G.R. No. L-34674 | October 26, 1931 | MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, respondentappellee. | OSTRAND, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole purpose of the enactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint because of petitioner’s failure to file another complaint. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg contended that even if Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective. ISSUES: 1. WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional 2. WON the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers 3. WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law RULING: 1. No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former laws or parts of laws by implication. The court will not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power. The Government of the Philippine Islands has the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. 2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
3. No. It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not an amendment but merely supplemental to Tariff Law. G.R. No. 118712 | October 6, 1995 | LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents. | FRANCISCO, R., J.: FACTS The nature of the case is the consolidation of two separate petitions for review filed by Department of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of the Philippines, assailing the Court of Appeal’s decision, which granted private respondents' petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development Corporation or AMADCOR (private respondents) are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (RA 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land, private respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition questioning the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (1992) and No. 9 (1990), and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. The Supreme Court referred the petition to CA for proper determination and disposition. The CA found the following facts undisputed: Respondents argued that Admin. Order No. 9 (1990) was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting excess in jurisdiction because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. On the other hand, petitioner DAR contended that Admin Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. The issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Landbank averred that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits is in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. ISSUES 1. WON CA erred in declaring as null and void DAR Admin Order No. 9 (1990) insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds 2. WON CA erred in holding that private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just compensation.
RULING: NO. Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 provides: Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. It is explicit that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. 2. YES. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they rejected the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived of the possession and use of such properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. It is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the same; the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated. Wherefore, petition is denied for lack of merit. Appealed decision is affirmed. G.R. No. 109023 | August 12, 1998 | RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DE PARUNGAO, VENUS M. POZON AND other similarly situated personnel of the LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION (LWUA), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND LEONARDO L. JAMORALIN in his capacity as COA-LWUA Corporate Auditor,respondents. | PURISIMA, J.: FACTS: Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. Prior to this, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. To implement RA 6758, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular
No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Pursuant to said Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability of DBM-CCC No. 10. They contend that the Circular is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette. COA upheld the validity and effectivity of DBM-CCC No. 10. Petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General supported the petitioners, saying that Sec. 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 is a nullity for being inconsistent with and repugnant to the very law it is intended to implement. The DBM Secretary asserted that the honoraria in question are considered included in the basic salary, for the reason that they are not listed as exceptions under Sec. 12 of Rep. Act 6758. ISSUE: Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 has legal force or effect despite its lack of publication in the Official Gazette RULING: No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera (146 SCRA 446), publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. It is clear that DBM-CCC No. 10 is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. Before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. The ineffectiveness of the Circular makes resolution of the other issues at bar unnecessary. Petition is granted. G.R. No. 78385 August 31, 1987 | INC., Petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY SPORTS,Respondent. | GANCAYCO, J
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
FACTS: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees."
The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force. The petitioner averred that the increases were too high. Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. Despite this, the petitioner still opposed the increases. The petitioner, through a counsel, sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines urging the suspension of the implementation of Department Order No. 37. There was no response from the Office of the President. The petitioner filed the instant Petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court. Petitioner alleged that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order and was issued in violation of the due process clause because petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued. In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. In the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. The respondent Secretary submitted a Comment on the Petition saying that the increase in tuition and other school fees is urgent and necessary, and that the assailed Department Order is not arbitrary in character. ISSUE: 1. WON DECS’ power to regulate school fees "does not always include the power to increase" 2. WON there is a violation of due process clause RULING: 1. No. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. 2. No. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. The Court ruled that Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function. The burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption. Petition is dismissed.
