AKBAYAN-YOUTH v. COMELEC Facts: Petitioners in this case represent the youth sector and they seek to seek to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to them, around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the respondent COMELEC. However, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 disapproving the request for additional registration of voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners filed before the SC the instant which seeks to set aside and nullify respondent COMELEC‟s Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of R. A. R. A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as said provision effectively causes the disenfranchisement of petitioners and others similarly situated. Likewise, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters and to admit for registration petitioners and other similarly situated young Filipinos to qualify them to vote in the May 14, 2001 General Elections.
Issue: Whether or not the SC can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
Held: N0. The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories of law. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Section 8, of the R.A. 8189, explicitly provides that "No registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election." The 100-day prohibitive period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of the registration process. Without the prohibitive periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time to evaluate the evidence on the application. Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.
Albano v. Arranz Facts: Albano was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party for th e office of Representative f or the lone congressional district of Isabela. His opponent was respondent Samuel Reyes, official candidate of the Liberal Party for the same position. Albano questioned the returns produced by the Pro vincial Treasurer for a number of precincts on the ground that the said returns appeared with erasures on their face and alterations that operated to the detriment of Albano. The Commission on Elections ordered the suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. Reyes filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch I, presided over by Judge Manuel Arranz, with the Provincial Board of Canvassers as lone respondents, praying Board of Canvassers be directed to canvass the disputed votes cast in the precincts referred to, and proclaim the winner, claiming that the suspension orders of the Commission on Elections were null and void. Respondent Judge, thereafter ordered the case set for hearing within five days, and on the same day, upon motion of Reyes, issued a preliminary injunction ordering the board of Canvassers and the Provincial Treasurer to refrain from bringing the questioned returns to Manila, as instructed by the Commission on Elections. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion when it attempted to correct the error of the Commission on Election. Held: Yes, respondent court's actions are highly irregular and void for lack of jurisdiction. The suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into irregularities brought to the attention of the Commission on Elections was well within its administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority conferred upon it by the Constitution (Art. X), for the administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections. The Commission certainly had the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed between the various copies of election returns for the precincts in question, and suspend the canvass in the meantime, so the parties could ask for a recount in case of variance. Moreover, the Court below could not properly pass upon the validity of the Commission‟s orders without giving it a hearing, and the Commission had not been impleaded. Even assuming that the order to suspend the proclamation of the winner was in any way defective, the correction thereof did not lie within the authority of the statutory Courts of First Instance, since Article X, section 2 (in fine) expressly prescribes "that the decisions, orders, and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" and by no other tribunal (Luison v. Garcia, G. R. No. L-10916, May 20, 1957). It is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence.
Aquino Vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
FACTS: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution. HELD: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioner‟s intention to reside in Makati Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one‟s original domicile.
Petitioner‟s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Aratuc v. Comelec Facts: Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by respondent Board in Cotabato city. A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in the voting centers. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed resumption of the canvass but issued guidelines to be followed but thereafter modified. On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting. The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which, the case was declared submitted for decision. In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly: a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affected. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass. Issue: WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of COMELEC. Held: Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections)shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass. On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-à-vis the preservation of the purity of elections and electoral.
ATIENZA v. COMELEC (16 Feb 2010) Facts: In 2005, Drilon (Liberal Party president) withdrew his support from the Arroyo administration The next year, 2006, Atienza (LP chairman) hosted a party conference/assembly which proceeded to elect new officers for all positions. Atienza won as LP president. Drilon filed a petition before COMELEC for the nullification of the election. In 2007, the National Executive Council (NECO), the party‟s electing body, convened for the election of new set of officers before Drilon‟s term expired. Manuel Roxas II was installed as new LP president. Atienza and other LP members filed a petition for m andatory and prohibitory injunction to enjoin Roxas from assuming his position, alleging illegal constitution of the NECO and illegal expulsion/exclusion of Atienza from the party and i ts election. Issue WON COMELEC has jurisdiction jurisdiction over the issue of validity of Atienza, et al.‟s expulsion from the party Held: No. The COMELEC‟s jurisdiction over intra-party intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COM ELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The COMELEC‟s jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELEC‟s powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C IX -C of the Constitution, "include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court also declared in another case that the COMELEC‟s power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. Courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within apolitical party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.
