ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW 1. EXAMPLES OF RULE-MAKING
CASE DIGEST
G.R. No. L-24796 June 28, 1968 DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY vs. HON. EMMANUEL M. MUÑOZ, MUÑOZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, FACTS: Pinagcamaligan Indo-Agro Development Corp (Piadeco) claims to be the owner of Some 72,000 hectares of land 3 located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and Montalban, province of Rizal, and a deed of absolute sale in its favor. Piadeco applied for registration as private as private woodland some 10,000 hectares of this land to the Bureau of Forestry, on December 4, 1963. The controversy c ontroversy in these cases began when Acting A cting Director of Forestry Apolonio F. Rivera issued an order cancelling PWR No. 2065-New. He required Piadeco to surrender the original certificate to him. Ground for this cancellation was that Piadeco had violated forestry rules and regulations for cutting trees within the Angat and Marikina Watershed Reservations, expressly excluded from the said certificate. On December 28, 1964, Piadeco applied for the renewal of its Certificate of Private Woodland Registration PWR 2065-New, which would expire on the last day of that month. Assistant Director of Forestry J. L. Utleg denied the renewal requested. He informed Piadeco that its Titulo de Propiedad 4136 4136 was not registerable under Forestry Administrative Order No. 12-2 which took effect on January 1, 1963. The expiration of its registration certificate and the non-renewal thereof notwithstanding, Piadeco continued logging operations. It was about this time that illegal logging was denounced by some members of Congress thereby attracting national attention. On July 8, 1965, the judge came out with an order declaring that notwithstanding "the expiration of petitioner's [Piadeco's] license on December 31, 1964, their said property remains registered with the Bureau of Forestry subject only to renewal, in which case it can still pursue its logging operations, conditioned upon the payment by it of forest charges." The judge thereupon directed the forestry officials "and all members of the Armed Forces stationed along the way" to allow Piadeco "to haul its logs which have already been properly documented." This precipitated the filing on July 28, 1965 by the Director of Forestry, the Forest Station Warden, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff 7 of an original petition with this Court (L-24796, now at bar) for certiorari and certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul the order of execution.
ATTY. CABRAS
ISSUE: Whether PIADECO’s tite is registrable with the Bureau of Forestry and whether the Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 is valid
HELD: PIADECO’s title is not registrable under AO 12 -
2. Forestry Admin. Order no. 12-2 is valid. PIADECO’s position is that such amendment contravenes a.) SEC. 1829 of RAC which does not specify the titles that are registrable and b.) opinions of officials that titles issued during the Spanish regime are registrable. 1. True it is that the law, Section 1829, does not describe with particularity titles that may be registered with the Bureau of Forestry. Concededly, too, administrative authorities in the past considered as registrable, titles issued during the Spanish regime. In fact, as late as 1962, Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 was still in force, authorizing registration of such Spanish titles. But when Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 came into effect on January 1, 1963, that order should be deemed to have repealed all such previous administrative determinations. 2. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law . Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations "deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, "[a]ll that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes."
2. Quasi-legislative or Rule-making Functions GOMEZ vs PALOMAR FACTS: This
appeal
puts
in
issue
the
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ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS constitutionality of Republic Act 1635 (Anti-TB bear the anti-TB stamp, but a declaration therein Stamp Law) which provides for the issuance of semithat "no mail matter shall be accepted in the postal stamps with regular postage charge plus the mails unless it bears such semi-postal stamp" is additional amount of 5centavos for the Philippine a declaration that such mail matter is Tuberculosis Society. The respondent Postmaster nonmailable within the meaning of section 1952 of General, in implementation of the law, thereafter the Administrative Code. Administrative Order 7 issued four (4) administrative orders. All these of the Postmaster General is but a restatement administrative orders were issued with the approval of the law for the guidance of postal officials and of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and employees. As for Administrative Order 9, we have Communications. already said that in listing the offices and entities of Petitioner Benjamin P. Gomez mailed a letter the Government exempt from the payment of the at the post office in San Fernando, Pampanga. stamp, the respondent Postmaster General Because this letter, addressed to a certain Agustin merely observed an established principle, Aquino did not bear the special anti-TB stamp namely, that the Government is exempt from required by the statute, it was returned to the taxation. petitioner. Petitioner brought suit for declaratory relief in the 3. Central Bank vs Cloribel Court of First Instance of Pampanga, to test the Facts: constitutionality of the statute, as well as the Respondent Banco Filipino is savings and mortgage implementing administrative orders issued, bank which began operations in July 1964. Central contending that it violates the equal protection Bank seeks annulment of Judge Gaudencio clause of the Constitution as well as the rule of Cloribel’s order restraining Central Bank from uniformity and equality of taxation. enforcing CB Circular Nos. 185 and 222 and The lower court declared the statute and the Monetary Board Resolution Nos. 805 and 1566 in so orders unconstitutional. One of the grounds relied far as they restrict the payment by Banco Filipino of upon by the court is that the statute is so broadly “monthly” interest on savings deposits and drawn that to execute it the respondents had to “advance” interests on time deposits. issue administrative orders far beyond their powers; Banco Filipino sets up the defense that the that it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative contested resolutions and circulars are null and power. void for a) they were issued without previous notice Hence this appeal by the respondent postal and hearing b) they impair vested rights and c) the authorities. statutory power of the Monetary Board to “fix the ISSUE: Whether RA 1635 and the assailed maximum rates of interest which banks may pay on Administrative Orders are valid deposits and any other obligation” does not include RULING: Yes. The Court held that judgment the regulation of the manner computing and paying appealed from must be reversed. interest, since this function is not expressly granted Administrative Order 3, as amended by to petitioner Central Bank. Administrative Orders 7 and 10, provides that for Issue: certain classes of mail matters (such as mail Whether or not the resolutions and circulars issued permits, metered mails, business reply cards, etc.), by Central Bank are null and void? the five-centavo charge may be paid in cash instead Ruling : of the purchase of the anti-TB stamp. It further No. Central Bank is supposed to gather relevant states that mails deposited during the period data and make the necessary study, but has no legal August 19 to September 30 of each year in mail obligation to notify and hear anybody, before boxes without the stamp should be returned to the exercising its power to fix the maximum rates of sender, if known, otherwise they should be treated interest. Previous notice and hearing, as elements of as nonmailable. due process, are constitutionally required for the It is true that the law does not expressly authorize protection of life or vested property rights, when its the collection of five centavos except through the limitation or loss takes place in consequence of a sale of anti-TB stamps, but such authority may be judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding., generally implied in so far as it may be necessary to dependent upon a past act or event which has to be prevent a failure of the undertaking . The established or ascertained. It is is not essential for the validity of General rules and regulations authority given to the Postmaster General to raise promulgated to govern future conduct of a class of funds through the mails must be liberally construed, consistent with the principle that where persons or enterprises, unless the law provides the end is required the appropriate means are given. otherwise and there is no statutory requirement to It is likewise true that the statute does not this effect, in so far as the fixing of interest is provide for the disposition of mails which do not concerned. Page 2 of 80
ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS That they impair vested rights is obviously by virtue of delegation of legislative power. unfounded, for the said resolutions and circulars Yes. The The constitutional challenge of the ruleoperate prospectively and affect only deposits made making power of the POEA-based onimpermissible and/or interests occurring subsequent to the delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly promulgation thereof. Furthermore, all contracts contented by the public respondents, brushed aside are subject to the police power of the state. by this Court in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. The justification for the inclusion, in the power to fix POEA. the maximum rate of interest, of the Authority to The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) prescribe the time or manner of payments thereof shall promulgate the necessary rules and springs a) not only from the implied grant of all regulations to govern the exercise of the powers necessary to carry out those expressly adjudicatory functions of the conferred and b) from the explicit authority of the Administration (POEA). Monetary Board to “avoid evasion by likewise fixing To many of the problems attendant upon presentmaximum rates” in any other “form” (oy payments day undertakings, the legislature may not have the of any sort) but also c) from the reasons underlying competence to provide the required direct and the grant of authority to fix said maximum rates. efficacious not to say, specific solutions. One objective is to establish a uniform ceiling These solutions may, however, be expected from its applicable to all banks, in order to avoid competition delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the in the form or higher rates offered to depositors particular fields assigned to them. resulting in reduction of their profits impelling them While the making of laws is a nondelegable power t to resort to risky ventures and more remunerative hat pertains exclusively to loans and investments. Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitution From the facts, Banco Filipino as it compounds ally delegate the authority topromulgate rules and monthly and pays advance in time deposits regulations to implement undertakes to pay its depositors more than the a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the amount fixed by these resolutions and circulars reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if when compounded quarterly (by 0.029% higher for not impossible, to anticipate situations that may savings deposits and by 0.452% higher for time be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is deposits), the Central Bank is legally authorized to required is that the regulation should be germane to demand strict compliance. the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the 4.Conference of Maritime manning Agencies vs law. (Principle of Subordinate Legislation) POEA 243 SCRA 666 That the challenged resolution and memorandum c ircular, which merely furtheramended the previous Facts: Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform to Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencie the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and s, Inc., an incorporated equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, No.797 can no longer be disputed and its copetitioners, all licensedmanning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of theirrespective foreign ship-owner5. 69 Phil. 635 – Political Political Law – Constitutional Constitutional principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, Law – Due Due Process in Administrative Bodies series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA ANG TIBAY VS. CIR and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05. Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang power and authority to fix and Tibay, a leather company which supplies the promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's co Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, mpensation of Filipino seamenworking in ocean Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his going vessels; only Congress can. Governing Board employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it resolves to amend and increase the compensation averred that the said employees laid off were and other benefits as specified under Part members of NLU while no members of the rival II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company Employment Contract for Seafarers dominated union and Toribio was merely busting Issue: NLU. WON the POEA can promulgate rules The case reached the t he Court of Industrial Relations Page 3 of 80
ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU therefore, must act on its or his own independent went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a consideration of the law and facts of the new trial on the ground of newly discovered controversy, and not simply accept the views of a evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The subordinate in arriving at a decision. Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion (7) The administrative body should, in all for reconsideration. controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the National Labor know the various issues involved, and the reasons Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial. for the decisions rendered. The performance of this 2. Whether or not CIR as administrative body duty is inseparable from the authority conferred should comply with the requirements of due procss upon it.
HELD: 1. Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing).
2. YES. The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following: (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial Subs tantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in t he record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The administrative body or any of its judges,
6. C. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES No. L-16537. June 29, 1962. FRANCISCO C. CALO, petitioner-appellant, vs. DELFIN C. FUERTES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, respondents-appellees. FACTS: In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C. Fuertes,applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing former's claim andcontest against the homestead application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to vacate the premises within60 days from receipt of a copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality thereof, the homestead patentwould be issued to Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands,Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, who modified theopinion of the Director of Lands, ordering Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference between the value of theimprovements that the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the consequentialbenefits derived by him therefrom.Still dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but withdrew it before thePresident could act thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of theDirector of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined among others. For failureto state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative remediesavailable to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismissesthe herein petition with costs against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justic e.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS of Charge No. III, for lack of jurisdiction. HELD: The Provincial Board moved to dismiss the case on Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the the ground that it states no cause of action because Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the Pascual had not exhausted his administrative the alter ego of the President and his acts or remedies before filing an appeal to the courts, and decisions are also those of the latter, he need not because the Provincial Board had jurisdiction over appeal from the decision of the opinion of the former Charge No. III. CFI dismissed the petition and to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he Pascual brought the case to the SC on appeal. had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Issue Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of Whether a municipal mayor may be subjected to an the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the administrative investigation of a charge based on administrative remedies, is untenable. The misconduct allegedly committed by him during his withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of prior term. the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at Held all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the No. each term is separate from other terms, and that appeal to the President is the last step he should the reelection to office operates as a condonation of take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of special civil action for certiorari and prohibition cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when Court should never remove a public officer for acts "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and done prior to his present term of office. To do adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In otherwise would be to deprive the people of their the case at bar, appeal from an opinion ororder by right to elect their officers. When the people have the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they to the President of the Philippines is the plain, did this with knowledge of his life and character, speedy and adequate remedy available to the and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for had already become final and cannot be reviewed. the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the practically overrule the will of the people. petitioner-appellant.
8. ALZATE VS ALDANA, 107 PHIL 298 7. Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija (G.R. No. L-11959) Facts Petitioner-appellant Arturo B. Pascual was the mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija in 1951 and was reelected in 1955. During Pascual’s second term, the Acting Provincial Governor filed three administrative case with the Provincial Board on Nueva Ecija against him. Charge No. III was “Maladministrative. Abuse of Authority, and Usurpation of Judicial Functions.” After presenting evidence regarding the first two charges, Pascual filed with the Provincial Board a motion to dismiss on the main ground that the wrongful acts alleged had been committed during his previous term of office and could not constitute a ground for disciplining him during his second term. However, the motion was denied. Pascual then filed a petition with the SC to enjoin the Provincial Board from taking cognizance of the third charge, but the petition was denied by minute resolution of December 21, 1956 "without prejudice to action, if any, in the Court of First Instance." Accordingly, the petitioner-appellant filed with the CFI of Nueva Ecija a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to inhibit the said Provincial Board from proceeding with the hearing
FACTS:
Anacleto Alzate, Principal of the South Provincial High School in Agoo, La Union Province, wrote to the Director of Public Schools that pursuant to RA No. 842, he was entitled to an automatic salary increase of 4 rates (1 rate for every 5 years of service) after his salary has been adjusted to the minimum, and to an additional automatic salary to the minimum, and to an additional automatic salary increase of 1 rate, pursuant to paragraph (b) of the same section and Act, for having passed the examination for Superintendent of Private Schools given by the Civil Service Commission. The Division Superintendent of Schools for La Union, denied petitioner's request contending that in the adjustment of salary of secondary principals, only the actual number of years of service as such secondary principal would be considered, and he would be entitled only to one rate of salary increase; and since the examination taken and passed by petitioner was only for the Bureau of Private Schools, he was not entitled to the benefit of paragraph (b) of the Public School Salary Act. Petitioner requested for reconsideration but he did not receive a ruling on his request. Fearing that the amount appropriated for payment of the
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS salary would be disbursed or expired of the fiscal the area covered by the latter’s timber concession year and would be reverted to the general funds of which cost the company approximately the government, he filed a mandamus proceeding in P139,000.00. This prompted P & B to protest CFI La Union. The latter rendered a decision against the approval in so far as t he area of conflict directing the Director of Public Schools the sum is concerned. The protest was overruled hence the claimed by the petitioner. Respondents filed a company appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture motion to dismiss the same, which was granted. and Natural Resources but remains pending study ISSUE: W/N the petition states no cause of action and consideration. However, the petitioner in view of the non-exhaustion of administrative continued his logging operation and in doing so remedies. trespassed and used the road constru cted by P & B. HELD: NO. The fact that the parties had to agree The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the court had to approve the agreement that the issued an order prohibiting De Lara from operating Director of Public Schools shall recommend to the and entering within the contested area. Still, De proper official not later than June 30, 1958 and Lara continued the operation. A writ of preliminary before the closing of office hours on that date the injuction enjoining De Lara and his aids from commitment of the sum of P840.00 claimed by operating was issued in favor of P & B. De Lara filed petitioner, to accounts payable in order to prevent a motion to dissolve the injuction alleging among its reversion, is a recognition by the parties as well others that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust its as the court of the validity and urgency of the action administrative remedies appearing that the appeal taken by the petitioner-appellant. regarding the conflict was still pending Petitioner contends that if he waited for the final determination. decision, which in fact did not come, whatever action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner, would be of no avail after ISSUE: the reversion of the funds appropriated for the Whether or not the petitioner is correct that the purpose of salary adjustment. Hence, he claims, doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is that to require him to exhaust the administrative applicable. remedies would, in the circumstances of the case, in effect amount to a nullification of his claim. It would seem, therefore, that in the particular HELD: circumstances of the present case, petitioner had No. the rule of exhaustion of administrative sufficient cause of action at the time of the filing of remedies is not applicable if it should appear that his petition on June 11, 1958, and a resort to the an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by court without awaiting for the final decision of the a party if he should await, before taking court administrative officers is not, in view of the special action, the final action of the administrative official situation, premature. The order appealed from was concerned on the matter. Petition was dismissed. set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings. 10. G.R. No. 113357. February 1, 1996.*
9.De Lara Jr. vs Cloribel No. L-21653 (May 31, 1965) 14 SCRA 269 FACTS: In this case, the petitioner, De Lara Jr., was granted a timber license to log over an area for which he is authorized to cut annually. Consequently, the during non-renewal of his license, an application for the similar forest concession was filed by the respondents (P & B Enterprises Co., Inc.) was approved. After the grant, P & B procured heavy equipments and introduced improvements. Meanwhile, the petitioner’s renewal for license was approved. The construction of logging roads within the forest area covered by the license was commenced which extended not only along the plaintiff’s concession but partially within
BENJAMIN PAREDES, LUZ BUENSUCESO, AUGUSTO SEVERINO, RODRIGO TABANERA, STEPHEN SOLIVEN and ROBERTO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RIZALINO S. NAVARRO, as Secretary of Trade and Industry, and IGNACIO S. SAPAL, Director of the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, respondents. TOPIC: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
FACTS:
Public respondents promulgated Administrative Order, revising the rules of practice before the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases. Among the provisions of said administrative orders increased the fees payable to the BPTTT for registration of patents and trademarks and
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that conversion plan does not in any way compensate the is, one application covering several classes of goods. predecessors of the present membership (and also those of the present) members’ money, time, effort Petitioners, who are registered patent agents, filed and foresight; and the conversion plan does not in with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition any way compensate the predecessors of the present to stop public respondents from enforcing the membership (and also those of the present aforementioned administrative orders. membership who do not opt for conversion) who substantially contributed to making the Club what The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for it is today” and further claiming that the prohibition and denied the motion for amendments had not been duly adopted by the reconsideration filed by petitioners. required two-thirds vote. Petitioner prayed for the disapproval and cancellation of respondent club’s articles and by-laws and denial of its application to ISSUE: WON the petitioners may proceed register its proprietary shares, and prayed for a with the petition for prohibition when there are restraining order meanwhile enjoining it from selling other remedies available. and/or accepting any payments for the questioned proprietary shares. No, Prohibition is granted only in On December 22, 1977, the respondent HELD: cases where no other remedy is available which is commission through its hearing office Jose C. sufficient to afford redress. Castro issued its Order of the same date denying injunctive relief “for lack of sufficient allegations in That the petitioners have another and complete support of the prayer for the issuance of the remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise, is preliminary injunction and for obvious lack of merit. generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ. Hence, the petition filed forthwith on The court dismissed the petition. December 23, 1977 by petitioner directly with the Supreme Court claiming inter alia violation of petitioner’s right to due process in that the 11. QUASHA VS. SEC – 83 SCRA 557 questioned order allegedly adjudged the main issues which “should have been resolved (only) after a fullPetitioner had filed on October 10, 1977 and blown hearing on the merits” and praying for the Facts: October 17, 1977 his complaints and continuing issuance of a restraining order. opposition with respondent Commission against the Issue: Whether there was exhaustion of filing of respondent Manila Polo Club, Inc’s administrative remedies. Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended Held: No, In view of the extremely limited time , with By-Laws which would convert said club into a the Commission’s hearing officer having issued his proprietary club, assailing the amendments as questioned order denying injunctive relief only on illegal, inequitable and immoral, alleging inter alia December 22, 1977 at the height of the Christmas that “the amendments have the effect of enabling holidays with just a few days before the scheduled the members to appropriate the club’s property and deadline of December 28, 1977 petitioner properly to use it as their contribution to the new club”; the filed the present petition directly with the Supreme real estate assets of Manila Polo Club consists of 25 Court without going through the prescribed hectares, more or less, of prime real estate in the procedure of filing an appeal with respondent middle of Forbes Park, Makita, Metro Manila, which Commission en banc within the 30-day are conservatively valued at present market reglementary period since such recourse was valuation of P200 Million and its building, obviously not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. improvements, facilities and other equipment at about 20 Million. The questions raised by petitioner in his “The more or less 2,000 actual members who pending complaints with respondent commission will become proprietary owners of the Club’s assets warrant “a full-blown trial on the merits” after which under the proposed conversion will inequitably the main issues may be duly adjudicated as enrich themselves if this Honorable Commission will contended by him, and since respondents likewise allow the comparatively paltry sum P12,500.00 to concur in this stand, the case will be remanded to be paid on or before December 28, 1977 for each respondent commission for such trial and proprietary membership”; determination on the merits. “the value which the club now commands results from the accrued contribution of past (and present) 12. Under Exhaustion of Administrative members’ money, time, effort and foresight; and the Remedies Page 7 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Valmonte vs. Belmonte v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which Facts: Petitioner Velmonte represents himself and requires the interpretation of the scope of the co petitioners in the instant case of mandamus constitutional right to information, is one which can requiring the GSIS to a) furnish petitioners the list be passed upon by the regular courts more of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, able to secure clean loans immediately before the the exception of this case from the application of the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal general rule on exhaustion of administrative note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or remedies is warranted. b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of (WARNING) The issue above is not the main issue :D the documents evidencing their respective loans; it is only the issue based on the syllabus. and/or c) to allow petitioners access to the public Main Issue: whether or not petitioners are entitled records for the subject information. to access to the documents evidencing loans The case arose when a request letter was sent by granted by the GSIS Velmonte to respondent Belmonte, the then GSIS Ruling : Yes. General Manager. Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right A reply letter was sent by Atty. Meynardo Trio, to information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's right to information is Deputy General Counsel. However, said letter was never received by petitioner which resulted to limited to "matters of public concern," and is further another letter stating "(W)e are now considering "subject to such limitations as may be provided by ourselves free to do whatever action necessary law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is within the premises to pursue our desired objective limited to "transactions involving public interest," in pursuance of public interest.” Thereafter and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed resulting to this instant petition. by law." Issue: Whether or Not the Doctrine of exhaustion of Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be administrative remedies is applicable. clear that the information sought is of "public Ruling: No, the doctrine does not apply. interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted Defense of Respondent: Respondent claims that by law from the operation of the constitutional actions of the GSIS General Manager are rev iewable guarantee. by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, The information sought by petitioners in this case is however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of the truth of reports that certain Members of the Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition administrative remedies were not exhausted, then were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS petitioners have no cause of action. immediately before the February 7, 1986 election Petitioners Contention: Petitioners claim that they through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, have raised a purely legal issue, viz., whether or not Mrs. Imelda Marcos. The public nature of the they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it by the alleged borrowers make the information is argued that this case falls under one of the sought clearly a matter of public interest and exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of concern. And the same in not exempted by privacy administrative remedies. under the constitution and is not barred by the Court Ruling: Among the settled principles in confidentiality of the loan because the same is not administrative law is that before a party can be based on any law, nor is it a private document (loan allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to by GSIS to Public Officials). have exhausted all means of administrative redress Petition Granted. available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a 13. G.R. Nos. March 29, 1996 case unless the available administrative remedies 11270809 have been resorted to and the appropriate PETITIONER REPUBLIC OF THE authorities have been given opportunity to act and PHILIPPINES, represented correct the errors committed in the administrative by PRESIDENTIAL forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of COMMISSION ON GOOD administrative remedies is subject to settled GOVERNMENT exceptions, among which is when only a question of RESPONDENTS SANDIGANBAYAN, SIPALAY law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 TRADING CORPORATION Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. and ALLIED BANKING L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan CORPORATION Page 8 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST action.
ATTY. CABRAS
Facts: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions, this Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition. When Sandiganbayan directed the parties to the case to submit formal evidence in writing. However, PCGG filed a "Motion To Dismiss" the petitions of SIPALAY and ALLIED on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. PCGG lost in the two petitions. In the SIPALAY petition, the Sandiganbayan predicating on PCGG’s failure to implead the petitioner within the period mandated under Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and for having issued the writ of sequestration without sufficient evidentiary foundation because PCGG failed to adduce and proffer that quantum of evidence necessary for its validity. In the ALLIED petition, Sandiganbayan held that the search and seizure order was issued without due process and in contravention of the organic law then in force, the Freedom Constitution, under which mantle, the Bill of Rights found in the 1973 Constitution was amply protected and enforced.
However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principles aforestated. The SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions were both filed on the third quarter of 1986 (September 16 and August 26, respectively), while the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of 1993 (July 7). Nearly seven (7) years came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the proceedings during the interregnum. SIPALAY and ALLIED had rested their cases, and the PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses, not to mention other various motions and incidents already disposed of by the SANDIGANBAYAN, with special attention to the numerous postponements granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence which prevented an earlier termination of the proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the SANDIGANBAYAN. With its undenied belated action, seven (7) years in the making at that, it is only proper to presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what it bewailed as the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions' lack of cause of action.
Doctrines Learned:
Issue/s: Whether SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss proper
Ruling: Yes, SANDIGANBAYAN's denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss was proper.
Ratio Decidendi:
A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it.
