Admin Case Digests

SAN BEDA COLLEGE COLLEGE OF LAW 638 Mendiola St. San Miguel, Manila SY 2016-2017

CASE DIGESTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, AND LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATIONS Submitted to: Atty. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17)

Submitted by: 2C ABDULHALIM, Abduljalil DOLOR, Xylene ESPINOSA, Ma. Ana LAGUMBAY, Maeryl MACASINAG, Hoven MALAPITAN, Chelo MONES, Mikkaela QUE, Anna Carmela REYES, Marie Sherrydane REYNO, Rosette ROQUE, Christian SAGMON, Kristine TOLENTINO, Ruiza VARDELEON, Crizedhen VITUG, Mary Anne

2K ABONG, Mario ACOSTA, Noel ALIH, James BERNALES, Maybelle CHING, Anj CULAJARA, Jes FONTANILLA, Miguel MANDA, Loren PELAUSA, Steph SALONGA, Jay SAMANIEGO, Emil SARMIENTO, Mica TOLENTINO, Fatima VELASCO, EG

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

2C and 2K would like to thank Atty. Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura for tirelessly imparting his knowledge on Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers, Election Law, and Law on Public Corporations

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

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OVERVIEW 1. Aratuc v COMELEC G.R NO. 49705-09 8 February 1979 FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte, Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates, declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction. HELD: “As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.” “The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. The Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given due course. Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such dismissal. Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later, so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are strong considerations warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks of seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved, and he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put down at least some of the important considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record their points of view. In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their respective reactions in proper perspective.

2. Maceda et.al vs Energy Regulatory Board G.R. Nos. 95203-05 December 18, 1990 FACTS: On September 10, 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. and Petron Corporation proferred separate applications with the respondent Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) for permission to increase the wholesale posted price of petroleum products and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further proceedings. ERB granted the provisional relief pursuant to Sec. 8 of EO No. 172. Petitioners contended that the Order had been issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. They submitted that the Order was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Sec. 3 par. (E) of EO No. 172. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the Order by ERB is a grave abuse of discretion resulting to excess or lack of jurisdiction HELD: No. The Court held that petitioners overlooked the provisions of Sec. 8 of EO No. 172 which provides for the authority to grant provisional relief. Their contention that what should be applicable is Sec. 3(e) has no merit. What must be stressed is that while under EO No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the ERB from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did in this case, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Sections 3 and 8 of the said executive order do not negate each other, or otherwise, they operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Sec. 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order under Sec. 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of hearing, subject to final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority, however, it can be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one.

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 3. Malaga vs. Penachos. Jr. G.R. No. 86695 3 September 1992 FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late. On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint. On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject law. ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of PD 1818? RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions). The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818. There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law. Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the bidding and the award of the project 4. Beja. Sr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97149 31 March 1992 FACTS: Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, hired as Arrastre supervisor in 1975. and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty. Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC. HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857 but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the “Jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA. With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power “to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel”. On December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision, “Attachment” is defined as the “lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination”. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program coordination.” With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel actions “ in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions” under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA –AAB-1-049-89. The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation 5. EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No. 115863 FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states: “Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.”

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution. ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside NO 1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.. 2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.” The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency. 6. THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE TEOFILO L, GUADIZ, JR.,Presiding Judge, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 147: NCR (MAKATI), and KARAMFIL IMPORT-EXPORT CO., INC.G.R. No. 8357, March 16, 1989, SARMIENTO, J. FACTS: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the petitioners Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation, Philippine Construction Development Corporation,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Inter-trade Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises. The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of the six (6) search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. Shortly thereafter, the private respondent (the petitioner below) went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. 6 On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five (5) days notice " 7 ] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985. On April 16, 1985, the lower court declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. On August 21, 1985, the trial court denied reconsideration. On April 4, 1986, the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest, on certiorari, the twin Order(s) of the lower court. The petitioner asked the Supreme Court to hold as null and void two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 24, 1987 and May 20, 1988, reversing its Decision, dated October 24, 1986. The Decision set aside an Order, dated April 16, 1985, of the Regional Trial Court, as well as its Order, dated August 21, 1985. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is a quasi-judicial body, and one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and 2. Whether or not said presidential body may be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution. HELD: 1. No. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as follows: (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity, grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration. (2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the Central Bank of the Philippines. (3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics Administration. (4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner. (5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission, Board of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional Regulation Commission. (6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and Minors Bureau. As may be seen, it is the basic function of these bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. Its undertaking is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities". If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court. In that respect, we do not find error in the respondent Court of Appeal's resolution sustaining the assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo. 2. No. We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. It is our ruling, thus, that when the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible". We are not saying, of course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.

7. GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C. ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR., VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA vs. MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commission on Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice G.R. No. L-57883, March 12, 1982, FERNANDO, C.J.

FACTS: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes" is being assailed in this case. The assailed legislation mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. Petitioners sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. ISSUE:

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Whether or not BP Blg. 129 is unconstitutional. HELD: The Court held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing tulle inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this petition is dismissed. 8. LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC. vs. JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources G.R. No. L-27811, November 17, 1967, SANCHEZ, J. FACTS: In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao. On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff. On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area. On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31, 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed. On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same. The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines. On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion." ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the President cannot undo the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and 2. Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of no legal force and effect. HELD: 1. No. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary. Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive departments. And control simply means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department secretary. 2. No. It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in person. Not as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 9. EUSTAQUIO M. MEDALLA, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE MARCELINO N. SAYO, Judge of the CFI of Rizal, Branch XXXIII and HONORATO G. MACKAY, acting Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital and the CITY MAYOR OF CALOOCAN G.R. No. L-54554, March 30, 1981, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J. FACTS: Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General Hospital, Caloocan City. Private respondent,, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was the Resident Physician thereat. When the position of Assistant hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A. Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator private respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr., protested Dr. Mackay's designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as Chief of Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who succeeded former Mayor, now Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay's appointment. Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on appeal. On December 29, 1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla's appeal and revoking Mackay's appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, pursuant to section 19(6), PD No. 807, Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave revoked the appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as Assistant Hospital Administrator and awarded the position in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla. The Acting City Mayor, on behalf of Mackay, moved for reconsideration. On May 7, 1979, totally disregarding the Decision of the Office of the President, the same Acting City Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as Hospital Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco as his Assistant, thereby again completely bypassing Medalla. Mackay took his oath of office on May 7, 1979. On June 27, 1979, however, the Civil Service Commission, acting on Medalla's protest, and besides calling attention to the penal provision of P.D. No. 807, disapproved Mackay's appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr. Honorato C. Mackay, as Hospital Administrator is null and void. HELD: Yes. Under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan RA No. 5502, it is clear that the power of appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations. The Caloocan City General Hospital is one of the city departments provided for in the said law. The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla. The special reason given by the Acting City Mayor for Mackay's appointment, which is, that lie had completed all academic requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not tenable, since Medalla himself was found to be in possession of the same qualification. But while the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear that the position of Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to I hospital Administrator under the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackay’s appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator and subsequently hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in rank, Medalla is entitled to appointment as Hospital Administrator. It is true that, as the respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are possesses of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment. However, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be ignored. 10. Lianga Bay Logging Co. vs. Enage GR. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987 FACTS: The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary-the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary-whereby the eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director of Forestry ordered asurvey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. The decision fixed the common boundary of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in red pencil of the sketch attached to the decision. In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the green line on the same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed decision." Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated June 16,1966, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. On motion for reconsideration, the Office of the President issued another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision, dated March 20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry. Thereafter, Ago brought the action in the CFI.