ATONG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC[G.R. NO. 203766 ETC., 02 APRIL 2013 ] Facts: A few weeks before the elections, t he Supreme Court in Atong Pagl aum Inc. vs. Commission on Elections reinterpreted Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and reversed its own ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT). Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other part ies were disqualified by the Comm ission on Elections in the Ma y 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors, which is contrary to the doctrine laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani, stating that the party-list system is not the exclusive exclusive domain of sectoral representatives belonging to the “marginalized and underrepresented sectors” but may be participated in by non-sectoral non -sectoral parties as well who do not need to represent marginalized and underrepresented sector. Atong Paglaum et al then fil ed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it merely followed the rulings laid down in ABB and BANAT. However, the Court decided to abandon these rulings and adopted new parameters for the upcoming elections; thus, it remanded the case to COMELEC so the latter can determine the status of the petitioners based on the following new guidelines:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in partylist elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns conc erns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined “well-defined political constituencies” constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
It is clear from the foregoing that a new rule has been set: not all parties in the party-list system have to represent a sector that is marginalized and underrepresented.
Carlos v. Angeles (2000)
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, Jose Carlos was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela over Antonio Serapio. Serapio f iled an election protest challenging the r esults and the case was assigned to Judge Angeles of the RTC of Caloocan (because of the inhibition of all the judges of the RTC in Valenzuela). The final tally showed that Carlos won over a margin of 17,007 votes. However, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of “significant badges of fraud”. The trial court held that the fraud was attributable to Carlos and it declared Serapio as the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela City.
Issues: 1. W/N the SC has jurisdiction. 2. W/N the trial court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Held/Ratio: 1. YES. The SC has jurisdiction over the present petition. Both the Supreme Court and Comelec (in aid of its appellate jurisdiction) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTC) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. 2. YES. The trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in proclaiming Serapio the duly elected mayor of Valenzuela even without a majority of votes cast in his favor. The trial court in its decision actually pronounced a failure of election by disregarding and setting aside the results of the election. The trial court erred to the extent of ousting itself of jurisdiction because the grounds for failure of election were not significant and even non-existent. More importantly, the commission of fraud cannot be attributed to Carlos as there was no evidence on record that he had a hand in any of the irregularities that Serapio averred. The court annuls and declares void the trial court decision. The case is remanded to the trial court for decision.
Francisco I. Chavez v Commission on Elections Facts: This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate. On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a resolution in GR No. 104704. The above mentioned resolution was received by respondent COMELEC on May 6, 1992 and on the same day, petitioner filed an urgent motion to disseminate through the fastest available means and order said Election Officials to delete the name Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and count all votes in favor of Fransisco I. Chavez. But petitioner assailed that COMELEC failed to perform its mandatory function thus the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted. Petitioner prays not only for a restraining order but the judgment be rendered requiring the COMELEC to reopen the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13 provinces including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for “Chavez” votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned “Chavez” votes in f avor f avor of petitioner. Issue: Whether or not Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Ruling: It is quite obvious that petitioner‟s prayer does not call for the correction of “manifest errors” in the certificates of canvass or election returns before the COMELEC but for the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to any “manifest error” in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There being none, petitioners proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the constitution and the Omnibus Election code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Thus, Sec. 17 Art. Vl of the constitution provides that “the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contest relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members…” (Emphasis supplied). The word sole underscores the exclusivity of the tribunal‟s jurisdiction jurisdic tion over election contest relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner relating to the election of a member of the Senate. As the authenticity of the certif icates of canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. Premises considered, the Court resolved to dismiss the instant petition for lack of merit.