14.FORTICH V. CORONA 289 SCRA 624 Factors Affecting Topic:
Finality
of
Administrative Decisions As a general rule, a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of
Facts: On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a “win-win” Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424. The said Resolution Page 9 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS substantially modified its March 29, 1996 Decision. While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, The OP had long declared the said Decision final & every case must be prosecuted in accordance with executory after the DAR’s Motion for the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly & Reconsideration was denied for having been filed speedy administration of justice. The flexibility in beyond the 15-day reglementary period. the relaxation of rules was ‘never intended to forge The SC then struck down as void the OP’s act, it a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with being in gross disregard of the rules & basic legal impunity.’ precept that accord finality to administrative A liberal interpretation & application of the rules of determinations. procedure can only be resorted to in proper cases The respondents contended in their instant motion and under justifiable causes and circumstances. that the “win-win” Resolution of November 7, 1997 No, the issue is NOT a question of technicality. It is is not void since “it seeks to correct an erroneous a question of substance & merit. ruling,” hence, the “March 29, 1996 decision…could A decision/resolution/order of an administrative not as yet become final and executory as to be body, court or tribunal which is declared void on the beyond modification”. They further explained that ground that the same was rendered Without or in the DAR’s failure to file their Motion for Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave Abuse of Reconsideration on time was “excusable." Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and Issues: WON the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for mandatory requirement before a case or controversy Reconsideration is excusable. can be acted on. Moreover, an act is still invalid if WON the respondent’s have shown a justifiable done in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of reason for the relaxation of rules. discretion. WON the issue is a question of technicality. In the instant case, several fatal violations of law Held: were committed. These grave breaches of law, rules No, the DAR’s late filing of the Motion for & settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not Reconsideration is NOT excusable. of technical nature. Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declar ed February 12, 1987, mandates that final and executory, vested rights were acquired by ‘decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the the petitioners, and all others who should be President shall…become final after the lapse of 15 benefited by the said Decision. days from receipt of a copy therof xxx’ unless a In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Motion for Reconsideration thereof is filed within Panganiban in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, such period. The respondent’s explanation that the et al., “just as a losing party has the right to file an DAR’s office procedure ‘made it impossible…to file appeal within the prescribed period, the winning its Motion for Reconsideration on time’ since the party also has the correlative right to enjoy the said decision had to be referred to its different finality of the resolution of his/her case. departments cannot be considered a valid Referential Syllabus: justification. While there is nothing wrong with such Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; “Errors referral, the DAR must not disregard the of Judgment” and “Errors of Jurisdiction,” reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. Compared; Words and Phrases; An error of The rules relating to reglementary period should not judgment is one which the court may commit in the be made subservient to the internal office procedure exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is of an administrative body. reviewable only by an appeal, while an error of No, the respondent’s have NOT shown a justifiable jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was reason for the relaxation of rules. issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body The final & executory character of the OP Decision without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave can no longer be disturbed or substantially abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or modified. Res judicata has set in and the in excess of jurisdiction, and which error is adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest. correctable only by the extraordinary writ of Procedural rules should be treated with utmost certiorari. — Anent the first issue, in order to respect and due regard since they are designed to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival an error of judgment and an err or of jurisdiction. An claims and in the administration of justice. The error of judgment is one which the court may Constitution guarantees that “all persons shall have commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which a right to the speedy disposition of their cases before error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act bodies.” complained of was issued by the court, officer or a Page 10 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS quasi-judicial body without or in excess of specifically set out in the petition. This is jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time This error is correctable only by the extraordinary and attention which are better devoted to those writ of certiorari. matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to Same; Same; Same; Same; The remedy prescribed prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s in Rule 43 is inapplicable where the petition docket.” Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve contains an allegation that the challenged to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued with in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future “grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond the public litigations so as to promptly put an end to the respondent’s jurisdiction” when said resolution present controversy which, as correctly observed by substantially modified the earlier decision which petitioners, has sparked national interest because had long become final and executory. — It is true that of the magnitude of the problem created by the under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial be dis cussed later, we find the assailed resolution agency exercising quasi-judicial functions, wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their including the Office of the President, may be taken petition first with the Court of Appeals would only to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition result in a waste of time and money. for review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Same; Same; Same; Suspension of the Rules; That said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the the Supreme Court has the power to set aside its appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed own rules in the higher interests of justice is wellquestions of fact and law. However, we hold that, in entrenched in our jurisprudence. — That the Court this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule has the power to set aside its own rules in t he higher 43 is inapplicable considering that the present interests of justice is well-entrenched in our petition contains an allegation that the challenged jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon resolution is “patently illegal” and was issued with vs. Court of Appeals: “Be it remembered that rules “grave abuse of discretion” and “beyond his of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona’s) the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid jurisdiction” when said resolution substantially application, which would result in technicalities modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 that tend to frustrate rather than promote which had long become final and executory. In other substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time words, the crucial issue raised here involves an and again, this Court has suspended its own rules error of jurisdiction, not an err or of judgment which and excepted a particular case from their operation is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the whenever the higher interests of justice so require. appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy assailed resolution is an original special civil action disquisition of the proper procedure that should for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have been taken by the parties involved and proceed have correctly done. x x x The office of a writ of directly to the merits of the case.” certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases — Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; A cases in which the act of the lower court or motion for reconsideration is not necessary when quasijudicial body is wholly void. the questioned resolution is a patent nullity. — As to Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has the full the second issue of whether the petitioners discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed for certiorari filed directly to it if compelling reasons, to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed or the nature and importance of the issues raised, resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it warrant. — The Supreme Court has the full to state that the said motion is not necessary when discretionary power to take cognizance of the the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, as will petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons, or be taken up later. the nature and importance of the issues raised, Same; Same; ‘‘Forum Shopping,’’ Explained; Words warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be and Phrases. ------‘‘There is forum-shopping observed and which has been reiterated in whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one subsequent cases, namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et al., forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than Torres vs. Arranz, Bercero vs. De Guzman, and by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle Advincula vs. Legaspi, et al. As we have further applies not only with respect to suits filed in the stated in Cuaresma: “x x x. A direct invocation of the courts but also in connection with litigation Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these commenced in the courts while an administrative writs should be allowed only when there are special proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to and important reasons therefor, clearly and defeat administrative processes and in anticipation Page 11 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for favorable court ruling. This specially so, as in this intervention filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, case, where the court in which the second suit was which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their brought, has no jurisdiction (citations omitted). motion, movants contend that they are the “The test for determining whether a party violated farmerbeneficiaries of the land in question, hence, the rule against forum shopping has been laid down are real parties in interest. To prove this, they in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), attached as Annex “I” in their motion a Master List x x x and that is, forum shopping exists where the of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged elements of litis pendentia are present or where a master list was made pursuant to the directive in final judgment in one case will amount to res the dispositive portion of the assailed “Win-Win” judicata in the other, as follows: ‘There thus exists Resolution which directs the DAR “to carefully and between the action before this Court and RTC Case meticulously determine who among the claimants No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such are qualified farmer-beneficiaries.” However, a parties as represent the same interests in both perusal of the said document reveals that movants actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and are those purportedly “Found Qualified and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the Recommended for Approval.” In other words, same facts, and the identity on the two preceding movants are merely recommendee farmerparticulars is such that any judgment rendered in beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is that a the other action, will, regardless of which party is real party in interest is a party who would be successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means auter action pendant.’ ” a present substantial interest, as distinguished Same; Same; Same; The test for determining from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, whether a party has violated the rule against forum subordinate or consequential interest. shopping is where a final judgment in one case will Undoubtedly, movants’ interest over the land in amount to res adjudicata in the action under question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not consideration. — It is clear from the above-quoted real parties in interest. rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum Administrative Law; Judgments; The act of the shopping. The test for determining whether a party Office of the President in re-opening the case and has violated the rule against forum shopping is substantially modifying its earlier decision which where a final judgment in one case will amount to had already become final and executory, was in res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept cursory examination of the cases filed by the that accord finality to administrative petitioners does not show that the said cases are determinations. — When the Office of the President similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as DAR Secretary’s order to proceed with the no one has seasonably filed a motion for compulsory acquisition and distribution of the reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its subject property. On the other hand, the civil case jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of and cancellation of title issued in the name of the the President has no more authority to entertain the Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was second motion for reconsideration filed by based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC’s became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” title, used documents which were earlier declared Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court NQSRMDC’s title was made without payment of just mandate that only one (1) motion for compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the for the surrender of its title. The present petition is Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks motion for reconsideration was permitted t o be filed the nullification of the assailed “Win-Win” in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in Resolution of the Office of the President dated the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued said motion should not have been entertained long after the previous two cases were instituted. considering that the first motion for reconsideration Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Real Part y was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the In Interest” and “Real Interest,” Explained; One Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. whose interest over land is a mere expectancy is not Thus, the act of the Office of the President in rea real party in interest. — The fourth and final opening the case and substantially modifying its Page 12 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the 16. Antique Sawmills vs Zayco - SANTILLANA rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to Facts: administrative determinations. Same; Same; The orderly administration of justice On September 30, 1954, a public bidding was requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court conducted for the award of a 12680-hectare forest or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality area. Four parties submitted bid applications with set by the law, rules and regulations; A resolution the Bureau of Forestry, namely: the petitionerwhich substantially modifies a decision after it has appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc., the attained finality, is utterly void. — The orderly respondent-appellee, Aquiles Zayco, Crisencio administration of justice requires that the Milendez and Pedro T. Lo. On November 29, 1954, judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, the Director of Forestry awarded the bid to the rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write respondent-appellee, Aquiles R. Zayco. Thereafter, finis to disputes once and for all. This is a the losing bidders appealed the above award to the fundamental principle in our justice system, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources without which there would be no end to litigations. who, on March 23, 1955, however, affirmed the Utmost respect and adherence to this principle same. All the losing bidders filed a motion for must always be maintained by those who wield the reconsideration with the Secretary of Agricultural power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down. and Natural Resources and issued an order on July Therefore, the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution which 14, 1955 modifying that the forest area in question substantially modified the Decision of March 29, was awarded in equal portions to Aquiles R. Zayco 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. and the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas A. Street in a 1918 case, is “a lawless thing, Zayco received a copy of the above-mentioned order which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, on July 28, 1955, and on August 20, 1955, he filed or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its against it a motion for reconsideration. On head.” September 10, 1955, the same was denied. On 15. Sotto vs. Ruiz (41 Phil 468 [No. 17419], 18 December 19, 1955, Zayco filed with the Secretary March 1921) of Agriculture and Natural Resources a second motion for reconsideration which, on February 15, Facts: Antonio Ruiz, the Acting Director of the 1956, was resolved by the latter stating that the Bureau of Posts, refused to forward a copy of The second motion for reconsideration was filed too late, Independent as registered mail on the ground that it that is, outside the reglementary period of thirty (30) contained a libelous matter. Vicente Sotto, a public official, at that time, was the proprietor of the said days prescribed in Section 10 of Forestry periodical. Administrative Order No. 6-2. From the time the Issue/s: Whether or not the Director of Posts was movant received notice of the order sought to be wrong in refusing to forward the said copy of The reconsidered on July 28, 1955, to the time he filed Independent. (Yes) his first motion for reconsideration on August 20, Held: To say that the publication of an official 1955, twenty-three (23) days had elapsed; and from telegram from one public official to another is his receipt of the order of this Office dated printed or written matter of a libelous character, when such telegram contains no attack upon any September 10, 1955, denying the first motion for person is manifestly arbitrary and unjust and is not reconsideration on November 22, 1955, to the filing based upon any reasonable interpretation of the of the instant motion on December 19, 1955, law. The propriety of periodical distributing copies twenty-seven (27) days had elapsed. All in all, fifty of a confidential telegram sent by one official to (50) days had elapsed from his receipt of the order another may well be questioned. But to do so is not sought to be reconsidered to the filing of the herein libelous per se. Even the squib following the copy of the telegram is no more than attempted humor and motion. Consequently, the said order of this office would not be taken seriously by the reading public. dated July 14, 1955 had already become final and The action of the Director of Posts in disbarring from executory pursuant to the aforecited regulation. the mails copies of The Independent on the ground that they contained matter of a libelous character was clearly wrong. Page 13 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS On February 27, 1956, the respondent-appellee 2. That administrative rules and regulations appealed to the Office of the President. have the force of law can no longer be questioned. ( Valerio vs. Secretary of On August 27, 1956, however, the Executive Agriculture, et al., G.R. No. L-18587, April Secretary rendered a decision sustaining the appeal 23, 1963) . This order of the Executive Secretary awarded the The appellees' view that the period fixed in entire forest concession in question to the Administrative Order No. 6-2 of the Director of respondent-appellee, Aquiles B. Zayco. Forestry cannot bind the Office of the President since the latter has supervision and control over the Petitioner contends that the period provided by the former cannot commend itself to sound public rules for the perfection of an appeal is not only policy. Even administrative decisions must and mandatory but jurisdictional. Thus, since, the sometime, as fully as public policy demands that respondent-appellee failed to perfect his appeal on finality be written on judicial controversies (Manila time and finality had already set in the order of July Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 61 Phil. 14, 1955, the Office of the President could not have 456). required jurisdiction over the same.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the said period is a mere procedural technicality which, at least in administrative proceedings, may liberally be relaxed. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the period for perfecting an appeal is only procedural and can be relaxed. 2. Whether or not administrative regulations have the force and effect of law RULING: 1. In a long line of cases, 1 the Supreme Court has ruled that compliance with the period provided by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement. Thus, in the case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al., 92 Phil. 168, this Court held: Section 13 of Rule 41 provides that when the appeal is not perfected within the reglementary period the appeal shall be dismissed. The requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but jurisdictional . Such failure has the effect of rendering final the judgment of the court, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost.
In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615).
17. Uy vs Palomar 27 SCRA 287 Facts: Manuel Uy filed the complaint with the CFI of Manila against the Postmaster General, praying for an injunction to restrain the latter from enforcing Fraud Order No. 3, dated Nov. 22, 1963, declaring Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency as conducting a lottery or gift enterprise and directing all postmasters and their employees of the Bureau of Post concerned to return to the sender any mail matter addressed to Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or to any of its agents or representatives with the notation: “Fraudulent” stamped upon the cover of such mail matter and, prohibiting the issuance of payment of any money order or telegraphic transfers to the said representatives. Issue: Whether appellee’s “Grand Christmas Bonus Award” plan constitute a lottery, gift, enterprise, or similar scheme prescribed by the Postal Law as would authorize the appellant to issue the fraud order in question. Held: The Postal Law contains no provision for judicial review of decision of the Postmaster General. This Court, however, had stated that the action of the Director of Post is subject to revision
Page 14 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS by the courts in case he exceeded his authority of decide administrative questions and that non-legal his act is palpably wrong. factors, such as government policy on the matter, For lottery to exist, three elements must concur, are usually involved in the decisions. namely: consideration, prize and chance. There are, of course, limits to the exercise of In the “Grand Christmas Bonus Award” plan administrative discretion. Administrative of the appellee. We do not see the presence of the proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a element of consideration, that is payment of showing that “the board or official has gone beyond something of value, or agreement to pay, for the his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional chance to win the bonus or award offered. True, that powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without to be a participant in said plan, one must have to regard to his duty or with grave abuse of buy a whole sweepstakes ticket (8 shares) sold by discretion”2 or that the decision is vitiated by fraud, the Manuel Uy Sweepstakes Agency or by its sub imposition or mistake. agents. But the payment for the price of the sweepstakes ticket in the consideration for the chance to win any of the prizes offered by the PCSO 19. SAN LUIS VS. CA in the sweepstakes draw of December 15, 1953. Wholly or partly, said payment cannot be deemed as FACTS: a consideration also for the chance to win the prizes Petitioner-appellant,Berroya, (private respondent offered by the appellee. For nothing is asked of, or herein) had been the quarry superintendent in the received from, the buyer of the ticket more than the Province of Laguna. In April and May of 1973, authorized price thereof, and which price appears petitioner-appellant denounced graft and corrupt on the face of the ticket. practices by employees of the provincial government of Laguna. Herein respondent-appellee provincial 18. MANUEL vs. VILLENA governor (one of the petitioners herein) issued an FACTS: Magno Manuel had been in continuous Office Order transferring Berroya to the office of the possession of a 20-hectare parcel of public land Provincial Engineer. Berroya challenged said since 1939; being an ignorant farmer he did not file transfer, and the Civil Service Commission ruled the his Tree Farm application (No. 13312) until June same violative and ordered that Berroya be reverted 1954. The Director of Forestry rejected the same to his regular position of quarry superintendent. because a prior application (No. 3852) had been filed Instead of complying, herein respondent-appellee by Mariano Villena in November 1955. Manuel filed provincial governor suspended Berroya for alleged two motions for reconsideration of the rejection gross discourtesy, inefficiency and insubordination. order but were turned down. Manuel thereafter On petitioner-appellant’s motion for appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural reconsideration, the Office of the President rendered Resources, but the appeal was dismissed the latter. a Decision, declaring the one-year suspension On motion for reconsideration the Secretary found improper, and ordering payment of back salaries to that the previous investigation conducted by the Berroya. In the interim, respondent-appellant District Forester was not in accordance with the provincial governor issued an Order dismissing rules and regulations of the Bureau, and so ordered Berroya for alleged neglect of duty, frequent another investigation to be made; but that before unauthorized absences, conduct prejudicial to the said investigation was terminated the Secretary best interest of duty and abandonment of office, rendered a decision dismissing the appeal. which order of dismissal was appealed by Berroya ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Secretary to the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service of DENR should be set aside. Commission resolved said appeal by declaring the RULING: No. Under Section 1838 of the Revised dismissal unjustified, exonerating Berroya of Administrative Code, the function of approval or charges, and directing his reinstatement as quarry rejection of an application for a Tree Farm Permit superintendent. Berroya instituted suit in 1980 to falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of compel petitioner to reinstate him to his former Forestry with the approval of the Secretary of position and to pay his back salaries. After trial, the Agriculture and Natural Resources. court a quo rendered its decision finding the The power thus conferred on the Director of Forestry transfer of petitioner-appellant sufficiently with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and warranted. Furthermore, his one-year suspension Natural Resources is basically executive or was found to be proper and unassailable. Berroya administrative in nature.1 And courts, as a rule, appealed from the decision of the Regional Trial refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by Court and it was resolved by the respondent Court administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of of Appeals in his favor. Petitioners moved to administrative functions. This is so because such reconsider the decision of the appellate court but bodies are generally better equipped technically to their motion was denied. Hence, the instant Page 15 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW petition.
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS the Philippine Veterans Investment Development ISSUE: Corporation (PHIVDEC) and PHIVIDEC Industrial Whether or not the decisions of both the Civil Authority (PIA). Service Commission and the Office of the President PHIVIDEC and PIA in their answer alleged lack of can be reviewed by the courts. jurisdiction over the case and averred that it is under the arbitration powers of the Government HELD: Corporate Counsel under Presidential Decree No. Since the decisions of both the Civil Service 242 which prescribed the procedure for the Commission and the Office of the President had long administrative settlement and adjudication of become final and executory, the same can no longer disputes, claims, and controversies between or be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established in among government offices, agencies and our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of instrumentalities, including government-owned or administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their controlled corporations. quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, RTC denied the motion to dismiss of Petitioner on the force and binding effect of a final judgment the ground that PD 242 is unconstitutional as it within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. impair the power of judiciary to review. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening HENCE this petition for certiori of a matter once judicially determined by competent Sections 1, 3-b and 6 of P.D. 242 provide: authority applies as well to the judicial and quasiSec. 1. Provisions of law to the contrary judicial acts of public, executive or administrative notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction controversies solely between or among the as to the judgments of courts having general judicial departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and powers. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of instrumentalities of the National Government, prior adjudications is not confined in its operation including government-owned or controlled to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as corporations but excluding constitutional offices or agencies, arising from the interpretation and courts, but it extends to all bodies upon whom application of statutes, contracts or agreements , judicial powers had been conferred. Hence, whenever any board, tribunal or person is by law shall henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided , That vested with authority to judicially determine a question, like the Merit Systems Board of the Civil this shall not apply to cases already pending in Service Commission and the Office of the President, court at the time of the effectivity of this decree. for instance, such determination, when it has Sec. 3. . . . become final, is as conclusive between the same (b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with parties litigating for the same cause as though the respect to disputes or claims or controversies adjudication had been made by a court of general between or among the government-owned or jurisdiction. Furthermore, the trial court’s act of controlled corporations or entities being served by reviewing and setting aside the findings of the two the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel; administrative bodies was in gross disregard of the Sec. 6. The final decisions rendered in the basic legal precept that accords finality to settlement or adjudication of all such disputes, administrative findings of facts. The general rule, claims or controversies shall have the same force under the principles of administrative law in force and effect as final decisions of the court of justice. (Rollo , pp. 29-30.) in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the ISSUE: W/N PD 242 is unconstitutional? courts, except when the former have acted without HELD: No. Since the foreclosure proceeding filed or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse by PVAC against PHIVIDEC and PIA arose from of discretion. Findings of administrative officials and the interpretation and application of the agencies who have acquired expertise because their mortgage contract between them, P.D. No. 242 jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are applies to the case. generally accorded not only respect but at times It does not diminish the jurisdiction of courts even finality if such findings are supported by but only prescribes an administrative procedure substantial evidence. for the settlement of certain types of disputes between or among departments, bureaus, offices, 20. VETERANS V VELEZ agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or Facts controlled corporations, so that they need not Respondent, Philippine Veterans Assistance always repair to the courts for the settlement of Commission (PVAC), filed in the RTC complaint for controversies arising from the interpretation and foreclosure of mortgage against the petitioners –– application of statutes, contracts or agreements. Page 16 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS The procedure is not much different, and no less (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas desirable, than the arbitration procedures provided Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary in Republic Act No. 876 (Arbitration Law) and in Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for Section 26, R.A. 6715 (The Labor Code). and warrant a reassessment of that procedural It is an alternative to, or a substitute for, aspect. The Court noted that there may have traditional litigation in court with the added been an oversight in the course of the advantage of avoiding the delays, vexations and deliberations on R.A. 7902, amending B.P. 129, or expense of court proceedings an imprecision in the terminology used therein as P.D. No. 242 is a valid law prescribing an from the records, Congress had intended to provide administrative arbitration procedure for certain for judicial review of the adjudication of the NLRC in disputes among offices, agencies and labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was an instrumentalities under the executive control and inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode supervision of the President of the Philippines. of review. Since PVAC filed Civil Case No. 11157 against The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion PHIVIDEC and PIA without first passing through that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the the administrative channel, the judicial action Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative was premature for non-exhaustion of intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for administrative remedies, hence, dismissible on that account judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word “appeal” in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could have been a lapsus 21. St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC (1998) plumae because appeals by certiorari and the G.R. 130866 original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. Facts: Private respondent alleges that he started The important distinction between them, however, working as Operations Manager of petitioner St. and with which the Court is particularly concerned Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. here is that the special civil action of certiorari is Howev er, there was n o cont ract of employment within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this executed between him and petitioner nor was his Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but employment for allegedly misappropriating would subvert, the intention of Congress as P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill that private respondent was not its employee but No. 1495. only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin’s Funeral Home and in 22 CERTIORARI January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989 so the latter took over the management of the THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION vs. HON. business. Amelita made some changes in the DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the business operation and private respondent and his Regional Trial Court, Branch 74 wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, FACTS: the latter filed a complaint charging that Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the petitioner had illegally terminated his government agency which supervises and regulates employment. The labor arbiter rendered a decision the country's medical colleges, and Secretary in favor of petitioner declaring that no employerLourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of employee relationship existed between the parties Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and case. set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Issue: Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Whether or not NLRC decisions are appealable to Rizal, restraining the enforcement of petitioner the CA? Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Held: Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College). Yes, In view of The increasing number of labor The, College, a private educational institution, was disputes that find their way to this Court and the founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of legislative changes introduced over the years into producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 citizens from age-old attitudes on health." Page 17 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and by him should not and will not be subject to review Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education and reversal by any court. (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Education to conduct a study of all medical schools Court that those powers were in a case exercised so in the Philippines. The report of the Commission whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically showed that the College fell very much short of the or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction — minimum standards set for medical schools. or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted In her letter, Secretary Quisumbing informed the with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. neglected the performance of an act which the law Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another Medical Education to close the College. The College from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to appealed the decision to the Office of the President, which such other is entitled — it becomes the imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Court's duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, Secretary. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may decision, affirmed it. properly apply. Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has On March 2, 1989, the College went to c ourt. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent been abuse of powers by the Secretary and Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an Quisumbing questioning the decision as illegal, abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to Court, absent any compelling reason to do restrain its implementation. otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the Hence the present petition, assailing the order of ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy injunction made by respondent judge as having action or fulfillment by an educational institution of been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and the standards set down for its legitimate operation, praying for a restraining order against its as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the over judgment for that of said office. action instituted in the court a quo . Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that ISSUE: the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports Whether the Courts can hear or determine appeals exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the from decisions or orders of the Secretary of requirements laid down for medical schools and to Education, Culture and Sports mete out sanctions where he finds that violations HELD: No. thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly allowing the College to operate without the unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law requisite government permit . A single ocular authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders inspection, done after the College had been preof the Secretary of Education, Culture and warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not warrant only the findings of more qualified the function of this Court or any other Court to inspectors about the true state of the College, its review the decisions and orders of the Secretary faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of on the issue of whether or not an educational the evaluating team came from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine, and their institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to judgment in this particular area is certainly better continue operating as such. On this question, no than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and Court has the power or prerogative to substitute only visit to the school could hardly have given him its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is much more to go on than a brief look at the physical obviously not expected that any Court would have plant and facilities and into the conduct of the the competence to do so. classes and other school activities. The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion matter is the determination of whether or not in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports well-settled doctrine that courts of justice has acted within the scope of powers granted should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered that courts have no supervisory power over the Page 18 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS proceedings and actions of the administrative Reconsideration, but the same was denied in an departments of the government; involving the order. exercise of judgment and findings of facts, ISSUE: Whether petition for certiorari is the proper because by reason of their special knowledge remedy and expertise over matters falling under their RULING: No. jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position There is no question that certiorari is not to pass judgment on such matters andn their the proper remedy in this case as PD No. 1206 findings of facts in that regard are generally creating BOE provides for an appeal to the Office accorded respect, if not finality, by the of the President within seven (7) days from 15 courts . There are, to be sure, exceptions to this receipt of notice of its decision or orders. general rule but none of them obtains in this case. Thereafter, under the Interim Rules Implementing Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
23. Certiorari TESORERO VS MATHAY FACTS: Respondent DALIGHT filed with public respondent BOE an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its properties and equipment. Respondent BOE, after hearings in an order dated March 13, 1981, constituted an inspection team to conduct ocular inspection/verification of the physical existence and ownership of all the properties and equipment of DALIGHT. Thereafter, respondent BOE, in an order dated June 19, 1981, based on the submission of the inspection team, disapproved TAMSPHIL appraisal because: (1) TAMSPHIL was disqualified from making the appraisal, its President-Chairman being then a technical and engineering consultant of applicant DALIGHT and (2) there were deficiencies and discrepancies in the appraisal report of such serious proportion as to affect the over-all integrity and reliability of the said report. On June 24, 1982, DALIGHT again filed an application for the approval of the appraisal. BOE constituted a team to conduct ocular examination/verification of DALIGHT's properties and equipment, including its books of accounts and other papers relative to the Appraisal Report of Asian Appraisal Co., Inc. Respondent BOE, in a decision dated December 6, 1983, approved the amount of P282,024,877.40 as the fair and reasonable value of DALIGHT's properties, assets and equipments. Petitioners, in their own behalf and on behalf of the more or less 70,000 consumers of Davao City and its environ opposed the inclusion by herein public respondent Board of Energy (BOE) of some properties of DALIGHT for reappraisals because they will have a direct bearing on the rates that respondent DALIGHT charges its customers to the effect that the higher the appraisal of the propertie s, the higher will be the base of the 12% allowable return; or otherwise stated, the higher the rates the consumers will have to pay. Seventeen (17) days after receipt of the said decision, petitioners filed a Motion for
final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of all quasi-judicial bodies other than those specifically excepted are reviewable by the Intermediate Appellate Court. It will be noted that after receipt of the questioned decision of December 6, 1983 on December 19, 1983, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration thereof only on January 5, 1984, or seventeen (17) days from receipt of the said decision, which
therefore had executory.
already
become
final
and
But while it is evident that there was error in the remedy resorted to, this Court in the broader interests of justice has in a number of cases given due course to a petition for certiorari , although the proper remedy is appeal especially where the
equities warrant such recourse and considering that dismissals on technicalities are viewed with disapproval. Furthermore, it is well settled that litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities; that every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his case, free from unacceptable plea of technicalities ; that this Court in the exercise of equity jurisdiction, decided to disregard technicalities in order to resolve the case on its merits based on evidence. A careful review of the records show that this case will not only affect herein petitioners who on some points have a good cause of action but also the more or less 70,000 consumers in Davao City and its environ. Hence, it appears more appropriate to consider the petition on its merits rather than to dismiss it on technicalities.
