.$ 2erminating 2erminating the contract contract and awarding awarding it to Hanil, a previously dis4ualified 'idder, would actually result in a financial loss to the government.
L!"IN M!IM$ 11a, 7, 9E
0 termination of contract with Petitioners is valid.
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, /a, 1)a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
157
2enorio v. Manila Railroad &o.
&ity of Manila v. &hinese &ommunity of Manila, et al.
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-**9+ (March 29, 1912) Chapter :II, Page 297, Footote No. *2
Case No. *1 G.R. No. L-143 (ctoer 31, 1919) Chapter :II, Page 297, Footote No. *4
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
*efendant company too" possession of and occupied a small parcel of land without the e3press consent of Plaintiff and without having made payment therefore, allegi alleging ng that that the land land is a part part of certai certain lands lands descri descri'ed 'ed in condem condemnat nation ion proceedings.
:ppellant presented a petition in the &AI of Manila praying that certain lands, 'e e3prop e3propria riated ted for the purpos purpose e of constru constructi cting ng a pu'lic pu'lic improv improvemen ementt N the e3tension of Ri#al :venue. :ppellee denied that it was either either necessary or e3pedient that the parcels of land 'e e3propriated for street purposes.
I##%&$
I##%&$
0 Plaintiff has the right to maintain this separate action for damages for trespa trespass ss on his land on the ground ground that it was his duty to see" redress redress in the condemnation proceedings instituted 'y *efendant company.
0 in e3propria e3propriation tion proceedings proceedings 'y the :ppellant, ant, the courts courts may in4uire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the e3propriation. '&L$
'&L$
:s a general rule, the steps prescri'ed 'y the statute must 'e followed or the proceedings will 'e void. 8ince these statutes are in derogation of general right and of common%law modes of procedure, they must 'e strictly construed in favor of the landowner, and must 'e at least su'stantially or fully and fairlyD complied with. In the a'sence of proof of a su'stantial compliance with the provisions of law touchin touching g such such procee proceedin dings, gs, the Plaint Plaintiff iff was clear clearly ly entitle entitled d to institut institute e any appropriate action to recover the damages which she may have suffered as a result of an unauthori#ed and unlawful sei#ure and occupation of her property. 2he theory on which the trial !udge correctly proceeded was that *efendant company company having having unlawf unlawfully ully ta"en ta"en possess possession ion of a part part of the tract of land land in 4uestion, and 'y its operations thereon rendered the whole tract worthless to the Plaintiff. 2hus, Plaintiff is entitled to a'andon the entire entire tract, and recover damages damages for its full value. L!"IN M!IM$ )1a, 9
In our opinion, opinion, when when the legisla legislatur ture e confer conferred red upon the courts of the Philippine Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right e3ists for the e3ercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should in4uire into, and hear proof upon, those 4uestions ;of necessity=. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in 4uestion may 'e used 'y the general community of &hinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition tion of a pu'lic cemetery, would ma"e the cemetery cemetery in 4uestion 4uestion pu'lic property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must 'e denied, for the reason that the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to e3propriate pu'lic property. Bven granting that a necessity e3ists for the opening of the street in 4uestion, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. 2he record shows that ad!oining and ad!acent lands lands have 'een offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, )9a, 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
158
elasco v. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Case No. 1* G.R. No. L-14214 (Ma0 2, 19*+) Chapter :II, Page 299, Footote No. 7*
Case No. 72 G.R. No. L-124+ (ece6er 2, 199) Chapter :II, Page 299, Footote No. 7*
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petition Petition for naturali#ati naturali#ation on of Petitioner was denied for failure to meet the re4uirements of the law.
>efore an applicant may apply for Philippine citi#enship, the law re4uires that he file a declaration of intention to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en one year prior to the filing of application unless he is e3empt from complying with said re4uirement. 2he law e3empts one from filing a declaration of intention in two casesF ;a= if he is 'orn in the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school recogni#ed recogni#ed 'y the government and ;b= if he has continuo continuously usly resided resided in the Philippines for a period of + years or more provided that he has given primary and secondary education to all his children either in a pu'lic school or private schools recogni#ed recogni#ed 'y the government. government. In the instant instant case, Petitioner Petitioner has not filed any declaratio declaration n of intention to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en 'ecause, 'ecause, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than + years and has given given primary m ary and second secondary ary educat education ion to all his childr children en in private v ate schools schools recogni#ed 'y the government.
I##%&$
0 the trial court erred in denying the petition for naturali#ation. '&L$
o. &onsidering that naturali#atio naturali#ation n laws should 'e rigidly rigidly enforced enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant$, we are constr constrain ained ed to hold that that the trial trial court court did not err in denying denying the petition petition for naturali#ation. L!"IN M!IM$ 9
I##%&$
0 the Petitioner has complied with the re4uirement of the law regarding his duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children. '&L$
o. 2he government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education to his daughters :ngelita and
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
159
&o v. Repu'lic of the Philippines
Mactan &e'u International :irport :uthority v. Marcos
Case No. 24 G.R. No. L-121+ (Ma0 2*, 19*+) Chapter :II, Page 299, Footote No. 7*
Case No. 17 G.R. No. L-12++2 (#epte6er 11, 199*) Chapter :II, Page 3+1, Footote No.
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petitioner Petitioner filed his petition petition for naturali#a naturali#ation tion in the trial trial court. court. 2he court court ordered that a certificate of naturali#ation 'e issued to Petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision 'ecame final and all the re4uisites provided for in R: 5+ were met. 2he government appealed the decision decision contending that from the evidence itself introduced 'y Petitioner it would appear that he failed to comply with some of the re4uirements prescri'ed 'y law in order to 4ualify him to 'ecome a Ailipino citi#en. 2hus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he 'elieves in the principles underlying the constitution, 'ut rather stated that he 'elieves in democracy upon cross%e3amination. It is contended that such 'elief is not sufficient to comply with the re4uir re4uireme ement nt of the law that one must 'elieve 'elieve in the principle n cipless underl underlyin ying g our constitution.
Respon Respondent dent &esa, &esa, I&, I&, ffice ffice of the 2reasure 2reasurerr of the &ity of &e' &e'u, u, demanded payment for realty ta3es on several parcels of land 'elonging to the Petitioner, who o'!ected to such demand claiming in its favor 8ec. 19 of R: (/5E which e3empt it from payment of realty ta3es. Respondent &ity of &e'u alleges that as an <@6 and a political su'division, it has the power to impose, levy, assess, assess, and collect ta3es within its !urisdiction. on. 8uch power is guaranteed 'y the &onstitution and enhanced further 'y the <@&. hile it may 'e true that under its &harter the Petitioner was e3empt from the payment of realty ta3es, this e3emption was withdrawn 'y 8ec. )9 of the <@&. I##%&$
0 Petitioner is a ta3a'le$ person. I##%&$
0 the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the 4ualifications for naturali#ation and none of the dis4ualifications mentioned in the law. '&L$
-es. In so stating that he 'elieves 'elieves merely in our laws, Petitioner Petitioner did not necessarily refer to those principles em'odied in our constitution which are referred to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper proper and irreproacha'le irreproacha'le manner in his relation with our government as evidenced 'y his failure to register his family with the >ureau of Immigration and to file his income ta3 ta3 return. &onsidering that Knaturali#ation laws should 'e rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant,K the 8upreme &ourt held that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturali#ation. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 7', 9
'&L$
-es. Petitioner Petitioner cannot claim claim that it was never a ta3a'le ta3a'le person$ under under its &harter. It was only e3empted from the payment of real property ta3es. 2he grant of the privilege only in respect of this ta3 is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to ma"e it a ta3a'le person su'!ect to all ta3es, e3cept real property ta3. Bven if the Petitioner was originally not a ta3a'le person for purposes of real property ta3, in light of the foregoing dis4uisitions, it had already 'ecome, a ta3a'le person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of 8ec. )9 of e3emptions from the payment of real property ta3es. 8ince ta3es are what we pay for civili#ed society, or are the life'lood of the nation, nation, the law frowns against e3emptions e3emptions from ta3ation ta3ation and statutes statutes granting granting ta3 e3emptions e3emptions are thus construed construed strictissimi (uris against the ta3payers and li'erally in favor of the ta3ing authority. Blse wise stated, ta3ation is the rule, e3emption therefore is the e3ception. L!"IN M!IM$ 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
160
2he Roman &atholic :postolic &hurch in the Philippines v. :. . Hastings, :ssessor and &ollector of the &ity of Manila, and the &ity of Manila
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt f :ppeals, &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals and :teneo de Manila 6niversity
Case No. 13* G.R. No. 1974 (March 1, 19+*) Chapter :II, Page 3++, Footote No. 79
Case No. 74 G.R. No. 11349 (!pr 1, 1997) Chapter :II, Page 3++, Footote No. 1
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In 1/+1, :ppellant imposed a ta3 upon the residence of the Roman &atholic arch'ishop arch'ishop of Manila, overruling the claim that it was e3empt from ta3ation as provided ded 'y 8ec. 9E of :ct o. 1E of the Philippine Philippine &ommission. ssion. 2he :ppellant :ppellant contended that the said property was not a parsonage and not ad!acent to the cathedral, 'eing E+ to 1++ meters distant from the church, and that the e3emption privilege was already e3hausted 'y its allowance to the parsonage of the ad!oining chapel.
Private Private Respondent is a non%stoc", non%stoc", non%profit educational educational institution institution with au3iliary units and 'ranches all over the Philippines, one of which is the Institute of Philippine Philippine &ulture ;IP&=, which is engaged engaged in social sciences sciences studies studies of Philippine Philippine society e ty and culture culture.. In 1/E, 1/E, Petiti Petitioner o ner issued issued a demand demand letter regard regarding ing the institutionDs institutionDs ta3 lia'ilities. lities. Petitioner Petitioner contended contended that private Respondent was an independent contractor$ within the purview of 8ec. )+5 of the 2a3 &ode, and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore su'!ect to C contractorDs ta3.
I##%&$
I##%&$
0 the house of the arch'ishop of Manila should 'e e3empted from ta3. '&L$ In enacting its e3emption laws, the &ommission had in view not only the conditions conditions peculiar to and inherent in Roman &atholic parishes in the Islands, 'ut their intent was to e3tend the e3emption to the parsonages parsonages appurtenant to all churches. :nd it is a general rule that statutes e3empting charita'le and religious property from ta3ation should 'e construed fairly and not unnaturally though strictly and in such manner as to give effect to the main intent of the legislators. legislators. :lthough :lthough separated separated from the cathedral 'y an intervening 'loc", and although a parsonage within the area was already already e3empt, the residence residence of the arch'ishop should still 'e e3empted e3empted from ta3ation as a parsonage ad!acent to the cathedral. L!"IN M!IM$ Ea, /', 9
0 Private v ate Responde Respondent, nt, throug through h its au3ili au3iliary ary unit unit or 'ranch 'ranch,, the IP&, IP&, perfor performing ming the wor" wor" of an indepe independe ndent nt contra contractor ctor and, thus thus su'!ec su'!ectt to C contractorDs ta3 levied 'y 8ec. )+5 of the ational Internal Revenue &ode. '&L$ o. 2he research research activity of the IP& was done in pursuance of maintaining maintaining private private RespondentDs RespondentDs university university status and not in the course of an independent 'usiness 'usiness of selling such such research with with profit in mind. 2here was no evidence evidence that the IP& ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in 'usiness apart from the academic purposes of the university. Petitioner erred in applying applying the principles of ta3 e3emption without first applying a strict interpretation of the ta3 laws. L!"IN M!IM$ 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
161
Manila Railroad &ompany v. Insular &ollector of &ustoms
Repu'lic v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
Case No. 1*7 G.R. No. 3+2*4 (March 12, 1929) Chapter :II, Page 3+1, Footote No. 4
Case No. 2* G.R. No. L-*9344 (!pr 2*, 1991) Chapter :II, Page 3+1, Footote No. 4
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:ppellee Manila Railroad &ompany used dust shields made of wool on all of its railway wagons to cover the a3le 'o3 which protects from dust the oil deposited therein which serves as lu'ricant of the 'earings of the wheel. 6nder par. 191 of 8ec. E of the 2ariff
Respondent spouses :ntonio and &lara Pastor owed the @overnment P1,)E, ()1.( for ta3es from the years 1/55%1/5/. : reinvestigation of their de't was made and the amount was changed to P17,117.+E. 2hey applied for ta3 amnesty under P.*. ), )1 and 7+. *ue to this, their de't even decreased to a'out P1),+++. 2hey paid such de't to the @overnment and had receipts as proofs of such. 2he @overnment contended that the spouses could not avail of the ta3 amnesty under P.*. )1 'ecause of Revenue Regulation o. E%7) which stated that amnesty is not allowed for those who had pending assessments with the >IR. Respondent spouses then contended that Revenue Regulation o. E%7) was null 'ecause P.*. )1 did not contain any e3emption wherein one should not 'e allowed to amnesty.
I##%&$
hether dust shields should 'e classified as manufactures of wool or as detached parts of vehicles for use on railways.
I##%&$
'&L$
'&L$
*ust shields are classified for the purposes of tariff as detached parts of vehicles under par. 1/7. It is a general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying ta3es not to e3tend their provisions 'eyond the clear import of the language used. In case of dou't, they should 'e construed strictly against the government and in favor of the citi#en. :nd when there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is em'raced in the former, the particular enactment must 'e operative, and the general one must 'e ta"en to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.
-es, 'ecause Revenue Regulation o. E%7) was null and void. If Revenue Regulation o. E%7) provided an e3ception to the coverage of P.*. )1, then such provision is null and void for 'eing contrary to the Presidential *ecree. Revenue regulations shall not prevail over provisions of a Presidential *ecree.
<:2I M:GIMF Ea, 9, 5+
0 Respondent spouses were properly given ta3 amnesty.
L!"IN M!IM$ E, )(
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
162
Misamis riental :ssociation of &oco 2raders, Inc. v. *epartment of Ainance 8ecretary Case No. 2 G.R. No. 1+24 (No8e6er 1+, 1994) Chapter :II, Page 3+1, Footote No.
:cting &ommissioner of &ustoms v. Manila Blectric &ompany Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-23*23 (/e 3+, 1977) Chapter :II, Page 3+1, Footote No.
F!C"#$ F!C"#$
Petitioner is a corporation whose mem'ers are engaged in 'uying and selling copra. Prior to Revenue Memorandum &ircular ;RM&= 97%/1, copra was classified as a food product under 8ec. 1+;'= of the ational Internal Revenue &ode and therefore e3empt from ta3 in all stages, including distri'ution. 6nder 8ec. 1+;a=, the sale of agricultural %food products in their original state is e3empt from :2 only if the seller is the primary producer and the owner of the land which the same is produced. 6nder 8ec. 1+;'=, the sale of agricultural food products in their original state is e3empt from :2 in all stages. RM& 97%/1 then reclassified copra as a non%food product. I##%&$
0 copra is an agricultural food product which is e3empt from :2 and thus not under the purview of RM& 97%/1. '&L$
o, it is not an agricultural food product, thus it is not e3empt from :2. 2he &ommissioner of Internal RevenueDs interpretation is entitled to great respect 'ecause it is the government agency charged with the interpretatio n and implementation of ta3 laws. In fact, although copra is from coconut, and E+C of the coconut plant is edi'le, copra per se is not intended for human consumption. L!"IN M!IM$ )a, 9)a, '
R: 1/9 e3empted payment of special import ta3 for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all ta3es of whatever nature. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are e3empt from ta3es. I##%&$
0 insulating oil is an insulator ma"ing Respondent e3empt from paying its ta3es. '&L$
o, insulating oil is different from insulators. 2he 8upreme &ourt loo"ed into the definition of insulating oils$ under Materials Hand'oo" 'y @eorge J. >rady, Eth Bdition. 2he court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. :nd there is no 4uestion that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. 2he law frowns on e3emption from ta3ation hence an e3empting provision must 'e construed stictissimi (uris. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 9, '
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
163
&ollector of Internal Revenue v. Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc.
People v. &astaeda Jr.
Case No. * G.R. No. L-7 (March 23, 19*) Chapter :II, Page 3+4, Footote No. 97
Case No. 1+4 G.R. No. L-4*1 (#epte6er 1, 19) Chapter :II, Page 3+*, Footote No. 1+2
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Respondents Manila Joc"ey &lu' Inc. and Philippine Racing &lu' Inc. are corporations organi#ed primarily for holding horse races. Petitioner is contending that payments for renting several parts of the property that Respondents rent and lease are su'!ect to the )+C amusement ta3 in the ational Internal Revenue &ode.
Respondents were charged of E criminal cases for violating the ational Internal Revenue &ode for manufacturing alcoholic products su'!ect to specific ta3 without having paid the annual privilege ta3 therefore. Respondents argued that they are e3empt from ta3es 'ecause they are entitled to the 'enefits availa'le under P.*. 7+ which declares ta3 amnesty.
I##%&$
0 rentals received 'y the Respondents from private horse owners or trainers, the P&8, the hite &ross, the Philippine :nti%2u'erculosis 8ociety are su'!ect to the )+C amusement ta3.
I##%&$
0 Respondent is entitled to the 'enefits of ta3 amnesty under the P.*. '&L$
'&L$
2he law refers to gross receipts$ and not gross income$. 2his clause is plain demonstration that the gross receipts$ refer to the collections on days when the race trac" is open to the general pu'lic and admission fees are or are not charged. 2his necessarily e3cludes income of the Respondents received on days when they do not legally and actually hold horse races. 2he lease 'y the Respondents of the land clearly has nothing to do with horse racing. It is to 'e remem'ered that the law ma"es the proprietor, lessee, or operator, of the amusement place lia'le for the amusement ta3, the three ta3 payers 'ein g connected 'y the dis!unctive con!unction or$, there'y positively implying that the ta3 should 'e paid 'y either the proprietor, the lessee, or the operator, as the case may 'e, singly and not all at one and the same time. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 7a, )7
2o 'e entitled to the e3tinction of lia'ility provided 'y P.*. 7+, the claimant must have voluntarily disclosed his previously unta3ed income or wealth and paid the re4uired 15C ta3 on such previously unta3ed income or wealth. here the disclosure was not voluntary, the claimant is not entitled to the 'enefits e3pressly e3cluded from the coverage of P.*. 7+. In the instant case, the violations with which the Respondents were charged had already 'een discovered 'y the >IR when P.*. 7+ too" effect. It is necessary to note that the Kvalid information under R: )EK referred to in 8ec. 1;a=;9= of P.*. 7+ refers not to a criminal information filed in court 'y a fiscal or special prosecutor, 'ut rather to the sworn information or complaint filed 'y an informer with the >IR under R: )E in the hope of earning an informerLs reward. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, )5a, 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
164
amora v. &ity of Manila
Repu'lic Alour Mills, Inc. v. &ommissioner of Internal Revenue
Case No. 17 G.R. No. 3433 (March 2, 19+7) Chapter :II, Page 3+*, Footote No. 1+2
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L- 2*+2 31 (Fer/ar0 1, 197+) Chapter :II, Page 3+*, Footote No. 1+3
F!C"#$
F!C"#F
:ct o. /75 is a remedial statute which provides for relief of persons who have paid an e3cessive assessment on ta3es prior to the creation of the >oard of 2a3 revision. Petitioner prays that the word land$ in the title and 'ody of the statute 'e interpreted to mean land including 'uildings and improvements thereon$.
In 1/57, Petitioner was granted ta3%e3emption privileges pursuant to R: /+1. In 1/5E, Petitioner imported a 4uantity of wheat grains, part of which was not used in the 'usiness that year. 2he surplus of wheat grains were finally utili#ed into flour and sold in 1/5/. Petitioner paid sales ta3 of P7,)75.55, 'ut the cost of wheat left over was treated as deducti'le item from gross sales in 1/5/. Respondent &ommissioner finally assessed the Petitioner of deficiency ta3 of P),17+.17 'ecause materials purchased from ta3%e3empt industries were not ac4uired from one en!oying ta3% e3emption privilege under our laws.