Demafiles v. Comelec FACTS: Respondent Galido won over Petitioner due to the Provincial Board voting to reject returns. Petitioner challenged the right of 2 board members to sit, considering that they were re-electionists. Respondent Commission ruled in favor of Petitioner. Galido then asked for reconsideration, stating that the 2 board members in question were disqualified only when the board was acting as a provincial but not as municipal. In light of this, Respondent Commission reversed its previous decision. ISSUES: 1. W/N this case is moot and the board had the authority to reject the returns from Precinct. 2. W/N the board members who were candidates for reelection were disqualified from sitting in the board in its capacity as a municipal board of canvassers. 3.W/N Respondent Commission can order the board of canvassers to count a return. HELD: RA 4970 reads the first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of the municipality of Sebaste shall be elected in the next general elections for local officials and shall have qualified. The Supreme Court ruled that and shall have qualified is devoid of meaning. The term of office of municipals shall begin in the 1st day of January following their election, despite the fact that Sebaste was a newly created municipality. No, a canvassing board may not reject any returns due to whatever cause. However, since there is a possibility of fraud, the canvass made and proclamation should be annulled. The laws states any member of a provincial board or of municipal council who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be in competent to act on the said body. Since Respondent Commission has the power to annul an illegal canvass and proclamation, there is no reason as to why it cannot order canvassing bodies to count all returns which are otherwise regular.
Dino v. Olivarez
Jurisdiction; election cases. A public prosecutor exceeded the authority delegated to him by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to prosecute election-related cases when he filed amended informations in court against the respondent Pablo Olivares even after he had been directed by the Legal Department of the COMELEC to suspend the implementation of his joint resolution (which found that the respondent should be indicted) but before his delegated authority had been revoked by the COMELEC en banc.
The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section 20, empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when appropriate, prosecute election cases. Furthermore, under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct the preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the OEC and to prosecute the same. Under Section 265 of the OEC, the COMELEC may avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides for the continuing delegation of authority to other prosecuting arms of the government, which authority, however, may be revoked or withdrawn at anytime by the COMELEC in the proper exercise of its judgment. Section 10 of the same Rule 34 gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors.
Clearly, the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. However, such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good or where it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of the resolutions, directives or orders of the COMELEC in relation to election cases where it had been deputized to investigate and prosecute by the COMELEC. As mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors acting on behalf of the COMELEC must proceed within within the lawful scope of their delegated authority. (Bievenido Diño and Renato Comparativo vs. Pablo Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009.)
Domino vs Comelec Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter, the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack of the oneyear residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy based on his own Voter‟s Registration Record and his address address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections Held: The term “residence,” as used in the law p rescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intenti on. “Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. Records show that petitioner‟s domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani. A person‟s domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Domino‟s intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonme nt of one‟s original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year one- year residence requirement. Further, Domino‟s lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
Fermin v. Comelec FACTS: Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally making Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and registration as a voter of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. Private respondent filed a disqualification case against petitioner. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record. Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor. Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), nd Branch 13 of Cotabato City. On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2 Division, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could nothave been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year Petitioner argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voter‟s registration record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of its creation. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections HELD: YES. The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately declared that Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said elections. COMELEC relied on a single piece of evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the oath of office subscribed and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27, 2006, on or before May 14, 2006.
Gayo vs. Verceles Facts: Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the winner in that election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the residence requirement.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent was able to meet the residency requirement for the position of municipal mayor during the May 2001 elections.
Ruling: Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her “greencard holder” status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country.
Javier v. Comelec, 13 SCRA 156 Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, votevote buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier‟s death. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen‟s Sol-Gen‟s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter‟s men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent‟s proclamation, p roclamation, the petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Comelec en banc as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Comelec authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election. Held: Article XII-C, XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution provides that: “The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.
Kilosbayan v. Comelec Facts: Special Provision No. 1 of the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under Republic Act No. 7180, allocates a specific amount of government funds for infrastructure and other priority projects and activities. In order to be valid, the use and release of said amount should have the following mandatory requirements: (1) Approval by the President of the Philippines; (2) Release of the amount directly to the appropriate implementing agency; and (3) List of projects and activities. Respondent Cesar Sarino, the then DILG Secretary, requested for authority to negotiate, enter into, sign Memoranda of Agreements with accredited Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in order to utilize them to implement the projects of the CDF provided for under R.A. No. 7180. Respondent Franklin Drilon, the then Executive Secretary, granted the abovementioned request of Secretary Sarino. Such an authority was extended to all the Regional Directors of the DILG. Pursuant to the above-described authority granted him, respondent Tiburcio Relucio, on April 24, 1992, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with an accredited NGO known as the “Philippine Youth Health and Spor ts ts Development Foundation, Inc.” (PYHSDFI). COMELEC received from petitioner Kilosbayan a letter informing the former of “two serious violations of election laws,” among them that the amount of P70 million was released by the Budget Department, shortly before the elections of May 11, 1992, in favor of “PYHSDFI” a private entity, which had reportedly engaged in dirty election tricks and practices in said elections and requesting that these offenses and malpractices be investigated promptly, thoroughly, impartially, without fear of favor. Issue: Based on recommendations by the Comelec Law Department, the Commission en banc dismissed the letter-complaint for lack of evidence. Held: The constitutional and statutory mandate for the Comelec to investigate and prosecute cases of violation of election laws translates, in effect, to the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the twin purpose of filing an information in court and helping the Judge determine, in the course of preliminary inquiry, whether or not a warrant of arrest should be issued. Although only a low quantum and quality of evidence is needed to support a finding of probable cause, the same cannot be justified upon hearsay evidence that is never given any evidentiary or probative value in this jurisdiction.