Page 19 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS is the exception rather than the rule, the party 24. Police Commission vs Bello applying for it must show a clear legal right the violation of which is so recent as to make its Facts: vindication an urgent one. A complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and The principal ground of the petitions by the neglect of duty was filed by certain persons with the respondents is the lack of jurisdiction of the Police Board of Investigators in Binmaley, Pangasinan Commission because it had not yet published a against the respondents Genaro C. Ferrer and Police Manual when it rendered its decision. Emerano Bonifacio, Chief of Police and Corporal, Section 26of the Police Act of 1966 is a mere saving respectively. After the two private respondents filed clause, and refers solely to administrative cases their answers, the Board found that the charges involving police service and personnel which were pending at the time of the effectivity of the Act. The imputed against the two were not committed deliberately but, rather, were done through honest PC was required to absorb the said pending cases mistake and recommending the Police Commission after one hundred days after it shall have published (PC) that the case be dropped. But in its decision, a police manual. The said Sec 26 may not be the PC still found the respondents guilty of serious interpreted to mean that the Board of investigators neglect of duty and ordered their dismissal in the and the police Commission could not legally service. function to carry into effect the purposes of the Act Because of this, Ferrer and Bonifacio filed two until after the lapse of the said one hundred days, separate petitions and contended that the PC had because Sec 28 provides that “this Act shall take no jurisdiction to render a decision on the effect upon its approval.” Since the Act was administrative case because at that time it had not approved on September 8, 1966, it became effective yet even published its Police Manual as required by immediately on that date. Moreover, Sec. 5, Rule 8 Sec. 26 of R.A. 4864 (Police Act of 1966); and that of the Revised Rules of Court prohibits the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte “unless the Commission gravely abused its discretion in dismissing them. Thereafter, the respondent Judge it appears from the facts, shown by affidavits, or by issued an order requiring the Commission to file an the verified complaint that great or irreparable answer within ten days and issued the writ of injury would result to the applicant before the preliminary mandatory injunctions ex parte filed. matter can be heard on notice.” Such facts do not The Judge also dismissed the Civil case against appear in the case of the private respondents. Ferrer and directed that the latter be reinstated Orders of the respondent Judge are hereby declared within 24 hours from receipt of the order. The next null and void. day a similar order was issued in connection with Bonifacio’s petition. 25. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte The Motion for reconsideration filed by PC was Foitaf vs Noriel returned unacted upon because it did not have a proof of service and therefore not in accordance with Facts: the Rules of Court. And on motion by Ferrer and Petitioner labor union would impugn the holding of Bonifacio, respondent Judge issued another order, a certification election ordered by respondent this time requiring the members of the PC to show Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, Carmelo C. cause why they should not be held guilty of Noriel, it being alleged that there was a failure to contempt for their failure to reinstate the two priv ate comply with the thirty percent requirement in the respondents as ordered on the writs. Hence, this petition for certification and that it was filed after present petition. the sixty-day period provided for by the law. Issue: Federation of Free Workers, La Suerte Whether or not the respondent Judge had the power Chapter, filed a petition foe certification election to issue said writs against the Police Commission? alleging that out of bargaining unit of more or less No. 3,500, there were 1,068 signatories. The previous Ruling: certification collective bargaining agreement The Court has already held that it is improper to between the employer La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette issue a writ of preliminary injunction prior to a final Factory and petitioner labor union on December 5, hearing except in cases of extreme urgency, where 1975. There was eleven days later, a motion to the right is very clear; where considerations of intervene filed by petitioner followed by a motion to relative convenience bear strongly in complainant’s dismiss on the ground that respondent Union had favor; where there is a wilful and unlawful invasion not complied with the thirty percent consent of plaintiff’s right against his protest and requirement and that the petition for certification remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one, was filed beyond the sixty-day period to the and etc. As the issuance of a mandatory injunction expiration of the collective bargaining contract. Page 20 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS When a few days later, the employer submitted a list election was filed by respondent union February 6, of the rank and file employees numbering 4,055. 1976. There was no legal bar then to such move. Private respondent thereafter, opposed the motion to dismiss, stating that there was compliance with the thirty percent consent requirement and t hat the 26.MERALCO VS. CBAA filing was within the period allowed by law. An appeal was taken to respondent Noriel as FACTS: Petitioner questions the decision of the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. An order respondent which held that petitioner’s pipeline is came from him, the dispositive portion of which is subject to realty tax. Pursuant to a concession, to the effect that the appeal was denied. A motion petitioner installed a pipeline system from Manila to for certiorari was filed. Batangas. Meanwhile, the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real property. So, Issue: petitioner appealed the assessments to the Board of Whether or not there is no showing of Assessment Appeals of Laguna. The board upheld arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority to the assessments and the decision became final and justify granting the writ of certiorari executory after the lapse of fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision by the appellant. Meralco Securities contends that the Held: No. The objection of petitioner as to the Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to review alleged lack of the thirty percent requirement in the the decision of the Central Board of Assessment number of signatories according to the present Appeals and no judicial review of the Board's Labor Code is without merit. Private respondent decision is provided for in the Real Property Tax filed the petition for certification supported by 1,068 Code. Hence, the petitioner’s recourse to file a signatories of the employees of the employer. After petition for certiorari. the petition was filed, the employer however submitted a list of its regular rank and file employees with a total number of 4, 055. Private ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari is the proper respondent in order to comply with 30% consent recourse of the petitioner. requirement submitted additional list of rank and file employees. Petitioner did miss the point that HELD: YES. It was held that certiorari was properly such a requirement of thirty percent of all the availed of in this case. It is a writ issued by a employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only superior court to an inferior court, board or officer when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions conduct a certification election. In such a case, whereby the record of a particular case is ordered to there is no thirty percent requirement. be elevated for review and correction in matters of Nor was there any improvident or arbitrary law. exercise of authority when respondent Noriel ordered the certification election after the lapse of The rule is that as to administrative agencies sixty-dat period provided for by the law. The law exercising quasi-judicial power there is an cannot be any clearer. It argues against the underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts pretension of the petitioner. According to the Labor of such agencies on questions of law and Code: “No certification election issue shall be jurisdiction even though no right of review is given entertained by the Bureau in any collective by the statute. The purpose of judicial review is to bargaining unit if a collective bargaining agreement keep the administrative agency within its exist between the employer and a legitimate labor jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties organization, except within sixty (60) days prior to affected by its decisions. The review is a part of the the expiration of the life of such certified collective system of checks and balances which is a limitati on bargaining agreement.” on the separation of powers and which forestalls No other meaning can be attached to such arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review provision, as applied to the present situation, exc ept of the decision of an official or administrative agency that the former collective bargaining agreement exercising quasi-judicial functions is proper in expired on December 5, 1975, sixty days prior to cases of lack of jurisdiction, error of law, grave that date, a petition for certification election could abuse of discretion, fraud or collusion or in case the have been filed. It does not mean that after administrative decision is corrupt, arbitrary or December 5, 1975, no such petition could be capricious. entertained be respondent Noriel, provided there was no certified collective contract in existence at 27. CERTIORARI the time of the petition for holding the certification 7. No. L-74687. November 12, 1987.* Page 21 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS ANTONIO DE LEON, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF (International Gateway Facility). GREGORIO REYES, OFFICE OF THE Eastern is a 60% Filipino owned PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT FOR LEGAL corporation organized under Philippine law and AFFAIRS, thru MANUEL LAZARO, (now OFFICE holder of a legislative franchise under R.A. No. 808, OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY), respondents. as amended by R.A. No. 5002, in relation to P.D. No. 489 granting it the right and privilege to: “. . . land, FACTS construct, maintain and operate telecommunication systems by cable or any The land in question is the subject of two other means now known to science or which in the separate applications, one for sale filed by Gregorio future may be developed for the reception and Reyes and one for free patent filed by petitioner transmission of messages between any point in the Antonio De Leon. Both are based on the claim of Philippines to points exterior thereto , including actual possession. airplanes, airships or vessels even though such The Bureau of Lands ruled against Reyes, airplanes, airships or vessels may be located within who appealed to the Ministry of Natural Resources. territorial limits of the Philippines.” The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs set aside PLDT contended that an IGF is inherently part of "a the decision of the Bureau, but was reversed by the telephone system" since it is "useful only for a Minister on motion for reconsideration. Private telephone system." Thus, PLDT contends that in respondents elevated the case to the Office of the effect Eastern is asking for a CPCN to establish President where they were sustained. a telephone system. But Eastern has no franchise to establish a telephone system. Hence, PLDT ISSUE continues, Eastern cannot be granted the CPCN it Whether or not the challenged decision was seeks. issued with grave abuse of discretion. On 14 November 1989 and 16 July 1990, the National Telecommunications Commission ("NTC") HELD rendered a Decision and Order respectively. The The Court held in the affirmative. While court originally set aside the order and decision on there is no disputing the authority of administrative a petition for certiorari filed by PLDT. superiors to reverse the findings of their subordinates, this power must be exercised Issue sparingly and only upon a clear showing of error. Whether the petition for certiorari should be Lacking such flaw, the decision of the lower dismissed. administrative officials should be sustained, if only Held Yes. Eastern in its application was not asking for because they have closer access to the problem sought to be resolved and have the direct authority to install and operate opportunity to question the parties and their a domestic telephone or other telecommunications witnesses and to assess the evidence first-hand. system, understood as a system for carrying messages from one point in the Philippines to another point also in the Philippines. Eastern was 28. PLDT vs NTC (241 SCRA 486; G.R. No. 94374, merely asking for authority to install and operate an international gateway facility, which would 21 Feb 1995) mediate between the domestic telephone system of Facts PLDT and the transmitting and carrying facilities of Eastern. The gateway facility will permit messages The court r endered a Decision on 27 August 1992 granting the Petition for Certiorari filed by PLDT and originating from a person using PLDT's domestic set aside the Decision and Order on 14 November telephone system to enter the transmitting and 1989 and 16 July 1990 of the National carrying facilities of Eastern, and as well allow Telecommunications Commission ("NTC"). That messages incoming from abroad through Eastern's Decision of the NTC had granted the application of carrying facilities to enter PLDT's domestic system. private-respondent Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. ("Eastern") for a Certificate of 29. ALZORES VS SEC, 252 SCRA 387 Public Convenience and Necessity ("CPCN") and to construct, maintain and operate an International FACTS: Petitioner was a member of Philippine Gateway Facility ("IGF"). Columbian Association (PCA), and later immigrated On 16 July 1987 Private respondent Eastern, filed to US to work as Attorney-Adviser in the U.S. with the NTC an application for a CPCN Department of Commerce and simply stopped (Certification for Public Convenience and Necessity), paying membership dues without informing the PCA to construct, maintain and operate an IGF of his change of residence and citizenship. When Page 22 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS petitioner came back to the Philippines, he inquired the SEC en banc, the errors are not errors of from the PCA President, how he could reactivate his jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. There was, membership. He was told that he had to pay all therefore, reasonable basis for the decision of the dues, which active members had to pay, during the Hearing Officer in dismissing petitioner’s complaint. time he was out of the country. Petitioner objected alleging that it was not fair that he should be required to pay the amount due acti ve 30. Chua Hiong vs Deportation Board members since he was out of the country and did No. L-6038 (March 19, 1955) not use PCA facilities during his absence. He was 96 Phil. 665 offered to recommend to the PCA Board of Directors the reactivation of petitioner’s membership on condition (1) that only one of his shares would be FACTS: validated and (2) that petitioner pay one month due In this case petitioner, Chua Hiong, was for every year of absence from the Philippines. alleged to have secured the cancellation of his alien Petitioner replied that he was willing to accept the certificate of registration with the Bureau of second condition but considered the first unfair. Immigration through fraud and misrepresentation But PCA stood pat on its original proposal. claiming to be an illegitimate son of a filipino Petitioner filed with the SEC a complaint, praying mother). He filed a bond and petitioned for the for the replacement of his membership certificates dismissal of the proceedings against him on the and his reinstatement as an active member. following grounds: 1. The jurisdiction to deport Petitioner’s complaint was referred to a Hearing aliens exists only with regard to aliens, those who Officer. After the parties had submitted their are admittedly so; 2. Respondent is a citizen of the pleadings and evidence, the decision sustained PCA. Philippines and his claim is supported by evidence Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but his motion that, if believed, is sufficient to entitle him to a was denied in an order. His appeal was dismissed declaration of his citizenship; and 3. His filipino for having been filed out of time. Petitioner filed a citizenship has already been declared by the motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Secretary of Labor, in representation of the appeal but the same was denied. President of the Philippines, and the same is binding ISSUE: W/N SEC gravely abused its discretion in on the other executive branches of the government, dismissing the petitioner’s appeal. the Deportation Board including. The motion to NO. The alleged errors assigned by petitioner quash was denied on the ground that mere plea of HELD: are mere errors of judgment, but since he failed to citizenship does not divest the proceedings. That the perfect his appeal to the SEC en banc, he cannot Deportation Board has judicial power to pass upon now raise them. Even then further appeal should be the sufficiency of the evidence that the respondent taken to the CA in accordance with B.P. Blg. 129, 9 may submit to support his claim of citizenship. The and Circular No. 1-91. In this case for cer tiorari are Deportation Board found the support to his limited to an inquiry into any jurisdictional errors citizenship inconclusive. The petitioner sought which are not present in this case.The failure of a herein a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that party to perfect his appeal in the manner and within his arrest was made without jurisdiction, that his the period fixed by law renders the decision sought claim of citizenship is supported by evidence, that a to be appealed final, with the result that no court writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the Deportation Board for the case until his petition is decision. heard by the court. There was absolutely no reason why petitioner did not perfect his appeal on time. Nor is there any showing that the SEC committed the errors ISSUE: attributed to it in the petition. In the first place, the Whether or not the preliminary injuction should alleged errors were not committed by the SEC en continue. banc but, if at all, by the Hearing Officer. What petitioner claims to be errors of the SEC en banc is only the consequence of the dismissal of his appeal. HELD: For the fact is that the SEC en banc did not decide Yes. In the case at bar, the court found that his appeal. What is more, as already stated, the the evidence of which petitioner and the State may dismissal of petitioners appeal was in accordance avail of such substantial nature as to afford belief with law and not at all a grave abuse of the Hearing that only impartial judicial investigation can Officers discretion. In the second place, this is a evaluate with fairness to the petitioner with justice petition for certiorari under Rule 65. As such, even to all concerned. Besides, the Executive department assuming that errors were allegedly committed by has seen it proper that the issue of citizenship be Page 23 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS determined in a judicial proceeding. Wherefore, the 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo) in his capacity as preliminary injuction issued in this case should an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated continue. Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the 31. No. L-22748. July 29, 1977.* private respondents (being the officers and members GREGORIO CO and HERCULANO CO, of the North EDSA Vendors Association, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE DEPORTATION Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were BOARD, respondent-appellant. given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July, 1990) within which to vacate the questioned TOPIC: Modes of Judicial Review | Prohibition premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were FACTS: Special Prosecutor of the Deportation informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls Board filed charges against petitioners with such should be removed to give way to the “People’s Board alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in Park.” On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their the Philippines, who failed, neglected and refused to President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay ) with the CHR register as Chinese nationals with the Bureau of Immigration, they violated the law, compounded by against the petitioners, asking the late CHR the fact that they represented themselves as Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to Filipinos. be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents’ stalls, sari-sari stores, Then they filed with the Deportation Board a motion and carinderia along NORTH EDSA. The complaint to dismiss based on the plea that it lacked jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580 . On 23 July the Philippines. 1990, the CHR issued an order, directing the petitioners “to desist from demolishing the stalls Such motion was denied as was a subsequent and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of motion seeking reconsideration. They did exhaust the vendors/squatters’ complaint before the their administrative remedy, an appeal to the Commission” and ordering said petitioners to President being fruitless. appear before the CHR. Issue: Whether or not the CHR is prohibited to act Thereafter, they filed the special civil action of upon the case and petition should be granted? prohibition and habeas corpus, with the decision as Held: Yes, In the particular case at hand, there is no noted being in their favor on the ground of their cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as being Filipinos. temporary shanties, erected by private respondents ISSUE: WON the judiciary may entertain an on a land which is planned to be developed into a action for prohibition against Deportation Board “People’s Park.” More than that, the land adjoins the during the pendency of an inquiry against appellees. North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. HELD: Judicial determination is allowable The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus “in cases when the courts themselves believe that to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed there is substantial evidence supporting the claim paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have of citizenship, so substantial that there are been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is even be invoked, if it is not, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards discoursed vis- correct. In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, court in a proper proceeding.” the Court are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall 32. SIMON VS. CHR – 229 SCRA 117 within the compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights” intended by the Facts: A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a Constitution. Petition is granted. restraining order and preliminary injunction was filed by the petitioners (Simon). The petitioners asks 33. Under Prohibition: the Court to prohibit public respondent CHR from Paredes vs. CA further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 901580, entitled “Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al.” Facts: On 9 November 1992, public respondents In the case, A “Demolition Notice,” dated 9 July (Secretary of Trade and Industry) promulgated Page 24 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Administrative Order Nos. 1 and 2, Series of 1992, will not entertain a case unless the available revising the rules of practice before the Bureau of administrative remedies have been resorted to and Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer the appropriate authorities have been given (BPTTT) in patent and trademark cases, to take opportunity to act and correct the errors committed effect on 15 March 1993. Among the provisions of in the administrative forum. said administrative orders are Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 And in Philnabank Employees v. Estanislao,[10] we and Rule 15 of A.O. No. 2, which increased the fees declared: payable to the BPTTT for registration of patents and Secondly, although not inflexible, we have trademarks and Rule 59 of A.O. No. 2 which repeatedly declined on grounds of prematurity, as prohibited the filing of multi-class applications, that well as in the interest of good order, a hasty recourse is, one application covering several classes of goods. to the courts when administrative avenues are still On 11 March 1993, petitioners, who are registered open. In the instant case, we concur with the ruling patent agents, filed with the Court of Appeals a of the Court of Appeals that: Petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance . . . herein petitioners have still another available of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to stop public recourse under the law being relied upon. Section 2 respondents from enforcing the aforementioned of B.P. 325 reads in part: Sec. 2. Determination of Ratio.- xxx. The revision of administrative orders and to declare Rule 16 of A.O. No. 1 and Rules 15 and 59 of A.O. No. 2, series of rates shall be determined by the respective ministry heads or equivalent functionaries conformably with 1992 of the BPTTT null and void. On 27 October 1993, the Court of Appeals the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof, upon dismissed the petition for prohibition and on 10 recommendation of the imposing and collecting January 1994, denied the motion for authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the reconsideration filed by petitioners on 18 November 1993. Cabinet. xx x (Italics supplied) The above provision envisions a three-step process Issue: Whether or not prohibition is a proper involving a hierarchy of authority before the rate remedy. (Again not the main issue) increases and charges can be imposed and collected. First, the BPTTT, which is the imposing Ruling: Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The and collecting agency, makes a recommendation of enabling law itself, which is B.P. Blg. 325, has the fee increases and charges. Those recommended specifically tasked the Cabinet to review and rates and charges are submitted to the Secretary of approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and the DTI for his evaluation and approval. Second, if charges. Petitioners should have availed of this e asy the Secretary of the DTI finds that the rate increases and accessible remedy instead of immediately and charges conform with the rules and regulations resorting to the judicial process. of the Ministry of Finance, then the same are Our legislature in delegating to administrative approved and in turn become the rates of the officers the authority to revise fees and charges department. The determination of the supposed expressly required cabinet approval for the proper rates and charges does not end here. As mentioned exercise of said power. Petitioners should not have in Section 2 above; the rates as determined by the department head are subject to the approval of the wasted the opportunity to utilize this built-in remedy. Cabinet. The grant (or denial) of a writ of prohibition is The phrase subject to is one qualification. It means ordinarily within the sound discretion of the court under the control, power or dominion of or to be exercised with caution and forbearance, subordinated to, a higher authority (cf. PNB vs. Deputy, G.R. No. 35515-R, December 12, according to the circumstances of the particular case, and only where the right to seek relief is 1970). Meaning, that the proposed rates and [7] clear. charges still have to obtain the imprimatur of the Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other Cabinet, and prior to which, they have to undergo remedy is available which is sufficient to afford Cabinet scrutiny. Thus, there is the contingency redress. That the petitioners have another and that the same may not obtain the approval of the complete remedy at law either by appeal or Cabinet. otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for Petitioners are not unaware of this remedy provided [8] dismissing the writ. by law. They have, in fact, raised the lack of Cabinet Hence, in Chua Huat v. CA ,[9] we ruled that: approval as one of the reasons for seeking the Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for nullification of the aforementioned administrative administrative review, and provides a system of orders. (Note: nasagut na yung main issue as to administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the exhaustion of administrative remedy, that is merun courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, pang remedy). Page 25 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
34. G.R. No. 100127 PETITIONER RESPONDENTS
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Maintenance of an Integrated System of Education), and the opinions of the Court in Phil. Consumer April 23, 1993 case and the Cebu Institute case, the Court considers that the legal authority of respondent JOSE D. LINA, JR. DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates ISIDRO D. CARINO, in his or levels of tuition and other school fees, and to capacity as Secretary of issue guidelines for the imposition and collection Education, Culture and thereof, like DECS Order No. 30, must be s ustained.
Sports Facts: This is a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus filed by petitioner Senator Jose D. Lina, Jr. principally as taxpayer, against respondent Isidro D. Carino, in the latter’s capacity as the then Secretary of Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Petitioner disputes the legal authority of respondent Carino to issue DECS Order No. 30, series of 1991, dated 11 March 1991, entitled “Guidelines on Tuition and/or other School Fees in Private Schools, Colleges and Universities for School Year 19911992.” It allows private schools to increase tuition and other school fees, subject to the guidelines there set out. Petitioner basically denies the legal authority of respondent Secretary to issue DECS Order No. 30. It is the contention of the petitioner that respondent Secretary at the time of issuing DECS Order No. 30 no longer possessed legal authority to do so, considering that authority to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the imposition of school fees had been transferred to the State Assistance Council (SAC) by Republic Act No. 6728 (An Act Providing Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education, and Appropriating Funds therefor).
Issue/s: Whether DECS Secretary Carino has legal authority to issue DECS Order No. 30
The Court is unable to agree with Lina’s contention. We do not see how R.A. No. 6728 could be regarded as vesting upon the SAC the legal authority to establish maximum permissible tuition and other school fees for private schools. As earlier noted, R.A. No. 6728 deals with government assistance to students and teachers in private schools; it does not, in other words, purport to deal at all with the question of authority to fix maximum collectible tuition and other school fees. R.A. No. 6728 did authorize the SAC to issue rules and regulations; but the rules and regulations which may be promulgated by the SAC must relate to the authority granted by R.A. No. 6728 to the SAC. It is axiomatic that a rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute if such rule or regulation is to be valid. The SAC was authorized to define the classes of students who may be entitled to claim government financial assistance. Under the statute, students of schools charging tuition and other school fees in excess of certain identified rate or levels thereof shall not be entitled to claim government assistance or subsidies. The specification of such levels of tuition and other school fees for purposes of qualifying (or disqualifying) the students in such schools for government financial assistance is one thing; this is the task SAC was authorized to carry out through the promulgation of rules and regulations. The determination of the leve ls of tution and other school fees which may lawfully be charged by any private school, is clearly another matter; this task is vested in respondent Secretary.
Ruling:
Doctrine Learned:
Yes, Secretary Carino has legal authority to issue DECS Order No. 30.
A rule or regulation must bear upon, and be consistent with the provisions of its enabling statute.
Ratio Decidendi: After careful examination of the provisions of both P.D. No. 451 (Authorizing The Secretary of Education and Culture to Regulate the Imposition of Tuition and Other School Fees) and B.P. Blg. 232 (An Act Providing for the Establishment and
35. BLANCO V. BOARD 46 PHIL 190 Topic: Modes of judicial review; Mandamus Facts: Page 26 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS The petitioners, along with other qualified persons, power granted to him with manifest injustice, or took the examination prescribed by law for a with gross abuse. Quite otherwise. physician's certificate on May 13 to 16, 1924, and Referential Syllabus: apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical PUBLIC OFFICERS; MANDAMUS, WHEN ISSUES; Examiners thereupon submitted the final results of DISCRETIONARY DUTY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS. — the examinations to the Department Head for The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or confirmation. But the Secretary of the Interior held review the exercise of the discretion of a public the matter in abeyance, pending the outcome of an officer. Where the law imposes upon a public offic er investigation conducted by the Under-Secretary of the right and duty to exercise judgment, in referenc e the Interior. The finding of the special investigator to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is was that the questions on the subjects of the his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of medical examinations held on May 13 to May 16, the court. 1924, had leaked out before said dates. Following ID.; ID.; ID. — Mandamus may issue to correct abuse the recommendation of the Under-Secretary, the of discretion, if the case is otherwise proper. Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 776, AS AMENDED, OF THE examinations. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, CONSTRUED; DUTY OF The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR TO CONFIRM Law, as found in the Administrative Code, and as RESULTS OF MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS. — The last amended by section 10 of Act No. 3111, official duty imposed on the Secretary of the Interior provides that "The results of all examinations by the Medical Law (sec. 776, as amended, of the (medical), including the average and grades Administrative Code), is discretionary in nature. It obtained by each applicant, shall be submitted for is the discretionary duty of the Secretary of the confirmation to the Department Head (the Secretary Interior to confirm or not to confirm the report of the of the Interior) and made known to the respective medical examiners. candidates within one month after the date of the examination." Issue: WON the mandamus filed by the petitioner 36. Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans Board will prosper. (99 Phil 797 [No. L-10062], 28 August 1956)
Held: No, the mandamus filed by the petitioner will not prosper. The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of the discretion of a public officer. Where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgment that is t o be exercised and not that of the court. Under the plain terms of the Medical law, it is the discretionary duty of the Secretary of the Interior to confirm or not to confirm — to confirm or, as in this instance, to annul — the report of the medical examiners. To hold that the Secretary of the Interior must in all cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any irregularity, no matter how glaring, would convert him into an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting the requisite approval. That the Department Secretary who appoints the members of the Board of Medical Examiners, who has the Board under his administrative supervision, and who has the power of confirmation of the report of the Board, cannot do more than perform the clerical duty of approving the results of the examinations, under any and all circumstances, is too specious an argument to mer it serious consideration. It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion, if the case is otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that the Secretary of the Interior did not exercise the
Facts: Paula Aquino Policarpio was the widow of a member of the Armed Forces killed in action in 1942; upon her application duly approved, she was granted a monthly pension by Philippine Veterans Board (herein referred to as ‘the Board.’) The pension was stopped in July 1948 because the widow received a similar pension from U. S. Veterans Administration. However, the latter certified to the Board that the widow had ceased receiving her pension from the U. S. Veterans Administration since 1951, whereupon, in February 11, 1953, Policarpio applied to the Board for the resumption of her former pension. On February 28, 1953, the Secretary of the Philippine Veterans Board issued a memorandum that her pension was resumed effective January 30, 1951; and in view thereof the auditor caused treasury warrants to be prepared in favor of the widow. Delivery of the warrants was, however, subsequently stopped, for the reason that the Board had not yet granted the restoration of her pension. On the basis of such facts and in view of the refusal of the board officers to release the warrants, Policarpio applied to the Court of First Instance for a writ of mandamus to compel their release. In its answer the Board specifically pleaded that the preparation of the warrants was ordered by mistake, because Policarpio's petition had not been as yet
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW acted upon by the Board.
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS this Chapter . . . .only twenty-five per centum thereof shall be returnable for the purposes of the By agreement of the parties the lower court decreed tax imposed under this section." The Commissioner the issuance of the writ complained of on the basis accordingly rejected Maniago's contention that the that the fact that the Secretary has signed the Meralco from whom the dividends were received is memorandum for the chairman of the board "not a domestic corporation liable to tax under this restoring Policarpio’s pension, and the further fact Chapter." that said check has been drawn by virtue of such memorandum are sufficient reasons to justify the Because of this ruling, the claim of informer’s release of the same in payment of petitioner's accumulated pension. reward to Maniago was also denied.
Issue/s: Whether or not the lower court lacked the authority in rendering its decision. (Yes)
Held: The decision is untenable. It being an established fact that the resumption of the pension had not yet been approved by the Veterans Board, the memorandum of the Secretary and the preparation of the warrants were obviously unauthorized, and the taking of such action proves nothing but that the error or lack of authority was not discovered until later, as shown by the subsequent withholding of the warrants. It was improper to compel delivery of the warrants, because the Board might, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to restore Policarpio's pension; and even if its refusal should be wrongful or erroneous, the court could not properly intervene until she should have exhausted her administrative remedies. Therefore, the court below should have limited itself to ordering the Board to take action upon Policarpio's petition that her pension payments be resumed.
37. Meralco vs. Savellano FACTS: the late Juan G. Maniago (substituted in these proceedings by his wife and children) submitted to petitioner Commissionerof Internal Revenue confidential denunciation against the Meralco Securities Corporation for tax evasion for having paid income tax only on 25 % of the dividends it received from the Manila Electric Co. for the years 1962-1966, thereby allegedly shortchanging the government of income tax due from 75% of the said dividends. Petitioner caused the investigation but did not found any deficiency of corporate income tax since under the law, then prevailing (section 24[a] of the National Internal Revenue Code) "in the case of dividends received by a domestic or foreign resident corporation liable to (corporate income) tax under
Maniago filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC against the CIR and Meralco to compel him to impose the alleged tax deficiency and award him the informer’s reward by virtue of RA 2338. The commissioner moved to dismiss that he is clothed under the National Internal Revenue Code and existing rules and regulations with discretionary power in evaluating the facts of a case and since mandamus win not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary power, he cannot be compelled to impose the alleged tax deficiency assessment against the Meralco Securities Corporation. He further argued that mandamus may not lie against him for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of executive powers, since the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is undeniably under the control of the executive department. The respondent judge granted the writ hence the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of mandamus may lie against the CIR RULING: No. A well-recognized rule that mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others. Mandamus may not be resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in which the discretion shall be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular determination.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Moreover, since the office of the Commissioner of mandamus, quo warranto and prohibition. Internal Revenue is charged with the administration Issue; Whether Antonio is entitled to the writ of of revenue laws, which is the primary responsibility mandamus to compel the Sec. of Natural Resources of the executive branch of the government, to reinstate him. mandamus may not issue against the Commissioner to compel him to impose a tax Held: assessment not found by him to be due or proper We are of the opinion that the mandamus action was prematurely filed, or, as the respondents for that would be tantamount to a usurpation of put it, the case is not ripe for adjudication for the executive functions. court of justice in view of the pendency of the Office of the President of Antonio’s request for Such discretionary power vested in the proper reinstatement. As long as that request is pending, executive official, in the absence of arbitrariness or the matter of his reinstatement is not justiciable. grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory A mandamus action against administrative authority, is not subject to the contrary judgment or officers should not be entertained if their superiors control of others. Such decision or ruling is a valid can grant relief. Parties asking judicial review of exercise of discretion in the performance of official administrative official action must first exhaust their remedies in the executive branch. duty and cannot be controlled much less reversed by mandamus.
39. QUINTOS-DELES vs. COMMISSION 38. Antonio vs Tanco Jr. 65 SCRA 448, July 25, 1975 Facts: On Sept 5, 1973, the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources, pursuant to PD No. 6, which amended certain rules on discipline on government employees and upon the recommendation of Acting Director of Fisheries, charged Hilario C. Antonio, the Regional Director of Region No. IV of the Bureau of Fisheries, was incompetence and conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was embodied in a “formal charge with order of suspension” which was served upon Antonio on Sept. 14, 1973. The suspension took effect immediately. It was alleged that Antonio on May 31, October 31 and Nov. 30 1972 issued to eleven persons closely related to, or associated with, each other twelve seaweed areas of Manila Bay despite his knowledge that the official policy was that no exclusive seaweed licenses. Some weeks after his suspension, or on October 24, 1973, Antonio sent a telegraphic request for reinstatement to President Marcos. On Nov. 16, 1973 or 63 days after his suspension Antonio informed the Director of Fisheries that by virtue of section 35 of the Civil Service Law he was going to return to duty as Regional Fishery Director. On Jan 29, 1974 Antonio without awaiting the decision of the Pres to his request for reinstatement, ventilated his grievance in the Judicial forum by filling the instant petition for
FACTS: Teresita Quintos-Deles, Al Ignatius Lopez, Bartolome Arteche, and Rey Magno Teves were appointed Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter the appointment of the said sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. These sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However, petitioner and the three other sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oathtaking of the four sectoral representatives. ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. RULING: Yes. SEC.16.The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the execu-tive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS of the Government whose appointments are not President acted outside her jurisdiction. otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress ISSUE: may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers Whether or not in the exercise of the power of lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, judicial review, the function of the court is merely to or in the heads of departments, agencies, check, not to supplant the Executive. commissions, or boards HELD: In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission [1987]), we construed Section 16, Article VII of the cited by petitioners show that the framers intended Constitution to mean that only appointments to to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not offices mentioned in the first sentence of the said intend courts of justice to settle all actual Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the controversies before them. When political questions Commission on Appointments. Under the provisions are involved, the Constitution limits the of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups determination to whether or not there has been a of officers whom the President shall appoint. These grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official time to time, are: whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is First, the heads of the executive departments, not established, the Court will not substitute its ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judgment for that of the official concerned and officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for or naval captain, and other officers whose the latter alone to decide. In this light, it would appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; appear clear that the second paragraph of Article Second, all other officers of the Government whose VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining “judicial appointments are not otherwise provided for by l aw; power,” which specifically empowers the courts to Third, those whom the President may be authorized determine whether or not there has been a grave by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or whose appointments the Congress may by law vest instrumentality of the government, that: Article VII in the President alone. of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the The first group of officers is clearly appointed with power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas the consent of the Commission on Appointments. corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the Appointments of such officers are initiated by principle of separation of powers underlying our nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by system of government, the Executive is supreme the Commission on Appointments, the President within his own sphere. However, the separation of appoints. powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the syst em 40. Marcos vs Manglapus of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the FACTS: privilege, but only if and when he acts within the Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the from the presidency via the non-violent “people authority to determine whether or not he has so power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally suprem e. the Philippines to die. But President Corazon In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the Court is merely to check not to supplant the nation of his return at a time when the stability of Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has government is threatened from various directions gone beyond the constitutional limits of his and the economy is just beginning to rise and move jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the or to determine the wisdom of his act. return of Marcos and his family. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the 41.DE BORJA V VILLADOLID respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President FACTS: Villadolid, as Director of the Bureau of Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in Fisheries required the plaintiff, to procure a the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power commercial fishing boat license as owner and to bar his return in the country. He al so questioned operator of said motor boats. the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public Plaintiff refused to secure such license and safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the contended that he is not so required by section 18 Page 30 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS of Act No. 4003, as amended by section 1 of should always be invoked and the Rules of Court Commonwealth Act No. 471, for the reason that he obviously seeks to prevent when, in section 2 of Rule "is not operating his motor boats for the purpose of 66, it provides that the action for declaratory catching fish." relief must be brought "before there has been a A motion to dismiss the complaint was granted by breach" of a contract or statute the construction the lower court and a motion for reconsideration of which is sought. having been denied, this case has brought here on appeal. The facts in this case are so clear and unambiguous, Section 17 of Act No. 4003 and section 18 of the that in the light of said section 2 or Rule 66, there same Act, as amended by section 1 of is nothing left for the courts to adjudicate or Commonwealth Act No. 471, read as follows: construe regarding the legal rights, suites and SEC. 17. License tax on operation of boat . — Unless status of appellant in the premises. The general purpose of declaratory judgment act is to provide for provided with a license issued in accordance with the provisions of this Act, no person, association or adjudication of the legal rights, duties, or status of corporation shall operate any vessel of more than the respective parties." three tons gross for the purpose of catching fish in the territorial waters of the Philippine Islands. 2. Pursuant to Act No. 4003, required to pay the SEC. 18. Annual fee on operation of boat . — The commercial fishing boat license Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is hereby empowered to issue to the proper parties licenses 42. Azajar vs. Bureau of Lands for fishing operation of powered vessels of more than three tons gross and sailing or rowed vessels of mo re Facts: The plaintiff, Maria De Azajar filed a than three tons gross towed or operated in complaint in the Court of First Instance of Albay seeking a declaratory judgment or relief pleading connection with power -propelled vessels in the territorial waters of the Philippines upon the that she applied for the purchase of a parcel of land payment of an annual fee of not less than two pesos belonging to the public domain located in the nor more than two hundred pesos for every vessel Province of Albay and that an opposition to such subject to taxation under this Act: Provided That application was filed by Francisco Ardales, one of failure of a licensee to secure a renewal or extension the respondents herein. The respondent contended that the applicant cannot be entitled to acquire said of his license and pay the annual fee on or before the last day of February of each year shall subject lands being a Chinese Citizen. Such opposition, him to a surcharge of one hundred per centum according to the plaintiff, raises uncertainty and based on the amount of the original fee, without insecurity to her citizenship which is prejudicial to prejudice to criminal proceedings against the her. She contended that unless such question of citizenship be judicially determined, the Bureau of delinquent licensee under the penal provisions of this Act: Provided, further , That all vessels less than Lands should not deny her application. Moreover, three tons gross shall be licensed under the she contended that her father is a Filipino Citizen. provisions of section seventy of this Act: And The petitioner prayed that after due hearing, provided, also , That the catching of fish under the judgment be rendered declaring her to be a Filipino license issued shall be subject to the limitations, Citizen and as such, entitled her to acquire lands of the public domain and that she possessed all the restrictions, and penalties imposed by this Act. (As rights and privileges accorded to the Filipino amended by sec. 1 of Com. Act No. 471.) Citizens. After hearing, the court rendered a ISSUE: W/N the dismissal of declaratory relief shall decision stating that the plaintiff is a Chinese be given due course? No. Citizen and being such, she is not entitled to acquire lands of the public domain. The petitioner moved for W/N plaintiff is obliged to procure a commercial reconsideration but it was denied. The appeal was fishing boat license? Yes. forwarded to the Court of Appeals. While it was HELD: pending, the First Assistant Solicitor General filed a 1. It appears that the Director of the Bureau of motion praying that the appeal be dismissed on the Fisheries demanded that plaintiff pay the license grounds that an action for declaratory relief is not the proper proceedings for the purpose of securing provided in that Act and in view of the insistent a judicial declaration of Filipino Citizenship and refusal of plaintiff to comply with such demand, he finally turned over the case to the Office of that the action brought by the plaintiff was not the the Fiscal of the City of Manila for appropriate proper remedy because the trial court had no action. However, plaintiff, file a complaint for authority or jurisdiction to decide on the merits but to dismiss it. The appellant objected to this motion declaratory relief. This attitude of the plaintiff and moved that the appeal be forwarded to the will only result in multiplicity of actions which Page 31 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Supreme Court because it involves pre questions of HELD: law. However, the First Assistant Solicitor General Plaintiff contends that it can do so under section 1, objected and appealed for the case to be dismissed Rule 66, of the Rules of Court, which contains no on the ground that the case involved not only prohibition to a taxpayer to file an action for questions of law but also questions of fact being declaratory relief to test the legality of any tax, such the court lacked jurisdiction to hear and whereas defendant contends that the failure to render judgment therein. incorporate in Rule 66 the proviso added by Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1, of Act No. Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff’s citizenship can 3736, does not imply its repeal and, therefore, it still be determined in a complaint for declaratory stands and applies to the plaintiff. judgment or relief. The original law on declaratory relief is Act No. 3736, which went into effect on November 22, 1930. Held: From a decision of the Director of Lands, an On October 17, 1936, Congress approved appeal lies to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commonwealth Act No. 55 adding to section 1 of Natural Resources. Until all the administrative said Act No. 3736, the following proviso: . . . Provided, however , That the provisions of this remedies had been exhausted, no court may c ompel Act, shall not apply to cases where a taxpayer the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agricultur e to decide any sales application as such is exclusively questions his liability for the payment of any vested upon them. The Supreme Court held that the tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law appellant’s citizenship cannot be determined in the administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal Revenue . complaint for declaratory judgment/relief as such is (a) Propriety of remedy . — The proviso added by not proper remedy for determination of citizenship. The appellant may resort to the courts if the exercise Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1 of Act No. of her rights as citizens be prevented or denied. 3736, which prohibits an action for declaratory However, such was not the action brought in the relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his case at bar and the lower court should have liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge dismissed it. collectible under any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal Revenue', is not incorporated in the above 43. DECLARATORY RELIEF provision in order to make it discretionary upon the courts to apply or not to apply the remedy G.R. No. L-4183 October 26, 1951 NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. vs. BIBIANO in such cases. Of course, where the tax is already MEER, in his capacity as Collector of Internal due and collectible, the tax payer cannot prevent Revenue, defendant-appellee. collection by the declaratory action, but he should pay the tax and sue for its recovery within the peri od FACTS: limited by law. But, where the tax is not yet due, This is an action for declaratory relief to obtain a there can be no valid reason why the tax-payer ruling on whether sales of dental gold or gold alloys cannot by declaratory relief test its validity. and other metals used for dental purposes come From the opinion of the former Chief Justice Moran within the purview of Article 184 of the National may be deduced that the failure to incorporate the Internal Revenue Code as claimed by the Collector above proviso in section 1, rule 66, is not due to an of Internal Revenue. intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground leave its application to the sound discretion of (1) that plaintiff has no cause of action for the court, which is the sole arbiter to determine declaratory judgment and (2) that even assuming whether a case is meritorious or not . the existence of a cause of action, relief by The foregoing view finds support in section 306 of declaratory judgment is not proper because it will the National Internal Revenue Code, which not terminate the controversy. specifically lays down the procedure to be followed The court sustained the motion under the first in those cases wherein a taxpayer entertains some ground holding that actions for declaratory relief do doubt about the correctness of a tax sought to be not apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his collected. Said section provides that the tax should liability for the payment of any tax collectible under first be paid and the taxpayer should sue for its any law administered by the Bureau of Internal recovery afterwards. The purpose of the law Revenue. From this ruling the plaintiff has obviously is to prevent delay in the collection of appealed. taxes upon which the Government depends for its ISSUE: very existence. To allow a taxpayer to first secure a Whether plaintiff can bring the present action for ruling as regards the validity of the tax before paying declaratory relief. it would be to defeat this purpose, and to prevent Page 32 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS this result the rule regarding declaratory relief was Thus, the present petition should be dismissed declared inapplicable to cases involving collection of on this score. taxes. Moreover, there is no actual case or controversy Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with involving the law sought to be annulled. costs against the appellant. Petitioner does not allege that it has filed an application for a license to operate a radio or 44. Declaratory Relief television station in excess of the authorized ALLIED BROADCASTING VS REPUBLIC number and that the same is being denied or refused on the basis of the restrictions under FACTS: Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Petitioner does not Republic Act No. 3001 was passed granting also allege that it had been penalized or is being petitioner the permit or franchise to construct, penalized for a violation under said Decree. There is, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations i n likewise, no allegation that any of the petitioner's the Philippines. Petitioner was able to construct, stations had been confiscated or shut down
maintain and operate ten (10) radio broadcasting stations all over the country. Under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3001, petitioner's franchise or permit "shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress of the Philippines when the public interest so requires . ..." On November 11, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 576-A entitled "Decree Regulating The Ownership And Operation Of Radio And Television Stations And For Other Purposes" was issued. Pursuant to Section 6 of the said Decree, all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, certificates, or other forms of authority to operate radio or television broadcasting systems/stations, including the franchise or permit of petitioner under Republic Act No. 3001, have been deemed terminated or revoked effective December 31, 1981. Thus, petitioner is left with only 3 radio stations located in Iloilo City, Bacolod City and Roxas City. Petitioner alleged that said Decree has caused it great and irreparable damage, because — (a) it divested petitioner of its franchise without due process of law and forced it to divest itself of some of its radio stations; (b) it deprived petitioner of its right to further construct, maintain and operate radio broadcasting stations in other cities or municipalities of the country. Hence, this petition to declare Presidential Decree No. 576-A as unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. ISSUE: Whether this petition be treated as a prohibition as being alleged by petitioner
RULING: No. The petition seeks a declaration of the unconstitutionality and/or nullity of Presidential Decree No. 576-A . As such, it must be treated as one seeking declaratory relief under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Such an action should be brought before the Regional Trial Court and not before the Supreme Court . A petition for declaratory relief is not among the petitions within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the constitutional challenge is not being raised in the context of a specific case or controversy wherein the petitioner has asserted his rights. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo . Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants." The allegation of petitioner that its petition should be treated as a petition for prohibition does not place petitioner in any better position. The petition
cannot be considered as one for prohibition as it does not seek to prohibit further proceedings being conducted by any tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising judicial or ministerial functions. In the instant petition , petitioner does not seek to prohibit any proceeding being conducted by public respondent which adversely affects its interest. Apparently, what petitioner seeks to prohibit is the possible denial of an application it may make to operate radio or television stations on the basis of the restrictions imposed by Presidential Decree No. 576-A. Obviously, the petition is premature.