I##%&$
0 the word land$ should 'e interpreted li'erally to mean land with the 'uildings and improvements thereon.
I##%&$
0 Respondent &ommissioner is correct in imposing the deficiency sales ta3.
'&L$
hile the distinction does not appear to have 'een consciously made in :ct o. 1), it is disregarded in :ct os. E) and 551. 2he rule of strict construction of statutes granting e3emptions from ta3ation is not applica'le in this case. 2his rule is not without its e3ceptions and limitations, and the plain principles of !ustice suggest that the act under consideration should 'e construed with some li'erality. It is a remedial statute, providing for a refund of ta3es which have 'een collected un!ustly and upon an unfair and ine4uita'le valuation of land. hile some of the :cts of the &ommission have consciously sought to give to the word land and real estate a special signification, nevertheless such use has not 'een uniform and the deviations therefrom have 'een so fre4uent that it affords no safe rule from interpretation. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, /d, /f, )7, ')
'&LF
o. 8ec. 1E(%: of Internal Revenue provides that whenever a ta3%free product is utili#ed in the manufacture or production of any article, in the determination of the value of such finished article, the value of such ta3%free product shall 'e deducted. hile It is true that ta3 e3emptions ;and deductions= are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi !uris against the ta3payer, it is e4ually a recogni#ed principle that where the provision of the law is clear and unam'iguous, so that there is no occasion for the courtDs see"ing the legislative intent, the law must 'e ta"en as it is, devoid of !udicial addition or su'traction. L!"IN M!IM F (c, 7a, 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
165
:!ero v. &ourt of :ppeals
In reF 2estate Bstate of 2ampoy
Case No. Chapter :II, Page 3+9, Footote No. 117
Case No. *1 G.R. No. L-14322 (Fer/ar0 2, 19*+) Chapter :II, Page 3+9, Footote No. 117
F!C"#F
F!C"#F
Petitioners filed a petition for pro'ate of holographic will left 'y the late :nnie 8and. 2hey alleged that the decedent was of sound and disposing mind, and was capacitated to dispose of her estate 'y will. Private Respondent opposed the petition claiming the will or testament was not of the decedent and the same was procured through improper pressure. It was also opposed 'y *r. Jose :!ero claiming that the decedent was not the sole owner of the property. 2he trial court granted and0or admitted the decedentDs holographic will to pro'ate. n appeal, said *ecision was reversed 'y the &: for its failure to comply with :rt. E1 and E19 of the ew &ivil &ode.
In the matter of Petition for Pro'ate Proceedings 'efore the &AI of &e'u, the will consists of two pages and the last page had 'een duly signed 'y the testatri3 and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page 'ut the testatri3 failed to sign the left margin of the first page. 2he lower court denied the petition 'ecause the will was not e3ecuted in accordance with law, citing 8ec. (1E of :ct o. 1/+, as amended.
G.R. No. 1+*72+ (#epte6er 1, 1994)
I##%&F
0 the pro'ate court ;&AI= is correct in denying the petition for the allowance of the will.
I##%&F
0 the &: is correct that the will did not comply with the law. '&LF
o. Aailure to strictly o'serve other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is un4uestiona'ly handwritten 'y the testator. :rt. E1 of the ew &ivil &ode affects only the validity of the dispositions in the will, 'ut not its pro'ate. : holographic will can still 'e admitted to pro'ate, notwithstanding non% compliance with :rt. E19. In case of alterations, cancellations or insertions, the lac" of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes, 'ut not its entirety. 2he &:, however, correctly held that :nnie 8and could not dispose the other property including the house and lot, which she shares with her fatherDs other heirs. L!"IN M!IM F 1, (c, 7a, /a
'&LF
-es. 8ec. (1E of :ct o. 1/+, as amended, re4uires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which re4uirement should 'e e3pressed in the attestation clause. 2his re4uirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will. 2hus, it has 'een held that 8tatutes prescri'ing the formalities to 'e o'served in the e3ecution of wills are very strictly construed. : will must 'e e3ecuted in accordance with the statutory re4uirements otherwise it is entirely void. :ll these re4uirements stand as of e4ual importance and must 'e o'served, and courts cannot supply the defective e3ecution of the will.$ :ccordingly, we cannot escape the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot 'e admitted to pro'ate. L!"IN M!IM F (c, 7a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
166
:.<. :mmen 2ransportation &ompany, Inc. v. >or!a
Case No. 1 G.R. No. L-177+ (!/g/st 31, 19*2) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 123
Case No. 7+ G.R. No. 7*17 (/e 1, 199+) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 123
F!C"#$
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Respondent filed an action against Petitioners in the &AI of :l'ay to recover compensation for overtime wor" rendered, and damages. Pending this, Respondent filed the present proceedings on the &ourt of Industrial Relations.
Petitioner is a security guard of the &entral >an" of the Philippines assigned to its main office. His regular tour of duty is from )pm to 1+pm. n June 1E, 1/E(, the Petitioner rendered full duty. >ut, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the Petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5am the ne3t day. n his way home, he met an accident and as a result, he sustained in!uries. Aor in!uries sustained, he claimed for disa'ility 'enefits under P.*. ()( 'ut was denied 'y the @8I8.
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1. 0 the scope of the term action$ falls under R: 1//9. ). 0 the &ourt of Industrial Relations has !urisdiction.
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0 the denial of compensation under P.*. ()( was valid.
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1. 2he Petitioner contends that the phrase action already commenced$ employed in the statute should 'e construed as meaning only actions filed in a regular court of !ustice. ith this limited and narrow interpretation, we cannot agree. 2he statute under consideration is undou'tedly a la'or statute and as such must 'e li'erally construed in favor of the la'orer concerned. ). 2he allegation in the complaint filed 'y the Respondent employee that he was separated automatically from the said employment with *efendants, and notwithstanding pleas for reinstatement, *efendants refused and still refuse to reinstate Plaintiff,$ and his prayer for specific reliefs and other reliefs !ustify the conclusion that said Respondent ought reinstatement aside from overtime wages. 2his was within the !urisdiction of the &ourt of Industrial Relations. L!"IN M!IM$ /a
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o. In the case at 'ar, it can 'e seen that Petitioner left his station at the &entral >an" several hours after his regular time off, 'ecause the reliever did not come on time. 2here is no evidence on the record that Petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route. hile presumption of compensa'ility and theory of aggravation under the or"menDs &ompensation :ct may have 'een a'andoned under the ew
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
167
illavert v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
:'ella v. ational
Case No. 313 G.R. No. L-4*+ (ece6er 14, 191) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 124
Case No. 2 G.R. No. 7113 (/0 2+, 197) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 124
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2he Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino illavert, who died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine &onsta'ulary. 8he filed a claim for income 'enefits for the death of her son under P.*. ()(, as amended, with the @8I8. 2he said claim was denied 'y the @8I8 on the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner had failed to show that there was a causal connection 'etween the fatal ailment of Marcelino and the nature of his employment. 2he Petitioner appealed to the B&& which affirmed the denial.
Petitioner leased a farm land, Hacienda *anaoNRamona, in egros ccidental for a period of ten years. It is renewa'le at her instance, which she opted to do, for another ten years. *uring the e3istence of the lease she employed the private Respondents. 6pon e3piration of the leasehold rights, Petitioner dismissed the two Respondents.
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0 the B&& committed grave a'use of discretion in denying the claim of the Petitioner.
-es. 2he applica'le law on the case is :rt. )E9 of the
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Arom the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated 'y the duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and cler" typist of the Philippine &onsta'ulary. 2here is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a 'out of alcoholic into3ication$ shortly 'efore he died. either is there a showing that he used drugs. :ll dou'ts in the implementation and interpretation of this &ode, including its implementing rules and regulations shall 'e resolved in favor of the la'or. L!"IN M!IM$ /a
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0 the Respondents are entitled to separation pays.
L!"IN M!IM$ 5a, /a, /d
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
168
*el Rosario 8ons v. ational
Manahan v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 3* No. L-*42+4 (Ma0 31, 19) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 124
Case No. 79 G.R. No. L-4499 (!pr 22, 191) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 124
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Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with &almar 8ecurity :gency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. 2he security guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against the Petitioner and the security agency. 2he
a#ario Manahan, Jr., died of Bnteric Aever while he was employed as a teacher in the
0 the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim 'enefits.
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0 the formal defects of the appeal of the securit y agency should invalidate the appeal. '&L$
o. :ccording to :rt. ))1 of the
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-es. 2he findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his employment, he was treated for Bpigastric pain% and ulcer%li"e symptoms. 2his was supported 'y his medical records and a medical certificate issued 'y *r. >erna'e. Bpigastric pain is a symptom of 6lcer and 6lcer is a common complication of Bnteric Aever. Pursuant to the doctrine of &orales v. B&&, the provisions of the or"menDs &ompensation :ct shall 'e applied, thus the presumption of compensa'ility should 'e in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of dou't, the case should 'e resolved in favor of the wor"er and that
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
169
8i'ulo v. :ltar
Case No. 7 G.R. No. L-121*4 (Ma0 2, 199) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 124
Case No. 279 G.R. No. L-191* (!pr 3+, 1949) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 12
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:ppellants >enito
Petitioner, owner of first class agricultural land, entered into a contract of tenancy with Respondent. Petitioner was to furnish the wor" animals and farm implements and Respondent was to defray all e3penses of planting and cultivation. 2he net produce was to 'e divided e4ually. 2he contract was disapproved 'y the 2enancy
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0 the &ommission erred in ordering the :ppellants to pay !ointly and severally.
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0 the contract is against pu'lic policy as contemplated in 8ec. 7 of the 2enancy
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o. :lthough the &: does not contain any provision e3pressly declaring that the o'ligation arising from compensation is solidary, other provisions of law show how their lia'ility is solidary. :rt. 1711 and 171) of the ew &ivil &ode and 8ec. ) of the &: reasona'ly indicate that in compensation cases, the lia'ility of 'usiness partners should 'e solidary. If the responsi'ility were to 'e merely !ointly, and one of them happens to 'e insolvent, the award would only 'e partially satisfied, which is evidently contrary to the intent of the law to give full protection to employees. 2he &: should 'e construed fairly, reasona'ly and li'erally for the employee and dependents. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, /c, /d, (, E, 9+
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o. In declaring certain stipulations to 'e against pu'lic policy, the legislature could not have meant to sanction other stipulations which, though not specified, are similar to those e3pressly mentioned. 2he purpose of the law might easily 'e defeated otherwise. 2he 2enancy :ct is a remedial legislation intended to 'etter the lot of the share%cropper 'y giving him a more e4uita'le participation in the produce of the land which he cultivates. >eing a remedial statute, it should 'e construed to further its purpose in accordance with its general intent. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, /c, 1)a, (, 9+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
170
@uerrero v. &ourt of :ppeals
icente v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 4 Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 12*
Case No. 1* G.R. No. +24 (a/ar0 23, 1991) Chapter :II, Page 31+, Footote No. 127
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:polonio >enite# was hired 'y the Petitioners to wor" in their plantation. He was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 10 of the proceeds with his coconut%related responsi'ilities. :fterwards, the Petitioners and >enite# e3ecuted an agreement allowing >enite# to continue wor"ing as tenant the :gricultural 2enancy :ct would govern their relationship.
Petitioner was an employed nursin g attendant. :t the course of his employment, he had several physical complications which forced him to retire. 8o at the age of forty%five, he availed an optional retirement to entitle him to income 'enefits$ under the @8I8 retirement program. 2he application was supported 'y a physicianDs certification that Petitioner was classified as under permanent total disa'ility.$ 2he significance of such classification was whether or not Petitioner could avail of the full income 'enefits. @8I8 contended that Petitioner was only permanent partial disa'ility$. 2he B&& affirmed the @8I8 decision.
G.R. No. L-447+ (Ma0 3+,19*)
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hether Petitioner was under permanent total disa'ility or permanent partial disa'ility.
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0 share tenancy ended. '&L$
o. :n agreement is not a'rogated 'y the su'se4uent repeal of the law. 2he phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of tenants into farmhands or hired la'orers with no rights. 2he :gricultural 2enancy :ct and :gricultural
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Petitioner was under permanent total disa'ility. 2he test of whether or not an employee suffers from permanent total disa'ility is a showing of the capacity of the employee to continue performing his wor" notwithstanding the disa'ility he incurred. 2he &ourt ta"es this occasion to stress once more its a'iding concern for the welfare of government wor"ers, especially the hum'le ran" and file. It is for this reason that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its 'eneficiaries and re4uires a construction of utmost li'erality in their favor. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 11', 1)a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
171
2amayo, et al. v. Manila Hotel &ompany
&orporal v. BmployeeDs &ompensation &ommission
Case No. 23 G.R. No. L-97 (/e 29, 197) Chapter :II, Page 311, Footote No. 12
Case No. 3 G.R. No. *+2+ (!/g/st , 1994) Chapter :II, Page 311, Footote No. 131
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)(5 employees of :ppellee Manila Hotel &o., who had to 'e dismissed and paid the value of their accumulated leave under 8ec. )(( of the :dministrative &ode, as amended 'y R: (11, when the hotel was leased to a private concern on June +, 1/59, 'rought the present action to recover from the :ppellee Manila Hotel &o. an additional amount for accrued leave alleged to 'e due them under the same section of the :dministrative &ode, as later amended 'y R: 1+E1, approved on June 15, 1/59, that is to say, 15 days 'efore they were separated from the company.
orma &orporal was an employed pu'lic school teacher. *uring the course of her wor", she had several pregnancies. n her 9th pregnancy, she suffered complete a'ortion. n her 5th pregnancy, she gave 'irth to a 'a'y 'oy with the help of a hilot$. :n hour later, she was rushed to the hospital due to profuse vaginal 'leeding. 8he underwent hysterectomy 'ut she died afterwards. Her hus'and, herein Petitioner, filed a claim for compensation 'enefit with @8I8. >ut said agency denied. 2he matter was elevated to B&& 'ut the petition was also dismissed 'ecause the cause of his wifeDs death was non%wor"%related.
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0 Petitioners could avail of the alleged accrued 'enefits.
0 Petitioner could avail the compensation 'enefit.
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o. :rt. 9 of the ew &ivil &ode provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. :s R: 1+E1 does not provide that it is to have a retroactive effect, it can only 'e given effect from the date of its approval.
o. 2he determination of whether the prolapse of ormaDs uterus developed 'efore or after her 5th pregnancy is immaterial since this illness is the result of her physiological structure and changes in the 'ody. hile as a rule that la'or and social welfare legislation should 'e li'erally construed in favor of the applicant, there is also a rule that such li'eral constructio n cannot 'e applied if the pertinent provisions of the
L!"IN M!IM F 9(a
L!"IN M!IM F (c, 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
172
Case No. 21* G.R. No. 179+ (a/ar0 27, 1923) Chapter :II, Page 32+, Footote No. 1*7
People v. Reyes Case No. 222 G.R. Nos. 7422*-227 (/0 27, 199) Chapter :II, Page 32+, Footote No. 1*
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:ppellant was punished for violating the Blection
n June 1/E, the complainants allegedly discovered that the property of their deceased parents was falsely transferred to Mi#aph Reyes through falsified signatures and untruthful statements in the deed of registration. However as the deed was registered on May )(, 1/(1, the lower courts held that the period of prescription has long passed.
People v. Moran
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0 :ct o. ++ is meant to apply to the :dministrative &ode and whether the said act should 'e retroactive with respect to :rt. )) and 7 of the RP&.
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hether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the case due to the passing of the prescriptive period.
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:ct o. ++ is intended to 'e amendatory to several sections of the :dministrative &ode. Aurthermore, :rt. )) of the RP& can only 'e invo"ed with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to :rt. 7, the 8& contends that :rt. )) should still apply to special laws. :lso, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. : statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. hen the statute ma"es no distinction, it ma"es no e3ception. 8tatutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. 2he new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign ac"nowledges that the previous one was un!ust and enforcing the latter would 'e contradictory. L!"IN M!IM$ )(, 7, 9(a, 9E
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2he 8& ruled affirmed the decision of the lower court, as the registration of land acts as a notice to the whole world. 6nder this, it is also presumed that the purchaser has e3amined the instruments of the record. 2he court will not hesitate to apply rules of construction in civil cases to that of criminal ones, should the circumstances warrant. Rights should not 'e left on a precarious 'alance, always suscepti'le possi'le challenges. 2his should also apply to criminal cases. Aurthermore, as stated in People v. Moran, in the interpretation of the law and that of the prescription of crimes, a li'eral reading that is most favora'le to the accused is the one to 'e adopted. L!"IN M!IM$ 9E
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
173
>oard of :dministrators of the P: v. >autista
Case No. 37 G.R. No. L-37*7 (Fer/ar0 22, 192) Chapter :II, Page 321, Footote No. 17+
Case No. 14 No. L-3*13 (No8e6er 2, 197) Chapter :II, Page 322, Footote No. 173
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Respondent @asilao, a veteran, failed to present all the necessary papers to receive his pension. :fter finally complying with all the necessities, he was awarded with the full 'enefits of R: (5, 8ec. / and R: 1/)+, for P1++ a month and an additional P1+ per minor.