Mastura v. Comelec
Facts: Petitioner Facts: Petitioner Michael O. Mastura and private respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen were congressional candidates for the first district of Maguindanao during the 8 May 1995 elections. In the canvassing of votes, Dilangalen objected to the inclusion of the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog on the ground that the same was allegedly tampered. Acting on the objection, the COMELEC Second Division ordered the production and examination of the election returns of the Municipality of Matanog. In the course of the examination four (4) ballot boxes were produced and opened. Upon examination and comparison of the copies of the election returns of the MTC Judge and the COMELEC, the COMELEC Second Division found that, indeed, the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog had been tampered with. Consequently, the COMELEC Second Division issued the herein assailed Order of 29 February 1996 annulling the Certificate of Canvass of Matanog. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry whether there Issue: exists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Held: We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC. It is settled jurisprudence that th at COMELEC COMEL EC can suspend the canvass of votes pending its inquiry inquir y whether there exists ex ists a discrepancy between the various copies of election returns from the disputed voting centers. Corollarily, once the election returns were found to be falsified or tampered with, the COMELEC can annul the illegal canvass and order the Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winners on the basis of the genuine returns or, if it should refuse, replace the members of the board or proclaim the winners itself. That the Certificate of Canvass of the Municipality of Matanog was tampered with is a factual finding of the COMELEC. Absent any showing of abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court should refrain from reviewing the same, and must accord it instead the respect it deserves. The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC - created and explicitly made independent by the Constitution itself - on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.
PUNGUTAN VS ABUBAKAR 43 SCRA 1 (1972) Facts: COMELEC excluded from the canvass for the election of delegates for the lone district of the province of Sulu the returns from 107 precincts of Siasi, 56 precincts of Tapul, 67 precincts of Parang and 60 precincts of Luuk for being spurious or manufactured and therefore no returns at all. Unless set aside then, petitioner Abdulgafar Pungutan, who otherwise would have been entitled to the last remaining seat for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, there being no question as to the election of the other two delegates, would lose out to respondent Benjamin Abubakar. Pungutan disputes the power of respondent Commission to exclude such returns as a result of oral testimony as well as the examination of the fingerprints and signatures of those who allegedly voted as the basis for the holding that no election in fact did take place.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec has exceeded its constitutional power by encroaching on terrain properly judicial, the right to vote being involved.
Held: The contention is unavailing, in the light of SC‟s holding in Usman v. Comelec. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon Courts of Law, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. The resolution of respondent Comelec being assailed in this petition for review, was undoubtedly motivated by the objective of insuring free, orderly and honest elections in the discharge of its constitutional function to enforce and administer electoral laws. The other principal question raised is whether there cognition of such prerogative on the part of respondent Commission would contravene the constitutional provision that it cannot pass on the right to vote. The appropriate answer as will be made clear is likewise adverse to petitioner. Hence, respondent Commission must be sustained. WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated May14, 1971 is affirmed.