45. Mejoff vs Director of Prisons Facts: This is a second petition for habeas corpus by Boris Mejoff, the first having been denied. The petitioner Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent to this country from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter’s regime in these Islands. Upon liberation he was arrested as a Japanese spy. The Board of Commissioners of Immigration declared that Mejoff had entered the Philippines illegally, without inspection and admission by the immigration officials at a designation point of entry and, therefore, it ordered that he be deported on the first available transportation to Russia. In July and August, 1948, two boats of Russian nationality called at the Cebu
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Port. But their master refused to take the petitioner submitted to this Court for decision in case of and his companions alleging lack of authority to do abuse. Petition granted. so. In October of the same year, after repeated failures to ship this deportee abroad, the authorities 46. Co vs Deportation Board transferred him to Bilibid prison where he has been confined up to the present time. Facts: The Court held that petitioner’s detention be Petitioners Gregorio Co and Herculano Co temporary and said that ”temporary detention is a being born in Aparri, Cagayan, on April 24, 1920 necessary step in the process of expulsion and and September 25, 1922. Their father, a certain Co exclusion of undesirable aliens and that pending Pengco, was a Chinese merchant residing in Aparri, arrangements of his deportation, the Government Cagayan and their mother was Maria Tan Comin, has the right to hold the undesirable alien under whose nationality was disputed. Then on July 12, confinement for a reasonable length of time”. But 1957, a Special Prosecutor of the Deportation Board the Court warned that “under established filed charges against petitioners with such Board precedents, too long a detention may justify the alleging that as Chinese subjects residing in the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Philippines, who failed, neglected and refused to Issue: register as Chinese nationals with the Bureau of Whether the writ of habeas corpus should be Immigration, they violated the law, compounded by granted? the fact that they represented themselves as Ruling: Filipinos. They were thus enabled to enjoy certain Over two years having elapsed since the decision rights and privileges which are accorded only to aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not Filipino citizens, such as suffrage, ownership of real found ways and means of removing the petitioner property, Herculano's ownership of a coastwise out of the country, and none are in sight, although, vessel, Gregorio Co's loan from the Rehabilitation it should be said in justice to deportation Finance Corporation. authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no Then they filed with the Deportation Board a ship or country would take the petitioner. motion to dismiss based on the plea that it lacked Aliens illegally staying in the Philippines have no jurisdiction for the reason that they are citizens of right of asylum therein even if they are “stateless” , the Philippines. 9 Such motion was denied as was a which the petitioner claims to be. It is no less true, subsequent motion seeking reconsideration. They however, as impliedly stated in this Court’s did exhaust their administrative remedy, an appeal decision, supra, that foreign nationals, not enemy, to the President being fruitless. Thereafter, they filed against whom no charge has been made other than the special civil action of prohibition and habeas that their permission to stay has expired, may no corpus, with the decision as noted being in their indefinitely be kept in detention. favor on the ground of their being Filipinos. They The protection against deprivation of liberty without pointed out that both the appellee Deportation due process of law and except for crimes committed Board and the lower court maintained the contrary against the laws of the land is not limited to view, her citizenship being admitted Philippine citizens but extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality. Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, Sec. 3) the Issue: Philippines ”adopts the generally accepted Whether or not the judiciary may entertain principles of international law as part of law of the an action for prohibition and habeas corpus filed Nation.” And in a resolution entitled “Universal against the Deportation Board Declaration of Human Rights” and approved by the general assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all other fundamental rights as applied to all Held: human beings were proclaimed. No. The petitioners are Filipino citizens and Premises considered, the writ will issue that the Deportation Board was without jurisdiction commanding the respondents to release the to take cognizance of the deportation proceedings petitioner from custody upon these terms; The filed against them. petitioner shall be places under the surveillance of Judge Jesus de Veyra of the Manila Court of the immigration authorities or their agents in such First Instance, in a well-written decision, sustained form and manner as may be deemed adequate to his jurisdiction, granted the relief sought on the insure that he keep peace and be available when the ground that they were Filipinos, and restrained Government is ready to deport him. The surveillance appellant Board from taking further cognizance of and the question of reasonableness shall be the proceeding. Hence this appeal by the Page 34 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Deportation Board. On the basis of the finding of facts of the lower court, tested by the standards RATIONALE prescribed in Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board, - SC cited Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago: The there was justification for the decision it rendered. requirement of probable cause to be determined by 2 3 While Vivo v. Montesa and Calacday v. Vivo stand a Judge, does not extend to deportation for the proposition that under the well-settled proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo). There need be no administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdiction, 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and an administrative agency, such as appellant, must administrative warrants in a single deportation be given the opportunity to decide the matter before proceeding. - What is essential is that there should be a specific it before the courts could intervene, the latter case pointed out that there are appropriate where the charge against the alien intended to be arrested and right to immediate judicial review should be deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section recognized. As the lower court found, this is one of 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and them. We cannot see any valid ground for reversal. that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. ... . 47. Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag | Fernan, - The particular circumstances obtaining in the case C.J. (1989) at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by FACTS respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey - Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French case where the warrantless capture of two national. suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable - He was a temporary visitor, but his status was cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a later changed to that of an immigrant. three-month period during which their activities - respondent CID Commissioner Ramon Liwag were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio combined team of CID agents and police officers at G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly petitioner's landlord, his apartment unit on the strength of a mission accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration "committing acts inimical to public safety and based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. progress." The essential requisite of probable cause was - Liwag issued a mission order to a team of CID conspicuously absent. agents for them "to locate and bring subject to - But even assuming that the arrest of petitioner was Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and not legal at the beginning, certain events have "submit report." supervened to render his petition moot and - CID agents went to petitioner's residence in Sta. academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there Ana to invite the latter to the CID headquarters for was at the inception of his arrest. verification of his status but petitioner and his then - Firstly, petitioner is no longer under confinement. lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside Petitioner was released upon the posting and their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. approval of a personal bailbond. - The immigration agents then sought the - The general rule in a number of cases is that the assistance of members of the WPD. Once again release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas petitioner adamantly refused to be taken in and in corpus moot and academic, unless there are the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the lawmen were injured. Finally, petitioner was restraints attached to his release which precludes subdued and immediately taken to the CID freedom of action (Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule) Intelligence Office. - Examples in Moncupa vs. Enrile: prohibition to - A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent travel, to change his abode and to grant interviews… Commissioner on the same day but there is nothing - Petitioner Lucien Tran Van Nghia is not similarly in the records to convince this Court that said restrained. Secondly, records show that formal warrant was served on petitioner prior to his deportation proceedings have been initiated against apprehension. petitioner before the Board of Special Inquiry of the - Petitioner's counsel filed the instant petition for CID. habeas corpus. - The restraint (if any) against petitioner's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas ISSUE/S & HELD: corpus has served its purpose. The core issue is the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioner by the Immigration 48. HABEAS CORPUS Commissioner preparatory to deportation CASIMIRO BAYANI, petitioner and appellant, vs. proceedings. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Page 35 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
respondent and appellee.
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS speedily as the facts and circumstances will permit, and without any findings as to costs.
FACTS: Appellant, Casimiro Bayani arrived at Manila in August 1917on the syeamship Loongsang and requested permission to enter declaring that he was a citizen of the Philippines. The request was inquired into by a board of special inquiry but was subsequently denied. Appeal was taken to the Collector of Customs, which confirmed the earlier decision. A writ of habeas corpus was petitioned for in the CFI, which was also denied. In the appeal with the Supreme Court , Bayani alleges that he was not give an full , free and fair hearing before the special board of inquiry, and he prayed for a new trial on the merits. In reply, the Attorney-General admitted the errors assigned by the appellant. In his brief, he found on record that some members of the board exhibited illadvised actions, there were misstatement of material facts to witnesses, and one witness was barred even before she concluded her testimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal can be made to courts after the decision of an administrative body has become final.
HELD: Yes, The courts will not hesitate to review the decision of administrative officers whenever it is alleged and proved that they have abused the power and discretion conferred upon them. It was found out that the witnesses came from a humble background and were perhaps ignorant a nd not accustomed with the scenes of judicial proceedings and that the entire examination by the board from beginning to end, of all witnesses, was made in the spirit of hostility. The court said, that what should have been done by the board was to allay their fears and indicated to them that they were under protection. And where the record itself had disclosed the fact that the evidence is weighed in such hostility, the court said that there could never be that impartial, free , full and fair hearing contemplated in law. Further, the court stressed that the essential thing in investigations like the present as well as all other judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is that there shall have been an honest effort to arrive at the truth by methods sufficiently fair and reasonable to amount to due process of law. In the end, the court adopted the recommendation of the Attorney-General and ordered and decreed that the record be returned to the court whence it came with directions that the judgment appealed from be reversed and that an order be issued directing and commanding the board of special inquiry to give to the appellant a rehearing as
49. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago Facts Petitioner Yu was originally a Portuguese national who was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. However, he petitioner applied for and was issued a renewed Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. The CID (Commission on Immigration and Deportation) detained the petitioner pending his deportation case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Issue Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued Held No. The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano , 21express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon 22 naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.
50. COLLECTOR VS REYES, 100 PHIL 822 FACTS: CIR demanded from Aurelio P. Reyes payment of his alleged deficiency income taxes, surcharges, interests and penalties for the tax years 1946 to 1950. Together with said letter of assessment, the latter received a warrant of distraint and levy on his properties in the event that he should fail to pay the alleged deficiency income taxes. Reyes filed with the CTA a petition for review of the Collector's assessment of his alleged deficiency income tax liabilities. This was followed by an urgent petition to restrain the CIR from executing the warrant of distrain and levy on his properties, alleging that the right of respondent to collect by
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS summary proceedings the tax demanded had of its finding that the means intended to be used by already prescribed in accordance with section 51 ( d) petitioner in the collection of the alleged deficiency of the National Internal Revenue Code, as his taxes were in violation of law. It certainly would be income tax returns for the tax years 1946 to 1950 an absurdity on the part of the Court of Tax Appeals had been filed more than three years ago, the last to declare that the collection by the summary one being on April 27, 1951; that a distrain and levy methods of distraint and levy was violative of law, on his properties would work injustice or irreparable and then, on the same breath require the petitioner injury to him and would tend to render any to deposit or file a bond as a prerequisite for the judgment of the Court in the main case meaningless issuance of a writ of injunction. and ineffectual; that the requisite if Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 for the filing of a bond or deposit before a writ of distrain and levy may be 51. Pineda vs Lantin suspended is not applicable in this cas e; and that a No. L-15350 (November 30, 1962) greater portion of his assets consists of real 6 SCRA 757 properties located in Manila and shares a stock in the Philippine Racing Club which are all encumbered in various financial institutions and FACTS: therefore there is no possibility that he would In this case, Teresa Cuyaong and Apeles abscond with his property or remove or conceal the Lopez thru their counsel, complained of certain same. actions of the respondent corporation and its CIR opposed said petition on the ground that CTA president. They claimed that the above-mentioned has no authority from executing the warrant of respondents committed various acts in violation of distraint and levy on his properties of Reyes in the Articles of Incorporation of the respondent connection with the collection of the latter's corporation. Petitioner ordered the investigation of deficiency income taxes. CTA upheld the stand of the charges and designated the other petitioners, Reyes and ordered the CIR to desist from collecting Yabyabin and Pizarro as investigators. Pursuant to by administrative method the taxes allegedly due the order, the petitioners addressed a subpoena to from Reyes pending the outcome of his appeal. the respondent. However, the respondent thru a ISSUE: W/N CTA had any power to grant an counsel filed a petition to reconsider order and to injunction without requiring the filing of a bond or set aside subpoena duces tecum contending that making a deposit as prescribed by section 11 of the approval of the Republic Act. No. 1143 “the Republic Act No. 1125. power given by law to the Securities and Exchange HELD: Yes. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 Commission to conduct investigations must be prescribes the following: conducted in accordance with the rules adopted by SEC. 11. — Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any the Commission.” And since the Securities and person, association or corporation adversely Exchange Commission had not till adopted the affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of rules, it could not proceed with the investigation. internal Revenue, may file an appeal in the Court of The respondents filed a motion to quash and Tax Appeals within thirty days after r eceipt of such discontinue the entire proceedings but it is denied. decision or ruling. Hence, the respondents filed a special civil action for The requirement of the bond as a condition prohibition against herein petitioners. Herein precedent to the issuance of the writ of injunction petitioners moved to dismiss the same. On applies only in cases where the processes by which December 6, 1958, Judge Lantin deferred the the collection sought to be made by means thereof resolution of the motion to dismiss. Disagreeing, are carried out in consonance with the law for such herein petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration cases provided and not when said processes are and reaffirmed their position that only the Supreme obviously in violation of the law to the extreme that Court may review orders of the Securities and they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing the Exchange Commission; that when the Manila Court interests of the taxpayer. Section 11 of Republic Act of First Instance did so review, it went beyond its No. 1125 is therefore premised on the assumption authority and jurisdiction. It was then denied by the that the collection by summary proceedings is by respondent judge. The case was elevated to the itself in accordance with existing law; and then what Supreme Court for a review on petition for certiorari is suspended is the act of collecting, whereas, in the with prohibition and preliminary injuction. case at bar what the respondent Court suspended was the use of the method employed to verify the collection which was evidently illegal after the lapse ISSUE: of the three-year limitation period. The respondent Whether or not the civil case for prohibition filed by Court issued the injunction in question on the basis the respondents within the jurisdiction of the court Page 37 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW of first instance?
CASE DIGEST preliminary mandatory injunction.
ATTY. CABRAS
53. HONDA VS. SAN DIEGO – 16 SCRA 406 HELD: No. A Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction to grant an injuctive relief against the Securities and Exchange Commission. That power is lodged exclusively with the Supreme Court.
52.
LEMI vs. VALENCIA 7 SCRA 469, February 28, 1963
FACTS:
On January 11, 1963, upon application of respondent Alfredo M. Cargo, supported by a sworn statement subscribe by his co-respondent, Heraclio San Juan, the CFI of Manila issued a search warrant authorizing them to search radio station DZQR located at 603 Ronquillo St., Sta. Cruz Manila, and to seize and take possession of the radio transmitter used threat, allegedly in violation of the law in that petitioner used a transmitter different from the one he was authorized to use. On that same date and in the middle of a broadcasting program, they, accompanied by the agents of the Presidential AntiGraft Committee (PAGCOM) served the search warrant, made the corresponding search, and seized the transmitter then being used at the aforesaid station. Subsequently, ELiseo B. Lemi filed with Us a special civil action of mandamus, with a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunctionagainst the respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether injunction is proper.
HELD:
preliminary
mandatory
It cannot be denied, therefore, that, in practical effect, the seizure amounted to a closure of the station and/or disapproval of petitioner’s last application for the renewal of his license. Section 3 of the Radio Control Act provides that no application for the renewal of stations or operator or operator license shall be disapproved without giving the license a hearing. Respondents claim that the seizure of petitioner’s transmitter was effected lawfully because it was done pursuant to a search warrant issued by the CFI of Manila. We perceive no force and validity in this argument. That the seizure was made under the authority of a search warrant cannot obliterate the fact that such seizure was made in violation of the law requiring previous hearing. The application for the issuance of the warrant amounted, in effect, to an effort to evade the law requiring said hearing. Supreme Court granted the writ of
Facts: In the case, the petitioner questioned the decision of CFI when it issued the writ of injunction to the Patent Office. Issue: Whether or not the CFI erred in the issuance of writ to the Patent Office Held: The law in this jurisdiction vests upon the Supreme Court the authority to review final orders and decisions of the Public Service Commissions. And in Iloilo Commercial, etc. vs. Public Service Commission (56 Phil. 28), it was held that in the absence of a specific delegation of jurisdiction to the Courts of First Instance co grant injunctive relief against orders of the Public Service Commission, no court, other than the Supreme Court, possesses such jurisdiction. On the other hand, under Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 33 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, appeals from orders and decisions of the Director of the Patent Office must likewise be taken to the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, undeniable that the Philippine Patent Office and the Public Service Commission are similarly situated and that both are of the same rank or category as Courts of First Instance. Consequently, the latter have no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against them, for the rule is well settled that a writ of injunction or of prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank.
54. Under Injuction: Nocnoc vs. Judge Vera CFI Camarines Norte and Ernesto Manarang Facts: In this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed on October 30, 1973, petitioner, a claimant for death compensation benefit, assails the order of respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance dated September 18, 1973 which enjoined the execution of the order of the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU) Regional District No. 6, dated March 14, 1973, directing inter alia private respondent to pay petitioner-claimant the sum of P3,910.00 for the death of his son, 2 as well as the order of the same Court dated October 10, 1973 which denied the motion for reconsideration of above order of September 18, 1973. On September 19, 1972, petitioner-claimant filed a claim for compensation under Act 3842, i.e., the Workmen's Compensation Act as amended, with the Workmen's Compensation Unit (WCU), Regional District No. 6, at Naga City, for the death of his son, Norberto Nocnoc, single, who died in an accident on June 9, 1970, while employed as a bus conductor in
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS the transportation business of private respondent, to this Court. Ernest Manarang. The WCU awarded to petitionerclaimant the sum of P6,240.00, but deducted thereform the aforesaid amount of P2,330.00 which 55. G.R. No. October 1, 1992 was deemed as advance and/or partial payment on 101344 the claim. PETITIONER ASSET PRIVATIZATION On May 25, 1973, a petition for certiorari with this TRUST, as Trustee of the Court, 17 the resolution of which " is a prejudicial Government of the question," The "Petition for Review on Certiorari" Republic of the Philippines adverted to was, per resolution of this court dated RESPONDENTS COURT OF APPEALS, JOB June 8, 1973, considered "NOT FILED" for failure of C. MADAYAG Presiding peitioner Manarang to pay docket and legal fees. Judge of the Regional Trial On August 4, 1973, respodent filed a complaint, Court of Makati, Br. 145, entitled "Ernesto Manarang v. Estanislao Sarto, et and JOHANNESBURG al." Civil Case No. 2438, for injunction with the PACKAGING CORP. Court of First Instance, branch II at camarines Norte, presided by respondent Judge to enjoin the Facts: enforcement of the writ of execution so issued. Issue: whether the Court of First Instance, as a On 1 August 1986, the Paragon Paper Plant was court of general jurisdiction, can entertain a case sold in public auction by the Development Bank of impugning the validity of award of the Workmen's the Philippines (DBP) Inc., over the latter’s parcels Compensation Unit and, in the process restrain the of land in Orani, Bataan, including the enforcement of a writ of execution is issued by its improvements, machinery and equipment thereon. Chief Referee. Private respondent Johannesberg Packaging Ruling: No! Corporation (JPC) with its cash bid of SEC. 46. Jurisdiction The Workmen's Compensation P120,579,000.00 won in the bidding. Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the On 22 May 1987, by reason of JPC’s failure to pay Workmen's Compensation Act subject to appeal to the the full amount of its cash bid within the stipulated Supreme Court, in the same manner and in the same period, including the extensions it obtained, DBP period provided by law and by Rules of Court for rescinded the sale. To avoid the rescission, JPC filed appeal from the Court of Industrial Relations to the an action before the RTC docketed as Civil Case No. Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.) 16960, captioned “Johannesberg Packaging For, in reviewing the alleged nullity of the award and Corporation and Romeo Cabalinan vs. Development Bank of the Philippines.” enjoining its execution, respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction over a matter which could have been elevated from the Workmen's Compensation Unit to On 10 June 1987, the trial court issued a the Workmen's Compensation Commission, and restraining order directing DBP therein and all thereafter, on appeal, to this Court. This, he cannot persons acting under them to desist from do, for "... the decisions, orders and awards enter ed implementing the order of 22 May 1987 rescinding the Award of Sale in favor of JPC and the by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are appealable to the Supreme Court. ... (T)he Court of repossession/take-over from JPC of the Paragon First Instance is not empowered or clothed with Paper Mill/Plant and facilities at Orani, Bataan, jurisdiction to review or modify, much less, annul scheduled on 15 June 1987. an award or order of execution issued by the Issue/s: Workmen's Compensation Commission. In point of fact, respondent Manarang filed a Petition for Review on certiorari earlier with this Whether the trial court has the authority to issue a court on May 25, 1973. This, however, was restraining order or a writ of injunction against APT considered "NOT FILED" per this Court's resolution in Civil Case No. 16960 of June 8, 1973 for his failure to pay docket and Ruling: legal fees. Since he did not pursue the said remedy by seeking the reconsideration of this Court's resolution and/or paying the required fees, and, No, the trial court has the authority to issue a instead, went to respondent Judge's court and filed restraining order or a writ of injunction against APT the complaint for injunction, he may be deemed to in Civil Case No. 16960. have abandoned the appropriate recourse of appeal to the Workmen's Compensation Commission and Ratio Decidendi: Page 39 of 80
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CASE DIGEST
No restraining order lies against APT in view of Sec. 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A dated 15 December 1986 which provides: “No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it x x x Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him.” Indeed, this is not the first time that the propriety of the issuance of the writ by the lower court against APT was raised. In Manstruste Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court through Mme. Justice Carolina Grino-Aquino, ruled that: “Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of APT, nor block by injunction the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decision in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it.” We have expressly ruled therein, in addition, that Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. Thus: “The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution; issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering the discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its tasks of carrying out “the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art XVIII, 1987 Constitution.)”
ATTY. CABRAS
Quite significantly, the records do not disclose any grave abuse of discretion committed by petitioner amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in its effort to take possession of the assets tr ansferred to it by DBP. Petitioner simply availed of judicial processes to recover the transferred assets formerly owned by private respondent. In fine, the Court held that respondent Judge has no authority to issue any restraining order or injunction against petitioner APT absent any grave abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Doctrine Learned: Courts are prevented from interfering with the discharge of tasks of an instrumentality of the executive branch absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part.
56. BINAMIRA V. GARRUCHO 188 SCRA 154 Topic: Modes of judicial review; Quo Warranto Facts: In this petition for quo warranto, Ramon P. Binamira seeks reinstatement to the office of General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority from which he claims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. Petitioner was designated as General Manager of Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) by the Minister of Tourism. In addition to this, he was also become a member of the Board of Directors of the PTA which was approved by the President. The respondent, being the new Secretary of Tourism demanded the petitioner’s resignation. This was supported by the memorandum by the President which states that: “It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.” Thus, this case. Issue: WON the petitioner must be reinstated of being the General Manager of Philippines Tourism Authority.