ISSUE: WON the CFI has authority to hear and decide the case. HELD: No. The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review anew the decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry, secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of the Office of the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 11. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD GR No. L-75697, June 18, 1987 DOCTRINE: VRB was conferred the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law and not being tasked to legislate. FACTS: In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the ground that there is undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD. ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s argument is correct. HELD: No. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being “subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”

12. Rabor vs. Civil Service Commission GR No. 11612 Facts: Sometime in May 1991, Alma D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this" Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date"2/28/91." In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City. Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows: "Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted: 'Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months. ’ IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador Rabor as Utility Worker in that office, is already non- extendible." Accordingly, on 8 August 1991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him "to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991. Issue: Whether or not the service of the petitioner is already not extendible. Held: Yes. We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law."Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2)delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examinations but must wait for jobs to be vacated by 'extendees' who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension." Applying now the results of our reexamination of the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July 1991, must be upheld and affirmed." It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not incontradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. "The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450). The rule on limiting to one year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, S.1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 13. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD and GRAND INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC. G.R. No. 11952, March 26, 1997 FACTS: This Special Civil Action seeks to prohibit respondent Civil Aeronautics Board from exercising jurisdiction over private respondent's Application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, and to annul and set aside a temporary operating permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of Grand International Airways, allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic air transportation services, particularly the Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse routes. Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) alleges that Grand Air does not possess a legislative franchise authorizing it to engage in air transportation service within the Philippines or elsewhere. Such franchise is, as argued, a requisite for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity by the respondent Board, as mandated under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. Respondent Grand Air, on the other hand, posits that a legislative franchise is no longer a requirement for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or a Temporary Operating Permit, following the Court's pronouncements in various jurisprudential cases. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such that Congressional mandate for the approval of such authority is no longer necessary. HELD: Yes. It is generally recognized that a franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a legislative nature. In pursuance of this, it has been held that privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature. The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the power to regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion when it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right. The Civil Aeronautics Board has the authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a legislative franchise, meets all the other requirements prescribed by the law. Such requirements were enumerated in Section 21 of R.A. 776. There is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over any franchise, certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress are not required before each and every public utility may operate. In many instances, Congress has seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies, specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service. 14. US v Ang Tang Ho GR No. L-17122 February 27, 1922 Facts:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Act 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose” was passed by the Philippine Legislature in 1919. The said act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919, the Governor General issued Executive Order No. 53 which fixed the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos, which was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said EO. Issue: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General Ruling: Yes, there is an undue delegation of legislative power to the Governor General in this case. By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event. If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void. 15. Ynot v IAC GR L-74457 March 20, 1987 Facts: Executive Order 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabao and carabeef from one province to another and provides for confiscation and forfeiture of those transported by the government to be distributed to charitable institutions and similar institutions and to deserving farmers as the Chairman of the National meat Inspection Commission and the Director of Animal Industry may see fit. Restituto Ynot had transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984 when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of EO 626-A. Ynot sued for recovery but the RTC sustained the confiscation of the carabaos. The Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the ruling of the trial court, which led petitioner to file a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court. He alleged that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it is an improper exercise of legislative power. Issue: Whether or not there is an invalid delegation of legislative power Ruling: Yes, the Court held that there is an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken and declared EO 626-A unconstitutional. The Court marked the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. 16. Pelaez v Auditor General GR No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 Facts: During the period from September 4 to October 29. 1964, the President issued Executive Orders 93 to 121, 124, and 126 to 129, all based on section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, creating 33 municipalities. On November 10, 1964 Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez instituted an action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General to restrain him from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities, alleging that said Eos are null and void as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power. Pelaez cites the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 3 RA2370 which prohibited the creation of barrios except under provisions of the Act or by Act of Congress and argues that "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" Issue: Whether or not the Executive Orders are valid Ruling: No, the Court declared the Executive Orders in question as null and void ab initio. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, what must not be overlooked is the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President “... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require”. It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may require" qualified only the place to which the seat of the government may be transferred. The creation of municipalities is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is purely a legislative question or a political question. The power of control of the President only covers the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. It does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau or to create a new one. Therefore, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code entails an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President insofar as confers more power to the President over municipal corporations and the questioned Executive Orders, which are issued pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, are all null and void ab initio.

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QUASI-LEGISLATIVE 17. Republic v Drugmaker’s Laboratories. Inc GR No. 190837 March 5, 2014 Doctrine: Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making powers only if there exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power. Kinds of Administrative Rules or Regulations: 1. Legislative Rule - in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual rights and obligations. 2. Interpretative Rule - try to say what the statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said rules. 3. Contingent Rule - those issued by an administrative authority based on the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends. Facts: The Food and Drug Administration was created pursuant to RA3720 to establish safety standards and quality measures for foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetic products . In 1989, the DOH issued Administrative Order 67 s. 1989 which required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products with FDA before release to the market. In this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence test is needed for a manufacturer to secure a Certificate of Product Registration. The BA/BE testing requirement was implemented through Circular no. 1 s. 1991 and Circular no. 8 s. 1997 issued by the FDA. Respondents Drugmakers Laboratories Inc and Terramedic Inc are manufacturers of rifampticin/Refam which were issued CPRs until 2008 despite lack of BA/BE test results. The results turned out that Refam is not bioequivalent with reference drug. Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results, respondents filed a petition for prohibition and annulment of Circular nos. 1 and 8 alleging that it is the DOH which was granted authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA3720. The RTC ruled for respondents. Issues: 1. Whether or not Circular nos. 1 and 8 partake the nature of administrative rules and regulations 2. Whether or not the FDA may validly issue the assailed Circulars Ruling: 1. No, Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720. 2. Yes. As they are not administrative regulations, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and binding to all concerned parties, including the respondents in this case.

18. Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Defensor GR No. 163980 3 August 2006

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FACTS: Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). Presidential issuances: President Ferdinand Marcos - Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. President Corazon Aquino - Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. President Fidel Ramos - Proclamation No. 248, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the governments socialized housing program. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207 (NGC Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003) In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition. Contentions: The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for prohibition is not the properremedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislativefunction (YES) HELD: YES. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entitys or persons jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners allegation that respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 19. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 98472 August 19, 1993 FACTS: On 20 January 1982, President Marcos issued LOI 1190 withholding the grant of new licenses to operate agencies for overseas employment effective 1 January 1982 except as he may otherwise direct. On 19 March 1991, President Aquino issued EO 450 lifting the ban on new applications for licenses to operate recruitment agencies subject to guidelines and regulations the Secretary of Labor may promulgate. On 8 April 1991, respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment promulgated Department (DO) No. 9, Series of 1991, entitled "Guidelines Implementing Executive Order No. 450." The central thesis of the petition is that LOI 1190 was issued pursuant to the law-making power of the President under Sec. 6 of the 1976 Amendments to the 1973 Constitution in response to "a grave emergency which cried for immediate and decisive action," hence, should be considered part of the law of the land. Petitioners contend that the LOI is a law, hence, the EO cannot countermand it, while public respondent claims that the LOI is only an administrative issuance which may be superseded by an EO. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of EO 450 cannot repeal LOI 1190 for Congress has not delegated that power to the President RULING: No. There is no need for legislative delegation of power to the President to revoke the LOI by way of an EO in view of our finding that LOI 1190 is a mere administrative directive, hence, may be repealed, altered or modified by EO 450, and DO must consequently be upheld. There is nothing in the LOI which repeals or runs counter to Art. 25 of the Labor Code, as amended. Instead, contrary to the perception of petitioners, LOI 1190 does not actually ban the grant of licenses nor bar the entry of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) new licensees since anybody could still apply for license with the Minister of Labor and Employment, although the grant thereof is subject to the prior authority of the President. In fact, the LOI did not modify the rule-making power of the Minister of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code; it only added another tier of review. Neither can petitioners consider this additional review by the President as an amendment of Art. 25, for this is within the scope of the exercise of his constitutionally sanctioned control over the executive departments of government. Implicit in that power of control is the President's "authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries." Moreover, if we discern the intent of LOI 1190 from the manner it was enforced, the unrebutted allegation of respondent that 319 private employment agencies secured administrative presidential approval from 1982 to 1989 shows that then President Marcos merely intended to regulate, and not ban altogether, new applications for licenses. For this reason, Marcos could not have contemplated repealing Art. 25 of the Labor Code. 20. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995 FACTS: Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked", "reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the same. Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or "reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA 343). For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the assailed decision in favor of private respondents. ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when if ruled that Administrative Order No. 9 is null and void. HELD: NO. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as follows “Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.” It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term "deposit". Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void. 21. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108358, January 20, 1995 Facts: On 22 August 1986, during the period when the President of the Republic still wielded legislative powers, Executive Order No. 41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnesty on unpaid income taxes, later amended to include estate and donor's taxes and taxes on business, for the taxable years 1981 to 1985. Availing itself of the amnesty, R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., filed Tax Amnesty Return, and paid the corresponding amnesty taxes due. Prior to this availment, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue, assessed the R.O.H. Auto Products Philippines, Inc., for deficiency income and business taxes for its fiscal years ended 30 September 1981and 30 September 1982 in an aggregate amount of P1,410,157.71. The taxpayer wrote back to state that since it had been able to avail itself of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice should forthwith be cancelled and withdrawn. The request was denied on the ground that Revenue Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09 February 1987, implementing Executive Order No. 41, had construed the amnesty coverage to include only assessments issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue after the promulgation of the executive order on 22 August 1986 and not to assessments theretofore made. Issue: Whether the respondent pay the tax deficiency. (NO) Holding: The authority of the Minister of Finance (now the Secretary of Finance), in conjunction with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental than either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The period of the amnesty was later extended to 05 December 1986 from 31 October 1986 by Executive Order No. 54, dated 04 November 1986, and, its coverage expanded, under Executive Order No. 64, dated 17 November 1986, to include estate and donors taxes and taxes on business. If, as the Commissioner argues, Executive Order No. 41 had not been intended to include 1981-1985 tax liabilities already assessed (administratively) prior to 22 August 1986, the law could have simply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not. The conclusion is unavoidable, and it is that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it. It might not be amiss to recall that the taxable periods covered by the amnesty include the years immediately preceding the 1986 revolution during which time there had been persistent calls, all too vivid to be easily forgotten, for civil disobedience, most particularly in the payment of taxes, to the martial law regime. It should be understandable then that those who ultimately took over the reigns of government following the successful revolution would promptly provide for a broad, and not a confined, tax amnesty. 22BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA, CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents . G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998 Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate. Petitioner contends among others that THE ESTABLISNMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES. In response, respondents argued that A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS; Issue: Whether or not A.O 308 is a usurpation of legislative powers of the Congress? Held: Yes. The Court held that administrative order.