Regina Onsiako Reyes v COMELEC
Facts: The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative of the lone district of Marinduque. On Octocer 31, 2012 Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the Comelec an amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained material representations. On March 27, 2013 the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14, 2014, COMELEC en banc denied her MR. Howewer, on May 13, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and E3ecutory.On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of June 30, 2013. According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because pursuant to Section17, Article VI of the 1987Constitution, the House of the Representatives has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “ole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications” qualifications ” of the members of the House of Representatives. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of member of the House of Representative of Marinduque. Held: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives begins only after the candidate is considered a member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section17, Article VI of the 1987Constit ution. For one to be consider ed a member of the House of Represe ntatives, there must be a concurrence of these requisites: 1. Valid proclamation, 2. Proper oath, and 3. Assumption of office. Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the House of Representatives yet as she has not assumed office yet.
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC Facts: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of Leyte First District. On March 2P, „995, private respondent Cirilio Montejo, also a candidate for the same position, filed a petition for disqualification of the petitioner with COMELEC on the ground that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an amended certificate of candidacy, changing the entry of seven months to “since childhood” in item no. 8 in said certificate. However, the amended certificate was not received since it was already past deadline. She claimed that she always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile and residence. The Second Division of the COMELEC With a vote of 2 to 1 came up with a resolution finding private respondent‟s petition for disqualification meritorious. Issue: Whether or not petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Marcos. Held: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 4 months, because of the following: a. a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioner‟s domicile of origin by operation operatio n of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; b. domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; c. the wife does not automatically gain the husband‟s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; d. even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
Salva v. Makalintal FACTS: The petitioners filed with the RTC a class suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca, Batangas, and the COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 both enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of Barangay San Rafael and its merger with Barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the veto exercised by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for being ultra vires, particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements regarding the attestations or certifications of several government agencies were obtained. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas. The trial court denied the petition saying that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court. The petitioners contend that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code, its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners submit that the conduct of a plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory or quasi-judicial in nature but simply ministerial or administrative in nature and only in obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC's power to conduct plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is of ministerial or administrative nature. HELD: The SC ruled that “…What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELEC‟s quasi -judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
SBMA vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 125416 Sep 26, 1996) Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enactor reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The SangguniangBayan ng Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain provisions of RA 7227, particularly those concerning the matters cited in items (A),(B), (K), (E), and (G) of private respondent's petition. The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong also informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases Conversion Development Authority and the Office of the President. Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan". SBMA instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issue: Whether or not respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848
Held: Yes, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus - “Initiative” is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. - “Referendum” is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.
Velasco vs COMELEC FACTS: This petition for certiorari seeks to set aside and annul the resolutions denying the COC Velasco had filed for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Sasmuan, Pampanga. The distinctions between inclusion/exclusion proceedings and COC denial/cancellation proceedings, refute and belie Velasco's position that the COMELEC improperly ruled on his right to vote when it cancelled his COC. ISSUE: Is decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding operate as a bar to any future action challenging one‟s right to be registered as a voter?
HELD: Inclusion/exclusion proceedings, while judicial in character, are summary proceedings. A decision in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding does not operate as a bar to any future action in any other election that a party may take concerning his right to be registered as a voter. A ruling on the right to vote by the trial court for a specific election is binding on the COMELEC. By clear implication, the COMELEC itself does not rule on the right to vote by recognizing in a Sec. 78 COC denial/cancellation proceeding the final and executory ruling by a court, as mandated by law, in an inclusion/exclusion proceeding
Veloria v. Comelec Facts: The seven (7) petitioners, Ramon Veloria et. al, were not satisfied with the election results and filed an election protest against their political rivals in the RTC.The election protest was dismissed but instead of perfecting an appeal within five (5) days as provided by law, the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. When the MR was denied, the peititioners filed a Notice of Appeal even though it was beyond the 5 day period provided for the perfection of appeal. Judge Abasolo gave due course to petitioners' Notice of Appeal. Thus, the private respondents (as protestees) sought recourse in the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by a petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order (SPR No. 8-90) to annul Judge Abasolo's order giving due course to the appeal. Issues: 1. WON Judge Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when he gave due course to the petitioners' tardy appeal. 2. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to grant jurisdiction to grant the private respondents' petition for certiorari. Held: 1. Yes. Since the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege that must be exercised in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law (Borre vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA 560), and its timely perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and jurisdictional Judge Abasolo gravely abused his discretion when he gave due course to the petitioners' tardy appeal.
2. No. COMELEC has not been given, by the Constitution nor by law, jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Original special civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals or in this Court, being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the Constitution and the law.