Held: No, the petitioner must NOT be reinstated of being
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS the General Manager of Philippines Tourism security of tenure for the person chosen unless he Authority. The line must be drawn between is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of appointment and designation. his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the merely the imposition by law of additional duties on authority vested with the power, of an individual an incumbent official, as where, in the case before who is to exercise the functions of a given office. us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated When completed, usually with its confirmation, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine appointment results in security of tenure for the Tourism Authority, or where, under the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court because of the nature of his office. Designation, on are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of law of additional duties on an incumbent official, as Representatives. It is said that appointment is where, in the case before us, the Secretary of essentially executive while designation is legislative Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of in nature. Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or Same; Same; Same; Where the person is merely where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the designated and not appointed, the implication is Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice that he shall hold the office only in a temporary to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the capacity and may be replaced at will by the House of Representatives. It is said that appointing authority. — Designation may also be appointment is essentially executive while loosely defined as an appointment because it designation is legislative in nature. likewise involves the naming of a particular person Designation may also be loosely defined as an to a specified public office, That is the common appointment because it likewise involves the understanding of the term However, where the naming of a particular person to a specified public person is merely designated and not appointed, the office. That is the common understanding of the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a term. However, where the person is merely temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by designated and not appointed, the implication is the appointing authority. In this sense, the that he shall hold the office only in a temporary designation is considered only an acting or capacity and may be replaced at will by the temporary appointment, which does not confer appointing authority. In this sense, the designation security of tenure on the person named. is considered only an acting or temporary Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if so understood as appointment, which does not confer security of an appointment the designation of the petitioner tenure on the person named. cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally The Court sympathizes with the petitioner, who removed; Case at bar; Reason. — Even if so apparently believed in good faith that he was being understood, that is, as an appointment, the extended a permanent appointment by the Minister designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason ostensible authority to do so at the time the is that the decree clearly provides that the designation was made. This belief seemed appointment of the General Manager of the strengthened when President Aquino later approved Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the the composition of the PTA Board of Directors where President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. the petitioner was designated Vice-Chairman Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, because of his position as General Manager of the which because of its nature cannot be delegated. PTA. However, such circumstances fall short of the Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister categorical appointment required to be made by the Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion President herself, and not the Minister of Tourism, as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. We must rule designation) of the petitioner was not a merely therefore that the petitioner never acquired valid mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly title to the disputed position and so has no right to performed by a subordinate even if he happened as be reinstated as General Manager of the Philippine in this case to be a member of the Cabinet. Tourism Authority. Same; Same; Same; Same; Court cannot accept the Referential Syllabus: fact that the act of the Secretary as an extension or Political Law; Administrative Law; Appointment and projection of the personality of the President made Designation defined. — Appointment may be defined irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in as the selection, by the authority vested with the question. — Indeed, even on the assumption that the power, of an individual who is to exercise the power conferred on the President could be validly functions of a given office. When completed, usually exercised by the Secretary, we still cannot accept with its confirmation, the appointment results in that the act of the latter, as an extension or Page 41 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS "projection" of the personality of the President, made 57. Tarrosa vs. Singson (232 SCRA 553 [G.R. No. irreversible the petitioner's title to the position in 111243], 25 May 1994) question. The petitioner's conclusion that Minister Gonzales's act was in effect the act of President Facts: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor Aquino is based only on half the doctrine he of the Bangko Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos vigorously invokes, in 1993. Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", Same; Same; Same; Same; Acts of Department filed a petition for prohibition questioning the Heads performed and promulgated in the regular appointment of Singson for not having been course of business to be considered valid as acts of confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (CA) the President of the Philippines must not be as required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive. — 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the The doctrine presumes the acts of the Department Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. The Head to be the acts of the President of the Secretary of Budget and Management was Philippines when "performed and promulgated in impleaded for disbursing public funds in payment the regular course of business." which was true of of the salaries and emoluments of respondent the designation made by Minister Gonzales in favor Singson. In their comment, respondents claim that of the petitioner. But it also adds that such acts Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring shall be considered valid only if not "disapproved or the confirmation by the CA of the appointment of reprobated by the Chief Executive," as also the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend happened in the case at bar. that an appointment to the said position is not Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner's claim among the appointments which have to be of security of tenure must perforce fall to the confirmed by the CA, citing Section 16 of Article VI ground. — With these rulings, the petitioner's claim of the Constitution. of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful Issue/s: Whether or not the Governor of the Banko encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) is subject to CA’s not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in confirmation. (No) question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and Held: Congress exceeded its legislative powers in was authorized, the designation signified merely a requiring the confirmation by the CA of the temporary or acting appointment that could be appointment of the Governor of the BSP. An legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was appointment to the said position is not among the (albeit for a different reason). In either case, the appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be under Section 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution. rejected. Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation Same; Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the powers of the Commission on Appointments and petitioner never acquired valid title to the disputed require confirmation of appointment of other position and so has no right to be reinstated as government officials not expressly mentioned in the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism first sentence of Section 16 of Article 7 of the Authority. — The Court sympathizes with the Constitution. petitioner, who apparently believed in good faith that he was being extended a permanent 58. Phil. Racing Club vs. Bonifacio appointment by the Minister of Tourism. After all, Minister Gonzales had the ostensible authority to do FACTS: In a race held at the Sta. Ana Hippodrome so at the time the designation was made. This belief belonging to the Philippine Racing Club, Inc. on July seemed strengthened when President Aquino later 23, 1950, the competing horses went off to a faulty approved the composition of the PTA Board of start. When the barrier was lifted, one of the horses Directors where the petitioner was designated Viceturned around and blocked the three horses at its Chairman because of his position as General left thus enabling the three horses on the right side Manager of the PTA However, such circumstances to run ahead and gain a good lead. The official fall short of the categorical appointment required to be made by the President herself, and not the starter signaled the stewards of the races who were Minister of Tourism, under Sec. 23 of P.D. No. 564. then on the judges' stand indicating that the race We must rule therefore that the petitioner never should be cancelled. However, one of the stewards acquired valid title to the disputed position and so told him to "shut up" and allowed the race to go on has no right to be reinstated as General Manager of until its termination. the Philippine Tourism Authority.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS When the winning horses as well as the The law governing the operation of horse races in corresponding dividends were announced, the the Philippines is Republic Act No. 309. This Act betting public showed its disapproval of the result. creates a Commission on Races which is charged A commotion resulted which reached the knowledge with the supervision and regulation as well as the of the members of the Commission on Races among duty to enforce the laws relating to horse races in whom were respondents Arsenio Bonifacio et al. the Philippines. When they noticed the uproar they sent for the It would, therefore, appear that in every horse race stewards and made an on the spot investigation. the rule requires that there be a board of judges who Convinced that the start of the race was faulty, they should determine the result of the race and whose decided to cancel it and had their decision decisions are final and unappealable. In addition, announced to the public. In the meantime, while the the rule requires that there be a board of stewards investigation was going on, the holders of the which among others, is given the power to "annul winning the tickets were able to cash the same. The any race before the horses reach their destination if result was that while the club paid the dividends on in their opinion there is a bad start or any other the winning tickets it had to refund to the holders of incident takes place that makes such action the losing ones the sum of P5,032.00. necessary" Hence, there are two groups of officials Because of this incident, plaintiffs commenced the who act in every race whose functions are different present action before the Court of First Instance of from the other: the board of judges and the board of Manila seeking to recover from defendants said sum stewards. The judges determine who the winners of P5,032.00; plus P10,000.00 as moral damages, are, their decision being final and irrevocable; the alleging that defendants acted without or in excess stewards, on the other hand, are given the power to of their authority when they ordered the annul any race if in their opinion there is a bad start cancellation of the race and the return of the bets of or some good reasons exist justifying it. And over the holders of the losing tickets, said acts having these officials we have the Commission on Races caused plaintiffs moral damages for having placed which is charged with the duty to supervise their their character and reputation under public action and the performance of their duties in suspicion. connection with the races. Defendants disclaimed responsibility alleging that if on the date alleged in the complaint they annulled the race they did so merely pursuant to their official duties as members of the Commission on Races and after conducting an on the spot investigation at which plaintiffs and its employees were heard, and hence they cannot be held liable for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Board of Stewards in not cancelling the race notwithstanding the bad start which raised a howl of protest from the public was final and irrevocable and could no longer be revised by the Commission on Races in the exercise of the power of supervision it has over all horse races in the Philippines. RULING: Yes.
The action taken by the Commission on Races cancelling or annulling the race held on July 23, 1950 for the reason that there was a faulty start on the part of some horses was in excess of the authority granted to it by law. As defined by this Court, supervision only means overseeing or the power or authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It is different from control which includes the power to alter, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer may do in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the superior for that of his subordinate (Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz., [6] 2884). This power of control has been withheld from the Commission. However, considering that respondents have acted in their official capacity in the honest belief that they had such power as in fact they acted on the matter only after an on the spot invest igation, we hold that they cannot be held liable for damages. In this
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS sense, the decision of the Court of Appeals should view that, if Dauan’s application had been approved, then the transfer of rights to appellants must be be affirmed. approved by the Secretary; otherwise, no such approval was necessary. It appears that Dauan sold his rights to one-half of the land to appellant Simon Ilarde and that he sold his rights to 4 hectares to 59. Donato vs Phil Marine Officers Assoc. appellant Lord Calangan and to 3 hectares to 105 SCRA 1317 appellant Basilia Tomas. Calangan and Tomas in turn sold their rights to some part of the land to Facts: Santos Baysa. These sales were all made without Appeals by certiorari from a decision of the the previous approval of the Secretary of Agriculture CIR, Teodora Donato, an operator of fishing boats, and Natural Resources. was accused of unfair labor practice within the Dauan, the appellee, asked the Bureau of Lands to meaning of section 4(a) (1) and (4) of RA No. 875. cancel the application for free patents which the The complaint alleged that on Sept. 2, 1955, said appellants filed, covering the portions of the Teodora Donato discriminately discharged Melanio homestead sold to them. Appellee questioned the Morales, one of her employees, by reason of his validity of the sales, claiming that the agreement membership in the complaint union. was that of a loan and that at any rate the supposed The Cir found that the charges sales were void for having been made without the substantiated and rendered the appealed judgment, prior approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and ordering the petitioner herein to reinstate to Morales Natural Resources. On the other hand, appellants to his position with back pay, at the rate of P4.00 a maintained that their agreement with the appellee day. was that of a sale and, that as the homestead application of appellee himself had not been Issue: Whether findings of facts by CIR are binding approved by the Director of Lands, no approval by on SC the Secretary of the subsequent sales to them was necessary. Held: ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyances to the The findings of fact of Court Industrial appellants, made without the previous approval of Relations that Morales was an employee, not a mere the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources servant, of the petitioner and that he was dismissed is valid. because he joined a labor union, not being RULING: No. Here the question ‘was whether from unsupported by substantial or creditable proof, are the evidence submitted by the parties it could fairly binding upon the SC. However, the court acted be concluded that appellee’s homestead application without authority and without jurisdiction in fixing had been granted. Were the matter a simple process the amount of back pay at P4.00 a day because (1) of ascertaining from the records whether the that the amount was not in issue and was entirely application had been granted, we would agree with outside the complaint for unfair labor practice appellants that it is a question of fact But precisely based on improper dismissal and (2) violation of the because the records of the Bureau of Lands had Minimum Wage Law, as well as the collection of been destroyed during the war that circumstantial underpayment, fall under the jurisdiction of the evidence had to be introduced and it is a rule now regular court, not the Industrial Court. settled that the conclusion drawn from the facts is Decision Modified a conclusion of law which the courts may review. We hold that the conveyances to the appellants, 60. DAUAN vs. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE which were admittedly made without the previous AND NATURAL RESOURCES approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural FACTS: This case involves claims to 14.25 hectares Resources, are void and, consequently, that of public land in Bambancsg, Sto. Domingo, Nueva appellants return the possession of the land in Vizcaya. The land was originally applied for as question to the appellee upon the return to them of homestead by Jose Aquino. Upon his death, Aquino the purchase price they had paid to the appellee. We was succeeded by his children who sold their rights do not forget, of course, that a transfer of rights to the land to Serapio Dauan. without the previous approval of the Secretary of Dauan filed an application for a homestead of the Agriculture and Natural Resources “shall result in land but there is considerable dispute as to whether the cancellation of the entry and the refusal of the this application was approved by the Director of patent” of the appellee but the cancellation is not Lands. Meanwhile, Dauan sold his rights to various automatic and as long as the Government has not portions of the homestead to the appellants without chosen to act, the rights of appellee must stand. securing the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and both parties took the Page 44 of 80
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CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS death benefits, and describing the circumstances of 61. REYES VS REYES the alleged death of Demetrio Pepito on the night of November 30, 1961 in the following manner, viz : FACTS: "While the vessel was navigating from Surigao to This is a petition to review the decision of the Tandag, the herein deceased was lost or reported majority of the members of the Workmen's missing as per record of the deck log of the M/V P. Compensation Commission, denying a claim for Aboitiz". without hearing , the Regional Administrator issued compensation of petitioners for the death of Victoriano Santiago, driver of a jeepney operated by an award for death benefits to respondents, planted the respondent. The said deceased was the driver of upon the ground that "the right to compensation of an autocalesa belonging to respondent and was last the claimant has not been controverted by seen operating said autocalesa in the evening of respondent within the period provided for by law." September 26, 1955. In the morning of September HENCE, the petition 27, 1955, his dead body was found in Tayabas, HELD: Legal implications — such as right to Quezon obviously a victim of murder by persons compensation, succession, the legal status of the who were at large and whose identities were not wife — are so important that courts should not so known. Apparently the driver must have been easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is attacked with blunt instrument or instruments as dead.2 The result is that death cannot be taken as a an examination of his head disclosed that it was fact. heavily fractured, fragmenting it into many pieces, Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the crushing and lacerating the brain. The respondent case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply contended that there is a specific instruction to the means admission of facts, not conclusions of law. deceased to follow the route prescribed by the Public The mere failure to controvert the statement that Service Commission. The decision of the majority of Demetrio Pepito is believed to be "dead" or the members of the Commission concludes that the "deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported deceased willfully violated Public Service missing", does not import an admission that the Commission rules and regulations and, therefore, man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or death did not arise out of or by reason of his missing. Petitioner was directed to pay employment. compensation without inquiry into the fact and circumstances of death. This trenches upon petitioner's right to due process enshrined in the ISSUE: Whether or not the law establishes the presumption Constitution. that the ordinary course of business has been ART. 391. The following shall be presume d dead for followed. all purposes, including the division of estate among the heirs: HELD: (3) A person who has been in danger of death under Inasmuch as the law establishes the presumption other circumstances and his existence has not been that the deceased followed the law and regulations, known for four years. 6 it was incumbent upon respondent to prove that the With the known facts, namely, that Demetrio Pepito deceased voluntarily went out of his route and drove was lost or missing while the boat was navigating, his jeepney towards the province of Quezon. In the he could have been in danger of death. But of absence of evidence to that effect, it must be course, evidence must be taken that his existence concluded that the deceased was forced by has not been known for four years or thereafter circumstances beyond his will to go outside his The SC order that the appealed decision be set aside ordinary route. There being a presumption under and to direct that the record be returned to the the provisions of Section 43 of the Workmen's wokmens compensation commission Compensation Act that the deceased died while in 1. To hold a hearing, with notice to the parties, to the course of his employment, his death must be determine (a) whether Demetrio Pepito is alive ; or (b) presumed to have arisen out of said employment. whether he should be presumed dead, under the Consequently, his heirs are entitled to receive the provisions of paragraph 3, Article 391 of the Civil compensation provided for by law. Code; and (c) the circumstances of death if it be found or presumed that he died; and 2. To render judgment accordingly.
62. ABOITIZ V PEPITO FACTS: heirs of Pepito filed to Department of Labor anotice and claim for compensation, asking for
63. Fortunato Ortua vs Singson Encarnacion Page 45 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS FACTS: The principal facts admitted by the done legally. Giving force to all possible intendments pleadings may be stated as follows: In January, regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands 1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an ON QUESTION OF LAW. — The decision of the application with the Bureau of Lands for the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary of purchase of a tract of public land situated in the Agriculture and Commerce on a question of law, is municipality of San Jose, Province of Camarines in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is Sur. Following an investigation conducted by the subject to review. Any action of the Director of Lands Bureau of Lands, Ortua’s application was rejected, which is based upon a misconstruction of the law allowing him, however, to file a sale or lease can be corrected by the courts. application for the portion of the land classified to The Director of Lands gave too much prominence, be suitable for commercial purposes. Two motions we think, to two minor facts, susceptible of for reconsideration of the decision were filed and explanation. When Ortua returned from China at denied. On appeal to the then Secretary of the age of twenty-one, it was the most natural thing Agriculture and Natural Resources (Agriculture and in the world for him to land as a Chinese, for this Commerce), the decision was affirmed. would facilitate entry and obviate complications. It should be explained that one condition for the Again, when Ortua applied for the registration of a purchase of a tract of public agricultural land, boat, there may have been any number of reasons provided by the Public Land Law, Act No. 2874, in why he did not care to appeal from the decision of its sections 23 and 88, is that the purchaser shall the Insular Collector of Customs. On the other be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or hand, some consideration should be given to the of the United States. Fortunato Ortua in his intention of the petitioner, and he vigorously insists application stated that he was a Filipino citizen, but that it is his desire to be considered a Philippine the Director of Lands held that on the contrary, citizen. He has taken a Filipino name. He has gone Ortua was a Chinese citizen. The Dir of Land into business and has improved the property here established the ff facts: Fortunato Ortua was born in question to a great extent. There has been no in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, Philippine implied renunciation of citizenship, because the Islands, being the natural son of Irene Demesa, a petitioner has been domiciled in these Islands Filipina, and Joaquin Ortua, a Chinese. In 1896 except for a short period during his infancy when he Fortunato was sent to China to study. While he was temporarily sojourned in China for study. On the in China his father and mother were legally marr ied. contrary, he states that he has always considered Fortunato returned to the Philippines in 1906, that himself to be a Filipino, and that he has elected to is, when he was twenty-one years of age. And that remain as a Philippine citizen. Therefore, on the even if presumptively Fortunato Ortua was a facts found by the Director of Lands, we hold that Philippine citizen, certain acts of Ortua were pointed clear error of law resulted in not considering to as demonstrating that he had forfeited his petitioner a Philippine citizen and so qualified under Philippine citizenship. the Public Land Law to purchase public agricultural ISSUE: WON the question of law arising from the lands. undisputed evidence was correctly decided by the Director of Lands. 64. QUESTION OF LAW HELD: NO. G.R. No. L-14280 May 30, 1960 ON QUESTION OF FACT. — A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whatever or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. There is, however, another side to the case. It certainly was not intended by the legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not be
JUAN YSMAEL & COMPANY, INC. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
vs.
FACTS: On November 27, 1957, the petitioning Union, a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor, filed a petition praying for the aforesaid certification, upon the ground that it is a labor organization composed of all the salesme n working for the Ysmael Steel Manufacturing Co., which is operated by the Company, as a subsidiary thereof, both of which are employers of the aforementioned salesmen; that there are in the Company two (2) other labor unions, namely, the Ysmael Steel Labor Organization (PAFLU), the membership of which is composed mainly of manual factory workers (non-supervisors), and the Ysmael Steel Employees Union, the membership of which is
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS composed of supervisors, non-supervisors who are HELD: technical employees, office non-technical employees The foregoing findings constitute a substantial and clerical factory workers, and that the members compliance with the constitutional mandate invoked by the Company. In any event, this Court of petitioning Union are not included in or represented by any of said two (2) unions in their held in Talabon vs. Provincial Warden (78 Phil., 599; collective bargaining agreement with the Company, 44 Off. Gaz. 4326) that failure to comply with said requirement of our fundamental law does for the economic factors affecting the members of not nullify or affect the validity of the decision petitioning Union are different and they constitute a separate and distinct union for an appropriate or order in question . bargaining unit. (another issue, not sure if related to the topic “QUESTION OF LAW”) The Company filed an answer objecting to the petition upon several grounds, which were, in effect, The main issue is whether the members of overruled by the Court in the or der appealed from. petitioning Union are employees of the Company, for The Company assails the same as null and void purposes of certification of the former as the sole for alleged want of a clear and distinct and exclusive bargaining representative of all the statement of the law and facts on which it is salesmen of the latter. The Company maintains the based, in violation, it is claimed, of Article VIII, negative upon the ground that the members of Section 12, of the Constitution. The pertinent petitioning Union are mere commission agents or part of the order appealed from reads as follows: sales representatives, whose form of selection and At the hearing of this case on February 11, March engagement is different from that of the employees 12, 26 and May 5, 1958, the following facts appear of the Company, for unlike such employees, to have been established in evidence: That the commission agents are not required to undergo petitioning Union is duly registered by the physical examination, to submit a police clearance, Department of Labor and is, therefore, a legitimate and to punch the bundy clock, and are not provided labor organization within the meaning of Section 2( f ) with identification cards. It is further urged that of the Act; that the Company is a corporation commission agents are paid neither wages nor engaged in the manufacture of steel equipment, salaries, but are granted commissions, the amount machines, etc., owned and operated by the Juan of which depends on their sales, and that their Ysmael & Company, Inc; that at the time of the conduct as agents is not subject to the control or instant petition for certification was filed, there were supervision of the Company, which, moreover, has twenty (20) salesmen or commission agents working no power of dismissal over them. for the Company, but that as of March 26, 1958, The aforementioned difference in the manner of only fourteen (14) of them were left; and that neither "selection and engagement" does not prove, of the two unions existing in the Company, namely however, the alleged absence of employer-employee the Ysmael Steel Employees' Union, represents the relationship. Most business enterprises have members of the petitioning Union in any of their employees of different classes, necessarily requiring respective collective bargaining agreement with the different methods of selection and contracts of Company. services of various types, without detracting from Furthermore, after a careful examination of the the existence of said relationship. Besides, the very records, particularly the respective memoranda filed evidence for the Company shows that commission by both of the petitioning Union and the Company, agents are dispensed from physical examination and after a mature consideration of all the proofs and from punching the bundy clock because their submitted in evidence in this case by both parties, duties are extraneous to the factory work and they the Court believes and so holds that there exists an have no fixed hours to contact their customers. employer-employee relationship between the Again, the records disclose the following facts, members of the petitioning Union and the Company; among others: that all the salesmen working with the Company 1. One who wishes to be a commission agent must may constitute a distinct and separate appropriate file an application therefor. Then he is given a twounit for bargaining purposes with the Company; month probationary period, within which technical and that the members of the petitioning Union men of the Company train him. On the basis of his constitute the majority of the salesmen working for performance during said period, the Company, the Company. The certification of the petitioning thereafter, decides whether or not he will be taken Union, therefore, as the sole and exclusive as a regular commission agent. 2. His duties as such include the following: ( a ) One bargaining representative of all the salesmen working with the Company is in order. hundred per centum (100%) "loyalty to the ISSUE: Company", and "disloyalty of any form or freeWhether the findings constitute compliance with the lancing for any other company during their tour of constitutional mandate invoked by the company duty, will be sufficient cause for cutting allowances Page 47 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS and withdrawal of the authority to sell for the therefor said products. Company." (b ) He must check in at 8:00 a.m., to 8. The salesmen or agents in question are, according "report daily all visits made", and "any to the assistant general manager of the Company, misrepresentation with regard to coverage will be registered as members of the Social Security sufficient cause for cutting allowances." He was, System, established by Republic Act No. 1161, as also, required, before, to check in at 4:00 p.m., but amended by Republic Act No. 1792, sections 9 and subsequently, this requirement was eliminated. (c ) 8(d) of which reads: He "must list in his daily report all items offered to x x x xxx xxx customers, plus results." (d ) He "has to visit his SEC. 9. — Compulsory coverage . — Coverage in the accounts at least twice every month", and "if he fails System shall be compulsory upon all employees to visit an account within two (2) months, he shall between the ages of sixteen and sixty years, automatically lose any claim to his account." inclusive, if they have been for at least six months 3. The Company directs the details of the work of in the service of an employer who is a member of the System ... . making sales, through a sales manager, under SEC. 8. — Terms defined . — For the purposes of this whose authority commission agents are. 4. As the agents or salesmen report for work each Act, the following shall, unless the context indicates morning, they are given transportation allowances otherwise, have the following meanings: of P1.50 or P2.00 each. They have, also, a drawing (d ) Employee . — Any person who performs services allowance, the amount of which varies depending for an "employer" in which either or both mental and upon past performances, deductible from future physical efforts are used and who receives commissions. compensation for such services. Pursuant to section 2, paragraphs (c ) and (d ), of 5. The Company exercises the power of dismissal: (a ) by cutting off these allowances, when the agent Republic Act No. 875: makes a misrepresentation with regards to coverage An employer includes any person acting in the or report on daily visits made, or is guilty of interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but disloyalty in any form or free-lancing for any other shall not include any labor organization (otherwise company during his tour of duty; ( b ) by withdrawing than when acting as an employer) or anyone acting the authority to sell in case of such disloyalty or in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor free-lanching, or when an agent fails to make any organization.(Sec. 2[c], Rep. Act No. 875.) reasonably good sale within a reasonable period; The term "employee" shall include any employee and and (c ) by forcing him to resign for any compelling shall not be limited to the employee of a particular reason, as the company has done in the case of employer unless the Act explicitly states otherwise commission agents Jose S. Esquivias, Melecio Data and shall include any individual whose work has and Felicidad Sinope. ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, 6. The company has adopted the foregoing norms any current labor dispute or because of any labor unilaterally — generally by the promulgation of practice and who has not obtained any other substantially equivalent and regular employment. pertinent rules — without the intervention or (Sec. 2[d], id .) consent of the agents, and without any objection on their part. Both parties have thereby indicated that In the light of the foregoing, it is our considered the Company has full authority to determine the opinion that the lower court did not err in manner and conditions under which the agents holding that the members of petitioning Union shall perform their duties. In other words, the are employees of the Company — within the purview of the terms "employer" and "employee" Company has control over the conduct of its salesmen or agents. Thus, absence of any duty on as defined in the Industrial Peace Act — for their part to keep regular office hours, submit a purposes of certification of said union as the police clearance and punch the bundy clock, and of bargaining representative of its salesmen or commission agents. other additional duties, is due, not to lack of power or authority to impose the same, but merely to a policy of the management which deems it, for the time being, either unnecessary or inexpedient or 65. Question of Fact both, owing to the peculiar nature of the task of GONZALES VS VICTORY LABOR UNION commission agents. 7. All sales of products of Ysmael Steel FACTS: Manufacturing Company are seemingly effected Herein petitioner Gonzalez was engaged in through the aforementioned salesmen or trawl fishing, and among his employees were Julian commission agents. There are no other persons, Beltran, Severino Apawan, Ponciano Sayan, Quirico apart from the sales manager and sales supervisor Mendez and Virgilio Baes - all of them working in of the Company, charged with the duty to sell petitioner's fishing boat, the M/L Emiliana. Page 48 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS On March 31, 1962 the Acting Prosecutor of the was not yet through with the investigation, but they Court of Industrial Relations filed a complaint failed to return after February 7, 1962; and that he against petitioner, charging him with unfair labor did not know they were members of any labor union. practice in dismissing said employees without The bare testimony of respondents, just cause but by reason of their membership in complainants below, is insufficient to establish the VICLU and thereby interfering and coercing them in charge of unfair labor practice under the standard the exercise of their right to self-organization. fixed by law and enunciated in the decisions of this Gonzales denied that he dismissed them for their Court. union affiliation, and alleged that their dismissal was for cause, they having been found to have 66. Suarnaba vs WCC (Workmen’s Compensation
connived with each other in pilfering the catch of the fishing boat and selling the same to the public for their personal benefit. Petitioner further denied that he had knowledge, prior to the filing of the complaint, of the complainants' membership in the labor union. After trial, the court below, in a decision penned by Presiding Judge Jose S. Bautista, held herein petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the Court en banc, but the motion was denied in a minute resolution signed by Presiding Judge Bautista and concurred in by Associate Judges Arsenio I. Martinez and Baltazar M. Villanueva. An extended dissent, however, was filed by Associate Judge Emiliano C. Tabigne, with the concurrence of Associate Judge Amando C. Bugayong. ISSUE: Whether the findings of fact are binding upon the Court
RULING: No. In this case we are again faced with the application of the substantial evidence rule,under which the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations are not disturbed on appeal as long as they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." There is one circumstance which, at the very outset, has detained the Court from accepting the findings of fact in the decision appealed from as conclusive, namely, that the said decision was rendered by an almost evenly divided court and that the division was precisely on the facts as borne out by the evidence . In such a situation the Court feels called upon to go over the record and, in order to determine the substantiality of the evidence, consider it not only in its quantitative but also in its qualitative aspects. For it to be substantial, evidence must first at all be credible. The circumstances found by the Court, objective as they are, lend strong support to the testimony of petitioner Gonzales and of his witness Felipe Jubay, to the effect that they had received evidence, consisting of reports from different sources, that whenever the boat arrived at Cebu after a fishing trip respondents would sell fish at very cheap prices; that Gonzales investigated them one by one and was convinced of their guilt; that he
Commission Facts: This case involves the decision of WCC regarding the claim of Rosita Suarnaba for death benefits as the widow of Ireneo Suarnaba, employee of private respondent Clavecilla Radio System. At first the Regional Office of the Department of Labor in Ilo-ilo favored Rosita and awarded her with P4,986.00 representing death benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses. However, upon review, the Commission (WCC) sustained the compensability of the claim but found the evidence submitted by petitioner to prove that she is the widow of Ireneo Suarnaba as insufficient and barred from recovering any benefits. According to the Commission, The certification issued by the Assistant Parish Priest in Iloilo attesting to the fact that they were married cannot be considered authentic document to prove filiation between the deceased and the herein claimant but only a proof of the solemnization of their marriage sacrament. The Commission instead sentenced Rosita to pay the sum of P1,000 to the WCC fund in accordance with Sec 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. As a defense, counsel for the petitioner argues that marriage may be proved by parol evidence; that petitioner submitted her affidavit to the effect that she and the late Ireneo Suarnaba were married in the Catholic Church of Sta. Barbara in Iloilo City, as shown by the Marriage Registry of said place, attested by Fr. Samandra in a Certificate of Marriage which was made an integral part of her affidavit because she lost her Marriage Contract during the Japanese Occupation and can no longer retrieve it. She also mentioned witnesses that could attest that they frequently see the petitioner herself as the one collecting the salary of Ireneo. This, according to them is a clear indication that Rosita and Ireneo have entered into a lawful marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the facts support the claim of Rosita Suarnaba that she is the rightful widow of the deceased Ireneo Suarnaba? Yes
Ruling: The petition is invested with merit. The Commission’s decision under review should be set aside as contrary to the evidence on recor d.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS A cursory examination of the records shows that controversy is manifest in this portion of the opinion private respondent (Clavecilla Radio System) of then Judge Ansberto Paredes: “If as contended, through its General Manager, Manuel Padua, stated respondent company had ceased operation on in the “Employers Reports of Accident and Sickness” November 30, 1957, the back wages should end up that petitioner Rosita Suarnaba is the wife and one to the date and no more. This must be so if such the dependents of the deceased. In view of this contention were true, for even if the workers admission by private respondent, herein petitioner’s concerned were not separated from work they could status as the legal wife of its deceased employee, the not have worked after November 30, 1957, because same may be considered as duly established of alleged stoppage of operation. To give them back without the need for further proof, since the wages thereafter would be place them in a position Employer’s Report serves as Answer. Aside from this better than that of dismissed.” the Certification of Death submitted by the “Even as the Motion to Re-open, which is verified, admits that a copy of the Oder approving petitioner when she was claiming for the benefits indicates her as the “surviving spouse” of the the Examiner’s Report and directing the deposit of deceased employee of the respondent. Moreover, P128,920.50 with the Court, was received on under its rules, “The hearing, investigation and December 13, 1961, the same motion attempts to determination of any question or controversy in justify its belatedness by alleging, among others, workmen’s compensation cases shall be without that Lee Koc, the respondent’s former Manager, regard to technicalities, legal forms and technical came to the undersigned’s office after many weeks rules on evidence. Substantial evidence, whenever of absence. Counsel for respondent Community necessary, shall be sufficient to support a decision, Sawmill had been put on notice respecting the order or award. Respondent Commission period covered by the back wages since he received disregarded this rule by negligently failing to on November 21, 1961, a copy of the Court Examiner’s Report. It was his duty to inform his consider the several pieces of ev idence extant in the client about the Report From the affidavit of Lee Koc record of this case which clearly establish the material status of petitioner. Petition granted. attached to the Motion to Re-open as well as his testimony, counsel for respondent sawmill could 67. Community Sawmill Company vs CIR have easily contacted Lee Koc because the latter admitted having resided in the compound of respondent sawmill even during the time the Facts: A petition for certiorari to review an order of operation of the sawmill allegedly had ceased. But the Court of Industrial Relations, denying a motion this in not all. Respondent company claims that for the reopening of a case wherein petitioner since. It ceased operation on November 30, 1957, it company as respondent was required to pay the did not operate anymore because it leased the sawmill and otter machineries to the Mindoro total amount of P128,920.50 by way of back wages. Eastern Sawmill. Petitioner would seek a reduction of its liability for such payment on the ground that its responsibility Even a cursory perusal of the order of Judge to pay compensation ought to have ceased as far Paredes, affirmed in a resolution by the Court of back as November 30, 1975, when it closed shop. Industrial Relations en banc on February 16, 1965, The total amount of back wages if the did indicate that the imputation of arbitrariness, allegedly consisting of imposing a liability for back claimants from the time they were dismissed up to November 11, 1961 is P128,920.50. Record further wages on petitioner even after it had ceased shows that counsel for respondent company or business operation is devoid of support in the sawmill received a copy of this Order on December evidence. It cannot be denied that painstaking care 13, 1961. Considering that the Motion to Re-open was taken by the then Judge Paredes to appraise the competent and credible evidence of record. was filed on December 28,1961, there is no doubt Under the circumstances, it did require a certain that the same was filed after the Order had long become final and executory. These facts shows that degree of temerity on the part of petitioner to raise the motion has no basis. an issue that it ought to have known would be disproved by the very actuation of its officials. It was Issue: indicative of the stubbornness on its part to refuse compliance with what the law requires. Such being Whether or not petition to reopen the case and petition for certiorari to review by the petitioner the case, the allegation of blatant disregard of the company be granted proof submitted as to petitioner having ceased to do business as of November 30, 1957 clearly lacks of Held: foundation. No due process question arose. No. The care taken by the labor tribunal to take into consideration the equitable aspects of this Page 50 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
68. PAL VS. CONFESOR
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS cannot be reviewed in petition for certioari.
This petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) seeks to annul the Orders dated June 30, 1993 and July 30, 1993 of respondent Secretary of Labor Nieves R. Confesor which directed the inclusion of benefits worth at least P1.268 billion in its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the respondent Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA).