that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. 22 To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. 24 We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance." 25 and "embodies changes in administrative structure and procedures designed to serve the people." It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies - the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. 23. Manila Jockey Club, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998 Facts: Manila Jockey Club, Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) were granted franchises to operate race tracks for horse racing by virtue of RA 6631 and 6632. They were allowed to hold horse races with bets on Saturdays, Sundays and some official holidays, and allocation of "breakages" to specified beneficiaries were provided. Later, the Philippine Racing Commission (PHILRACOM) was created and it was given exclusive jurisdiction over every aspect of the conduct of horse racing including the scheduling of races. When races were scheduled on Wednesdays, PHILRACOM opined that the "breakages" on said day belonged to the racing clubs concerned. Later, PHILRACOM also authorized the holding of races on Thursdays and on Tuesdays. These midweek races are in addition to those mentioned in RA 6631 and 6632. Likewise, petitioners allocated the "breakages" from these races for their own uses. Later, EO 88 and 89 were issued amending percentage allocation of RA 6631 and 6632. PHILRACOM asked the Office of the President which agency is entitled to dispose of the proceeds of the "breakages" derived from the Tuesday and Wednesday races. The Office of the President, replied that the disposition of the breakages rightfully belongs to PHILRACOM, not only those derived from the Saturday, Sunday and holiday races, but also from the Tuesday and Wednesday races in accordance with the distribution scheme prescribed in the EOs. PHILRACOM thus demanded from MJCI and PRCI its share in the "breakages" of mid-week races and proof of remittances to other legal beneficiaries as provided under the franchise laws. Issue: Who are the rightful beneficiaries of the breakages derived from mid-week races? Holding: Franchise laws are privileges conferred by the government on corporations to do that "which does not belong to the citizens of the country generally by common right". As a rule, a franchise springs from contracts between the sovereign power and the private corporation for purposes of individual advantage as well as public benefit. Thus, a franchise partakes of a double nature and character. In so far as it affects or concerns the public, it is public juris and subject to governmental control. The legislature may prescribe the conditions and terms upon which it may be held, and the duty of grantee to the public exercising it. As grantees of a franchise, petitioners derive their existence from the same. Petitioners' operations are governed by all existing rules relative to horse racing provided they are not inconsistent with each other and could be reasonably harmonized. Therefore, the applicable laws are R.A. 309, as amended, R.A. 663l and 6632, as amended by E.O. 88 and 89, P.D. 420 and the orders issued by PHILRACOM. Consequently, every statute should be construed in such a way that will harmonize it with existing laws. This principle is expressed in the legal maxim "interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi", that is, to interpret and to do it in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method of interpretation. A reasonable reading of the horse racing laws favors the determination that the entities enumerated in the distribution scheme provided under R.A. Nos. 6631 and 6632, as amended by Executive Orders 88 and 89, are the rightful beneficiaries of breakages from mid-week races. Petitioners should therefore remit the proceeds of breakages to those benefactors designated by the aforesaid laws. 24. CRUZ v. YOUNGBERG G.R. No. L34674 October 26, 1931

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: 1. This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands. 2. Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature. Sec. 1 of Act. 3155 - SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however, That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the lands. 3. The respondent (Youngberg) demurred to the petition on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No. 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid. 4. The court (Court of First Instance) sustained the demurrer and the complaint was dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed to this court. ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an unlawful delegation of the legislative powers. HELD: The Court is of the opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid.  As shown in paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police power.  The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.  The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 

The appellant argues that Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law.

25. Walter Olsen vs. Vicente Aldanese, G.R. No. L-18740, April 28, 1922 FACTS: Walter Olsen (plaintiff) is a duly licensed domestic corporation with its principal office and place of business in the city of Manila and engaged in the manufacture and export of cigars made of tobacco grown in the Philippine Islands. The defendant, Vicente Aldanese, is the Insular collector of Customs, and the defendant, W. Trinidad, is the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands. As grounds for its petition, Olsen alleges that, under the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, it had the legal right to export from the Philippine Islands into the US cigars which it manufactured from tobacco grown in the Philippine Islands. That on February 4, 1916, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2613 entitled "An Act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein". It is then alleged that on March 1, 1918, the CIR promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations." The petition then quotes sections 1 and 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and section 10 of "The Jones Law," which provides as follows: "That while this Act provides that the Philippine Government shall have the authority to enact a Tariff Law the trade relations between the Islands and the United States shall continue to be governed exclusively by laws of the Congress of the United States." It is also alleged that so much of clause B of section 6 of Act No. 2613 as empowers the CIR to establish rules defining the standard and the type of leaf and manufactured tobacco which may be exported into the United States, and portion of section 7 of said Act which provides: "No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall have been in inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue, etc.," and all that portion of section 11 of the Act, which requires the certificate of origin of the CIR to show that the tobacco to be exported is standard, and that portion of section 9 of Administrative Order No. 35, which limits the exportation into the United States of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya, are unconstitutional and void. Petitioner applied to the CIR for a certificate to the Insular Collector of Internal Revenue for a consignment of cigars manufactured by it from tobacco grown and produced in the Philippine Islands, and was submitted for inspection and the issuance of the proper certificate of origin. That the consignment was packed and stamped as required by the regulations contained in Administrative Order No. 35, and in all things and respects complied with the requirements of the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, and with the Act NO. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature, after the elimination of the void portions of Act No. 2613 and of the Administrative Order. That the Collector of Internal Revenue wrongfully and unlawfully refused to issue such certificate of origin "on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured of long filler tobacco produced exclusively in the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela or Nueva Vizcaya." By reason of such refusal, the petitioner was deprived of the right of exporting the cigars to the United States and that the petitioner has no "other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law," and prays for a peremptory writ of mandamus. An order to show cause was made by the court, and on February 6, a demurrer was filed "on the ground that the facts stated in the said petition do not entitle the petitioner to the relief demanded, in that —"1. Act No. 2613 and the executive regulations issued in accordance therewith do not contravene any provision of the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands; "2. It does not appear from the facts stated in the said petition that the respondents unlawfully neglected the performance of an act specially enjoined upon them by law as a duty, or unlawfully exclude the petitioner from the use and enjoyment of a right granted by law."