Petitioner, an employee of the *epartment of :grarian Reforms, sent a letter to the Respondent 8ecretary of the *epartment, &onrado Bstrella. Petitioner e3pressed his desire to 'e laid%off under the provisions of R: E99, as amended 'y R: (E/, on the condition that he would also 'e paid the gratuity 'enefits to which he might 'e entitled under &.:. o. 1E(, as amended 'y R: 1(1(. @8I8 approved his retirement gratuity under &.:. o. 1E(, as amended 'y R: 1(1( 'ut denied his claim for gratuity under R: E99, as amended 'y R: (E/. I##%&$
0 Petitioner is entitled to 'oth gratuity 'enefits under &.:. o. 1E(, as amended 'y R: 1(1(, and R: E99, as amended 'y R: (E/. '&L$
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0 the lower court erred in the retroactivity of Respondent @asilaoDs pension. '&L$
Respondent @asilao is a veteran of good standing and has complied with the prescriptive period for filing for his pension. 2he laws on veteran pension must 'e li'erally construed as to grant our veterans the proper recognition. @ranting such pensions the earliest possi'le time is more in tune with the spirit of R: (5. >ut, as the government has yet to provide the necessary funds, the !udgment of the lower courts is modified as, effective *ecem'er 1E, 1/55 at P5+ plus P1+ per month for each minor, increased to P1++ from June )), 1/57 to :ugust 7, 1/(E. 2he difference from June )), 1/(/ to January 19, 1/7) is su'!ect to the release of funds 'y the government. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 9+'
o. 2here is nothing in R: E99, as amended 'y R: (E/, that would suggest that an employee who is laid%off or prefers to 'e laid%off can receive two pension 'enefits, one under its provisions and another pursuant to &.:. o. 1E(. 2his interpretation is more in line with the policy of the law em'odied in &.:. o. 1E( prohi'iting an employer from paying dou'le retirement 'enefits to an employee. >eing the law governing the retirement of government employees, all other laws e3tending retirement 'enefits to government employees should, in case of am'iguity, 'e construed in relation to &.:. o. 1E( and in the light of its provisions. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts a provision, it is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same su'!ect matter, and that in the a'sence of an e3press repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should 'e deemed enacted pursuant to the legislative policy em'odied in prior statutes, which should all 'e construed together. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, E'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
174
ReF Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Case No. *+ !.M. No. +9-9-+19-#C (ctoer 4, 199+) Chapter :II, Page 322, Footote No. 174
ReF :pplication Aor Retirement 6nder R.:. o. /1+ of :ssociate Justice Ramon >. >ritanico of the I:& Case No. 12 !.M. No. *44-Ret. (Ma0 1, 199) Chapter :II, Page 323, Footote No. 177
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2his matter was 'rought a'out due to two separate pu'lications in the fficial @a#ette of the same amendment to R: /1+ ;8pecial Retirement
hich version of P.*. 19E must 'e followed. '&L$
2he &ourt directed @8I8 to continue implementing R: /1+, as amended 'y P.*. 19E, in the same manner as it has done since 1/7E. 2his is definitely more in "eeping with and gives su'stance to the elementary rule of statutory construction that, 'eing remedial in character, retirement laws should 'e li'erally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to 'e 'enefited and all dou'ts as to the intent of the law should 'e resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. Retirement laws are intended to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor 'ut, more so, for those who have 'een incapacitated 'y illness or accident. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 9+'
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Justice >ritanico re4uested that he 'e granted retirement 'enefits under R: /1+ in addition to or in lieu of 'enefits he received under R: 1(1( upon termination of his service in the Judiciary 'y the acceptance of his courtesy resignation 'y President :4uino, pursuant to Proclamation o. 1 dated Ae'ruary )5, 1/E(, re4uiring all appointive pu'lic officials to su'mit their courtesy resignations 'eginning with the mem'ers of the 8upreme &ourt. Justice >ritanico served the government for (.) years, of which 1+ years, ) months, and )7 days were served in the Judiciary. :s provided in 8ec. 1 of R: /1+, the !udges or !ustices who may en!oy retirement 'enefits with their lifetime annuity, should have rendered at least )+ years service in the !udiciary or in any other 'ranch of the government or 'oth.$ 2hey fall into three categoriesF GGG ). those who resig n 'y reason of incapacity to discharge the dutie s of their office and had rendered at least )+ years service in the !udiciary or in any other 'ranch of the government or 'oth GGG I##%&$
hich category Justice >ritanico 'elongs to. '&L$
He 'elongs to the second category of 8ec. 1. 2he acceptance of his courtesy resignation, not 'eing a voluntary resignation ;as held in 3rti4 v+ /3M5/ =, resulted in his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, which he could have very well held until he reaches the mandatory retirement age of 7+ years. Retirement laws should 'e li'erally construed to and applied in favor of the persons intended to 'e 'enefited there'y. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 9+', 9c
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
175
ReF @regorio @. Pineda
Ramire# v. :rrieta
Case No. 132 !.M. No. *79-R&" (/ 13, 199+) Chapter :II, Page 323, Footote No. 17
Case No. 13+ G.R. No. L-1913 (No8. 29, 19*2) Chapter :II, Page 32, Footote No. 11
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2hese are petitions or motions for reconsideration filed 'y si3 retired !udges, namely Pineda, Montesclaros, de
Petitioner filed an action against :polinar 8erina see"ing the annulment of a transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land alleging misrepresentation. 2he &AI dismissed the complaint. 2he Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to appeal. 2he end of the + day period fell on a 8unday hence it was moved to the following Monday 'ut one of the two 'ondsmen was una'le to sign the appeal 'ond. 2he cler" of court suggested that the document first 'e completed 'y the Plaintiff 'efore filing it. Petitioner followed the suggestion and filed the complete document the ne3t day. *efendant filed an opposition to the approval of the appeal 'ond since it was filed one day after the end of the reglementary period. 2he !udge disapproved the 'ond and rendered the !udgment final and e3ecutory. Plaintiff interposed a petition for mandamus to the 8& saying that the &AI committed a grave a'use of discretion.
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0 they should 'e granted 'enefits under R: /1+ pursuant to the Plana or >ritanico ruling. '&L$
o. : close scrutiny into the service records as well as the conduct of the !udges is necessary to determine their 4ualification to receive 'enefits under R: /1+. 2he rule is that retirement laws are construed li'erally in favor of the retiring employee. hen the court allows e3emptions to fi3 rules for certain !udges, there are ample reasons 'ehind each grant. 2he crediting of leaves is not done indiscriminately. 2he court only allows the use of the Plana or >ritanico ruling if the career of the !udge was mar"ed 'y competence, integrity and dedication to the pu'lic service. Most of the !udges however retired 'owing to policy considerations, id est courtesy resignations. 2he *e
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0 the &AI committed grave a'use of discretion in disallowing the appeal 'ond. '&L$
-es, it did. 2he action of the &AI is harsh and improvident according to the 8&. 2he 'ond would have 'een filed on time if it had not 'een for the defect. :ccording to the Rules of &ourt, a personal appeal 'ond need not necessarily 'e su'scri'ed 'y ) sureties, it would suffice that the court approves such. Aurthermore, the Rules of &ourt also state that the appeal needs only one surety. 8o long as the surety is solvent and accepta'le to the court, it should suffice. Moreover, the defect in the appeal 'ond, even if indeed ) sureties were needed, the court would not have 'een deprived of !urisdiction since it was filed within the reglementary period. Rules of procedure should 'e li'erally construed in order to promote their o'!ect and assist the parties in o'taining a !ust determination of their cases. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, /d, /e, 11'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
176
International &orporate >an" v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt
*el Rosario v. Hamoy
Case No. *3 G.R. No. L-*97+ (a. 3+, 19) Chapter :II, Page 32*, Footote No. 11
Case No. 3 No. L-7714 (/e 3+, 197) Chapter :II, Page 32*, Footote No. 11
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Private Respondent secured a loan from PetitionerDs predecessor in interest 'y mortgaging her properties. 2he amount approved for release was used to pay for her other o'ligations to Petitioner. 2hus, private Respondent claimed that she never received anything from the approved loan. Private Respondent made a money mar"et placement. Meanwhile, she allegedly failed to pay her mortgage so the 'an" refused to pay the interest earned 'y the placement, applying the amount instead to the deficiency in the mortgage. 2he mortgaged properties were auctioned. Private Respondent filed a petition to release in her favor the amount earned in the money mar"et investment which was su'se4uently granted 'y the court. 2he court issued a writ of e3ecution against PetitionerDs property. Private Respondent filed an e3 parte motion praying that five 'ranches of the 'an" pay her the total amount of the money mar"et interest, which was granted. Petitioner failed to comply with all the said orders. 2he supplemental petition of the Private Respondent was marred 'y erasures, alterations, and0or additions. 8uch 'ond was therefore rendered without force and effect. Private Respondent contends that the alterations were all made 'y the insurance company itself since there were no ready%made forms availa'le.
Aor want of a one%peso documentary stamp in a special power of attorney for pre%trial purposes, in lieu of the personal appearance of Plaintiff, the Respondent Judge declared him non%suited and dismissed the complaint for failure of the Plaintiff to appear for pre%trial conference.$
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0 Respondent Judge erred in dismissing the case 'ecause the document did not have the re4uired one%peso documentary stamp. '&L$
-es. Had Respondent Judge 'een less technical and more sensi'le, the present proceedings and the conse4uent waste of time of this &ourt would have 'een avoided. >y such rigidity, Respondent denied the Petitioner su'stantial !ustice. He could have easily re4uired counsel for Plaintiff to 'uy the documentary stamp and affi3 it to the special power of attorney and it would not have ta"en ten minutes. 2he Respondent Judge lost sight of the fact that even the Rules of &ourt themselves, fortified 'y !urisprudence, mandate a li'eral construction of the rules and pleadings in order to effect su'stantial !ustice.
0 there can 'e legal compensation in the case at 'ar. '&L$
&ompensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the set% off against the other is neither clear nor li4uidated. &ompensation cannot e3tend to unli4uidated disputed claim arising from 'reach of contract. Petitioner is inde'ted to private Respondent in the amount of the money mar"et interest. 2he de't of P(.E1M of priv ate Respondent to Petitioner is however in dou't. 2his prevents legal compensation from ta"ing place under :rt. 1)/+ of the &ivil &ode. 2he filing of insufficient or defective 'ond does not dissolve a'solutely and unconditionally the in!unction issued. 2he decision of the &: is affirmed. L!"IN M!IM$ /c, /d, 11'
L!"IN M!IM$ Ec, /d, 1Ea, 1E'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
177
@imene# v. 8ecurities and B3change &ommission
Case No. *9 No. L-7314*-3 (!/g/st 2*, 19*) Chapter :II, Page 32*, Footote No. 11
Case No. 2 No. L-** (ece6er 2*, 194) Chapter :II, Page 32*, Footote No. 11
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: decision was rendered against Petitioner 'y the R2&, thus counsel for Petitioner filed a motion with Respondent court for 15 days e3tension to file a petition for review. However, a decision was promulgated 'y the Respondent court ruling that the period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot 'e e3tended and declared the case terminated. 2he Respondent court cited a 8upreme &ourt decision where the issue was regarding an e3tension to file a motion for reconsideration of a final order or ruling and not the 4uestion of granting a motion for e3tension of time to file a petition for review.
@imene# 8toc"'ro"erage filed a motion for reconsideration 'efore the &ommissioners of the 8B& )7 days after receiving their decision. 2he 8B& denied their motion for reconsideration for 'eing filed out of time. 2he 8B& ruled that the +%day period provided for in 8ec. ( of P.*. /+)%: was modified 'y 8ec. / of the Judiciary Revamp
0 8ec. / of >P 1)/ applies to the 8B&. I##%&$
0 Respondent court erred in terminating the case. '&L$
-es. 2he &ourt rules, for the guidance of >ench and >ar, that a motion for e3tensio n of time to file a petition for review under 8ec. )) of the Judiciary Reorgani#ation :ct and 8ec. ));'= of the Interim Rules, may properly 'e filed with and granted 'y the I:& ;now the &ourt of :ppeals=. 2he &ourt further restates and clarifies the modes and periods as followsF ? ;(= Period of e3tension of time to file petition for reviewF >eginning one month after the promulgation of this *ecision, an e3tension of only 15 days for filing a petition for review may 'e granted 'y the &:, save in e3ceptionally meritorious cases. 2he motion for e3tension of time must 'e filed and the corresponding doc"et fee paid within the reglementary period of appeal. L!"IN M!IM$ )a, 5', )7
'&L$
o. 8ec. / of >P 1)/ e3pressly refers to courts$. 2he 8B& is not a court. It is an administrative agency. Repeals 'y implication are not favored. 2he +%day period fi3ed 'y P.*. /+)%:, the organic law of the 8B&, is still in force. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 7a, )9a, 7, E'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
178
>lanco v. >erna'e and
&ase and ant# v. Jugo
Case No. 3* G.R. No. L-4497+ (March 31, 193*) Chapter :II, Page 32*, Footote No. 13
Case No. 49 G.R. No. L-32 (ctoer 14, 194*) Chapter :II, Page 327, Footote No. 17
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
2o comply with the re4uirements to file an appeal the Petitioners filed the notice along with a money order for the sum of P1( to the &ollector of Internal Revenue. However the &ollector returned the said money order to sender for the reason that he had no authority to 'e its depositary. ith such, the appeal was not deemed filed for failure to comply with the re4uirements.
Herein *efendants were to pay a counter'ond to which they had complied with. 2hey furnished the 8heriff with a copy of the said counter'ond to comply with the re4uirement. 2he 8heriff is then tas"ed to furnish the Plaintiff with a copy. n the occasion when the 8heriff received the copy of such, the counsel of the Plaintiff was present in his office. He as"ed the latter if there were o'!ections to the said counter'ond and the counsel replied none. *ue to unfortunate circumstances the 8heriff failed to deliver a copy of such counter'ond to the counsel to formali#e the act of furnishing a copy.
I##%&$
0 the re4uisites were complied with and 0 the court should grant the remedy prayed for 'y the Petitioners.
I##%&$ '&L$
6nder 8ec. 7( of :ct o. 1/+ on how appeals are perfected, ? 2he 'ond to 'e given shall 'e filed with the !ustice of peace ?. In lieu of such 'ond the :ppellant may file with the !ustice a certificate of the proper official that the :ppellant has deposited P)5 with the municipal treasurer ;In Manila with the &ollector of Internal Revenue=. 2he Petitioners therefore have complied with said re4uirements. 2he non%presentation of this certificate was not due to the PetitionerDs failure or omission 'ut to the refusal of the &ollector of Internal Revenue to receive the deposit tendered 'y the Petitioner. 2he fact that the corresponding receipt therefore has not 'een issued or the failure to present the same in due time should not affect the remedy. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, (d, 7a
0 the *efendants complied with the re4uirement of filing a counter'ond and 0 the Plaintiff was furnished a copy of such. '&L$
-es to 'oth issues. egligence or unavoida'le circumstances should not adversely affect the *efendant under the circumstance of this case. 2he sole purpose of the counter'ond is to ena'le the Plaintiff to see that the 'ond is in the prescri'ed form and for the right amount. 2here was su'stantial compliance with this when their attorney was shown in the 8heriffDs office the *efendantDs counter'ond. L!"IN M!IM (d, /a, /d
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
179
&. iuda de rdove#a v. Raymundo
Javellana v. Mirasol and ue#
Case No. 91 G.R. No. L-41 (/0 31, 193*) Chapter :II, Page 327, Footote No. 19
Case No. * G.R. No. 141 (Fer/ar0 , 192+) Chapter :II, Page 32, Footote No. 192
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her 'rief within the 15%day period which ma"es her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the &: had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her 'rief.
: redemption of property from an e3ecution sale, which had 'een effected in 'ehalf of a 'rother of the e3ecution de'tor ;Julio Javellana=, was attac"ed in this case as void 'ecause of a supposed collusiv e agreement 'etween the redemptioner ;
I##%&$
0 the &: had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the :ppellant an additional days with which to file her 'rief.
I##%&$ '&L$
-es. 6nder the Rules of &ourt the court may, on motion to the :ppellee and notice the :ppellant or on its own motion dismiss the 'ill of e3ceptions or the appeal.$ 2he word may$ implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court. L!"IN M!IM$ /d
0 the redemption has 'een effected in good faith and in accordance with the re4uirements of law. '&L$
: li'eral construction will 'e given to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end that the property of the de'tor may 'e made to satisfy as many lia'ilities as possi'le. Redemption of property sold under e3ecution is not rendered invalid 'y reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected 'y means of a chec" for the amount due. :ny ordinary creditor, or assignee as such, having a !udgment su'se4uent to that under which the property was sold may e3ercise the right of redemption. 2he act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasona'le protection of his right as a su'se4uent !udgment%creditor of Ma3imino Mirasol. L!"IN M!IM$ E', 91
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
180
*el Rosario v. B4uita'le Ins. and &asualty &o., Inc.
*e la &ru# v. &apital Ins. 8urety &o.
Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-1*21 (/e 29, 19*3) Chapter :II, Page 32, Footote No. 192
Case No. 1* G.R. No. L-1*13 (!pr 29, 19*1) Chapter :II, Page 32, Footote No. 192
F!C"#$
F!C"#F
*efendant company issued Personal :ccident Policy o. 71( on the life of Arancisco del Rosario, 'inding itself to pay the sum of P1,+++ to P,+++, as indemnity for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim for payment with *efendant company when his son died of drowning after 'eing forced to !ump off the motor launch I8<:M:$ on account of fire. *efendant company refused to pay more than P1,+++ since they alleged that their lia'ility was only said amount pursuant to 8ec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy. I##%&$
Bduardo de la &ru# was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten 'y the &apital Insurance 8urety &o., Inc. In a 'o3ing contest participated into 'y the insured, Bduardo slipped and was hit 'y his opponent on the left part of the 'ac" of the head, causing Bduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. 2he cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left. 8imon de la &ru#, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. *efendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused 'y his participation in a 'o3ing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered 'y insurance.
How much the *efendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Arancisco del Rosario.
I##%&$
'&L$
0 BduardoDs death falls under the definition of the policy against death or disa'ility caused 'y accidental means.$
2he policy does not positively state any definite amount that may 'e recovered in case of death 'y drowning. 2here is an am'iguity in this respect in the policy, which am'iguity must 'e interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recover P,+++. 2he insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,+++ to Petitioner so that there still remains a 'alance of P),+++ of the amount to which he is entitled to recover. L!"IN M!IM$ 11a, E
'&LF
2he terms accident$ and accidental$, as used in insurance contracts, have not ac4uired any technical meaning, and are construed 'y the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. 2here is no accident when a deli'erate act is performed unless some additional, une3pected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or 'rings a'out the result of in!ury or death. 2he failure of the *efendant company to include death resulting from a 'o3ing match or other sports among the prohi'itive ris"s leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or e3empt itself from the lia'ility for such death. L!"IN M!IM$ , )5a, +a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
181
2y s. Airst ational 8urety :ssurance &o., Inc.
&apati v. campo
Case No. 1* G.R. No. L-1*13 (!pr 29, 19*1) Chapter :II, Page 32, Footote No. 192
Case No. 4* G.R. No. L-2742 (!pr 3+, 192) Chapter :III, Page 33+, Footote No.
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Plaintiff *iosdado &. 2y insured himself in 1E local insurance companies, among which 'eing the eight a'ove named *efendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. n *ecem'er )9, 1/5, a fire 'ro"e out which totally destroyed the >roadway &otton Aactory. Aighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff was in!ured on the left hand 'y a heavy o'!ect which caused temporary total disa'ility of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the *efendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy 'ut the *efendants re!ected plaintiffLs claim for indemnity for the reason that there 'eing no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disa'ility suffered 'y him was not covered 'y his policy.
Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a su'%contract with the *efendant, a resident of aga &ity. 2he *efendant completed a construction !o' for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the &AI of Pampanga an action for recovery of conse4uential damages due to the delay. *efendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. 2he &AI of Pampanga dismissed the PlaintiffLs complaint on ground of improper venue. I##%&$
0 the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct.
I##%&$
0 it is necessary that there should 'e an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff 'efore he can recover on the insurance policies. '&L$
2he clear and e3press conditions of the insurance policies define partial disa'ility as loss of either hand 'y amputation through the 'ones of the wrist. 2here was no such amputation in the case at 'ar. :ll that was found 'y the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical in!uries Kcaused temporary total disa'ility of plaintiffLs left hand.K In addition, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law 'etween the parties. :s the terms of the policies are clear, e3press and specific that only amputatio n of the left hand should 'e considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disa'il ity not covered 'y the policies would certain ly 'e unwarranted. L!"IN M!IM$ (', 7a, /c
'&L$
o. 2he rule on venue of personal actions cogni#a'le 'y the &AI is found in 8ec. );'=, Rule 9 of the Rules of &ourt, which provides that such Kactions may 'e commenced and tried where the *efendant or any of the *efendants resides or may 'e found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Plaintiff.K 2he word KmayK is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. 6nder ordinary circumstances, the term Kmay 'eK connotes possi'ility it does not connote certain ty. KMayK is an au3illary ver' indicating li'erty, opportunity, permission or possi'ility. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, )5a, '
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
182
&hartered >an" v. ational @overnment :uditing ffice
@uiao v. Aigueroa
Case No. G.R. No. L-313 (March 31, 197) Chapter :III, Page 331, Footote No. 1+
Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-*41 (Ma0 17, 194) Chapter :III, Page 333, Footote No. 17
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Iloilo city 'ranch of Petitioner 'an" was accepting postal money order from the general pu'lic since 1/9(. 2hese orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for their remaining 'alance. n 1/(E, the >ureau of Posts issued an unnum'ered circularF KMemorandum of 6nderstanding &overing &ashing and &learing of Money rders,K effective cto'er 1, 1/(E, involving the installation of a new postal money order system which re4uires that all commercial 'an"s, regardless of location, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the &entral >an" at Manila. Petitioner 'an" continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latterLs :cting &ashier 'eyond cto'er 1, 1/(E. 2he post office said that the arrangements made 'y the acting cashier and the Petitioner 'an" were private, unauthori#ed arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should 'e directed against the said cashier.
In the trial of People v. @ope#, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio *i#on and Bmiliano Manalo as witnesses for the 8tate. :fter the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus @uiao and Bulogio 8errano. >ut *i#on and Manalo were not included. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for mandamus was filed 'y Jesus @uiao to compel the fiscal to include *i#on and Manalo as accused in his information.