FACTS: On September 30, 1992, the nonrepresentation aspects or economic package of the 1989-1992 CBA between PAL and PALEA expired. That same day, PALEA expressed its desire to renegotiate the CBA and submitted its proposals for an economic package that would cost PAL P16.1 billion. Negotiations soon began thereafter. PAL presented its proposed economic package amounting to P1 billion. This was rejected by PALEA. The parties continued their negotiations, but were unable to reach an agreement. On May 3, 1993, PALEA declared a deadlock in the negotiations and filed on the following day a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). According to PAL, the estimated cost of the foreg oing PALEA demands which are easily computable amounts to P3.4 billion. On May 21, 1993, PAL wrote respondent Secretary requesting that she assume jurisdiction over the dispute in view of the importance of its business and to prevent PALEA from going on strike. On May 31, 1993, respondent Secretary issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute. She also ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers within ten (10) days to facilitate the resolution of the dispute. Secretary of Labor rendered decision in favor of PALEA. PAL argues that respondent Secretary had gravely abused her discretion, amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction, in awarding P1.268 billion in benefits in favor of PALEA as the same was based on probabilities and conjectures not supported by evidence. On the other hand, PALEA argues that the issues questioning the validity of the award involve the findings of fact of respondent Secretary which cannot be reviewed in a petition for certiorari. Furthermore, PALEA argues that the subject matter involved pertains to the field of expertise of respondent Secretary and therefor her appreciation of the evidence should be respected by this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue concerning the validity of the award involve question of fact which
HELD: No, it does not involve question of fact but question of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that certiorari is the proper remedy because there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction where the respondent board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions exercised its judgment in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. While it is true that findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor are entitled to respect by this Court, we are inclined to review her findings since the fundamental issue here is the survival of the company. Besides, her findings are not based on a thorough examination of the parties' contending claims but merely on their respective position papers. There was no trial wherein the adversarial process would ensure a better presentation and appreciation of the evidence. After going over the record, we find that respondent Secretary gravely abused her discretion when she based her award in favor of PALEA on the assumption that PAL would earn P3.4 billion pesos during the three-year contract period. The assumption finds no basis on the evidence adduced before her. Despite her recognition of PAL's unstable financial performance and the possibility that its earnings in the foreseeable future could be held down by the factors she enumerated above, respondent Secretary proceeded to forecast that PAL would make a projected net profit of P1.128 billion for FY 1992-1993, and P3.4 billion for the three-year contract period. Subsequent events have shown the error in respondent Secretary's projections. The actual net income earned by PAL for FY 1992-1993 was P1,025,665.00, which fell short of respondent Secretary's projection by P87.813 million. Clearly, there is no way PAL could realize the income projected by respondent Secretary. After making her projection of PAL's net profits for the three-year contract period, respondent Secretary then allocated one-third of the projected profits as labor costs to be paid to PALEA under the so-called "traditional budget-management approach." This Court is unaware of such a budgetmanagement approach being traditional in this jurisdiction. Given the fact that neither of the parties cited the same in their position papers filed before her, respondent Secretary should have explained more thoroughly her application of said "traditional approach." In fine, this Court finds that respondent Secretary had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in failing to give weight to the evidence presented by PAL and in applying the so-
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ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS called traditional budget-management approach. being required that the former’s evidence “be of such WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE degree as is required in criminal cases, i.e., proof COURSE and the same GRANTED. beyond reasonable doubt.” It is absolutely of no consequence that the misconduct with which an employee may be charged also constitutes a 69. G.R. No. 60054. July 2, 1991.* criminal offense: theft, embezzlement, assault on MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. another employee or company officer, arson, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, malicious mischief, etc. The proceedings being LABOR ARBITER ANDRES LOMABAO, and JOSE administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by M. MASAYA, respondents. the substantial evidence rule and not, as the respondent Commission seems to imagine, by the FACTS: rule governing judgments in criminal actions. ANTONIO SANCHEZ a resident of Sta, Ana, It was thus serious error, and grave abuse of Manila was found to have an illegal connection of discretion for the Labor Arbiter and the respondent electricity and upon inquiry it was found out that Commission, for the reasons given, to reject and one of the electric company’s bill collectors, JOSE exclude from consideration the express admissions MASAYA made such connection and received P200 made by Masaya during the administrative for the job. investigation conducted by Meralco. An administrative inquiry ensued where JOSE MASAYA expressly admitted to the criminal act. 70. Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. Department of At the conclusion of the investigation, Agriculture & Natural Resources, 75 SCRA 285 Masaya was put on preventive suspension and Manila Electri Company sought clearance to Facts terminate Masaya from the Ministry of Labor. Petitioner is, a domestic mining cor poration engaged A week later, Jose Masaya filed a complaint for in the exploration and development of certain illegal dismissal against MERALCO, Both actions mineral claims. Private respondent Sofia V. Reyes were brought before Labor arbiter Lomabao, who filed with the Bureau of Mines an adverse claim eventually ruled in Masaya’s favor, and ordered against petitioner's Lode Lease Application covering MERALCO to pay complainant backwages and three mining claims in Benguet, Mountain Province. separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Petitioner countered with a motion to dismiss, On appeal of MERALCO, the NLRC affirmed the alleging as one of three legal objections the failure of arbiter’s decision, and affirmed his ruling as follows: such adverse claim to comply with the mandatory “x x while it is true that t hat in administrative requirements of Section 73 of the Mining Act. The proceedings, substantial evidence only is required, private respondent then submitted an opposition the instant case is an exception for the reason that with the Bureau of Mines thereafter dismissing the respondent-appellant in this case is charging adverse claim. The private respondent filed an complainant-appellee of a criminal offense, and, appeal with the Department of Agriculture and therefore, it is incumbent upon the former to prove Natural Resources. beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the crime, At first, the action taken by respondent Department failing which, complainant-appellee must be was the dismissal of such appeal, but on a second absolved from responsibility. The alleged admission motion for reconsideration, it issued an order in of complainant-appellee during the investigation favor of private respondent. r espondent. Hence this certiorari conducted by the legal department of respondent petition. appellant does not, if at all, prove beyond reasonable Issue doubt the criminal act allegedly committed by Whether the petition should be granted. complainant-appellee in the absence of any s howing Held that he was given the opportunity to be heard by No. This petition lacks merit. It must be dismissed. counsel or at least, a representative to confront his First, Petitioner lost sight of the fundamental accuser.” doctrine that a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture ISSUE: and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive Whether or not the quantum of proof required for and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the administrative proceedings involving criminal absence of a showing that such decision was violation is “proof beyond reasonable doubt”? rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or HELD: mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating NO. The Court has ruled that the ground for an the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether employer’s dismissal of an employee need need be or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the established only by substantial evidence, it not evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon Page 52 of 80
ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS which the finding in question could be made. Here where a defect consisting of an absence of notice of such a stage has not been reached. Precisely, the hearing was thereafter cured by the alleged assailed order spoke of no "hearing on the merits, aggrieved party having had the opportunity to be therefore it is but right and proper in the interest of heard on a motion for reconsideration. "What the justice that a formal hearing on the merits be law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, conducted. There is, therefore, an element of but the absolute absence thereof and lack of prematurity. opportunity to be heard. As was stated in a recent decision, what "due process contemplates is freedom from arbitrariness and what it requires is 71. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY vs. PSC, fairness or justice, the substance rather than the G.R No.10903, 18 January 1957 form being paramount,".
FACTS:
Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company(BLTBC) filed a petition for mandamus and contempt with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order to compel Land Transportation Commission(LTC) to act on its letters wherein it sought deferment of action on any request of Eastern Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. (ETBC) for the issuance of plates covering units involved in its lease agreement with petitioner for the alleged nullity of an order of Commissioner Cadiao of the Public Service Commission(PSC) granting the petition of ETBC. Petitioner contends that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the PSC, on the ground that the matter involved is pending resolution in arbitration proceeding and PSC was without jurisdiction to continue with the case until final judgment is rendered by the CFI of Laguna. In an amended petition, It was alleged that ETBC in cooperation with LTC caused the registration of the units for use in the disputed lines, that the delay in deciding its petition to vacate the order is part of the scheme of respondent under which the order of denial would be issued at the last minute to give petitioner no chance to take seasonable action. ISSUE: W/N PSC has jurisdiction over the case.
72. Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs Zulueta, et. al. No. 46853 (January 30, 1940) 68 Phil. 45 FACTS: In this case, the petitioner, Manila Trading and Supply Co. filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations directing the reinstatement of laborer Filomeno Ramolio. Filomeno Ramolio was suspended for a breach of duty. The breach consisted in that as the gatekeeper of the petitioner, he permitted, contrary to instructions, one of the customers to pass thru the exit gate without paying paying for work done on the car. The respondent court found that the laborer was guilty of the breach imputed to him but deciding that suspension from June 30 to July 28, 1939 was a sufficient punishment and ordered his immediate reinstatement. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The Court Court of Industrial Relations denied the the motion. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for certiorari shall continue.
HELD: YES. What is involved in this litigation, namely, a "petition to acquire and register the units or trucks required to operate the lines of respondent ETBC." after it had decided not to renew or extend its lease contract with petitioner, is properly cognizable by the Public Service Commission. The plea of lack of jurisdiction is therefore unavailing. It should suffice to dispose of this petition, were it not for the additional allegation that in the issuance of the order of November 2, 1967, there was no hearing accorded petitioner. Such an allegation is without basis as set forth in the motion to dismiss. Petitioner "did not disclose that the respondent PSC, through Associate Commissioner Josue L. Cadiao, conducted a full hearing on the dispute under Public Service Commission. What was not disclosed was specifically set forth in the motion to dismiss. It has already been a settled doctrine that a plea of denial of procedural due process does not lie
HELD: The court finds that an employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of malfeasance of misfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interests. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. There may be of course, be cases where the suspension or dismissal of an employee is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal in which case he will be protected. Each case will be scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will go to the core of the controversy and not close their eyes to the real situation.
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ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS by respondent Noriel is bereft of support in law. To 73. No. L-47182-83. October 30, 1978.* countenance it would be to foil the statutory FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (BISIG NG scheme. There can be no other conclusion except MANGGAGAWA SA UTEX), petitioner, vs. that his assailed order is tainted with a serious CARMELO C. NORIEL as Director of the Bureau jurisdictional defect. This is then the proper of Labor Relations, Department of Labor; occasion for the exercise of the corrective authority UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS WORKERS UNIONof this Tribunal.
ALU and UNIVERSAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., respondents.
Writ granted and decision nullified, reversed, and set aside.
TOPIC: Questions of Discretion
FACTS:
This is a certiorari proceeding assailing the decision of respondent Carmelo C. Noriel, Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, reversing an order of the Med-Arbiter calling for a certification election.
Noriel directed the respondent Union to renegotiate with the management of the Universal Textile Mills instead of issuance of a certification of election as mandated by law.
ISSUE:
WON administrative vested with discretionary powers.
agency
are
HELD:
Yes, this is not to deny that an administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement of a regulatory statute is vested with discretion. Such discretion, however, is not unbounded. Where, as in this case, the Labor Code itself sets limits, they must be observed. That is the only way to manifest fealty to the rule of law. We turn again to Article 258. Its least sentence specifically defines what must be done by the Bureau of Labor Relations once the certification election is conducted; it must “certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit.” That is the extent and scope of the authority entrusted to respondent Noriel as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. He cannot go further than that. Yet, in the assailed order, he would direct respondent Union “to renegotiate with the management at Universal Textile Mills the benefits and other conditions of employment for the second and third year of the contract within three (3) months from receipt of this Resolution and to submit the renegotiated benefits to the workers for acceptance and ratification through a secret balloting to be supervised by this Office.” And this, too, without the benefit of a certification election mandated by law. The failure to abide by what the Labor Code categorically requires is thus plain and manifest. What was done
74. LUPO VS. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION BOARD – 190 190 SCRA 69
Facts:
Petitioner substantially assails the Resolution dated September 30, 1988 of the Secretary Rainerio O. Reyes of the Department of Transportion and Communications which suspended her for one year and disqualified her for promotion for a period of one year and also, the Order of July 5,1989 of Chairman Onofre A. Villaluz of the Administrative Action Board of said department which set Adm. Case No. AAB-034-88 for trial. Issue: Whether or not the rules of procedure has been complied with? Held: No, From the very start, the basis upon which this case was investigated had been defective and irregular. For the letter-complaint of Fructuoso Arroyo was not verified and yet, the same was haphazardly made the basis of the informal inquiry. It should be stressed in par. (a) of Sec. 38 of the Civil Service Law mandates that administrative proceedings may be commenced against an employee by the head of the department officer of equivalent rank or upon sworn writte n complaint of any other person. It should also be noted that under paragraph (b) of said Section, a respondent is given the option to elect a formal investigation of the charge against him if his answer is not found satisfactory. In the case of petitioner, it appears that when her answer to the unverified complaint was found unsatisfactory, she was never given a chance to decide whether or not to submit herself to a formal investigation. The Memorandum of Telecom Investigator Calapano to the Regional Director is merely recommendatory since it was only the outcome of a fact finding investigation based on the unverified complaint. Note that the informal investigation was only an inquiry into the alleged dishonest acts of petitioner in which case the Memorandum could not be made as the basis for any final resolution of the case. The legal and proper procedure should have been for the Regional Director of Region V, the alter ego of the department secretary to initiate the formal complaint on the basis of the results of the inquiry
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ADMINISTRA ADMINIST RATIVE TIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS of the Telecom Investigator. Instead of obser ving the for a temporary restraining order against mandatory rules on formal investigations as respondents Commissioner of Customs and AJIC to prescribed by PD No. 807, the DOTC Secretary cut enjoin the latter from importing matches and "woodcorners and apparently railroaded this case by derivated" products, and the Collector of Customs rendering the assailed resolution. from allowing and releasing the importations. It should be noted that the Telecom Director PTFI prays for an order directing the Commissioner who was supposed to review the findings of the of Customs to impound the subject importations Telecom Investigator merely affixed his approval and the AJIC be directed to pay petitioner within the Memorandum, thus obviously indicating P250,000.00 in actual damages, P1,000,000.00 in that he never reviewed the merits of the case. exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 as attorney's It appears highly irregular that Asst. fees. Secretary Sibal of the DOTC, in his letter dated Court on its 28 July 1989 order dismissed the case August 2, 1989 to Chairman Villaluz of the on the ground that it had "no jurisdiction to Administrative Action Board, informed the latter determine what legal or illegal importations. that his Office did not file any administrative In this present recourse, PTFI seeks to set aside the complaint against petitioner nor had it filed a formal 8 February 1990 order of respondent court and charge against her for whatever administrative prays for the continuation of the hearing in Civil offense. Note that even with this letter, Chairman Case No. 89-48836 Villaluz proceeded to order the hearing of this case. Issue: 1.Whether or not the Courts may order to This is a clear indication that for lack of impound, seize or forfeit the imported matches. coordination among the DOTC authorities and the 2. Whether or not the absence of procedure for the Regional Office, the mandatory requirements of due enforcement of the import ban under the Tariff and to which petitioner was entitled were irreverently Customs Code as premised by petitioner reduces ignored. the jurisdiction of the Bureau Customs. Thus, in the case of Jose Rizal College v. A.1 The enforcement of the importation ban under National Labor Relations Commission the SC Sec. 36, par. (l), of the Revised Forestry Code is reiterated the “cardinal primary” requirements of within the exclusive realm of the Bureau of due process in administrative proceedings. Customs, and direct recourse of petitioner to the Evidently, respondents denied petitioner her Regional Trial Court to compel the Commissioner of right to a formal and full-blown administrative Customs to enforce the ban is devoid of any legal proceeding which she never had. basis. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner to impound the imported matches, 75. Provident Tree Farms Inc. vs. HON. as petitioner would, is clearly an interference with DEMETRIO M. BATARIO, JR., Presiding Judge the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs Branch 48, Regional Trial Court of Manila, over seizure and forfeiture cases. An order of a judge COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and to impound, seize or forfeit must inevitably be based A. J. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION on his determination and declaration of the invalidity of the importation, hence, an usurpation Facts: Petitioner is a Philippine corporation engaged of the prerogative and an encroachment on the in industrial tree planting. It grows gubas trees trees in jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. In other its plantations in Agusan and Mindoro which it words, the reliefs directed against the Bureau of supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for Customs 15 as well as the prayer for injunction production of matches. In consonance with the state against importation of matches by private policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in respondent AJIC 16 may not be granted without the industrial tree plantation, Sec. 36, par. (1), of the court arrogating upon itself the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Revised Forestry Code confers on entities like PTFI a set of incentives among which is a qualified ban A.2 The claim of petitioner that no procedure is against importation of wood and "wood-derivated" outlined for the enforcement of the import ban products. under the Tariff and Customs Code, if true, does not On 5 April 1989, private respondent A. J. at all diminish the jurisdiction of the Bureau of International Corporation (AJIC) imported four (4) Customs over the subject matter. The enforcement containers of matches from Indonesia, which the of statutory rights is not foreclosed by the absence Bureau of Customs released on 12 April 1989, and of a statutory procedure. The Commissioner of two (2) more containers of matches from Singapore Customs has the power to "promulgate all r ules and on 19 April 1989. The records do not disclos e when regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of the second shipment was released. this (Tariff and Customs) Code . . . subject to the Petitioner filed with the Regional Court of Manila a approval of the Secretary of Finance." 17 Moreover, it complaint for injunction and damages with prayer has been held that ". . . . (w)here the statute does Page 55 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS not require any particular method of procedure to Administrative due process requires delivery of be followed by an administrative agency, the agency notice of trial, an opportunity to be heard. may adopt any reasonable method to carry out its 77. SEC. OF JUSTICE V. LANTION functions. GR 139465, OCT. 17, 2000 Topic: Administrative procedure; adjudication process; Due process
Facts: 76. G.R. No. L21685 PETITIONERAPPELLANT RESPONDENTSAPPELLEES
April 30, 1966 CLETO ASPREC VICTORIANO ITCHON, JOSE SUGUITAN, FELIPE P. CRUZ, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NICANOR G. JORGE, ANTONIO NOBLEJAS,1 and JACINTO HERNANDEZ
Facts: An administrative complaint for unprofessional conduct was filed against Asprec with the Board of Examiners for Surveyors. The complaint alleged that Asprec received compensation from Hernandez but failed his obligation to survey and deliver a plan to Hernandez. The board found for Hernandez and revoked and required surrender of Asprec’s certificate of registration as a private land surveyor. Office of the President affirmed. Asprec went to CFI on certiorari which was denied. Appeal of CFI decision to SC.
Issue/s: Whether Asprec was denied his day in court
Ruling: No, Asprec was not denied his day in court.
Ratio Decidendi: From the facts, petitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the board. But he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing without cause or without any excuse at all. Presence of a party at a trial, petitioner concedes, is not always of the essence of due process. Really, all that the law requires is that parties be given notice of trial, an opportunity to be heard. More than this, the date of trial had been previously agreed upon by the parties and their counsel. He has forfeited his right to be heard in his defense.
Doctrine Learned:
Petitioner filed an urgent motion for reconsideration that focuses in the decision of this Court, by a vote of 9-6, which dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence This case merely involves the case of Extradition Proceeding the guarantee of rights available to an extraditee. The Private Respondent, an extraditee, demands the Constitutional guarantee, available to an accused, of due process of law and the twinpillars of it, which is notice and hearing. The case is concerned on the following law and treaty – P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court. Issue: WON the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Held: No, the private respondent is NOT entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. The Court holds that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. x x x There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The Court cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a “court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice.” In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due,
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS when it is due, and the degree of what is due. Stated great, or dispense with any of its conditions and otherwise, a prior determination should be made as requirements or take away any qualification, or to whether procedural protections are at all due and integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of when they are due, which in turn depends on the equity, or general convenience, or substantial extent to which an individual will be "condemned to justice.” suffer grievous loss." The Court had explained why Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceeding is not a an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing criminal proceeding which will call into operation all during the evaluation stage of the extradition the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which Rights. — An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an is not a criminal proceeding which will call into extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed evidence against him once the petition is filed in by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of court. The time for the extraditee to know the basis extradition does not involve the determination of the of the request for his extradition is merely moved to guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or the filing in court of the formal petition for innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state extradition. The extraditee's right to know is where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of constitutional rights that are only relevant to the extradition process to accommodate the more determine the guilt or innocence of an accused compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of cannot be invoked by an extraditee, especially by potential extraditees which can be precipitated by one whose extradition papers are still undergoing premature information of the basis of the request for evaluation. his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of Same; Same; Same; Differences between an the extradition proceedings is the need to be more extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. — deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of There are other differences between an extradition the government, the Executive, which has been proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An endowed by our Constitution with greater power extradition proceeding is summary in nature while over matters involving our foreign relations. criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules static but a moving balance which can be adjusted of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow as the extradition process moves from the admission of evidence under less stringent administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to execution stage depending on factors that will come be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond into play. In sum, the Court rule that the temporary reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitiv e may hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and be ordered extradited “upon showing of the hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process existence of a prima facie case.” Finally, unlike in a which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness criminal case where judgment becomes executory should he decide to resist the request for his upon being rendered final, in an extradition extradition to the United States. There is no denial proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual of due process as long as fundamental fairness is extraditable but the President has the final assured a party. discretion to extradite him. Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s plea to due Referential Syllabus: Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; process collides with important state interests Court holds now that private respondent is ber eft of which cannot also be ignored for they serve the the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation interest of the greater majority. — To be sure, private stage of the extradition process. — We now hold that respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and consideration involving as it does his primordial hearing during the evaluation stage of the right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, extradition process. x x x There is no provision in collides with important state interests which cannot the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 also be ignored for they serve the interest of the which gives an extraditee the right to demand from greater majority. The clash of rights demands a the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the delicate balancing of interests approach which is a extradition request from the US government and its “fundamental postulate of constitutional law.” The supporting documents and to comment thereon approach requires that we “take conscious and while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We detailed consideration of the interplay of interests cannot write a provision in the treaty giving private observable in a given situation or type of situation.” respondent that right where there is none. It is well These interests usually consist in the exercise by an settled that a “court cannot alter, amend, or add to individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or and the government’s promotion of fundamental Page 57 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS public interest or policy objectives on the other. given by the Government in support of the motion Same; Same; Same; The time for the extraditee to for reconsideration, I regret that I cannot go along know the basis of the request for his extradition is with the new ruling of the Court’s recent majority. I merely moved to the filing in court of the formal am convinced that there is greater reason to strike petition for extradition. — We have explained why an the balance in favor of a solitary beleaguered extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during individual against the exertion of overwhelming the evaluation stage of the extradition process. As Government power by beth the Philippines and the aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RPUnited States. To grant the respondent his right to US Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee know will not, in any significant way, weaken or sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against frustrate compliance with treaty objectives. But it him once the petition is filed in court. The time for will result in jurisprudence which reasser ts national the extraditee to know the basis of the request for dignity and gives meaningful protection to the rights his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of any citizen who is presumed innocent until of the formal petition for extradition. The proven guilty. extraditee’s right to know is momentarily withheld Same; Same; Same; No provision in the Treaty during the evaluation stage of the extradition mandates that an extraditee should be kept in the process to accommodate the more compelling dark about the charges against him until he is interest of the State to prevent escape of potential brought to trial. — There is no provision in the Treaty extraditees which can be precipitated by premature which mandates that an extraditee should be kept information of the basis of the request for his in the dark about the charges against him until he extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the is brought to trial. The Treaty deals only with the extradition proceedings is the need to be more trial proper. It cannot possibly cover everything. Our deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of law and jurisprudence are not superseded by the the government, the Executive, which has been mere absence of a specific provision in a treaty. endowed by our Constitution with greater power What is not prohibited should be allowed. over matters involving our foreign relations. Same; Same; Same; A proposed extraditee should MELO, J., Dissenting Opinion: not be denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; for trial. — A proposed extraditee should not be Petitioner is well versed in the use of a hold denied a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial. departure order which could easily lay his fear of In an extradition trial, there may be reasons for the private respondent’s flight to rest. — And as regards exercise of special care and caution. It is not a the apprehension of flight, petitioner is well versed casual occurrence to give up your citizen to another in the use of a hold departure order which could country’s criminal justice system. I do not want to easily lay his fear of private respondent’s flight to sound unduly jingoistic but in certain Western rest. In accordance with Department Circular No. 17 countries, especially those using the jury system, a issued on March 19, 1998 by then Secretary of second-class citizen or a colored non-citizen may Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, a hold departure order not always get equal justice inspite of protestations (HDO) may be issued by the Secretary of Justice to the contrary. The prospective extraditee, “upon the request of the Head of a Department of therefore, deserves every lawful consideration which the Government; the head of a constitutional body his poor third-world country can give him. or a commission or agency performing quasi-judicial functions; the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 78. Arocha vs. Vivo (21 SCRA 532, [Nos. 24844 for the Judiciary; or by the President of the Senate &24853], 26 October 1967 ) or the Speaker of the House of Representatives for the legislative body” when the interested party is the Facts: Pedro Gatchalian, a minor, arrived at the Government or any of its agencies or Manila International Airport together with four instrumentalities, “in the interest of national other persons and sought entry as a Filipino citizen. security, public safety or public health, as may be Not satisfied with his papers, the immigration officer provided by law” (Paragraph 2 [d], Department referred the case of Pedro Gatchalian to the Special Circular No. 17 [Prescribing Rules and Regulations Board of Inquiry. This body, after due hearing, Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders]). rendered decision admitting Pedro Gatchalian and This provision can easily be utilized by petitioner to seven others, as Filipino citizens. Submitted to the prevent private respondent’s flight. individual members of the Board of Commissioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Dissenting Opinion: the decision was marked "noted" by Commissione rs Constitutional Law; Remedial Law; Extradition; To Talabis and De la Rosa respectively, while grant the respondent his right to know will not, in Commissioner Galang voted to "exclude" the any significant way, weaken or frustrate compliance persons subject of the decision few days later. Pedro with treaty objectives. — After going over the grounds Gatchalian was issued an identification certificate Page 58 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS by the immigration authorities, attesting to his Republic Act 503, which empowers the former admission as citizen of the Philippines as per Board to review the latter's decision either upon appeal or motu proprio, otherwise the original decision of the Board of Special Inquiry dated July 6, 1961. Months after, the Secretary of Justice decision admitting immigrant petitioner-appellee issued a memorandum order directing the would have become final and definitive; where the Immigration Commissioners to review all cases originally typewritten date of July "20" 1962 had where entry was allowed on the ground that the been erased and then superimposed by "6" so as to entrant was a citizen of the Philippines. rectify a clerical mistake not only on the decision of reversal but also on the notice of appellee's counsel In July, 1962, the Board of Commissioners reversed and on the warrant of exclusion; and where there is the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and a showing that the reversal was actually rendered ordered the exclusion of Pedro Gatchalian, for being on July 6, 1962, such rectification or correction, in improperly documented. Macario Arocha, on behalf the absence of any evidence on record, does not of Pedro Gatchalian, petitioned the Court of First constitute sufficient ground for holding that the Instance of Manila for a writ of habeas three members of the Board of Commissioners are corpus claiming that the detention of Gatchalian, a acting as a board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and Filipino, by the Immigration Commissioner is violative of said petitioner's constitutional rights. signed, because such decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution was actually During the trial, the issues in controversy centered adopted; and where the correction of the date July on the actual date of rendition of the "20" to July "6" is susceptible of an explanation that Commissioners' decision, reversing that of the it was on July "20" that the reasoned and extended Special Board of Inquiry; and the validity of that decision was typewritten in final form, it was error Commissioners' decision, admittedly issued motu for the lower court to rule that the reversal decision proprio and without affording petitioner opportunity was rendered beyond the one-year period. to be heard. It was therein petitioner's contention that the decision was originally dated July 20, 1962, which date was erased and superimposed with 79. Arocha vs Vivo supra another figure to read July 6, 1962. On the other hand, respondents alleged that the erasures were In re: Form and Promulgation of Judgment made to correct clerical mistakes. …In the instant cases, the decision of the Board of In its decision, the court sustained petitioner's Commissioners (Exh. 5), the notification to theory that the decision of reversal of the Board of appellee's counsel that such decision was rendered Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond (Exh. 6), and the warrant of exclusion (Exh. 7), bear the prescribed one-year period. Holding that the the date July 6, 1962, or within one year from the decision of the Special Board of Inquiry, admitting reviewed decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. It the Philippine citizenship of Pedro Gatchalian had is contended, however, that in all of these already become final, the Court ordered his documents, the date of promulgation of the decision immediate release from detention and enjoined appeared to have been originally written as July 20, respondents, permanently, from arresting, 1962, but the number "20" was erased and superimposed by "6". deporting and otherwise depriving him of his liberty. On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued by Appellant Commissioner of Immigration insists that the Court, Pedro Gatchalian was released from these erasures and substitutions were corrections custody of the immigration authorities. Notified of made only to rectify clerical mistakes. Besides, the abovementioned decision of the lower court, according to appellant, there is proof that the respondents filed notice to appeal therefrom. decision was actually rendered on July 6, 1962, pointing to a certification of the Secretary of the Issue/s: Whether or not the decision rendered by Board of Commissioners that the said body voted to the Board of Commissioners was beyond the oneexclude the applicants in the said cases and to the year period. (No) minutes of the meeting of that Board. Held: Whereas the pivotal point of the case hinges As previously stated, the Court of First Instance agreed with the appellee that the erasures indicated upon the true date when the Board of Commissioners of Immigration reversed the that the original date was July "20" but that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry for the figures had been erased and retyped as "6"; and purpose of determining whether or not such reversal concluded that the Commissioners' decision and the was rendered within the one-year period set by Sec. warrant of exclusion had been antedated, in order 27(b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended by to bring the decision within the one-year term fixed Page 59 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS by Section 27 (b) of Commonwealth Act 613, as they did not actually meet to discuss and vote on amended, wherein the proceedings before the Board the case. This was officially made to record by the of Special Inquiry may be reviewed and revoked, Secretary of Justice in his Memorandum Order No. either upon appeal or motu proprio by the Board of 9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he stated. Immigration Commissioners. The Court below held, Individual action by members of a board plainly therefore, that the decision of the Board of Special renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as Inquiry, declaring Pedro Gatchalian to be a Filipino a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of citizen had become final and definitive. Commissioners precisely in order that they should We do not believe that the mere fact of a retyping of deliberate collectively and in order that their views dates on the face of the documents, without further and ideas should be exchanged and examined evidence of record, suffices to convict the three before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs. members of the Board of Immigration Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047). This process is of the essence of a board's action, save where otherwise Commissioners of maliciously antedating their decision, considering the presumption of regularity provided by law, and the salutary effects of the rule in official actuations, and the serious implications would be lost were the members to act individually, of the charge, which amounts to no less than a without benefit of discussion. falsification of official documents. Such an offense The powers and duties of boards and commissions cannot be lightly inferred, but must be clearly may not be exercised by the individual members proved beyond reasonable doubt. separately. Their acts are official only when done by In the official minutes of the Board's proceedings, the members convened in session, upon a no alteration in dates appears in these Exhibits. And concurrence of at least a majority and with at least it goes without saying that the operative date of the a quorum present. (42 Am. Jur. 389, sec. 74). Commissioners' action is that when the resolution Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a board but of the official body, the of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in members must be together and act in their official extenso was prepared, written and signed. capacity, and the action should appear on the It is argued for the appellee that the minutes in Exh. records of the board. (Penn R. Co. vs. Montgomery 5-A refer only to the cases of Gloria, Francisco and Co. Pass. R. Co., 167 P 2d. 62, 27 LRA 766). Benjamin Gatchalian. But the designation of the Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different individuals, that board can act officially case is "Gloria Gatchalian et al." No reason is shown why the case of these three should be considered only as such, in convened session, with the and voted upon separately, considering that the members, or a quorum thereof, present. (State vs. claims to citizenship and entry of all were based on Kelly, 21 ALR 156 the same circumstances, applicants being the descendants of one Santiago Gatchalian, a Filipino, and that all their applications for entry were in fact jointly resolved by the Board of Inquiry in one single decision (Annex 1, petition, G.R. No. L-24844). 