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The defendants [respondents] contend that the portions of Act. No. 2613 in question are not in violation of any constitutional right or any act of Congress; that the Philippine Legislature is empowered to enact what is known as "inspection laws;" and that they are not in conflict with the Constitution of United States, and also that under its police power, the Legislature has authority to enact such a law, and that it was enacted in the interest of the public welfare and to promote an important industry, and that it was not a delegation of legislative power. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to issue such certificate on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured of long-filler tobacco produced exclusively in the provisions of Cagayan, Isabela 2. Whether or not Administrative Order No. 35, Section 9 (which limits the exportation into the United States of Philippine cigars to those manufactured from long filler tobacco exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya) is valid? HELD: 1.No. The defendants are public officers of the Philippine Islands, and the acts of which the petitioner complains are their official acts. The facts in this case are peculiar. Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." Such rules and regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, we have a right to assume that he was acting under such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the certificate of origin. It appears from the record that the cigars in question were not long-filler cigars, and that they were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused. Disposition: The motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained, and the writ will issue, as prayed for in the petition, without costs. 2. No, the power of the Collector of Internal Revenue is confined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, making, and packing of tobacco, and that such power is further limited to what is necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. The power is further limited "to the end that leaf tobacco be not mixed, packed, and marked as of the same quality when it is not of the same quality when it is not of the same class and origin." Any rules or regulations which are not within the scope of the Act are null and void. Here, the Legislature has not defined what shall be the standard or the type of leaf or manufactured tobacco which may be exported to the United States, or even specified how or upon what basis the Collector of Internal Revenue should fix or determine the standard. All of that power is delegated to the Collector of Internal Revenue. It was never intended that a standard should be fixed which would limit the manufacture of cigars for export to certain provinces of the Islands, or that the tobacco produced in one province should be measured by another and different standard than the tobacco produced in any other province. That would amount to discrimination and class legislation, which, even the Legislature, would not have the power to enact. By: Manda, Loren