I##%&$
0 the unnum'ered circular and the understanding are directory and permissive in nature.
undated
memorandum
of
'&L$
Respondents are correct 'y saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial 'an"s operating in the Manila area only. L!"IN M!IM$ 7a, /a, (a, ('
I##%&$
0 a fiscal may 'e compelled 'y mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to 'e responsi'le for the crime charged therein. '&L$
-es. 8ec. 1 of Rule 1+( of the Rules of &ourt ta"en from :ct o. )7+/ states that, Bvery prosecution for a crime shall 'e in the name of the 6nited 8tates against all persons who appear to 'e responsi'le therefor, e3cept in the cases determined in 8ec. ) of this :ct.$ : perusal of :ct o. )7+/ discloses the legislative intent to re4uire that all persons who appear to 'e responsi'le for an offense should 'e included in the information. 2he use of the word KshallK and of the phrase Ke3cept in cases determinedK shows 8ec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, /a, )5a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
183
*irector of
Case No. 13 G.R. No. 1171 (!/g/st 7, 1997) Chapter :III, Page 334, Footote No. 22
Case No. 9 G.R. No. 1+2 (/0 2, 1997) Chapter :III, Page 334, Footote No. 23
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
2he
Private Respondent 2eodoro :'istado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. *uring the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were represented 'y Josefa :'istado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. 2he trial court dismissed the petition for want of !urisdiction$. However, it was found that the applicant had 'een in open, continuous and e3clusive possession of the su'!ect land since 1/E. 2he reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to pu'lish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. 2he &: set aside the decision of the trial court. 2hus, Petitioner 'rought the case to the 8upreme &ourt. I##%&$
I##%&$
hether the newspaper pu'lication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory.
0 the failure of a corporation to file its 'y%laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.
'&L$
'&L$
o. 2he legislatureDs intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its 'y%laws. 2he word must$ in a statute is not always imperative 'ut it may 'e consistent with an e3ercise of discretion. 2he language of the statute should 'e considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word must$ or shall$. L!"IN M!IM$ /c, )5a, (a, E', '
It is mandatory. 2he law used the term KshallK in prescri'ing the wor" to 'e done 'y the &ommissioner of
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
184
>ersa'al v. 8alvador
Repu'lic Planers >an" v. :gana 8r.
Case No. 34 G.R. No. L-391+ (/0 21, 197) Chapter :III, Page 33, Footote No. 2
Case No. 133 G. R. No. 17* (March 3, 1997)
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Private Respondents filed an e!ectment suit against the Petitioner. 2he su'se4uent decision was appealed 'y the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that ?counsels for 'oth parties are given + days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to 'e su'mitted for decision 'y the court.$ :fter receipt, Petitioner filed a motion e3 parte to su'mit memorandum within + days from receipt of notice of su'mission of the transcript of stenographic notes ta"en during the hearing of the case which was granted 'y the court. >ut the Respondent !udge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute PetitionerDs appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the su'mitted e3 parte motion 'ut the court denied it.
Private Respondents filed in court a )uo, an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem E++ preferred shares of stoc" with a face value of PE,+++.++ and to pay 1C 4uarterly interest thereon as 4uarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stoc". 2he court a )uo rendered !udgment in favor of Private Respondents.
I##%&$
0 the mere failure of an :ppellant to su'mit the mentioned memorandum would empower the &AI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute. '&L$
2he court is not empowered 'y law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an :ppellant to su'mit his memorandum. 2he law provides that &ourts? shall decide? cases on the 'asis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city? courtsF Provided? parties may su'mit memoranda? if so re4uested?$ It cannot 'e interpreted otherwise than that the su'mission of memoranda is optional. L!"IN M!IM$ (c
I##%&$
0 Respondent Judge committed grave a'use of discretion amounting to e3cess or lac" of !urisdic tio n in compellin g Petitioner 'an" to redeem Priv ate RespondentsD preferred shares '&L$ -es. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in 4uestion, stated that, n the 4uestion of the redemption 'y the *efendant of said preferred shares of stoc", the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stoc" certificates clearly allows the same.$ hat Respondent Judge failed to recogni#e was that while the stoc" certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner >an". 2he redemption therefore is clearly the type "nown as KoptionalK. Aurthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word KmayK. It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word KmayK denotes discretion, and cannot 'e construed as having a mandatory effect. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, (', 7a, +', (a
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
185
Phil. &onsumers Aoundation , Inc. v. atDl 2elecommunications &ommission
Phil. &onsumers Aoundation, Inc. v. 2& and P<*2 ;Resolution=
Case No. 121 G.R. No. L-*331 (No8e6er 2, 193)
Case No. 94 G.R. No. L-*331 (!/g/st 1, 194)
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Respondent &ommission approved a revised schedule for 8u'scri'er Investment Plan ;8IP= filed 'y Private Respondent. Petitioner states that 8IP schedule presented 'y the Private Respondent is pre%mature and, therefore, illegal and 'aseless, 'ecause the Respondent &ommission has not yet promulgated the re4uired rules and regulations implementing 8ec. ) of P.*. )17 which provides, 2he *epartment of Pu'lic or"s, 2ransportation and &ommunications through its >oard of &ommunications and0or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may 'e promulgated ...$ I##%&$ 0 Respondent &ommission acted with grave a'use of discretion.
Respondent &ommission filed a manifestation that it is !oining Priv ate Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. 2he decision promulgated interprets the rule%ma"ing authority delegated in 8ection ) of P.*. )17 to the then *epartment of Pu'lic or"s, 2ransportation and &ommunications as mandatory, which construction is not supported 'y the actual phraseology of said 8ection ). I##%&$
0 the previous decision rendered ma"ing it mandatory to set rules and regulations implementing P.*. )17 should 'e reconsidered. '&L$
'&L$
-es. P.*. )17 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that e3isting su'stantive and procedural laws would not 'e applica'le. 2hus, the 8IP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial via'ility of pu'lic telecommunications companies which in turn assures the en!oyment of the population at minimum cost the 'enefits of a telephone facility. ithout promulgation of rules and regulation there would 'e confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers and the government itself. 2he plan to e3pand the company program and0or improve its service is lauda'le, 'ut the e3penses should not 'e shouldered 'y the telephone su'scri'ers. &onsidering the multi%million profits of the company, the cost of e3pansion and0or improvement should come from part of its huge profits. L!"IN M!IM$
E', /d, 11', 1)a
-es. 2he 'asic canon of statutory interpretation is that the word used in the law must 'e given its ordinary meaning, unless a contrary intent is manifest from the law itself. Hence, the phrase Kmay 'e promulgatedK should not 'e construed to mean KshallK or KmustK. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, (d, /f, +', )9, (, /c
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
186
*io"no v. Reha'ilitation Ainance &orporation
>erces v. @uingona, et. al.
Case No. 93 G.R. No. L-4712 (/0 11, 192) Chapter :III, Page 33*, Footote No. 32
Case No. 33 G.R. No. 112+99 (Fer/ar0 21, 199) Chapter :III, Page 337, Footote No. 34
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petitioner, the holder of a 'ac" pay certificate of inde'tedness issued under R: +9, sought to compel Respondent company to accept his 'ac" pay certificate as payment of his loan from the latter. His 'asis was 8ec. ) of R: +9, which provides that investment funds or 'an"s or other financial institutions owned or controlled 'y the government shall su'!ect to availa'ility of loana'le funds ? accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years such certificate$ for certain specified purposes. Respondent company contended however that the word shall$ used in this particular section of the law is merely directory. 2he lower court sustained Respondent company.
Petitioner filed two administrative cases against Respondent mayor of 2iwi, :l'ay for 1= a'use of authority and )= dishonesty, with the 8angguiniang Panlalawigan. Respondent mayor was convicted, and accordingly, suspended in 'oth cases. Respondent mayor appealed to the ffice of the President and prayed for stay of e3ecution under 8ec. (7;'= of the <@&. 2he ffice of the President stayed e3ecution, citing 8ec. (E of R: 71(+ and 8ec. ( of :.. o. 1E. :ccording to Petitioner, the governing law is R: 71(+, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from 'ecoming final and e3ecutory. Petitioner further contends that :.. o. 1E was repealed 'y R: 71(+.
I##%&$
I##%&$
0 Petitioner can use his 'ac" pay certificate to pay for his loan to Respondent company.
0 R.:. 71(+ repealed :.. o. 1E. '&L$
'&L$
o. It is true that in its ordinary signification, the word shall$ is imperative. However, the rule is not a'solute it may 'e construed as may$ when re4uired 'y the conte3t or 'y the intention of the statute. 2he modifier, at not more than two per centum per annum for ten years.$, the interest to 'e charged, that the ver'% phrase is mandatory 'ecause not only the law uses at not more$ 'ut the legislative purpose and intent, to conserve the value of the 'ac" pay certificate for the 'enefit of the holders, for whose 'enefit the same have 'een issued, can 'e carried out 'y fi3ing a ma3imum limit for discounts. >ut as to when the discounting or acceptance shall 'e made, the conte3t and the sense demand a contrary interpretation. If the acceptance or discount of the certificate is to 'e su'!ect$ to the condition of the availa'ility of loana'le funds, it is evident the legislature intended that the acceptance shall 'e allowed on the condition that there are availa'le loana'le funds.$ In other words, acceptance or discount is to 'e permitted only if there are loana'le funds. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, )5a, )(
o. 8ec. 5+;f=, R: 71(+ did not e3pressly repeal 8ec. (, :.. o. 1E 'ecause it failed to identify or designate the laws on e3ecutive orders that are intended to 'e repealed. If there was any repeal, it was 'y implication which is not favored. In the a'sence of an e3press repeal, a su'se4uent law cannot 'e construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcila'le inconsistency and repugnancy e3ists 'etween the two. 2here is none in this case. 2he first sentence of 8ec. (E provides that an appeal shall not prevent a decision from 'ecoming final or e3ecutory.$ It gives discretion to reviewing appeals to stay e3ecution. 2he term shall$ may 'e read mandatory or directory, depending upon consideration of the entire provision where it is found. L!"IN M!IM$ )5a, )(, 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
187
Mers 8hoes Manufacturing, Inc. v. ational
Aule v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 1 G.R. No. 123**9 (Fer/ar0 27, 199) Chapter :III, Page 337, Footote No. 3
Case No. 4 G.R. No. L-79+94 (/e 22, 19) Chapter :III, Page 337, Footote No. 37
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petitioner hired Respondent wor"ers as piece rate wor"ers. :lleging serious 'usiness decline, Petitioner 'arred its wor"ers from entering the company to wor". 2he wor"ers challenged the legality of PetitionerDs stoppage of operations. 2he
Petitioner, an agent of the 2owers :ssurance &orporation, issued and made out chec" o. )(791 in favor of Roy adera. 8aid chec" was dishonored for the reason that the said chec"ing account was already closed, thus in violation of >P )), the >ouncing &hec"s
I##%&$
0 Respondent
0 the &: erred in affirming the decision of the R2& 'ased on the 8tipulation of Aacts that was not signed 'y the Petitioner nor his counsel.
'&L$
'&L$
o. 6nder :rt. )) of the
2he &: erred. &ase is re%opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. 8ec. 9 of the Rules on &riminal Procedure provides, o agreement or admission made or entered during the pre%trial conference shall 'e used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed 'y him and his counsel$. >ecause of the word shall$, in its language, the rule is mandatory. egative words and phrases are to 'e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. 2herefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. :lso, penal statues are to 'e li'erally construed in favor of the accused.
L!"IN M!IM$ )5a, )(
L!"IN M!IM$ /d
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
188
Mc@ee v. Repu'lic
Penid v. irata
Case No. 174 G.R. No. L-37 (!pr 29, 194) Chapter :III, Page 337, Footote No. 37
Case No. 1+1 G.R. No. L-44++4 (March 2, 193) Chapter :III, Page 33, Footote No. 4+
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petitioner, an :merican citi#en married to
&onfidential Information o. )E of the >IR was filed 'y the Petitioners. It is a sworn statement that listed the shipping companies and agents who had 'een falsely declaring their gross earnings N on the 'asis of a parity rate of P).++ to 68 X1.++ N defrauding the Philippine @overnment of millions of pesos in ta3es. Aurther, Petitioners divulged other cases of erroneous conversion not listed in the &onfidential Information. ne of these was Pan Ail &o. Inc. ow the Petitioners see" their )5C reward ta"en from the total revenue collected from shipping companies in payment for their deficiencies N as provided 'y R: )E.
I##%&$
0 a hus'and having a legitimate child may adopt a step%child. '&L$
o. ne strong argument presented 'y the trial court in upholding the adoptio n is that to hold otherwis e would render :rt. E meaningless and a surplusage. However, it must 'e noted that :rt. 5 and :rt. E should 'e considered in relation to each other. 2hat a parent can adopt a step%child is limited 'y :rt. 5 that said parent cannot have a legitimate child in order to 4ualify as an adopter. ne princip le 'ehind this is to protect the successional rights of the legitimate child. In addition, under the laws of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to 'e regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. :rt. 5 is phrased in a negative mannerF cannot adopt+ hile :rt. E is positiveF the follo!ing may be adopted+" L!"IN M!IM$ 15a
I##%&$
0 the Petitioners could claim reward from Pan Ail &o. Inc, a company which is not included in the &onfidential Information. '&L$
-es. :ccording to 8ec. 9 of R: )E, In order to entitle an informer to a reward, the information given 'y him must lead to or 'e instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation ? and results in the recovery of collection of revenues ?.$ ot only did the >IR rely on the &onfidential Information su'mitted 'y the Petitioners for their investigation, 'ut also on the categorical statement that other shipping companies falsely declared their gross earnings, which led to further investigations and, conse4uently, recovery of collection. 2herefore, this information was instrumental in the discovery of the fraud or violation. In !urisprudence, statues offering rewards must 'e li'erally construed in favor of informers and with regard to the purpose for which they are intended. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, /d
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
189
Pahilan v. 2a'al'a, et al.
Pimentel v. Aeste!o
Case No. 9* G.R. No. 11+17+ (Fer/ar0 21, 1994) Chapter :III, Page 342, Footote No. *3
Case No. 124 G.R. No. L-2327 (a/ar0 11, 1949) Chapter :III, Page 342, Footote No. *4
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Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for Mayor of @uinsili'an, &amiguin. Respondent 2a'al'a was proclaimed Mayor. Petitioner Pahilan filed an election protest although the doc"et fees he paid were insufficient. 2he trial court dismissed the election protest for non%payment on time of the re4uired fees for filing an initiatory pleading. ithin the 5%day period to appeal, Petitioner filed a verified appeal$ 'rief. >ut the &ler" of &ourt said that his office did not receive any notice of appeal$ from Petitioner. PetitionerDs appeal was then dismissed for failure to appeal within the prescri'ed period.
Aeste!o was proclaimed Mayor of 8anta
0 :ppellant can claim as votes in his favor 'allots with his name which does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor.
I##%&F
1. 0 the verified appeal$ was validly dismissed. ). 0 the trial !udge validly dismissed the petition of protest of Petitioner for non%payment on time of the re4uired fees. '&LF
1. o. 2he notice of appeal can 'e validly su'stituted 'y an appeal 'rief. 2he filing and approval of the record on appeal necessarily involves the filing of the notice of appeal. 2he R2& was sent copies 'y registered mail within the prescri'ed period, and is assumed to 'e received in the regular course of the mail, filed as of the date of mailing. ). o. 2he doc"et fee was paid although insufficient. 8tatutes providing for election contests are to 'e li'erally construed that the will of the people in the choice of pu'lic officers may not 'e defeated 'y mere technical o'!ections. L!"IN M!IM F /a, /c, /d, 9+'
'&L$
o. Aor any 'allot to 'e counted for a candidate for mayor, it is indispensa'le that his name 'e written 'y the voter in the 'allot and cannot 'e mista"en 'y a person who, as provided 'y the &onstitution, is a'le to read. : name can 'e counted for any office only when it is written within the space indicated upon the 'allot for the vote for such office. It is impossi'le to count a 'allot as vote for a candidate for mayor, when his name is clearly written in the space reserved for another office. &onsidering that in 5/ 'allots claimed 'y :ppellant in this appeal his name does not appear written in the space reserved for mayor, he cannot claim them as votes in his favor as candidate for mayor. L!"IN M!IM$ (d, 7', 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
190
Ro3as v. Rafferty
8erfino v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 2*4 G.R. No. L-1212 (March 27, 191) Chapter :III, Page 34, Footote No. 7
Case No. 14 G.R. No. 4+ (#epte6er 1, 197) Chapter :III, Page 34, Footote No. 7
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Plaintiffs owned a parcel of land. In the latter part of 1/1, the construction of a reinforced concrete 'uilding was 'egun. It was finished in all respects on Ae'ruary 15, 1/15. 2he city assessor and collector of Manila, under the date of *ecem'er 1, 1/19, sent Plaintiffs notice, received 'y them on *ecem'er )5, 1/19, re4uiring them to declare the new improvements for assessments for the year 1/15. Plaintiffs paid the amount of the ta3es, which amounted to P,+++, under protest. 8uit was 'egun in the &AI of Manila to recover this sum with interest at the legal rate from the date of payment.
: parcel of land, consisting of )1.1(7( hectares situated in 8agay, egros ccidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico &asamayor, under Homestead Patent o. 991/. 6pon registration of said patent, &2 o. 1E/ was issued 'y said office in the name of Pacifico &asamayor. In 1/95, &asamayor sold the land in favor of emesia >alta#ar. :pparently, &2 o. 1E/ was lost during the war and upon the petition of >alta#ar, the &AI of egros ordered its reconstitution in the name of &asamayor. n the same day, 2&2 o. 57% was issued in the name of emesia >alta#ar 'ut after the cancellation of &2 o. 19%R. In 1/51, >alta#ar sold the property to Respondent
I##%&$
0 the assessment was legal. '&LF
I##%&$
o. 2he assessor cannot ma"e a valid assessment unless he has given proper notice. 2he law re4uires that the assessor should have notified the Plaintiffs during ovem'er. His attempted notification on *ecem'er )5, 1/19, was not given during the time fi3ed 'y statute, thus there was no legal assessment of the Ro3as >uilding for the year 1/15. Aurthermore, the city assessor and collector were under the o'ligation to add any completed improvements to the assessment list. 2he city assessor and collector could not prematurely perform this duty on improvements not yet completed.
0 the purchase 'y Respondent
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 1/
L!"IN M!IM$ 7', 9
'&L$
o, applying 8ec. 11E of &.:. o. 191, which prohi'its the alienation of homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent, and not 8ec. 1)1 which governs sale to corporations. 8ince the grant was more than 5 years 'efore, the transfer to emesia >alta#ar was valid and legal.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
191
Sui!ano v. *evelopment >an" of the Philippines
Romualde#%Marcos v. &ommission on Blections
Case No. G. R. No. 2*419 (ctoer 1*, 197+)
Case No. 137 G.R. No. 11997* (#epte6er 1, 199) Chapter :III, Page 347, Footote No.4
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Petitioner filed an ur'an estate loan with respondent which was approved. 2he loan was to 'e released in installments. 2he outstanding o'ligation of the petitioners with respondent, including interests, amounted to P1,/E.5/. Petitioner wrote the respondent offering to pay in the amount of P19,+++ for his outstanding o'ligation, out of the proceeds of his 'ac" pay pursuant to R: o. E/7 ;R: E/7=. Respondent advised petitioners of the non%acceptance of the offer on the ground that the loan was not incurred 'efore or su'sisting on June )+, 1/5 when R: E/7 was approved.