80. G.R. No. L-52364 March 25, 1983 We, therefore, conclude that the Court below erred Villadolid vs Inciong in finding and declaring that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry in the case of petitionerG.R. No.L-53349 March 25, 1983 appellee had become final and unreviewable, and Ricardo Valladolid, the death of Joseph, was that its review and revocation by the Commissioners employed by JRM in 1977 as a telephone of Immigration was null and void. switchboard operator. He was subsequently Appellee also argues that the decision of the Inquiry transferred to the position of clerk-collector by Mrs. Board had become non-reviewable since 1961 Lourdes T. Yu, President of JRM. On February 24, 1979, JRM sent a letter to because of its confirmation by the majority of the preceding Board of Commissioners. It is pointed out Valladolid signed by Daniel T. Yu, advising him of that two members of the latter board (Talabis and his preventive suspension effective February 26, De la Rosa) in reference to said decision had marked 1979 preparatory to the termination of his services "Noted" over their own signatures, while only the 10 days from receipt of a copy of the application for third Commissioner made of record his adverse clearance to dismiss him. The grounds given were: opinion. Such argument is untenable. (1) Willful Breach of Trust for having divulged, in First, even disregarding the ambiguity of the term various instances, confidential business matters to "Noted", the former Immigration Commissioners competitors of the company; and (2) Gross Neglect appeared to have acted individually in this of Duty for having been absent without leave or particular instance and not as a Board. It is shown notice for more than 25 days, to the detriment of the company. by the different dates affixed to their signatures that Page 60 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Valladolid, in his affidavit dated March 29, 1979, denied having committed any breach of trust. In corroboration, he presented the affidavits of Mr. 81. NERIA vs. COMMISSIONER Manuel Yu dated March 20, 1979 and March 29, FACTS: Pio Neria with his widowed mother (Dolor es 1979, wherein the latter stated that Valladolid was Neria) and two younger brothers (Felix and Manuel "one of Copacabana's most hard-working and Neria), arrived at the Manila International Airport efficient employees;" that Valladolid's work is "mere from Hongkong on board a Cathay Pacific Airways routinary collection and clerical in nature which do plane. The petitioner was armed with Certificate of not involve trust (or) confidential business or trade Registration and Identity 621, issued by the secrets which he may 'divulge' to other companies." Philippine Consulate in Hongkong. The immigration Deputy Minister of Labor ruled in favor of Villadolid inspector at the airport, not satisfied with the ordering his reinstatement without backwages. petitioner’s travel documents and those of his JRM filed a petition that; Deputy Ministry acted in companions upon primary inspection thereof, excess of his jurisdiction when, without any referred the matter of their admission to the Board statutory authority or transcending beyond his of Special Inquiry for investigation “to determine jurisdiction, that he absolutely disregarded filiation and paternity to a Filipino citizen procedural requirement in the hearing of the Accordingly, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 present controversy, thus depriving petitioner of its conducted a hearing at which time the petitioner right to due process. offered oral and documentary evidence to support Issue: Whether or not the decision of Regional his claim for admission as a Filipino citizen. After Director committed error on his decision. the conclusion of the investigation, the said board Held: deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for No error was committed by respondent Regional petitioner’s admission. The Immigration authorities Director in ordering his reinstatement without issued Identification Certificate to the petitioner, backwages. attesting that he “was admitted as a citizen of the JRM admits that Valladolid requested for leave for 5 Philippines” per decision of the Board of Special days from December 30, 1978, and thereafter for 15 Inquiry No. 1. The Secretary of Justice issued a days, but denies that he notified the company of his Memorandum Order declaring that all decisions absences subsequent to this. The Regional Director purporting to have been rendered by the Board of ruled that the absences of Valladolid were Commissioners on Appeal from, or on review motu unauthorized but did not amount to gross neglect of proprio of, decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry duty or abandonment of work which requires are set aside. In compliance with the above directive, deliberate refusal to resume employment or a clear the Board of Immigration Commissioners, showing in terms of specific circumstances that the composed of Acting Commissioners proceeded to worker does not intend to repor t for work. We agree. review motu proprio the entire proceedings had But as Valladolid had been AWOL, before the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 relative to Constitutional provision requiring that decisions of the petitioner’s, case and that of his supposed court must contain a statement of facts and the relatives. The new Board of Immigration conclusions of law upon which it is based applies Commissioners found that the petitioner had not only to courts of record, not to the Ministry of Labor; satisfactorily established his claim for admission as Reasons; Proceedings in the NLRC non-litigatious a Filipino citizen and, consequently, reversed the and summary in nature without regard to legal decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1, and technicalities. — Nor is the questioned Order of the ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the Deputy Minister of Labor violative of Section 9, Philippines as an alien not properly documented for Article X of the Constitution, which requires a admission and be returned to the port from where statement of the facts and the conclusions of law he came or to the country of which he is a national. upon which it is based. That prescription applies to The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decisions of Courts of record. The Ministry of Labor decision. This motion was denied by the new Board, is an administrative body with quasi-judicial and the petitioner was informed of this denial by functions. Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V, states that letter. proceedings in the NLRC shall be non-litigious and The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and summary in nature without regard to legal prohibition, praying the Court of First Instance of technicalities obtaining in courts of law. As the Manila to restrain the Commissioner of Immigration Deputy Minister was in full accord with the findings and the Board of Immigration Commissioners from of fact and the conclusions of law drawn from those arresting and expelling him, and prohibit them from facts by the Regional Director, there was no taking any further steps or actions contrary to the necessity of discussing anew the issues raised decision rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry therein. No. 1. This petition was given due course, and a writ Page 61 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS of preliminary injunction was issued as prayed for. mayor to reinstate the plaintiff to his former positi on But later on this petition was dismissed, without as patrolman in the Police Department. Respondent prejudice and without costs. court ruled that the decision of petitioner The present petition for habeas corpus was filed. Pio commission was based on incomplete records as Neria seeks to inquire into the legality of his arrest there was no transcript of the testimonies of by agents of the respondent Commissioner of witnesses or minutes of the proceedings before the Immigration, and his subsequent detention or Board of Investigators and that the commission’s confinement at the Bureau of Immigration’s conclusion was without factual basis and was in detention station at Engineering Island, Manila. violation of administrative due process. The petitioner claims that the warrant of exclusion ISSUE: issued by the respondent is illegal because it is Whether or not the lower court erred in based on a decision rendered by the Board of disturbing the findings of facts of the Police Immigration Commissioners without or in excess of Commission, an administrative agency duly vested its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in by Republic Act No. 4864 with the power and violation of section 27 (b), Comm. Act 613, as authority to render decision in administrative cases amended. against policemen and whose decision is final. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the new HELD: Board of Immigration Commissioner is null and void The record amply shows that petitioner’s decision for having been rendered without or in excess of its was supported by substantial evidence consisting of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. the affidavit-complaint (which was duly affirmed RULING: The petitioner’s argument, at all events, is when complainant Jose Lee, Jr. appeared and without merit. Section 27 (b), provides that testified before the board) and the documentary proceedings of the Board of Special Inquiry — its evidence duly marked by the board as exhibits for appraisal of a case on the merits, the result of its the complainant (and which were not questioned by deliberation, its decision and notice thereof to an respondent). As uniformly held by the Court, it is alien, and the time when an appeal may be brought sufficient that administrative findings of fact are therefrom —“shall be conducted under rules of supported by evidence on the record, or stated procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of negatively, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not Immigration.” shown to be unsupported by evidence. As It is of no moment that before the present petition expounded by Justice Laurel in the leading case of for habeas corpus was instituted, the petitioner had Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, previously filed a petition for certiorari and substantial evidence is all that is needed to s upport prohibition. The dismissal of that petition was an administrative finding of fact, and substantial “without prejudice”, and, therefore, avoided the evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable effects of the Rules of Court provision (Rule 30, sec. mind might accept as adequate to support a 3, now Rule 17, sec. 3) that dismissal for failure to conclusion.” prosecute is equivalent to “an adjudication on the Respondent court therefore erred in choosing to merits [with prejudice].” The -order of dismissal believe the theory of the defense put up by therein did not settle the legality of the acts of the respondent Ibea on the equally erroneous ground Board of Commissioners, nor the legality of that there was no evidence to support the findings petitioner’s arrest and detention. The order of the Police Commission. In effect, respondent dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition court substituted its own judgment for that of the simply recites that the same is “dismissed without Police Commission which is final, contrary to the prejudice and without costs.” prevailing principle that “in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot 82. Police Commission vs. Hon. Judge Lood reexamine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the FACTS: Respondent Ibea had been dismissed from the administrative agency concerned. The findings of police service by the then Mayor Braulio Sto. fact must be respected, so long as they are Domingo pursuant to the decision of petitioner supported by substantial evidence, even if not commission finding him guilty of serious irregularity overwhelming or preponderant.’’ in the performance of duty on complaint of Jose Lee, Jr. Respondent thereafter filed his complaint with respondent court seeking his reinstatement. He was 83. PMC V ANG BISIG NG PMC sustained by respondent court which rendered its decision declaring the decision of the Police FACTS: Commission as null and void and ordered the town During the period 1947 to August 3, 1953, Page 62 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS the schedule of shifts in the PMC (Philippine one judge, yet it cannot be inferred from this Manufacturing Company) was from 7 a.m. to 3 p.m.; circumstance alone that no previous deliberation from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. and from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. was held. On the contrary , it is safe to assume that This schedule was adopted by the company and the the resolution was the result of a previous employees, who are members of respondent Ang consultation among the judges Bisig ng PMC, agreed to the same and worked in the shifts during the period mentioned. 2. The point rather is whether, on the assumption The union asked the Court of Industrial Relations to that the agreement is valid, work done on Sunday order the company to pay 50 per cent extra or legal holiday as a result of the schedule is to be compensation for work done from 12:01 a.m. to 7 paid extra compensation and we said it should be. a.m. from 1947 to August 3, 1953, whenever the period mentioned fell on a Sunday or a legal holiday.
84. Mison vs Coa PMC contended that since there was an agreeme nt, the period between 12:01 a.m. and 7 a.m. of Sunday should be considered a part of the Saturday workday and therefore work done during that period was not entitled to any extra pay. CIR: ruled in favor of Respondents. Denie the motion for reconsideration.HENCE, the petition of the case PMC contended that they were denied of due process in violation of Sec 1 Commonwealth act no. 103 which provides: . . . Should any party aggrieved by a ruling or decision of any of the judges, request a reconsideration hereof, or at the request of any of them, the judges shall sit together , and the concurrence of at least three of the five Judges shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order or award. ISSUE: W/N the PMC was denied of due process? HELD: 1. NO.The hearing of a motion for
reconsideration in oral argument is a matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court of Industrial Relations. Its refusal does not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of a showing of abuse of discretion.
Neither may it be said that the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations did not, as required by law, "sit together" in resolving the company's motion for reconsideration because as held in Tolentino, et al. v. Angeles, et al., 52 O.G. No. 9, 4262, "the fact that they (the judges) signed the resolution means that they sat together in consultation and in passing upon the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners." More recently, this Court ruled that "the requirement that a
motion for reconsideration shall be resolved by the court en banc , the judges sitting together, simply demands that all the available judges shall take part, for as long as three at least of the judges attending concur, it is enough for the pronouncement of the decision or award For while the resolution may have been pre pared by
Facts: The case is about customs case no. 813 where the commissioner of customs, MIson, declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V "Hyojin Maru" a vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo to the claimants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung I. However, the vessel was never released because it sank while in the custody of the bureau of customs and it could not be salvaged. The claimants filed a claim with the Commission on Audit for the payment of the vessel. Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu, Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the claim for the reasons set forth in his registered letter to the claimant's lawyer dated November 3, 1977captioned "Decision No. 77-142." In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimant’s counsel, Mr. David replied that said Decision No. 77-142rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, and "not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less . . . the Commission on Audit" — was void because the matter could validly be acted upon only by "the Commission on Audit duly constituted, by the appointment and qualification of its Chairman and two Commissioners," "as specifically provided by Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973) Constitution. In a 4th Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs," Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THE COMMISSION," reconsidered Decision No. 77-142 of Acting Commissioner of Audit Tantuico, supra. He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of the Bureau of Customs, which "should have pre-eminently taken adequate measures to preserve" it but did not.; hence, he declared that "this Commission will interpose no objection" to the instant claim, subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements." Petitioner seasonably filed with this Court a petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions pursuant to Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Issues: shares of stock of said Corporation. Whether or not the decision to reverse the Espiritu The motion was denied on the ground under the Decision was proper? provisions of the Patent Law (Republic Act No. 165) Held: the Director of Patents has no jurisdiction or power In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void ab to decide the question submitted to him.. initio. As manager of the COA Technical Service From the orders denying his motions to intervene Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power the movant has appealed. whatever to render and promulgate a decision of or ISSUE: for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, Whether the Director of Patents has the authority to alone, had not that power. As clearly set out in the decide the question submitted to him Constitution then in force, the power was lodged in HELD: No. the Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman What the appellant attempted to secure by his 20 and two Commissioners." It was the Commission, motion to intervene is clearly beyond the as a collegial body, which then as now, had the jurisdiction and authority of the Director of Patents jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any case brought before it to grant. Despite the amendment to the first motion within sixty days from the date of its submission for to the intervene by which he claims assignment of resolution," subject to review by the Supreme Court the invention, still it remains that the alleged on certiorari. assignment is not the invention but it is an Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu agreement whereby he is to act as selling agent for decision by the Acting COA Chairman was the inventors of the patent (if granted) and of the inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act invention covered thereby and to receive void ab initio because done absolutely without compensation therefor. authority. The act has to be done anew by the Assignments of patents and inventions covered person or entity duly endowed with authority to do thereby may be recorded in books and records kept so. for the purpose in the Patent Office is presented in Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper due form;3 but the appellant does not ask for the ratification or validation could have been effected by registration of the alleged agreement between him the Acting Chairman since he was not the and the inventors, because as it is not in due form Commission, and he himself had no power to decide it cannot be recorded, but prays that the Director of any case brought before the Commission, that Patents compel applicant-inventor Maximo B. power, to repeat, being lodged only in the Tapinio to sign the contract executed and signed by Commission itself, as a collegial body. it must be the other applicant-inventor Dolorito M. Feliciano made clear that the Espiritu Decision was not on 14 March 1950 (Appendix I) and both applicantmerely "technically invalid," as the petitioner inventors to acknowledge it and another document describes it. It was substantively void ab initio, which by all indication refers to the minutes of a because rendered without jurisdiction. It had an meeting of the organizers of the Manufacturing essential inherent defect that could not be cured or Corporation held on 30 March 1950, before a notary waived. public, and then to have both documents recorded in the Patent Office and in the office of the Regist rar of Deeds. Under the provisions of the Patent Law 85. JURISDICTION (Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent G.R. No. L-4572 May 22, 1953 has no power and authority to compel the applicant-inventors to do what the appellant is DOLORITO M. FELICIANO vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENT asking them to perform. What the appellant asked the Director Patents to do for him is essentially a judicial function which would FACTS: An application for patent was filed with the require the determination or finding by a court Patent Office. of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was Pending examination of the application, Meliton D. a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties Albaña filed a motion to intervene claiming that the before it could compel the applicant-inventors to applicant-inventors had "sold and/or bartered and perform what the appellant prays the court to or der assigned to him their right to contract or deal the them to do. Aside from want of authority and power, the Director of Patent lacks the means sale of their invention called Fel-Tap Meter Guard and Detector to or though the Corporation that they to make such determination and finding which were then organizing under his direction and to fix would be necessary before he could act on the appellant's motion . and decide on the purchase price of it to at least P200,000 in installments cash and P300,000 in The orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs Page 64 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW against the appellant.
CASE DIGEST
ATTY. CABRAS
87. Go Tek vs Deportation 86. JURISDICTION SYQUIA VS BOARD FACTS: In December, 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with respondent Board of Power and Waterworks charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments at Malate, Manila with the offense of selling
electricity without permit or franchise issued by respondent board, in that petitioner billed respondents-complainants various specified amounts for their electricity consumption at their respective apartments for the months of May to September, 1974 in excess of the Meralco rates authorized by respondent board. Petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaints asserting that they involved
contractual obligations of respondents as apartment tenants and were beyond respondent board's jurisdiction was denied by the latter. Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. concurred with petitioner and submitted that
respondent regulatory board acted without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the complaints. ISSUE: Whether respondent Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case
RULING: No. Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner. Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondentscomplainants as her tenants, since petitioner is
not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity without permit or franchise . Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a
Facts: Certain agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) searched an office located in Sta. Cruz Manila which is believed to be a headquarters of a guerrilla unit of the “Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States” and that among those arrested threat was Go Tek, a china man and an alleged sector commander and intelligence and record officer of that guerrilla unit. It was further alleged that fake dollar checks were found in Go Tek’s possession which is violation of article 168 of the Revised Penal Code and rendered himself an undesirable alien. The prosecutor prayed to the President that the undesirable alien be immediately deported because “his presence in this country having been, and will always be a menace to the peace, welfare, and security of the community.” After a case was filed against him, Go Tek filed a motion to dismiss contending that the board had no jurisdiction in view of the obiter dictum discussed in the case Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board and that they may deport an alien only on the ground specified under the law. The Board denied Go Tek’s motion and reasoned out that a conviction is not a prerequisite before the state may exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that their function is just to be a fact finding body and make recommendations to the President. The Trial Court granted a writ of prohibition in favor of Go Tek and ordered the Borad to desist from taking cognizance of Go Tek’s case. The trial court ’s reason is that a mere ion of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law and that a conviction must first be given to Go Tek before he may be validly deported otherwise the deportation would be premature. In appeal, the Board contends that the trial court erred in assuming that the President may deport undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law.
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
Issue:
Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.
Ruling:
Whether the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not specified under the Immigration Law and even if the alien has not yet been convicted of the offense charged? Yes. Under existing laws, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS under section 37 of the Immigration Law. The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. Issue: That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive Whether or not the Fair Trade Board has “when he deems such action necessary for the peace jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute alleged and tranquillity of the nation.” There is nothing misbranding, mislabeling, and/or misleading illegal or unconstitutional in the provision defining advertisement of filled milk product the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive “full Held: discretion to determine whether an alien’s residence No. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost the security welfare or interest of the state.” It has authority to enforce the same. The Comissioner’s been held that the Chief Executive is the sole and contention that he still has jurisdiction to enforce exclusive judge of the existence of facts which Section 169 by virtue of Section 3 of Tax Code which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an provides that the Bureau of Internal shall also “give investigation conducted in accordance with sec. 69 effect to and administer the supervisory and police of the Revised Administrative Code. No other tribunal power conferred to it by this Code or other laws” is is at liberty to re-examine or to controvert the untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. The claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement of its principal powers and duties lower court’s decision is reversed and set aside. consisting of the “collection of connected therewith”. The enforcement of Section 169 entails the 88. Vera vs Cuevas promotion of the health of the nation and is thus unconnected with any tax purpose for in Republic Act No. 3720 Facts: Consolidated Milk Company sells the Republic Act No.3720 provides: “Darigold” brand and Milk Industries sells “Dutch Section 9. Its shall be the duty of the Board Baby” brand (Milk Companies). Along with General (Food and Drug Inspection), conformably with the Milk selling under the brand “Liberty”, these three rules and regulation, to hold hearings and conduct milk companies are the plaintiffs of an action for investigations relative to matters touching the Administration of this Act, to investigate processes declaratory relief for an adjudication of their respective rights and obligations in relation to the of food, drug and cosmetic manufacture and to enforcement of Section 169 of the Tax Code against subject reports to the Food and Drug Administr ator, their filled milk products. [Civil Case] Institute of recommending food and drug standards for Evaporated Milk Manufacturers of the Philippines, adoption. Said Board shall perform such additional functions, properly within the scope of the Inc. is a corporation organized for the principal purpose of upholding and maintaining at its highest administration thereof, as maybe assigned to it by the standards of local filled milk industry, of which the Food and Drug Administrator. The decisions of all the milk companies are members. the board shall be advisory to the Food and Drug The milk companies get a preliminary Administrator. injunction against the CIR. Later, the CIR files for Section 26. c) Hearing authorized or required by this Act an injunction against the Fair Trade Board from hearing a special proceeding on a complaint for shall be conducted by the Board of Food and Drug misleading advertisement, mislabeling and/or Inspection which shall submit recommendation to misbranding involving the same milk companies. the Food and Drug Administrator. The issue is who among the CIR and the FTB have d) When it appears to the Food and Drug Administrator from the reports of the Food and Drug jurisdiction to decide the matter.SC says neither. Section 169 of the Tax Code was enacted with other Laboratory that any article of food or any drug or provisions that have already been repealed, cosmetic secured pursuant to Section 28 of this Act resulting in Section 169 being repealed by is adulterated or branded he shall cause notice implication and becoming a declaratory provision, thereof to be given to the person or persons losing its tax purpose. Without its tax purpose, the concerned and such personor persons shall be given an opportunity to subject evidence impeaching the CIR loses his authority to enforce it. Neither the CIR nor the FTB have jurisdiction as the law that correctness of the finding or charge on question. repealed Section 169 (RA 3720) provides that the e) When violation of any provison of this Act Board of Food and Drug inspection and the Food comes to the knowledge of the Food and Drudg and Drug Administrator, with the Secretary of Administrator of such character that a criminal Health and Secretary of Justice have jurisdiction prosecution ought to be instituted against the over the matter. offender, he shall certify the facts to the Secretary of Page 66 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS Justice through the Secretary of Health, together with the chemists’ report, the findings of the Board ISSUE: Whether or not the issue falls within the of Food and Drug Inspection, or other documentary jurisdiction of th NLRC. evidence on which the charge is based. f) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as HELD: No. The case falls within the exclusive requiring the Food and Drug Administrator to jurisdiction of the SEC. Under P.D 902-A, the SEC ceritify for prosecution pursuant to subparagraph has exclusive jrisdiction over controversies in the (e) hereof, minor violations of this Act whenever he election or appointment of directors, trustees, believes that public interest will be done adequately officers, or managers of such corporations, served by suitable written notice or warning. partnerships or associations. P.D 902-A, Sec. 5(c). From this, it is clear that the Comissioner of The Solicitor General contends that the case at bar Internal Revenue and Fair Trade Board, are without falls outside the purview of the aforequoted jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged provision. He insists that private respondent was a misbranding, mislabeling, and/0r misleading mere employee of petitioner corporation being advertisements of filled milk. The jurisdiction on the tasked mainly, as administrator/superintendent, matters cited is vested upon the Board of Food and with the upkeep of the condominium's common Drug inspection and the Food and Drug areas. He, thus, maintains that private respondent Administrator, with the Secretary of Health and the cannot be deemed a corporate officer because "it is Secretary of Justice, also intervening in case the nature of one's functions and not the criminal prosecution has to be instituted. nomenclature or title given to one's job which determines one's status in a corporation. The contentions of public respondent lack merit. That private respondent is an officer of petitioner 89. ONGKINGCO (President of Galeria de corporation and not its mere employee cannot be Magallanes Condominium Association, Inc.) vs. questioned. The by-laws of the Galeria de NLRC Magallanes Condominium Association specifically includes the Superintendent/Administrator in its FACTS: roster of corporate officers. Petitioner Galeria de Magallanes In the case at bar, considering that herein Condominium Association, Inc. (Galeria for brevity) petitioner, unlike an ordinary employee, was is a non-stock, non-profit corporation formed in appointed by respondent corporation's Board of accordance with R.A. No. 4726, otherwise known as Trustees in its memorandum of October 30, 1990, the Condominium Act. she is deemed an officer of the corporation. Perforce, Galeria's Board of Directors appointed private Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A, which respondent Federico B. Guilas as provides that the SEC exercises exclusive Administrator/Superintendent.e was given a jurisdiction over controversies in the election or "monthly salary of P10,000 subject to review after appointment of directors, trustees, officers or five (5) months and subsequently thereafter as managers of corporations, partnerships or Galeria's finances improved."[2] associations, applies in the present dispute. As Administrator, private respondent was tasked Accordingly, jurisdiction over the same is vested in with the maintenance of the "performance and the SEC, and not in the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. elegance of the common areas of the condominium WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is given and external appearance of the compound. DUE COURSE, the assailed resolutions of the NLRC However, on 17 March 1992, through a resolution are hereby REVERSED and the Order of the Labor passed by the Board of Directors of Galeria, private Arbiter dated 29 December 1992 REINSTATED. respondent was not re-appointed as Administrator. SO ORDERED. As a result, on 15 May 1992, private respondent instituted a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries with the 90. Yu vs Defensor-Santiago NLRC. In response, on 22 July 1992, petitioners filed a Facts motion to dismiss alleging that it is the SEC, and Petitioner Yu was originally a Portuguese not the labor arbiter, which has jurisdiction over the national who was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. subject matter of the complaint. However, he petitioner applied for and was issued a Labor Arbiter Lorenzo granted the aforestated renewed Portuguese Passport by the Consular motion to dismiss. Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. The The NLRC, however, reversed the Labor Arbiter's CID (Commission on Immigration and Deportation) order. Petition for certiorari was filed. detained the petitioner pending his deportation Page 67 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS case. The petitioner, in turn, filed a petition for Issue habeas corpus. Whether the NTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Issue Whether a writ of habeas corpus should be issued Held No. The foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano , 21express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon 22 naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.
91. BOISER vs CA Facts Petitioner Boiser and private respondent PLDT entered into a contract denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of a PLDT relay station. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in the operation of facilities under the agreement. Later, without any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the facilities of the petitioner's telephone system. To avert serious consequences to the public and private hours resulting from any disruption of the telephone network and to the long distance and overseas aspects of its business, the petitioner was compelled to seek judicial relief. It filed a case with the CFI which issued a TRO against PLDT. The petitioner filed a petition with the CA alleging that the CFI had no jurisdiction over the subject matter because it is NTC that has jurisdiction.
Held The NTC has no jurisdiction, and the PLDT has made no showing of any, not even by necessary implication, to decide an issue involving breach of contract. And as the Court stated in RCPI v. Board of Communications , "if in the two cases before us, complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Inocencio allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation, ... the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent Board of Communications." Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be conferred by the will of the parties. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations in the complaint.
92. GORDON VS VERIDIANO FACTS: Food and Drug Administration and the mayor of Olongapo City are in conflict over the power to grant and revoke licenses for the operation of drug stores in the said city. While conceding that the FDA possesses such power, the mayor claim s he may nevertheless, in the exercise of his own power, prevent the operation of drug stores previously permitted by the former. San Sebastian Drug Store and Olongapo City Drug Store, both owned by Rosalinda Yambao were covered by Mayor's Permits and licenses to operate issued by the FDA. A joint team composed of agents from the FDA and narcotics agents conducted a "test buy" at San Sebastian Drug Store and was sold 200 tablets of Valium 10 mg. without a doctor's prescription. A report on the operation was submitted to the petitioner wherein it revoked the Mayor’s permit. Vice-Mayor de Perio, caused the posting of a signboard at the San Sebastian Drug Store announcing its permanent closure. FDA Administrator Arsenio Regala, directed the closure of the drug store and lifted the same after noting that the penalties imposed had already been discharged and allowed the drug store to resume operations. Yambao, through her counsel, wrote a letter to the petitioner seeking reconsideration of the revocation of Mayor's Permit. Having received no reply, she and her husband filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a complaint for mandamus and damages, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, against the petitioner and de Perio. Yambao requested permission from the FDA to exchange the locations of drug stores for reasons of "business preference." The request was granted. But
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS when informed of this action, the petitioner and the mayor's permits or until the request for disapproved the transfers and suspended Mayor's transfer, if made by the private respondents, is Permit for the Olongapo City Drug Store. approved by the petitioner. Respondent judge issued an order directing the maintenance of the status quo with respect to the Olongapo City Drug Store pending resolution of the 93. Union Bank of the Philippines vs Housing issues. Petitioner wrote the FDA requesting and Land Use Regulatory Board reconsideration of its order, allowing resumption of G.R. No. 95364 (June 29, 1992) the operation of the San Sebastian Drug Store but 210 SCRA 558 the same was denied. The court declared the Mayor's Permit for the San Sebastian Drug Store as null and void. A writ of preliminary prohibitory FACTS: injunction was issued and the said drug store In this case, Martha David purchased a resumed in its normal business operation. condominium unit from Fereit Realty Development Corporation. Without her knowledge, and without ISSUE: W/N FDA or the Mayor has jurisdiction in the approval of the National Housing Authority, revoking Yambao’s permit. mortgaged the condominium project to Bancom, predecessor-interest of Union Bank of the HELD: Philippines as a security for loan. FDRC failed to pay Settled is the rule that the factual findings of its obligation to Bancom. Martha David and Teresi ta administrative authorities are accorded great Quazon filed a complaint in the HLURB against respect because of their acknowledged expertise in FRDC, UBP and FEBTC to annul the title of UBP the fields of specialization to which they are and FEBTC over David’s condominium unit and to assigned. Even the courts of justice, including this order the issuance of a new certificate of title in his Court, are concluded by such findings in the name. UBP and FEBTC filed their answer absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of questioning HLURB’s jurisdiction over the case and discretion, which is not present in the case at bar. filed a motion on the same ground. For all his experience in the enforcement of city ordinances, the petitioner cannot claim the superior aptitudes of the FDA in the enforcement of the ISSUE: pharmacy and drug addiction laws. He should Whether or not the petitioner is correct on assailing therefore also be prepared, like the courts of justice HLURB’s jurisdiction. themselves, to accept its decisions on this matter. The indefinite suspension of the mayor's permit for Olongapo City Drug Store was based on the transfer HELD: thereof to the site of the San Sebastian Drug Store No. The act of a subdivision developer mortgaging as approved by the FDA but without permission the subdivision without notifying an installment from the petitioner. On this matter, the Court buyer is violative P.D. 957. Case falls under the believes that the final decision rested with the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. Clearly, mayor. The condition violated related more to the FRDC’s act of mortgaging the condominium project location in Olongapo City of business to Bancom and FEBTC without the knowledge and establishments in general than to the regulation of consent of David as buyer of a unit therein, and drug stores in particular. It therefore came under without the approval of NHA (now HLURB) as the petitioner's jurisdiction. required by P.D. 957, was not only an unsound re al The FDA would have the right to disapprove the site estate business practice but also highly prejudicial of the drug store only if it would impair the health to the buyer. David, who has a cause of action for or other interests of the customers in contravention annulment of mortgage, the mortgage foreclosure of the national laws or policies, as where the drug sale, and the condominium certificate of the title store is located in an unsanitary site. But the local that was issued to the UBP and FEBTC as highest executive would have reason to object to the bidders at the sale. The case falls within the location, even if approved by the FDA, where it does exclusive jurisdiction of NHA (now HLURB) as not conform to, say, a zoning ordinance intended to provided in P.D. No. 957 of 1976 and P.D. No. 1344 promote the comfort and convenience of the city of 1978. residents. The challenged orders are modified in the sense that the suspension of Mayor's Permit shall be considered valid but only until the San Sebastian 94. G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.* Drug Store and the Olongapo City Drug Store return RP VS MIGRINO to their original sites as specified in the FDA licenses TOPIC: Jurisdiction Page 69 of 80
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CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish FACTS: Acting on information received by the to question or challenge the PCGG’s acts or orders New AFP Anti-Graft Board, which indicated the must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction. The private respondent Ret. Lt. Tecson was required by Sandiganbayan’s decisions and final orders are in the Board to submit his explanation/comment turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by together with his supporting evidence. Private this Court. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565]. The ruling inPeña respondent was unable to produce his supporting was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, evidence because they were allegedly in the custo dy June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, Soriano III v. Yuson, of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The Board G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10, proceeded with its investigation and submitted its 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v . RTC, NCJR, Br. resolution, recommending that private respondent 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trial No.3019, as amended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as courts from interfering with the actions of the amended. The case was set for preliminary PCGG. investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the case on the following grounds: 95. NASIPIT LUMBER VS. NLRC – 177 SCRA 93 (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action against him under Rep. Facts: Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3)that E.O. Private respondent Juanito Collado was No. 14, insofar as it suspended the provisions of employed by petitioner as security guard. In the Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was course of his employment, 4 crates of lawanit boards inapplicable to his case; and (4) that having retired were stolen. He was implicated in the theft and from the AFP, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. thereafter placed under preventive suspension. Act No.3019. The Board opposed the motion to NALCO then filed an application with the Regional dismiss. The PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for Office of the Department of Labor for clearance to lack of merit. Private respondent moved for dismiss Collado. The application was approved by reconsideration but was denied by the PCGG. Officer-in-Charge Rey Seneres. The said officer Private respondent was directed to submit his certified the case to the labor arbiter who, after counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence. perusal of records, returned the case to the Regional Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition Director, who recommended that the case be with preliminary injunction with the RTC. Petitioner elevated to the Secretary of Labor. The acting filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the Secretary of Labor affirmed the decision of Seneres application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary granting petitioner’s application for clearance to injunction on the principal ground that the RTC had dismiss Collado. no jurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of Collado then filed a complaint before the PCGG v. Pena. Private respondent opposed the District Labor Office for unjust dismissal and motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the reinstatement with backwages and benefits. NALCO opposition. The court judge denied petitioner’s filed a motion to dismiss upon the ground that the motion to dismiss. The respondent judge granted order of the Acting Secretary of Labor had become the application for the issuance of a writ of final and executory, making the issue of illegal preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners from dismissal res judicata. The Labor Arbiter ordered investigating or prosecuting private respondent NALCO to reinstate Collado without backwages. under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing Both parties appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC of a bond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos. modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision adding Petitioner strongly argues that the private backwages. respondent’s case falls within the jurisdiction of the Issue: Whether or not the principle of res judicata PCGG. Hence, this petition. applies.