26. SALVADOR A. ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. vs. THE HON. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, ETC., ET AL. EXEQUIEL SORIANO, ET AL. vs. SALVADOR ARANETA, ETC., ET AL. G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191 / April 30, 1957/ FELIX, J.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places migrated to San Miguel Bay, located between the provinces of Camarines Norte and CamarinesSur, for the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay. This move was manifested in the resolution of December 18, 1953, passed by the Municipal Mayors' League condemning the operation of trawls as the cause of the wanton destruction of the shrimp specie and resolving to petition the President of the Philippines to regulate fishing in San Miguel Bay by declaring it closed for trawl fishing at a certain period of the year. In another resolution dated March 27, 1954, the same League of Municipal Mayor, prayed the President to protect them and the fish resources of San Miguel Bay by banning the operation of trawls therein . In response to these pleas, the President issued on April 5, 1954, Executive Order No. 22 prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay, but said executive order was amended by Executive Order No. 66, issued on September 23, 1954, apparently in answer to a resolution of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur recommending the allowance of trawl fishing during the typhoon season only. On November 2, 1954, however, Executive Order No. 80 was issued reviving Executive Order No. 22, to take effect after December 31, 1954. Petitioners assailed the validity of said executive orders in their petition for a writ of injunction and/or declaratory relief filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila, and that the lower court, upon declaring Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80 invalid, issued an order requiring the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries to post a bond for P30,000 if the writ of injunction restraining them from enforcing the executive orders in question must be stayed. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Secretary of an Executive Department and the Director of a Bureau, acting in their capacities as such Government officials, could lawfully be required to post a bond in an action against them; (2) Whether or not the President of the Philippines has authority to issue Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, banning the operation of trawls in San Miguel Bay; and (3) Whether or not the issuance of said Executive Orders was, as an exercise of legislative powers, unduly delegated to the President. HELD: (1) No. The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the action, being one against herein petitioners as such Government officials, is essentially one against the Government, and to require these officials to file a bond would be indirectly a requirement against the Government for as regards bonds or damages that may be proved, if any, the real party in interest would be the Republic of the Philippines. The reason for this pronouncement is understandable; the State undoubtedly is always solvent. However, as the records show that herein petitioners failed to put up the bond required by the lower court, and that the orders subjects of the prohibition and certiorari proceedings, were enforced, the issue as to the regularity or adequacy of requiring herein petitioners to post a bond, becomes moot and academic. (2) Yes. In virture of Act No. 4003, known as the Fisheries Law, the Court is of the opinion that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties may even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions, regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters. Also, Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution of the Philippines prescribes: SEC. 10 (1). The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) One of the executive departments is that of Agriculture and Natural Resources which by law is placed under the direction and control of the Secretary, who exercises its functions subject to the general supervision and control of the President of the Philippines. Moreover, "executive orders, regulations, decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and recommendation of the respective Department", and there can be no doubt that the promulgation of the questioned Executive Orders was upon the proposition and recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Hence, Executive Orders Nos. 22, 66 and 80, series of 1954, of the President, are valid and issued by authority of law. (3) No. From the provisions of Act No. 4003 of the Legislature, the Court found that Congress (a) declared it unlawful "to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the territorial waters of the Philippines; (b) towards this end, it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to provide by the regulations such restrictions as may be deemed necessary to be imposed on the use of any fishing net or fishing device for the protection of fish fry or fish eggs (Sec. 13); (c) it authorized the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to set aside and establish fishery reservations or fish refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner to be prescribed by him and declared it unlawful for any person to take, destroy or kill in any of said places, or, in any manner disturb or drive away or take therefrom, any fish fry or fish eggs (See. 75); and (d) it penalizes the execution of such acts declared unlawful and in violation of this Act (No. 4003) or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, making the offender subject to a fine of not more than P200, or imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both, in the discretion of the court (Sec. 83). From the foregoing it may be seen that in so far as the protection of fish fry or fish egg is concerned, the Fisheries Act is complete in itself, leaving to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the promulgation of rules and regulations to carry into effect the legislative intent. Consequently, when the President, in response to the clamor of the people and authorities of Camarines Sur issued Executive Order No. 80 absolutely prohibiting fishing by means of trawls in all waters comprised within the San Miguel Bay, he did nothing but show an anxious regard for the welfare of the inhabitants of said coastal province and dispose of issues of general concern (Sec. 63, R.A.C.) which were in consonance and strict conformity with the law. 27. Public Schools District Supervisors Association v. Hon. Edilberto de Jesus GR No. 157286 16 June 2006 FACTS This is a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction filed by the Public Schools District Supervisor Association (PSDSA) seeking to declare as unconstitutional Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003. The petition likewise seeks to compel, by way of a writ of mandamus, the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to upgrade the salary grade level of the district supervisors from Salary Grade (SG) 19 to SG 24. Ever since the Department of Education (DepEd) was founded decades ago, its management had been so centralized in the Manila office. Schools in the national, regional, and division levels merely followed and implemented the orders and memoranda issued by the Education Secretary. Due to the evolution of the learning process and the onset of information technology, there was a need for a radical change in the governance of the DepEd. Thus, a study on how to improve the management of the Department was conducted, and one of the proposals was the abolition of the office of the district supervisor. Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act 2001," became a law on August 11, 2001, in accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under the law, each regional office shall have a director, an assistant director, and an office staff for program promotion and support, planning, administrative and fiscal services.5 The regional director was given the authority to hire, place and evaluate all employees in the regional office except for the position of assistant director,6 as well as the authority, accountability, and responsibility to determine the organization component of the divisions and districts, and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) approve the staffing pattern of all employees therein;7 evaluate all division superintendents and assistant division superintendents in the region;8 and other functions as may be assigned by the proper authorities.9 A division, on the other hand, is headed by a schools division superintendent with the following responsibilities, among others: to supervise the operations of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and learning centers;10 to hire, place and evaluate all division supervisors and schools district supervisors as well as all employees in the divisions, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division superintendent;11 and perform other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities.12 The office of the schools district supervisor has been retained under the law. Each district is headed by a school district supervisor and an office staff for program promotion. However, the responsibilities of the schools district supervisor are limited to the following: (1) providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof; (2) curricula supervision; and (3) performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. The schools district supervisors have no administrative, management, control or supervisory functions over the schools and learning centers within their respective districts.13 Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, petitioner sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the following administrative issues: 1. Restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives, and position level of Public Schools District Supervisors. 2. Upgrading of Salary Grade level of Public Schools District Supervisors from Salary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade Level 24 under DBM Circular No. 36, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Rules and Regulation.16 In a Letter dated March 1, 2002 addressed to then DepEd Secretary Raul Roco, the IBP stated that, per its review of the documents submitted by the PSDSA, it found the latter’s position valid and legal, to wit: First: The basis for the abolition of the position of District Supervisors under the Attrition Law and DECS Department Order No. 110, Series of 1991 is no longer valid and rendered moot and academic due to issuance of DECS Department Order No. 22, Series of 1996 and the passage by Congress of the Philippines of Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the Basic Education Governance Act of 2000. Under R.A. 9155, school districts are mandated to be maintained and responsibilities of Public School’s Districts Supervisors have been clearly defined. Second: There is a clear case of discrimination of grant of salaries and benefits to District Supervisors compared to salaries and benefits received by the School Principals – which position is lower in the hierarchy of positions as prepared by the Department of Education and the Department of Budget and Management. School Principals and District Supervisors enjoy the same level of Salary Grade even if the latter position is considered as a promotion and enjoys a higher level of position than that of the position of School Principals.17 The PSDSA thus requested the DepEd Secretary to call an immediate consultation with the district supervisors nationwide through a convention, and their valid inputs be considered in formulating the rules and regulations to be urged by the DepEd. However, the Secretary failed to reply. Thus, the IBP reiterated the concerns raised by the PSDSA in a Letter18 to the DepEd dated April 15, 2002. On January 6, 2003, DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus issued DECS Office Order No. 1, which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9155. Sections 4.1 to 4.3, Rule IV of the IRR provide: SECTION 4.1. The Schools Division Superintendent. – A division shall consist of a province or city which shall have a schools division superintendent. There shall be at least one assistant schools division superintendent and office staff for programs promotion, planning, administrative, fiscal, legal, ancillary, and other support services.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) SECTION 4.2. Authority, Accountability, and Responsibility of the Schools Division Superintendent. – Consistent with the national educational policies, plans, and standards, the schools division superintendents shall have authority, accountability, and responsibility for the following: 1) Developing and implementing division education development plans; 2) Planning and managing the effective and efficient performance of all personnel, physical, and fiscal resources of the division, including professional staff development; 3) Hiring, placing, and evaluating all division supervisors and schools district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant division superintendents; 4) Monitoring the utilization of funds provided by the national government and the local government units to the schools and learning centers; 5) Ensuring compliance of quality standards for basic education programs and for this purpose strengthening the role of division supervisors as subject area specialists; 6) Promoting awareness of, and adherence by, all schools and learning centers to accreditation standards prescribed by the Secretary of Education; 7) Supervising the operations of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools, and learning centers; and 8) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary and/or Regional Director. SECTION 4.3. Appointing and Disciplinary Authority of the Schools Division Superintendent. – The schools district superintendent shall appoint the division supervisors and school district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads, except for the assistant schools division superintendent, subject to the civil service laws, rules and regulations, and the policies and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of Education for the purpose. The schools division superintendent shall have disciplinary authority only over the non-teaching personnel under his jurisdiction. Such exercise of disciplinary authority by the schools division superintendent over the non-teaching personnel shall be subject to the civil service laws, rules and regulations, and procedures and guidelines to be issued by the Secretary of Education relative to this matter. The Regional Director shall continue exercising disciplinary authority over the teaching personnel insofar as the latter are covered by specific and exclusive disciplinary provisions under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4670). Sections 5.1 and 5.2, Rule V of the IRR, in turn, provide: SECTION 5.1. The Schools District Supervisor. – A school district shall have a school district supervisor and office staff for program promotion. The schools district supervisor shall primarily perform staff functions and shall not exercise administrative supervision over school principals, unless specifically authorized by the proper authorities. The main focus of his/her functions shall be instructional and curricula supervision aimed at raising academic standards at the school level. The schools district supervisor shall be specifically responsible for: 1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof; 2) Curricula supervision; and 3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by the Secretary, Regional Directors, and Schools Division Superintendents where they belong. The schools district supervisor being mentioned in this section shall refer to a public schools district supervisor. SECTION 5.2. The School District. – A school district already existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall be maintained. However, an additional school district may be established by the regional director based on criteria set by the Secretary and on the recommendation of the schools division superintendent. For this purpose,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the Secretary of Education shall set standards and formulate criteria as basis of the Regional Directors of the establishment of an additional school district. On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about 1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus. I.

THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN REMOVING PETITIONERS’ ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 – THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.

II.

THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT LAW.

III.

THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION – IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.

Before the DepEd could issue the appropriate implementing rules and regulations, petitioner PSDSA sought the legal assistance of the Integrated Bar of the PH National Committee on Legal Aid to make representations for the resolution of the following administrative issues: (1) restoration of the functions, duties, responsibilities, benefits, prerogatives and position level of Public School District Supervisors; and (2) upgrading of Salary Grade Level of Public Schools District Supervisors from alary Grade Level 19 to Salary Grade 24. DepEd Secretary Edilberto C. De Jesus thereafter issued DECS Office Order No. 1 which constitutes the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9155. PSDSA filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus alleging that the act of the DepEd in removing the petitioners’ administrative supervision over elementary schools and its principals within his/her district and converting his/her administrative function to that of performing staff for the division is a gross violation of RA 9155. Furthermore, petitioners also allege that the IRR of RA 9155 expanded and included provisions which are diametrically opposed to the letter and spirit of the subject law. They argue that the said law should be read in harmony with the existing educational laws. Ultimately, petitioners allege that by the implementation of the IRR they are stripped off of their administrative functions. ISSUES 1. Whether DECS Office Order No. 1 issued by DepEd expanded RA 9155 2. Whether the District Supervisor shall not exercise administrative supervision over the Elementary School Principals (ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs) 3. Whether Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph 11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003 are constitutional HELD

1. NO. It must be stressed that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. It bears stressing, however, that administrative bodies are allowed under their power of subordinate legislation to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by “filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be germane to the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation does not contradict but conforms to the standards prescribed by law. Here, the assailed IRR provisions merely reiterated and implemented the related provisions of RA 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers. Administrative supervision means “overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.” We have reviewed the IRR and find that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads.28 A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools.29 The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers.30 A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit: (1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof; (2) Curricula supervision; and (3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. As gleaned from the Senate deliberations on Senate Bill No. 2191, the district supervisors were divested of any administrative supervision over elementary and public high schools. The Senate resolved to vest the same in the division superintendents, and the Lower House concurred. Senator Rene Cayetano proposed that the traditional function of the school supervisors of exercising administrative supervision over the elementary and public high schools be maintained. Thus, under R.A. No. 9155, administrative supervision over school heads is not one of those responsibilities conferred on district supervisors. 2. YES. A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district supervisors have no administrative supervision over the school heads; their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of R.A. No. 9155, to wit: a) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers in the district or cluster thereof; b) Curricula supervision; and c) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper authorities. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