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Petitioner filed her &ertificate of &andidacy for the position of Representative of the Airst *istrict of
0 petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the Airst *istrict of
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0 petitionerDs o'ligation is su'sisting at the time of the approval of R: E/7. '&L$ '&L$
o. 2he provision e3pressly provides that the o'ligations must 'e su'sisting at the time of the approval of R: E/7. Hence, when such 'ac"pay certificates are offered in payment to a government%owned corporation of o'ligation thereto which was not su'sisting at the time of the enactment of said :ct on June )+, 1/5, such corporation may not legally 'e compelled to accept the certificates. 2he &ourt cannot see any room for interpretation or construction in the clear and unam'iguous language of the provision of law. L!"IN M!IM$ )E, 7a, (c, 1
-es. Residency 4ualification pertains to domicile. :s a minor, petitioner followed the domicile of her parents in 2aclo'an,
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
192
Portillo v. 8alvani
Sueru'i n v. &ourt of :p peals
Case No. 243 G.R. No. L-3211 (March 1+, 193+) Chapter III, Page 1+1, Footote No. 13+
Case No. 247 G.R. No. L-21 (ece6er 2, 194) Chapter :III, Page 332, Footote No. 14
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:ppellant 8alvani won the elections in 1/)E for the office of provincial governor of :nti4ue. :ppellee Portillo, his nearest opponent, filed an election protest on July /, 1/)E. *ecision was rendered on :ugust 15, 1/)/ declaring appellee Portillo the winner.
Petitioner defeated Aelipe Mamuri in the election for the mayoralty of Ilagan. Mamuri filed an election protest in the court, lost and filed an appeal thereafter. 2he appeal was not acted upon for three months hence the petition to dismiss the case for the court had lost !urisdiction.
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I##%&$
0 the decision 'y the trial !udge declaring appellee Portillo is valid.
0 the &: had lost their !urisdiction to decide the appeal.
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2he decision is void for want of !urisdiction. 2he Blection
o. 8ec. 17E of the Blection &ode provides that appeals from decisions in election contests should 'e decided within three months after filing. However, this provision is directory in nature since to apply a mandatory character would defeat the purpose of due process of the law. 2he dismissal in such a case will constitute a miscarriage of !ustice. 2he doctrine in Portillo v. 8alvani should 'e a'andoned.
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 7a, 7', /a, 9, 95, ')
L!"IN M!IM$ 1, ), 5', 1E', /'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
193
ilo v. &ourt of :ppeals
8alcedo and Ignacio v. &arpio and &arreon
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-34* (!pr 2, 194) Chapter III, Page 9, Footote No. 9
Case No. 13 G.R. No. L-449 (/e *, 191)
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Private respondent @atchalian is the owner of a parcel of Riceland at >ulacan with an area of ) hectares. Petitioner elected to use the leasehold system. Private respondent then filed for e!ection citing personal cultivation$ on March 7, 1/(E. Private respondent won the case and petitioner filed an appeal citing that R: E99 was amended on 8eptem'er 1+, 1/71 removing personal cultivation$ from the grounds for e!ectment.
Petitioners were appointed mem'ers of the >oard of *ental B3aminers. R: 59( was approved and 8ec. 1 thereof amended 8ec. 1+ of the Reorgani#ation :ct o. 9++7. >y virtue of this law, a >oard of *ental B3aminers was appointed 'y the President, whose terms directly overlapped and conflicted with that of the petitioners. I##%&$
I##%&$
0 the amendment of R: (E/ has retroactive effect.
0 it was the intention of &ongress, in enacting R: 59(, to a'olish all the pre%e3isting >oards of B3aminers e3isting after the time of the enactment thereof.
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o. :rt. 9 of the ew &ivil &ode provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless it is e3plicitly provided. 2he legislation involves social !ustice, however the landowners 'eing holders of only small parcels of land should also 'e entitled to social !ustice. Aurthermore, to rule against the small landowners would 'e thwarting legislative intent of creating independent and self%reliant farmers.
:ppointment of the respondents is valid. It is o'vious that it is the intention of &ongress to do so, 'ecause the provisions of said :ct are inconsistent with those of the Revised :dministrative &ode as amended 'y :ct o. 9++7. In the case of &amacho vs. &ourt of Industrial Relations it was held that it is a well esta'lished rule recogni# ed 'y all authorities without e3ception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new o'ligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disa'ility in respect to a transaction already past 'ut that status is not made retrospective 'ecause it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the re4uirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage.
L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 9(a, 9('
L!"IN M!IM$ 5a, /c, 9(, 9/
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
194
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v.
@allardo v. >orromeo
Case No. 7 G.R. No. L-23771 (!/g/st 4, 19) Chapter I, Page 3, Footote No. 14
Case No. + G.R. No. L-3*++7 (Ma0 2, 19)
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2he >ureau of Internal Revenue ;>IR= assessed and demanded from respondent deficiency franchise ta3es and surcharges applying the franchise ta3 rate of 5C as prescri'ed in 8ec. )5/ of the ational Internal Revenue &ode, instead of the lower rates as provided in the municipal franchises. Pending the case, R: E9 was passed, granting to the respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of light, heat, and power. 2his law lowered the franchise ta3 rate to )C.
Petitioner filed to terminate the leasehold of the respondent tenant so he ;plaintiff= may cultivate it himself as he had retired from his government !o' as a letter carrier. 6pon appeal, the &: applying 8ec. 7 of R: (E/, held that the landownerDs desire to cultivate the land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. I##%&$
0 the &: correctly gave retroactive application to 8ec. 7 of R: (E/. I##%&$
0 R: E9 is unconstitutional for 'eing violative of the uniformity and e4uality of ta3ation$ clause of the &onstitution. '&L$
It is valid. 8ec. )5/ of the 2a3 &ode was never intended to have a universal application. R: E9 did not only fi3 and specify a franchise ta3 of )C on its gross receipts, 'ut made it in lieu of any and all ta3es, all laws to the contrary notwithstanding,$ thus leaving no room for dou't regarding the legislative intent. &harters or special laws granted and enacted 'y the
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o. 2he applica'le law when petitioner filed his complaint was R: E99 which provided a ground for the e!ectment of the tenant should the landowner have a desire to personally cultivate the landholding. 2he newer law, R.:. (E/ eliminated this ground. In applying :rt. 9 of the ew &ivil &ode, R: (E/ cannot 'e given retroactive effect in the a'sence of a statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect. 8ince &ongress failed to e3press an intention to ma"e said R: retroactive, it may not apply to e!ectment cases then already pending ad!udication 'y the courts. L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
195
&e'u Portland &ement v. &IR
&ommis sione r of Intern al Revenu e v. Ailipin as &ompa Yia de 8eguro s
Case No. 2 G.R. No. 2+*3 (ctoer 29, 19*) Chapter I, Page 3, Footote No. 1
Case No. 7* G.R. No. 14+ (!pr 29, 19*+) Chapter I:, Page 134, Footote No. 41
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2he case involves petitionerDs claim for refund of sales ta3 paid from ovem'er 1/59 to March 1/55, and ad valorem ta3 paid from :pril 1/55 to 8eptem'er 1/5( from the sale of :P Portland cement produced 'y petitioner. 8ince 1/5), however, petitioner had 'een protesting the imposition of the sales ta3 on its :P Portland cement, and on January 1/5, it also protested the payment of the ad valorem ta3es. Petitioner claimed for refund and 'rought its case to the &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals. Petitioner contends that the percentage ta3es collected 'y respondent are refunda'le since under R: 1))/ ;effective June 1/55=, producers of cement are e3empt from the payment of said ta3. 2he &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals ruled otherwise.
Respondent, an insurance company, was engaged in 'usiness as a real estate dealer. R: 1(1) amended the ational Internal Revenue &ode and provided for a scale of graduated rates this too" effect on :ugust of 1/5(. Petitioner assessed against the respondent ta3es ;to which the insurance company has already paid in full on January 1/5(= for the year 1/5( 'ased on R: 1(1). Respondent appealed to the &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals the erroneous assessment of the petitioner and was granted a decision in favor of it. I##%&$
0 R: 1(1) should 'e applied retroactively. I##%&$
hether R: 1))/ applies prospectively or retroactively. '&L$
: statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either 'y the e3press terms of the statute or 'y necessary implication. In every case of dou't, the dou't must 'e resolved against the retrospective effect. hile the purpose of the amendment, as mentioned in the e3planatory note to the 'ill, was not only to accelerate the collection of mining royalties and ad valorem ta3es 'ut also clarify the dou't of the ta3%paying pu'lic on the interpretative scope of the two terms,$ it certainly could not have 'een the intention of the lawma"ers to unsettle previously consummated transactions 'etween the ta3payer and the @overnment. L!"IN M!IM$ 9(a, 9(c, 9(e
'&L$
o. :s a rule, laws have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. 2he rule applies with greater force to the case at 'ar, considering that R: 1(1), which imposes the new and higher ta3es, e3pressly provides that said :ct shall ta"e effect upon its approval. L!"IN M!IM$ 9(a, 9(c, 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
196
>alat'at v. &ourt of :ppeals and Passion
Case No. 14+ G.R. No. 3** (Fer/ar0 1, 1932) Chapter I, Page 31, Footote No. 1
Case No. 29 G.R. No. L-3*37 (a/ar0 27, 1992) Chapter I, Page 3*3, Footote No. 73
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Petitioner committed rape along with icolas
Petitioner has an agricultural land in 8ta. :na, Pampanga containing 1E,9/+ s4uare meters of land owned 'y @arcia. @arcia sold the land to private respondent Pasion and had declared it for ta3ation purposes under 2a3 *eclaration o. 1)(. Private respondent Pasion claims that he will cultivate the land pursuant to 8ec. (;1= of R: E99. However, petitioner maintains that the case should have 'een decided in light of 8ec. 7 of R: (E/ since, in view of the appeal the respondent still does not have the vested right to ac4uire the land.
I##%&$
I##%&F
0 the last paragraph of :rt. 99 of the RP& has retroactive effect.
0 8ec. 7 of R: (E/ should 'e given retroactive effect.
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-es. 2he petition for ha'eas corpus was granted. 2he principle granting to the accused in certain cases an e3ception to the general rule that laws shall not 'e retroactive when the law in 4uestion favors the accused applies. &onscience and good law !ustify this e3ception.
o. :rt. 9 of the &ivil &ode provides that there should 'e no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided 'y law. In order for a law to have a retroactive effect it should have a provision stating its retroactivity, otherwise nothing should 'e understood which is not em'odied in the law. Aurthermore the law is a rule esta'lished to guide our action with no 'inding effect until it is enacted, thus laws have no effect in past times 'ut laws loo" forward in the future.
L!"IN M!IM$ 9E
L!"IN M!IM F )+, 9(', 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
197
People v. eta
8an Jose v. Reha'ilitation Ainance & orp.
Case No. 232 G.R. No. L-714+ (ece6er 22, 19) Chapter :I, Page 2**, Footote No. 72
Case No. 271 G.R. No. L-77** (No8e6er 29, 19) Chapter I, Page 3*9, Footote No. 1+4
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:ppellant was found guilty of violating R: 195 for having collected fees in e3cess of 5C of the amount received 'y the claimant as compensation for services rendered. :t the time the agreement was made the law in force was &.:. o. (75 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5C of any amount that the claimant would collect. 2he tria l court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5C fee on the amount collected was void and illegal.
Plaintiff presented this petition to recover the interest she supposedly has in her pre%war loan with defendant. 2he 'asis of the suit was R: (71 amending R: 9+1, the former law condoning the pre%war loans and the interest corresponding from January 1, 1/9( to March 19, 1/51. 2he lower court decided for defendant to return the interest to the plaintiff. I##%&$
0 the lower court was correct in imposing the return of interest to plaintiff 'y the defendant.
I##%&$
0 R: 195 has a retroactive effect. '&L$ '&L$
o. It does not appear in the language of R: 195 that it should 'e given retroactive effect. 2here is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of R: 195 for it to act on cases under the old law.
-es. R: (71 is made to condone only the unpaid interest. It did not include within its term completed payment and paid interest. here a statute was amended and reenacted, the amendment should 'e construed as if it had 'een included in the original act 'ut it could afford no retroactive effect unless plainly made so 'y the terms of the amendment. L!"IN M!IM$ )+, 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
198
People v. 8umilang Case No. 22* G.R. No. L-4917 (ece6er 1, 194*) Chapter I, Page 371, Footote No. 111
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2he petitioner was convicted of the crime of arson and sentenced to the indeterminate penalty from 5 years and 9 months and )1 days of prision correctional to 1+ years and 1 day of prision mayor. n appeal, 'oth the &: and the 8& affirmed the sentence of the lower court. >ased on the records, a copy of the resolution of the &ourt denying the motion for reconsideration was mailed to the petitionerDs attorney. However, the attorney alleges in his petition that he did not receive the notice 'ecause then he was already hiding in the mountains of
0 the petition to suspend reading of sentence and to file pleading or motion should 'e granted. '&LF
o. It is a well esta'lished rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e3tent. L!"IN M!IM$ 9(e
Palomo >uilding 2enants :ssociation v. Intermediate :ppellate &ourt Case No. 97 G.R. No. L-*+43 (ctoer 31, 194)
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Petitioner filed an action for *eclaration of ullity of 8ale and *amages with Preliminary In!unction 'efore the then &ourt of Airst Instance of Manila against respondents @overnment 8ervice Insurance 8ystem ;@8I8= and &apitol Hills, as principal defendants, and the five ;5= !udges of the then &ity &ourt of Manila in the in!unction aspect of the case. Respondent @8I8 and &apitol Hills filed separate motions to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action and that there are other actions pending 'etween the same parties for the same cause. Respondent !udge granted private respondentsL motion to dismiss. I##%&$
0 the Intermediate :ppellate &ourt ;I:&= erred in sustaining the order of respondent, denying petitionerLs motion for approval of the record on appeal due to failure to amend the record on appeal within the period granted them. '&L$
-es. Petitioners invo"e 8ection / of the Judiciary Reorgani#ation :ct of 1/E+ ;>P 1)/= which dispensed with the record on appeal and claim that herein respondent I:& erred in not applying retrospectively the said law. Ruled in 1lday vs+ /amilon, KVtWhe reorgani#ation having 'een declared to have 'een completed, >P >ig. 1)/ is now in full force and effect. : Record on :ppeal is no longer necessary for ta"ing an appeal. 2he same proviso appears in 8ection 1E of the Interim Rules and @uidelines issued 'y this &ourt on January 11, 1/E. >eing procedural in nature, those provision s may 'e applied retroactively for the 'enefit of petitioners, as appellants. L8tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e3tentL ;People vs+ 'umilang, 77 Phil. 7(9 V1/9(1.W K L!"IN M!IM$ 5a, 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
199
MR&:, Inc. v. &ourt of :ppeals
campo v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 7 G.R. No. **7 (ece6er 19, 199)
Case No. 9 G.R. No. 79*+ (ece6er , 199)
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2he petitioner prays to set aside the decision of the &: affirming the order of the R2& dismissing the complaint for non%payment of the proper filing fees as the prayer of the complaint failed to specify the amounts of moral damages, e3emplary damages, attorneyDs fees and litigation e3penses sought to 'e recovered 'y it from the defendants 'ut left them to the discretion of the Honora'le &ourt.
Petitioner 'egan construction of his house without permit from the owner, while 'eing informed of P.*. 77). Petitioner never showed title to the land he claimed to have purchased. 8ec. 1 of P.*. 77), otherwis e "nown as the :ntiN 84uatting
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0 the petition has merit. '&L$
-es. It is a well esta'lished rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will 'e construed as applica'le to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that e3tent.
I##%&$
1. 0 petitioner is guilty of the crime of s4uatting. ). 0 a motion to dismiss 'ars a petitioner from presenting his evidence.
L!"IN M!IM$ 9(e '&L$
-es on 'oth counts. >y moving to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, petitioner waives his right to present evidence to su'stantiate his defense and in effect su'mits the case for !udgment on the 'asis of the evidence for the prosecution. L!"IN M!IM$ 95a, 9('
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
200
-a"ult Philippines v. &ourt of :ppeals
:ris ;Phil.= Inc. v. ational
Case No. 31 G.R. No. 91* (ctoer , 199+) Chapter I, Page 372, Footote No. 117
Case No. 21 G.R. No. 9++1 (!/g/st , 1991) Chapter I, Page 372, Footote No. 119
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Petitioner argues that the civil action for damages for in!uries arising from alleged criminal negligence, 'eing without malice, cannot 'e filed independently of the criminal action under :rt. of the &ivil &ode.
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of 8ec. 1) of R: (71( to :rt. )) of the
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0 a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed may prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.
0 amendments introduced 'y 8ec. 1) of R: (715 to :rt. )) of the
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-es. 6nder the 1/E5 Rules of &riminal Procedure, the civil action for the recovery of civil lia'ility is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
-es on 'oth counts. 2he provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found un!ustified 'y the la'or ar'iter is a valid e3ercise of the police power of the state, and the contested provision is then a police legislation$. 2he 4uestioned Interim Rules can 'e given retroactive effect for they are procedural or remedial in character.
L!"IN M!IM$ E', 9(e
L!"IN M!IM$ Ea, 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
201
:tlas &onsolidated Mining and *evelopment &o. v. &ourt of :ppeals
@overnment of the Philippine Islands v. Municipality of >inalonan
Case No. 2 G.R. No. L-43+ (Fer/ar0 14, 199+) Chapter I, Page 373, Footote No. 124
Case No. 117 G.R. No. L-243 (ece6er 24, 191) Chapter I, Page 12, Footote No. 44
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Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with &6B&%B
2his is a registration proceedings instituted 'y the *irector of
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I##%&$
hether 8ec. (1 of :ct o. /)( authori#es the institution of compulsory registration proceedings against priv ate owners or whether it is not confined e3clusively to pu'lic lands.
0 P.*. 1)E1 prevails. '&L$
P.*. 1)E1 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application.
:ct o. ))5/ was enacted to remedy the shortcomings of e3isting legislation on the same su'!ect. 2he fact that the new :ct does not e3pressly state that it amends or repeals 8ec. (1 of :ct o. /)( does not necessarily re'ut this conclusion.
L!"IN M!IM$ 5+
L!"IN M!IM$ 9(e
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
202
*evelopment >an" of the Phil. v. &ourt of :ppeals
>riad :gro *evelopment &orp. v. Hon. dela 8erna, and dela &ru#, et al.
Case No. 92 G.R. No. L-2774 (Fer/ar0 2, 19+) Chapter I:, Page 17, Footote No. 199
Case No. 39 G.R. No. 322 (/e 29, 199) Chapter I, Page 37*, Footote No. 13*
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2he >oard of @overnors appropriated money to purchase land for a housing pro!ect for its employees who shall pay for them in monthly installments for )+ years. However, the area sold was then part of a 'igger parcel of land and 'ecause the su'division plan for the area was still pending approval 'y the >ureau of
2he case arose out of a complaint filed 'y 2rade 6nion of the Philippines and :llied 8ervices A26
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0 there is retroactivity of the amendment of 8ec. 1 of R: E5, 'y R: 197.
0 the !urisdiction over money claims is e3clusive to the
'&L$
'&L$
-es. ne of the purposes of &ongress when it enacted R: 197, 'y amending 8ec. 1 of R: E5, was to erase any dou'ts regarding the legality of the ac4uisition 'y the *>P of the 15/ lots from the PHH& for the housing pro!ect which it intended to esta'lish for its employees who did not yet have houses of their own. It is, therefore, a curative statute to render valid the ac4uisition 'y the *>P of the 15/ lots from the PHH&.