ISSUE:
WON the court could act on cases with exclusive jurisdiction to Sandiganbayan.
HELD: Yes, Petitioner assails the trial court’s cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent. Particularly, petitioner argues that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already been settled in Peña,
Held: The Court stated therein that the principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are “non-litigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law.” Said pronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum that the doctrine of res
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial Appellee proceedings and not to the exercise of Private respondent Angeles Dico filed with the administrative powers. Director of Lands a free patent application (No. V3-3852) for a 4-hectare dry portion of Lot 489-C 96. Under Enforcement of Agency Action and covered by Fishpond Permit Reorganization/Dissolution of Agencies: No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete, the latter in turn GODELIVA S. DULAY, Petitioner , vs. THE protested. HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL That the Director of Lands rejected said RESOURCES application. That a motion for reconsideration having been Facts: denied, private respondent Dico appealed to the Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; Court and asks Us to confine public respondent That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic the Secretary's decision, Annex "F", but her motion Resources within his jurisdiction and to uphold the was denied on January 26, 1971. A se cond motion principle of res judicata in administrative for reconsideration was likewise denied per Order proceedings by nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 dated May 5, 1971. order giving due course to the letter-petition of Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) private respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for succeeded to the rights and interests over the area the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs. in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of Sale of Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay and Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights" the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease Agreement No. (Annex "J") transferring their rights and interests in favor of the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay" This present conflict stems from two earlier cases 489-Cconsisting of 19.15 hectares, more or less, decided by the Office of the President, both of and covered by their Fishpond Permit No. which have attained finality. To wit: 1582.chanr Re : DANR Case No . 2898 On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles entitled "Angeles Dico Dico) submitted a letter-petition to the respondent officials (Annex "L") requesting for a "reopening of v. Juan Quibete That by a barter agreement entered into between fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete, Juan Quibete and Jose Padios sometime in 1932, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based the former exchanged his parcel of land situated at on newly discovered evidence". It was there alleged Sitio Palaypay, municipality of San Dionisio, that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete did not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C) province of Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond area of about 24 hectares located at sitio Talaba-an, located in Sitio Talaba-an, Municipality of Cadiz municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City), province of (now Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio Negros Occidental. That Juan Quibete, also in Luna, Cadiz City. She prayed that petitioner's 1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled over the area .His application was approved on and, in lieu thereof, a new one be issued in her name. February 10, 1949 and Fishpond Permit No. F738-E was issued. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res judicata. Dico applied for fish pond permit over the same area, and was disapproved due to the existing Issue : Whether or not res judicata is applicable. permit of Quibete. Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his Ruling : Yes! rights and interests over the area under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado. It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that Dico protested such transfer but was dismissed. the decisions and orders of administrative agencies That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, she appealed to the Office of the President. Her have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect appeal was in turn dismissed in the decision of of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata . The rule of res November 14, 1969.chanrobles judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter 2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447 entitled "F.P.A. No. once judicially determined by competent authority V-3-3852, Angeles Dico, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts Applicant-Appellant v. of public, executive or administrative officers and Juan Quibete, Claimantboards acting within their jurisdiction. Page 71 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Camarines Sur. Bicol Union Center was also notified Juan Quibete" was decided by the Office of the forthwith of the arrival time. Unfortunately, the 11 President on November 14, 1969. Since the same discharging, could not be effected immediately and was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the continuously due to the ff: same has long become final and executory.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles 1. the buoys were installed only virtual law library on September 11, 1985; DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. 2. the discharge permit was Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No. secured by the consignee V-3-385 of private respondent Dico. The Director of only on September 13, 1985; Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967 rejected her 3. a wooden catwalk had to be application. The Secretary of Agriculture and installed and extension of Natural Resources affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12 The findings of fact in said DANR case, the wharf had to be made, which were found by the Secretary to be the same which was completed only on facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are deemed September 26, 1985; conclusive by operation of law. 13Said DANR case, 4. the discharging was not not having been brought likewise to the courts for continuous because there judicial review has also become final and executory. were intermittent rains and The matter having become final as of August or the stevedores supplied by September 1970, 27it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent Director of the the consignee did not work Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give during the town fiesta. due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the Pending discharge of the cargo’s remainder, fishpond conflict involved herein. a strong typhoon named Saling hit the area. Petition Granted As a result, the vessel’s anchor chain
97. G.R. No. May 17, 1993 101426 PETITIONER PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. RESPONDENTS COURT OF APPEALS and TRANSPACIFIC TOWAGE, INC. Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari where Philippine American General Insurance Company, Incorporated (Philamgen) assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and entered a new one dismissing the Philamgen’s complaint which sought to collect the sum of P1,511,210.00 from the Transpacific Towage, Inc. Davao Union Marketing Corporation of Davao City shipped on board the vessel M/V “Crazy Horse” operated by the Transpacific Towage, Inc. cargo consisting of construction materials consigned to Bicol Union Center insured by Philamgen. The vessel M/V “Crazy Horse” arrived on September 7, 1985 as scheduled at the port of Pasacao,
stopper released its clutch; the vessel was dragged against the rocks, eventually destroyed and partially sank. People of the barrio came and started looting the vessel. As a result, nothing was left of the remaining cargo. Forty (40) days from the time the vessel arrived and thirty-four (34) days from the time actual discharge of the cargo commenced before Saling came. The total number of cement bags damaged and/or lost was 26,424 costing P1,056,960.00 while there were 4,000 pieces of the GI sheets unrecovered, the cost of which was P454,250.00. Hence, as the insurer, Philamgen was bound to pay Davao Union Marketing Corporation the sum of P1,511,210.00. Then, it sought to recover what it paid from Transpacific Towage, Inc. but Transpacific refused to do so. Thusly, Philamgen filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money before the RTC. Transpacific, as one of its arguments for the dismissal of the case, said that the doctrine of res judicata applies in the case at bar, because the Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision (acting
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS on the marine protest filed on 19 October 1985 by liability for the loss of the cargo, pursuant to Article the shipmaster of M/V “Crazy Horse”) holding that 1740 of the Civil Code. said shipmaster was not guilty of “negligence as the proximate cause of the grounding and subsequent 2. The resolution of the present case is not barred wreckage of M/V “Crazy Horse”, hence, by the judgment of the Board of Marine Inquiry. One recommending that the captain, his officers and of the requisites of the principle of res judicata is crew be absolved from any administrative liability that there must be, among other things, identity of arising out of the subject incident.” subject matters and causes of action between a first and second case in order that the judgment in the RTC ruled that although the immediate cause of the prior case may bar that in the subsequent case. loss may have been due to an act of God, the defendant carrier had exposed the property to the The cause of action in the marine protest was to accident because of unreasonable delay anchoring enforce the administrative liability of the its decision on Article 1740 of the Civil Code which shipmaster/captain of M/V “Crazy Horse”, its provides that if the common carrier negligently officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking of the incurs in delay in transporting the goods, a natural subject vessel. On the other hand, the cause of disaster shall not free the carrier from action at bar is to enforce the civil liability of private responsibility. respondent, a common carrier, for its failure to unload the subject cargo within a period of time CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled considered unreasonably long by the petitioner. instead that private respondent, as a common carrier, is not responsible for the loss of the insured While it may be true that the Court is bound to cargo involved in the case at bar, as said loss was accord great weight to factual findings of the due solely to a fortuitous event. According to the CA, Board,9 we hold that the protest filed before it and the delay in fully unloading the cargo from the ves sel the present case assert different causes of action “was occasioned by causes that may not be and seek different reliefs. attributed solely to human factors, among which were the natural conditions of the port where the Doctrine Learned: M/V “Crazy Horse” had docked, the customs of the place and the weather conditions. Res judicata doctrine does not apply to courts where prior decision was done by Board of Marine Inquiry.
Issue/s: 1. Whether delay for the unloading of the Cargo is attributable to Transpacific so as to not exempt it from liability due to fortuitous event? 2. Whether the case filed by Philamgen is barred by the doctrine of res judicata?
98. APOLEGA V. HIZON 25 SCRA 336 Topic:
Enforcement of Agency Action reorganization/dissolution of agencies
and
Facts: Ruling: 1. No, the delay in the discharge was not negligence attributable to any party, in particular, to Transpacific. 2. No, the case is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
Ratio Decidendi: 1. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither of the parties herein could be faulted for such delay, for the same (delay) was due not to negligence, but to several factors earlier discussed. The cargo having been lost due to typhoon “Saling”, and the delay incurred in its unloading not being due to negligence, private respondent is exempt from
This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in connection to the writ of execution from the Department of Labor through its Regional Office’s deputized officials. Petitioner is the employer of the respondent’s late husband. The respondent’s late husband was a former employee of the petitioner which suffered injury from the render of service to the latter. As result of the injury, the employee filed a claim for compensation for the injury sustained. The Regional Director issued an award requiring petitioner to pay the claimant for a sum of money. Petitioner was given a letter from the Chief Administrative Section in connection with claim which the former fails to answer. Due to the injury, the respondent’s husband died. A year after the husband’s death, petitioner, as guardian ad litem of their minor children, filed a death compensation
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS claim which was granted. justice to the officials appointed or offices created The petitioner filed a "Motion to Vacate the Award under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v. and Motion to Dismiss the Case," which was granted De Leon, et al., L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the but was not acted upon by the petitioner. The award Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution to became final and executory and remanded the case enforce a compensation award, we held that to the Regional Office a quo for appropriate action. "inasmuch as the writ of execution WAS issued by Thus, the petitioner elevated the case to the Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2, 1960, Supreme Court, alleging, among the others, that the before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said Commission or the duly deputized officials in the writ is there-fore null and void," thus impliedly Regional Offices of the Department of Labor have no upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act authority to issue writs of execution, and questions 4119. the constitutionality of Section 17, Republic Act 4119, which amended Section 51 of the Workmen's Referential Syllabus: Compensation Act and vests such authority in the Workmen's Compensation Act; Claim for Commission and its duly deputized officials. compensation; Effect of failure to controvert claim; Where allegation of lack of notice and hearing Issue: WON the Commission or the duly deputized cannot be sustained; Case at bar. — In the present officials in the Regional Offices of the Department of case, petitioner's (employer) allegation of lack of Labor have no authority to issue a writ of execution. notice and hearing cannot be sustained Petitioner failed to controvert the claims (injury and death) for Held: compensation, as required by Section 45 of the Yes, the Commission or the duly deputized officials Workmen's Compensation Act. By reason of such in the Regional Offices of the Departme nt of failure petitioner waived his right to present Labor have authority to issue a writ of execution. evidence concerning the claims and therefore Originally the power to enforce a final award made cannot complain that he was not duly heard. Under under the Workmen's Compensation Act was vested the circumstances the hearing officer could make "in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the award without the necessity of a formal hearing, the accident occurred" (Sec. 61, Act 3428). treating the claim as uncontested and thus Subsequently, pursuant to Republic Act 997, as dispensing with the reception of evidence. As to the amended by Republic Act 1241, and as effected by failure of the claimant to f ile the claim within the Reorganization Plan 20-A adopted in 1956, the time prescribed in Section 24 of the Act, the same authority to enforce awards was transferred from was non-jurisdictional and did not constitute a bar the courts of justice to the Regional Administrator to the proceeding, considering that the employer did and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, not suffer by such delay or failure. This Court, in a number of cases, nullified writs of Same; Effect of partial payment of benefits. — Where execution issued by the Regional Offices and by the the employer had paid the total amount of Commission on the ground that Reorganization Plan P530.00 — P480.00 when the employee was still alive 20-A, insofar as it purported to grant such power, and P50.00 after his death, such partial payment of was without legislative authority or sanction. benefits renders it unnecessary to file the claims As the law now stands, however, the power to (injury and death) within the time limit provided for enforce awards under the Workmen's under Section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Compensation Act is expressly vested in the Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 4119. Commission or the duly deputized officials in the Same; Power to enforce awards; Original and Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (R.A. present law; Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 4119). This grant of power does not contravene the 4119 upheld. — Originally the power to enforce a Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the final award made under the Workmen's enforcement of the award, and while it is procedural Compensation Act was vested "in any court of record in nature and therefore essentially falls within the in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred" rule-making power of this Court, it may be legislated (Sec. 61, Act 3428). Subsequently, pursuant to upon by Congress under its constitutional authority Republic Act 997, as amended by Republic Act to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning 1241, and as effected by Reorganization Plan 20-A pleading, practice and procedure x x x." (Section 13, adopted in 1956, the authority to enforce awards Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines). In was transferred from the courts of justice to the Republic Act 4119 the legislative intent to vest in the Regional Administrator and the Workmen's Commission the power to enforce its awards is clear, Compensation Commission, This Court, in a in contrast of Republic Act 997, which did not number of cases, nullified writs of execution issued authorize the Reorganization Commission to by the Regional Offices and by the Commission on transfer such judicial power from the courts of the ground that Reorganization Plan 20-A, insofar Page 74 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS as it purported to grant such power, was without of service, a fraction of at least six months being legislative authority or sanction. considered as one year. As the law now stands, however, the power to enforce awards under the Workmen's Even before the issuance of that NLRC resolution of Compensation Act is expressly vested in the June 11, 1981, or on February 10, 1981, Merano Commission or the duly deputized officials in the filed in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City a Regional Offices of the Department of Labor (R.A. special civil action of mandamus against San Miguel 4119). This grant of power does not contravene the Corporation and the Labor Arbiter who functioned Constitution. Execution is a necessary step in the as the execution arm of the NLRC. enforcement of the award, and while it is procedural in nature and therefore essentially falls within the Respondent Judge Eduardo C. Tutaan, in his order rule-making power of this Court, it may be legislated of April 20, 1981, dismissed Merano’s petition on upon by Congress under its constitutional authority the ground that he had no jurisdiction over the to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning subject-matter of the case which falls within the pleading, practice and procedure x x x." (Section 13, competent of the NLRC. Article VIII, Constitution of the Philippines). In Republic Act 4119 the legislative intent to vest in the Issue/s: Whether or not the trial court judge was Commission the power to enforce its awards is clear, wrong in dismissing the case. (No) in contrast of Republic Act 997, which did not authorize the Reorganization Commission to Held: Respondent judge did not err in dismissing transfer such judicial power from the courts of Merano’s petition for mandamus on the ground of justice to the officials appointed or offices created lack of jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance is under Reorganization Plan 20-A. In Lo Chi, et al. v. not the proper tribunal to pass upon Merano’s De Leon, et al., L-18584, Jan. 30, 1967, where the complaint against the failure of the Labor Arbiter to Regional Administrator issued a writ of execution to enforce the NLRC’s decision to reinstate him to his enforce a compensation award, we held that former position of sales staff assistant. The labor "inasmuch as the writ of execution WAS issued by tribunal has the same rank and is in the same Regional Administrator De Leon on Dec. 2, 1960, category as the Court of First Instance. before the effectivity of Republic Act 4119, the said writ is there-fore null and void," thus impliedly upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act 100. GSIS vs. CSC 4119. FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to review the order of 99. Merano vs. Tutaan (115 SCRA 343, [No. Lthe Civil Service Commission(CSC) dated June 20, 56833], 20 July 1982) 1990 which directed the Government Service Insurance System(GSIS) to pay the compulsory Facts: heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio The National Labor Relations Commission in Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal a decision ordered San Miguel Corporation to separation up to the date of their demise. The Order reinstate Ramon V. Merano to his former position dated November 22, 1990, however, denied herein without loss of seniority rights and other rights and petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of CSC’s benefits to which he is entitled under existing laws Order dated June 20, 1990. Deceased Elizar and with backwages from December 16, 1977 up to Namuco and Eusebio Manuel were illegally his reinstatement. dismissed by the GSIS for allegedly being involved in irregularities in the canvass of supplies and Pursuant to that decision, Merano was paid materials P53,949.16 as monetary award up to August 31, ISSUE: 1980 but he was not reinstated. San Miguel Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has Corporation opposed the reinstatement due to his the power to execute its judgments, final orders or supervening physical unfitness and asked that it be resolutions? allowed to pay Merano separation pay in lieu of RULING: reinstatement. Ruling: The Civil Service Commission has the power to execute its judgment, final orders or The NLRC in its en banc resolution of June 11, 1981 resolutions. The CSC is a constitutional commission ruled that because Merano could no longer be invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not reinstated due to his illness, he should be paid his only with the authority to administer the civil additional backwages and separation pay up to that service but is also vested with quasi-judicial powers. date at the rate of one month’s salary for every year It has the authority to hear and decide Page 75 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly petitioner Garcia of the termination of her services with it or brought to it on appeal. The grant to a as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground that tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power or the she was "receiving bribe money". authority to hear and adjudge cases, normally and However, in its Resolution 2 dated June 30, 1988, logically is deemed to include the grant of authority the Civil Service Commission directed that private to enforce or execute the judgments it thus respondent Garcia be restored to her position as renders unless the law otherwise provides. It is Deputy Register of Deeds II or its equivalent in the quite obvious that the authority to decide cases NALTDRA. It held that "under the vested right would be inutile unless accompanied by the theory the new requirement of BAR membership to authority to see that what has been decided is qualify for permanent appointment as Deputy carried out. The writ of execution issued on June Register of Deeds II or higher as mandated under 20, 1990 is valid. The Court upholds the same, said Executive Order, would not apply to her simply because there is no fair and feasible (private respondent Garcia) but only to the filling up alternative in the circumstances. The binding force of vacant lawyer positions on or after February 9, of Resolution of July 4, 1988, for all intents and 1981, the date said Executive Order took effect. purposes, is that it makes exoneration in the since private respondent Garcia had been holding administrative proceedings a condition precedent to the position of Deputy Register of Deeds II from payment of said back salaries, it cannot however 1977 to September 1984, she should not be affected exact an impossible performance or decree a useless by the operation on February 1, 1981 of Executive exercise such as that the subsequent disciplinary Order No. 649. proceedings is an empty, and inutile procedure as Petitioner NALTDRA filed the present petition to to the deceased employees, they cannot possibly be assail the validity of the above Resolution of the Civil bound by any substantiation in the said Service Commission. It contends that Sections 8 proceedings of the abovementioned charges. and 10 of Executive Order No. 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their 101. NATIONAL LAND TITLES and DEEDS functions to the appropriate new offices created by REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION vs CSC said Executive Order, which newly created offices G.R. No. 84301. April 7, 1993. required the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, Executive Order No. Facts: 649 applies to private respondent Garcia, and not Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Laws being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under II. permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III pursuant Issue: Whether or not a law abolishes an office is to PD 1529, to which position, petitioner was also one of legislative intent about which there can be no appointed under permanent status up to September controversy and if there is an explicit declaration in 1984. She was for two years, more or less, the law itself. designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan. By virtue of Executive Order Held: No. 649 (which took effect on February 9, 1981) A closer examination of Executive Order No. which authorized the restructuring of the Land 649 which authorized the reorganization of the Land Registration Commission to National Land Titles Registration Commission (LRC) into the National and Deeds Registration Administration and Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration regionalizing the Offices of the Registers therein, (NALTDRA), reveals that said law in express terms, petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as provided for the abolition of existing positions. Deputy Register of Deeds II on October 1, 1984, Thus, without need of any interpretation, the law under temporary status, for not being a member of mandates that from the moment an implementing the Philippine Bar. She appealed to the Secretary of order is issued, all positions in the Land Justice but her request was denied. Petitioner Registration Commission are deemed non-existent. Garcia moved for reconsideration but her motion This, however, does not mean removal. Abolition of remained unacted. On October 23, 1984, petitioner a position does not involve or mean removal for the Garcia was administratively charged with Conduct reason that removal implies that the post subsists Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. While and that one is merely separated therefrom. said case was pending decision, her temporary Executive Order No. 649 authorized the appointment as such was renewed in 1985. In a reorganization of the Land Registration Commission Memorandum dated October 30, 1986, the then (LRC) into the National Land Titles and Deeds Minister, now Secretary, of Justice notified Registration Administration (NALTDRA). It Page 76 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC university, defining its objectives, organizational and required new appointments to be issued to all structure and functions, and expanding its employees of the NALTDRA. curricular offerings. There is no dispute over the authority to carry out a Mateo continued as the head of the new University. valid reorganization in any branch or agency of the On April 3, 1979, he was appointed Acting President Government. Under Section 9, Article XVII of the and on March 28, 1980, as President for a term of 1973 Constitution. The power to reorganize is, six (6) years. however; not absolute. This court has pronounced On July 11, 1980, the Circuit Criminal Court of that if the newly created office has substantially Manila rendered judgment acquitting petitioner of new, different or additional functions, duties or the charges against him. On February 12, 1992, powers, so that it may be said in fact to create an petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a office different from the one abolished, even though motion for execution of the judgment, particularly it embraces all or some o f the duties of the old office the part ordering his reinstatement to the position it will be considered as an abolition of one office and of president of the PUP and the payment of his the creation of a new or different one. The same is salaries and other benefits during the period of true if one office is abolished and its duties, for suspension. reasons of economy are given to an existing officer The motion was granted and a partial writ of or office. Executive Order No. 649 was enacted to execution was issued by the trial court on March 6, improve the services and better systematize the 1992. On March 26, 1992, however, President operation of the Land Registration Commission. A Corazon C. Aquino appointed Dr. Jaime Gellor as reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for acting president of the PUP, following the expiration the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy of the term of office of Dr. Nemesio Prudente, who more efficient. To this end, the requirement of Bar had succeeded Dr. Mateo. Petitioner was one of the membership to qualify for key positions in the five nominees considered by the President of the NALTDRA was imposed to meet the changing Philippines for the position. circumstances and new development of the times. ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC Private respondent Garcia who formerly held the into PUP abolished the PCC. position of Deputy Register of Deeds II did not have RULING: No. In part the contention is well taken, such qualification. It is thus clear that she cannot but, as will presently be explained, reinstatement is hold any key position in the NALTDRA, The no longer possible because of the promulgation of additional qualification was not intended to remove P.D. No. 1437 by the President of the Philippines on her from office. Rather, it was a criterion imposed June10, 1978. P.D. No. 1437 did not abolish, but concomitant with a valid reorganization measure. only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that 102. CRISOSTOMO vs CA earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was the Philippine College of Commerce. What took appointed by the President of the Philippines as the place was a change in academic status of the President of the Philippine College of Commerce educational institution, not in its corporate life. (PCC) on July 17, 1974. During his incumbency as Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its president of the PCC, two administrative cases were curricular offerings, and the changes in its filed against petitioner for illegal use of government structure and organization. vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials As petitioner correctly points out, when belonging to the college, oppression and the purpose is to abolish a department or an harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and office or an organization and to replace it with another dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were one, the lawmaking authority says so. filed with the Office of the President, were But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor president of the PUP could not be ordered by the General for investigation. On October 22, 1976, trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had petitioner was preventively suspended from office been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of pursuant to R.A. No. 3019, as amended. In his place state universities and colleges at six Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as officer -in(6) years, renewable for another term of six charge on November 10, 1976, and then as Acting (6) years, and President on May 13, 1977. authorizing the President of the Philipp On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then ines to terminate the terms of incumbe President Ferdinand E. Marcos, converting the n t s w h o w e r e n o t reappointed. Philippine college of commerce into a polytechnic Page 77 of 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CASE DIGEST
ATTY. CABRAS
103. Blaquera vs. Civil Service Commission 104. DTI V CSC FACTS: The petitioners and intervenors who are permanent employees in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) filed this petition for prohibition and mandamus to stop the respondents from removing them from their positions in the DENR pursuant to the 1987 reorganization of that department under an Executive Order. To carry out said reorganization, the DENR Secretary submitted to t he Department of Budget and Management a staffing pattern consisting of 24,614 positions. The DBM released a revised staffing pattern containing 23,612 positions only which was 1,002 positions less than what the DENR Secretary requested and which still did not include the positions of the petitioners. The DENR requested the DBM to restore 839 positions which DBM had disapproved earlier. The request was approved after long negotiations between the DENR and DBM, subject to the condition that these positions shall be coterminous with the appointees but not to exceed three (3) years.
FACTS: EO 133 was promulgated (reorganizing the Dept of trade and industry )which provides that the NACIDA(nat’l cottage industry development authority) was to be reorganized into the CITC (cottage industry technology Center) and attached to DTI. Pursuant to EO 133. DTI issued Memorandum Circular no. 28 expressing the guidelines for the evaluation and the placement of DTI personel.
ISSUE:
DTI RAB in favor of DTI CSC ruled that Espejo should be given any position comparable to her previous position(Division Chief II)
Whether or not reorganization is a recognized valid ground for separation of civil service employees.
Espejo, who was a Division Chief II, Public Relations and Management Staff Service, of NACIDA, was assessed and evaluated and found that Espejo not to be sufficiently qualified for retention. A termination later was issued to her. Later, she was offered the position of Industrial Development Specialist, Operations Department, CITC, which was four (4) ranges lower than her previous position. She turned down the offer; instead, she appealed her case to the DTI-RAB.
HELD: The right of the State to reorganize the government resulting in the separation of career civil service employees under the 1987 Constitution is beyond dispute but said reorganization, ouster and appointments of successors must be made in good faith. That the reorganization of the DENR was not intended to achieve economy and efficiency, is revealed by the admission in the public respondents’ Comment that the new staffing pattern of the department contains “991 positions more than the total number of permanent positions in the DENR before the reorganization.” Since the abolition of their positions will not conduce to either “efficiency” or “economy” in the Service, which are the principal justifications for any government overhaul, then, obviously, the reorganization of the DENR is not justified. The conversion of the petitioners from permanent to coterminous employees is a wholesale demotion of personnel which is tantamount to removal without cause and without due process. The Court held that the removal of the petitioners and intervenors from office is declared null and void. The respondent Secretary of the DENR or his successor in office, is ordered to reinstate the petitioners to their former or equivalent positions in the DENR.
ISSUE: W/N Espejo should be given position comparable to her previus postion? HELD:
YES. Republic Act No. 6656, "An Act to Protect the Security Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employee in the Implementation of Government Reorganization," in part, provides: Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career
service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing A valid cause for removal exists when pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position had been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered its evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) Where an office abolished and another
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DIGEST ATTY. CABRAS performing substantially the same functions is mill in Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was created; issued by the President withdrawing from sale or (c) Where incumbents are replaced by less qualified settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used in terms of status of appointment, performance and by the NSC. However, certain portions of the public merit; land under Proclamation 2239 were occupied by (d) Where there is a reclassification of officers in Maria Cristina Fertilizer Co. (MCFC). LOI No. 1277 the department of agency concerned and the was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the reclassified offices perform substantially the owners of MCFC for and on behalf of the same functions as the original offices; Government for the compensation of MCFC’s (e) Where the removal violates the order of present occupancy rights on the subject land. The separation provided in Section 3 hereof. LOI directed that ISA may exercise the power of eminent domain should the negotiations fail. The "(i)t is a paramount principle in Public Officers Law negotiations failed and ISA commenced that the power to abolish public offices rested in the expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While legislature is not absolute, (and that it) is subject to trial was on-going the statutory existence of ISA had the limitations that it be exercised in good faith, expired prompting MCFC to file the dismissal of the should never be for personal or political reasons, case since ISA has ceased to be a juridical person. and cannot be implemented in a manner contrary to The trial court granted MCFC’s motion to dismiss anchoring on the Rules of Court that “only natural or law." It may be recalled that after 02 February 1987, juridical persons or entities authorized by law may any reorganization undertaken by government is be parties to a civil case .” ISA moved for a also circumscribed by the provisions and reconsideration contending that despite the safeguards of the new Constitution. expiration of its term, its juridicial existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be Section 18 (e) of E.O. No. 133 provides that NACIDA completed. In the alternative ISA urged that the Rep. is merely reorganized as CITC, and its functions of the Philippines should be allowed to be substituted other than technology development and training, in its place. The RTC denied its motion for were transferred to the Bureau of Small and reconsideration. This was affirmed by the CA. Medium Scale Business Development (BSMBD) and relevant operating units of the Department (DTI). Thus, the function of NACIDA are merely ISSUE: transferred to other units of DTI, it follows that its Whether or not the Republic of the personnel performing particular functions shall also Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in be transferred to the corresponding units. view of the expiration of ISA’s term. We find particular merit on the evidence submitted by Espejo that incumbents were replaced by those less qualified in terms of educational qualification, performance and merit. Espejo "undoubtedly possesses education and work experience to perhaps, merit retention in the service."(CHIEF OF DIVISION for 11yeears/MASTERAL DEGREE)
105. Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272, in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Initially, it was created for a ter m of 5 years but when its original term expired, its term was extended for another 10 years by EO No. 555. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is an entity wholly owned by the National Government embarked on an expansion program which includes the construction of a steel
HELD: There is no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. ISA in fact appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of the Republic are case in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and other times without capital stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. The term “Authority” has been used to designate both incorporated and non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government. The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as “legal personality.” When the statutory term of a non-incorporated
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