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3. The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV, and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155. Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A school head is a person responsible for the administrative and instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated schools and learning centers. 28. ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND G.R. No. 131082 June 19, 2000 Facts: Law firm Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc and De Los Angeles, was exempted for the period 1 January to 31 December 1995, from the Pag-IBIG Fund coverage by respondent HDMF because of a superior retirement plan. The HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In that the amendments are void insofar as they abolished the exemption granted by Section 19 of P.D. 1752, as amended. The repeal of such exemption involves the exercise of legislative power, which cannot be delegated to HMDF. HDMF disapproved PETITIONER’s application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase “and/or,” and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law. The respondent Board was merely exercising its rule-making power under Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752. It had the option to use “and” only instead of “or” in the rules on waiver in order to effectively implement the PagIBIG Fund Law. By choosing “and,” the Board has clarified the confusion brought about by the use of “and/or” in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended. PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power. Held: YES. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or.” It seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words “and” instead of “and/or.” Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

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It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 17 of R.A. No. 7742 and Section 13 18 of P.D. No. 1752. However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. 19 It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law. 29. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY GR No. 110526 February 10, 1998 FACTS: On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit in the Regional Trial Court to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses. Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not PCA’s Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body. 2. Whether or not the PCA is authorized to renounce the power to regulate implicit in the law creating it for that is what the resolution in question actually is. RULING: 1. No. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule-making or legislative power. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective. 2. No. On December 6, 1982, a phase-out of some of the existing plants was ordered by the government after finding that "a mere freeze in the present capacity of existing plants will not afford a viable solution to the problem considering that the total available limited market is not adequate to support all the existing processing plants, making it imperative to reduce the number of existing processing plants." Accordingly, it was ordered: “Sec. 1. The Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby ordered to take such action as may be necessary to reduce the number of existing desiccated coconut processing plants to a level which will insure the survival of the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) remaining plants. The Authority is hereby directed to determine which of the existing processing plants should be phased out and to enter into appropriate contracts with such plants for the above purpose.” In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted on March 24, 1993 the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. Instead of determining the qualifications of market players and preventing the entry into the field of those who are unfit, the PCA now relies entirely on competition — with all its wastefulness and inefficiency — to do the weeding out, in its naive belief in survival of the fittest. The result can very well be a repeat of 1982 when free enterprise degenerated into a "free-for-all," resulting in cut-throat competition, underselling, the production of inferior products and the like, which badly affected the foreign trade performance of the coconut industry. Furthermore, under Article II, Section 3(a) of the Revised Coconut Code (PD No. 1468) the role of the PCA is “to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oil industry in all its aspects.” By limiting the purpose of registration to merely monitoring volumes of production [and] administration of quality standards” of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. In so doing, the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry. At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administration agency to dismantle it. PCA Resolution No. 018-93 and all certificates of registration issued under it are hereby declared NULL and VOID for having been issued in excess of the power of the Philippine Coconut Authority to adopt or issue. By: Michaela Sarmiento

30. ECHEGARAY vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE (LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 104) G.R. No. 132601

FACTS:

October 12, 1998

Sometime on June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 or “The Death Penalty Law”, and the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition. In the meantime, Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

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In March 1998, the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to maintain status quo. Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition. The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become abolitionists in practice. Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading, inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE 1:

Whether R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the unconstitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and obligations, discriminatory and an undue delegation of legislative powers.

ISSUE 2:

Did the respondent Secretary unlawfully delegated the legislative powers delegated to him under Republic Act No. 8177 to respondent Director.

RULING 1:

LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION. The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads: 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment inflicted.' xxx In the 1973 Constitution the phrase became 'cruel or unusual punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text which prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject." Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In the oft-cited case of Harden v. Director of Prisons, this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."Would the lack in particularity then as to the details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of administrative officials.

RULING 2:

No. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID. A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of the correctional system." Hence, the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the Department of Health. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest." Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of legislative authority to administrative bodies. The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. 31. Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372) FACTS: On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The petition was granted. ISSUE:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional. HELD: No. CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch. SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution. As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful. Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. 32. TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-59234 September 30, 1982 FACTS: On October 10, 1977, BOT issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 that aimed to phase out and replace old dilapidated taxis to insure only safe comfortable units are used by the public, to respond to complaints by metro manila residents regarding the old dilapidated taxis, to make the commuting public more comfortable, have more convenience and safety. 6 years is enough for taxi operators to get back cost of unit plus profits. No car beyond 6 years can still be operated as taxi. Taxis model 1971 were considered withdrawn on Dec 31, 1977 and applying the same system to succeeding years by just adding one year to both dates. They had to surrender the expired taxi’s plates to the BOT for turnover to Land Transpo Commission.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980, instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the NCR, to implement the phasing out of the taxis and formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.. On January 27, 1981, a petition filed for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order" was filed by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located. On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following queries were posed for consideration by this Court: A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting, arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience. ISSUES: 1. WON the procedural and substantive due process rights of the taxi operators were violated (NO) 2. WON their equal protection rights were violated (NO) HELD: Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power 4. To fix just and reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in the exercise of its powers: Sec. 2. Exercise of powers. — In the exercise of the powers granted in the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion, may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, or any other government office or agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the implementation of this Decree. The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other persons that may be affected by the implementation of this Decree, or employ any other suitable means of inquiry. PET claim that they were denied due process because they were not asked to submit position papers or to attend conferences regarding the assailed circular. SC held that the PD provides a wide leeway as to how the board will choose to gather data in formulating its policy. NOT ALL OPTIONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE DONE FOR POLICY TO BE VALID the board has the choice of which avenue to pursue in collecting data. PET also claim that 6 year limit was arbitrarily set à oppressive à they want each taxi cab to be inspected regarding their condition WON it was still safe and roadworthy despite age. Court held that their proposed standard is not practicable and can open the door to multiple standards and corruption Court furthers aid that 6 years is a reasonable time based on experience and based on cost and fair returns on the units Court held that a uniform standard is best and fair Equal Protection of the Law: Manila was first because of the heavier traffic pressure and the more constant use of the taxis in MM. SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTION à the traffic conditions in the various cities 33. DE JESUS, ET AL VS. COA GR No. 109023 12 August 1998 DOCTRINE: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the socalled letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. FACTS: Petitioners(De Jesus) are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board Secretariat and the PreQualification, Bids and Awards Committee. Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes", some allowances and compensatoons were consolidated with the standardized salary rates of government employees. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary. Complyinh therewith,the assigned COA Leonardo Jamoralin, as corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein petitioners. Pet. Argument: 1. That the DBM Circular is repugnant to the law it seeks to implement since RA 6758 authorizes payment of allowances and compensation not included in the standardized salary. 2. And it is without force and effect because it was not published in the Official Gazette; petitioners stressed. COA Argument: 1. COA, on the other hand, pointed out that to allow honoraria without statutory, presidential or DBM authority, as in this case, would run counter to Sec. 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which proscribes payment of "additional or double compensation, unless specifically authorized by law." 2. DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of a law already published.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The Court first ruled on the 2nd argument since it is determinative of whether it should still tackle the 1st argumet of the parties. ISSUE: Whether DBM CCC No 10 is legally effective despite lack of publication. HELD: NO. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines — to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. Note: Tanada vs. Tuvera enumerate those that need and need not be published. Needs publication: statutes ( local or private law), presidential decree and executive orders, charter of a city. Need not be published are: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. 34. PEOPLE VS. MACEREN GR No. L-32166 18 October 1977 FACTS: Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1. It alleged that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by using their own motor banca, equipped with motor and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing. Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than five years. It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water." ISSUE: Whether or not Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 RULING: Yes. They exceeded their authority. The rule-making power confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing .As electro fishing is not banned under that law. Hence, theSecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. 35. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 119761 August 29, 1996