2he &ourt held that B.. 111 has the character of a curative law to remedy a defect that attached to the provision su'!ect of the amendment. 2his was clear from the provisoF 2he provisions of :rt. )17 of this &ode notwithstanding?$ 2he intended effect was clearly to ma"e the 8ecretary of
L!"IN M!IM$ 9(e
L!"IN M!IM$ (a, /, +', E', 9(e
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
203
Brectors, Inc. v. ational
8antos v. *uata and the &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 99 G.R. No. 1+421 (Ma0 , 199*) Chapter I, Page 377, Footote No. 14+
Case No. 274 G.R. No. L-2+9+1 (!/g/st 31, 19*) Chapter I, Page 37*, Footote No. 134
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Priv ate respondent was recruit ed to wor" in 8audi :ra'ia as a service contract driver. Months after, another contract was e3ecuted which changed his position into that of a helper0la'orer. hen private respondent returned to the Philippines, he invo"ed his first contract and demanded that petitioner pay the difference 'etween his salary and allowance as indicated in the said contract and the amount actually paid to him, plus his contractual 'onus. Private respondent filed the complaint with the
*uata and :guilar 'ought a parcel of land which su'se4uently 'ecame a 4uarter part of
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0 B.. 7/7 should 'e given retroactive effect and thus divest the
hether 8antos and :guil ar, in e3ecuting the said priv ate document, intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro. '&L$
o. B.. 7/7 is not a curative statute and is therefore not included in the e3ception to the rule on prospectivity.
It is a mortgage. :rt. 1(+) was designed primarily to curtail the evils 'rought a'out 'y contracts of sale with right of repurchase it envisioned contracts of sale with right to repurchase where the real intention of the parties is that the pretended purchase price is money loaned, and in order to secure the payment of the loan, a contract purporting to 'e a pacto de retro sale is drawn up. 8aid article is remedial in nature and can thus 'e applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the ew &ivil &ode.
L!"IN M!IM$ 5, 9(a, 9(c, 9(e
L!"IN M!IM$ Ec, 17, )1, 9(e
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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
204
Municipality of 8an arciso, Sue#on v. Mende#, 8r.
rtigas &o. v. Aeati >an" 2rust
Case No. 12 G.R. No. 1+37+2 (ece6er *, 1994) Chapter I, Page 31, Footote No. 1+
Case No. 193 G.R. No. L-24*7+ (ece6er 14, 1979) Chapter :III, Page 312, Footote No. 133
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President &. @arcia, issued B.. 5 creating the municipal district of 8an :ndres, Sue#on. 2hen 'y virtue of B.. 179, issued 'y President *. Macapagal, the municipal district of 8an :ndres was later officially recogni#ed to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality 'y operation of 8ec. ) of R: 1515. It was then attac"ed of its validity. hile petitioners would grant that the enactment of R: 71(+ may have converted the Municipality of 8an :ndres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition for )uo !arranto had 'een filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had ac4uired a vested right to see" the nullification of B.. 5, and any attempt to apply 8ec. 99) of R: 71(+ to the petitio n would perforce 'e violative of the e4ual protection clause of the &onstitution.
:ppellee 'egan laying the foundation and commenced the construction of a 'uilding on
0 the resolution of the Municipal &ouncil of Mandaluyong declaring
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0 the B.. creating the municipality of 8an :ndres was cured 'y 8ec. 99);d= of R: 71(+.
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-es. 2he de !ure status of the Municipality of 8an :ndres in the province of Sue#on must 'e conceded. 8ec. 99);d= of the <@& of 1//1, which provides that municipal districts organi#ed pursuant to presidential issuances or e3ecutives orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth 'e considered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities 'y e3ecutive orders which had 'een held to 'e an invalid usurpation of legislative power.
2he trial court held that the su'!ect restrictions were su'ordinate to Municipal Resolution o. )7. It upheld the classification 'y the Municipal &ouncil of the area along B*8: :venue as a commercial and industrial #one, and held that the same rendered Kineffective and unenforcea'leK the restrictions in 4uestion as against defendant. Resolution o. )7 was passed in the valid e3ercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. Bven if the su'!ect 'uilding restrictions were assumed 'y the defendant as vendee of
L!"IN M!IM$ 9(e, (c
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 9(e
'&L$
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
205
>illones v. &ourt of Industrial Relations
Philippine ational >an" v. :suncion
Case No. 3 G.R. No. L-17** (/0 3+, 19*) Chapter I, Page 372, Footote No. 119
Case No. 237 G.R. No. L-4*+9 (No8e6er 23, 1977) Chapter , Page 37, Footote No. 3
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Petitioners were allegedly employees of
n January 1/(, Philippine ational >an" ;P>= granted Aa'ar Incorporated a loan secured 'y !oint signatures of Jose >arredo, &armen and 2omas >orromeo and Manuel >arredo. >y May, 1/77 the outstanding 'alance was over PE million. P> filed a case against all 9 signatories. However, 'efore the case was decided, Manuel >arredo passed away. 2he case was dismissed pursuant to 8ec. (, Rule E( of the Rules of &ourt that the claim of P> should 'e filed with the estate proceedings of M. >arredo and cannot 'e 'rought against other surviving de'tors.
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0 8ec. 7%: of &.:. o. 199, as amended 'y R: 1// to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this :ct shall 'e commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued otherwise it shall 'e 'arred forever.
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It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced 'efore the effective date of this act shall not 'e affected 'y the period prescri'ed. :s the statute shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the si3 years from their accrual. 2he court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. >ecause the statute shortened the period within which to 'ring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claims were in!uriously affected there'y should have a reasona'le period of one year from the time the new statute too" effect within which to sue on such claims.
o. :rt. 1)1( of the ew &ivil &ode gives the creditor the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary de'tors, or some, or all$. 2hus, the choice is left up to P> to decide. 8ec. ( of Rule E( simply provides the procedure if in case the creditor desires to go against the deceased de'tor. 2o re4uire P> to go against the estate would deprive P> of his su'stantive rights provided 'y :rt. 1)1(. In this case, the Rules of &ourt may not prevail over :rt. 1)1( 'ecause su'stantive law cannot 'e amended 'y a procedural rule. Moreover, the 1/E7 &onstitution states that rules promulgated 'y the 8upreme &ourt should not diminish, increase of modify su'stantive rights.
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 9(e
0 the &ourts interpretation of 8ec. (, Rule E( prevents a creditor from proceeding against the surviving solidary de'tors is accurate.
L!"IN M!IM$ /a, /c
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
206
ngsia"o v. @am'oa
:mandy v. People
Case No. 9+ G.R. No. L-1*7 (!pr , 19+)
Case No. 7 G.R. No. 79+1+ (Ma0 23, 19)
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In 1/9(, ngsia"o ;landowner= and @am'oa ;tenant= entered into a contract pursuant of 8ec. E of :ct 9+59. 2his act provided that the palay would 'e divided e4ually 'y the ) parties. However, later that same year, :ct 9+59 was amended 'y R: 9. *uring li4uidation, @am'oa sought application of the amendatory law which provided for crop division on a 55%95 'asis in favor of the tenants. ngsia"o insists that R: 9 is not remedial in nature and therefore cannot 'e given retroactive effect. >ecause of this, the original contract starting an e4ual sharing of profits should 'e followed.
Petitioner was arrested and tried for possession of 1.( grams of mari!uana. >ecause he pleaded guilty in his trial, he was given a sentence of si3 years and 1 day ;the minimum time for his offense=. Petitioner then filed for pro'ation alleging P.*. /(E. However, the petition was denied 'ecause P.*. 1//+ had repealed P.*. /(E, no longer permitting petitioner to fall under those eligi'le for pro'ation.
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'&L$
0 R: 9 is remedial in nature and should 'e given retroactive effect. '&L$
-es. In the past, laws concerning this issue have 'een amended with the intent of 'eing remedial and therefore, producing retroactive effect. Moreover, it is clearly shown in the recommendation of the President concerning R: 9 that this 'ill see"s to amend the Rice 8hare 2enancy :ct in such a way to ma"e the division of the crops more e4uita'le to the tenants? 2he principal feature of this 'ill is to increase the participation of the tenants in the production of the land he is cultivating.$ L!"IN M!IM$ )a, (', /a, 9/
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0 the lower court erred in disapproving :mandyDs petition for pro'ation.
o. 2he law clearly declares who are entitled to pro'ation and who arenDt. Petitioner does not fall under those entitled 'ecause those who have 'een sentenced to serve a ma3imum term of more than si3 years$ are e3cluded from the 'enefits of the Pro'ation
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
207
Parras v.
*iu v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. 197 G.R. No. L-1*+11 (/0 2*, 19*+) Chapter , Page 39+, Footote No. 1*
Case No. 9* G.R. No. 11213 (ece6er 19, 199) Chapter , Page 391, Footote No. 2
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Petitioner was re4uired 'y the
n several occasions, private respondent Pag'a purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from petitionersL store all valued at P7,E().55. Private respondents failed to pay despite repeated demands. Petitioners 'rought the matter 'efore the >arangay &hairman and the latter set the case for hearing, 'ut private respondents failed to appear. hen the parties met, they failed to reach an amica'le settlement. Private respondents in their :nswer, while admitting inde'tedness, interposed two counterclaimsF ;1= for P(,))7.++ as alleged e3penses for maintenance and repair of the 'oat 'elonging to petitioners, and ;)= another for P1),++++.++ representing the cost of the two tires which petitioners allegedly misappropriated.
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1. 0 petitioner can 'e e3empted. ). 0 the law states that persons will 'e made to pay for the pu'lication.
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0 parties did not meet in presence of a Pang"at as re4uired 'y law.
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Petitioner was made to pay. 2he law that petitioner relies on was 8ec. 119 of :ct 9/(. 2he reenactment of the same law as R: 117 did not include the said provision of :ct 9/(.
Petitio n was granted without pre!udice to the re%filing of the case 'y petitioners after due compliance with the provisions of P.*. 15+E, otherwise "nown as the KOatarungang Pam'arangay
L!"IN M!IM$ 11, ), E'
L!"IN M!IM$ 9, 5', /a, ('
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
208
@overnment v. 8pringer
Mecano v. &ommission on :udit
Case No. 119 G.R. No. L-2*979 (!pr 1, 1927) Chapter I, Page 3, Footote No. 1**
Case No. 17* G.R. No. 1+392 (ece6er 11, 1992) Chapter , Page 39, Footote No. 4
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2he ational &oal &ompany elected its 'oard of directors via vote in accordance with its 'y%laws. However, the respondents are stated as usurping and illegally occupying said positions since they were not elected 'y the proper shareholders. 2he ational &oal &ompany was formed 'y the Philippine @overnment. 2he @overnment intended to retain a ma!ority sta"e in the said company however, it ended up occupying almost /+C of the stoc". *uring the election of directors, three mem'ers of the government appeared, two from the legislative and one from the e3ecutive.
Petitioner see"s to nullify the decision of the &ommission on :udit ;&:= em'odied in its Bndorsement denying his claim for reim'ursement under 8ec. (// of the Revised :dministrative &ode ;R:&=, as amended. Petitioner is a *irector II of the ational >ureau of Investigation ;>I=. He was hospitali#ed for cholecystitis from March )( to :pril 7, 1//+, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitali#ation e3penses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the &:. However, the reim'ursement process was stalled 'ecause of the issue that the R:& 8ec. (// was repealed 'y the :dministrative &ode of 1/E7. I##%&$
1. 0 petitioner can claim from the &:. ). 0 8ec. (// of R:& was repealed 'y the :dministrative &ode of 1/E7.
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0 the e3ecutive is the sole administrator of the Philippine @overnment. '&L$
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-es. 8ec. 9 of :ct o. )7+5, as amended 'y 8ec. ) of :ct o. )E)), as purports to vest the voting power of the government%owned stoc" in the ational &oal &ompany in the President of the 8enate and the 8pea"er of the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional and void.
Petition was granted. 2he 4uestion of whether or not petitioner can claim from &: is rooted on whether or not 8ec. (// of the R:& has 'een repealed. 2he &ourt finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the :dministrative &ode of 1/E7 is merely under implied repeal, and the &ourt considers such implied repeal as not favora'le. :lso the &ourt finds that laws must 'e in accord with each other. 2he second sentence of :rt. 17 of the
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, /a, +a, E'
L!"IN M!IM$ +a, ), 7, E', 9/
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
209
&hin :h Aoo and -ee 8hee v. &oncepcion and
-nchausti &o v. 8tanley
Case No. 2+ G.R. No. 3321 (March 31, 193+)
Case No. 174 G.R. No 1233+ (a/ar0 2, 1917)
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2he accused, one &han 8am, was ac4uitted of murder 'ut was ordered to 'e committed to an asylum. 2he court permitted accused to leave the hospital two years later on the strength of doctorDs reports. In issuing the order of release the respondent !udge relied upon :rt. E, par. 9, of the Penal &ode. n the other hand, 8ec. 1+9E of the :dministrative &ode confers on the *irector of Health the authority to say when a patient may 'e discharged from an insane asylum.
2he petitioner, a company engaged in the coastwise shipping 'usiness, sought to prohi'it the Insular &ollector of &ustoms from enforcing the re4uirement, which states that coastwise vessels shall carry third mate as one of the officers on each vessel. 2he petitioner relied upon the ground that :ct o. )(19 was not and could not have 'een repealed 'y the :dministrative &ode :ct o. )(19 'eing specific with regard to the management of Philippine vessels.
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0 the court which ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum possesses the power to permit said insane person su'se4uently to leave the asylum without the approval of the *irector of Health.
0 there is a conflict 'etween :ct o. )(19 and paragraph ;e= of 8ec. 11) of the :dministrative &ode. '&LF
'&LF
It is a well%"nown rule of statutory construction that when there is no e3press repeal, none is presumed to 'e intended.
2here is no e3press repeal of :ct o. )(19. It is apparent that there was no specific intention to repeal the statute. 2he Philippine
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
210
6.8. v. 2antoco
Aa'ros, et al. v.
Case No. 1*4 G.R. No. 1133 (!/g/st 1, 191*)
Case No. 44 G. R. No. 7+32 (ece6er 1, 197)
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2he defendant was charged with having illegally in his possession and under his control a certain amount of opium. 2he trial court dismissed the complaint on the theory that :ct o. )E1 and all other laws had 'een repealed 'y the :ct of the 6nited 8tates &ongress. 2he @overnment appealed.
2his is a consolid ated case involving the allocation of the incremental proceeds of authori#ed tuition fee increases of private schools provided for in 8ec. ;a= of P.*. 951, and thereafter, under the Bducation :ct of 1/E) ;>P ))=. 2hen Minister of Bducation Jaime &.
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hat the effect of said :ct was upon local legislation dealing with the su'!ect of opium. '&L$
2hat the 6nited 8tates &ongress did not intend to repeal any of the local laws dealing with the su'!ect of opium appears from the law itself. hether or not an :ct is impliedly repealed is a 4uestion of legislative intent to 'e ascertained 'y an e3amination of 'oth statutes, and in the light of the reason, purpose, and o'!ect of 'oth. 2he 6nited 8tates &ongress never intended to rela3 the stringent provisions relating to the smo"ing of opium or to its use in any of its forms whatever. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 9/
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0 >P )) has repealed P.*. 951 which there'y ma"es MB&8 rder o. )5 valid. '&L$
-es. 6nder P.*. 951, the authority to regulate the imposition of tuition and other school fees or charges 'y private schools is lodged with the 8ecretary of Bducation and &ulture, where 8ec. 9) of >P )) li'erali# ed the procedure 'y empowering each private school to determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges. P.*. 951 provides that (+C of the incremental proceeds of tuition fee increases shall 'e applied or used to augment the salaries and wages of mem'ers of the faculty and other employees of the school while >P )) provides that the increment shall 'e applied or used in accordance with the regulations promulgated 'y the MB&8. Hence, there was a repeal. L!"IN M!IM$ 9, /'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
211
Iloilo Palay and &orn Planters :ssociation, Inc. v. Aeliciano
>rias de &oya v. 2an
Case No. 127 G.R. No. L-24+22 (March 3, 19*) Chapter , Page 399, Footote No. *1
Case No. 1* G.R. No. 3+7* (#epte6er 22, 1931)
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Private respondent Aeliciano, the &hairman and @eneral Manager of the Rice and &orn :dministration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the ational Bconomic &ouncil as em'odied in its Resolution o. 7+, series of 1/(9. It was approved. 2he President designated the Rice and &orn :dministration as the government agency authori#ed to underta"e the importation pursuant to which &hairman Aeliciano announced an invitation to 'id for said importation and set the 'idding date. Petitioners contend that the importation is contrary to R: 95) which prohi'its the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same.
*efendant%appellant 2an
0 the mortgage given 'y respondent to petitioner was valid and legal considering the fact that the assignee recorded his appointment after the transfer has 'een made.
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0 R: ))+7 was repealed 'y R: 95). '&L$
2he importation may 'e illegal on the ground that such importation 'elong e3clusively to private parties, there'y prohi'iting any government agency from doing so. R: ))+7 provides that should there 'e an e3isting or imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified 'y the ational Bconomic &ouncil, the President may authori#e such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. 2he two laws, although with a common o'!ective, refer to different methods applica'le to different circumstances. 2he two laws can therefore 'e construed as harmonious parts of the legislative e3pression of its policy to promote a rice and corn program. In order to effect a repeal 'y implication, the latter statute must 'e irreconcila'ly inconsistent and repugnant to the prior e3isting law, hence there was no repeal. L!"IN M!IM$ E', /a
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2he Insolvency
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
212
illegas vs. 8u'ido
Jalandoni vs. Bndaya
Case No. 314 G.R. No. L-31711, (#epte6er 3+, 1971) Chapter , Page 411, Footote No.9*
Case No. 137 G.R. No. L-2394, (a/ar0 24, 1974) Chapter , Footote No. *2
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2he 8ecretary of Ainance authori#ed Jose R. @loria of the ffice of the &ity 2reasurer of Manila to assume the duties of :ssistant &ity 2reasurer. In an :dministrative rder, series of 1/(E, Petitioner, Mayor of the &ity of Manila, directed @loria to desist and refrain from e3ercising the duties and functions of the :ssistant &ity 2reasurer, saying that Romualde# is not empowered to ma"e such designation. Petitioner, appointed Manuel *.
Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for li'el against a 8erafin &ru# in the Municipal &ourt of >atangas presided over 'y the Respondent Judge. *uring the hearing of the li'el case &ru#, through counsel manifested in open court that under :rt. (+ of the Revised Penal &ode, ;the court of first instance of the province or city where the li'elous article is printed and first pu'lished or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense=, Respondent Judge was devoid of !urisdiction to do so. 2here was, as noted, a negative response. Respondent still tried the case. I##%&$
0 Municipal &ourt of >atangas has !urisdiction over case at hand. I##%&$
0 the *ecentrali#ation
o. It has 'een the constant holding of this court that repeals 'y implication are not favored and will not 'e so declared unless it 'e manifest that the legislature so intended. 8uch a doctrine goes as far 'ac" as 6nited 8tates v. Reyes, a 1/+E decision. It is necessary then 'efore such a repeal is deemed to e3ist that it 'e shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same su'!ect matter and that the latter 'e inconsistent with the former. : su'se4uent statute, general in character as to its terms and application, is not to 'e construed as repealing a special or specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. L!"IN M!IM$ 1, /, 5+
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o. :s is clear from his well%written memorandum, he did 'ase his action on what for him was the conse4uence of the Judiciary :ct as amended 'y R: E)E, 8ec. E7 of which would confer concurrent !urisdiction on municipal !udges in the capital of provinces with court of first instance where the penalty provided for 'y law does not e3ceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than si3 years or fine not e3ceeding si3 thousand pesos or 'oth.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
213
&IR vs. Rio 2u'a ic"el Mining &orporation.
alde# v. 2ua#on
Case No. 79 G.R. Nos. 33-4 #epte6er 3+, 1991 Chapter , Page 4++, Footote No.*4
Case No. 111 G.R. No. L-1497 (March 1*, 192+) Chapter , Page 3, Footote No. 9
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Respondent &orporation filed with the &ommissioner of Internal Revenue two separate written claims for refund in the amounts of P/79,/7E.5+ and P9)9,+., respectively, representing )5C of the specific ta3es collected on the refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor fuel and diesel fuel oils that it had utili#ed in its operations as a mining concessionaire, using R: 195 as 'asis. 2he &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals decided that Respondent &orporation can no longer claim this due to P.*. )1, 9( and 711.