REVENUE, petitioner, and

FORTUNE

TOBACCO

VITUG, J.:p Facts As a manufacturer of various brands of cigarettes, Fortune Tobacco Corporation was issued separate certificates of trademark registration over “Champion”, “Hope”, and “More” by the Philippine Patent Office. In a letter, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue stated that the initial position of the government was to include “Champion”, “Hope”, and “More” to the list of foreign brands. However, due to the change of names from “Hope” to “Hope Luxury” and “More” to “Premium More”; and due to a proof submitted to the BIR that Champion is an original brand by Fortune, said brands were listed as locally manufactured not bearing foreign brands. As such, the brands were subject to ad valorem tax. Later on, RA 7654 was enacted, affecting the taxation on locally manufactured cigarettes. A month after the enactment of the RA, Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-93 was released, explaining that as locally manufactured cigarettes with a foreign brand, “Hope”, “More”, and “Champion” are subject to 55% ad valorem tax. Fortune filed a petition for review with the CTA. The CTA ruled in favor of Fortune. The CIR then filed a petition for review with the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the CTA. In the present Petition, the Solicitor General, for the CIR, argues that as an interpretative ruling or opinion, RMC 37-93 may take effect even without publication. Issue W/N RMC 37-93 may take effect without publication? Held No, RMC 37-93 may not take effect without publication. RMC 97-93 does not merely interpret RA 7654, rather it places “Hope Luxury”, “Premium More”, and “Champion” under the category of locally manufactured bearing foreign brands. Without RMC 37-93, RA 7654 would not affect the taxation of said brands. 36. Philippine Consumers Foundation v. The Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports GR. No. 78385 Facts: On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the DECS) submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition and Other School Fees." The DECS took note of the report of the Task Force and on the basis of the same, the DECS, through the respondent Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Secretary), issued an Order authorizing, inter alia, the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the Task Force.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the said Order, apparently on the ground that the increases were too high. 2 Thereafter, the DECS issued Department Order No. 37 dated April 10, 1987 modifying its previous Order and reducing the increases to a lower ceiling of 10% to 15%, accordingly. 3 Despite this reduction, the petitioner still opposed the increases. The petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution inasmuch as the petitioner was not given due notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued. In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees. 5

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law. ISSUE: WON DECS is vested with the power to regulate school fees and allow increases HELD: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties under the law. The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of itsquasijudicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character. Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear 1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of its issuance. Under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed. 10 In the absence of proof to the contrary, that presumption prevails. This being so, the burden of proof is on the party assailing the regularity of official proceedings. In the case at bar, the petitioner has not successfully disputed the presumption. 37. Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Trades Inc. vs. Department of Finance Secretary G.R No. 108524, 11/10/1994 FACTS: Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders Inc. (Misamis, for short), filed a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 47-91 and enjoin the collection by respondent revenue officials of the VAT on the sale of copra by its members. Misamis is a domestic corporation engaged in the buying and selling of copra in Misamis Oriental. It alleges that prior to the issuance of said RMC,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) which implemented VAT ruling 190-90, copra was classified as agricultural food product under Sec. 103(b) of the NIRC, and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of production or distribution. However, the RMC in question reclassified copra as an agricultural non-food product and declaring it “exempt from VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the tax code, as amended.” Because of this reclassification, Misamis was denied of the exemption it previously enjoyed. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not BIR is the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products 2. Whether or not Misamis was denied due process when it was not heard before the ruling was made HELD: 1. Yes. Misamis contends that BFAD is the competent government agency to determine the proper classification of food products. However, respondents argue that BIR is the rightful agency to do such because it is the government agency charged with the implementation and interpretation of tax laws. The Court ruled in favor of the respondents explaining that in interpreting Section 103 (a) and (b) of the NIRC, the Commissioner of BIR gave it a strict construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state. Also, since BIR is the government agency charged with the enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of BIR, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly wrong, is entitled to a great weight. The ruling was made in the exercise of his power under Section 245 of the NIRC to “make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes.” 2. No. Misamis’ complaint of denial of due process was without merit. There is a distinction in administrative law between legislative and interpretative rules. If said circular was that of a legislative rule, there would be a force in its argument. However, the RMC in question is an interpretative rule. The Court explained that the reason for the distinction is that a legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is generally required that before legislative rule is adopted there must be a hearing and such rule must be published. On the other hand, interpretative rule is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. In this case, the inquiry is not into the validity of but into the correctness or propriety of the rule. The Court is free to give the force of law the rule, go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment, or give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. Thus, the Court finds no error in the classification made by the Commissioner of BIR. That previous Commissioners considered copra as food product is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is wrong. It should be noted that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his predecessors and that overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.

QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER 38. ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents. G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940 FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off were

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting NLU. The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to a new trial. HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already existing). The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by observing the following: (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. 39. ACUZAR V. JOROLAN, GR NO. 177878, APRIL 7, 2010

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: - May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed an administrative case against petitioner before the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondents minor daughter. e without the petitioner having been first convicted in the criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB Rules of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the administrative case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law, although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct. - September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National Police (PNP) by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff of the PNP, Police Regional Office 11, effective September 7, 2000. - October 15, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision annulling the Decision of the PLEB. - March 23, 2007, the CA rendered its Decision reversing and setting aside the trial courts decision. The CA found merit in respondents argument that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the RTC was not the proper remedy because (1) appeal was available and (2) the issues raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. According to the CA, the existence and availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one (1) of the requirements for its availment is the absence of the remedy of appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. The CA ruled that petitioner should have appealed the decision of the PLEB to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari before the court. The CA added that while it is true that there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal, petitioner, however, failed to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to it. Thus, it held that the trial court erred in giving due course to the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that petitioners resort to certiorari was not warranted as the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him. RULING: The SC affirm the appellate courts ruling. A careful perusal of respondents affidavit-complaint against petitioner would show that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondents minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law, as petitioner would like to convince this Court. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. It usually refers to transgression of some established and definite rule of action, where no discretion is left except what necessity may demand; it does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention but implies wrongful intention and not to mere error of judgment. On the other hand, violation of law presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has jurisdiction over the case. It is apparent from Sec. 43(e) of RA 6975 that the remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. Corollarily, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency, then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court. Contrary to petitioners claim that he has not been afforded all the opportunity to present his side, our own review of the records of the proceedings before the PLEB reveals otherwise. In administrative proceedings, procedural

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. In the instant case, petitioner was notified of the complaint against him and in fact, he had submitted his counteraffidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses. He attended the hearings together with his counsel and even asked for several postponements. Petitioner therefore cannot claim that he had been denied of due process. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. In other words, it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. Here, we note that petitioner had more than enough opportunity to present his side and adduce evidence in support of his defense; thus, he cannot claim that his right to due process has been violated. 40. Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs G.R. Nos. 90660-61 January 21, 1991 Facts: Paterok shipped from Germany to the Philippines 2 containers, one with used household goods and the other with 2 used cars . The first container was released by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and later on, the Bourgetti car, too. The Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said Bureau. Paterok received a notice of hearing from the legal officer of the Manila International Container Port informing her that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the car for violation of BP. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F) of the Tariff and Customs Code. While the said case was pending, Paterok received a letter informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her car had been rendered by the District Collector of Customs. Paterok had not been informed that a separate seizure case was filed on the same car in question before the said District Collector, an office likewise under the BOC. Paterok later found out that a Notice of Hearing set concerning her car was posted on the bulletin board of the BOC at Port Area, Manila. She thereafter, filed a motion for new trial before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila, but the latter denied the same, invoking the failure of the former to appear in the said hearing despite the posting of the notice on the bulletin board. Moreover, the Collector of Customs contended that a reopening of the case was an exercise in futility considering that the forfeited property, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, had an engine displacement of more than 2800 cubic cm. and therefore was under the category of prohibited importation pursuant to BP. 73. Subsequently, Paterok filed a petition for review with the Department of Finance, which petition the latter referred to the BOC. BOC then rendered a decision affirming the previous order of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in question in favor of the government. Issue: Whether the posting on the bulletin board of the public respondent was sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process?