2his is a petition for divorce filed 'y petitioner against his respondent wife. :ct o. )71+ states that a petition of divorce due to adultery or concu'inage cannot 'e granted e3cept upon conviction. 2he respondent has never 'een convicted of the offense of adultery. Petitioner contends that he is entitled to divorce 'ased on prevailing laws 'efore the enactment of :ct o. )71+. I##%&$
0 :ct o. )71+ should 'e applied in the case. I##%&$
0 Repu'lic :ct o. 195 ;:n :ct 2o Provide Means of Increasing the Highway 8pecial Aund= or certain provisions thereof have 'een repealed 'y su'se4uent statutes. '&L$
-es. e find that the disputed proviso found in 8ec. 5 of R: 195 was drafted to favor a particular group of ta3payers%the miners and the lum'ermen%'ecause it was KunfairK to su'!ect them to the increased rates and in effect ma"e them su'sidi#e the construction of highways from which they did not directly 'enefit. @iven the present concept of the general fund and its wide application, then the proviso in 8ec. 5 of R: 195 has truly 'ecome an anachronism. It is inevita'le that, sooner or later, the miners will stand to 'enefit from any of the government endeavors and it will no longer 'e correct to asseverate that the imposition of the increased rates in specific ta3es to augment the general fund for government underta"ings is KunfairK to the miners 'ecause they are not directly convenienced. hile we generally do not favor repeal 'y implication, it cannot 'e denied that situations can and do arise wherein we are left with no other alternative 'ut to concede the point that an earlier law has 'een impliedly repealed or revo"ed 'y a later law 'ecause of an o'vious inconsistency. L!"IN M!IM$ 9/
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:ct o. )71+ should 'e applied. Bven if the said :ct has no repealing clause, when there is a plain and unavoida'le repugnancy 'etween two laws, the later must 'e given effect. egative statutes are mandatory, and must 'e presumed to have 'een intended as a repeal of all conflicting provisions. 2he situation in this case does not re4uire the application of any of the artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the statute is so plain that its meaning is unmista"a'le. L!"IN M!IM$ 7a, 9/
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
214
Bstate of Mota v. &oncepcion
2orrente v. @rove
Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-341 (March 31, 1932)
Case No. 1 G.R. No. L-234+ (ece6er 21, 19+)
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In 1/1/,
2his case is an appeal from a ha'eas corpus proceeding, discharging the petitioner from detention. It is alleged that the order of arrest is illegal on its face in that the Justice of the Peace had no !urisdiction to issue the order directing the ma"ing of an arrest outside the Province of &e'u. It is contended that the arrest and detention of petitioner, were illegal and void. I##%&$
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1. 0 a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid. ). 0 enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission.
0 the Justice of the Peace can issue an order of arrest wherever he may 'e in the Philippines. '&L$
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1. :ccording to 8tandard il &o. vs. &astro, 8ec. 1/9 of the :dministrative &ode clearly recogni#es the validity of such a contract 'etween the contracting parties. ). 2he election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. 8erra foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the railway. L!"IN M!IM$ 1
6nder the provision of 8ec. 1 of @.. o. 5E, a !ustice of the peace is vested with authority to issue a lawful order of arrest, wherever he may 'e in the Philippines. *ue to contrary provisions, the general order has impliedly repealed the 8panish law. 2he contention of the petitioner that :ct o. 5/ is a proof that the &ivil &ommission deemed it necessary to ma"e an e3press grant of such authority and that they were of opinion that prior to the pu'lication of the said law the processes of the !ustices of the peace did not run throughout the province, much less the archipelago. 2he court however said that the opinion of the law ma"ing authority as to the meaning and effect of the law does not determine what the law actually is, it is entitled to respectful consideration, 'ut it is not conclusive on the courts. L!"IN M!IM$ 9, 9/
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
215
Pamil v. 2eleron
People v. :lmuete
Case No. 19 G.R. No. L-344 (No8e6er 2+, 197) Chapter I, Page 33, Footote No. 14
Case No. 2++ G.R. No. L-2*1 (Fer/ar0 27, 197*) Chapter I:, Page 142, Footote No. *1
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Respondent Ar. @on#aga was elected and proclaimed municipal mayor of :l'u4uer4ue, >ohol. 2he petitioner, himself an aspirant for the office, filed for @on#agaDs dis4ualification 'ased on 8ec. )175 of the :dministrative &ode which stated that in no case can ecclesiastics 'e elected to a municipal office.
:lmuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of 8ec. / of the :gricultural 2enancy
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0 an ecclesiastic is eligi'le to 'e elected.
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0 pre%threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. '&L$
2he vote was indecisive. 8even 'elieved 8ec. )175 was no longer operative. Aive 'elieved that the prohi'ition was not tainted with any constitutional infirmity. 2hough the five were a minority, the votes of the seven were insufficient to render the provision ineffective, hence it was presumed valid. @on#aga was ordered to vacate the mayoralty. ssetg #e8e$ 2he challenged provision was superseded 'y the 1/5 &onstitution, the supreme law, which mandated that no religious test shall 'e re4uired for the e3ercise of political rights. 8ec. )175 was also repealed 'y the Blection &ode for ecclesiastics are no longer included in the enumeration of ineligi'le persons. :lso, legislation that intends to repeal all former laws upon the su'!ect shows the legislative intent to repeal the former statutory law. Mor F8e$ Aor a later provision to repeal a prior one there must 'e such a'solute repugnance 'etween the two. o such repugnance is discerni'le. 8ec. )175 has neither 'een repealed nor superseded. 2he section also admitted no e3ception, therefore there can 'e none. 2he &ourt cannot rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. L!"IN M!IM$ ssetg #e8e$ /a, +a, ), 9/
Mor F8e$ (c, 7a, 7c, 7, 9
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8ec. / was impliedly repealed 'y the :gricultural
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
216
8mith >ell &o. v. Municipality of am'oanga
Case No. 14 G.R. No. L-3331 (ece6er 2+, 193+)
Case No. 71 G.R. No. L-32979-1 (Fer/ar0 29, 1972)
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Municipality of am'oanga imposed upon the plaintiff a license fee for its machine for the 'aling of hemp in accordance with rdinance o. ))(. Plaintiff paid the license fee under protest and contended that defendant had no authority to impose such ta3 and that the ordinance in 4uestion is null and void. 2he defendant argues that the latter has no power to levy the ta3 in 4uestion under 8ec. )()5;d= of the :dministrative &ode 'ut it does have such power under a su'se4uent enactment of :ct o. 9)).
Petitioner contends that 'y the enactment of R: )(77 amending 8ec. 1;a= and 19 of &.:. o. 19(, !urisdiction to control rates of airships was ta"en away from the &ivil :eronautics >oard ;&:>= and re%vested in the Pu'lic 8ervice &ommission ;P8&= since R: )(77 impliedly repealed R: 77( which conferred to the &:> the power of control over air rates and fares. n the other hand, respondents argue that !urisdiction over air fares and rates were, under 'oth statutes, e3ercisa'le concurrently 'y the &:> and the P8&.
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0 :ct o. 9)) repealed 8ec. )()5;d= the :dministrative &ode.
hether the authority to fi3 air carrierDs rates is vested in the &:> or in the P8&.
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Repeals 'y implication are not favored. If the legislature intended its repeal, it would have made specific reference in the repealing clause as it did in e3pressly repealing 8ec. )9+7 of the :dministrative &ode. : general affirmative act will not 'e construed to repeal a special or local statute unless the intention is manifest.
:uthority to fi3 air carrierDs rates is vested in 'oth the &:> and the P8&. 6nder R: 77(, the &:> can fi3 and determine reasona'le individual, !oint or special rates charges or fares for air carriers 'ut is su'!ect to the ma3imum rates on freights and passengers that may 'e set 'y the P8& under R: )(77. Aurthermore, implied repeal of statutes is not favored.
L!"IN M!IM F 7, 5+
L!"IN M!IM F 7, E'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
217
illegas v. Bnrile
illegas v. 8u'ido
Case No. 171 G.R. No. L-2927 (March 31, 1973)
Case No. 172 G.R. No. L-24+12 L- 24+4+ (!/g/st 9, 19*)
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It is the contention of the petitioner that if 8ec.9 of the *ecentrali#ation :ct 'e given effect, then the authority to appoint a &ity Aiscal is not lodged in respondent 8ecretary of Justice 'ut in him as Mayor of the &ity of Manila. 2he defense of the respondents on the other hand is the continuing effectivity of the provision of the &harter of the &ity of Manila, which negates the assumption of authority on the part of the petitioner.
2he &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice claims that R: ))(+ impliedly repealed R: 557and 9+/ providing for the removal and suspension of policemen. 2he &ity Mayor was ordered to cease from deciding administrative cases of officers and employees in Manila and su'mit to the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice all pending disciplinary cases. I##%&
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0 the *ecentrali#ation :ct impliedly repealed the provision of the &harter of the &ity of Manila.
0 R: ))(+ impliedly repeal R: 557 and 8ec. )) of R: 9+/ so as to vest in the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice the e3clusive and original !urisdiction to remove, suspend and separate policemen and employees of the &ity of Manila in the competitive service.
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o. 2he issue in this case was already decided in previous !urisprudence in the case of illegas v. 8u'ido. Aurthermore, petitioner ignored the provision that the &ity Aiscal is not included in the enumeration made in the *ecentrali#ation :ct. L!"IN M!IM F )a, 5a, 7
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o. R: ))(+ states that the removal and suspension 'y the &ity Mayor can 'e passed upon or reviewed 'y the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice. It does not state that the power of removal is conferred to the other 'ody. R: 557 and 9+/ are special laws covering specific situations of policemen and employees of the &ity of Manila, R: 557 and 9+/ su'sists side%'y%side with R: ))(+ and are not impliedly repealed 'y the latter which is a general law. R: ))(+ contemplates appeal from the decision of the &ity Mayor to the &ommissioner of &ivil 8ervice, instead of to the President. Repeal 'y implication is not favored and if two laws can 'e reconcil ed, the construction will 'e against such repeal. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, E', 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
218
6.8. v. Palacio
Marin v. acianceno
Case No. 3+1 G.R. No. 11++2 (a/ar0 17, 191*) Chapter , Page 4+*, Footote No. 77
Case No. 171 G.R. No. 939 (March 29, 1911) Chapter , Page 411, Footote No. 1++
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Respondent was accused of violating 8ec. E7 of :ct o. E) when he willfully omitted from the ta3 lists real property which he "nows to 'e lawfully ta3a'le. He posits that :ct o. ))E repeals 'y implication :ct o. E) 'ecause of the clause in 8ec. 1E that states all acts or parts of :cts in conflict therewith are repealed.$
Aelisa Hernande# died 'efore the testatri3, 'ut the testatri3 did not alter her will in respect to this legacy after the death of the legatee. 2he petitioners are the surviving heirs of the devisee who relies upon 8ec. 75E of the &ode of &ivil Procedure which provides that hen a devise or a legacy is made to a child? and the devisee or legatee dies 'efore the testator, leaving issues? such issue shall ta"e the estate so given as the devisee or legatee would have done? unless a different disposition is re4uired 'y law.$ 2he e3ecutor of the will opposes the payment upon the ground that such legatee had no interest therein, having died 'efore the testator so as to pass to the heirs.
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0 :ct o. ))E had repealed the penal effect of :ct o. E). '&L$
o. :ct o. ))E had done nothing 'ut to change the method and procedure provided in :ct o. E). Repeals 'y implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that such is the intention of the legislature. :ct o. ))E provides no penalty thus, 8ec. E7 of :ct o. E) continues in force. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, E'
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0 the heirs of Aelisa Hernande# 'ecome the heir to her legacy after her death even if the testator did not alter her will. '&L$
-es. 2he construction 'y the respondent would repeal or annul the section a'solutely. It is tantamount to saying that the legislature enacted a law and repealed it at the same time. If petitioners are not entitled to the payment of this legacy, then 8ec. 75E would have no value and might as well have never 'een written which is an a'surd interpretation. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 11
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
219
elunta v. &hief, Philippine &onsta'ulary
Pacis v. :veria
Case No. 3+9 G.R. No. L-71 (a/ar0 2+, 19) Chapter , Page 412, Footote No. 1+2
Case No. 194 G.R. No. L-222* (No8e6er 29, 19**) Chapter , Page 413, Footote No. 1+
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Petitioner as patrolman and mem'er of the Integrated ational police ;IP= apprehended a motorcycle driver for violation of traffic rules. :n altercation occurred which resulted in the shooting and death of the driver
Petitioner, the :cting &ollector of &ustoms, commenced a sei#ure and forfeiture proceedings pursuant to the 2ariff and &ustoms &ode referring to the incident wherein sailors were wounded in a chase for 'oat loaded with unta3ed cigarettes. n the same day, Marges, the alleged 'oat owner, filed a &ivil &ase for replevin alleging that the 'oat was stolen. 2he fishing 'oat therein was transferred to the Provincial 8heriff, and later on to Marges as commanded 'y respondent Hon. :veria.
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0 the &ourt Martial has !urisdiction.
3.
9. '&L$
-es. It is specifically stated under B.. 1+1) that it is only the operational supervision and direction$ over all units of the IP that was transferred from the &onsta'ulary to the city0municipal government. 6nder B.. 1+9+, it is the e3ercise of administrative control and supervision$ over units of the IP that was transferred to the President. 2he allegation that P.*. 1E5+ has 'een e3pressly repealed 'y clear and precise provision of B.. 1+9+ is inaccurate. Repeals 'y implication are not favored and will not 'e so declared unless the intent of the legislators in manifested. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, )+c, )7, 7
0 Marges could recover the fishing 'oat. 0 Provincial 8heriff may 'e held in contempt for failure to comply with the writ.
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1. o. 2he !urisdiction of the &ollector of &ustoms is provided for in R: 1/7 which too" effect much later than the Judiciary :ct. It is a3iomatic that the later law prevails over the prior statute. ). -es. 2he writ was received 'y respondent 8heriff. It has also caught the 8upreme &ourtDs notice that respondent sheriff has practically ta"en the cudgels for the 'oat owner. He went 'eyond his official acts and proceeded to espouse the cause of the 'oat owner giving impression that his interest in the su'!ect is more than !ust the interest of a pu'lic official. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, )+c, 9/
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
220
Herman v. Radio &orporation of the Philippines
Philippine ational >an" v. &ru#, et al.
Case No. 123 G.R. No. 2*+2 (/0 1, 1927) Chapter , Page 414, Footote No. 1+7
Case No. 239 G.R. No. +93 (ece6er 1, 199) Chapter , Page 414, Footote No. 1+
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2wo Philippine corporation attempting to develop the commercial radio 'usiness ;Aar Bastern Radio Inc. and Radio &orp.= agreed to merge. 2he petitioner herein has 'een largely interested in the respondent corporation, and in consideration of the cancelled contract for his services to the respondent, it was agreed in the contract of merger that he should 'e offered the post of manager of the traffic department.
:ggregate Mining B3ponents ;:MBG= suffered huge financial losses and was una'le to pay its remaining employees. 2wo years after, :MBG entered into an operation contract agreement with 2.M. 8an :ndres *evelopment &orporation, thus ena'ling the latter to ac4uire on lease the e4uipment of :MBG. 2he unpaid wor"ers filed for monetary compensation 'efore the
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0 HermanDs claim for salary has 'een e3pressly waiv ed in the final agreement. '&L$
-es. In 8ec. of the &ode of &ivil Procedures, it mentions that whenever a party has, 'y his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally or deli'erately led another to 'elieve a particular thing is true and to act upon such 'elief, he cannot 'e permitted to falsify it. 8ec. 1E15 of the &ivil &ode also does not apply since the transaction was more than a compromise. 2he &ode of &ivil Procedures must prevail 'ecause it is a later e3pression of legislative will than :rt. 1E15 of the &ivil &ode. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 9/
I##%&$
0 :rt. 11+ of the
o. :rt. 11+ of the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
221
*avid v. &ommission on Blections
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt of :ppeals
Case No. G.R. No. 12711* (!pr , 1997) Chapter , Page 413, Footote No. 1+
Case No. 73 G.R. No. 9+22 (March 23, 1992) Chapter :II, Page 3++, Footote No. 1
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>arangay &hairman :le3 *avid raised the 4uestion of when the 'arangay elections should 'e held and 4uestions the &MB
2his is a petition to reverse the *ecision ordering the refund of the @&< Retirement Plan representing the withholding ta3 on income. R: 9/17 e3empted the @&< Retirement Plan, including all the retirement 'enefits given to officials and employees of private firms, from income ta3. 8oon after, P.*. 1/5/ was promulgated a'olishing the e3emption from withholding ta3 of interest on 'an" deposits previously given 'y P.*. 17/ if the recipient of the interest is e3empt from income ta3ation. 2he @&< Plan is one of those e3empted from income ta3 under R: 9/17. Petitioner contends that P.*. 1/5/ impliedly repealed the provisions of R: 9/17 and R: 1/E, and that @&< Plan is su'!ect to the final withholding ta3.
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1. hat the term of office of 'arangay officials is. ). 0 there was a violation of :rt. 1+, 8ec. E of the &onstitution.
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1. It is 'asic in cases of irreconcila'le conflict 'etween two laws that the later legislative enactment prevails. Aurthermore, the 8upreme &ourt in Paras v+ /3M5/ had the opportunity to mention when the ne3t 'arangay election should 'e when it stated that the ne3t regular election involving the 'arangay office is 'arely 7 months away, the same having 'een scheduled in May 1//7$. ). o. :rt. 1+, 8ec. E of the &onstitution provides that, 2he term of office of elective local officials, e3cept 'arangay officials, which shall 'e determined 'y law, shall 'e three years?$ It is not to 'e construed as prohi'iting a %year term of office for 'arangay officials. L!"IN M!IM$
0 @&< Retirement Plan retains its ta3 e3emption after the promulgation of P.*. 1/5/. '&L$
-es. 2he deletion in P.*. 1/5/ of the provisions regarding ta3 e3emption under the old law canDt 'e deemed to 'e applica'le to the employeesD trusts. P.*. 1/5/ is a general law, hence, it canDt repeal a specific provision impliedly. It is "nown in statutory construction that a su'se4uent statute that is general in character canDt 'e construed as repealing a special or specific enactment unless there is a legislative manifestation of such effect. :lso in illegas v. 8u'ido, such rule is upheld even if the provisions of the latter legislation are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act.
1, /a, )+a, 9/
L!"IN M!IM$ 1, 5a, 9, 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
222
People v.
Philippine :irlines Inc. v. ational
Case No. 1+ G.R. No. 1+72-2* (#epte6er 2, 199)
Case No. 11 G.R. No. 1143+7 (/0 , 199)
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2he Provincial Prosecutor of ccidental Mindoro filed two separate information for violation of P.*. 77), also "nown as :nti%84uatting
Private respondent Bdil'erto &astro was hired as manifesting cler" 'y petitioner P:<. Respondent was apprehended 'y government authorities while a'out to 'oard a flight en route to Hong"ong in violation of &entral >an" ;&>= &ircular )(5, as amended 'y &> &ircular E, in relation to 8ec. 9 of R: )(5, as amended. P:< placed &astro on preventive suspension for grave misconduct. 2hree years and si3 months after his suspension, P:< issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of the offense charged 'ut nonetheless reinstated the latter. 2he said resolution li"ewise re4uired respondent to affi3 his signature therein to signify his full conformity to the action ta"en 'y P:<. 6pon his reinstatement, respondent filed a claim against P:< for 'ac"wages and salary increases granted under the collective 'argaining agreement ;&>:= covering the period of his suspension. I##%&F
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0 responded !udge acted in grave a'use of discretion in dismissing the su'!ect criminal case.
0 &astro is entitled to 'ac"wages and salary increases granted under the &>: during his period of suspension. '&L F
'&LF
-es. 2he :nti%84uatting law en!oys the presumption of constitutionality. 6nless otherwise repealed 'y a su'se4uent law or ad!udged unconstitutional 'y this court, a law will always 'e presumed valid. :t the time the order was issued 'y respondent !udge, P.*. 77) was still effective. either has this court declared its unconstitutionality, notwithstanding the social !ustice provision of the &onstitution. L!"IN M!IM F 7, 5+
-es. 2he rules clearly provide that a preventive suspension shall not e3ceed a ma3imum period of + days, after which period, the employee must 'e reinstated to his former position. If the suspension is otherwise e3tended, the employee shall 'e entitled to his salaries and other 'enefits that may accrue to him during the period of such suspension. L!"IN M!IM F 7a, 1'
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
223
Province of Misamis riental v. &agayan Blectric Power and
*e Joya v.
Case No. 127 G.R. No. 43 (a/ar0 12, 199+)
Case No. 31 G.R. No. L-24+37 (!pr 27, 19*7)
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Respondent &BP:<& was granted a franchise under R: )97, 57+, and (+)+ to install, operate and maintain an electric light, heat and power system in &agayan de ro &ity and its su'ur's including the municipalities of 2agoloan, pol, illanueva, and Jasaan. 2he franchise of &BP:<& e3pressly e3empts it from payment of all ta3es of whatever authority$ e3cept C ta3 on its gross earnings. 2he Provincial treasurer of Misamis riental, however, demanded payment of the provincial franchise ta3 from &BP:<& in accordance with the
Respondent Arancindy &ommercial purchased 'ales of te3tile from &e'u &ompany Brnerose &ommercial. However, the >ureau of &ustoms discovered that the goods to 'e delivered 'y Brnerose were different from those declared. &ustoms too" custody of the shipment. Arancindy &ommercial filed a petition in the &ourt of Airst Instance for &ustoms to release the goods. Arancindy insisted that the &AI had !urisdiction N on the 'asis of the Judiciary :ct N and not the >ureau of &ustoms. R: 1/7 and 11)5, on the other hand, vest e3clusive !urisdiction over sei#ure and forfeiture proceedings to the >ureau of &ustoms.
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0 &BP:<& is e3empt from paying the provincial franchise ta3.
I##%&$
ho has !urisdiction over the shipment. '&LF
o. o provision in P.*. )1 e3pressly or impliedly amends or repeals R: )97, 57+ and (+)+. : special and local statute applica'le to a particular case is not repealed 'y a later statute which is general in its terms, provisions and application even if the terms of the general act are 'road enough to include cases in the special law unless there is manifest intent to repeal or alter the special law. :lso, the 8ecretary of Ainance made it clear that the franchise ta3 provided in the
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2he >ureau of &ustoms does. R: 1/7 and 11)5 are special laws, whereas the Judiciary :ct is a general law. In case of conflict, special laws prevail over general ones. L!"IN M!IM$ 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
224
:rayata v. Joya
8itchon, et al. v. :4uino
Case No. 9 G.R. No. L-2+*7 (March 1+, 192)
Case No. 147 G.R. No. L-++ (Fer/ar0 27, 19*)
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&ecilio Joya was leasing si3 friar lots, and he started paying the @overnment for such. >ecause the num'er of lands he can hold is limited, he conveyed some of the lots to respondent A. Joya as administrator. &ecilio died 'efore fully paying the @overnment for the lands. His widow, herein petitioner, was ruled to own only one%half of the lot 'ased on the &ivil &ode provision on con!ugal property. 2he court then sought to deliver the property to Alorentino for li4uidation and distri'ution. Petitioner claimed that under :ct 11)+, 8ec. 1(, the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon compliance with re4uirements of the law.
Respondent :4uino, the &ity Bngineer of Manila, demolished the houses of the si3 petitioners in this class suit, 'ecause their houses were pu'lic nuisances$ 'uilt on pu'lic streets and river 'eds. Petitioners contend that under the &ivil &ode, :rt. 7+1 and 7+), it is the district health officer who should remove pu'lic nuisances. Respondent, on the other hand, argues that R: 9+/, the Revised &harter of the &ity of Manila, grants the power to remove pu'lic nuisances to the &ity Bngineer. I##%&$
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hose !o' it is to determine and demolish pu'lic nuisances, the health officer under the &ivil &ode or the city engineer under R: 9+/.
hether the &ivil &ode provision on con!ugal property prevails or :ct 11)+Ds full conveyance of the property to the widow.
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:ct 11)+ prevails. It lays down provisions regarding ac4uisition, disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the &ivil &ode. 2he &ivil &ode is a general law, while :ct 11)+ is a special law. 2he special law must prevail. L!"IN M!IM$ 5+
2he &ity Bngineer, under R: 9+/, has !urisdiction. 2he &ivil &ode is a general law applica'le throughout the Philippines, whereas R: 9+/ is a special law that pertains solely to the &ity of Manila. hen a general and a special law are in conflict, the latter prevails. L!"IN M!IM$ 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
225
>ellis v. >ellis
Philippine 2rust &o. v. Macuan
Case No. 14 G.R. No. L-23*7 (/e *, 19*7)
Case No. 123 G.R. No. 322+ (March 24, 193+)
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:mos >ellis, a citi#en of 2e3as 68:, died. He had 7 legitimate and illegimate children, all surnamed >ellis. :fter the e3ecution of the decedentDs will, which was e3ecuted in the Philippines where the properties involved were situated, the e3ecutor divided the residuary estate into 7 e4ual portions for the 'enefit of the testatorDs 7 legitimate children. Herein appellants filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the partition deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children. Relying on :rt. 1( of the ew &ivil &ode which provides that the national law of the decedent should apply ;2e3as
*efendant Macuan married A. 2ormo, who 'ecame mentally incapacitated. *efendant filed a petition to the &ourt as"ing that he 'e appointed guardian of the person and estate of his wife, the latter consisting in undivided half in a certain land with improvements, which is claimed to 'e con!ugal property. 8u'se4uently, M. 2ormo, et. al., filed a motion, which was later granted 'y the &ourt, praying that the guardian 'e instructed to file a complete inventory of all the property 'elonging to his ward. : special guardian, Philippine 2rust &o., was appointed for the recovery of the ownership and possession of the property herein involved. I##%&$
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hether 2e3as
1. 0 a married woman !udicially declared mentally incapacitated is entitled to include in the inventory of her property that which is con!ugal. ). 0 the defendant may 'e compelled to include in the inventory of his mentally incapacitated wifeDs property, her undivided half of the con!ugal property.
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2e3as
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1. o. 8he is not entitled to include half of the legal con!ugal partnership, which still su'sists, in the inventory of her property. ). 2he defendant, 'eing the guardian, cannot 'e compelled to include in the inventory of the same, said half of the con!ugal property. 2he &ourt relied on 1= the &ode of &ivil Procedure, which is general in character and )= the &ivil &ode, which is more specific, referring to the management of the property of a demented ward who is married. 2hus, &ivil &ode ta"es precedence over the &ode of &ivil Procedure. L!"IN M!IM$ 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
226
2an
&ommissioner of Internal Revenue v. &ourt of 2a3 :ppeal
Case No. 13 G.R. No. L-72+ (a/ar0 2+, 19*)
Case No. 7 G.R. No. 44++7 (March 2+, 1991) Chapter , Page 41, Footote No. 11
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2his is an action filed 'y plaintiff%appellant 2an
Private respondent, a >ritish%owned foreign corporation was granted a legislative franchise, pursuant to R: E+E, which included a ta3 e3emption from the payment of all ta3es e3cept a franchise ta3 of 5C on the gross earnings and ta3 on its real property. 2he &IR assessed the corporation in the amount of 7M pesos representing deficiency income ta3 maintaining that the franchise was inoperative for failure to comply with 8ec. E, :rt. 19 of the 1/5 &onstitution which limits the grant of franchise to Ailipino%owned corporations. 2he &ourt of 2a3 :ppeals rendered the franchise unconstitutional while declaring petitionerDs assessment without effect having 'een made 'eyond the prescri'ed period stipulated in the 2a3 &ode.
0 the action for damages had already prescri'ed, and thus, 'arred the appellant to receive compensation for damages.
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-es, it has already prescri'ed. 2he &arriage of @oods 'y 8ea :ct provides that loss or damage suit must 'e 'rought within one year after the delivery of the goods. Relying on the ruling in previous cases, the &ourt held that the prescriptive period of 1 year esta'lished 'y the &arriage of @oods 'y 8ea :ct modified pro tanto the provisions of :ct o. 1/+ as to goods transported in foreign trade, the former 'eing a special act while the latter is a law of general application. L!"IN M!IM$ 5a, 5+
0 the provision in the franchise re4uiring the payment of only 5C of the gross receipts in lieu of any and all ta3es is unenforcea'le and without legal effect, for failure of the respondent corporation to comply with the 1/5 &onstitution, the &orporation
o. 2he legislative franchise was valid. :s a charter is in the nature of a private contract, the imposition of another franchise ta3 on the corporation 'y the local authority would constitute an impairment of the contract 'etween the government and the corporation. R: E+E as a special statute must 'e deemed an e3emption to the general laws as it was meant to meet particular sets of conditio ns and circumstances. L!"IN M!IM$ /a, 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
227
P& v. Presiding Judge R2& >r. GG
Case No. 87
Case No. 1+ G.R. No. 7119 (!pr 1*, 1991) Chapter , Page 41, Footote No. 11*
G.R. No. 72477 (ctoer 1*, 199+)
F!C"#$
2he Province of Misamis riental filed a complaint with the Regional 2rial &ourt of &agayan de ro &ity, >ranch GG against :P&R for the collection of real property ta3 covering the period 1/7E to 1/E9. Petitioner contends that the court has no !urisdiction over the suit and that it is not the proper forum for the ad!udication of the case pursuant to P.*. )9) which provides that disputes 'etween agencies of the government including @&&Ds shall 'e administratively settled or ad!udicated 'y the 8ecretary of Justice. n the other hand respondent invo"es P.*. 9(9 which governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of ta3ation 'y provinces, cities and municipalities there'y !ustifying its position in favor of the concerned municipal corporations. I##%&$
0 the respondent court has !urisdiction over the civil action.
F!C"#$
2he ice%mayor of Manila su'mitted to the &ivil 8ervice &ommission the appointment of 1/ officers in the B3ecutive 8taff of the ffice of the Presiding fficer pursuant to the provisions of R: 9+/. However, the &ity >udget of Manila 4uestioned whether the payroll of the newly appointed employees may 'e paid out of city funds on the 'asis of the appointments signed 'y the ice Mayor. 2he &ity
0 the &harter of the &ity of Manila has 'een repealed 'y R: 51E5 giving mayors the power to appoint all officials entirely paid out 'y city funds and >P 7 empowering local e3ecutives to appoint all officers and employees of the city.
'&L$
'&L$
-es. P.*. )9) must yield to P.*. 9(9 on the matter of which tri'unal or agency has !urisdiction over the enforcement and collection of real property ta3es. granted that the latter is a special law dealing specifically with real property ta3es whereas P.*. )9) is a general law that deals with a 'road coverage concerning administrative settlement of disputes, claims and controversies 'etween or among government agencies and instrumentalities. 8pecial laws ought to 'e upheld and construed as e3ceptions to the general law in the a'sence of special circumstances calling for a contrary conclusion
o. Regardless of their date of passage, a special law ;R: 9+/= providing specifically for the organi#ation of the @overnment of the &ity of Manila prevails over a general law. R: 51E5 and >P 7 as general laws were not meant to deprive the &ity &ouncil of Manila of its appointing power. :lso, since repeals 'y implication are not favored, conflic t 'etween the statutes should 'e very clear to favor the assumption that the latter in time repeals the other.
L!"IN M!IM$ 5+
L!"IN M!IM$ 7, E', 5+
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
228
Man#ano v. alera
@arcia v. Pascual, et al.
Case No. 80
Case No. 11+ G.R. No. L-1*9+ (ece6er 22, 19*1) Chapter :I, Page 277, Footote No. 11
G.R. No. 122+* (/0 , 199)
F!C"#$
: criminal complaint for li'el was filed in the sala of herein petitioner, who initially recogni#ed that the Regional 2rial &ourt had !urisdiction over the case thereafter forwarding the records to the ffice of the Provincial Prosecutor. However, the latter opin ed that the M2& should ta"e cogni#ance of the case 'ased on Repu'lic :ct 7(/1 which e3panded the !urisdiction of Metropolitan, Municipal 2rial, and Municipal &ircuit 2rial &ourts to hear and decide criminal cases where the penalty does not e3ceed ( years. Petitioner thus filed a motion to dismiss upon the respondentDs acceptance of the case for the M2&Ds lac" of !urisdiction over the offense charged.
F!C"#$
Petitioner, a !unior typist civil service eligi'le, was appointed 'y the Justice of Peace as cler" of the municipality of 8an Jose, ueva Bci!a. hen vouchers were su'mitted to the mayor, he did not want to approve them. His reason was R: 1551 has repealed 8ec. 75 of R: /)(, otherwise "nown as the Judiciary :ct. 8ec. 75 of the Judiciary :ct provides that !ustices of peace may have cler"s of court at the e3pense of the municipalities and shall 'e appointed 'y respective !ustices. R: 1551 however, which is claimed to have repealed 8ec. 75 of R: )/( provides that all employees whose salaries are paid out of the general funds of the municipalities shall 'e appointed 'y the mayor.
I##%&$
0 the M2& has e3clusive !urisdiction over complaints for li'el.
I##%&$
0 8ec. 75 of R: /)( has 'een repealed 'y R: 1551. '&L$
o. 2he applica'le law is still :rticle (+ of the Revised Penal &ode which categorically provides that !urisdiction over li'el cases are lodged with the &ourts of Airst Instance ;now Regional 2rial &ourts=. :lthough R: 7(/1 was enacted to decongest the clogged doc"ets of the Regional 2rial &ourts 'y e3panding the !urisdiction of first level courts, the said law is of general character and does not alter the provisions of :rticle (+ of the RP&, which is a law of special nature.@ranted that there seems to 'e no manifest intent to repeal or alter the !urisdiction in li'el cases from the provisions of R.:. 7(/1it must 'e maintained that a special law cannot 'e repealed, amended or altered 'y a su'se4uent general law 'y mere implication. L!"IN M!IM$ 7, E, 5+
'&L$
2he !udge ruled that said R: 1551 did not e3pressly repeal 8ec. 75 of the Judiciary :ct and that the two laws may 'e reconciled following the principle of law that a prior specific statute is not repealed 'y a su'se4uent general law. :lso, there 'eing no specific grant of authority in favor of the mayor to appoint the cler" of court, the power to appoint should not 'e considered lodged in the said mayor.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
229
>agatsing v. Ramire#
Case No. 141 G.R. No. L-233+ (/e 3+, 19**) Chapter , Page 42+, Footote No. 12*
Case No. 2 G.R. No. L-41*31 (ece6er 17, 197*) Chapter :I, Page 2*, Footote No. 3
F!C"#$
F!C"#$
Petitioner operates 15 auto truc"s with fi3ed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. 2he Municipal of Manila repealed R: 9+/ and enacted rdinance o. 9/E(, entitled :n rdinance Rerouting 2raffic on Roads and 8treets within the &ity of Manila, and Aor ther Purposes.$
2he Municipal >oard of Manila enacted rdinance o. 75)), :n rdinance Regulating the peration of Pu'lic Mar"ets and Prescri'ing Aees for the Rentals of 8talls and Providing Penalties for iolation thereof and for other Purposes.$ Respondent were see"ing the declaration of nullity of the rdinance for the reason that a= the pu'lication re4uirement under the Revised &harter of the &ity of Manila has not 'een complied with, '= the Mar"et &ommittee was not given any participation in the enactment, c= 8ec. ;e= of the :nti%@raft and &orrupt Practices :ct has 'een violated, and d= the ordinance would violate P.*. 7 prescri'ing the collection of fees and charges on livestoc" and animal products.
I##%&$
0 the enactment and enforcement unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void.
of
rdinance o.
9/E(
is
'&L$
I##%&$
o. R: 9+/ is a special law and of later enactment than &.:. o. 59E and the Pu'lic 8ervice
hat law shall govern the pu'lication of ta3 ordinance enacted 'y the Municipal >oard of Manila, the Revised &ity &harter or the
L!"IN M!IM$ (c, 11a, 9/, 5+
'&L$
2he fact that one is a special law and the other a general law creates the presumption that the special law is to 'e considered an e3ception to the general. 2he Revised &harter of Manila spea"s of ordinance$ in general whereas the
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
230
Latin Maxims &hapter II N &82R6&2I :* I2BRPRB2:2I >. PBR 2 &82R6B 1. Legs terpretato egs 86 otet. Judicial construction and interpretation of a statute ac4uires the force of law. &hapter III N :I*8 2 &82R6&2I &. &2BMPR:R- &82R6&2I ). Cote6poraea e
&hapter I N :*HBRB&B 2, R *BP:R26RB ARM, <:@6:@B A 82:262B
231
Lttera ecat sprt/s 88=cate. 2he letter "ills 'ut the spirit gives life. :era teto, o e cotra, eet ser8ce . ords ought to 'e more su'servient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Aeg/s eges terpretaae s/t, @/o 8o/tas era/6 coser8et/r.
1+. Cessate rato egs, cessat et psa e< . hen the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. 11. Iterpretato tas a6g/s s6per =ea est /t e8tet/r co8ees et as/r/6. here there is am'iguity, the interpretation of such that will avoid inconveniences and a'surdity is to 'e adopted. Legs costr/cto o =act >/ra6. 2he construction of the law will not 'e such as to wor" in!ury or in!ustice. !rg/6et/6 a co8eet p/r6/6 8aet ege. :n argument drawn from inconvenience is forci'le in law. :era h operar 6e/s est @/a6 as/re. It is 'etter that words should have no operation at all than that they should operate a'surdly. Le< s6per tet @/o co8et rato. 2he law always intends that which is in accordance with reason. % eae6 rato e6 >/s.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION % eae6 est rato, est eae6 egs sposto . here there is the same reason, there is the same law
1). &a est accpea terpretato @/ae 8to caret. 2hat interpretation is to 'e adopted which is free from evil or in!ustice. Le< >/sta o est e<. :n un!ust law is not a law. 1. Fat >/stta, r/at coe/6 .
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
232
1E. #/66/6 >/s, s/66a >/ra . 2he rigor of the law would 'e the highest in!ustice. /s s/66/6 saepe, s/66a est 6ta . B3treme law is often e3treme wrong. 1/. Ne6o teet/r a 6possa . 2he law o'liges no one to perform an impossi'ility. I6poss/6 /a ogato est. 2here is no o'ligation to do an impossi'le thing. Le< o cogt a 6possa. 2he law does not re4uire an impossi'ility. Le< o tet a@/ 6posse. 2he law does not intend the impossi'le.
). ?/ao a@/ prohet/r e< recto, prohet/r et per o@//6. hat cannot, 'y law, 'e done directly cannot 'e done indirectly. &hapter N I2BRPRB2:2I A R*8 :* PHR:8B8 :. I @BBR:< )9. Geeraa 8era s/t geerater tegea. @eneral words should 'e understood in their general sense. Geers ct/6 geerater est terpreta/6. : general statement is understood in its general sense. )5. :era accpea s/t sec//6 s/>ecta6 6atera6. : word is to 'e understood in the conte3t in which it is used. :era 6ere ae@/8oca, s per co66/e6 /s/6 o@/e teect/ certo s/6/t/r, tas teect/s pre=ere/s est. B4uivocal words or those with dou'le meaning are to 'e understood according to their common and ordinary sense. :era arts e< arte. ords of art should 'e e3plained from their usage in the art to which they 'elong. :era geeraa restrg/t/r a hatate6 re 8e persoa6. @eneral words should 'e confined according to the su'!e ct%matter or persons to which they relate.
&. IMP