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Held: No. A notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board of the BOC in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process. In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown. This is clear from the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code relied upon by the BOC, namely, Sections 2304 and 2306, captioned "Notification of Unknown Owner and "Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to Unknown Parties," respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is specifically allowed. But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that Paterok could not have been unknown. Paterok had previous transactions with the BOC and in fact, the latter had earlier released the first container consisting of household goods and the Bourgetti car to the former at her address. Moreover, there was a similar seizure case that had been instituted by the Manila International Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224, covering the same Mercedes Benz in question and involving the same owner. Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity aforementioned, for which the Court expresses its rebuke, the petition nonetheless cannot be granted. The seizure and forfeiture proceedings was based on a violation of B.P. 73, specifically a law that promotes energy conservation and prohibits the importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters. The Mercedes Benz subject of this case has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters, which clearly falls within the prohibited importation and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents. 41. Carbonell V. Civil Service Comission G.R. No. 187689, September 7, 2010 FACTS: This is a case regarding Petitioner Clarita J. Carbonel an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. Who was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSCRO IV). On May 21, 1999 herein petitioner went to the CSRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Tes (CATS) Career Service Professional Examination. Due to the fact that she lost her original copy of her Career Service Professional Certificate of Rating, she was directed to accomplish a verification slip. There were discrepancies on the personal and physical appearance of the petitioner and the attached application form, likewise the signature on the attached application form and the verification slip. These discrepancies lead to the investigation of the Legal Affair Division of the CSCRO IV. In the course of the investigation, petitioner made a voluntary statement before Atty, Roslinda S.M. Gepigon, admitting that she accepted a proposal of a certain Navarro in order to obtain for petitioner a Career Service Professional Eligibility by merely accomplishing an application form with a fee of P10K. Petitioner indeed accomplish the application form and gave Navarro a down payment of P5K, and the remaining P5K after receiving the original copy of the certificate of rating from Navarro. Which petitioner eventually lost, thereby prompting her to accomplish the verification slip. After such voluntary statement, charges were press against her. Petitioner then denied her admission in her voluntary statement, stating that she indeed accomplish an application form which she ask Navarro to submit it in the CSC, yet due to her ailing mother, she did not proceed to take the examination. Yet, petitioner receive a certification of eligibility which petitioner prompted her to go to the CSCRO not to get a copy of the certificate of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) rating but to check the veracity of the certificate. Petitioner also questioned the use of her voluntary statement as basis for her formal charge against her. CSCRO convicted petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document, with a penalty of dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties. Petitioner move for a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. This prompted her to appeal to the CSC, which was also denied, on the ground that such appeal was filed three years after the decision of the CSCRO and setting aside the petitioner's explanation that the failure to file a timely appeal was due to the death of her counsel. Another MR was denied. Petitioner elevated it to the CA, which CA rendered its decision affirming the CSCRO and the CSC. MR was also Denied. ISSUE: WON her voluntary Statement may be used as basis for a formal charge against her? HELD: YES. It is true that the CSCRO IV, the CSC, and the CA gave credence to petitioners uncounseled statements and, partly on the basis thereof, uniformly found petitioner liable for the charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document. However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (3), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that, under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner's capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the investigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. 42. ADAMSON VS AMORES G.R. No. L-58292; July 23, 1987 FACTS: -Petitioner, Adamson, has been engaged in the manufacture, sale and exportation of absorbent cotton wool products, surgical dressings, bandages, medicinal, pharma products, chem products, sanitary towels and other articles and commodities. -Respondent, Johnson & Johnsons was organized to manufacture, import, export, export, buy, sell or otherwise acquire and deal with either wholesale of retail, pharma drugs, toiletry, hygiene products and other related products. -Adamson, not yet a Phil Nat'l defined by Investment Incentives Act (IIA), applied for certificates of authority from the Board of Investment (BOI) in compliance with Section 4 of Foreign Investment Act (FIA) -According to Adamson, said certs were necessary to enable it to expand its business activities. –Adamson was neither actually manufacturing nor marketing during the effectivity of IIA and FIA. -After publications and postings of notices, Johnson opposed the application. -BOI granted Adamson certs of authority. -Johnson has remained a foreign corp. and commenced the manufacture and marketing of disposable diapers, feminine tampons and cotton.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) -Adamson alleged that Johnson should not be allowed to expand its business activities to areas in which it was not licensed and not actually engaged w/o first obtaining from BOI the cert of authority and that expansion would cause Adamson irreparable injury but also injustice. -Petition was set for hearing -Adamson, impatient over what it considered a delay in the resolution of its prayer filed a motion praying for a permanent stop and desist order. -BOI Dir Ascaño denied said motion for lack of merit. -Adamson filed its motion but was denied. -Adamson filed in the CFI of Manila a petition seeking judicial relief from the BOI decision contending that BOI decision was based merely on the oral arguments of the rites. -CFI issued a TRO and set a hearing but prayer for prelim. Injuction was denied. Hence, this pet for certiorari. ISSUE: W/ BOI violated Adamson's right to procedural due process RULING: No. While administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them. However, the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. Hence, there is no denial of due process where records show that hearings were held with prior notice to adverse parties. But even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of procedural due process as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard. Based on the foregoing, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of its right to procedural due process in the BOI. In the first place, it was notified of the May 14, 1980 hearing. The notice specified that the hearing was on the petition although it also stated therein with particularity, petitioner's prayer for a stop and desist order. Necessarily, it is immaterial that said notice was sent before Johnson filed its answer to the petition and there was yet no joinder of issues considering that the proceeding was before an administrative tribunal where technicalities that should be observed in a regular court may be dispensed with. Secondly, during the hearing, petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case, including its prayer for a stop and desist order. As clearly enunciated in the minutes of the hearing which We have painstakingly studied and set forth herein to determine if any irregularity attended the questioned BOI proceeding, it was conducted for the purpose of hearing the arguments and receiving evidence of the parties "to resolve the case expeditiously." Having been given the opportunity to put forth its case, petitioner has only itself, or, better still, its counsel and officers who were present therein, to blame for its failure to do so. Petitioner's right to procedural due process was not violated when the hearing was conducted before a director of the BOI and not before the members of the board themselves who decided the case. The requirements of a fair hearing do not mandate that the actual taking of testimony or the presentation of evidence be before the same officer who will make the decision on the case. Petition for certiorari, dismissed. 43. De la Cruz v. Abille, G.R. No 130196, 26 February 2001

FACTS: Herminio Abille, now deceased, had a total landholding of 13.0561 hectares, located in Infanta, Pangasinan, comprising of 9.2903 hectares of riceland; 2.0000 hectares of cogonland; 1.7658 hectares of coconut land and .4660 hectare of residential land. Since 1968, Balbino dela Cruz was an agricultural tenant in the riceland tilling an area of 2.84 hectares. He died on June 14, 1981. After his death, Balbino dela Cruz was, nevertheless, issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 0-064711 dated October 25, 1981 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. The certificate was entered in the Registration Book of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. Tax Declaration No. 3 in the name of Herminio Abille was cancelled and Tax Declaration No. 1134 was issued in the name of Balbino dela Cruz. On April 3, 1987, Herminio Abille filed a petition for exemption under Operation Land Transfer (OLT) of his landholdings alleging, among others, that he was not notified of the coverage of his land under OLT; that he

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) learned of its coverage only on March 25, 1987; that prior to the issuance of the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711, DAR did not notify him or his representative; that he has been deprived of his constitutional right to due process. Petition was granted. On June 29, 1992, petitioners, who are the compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz, filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform a petition for the issuance of emancipation patent. The petition was referred to the Regional Director, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, for appropriate action. In his Comment, respondent Adjuto M. Abille, representing Herminio Abille, prayed for the dismissal of the petition for the issuance of emancipation patent on the ground that DAR Order dated April 19, 1989, ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Land Transfer of the retained area, had become final and had been implemented by the Provincial Agrarian Officer of Pangasinan; hence, the petition had become moot and academic. On October 21, 1992, Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, Region I, San Fernando, La Union, issued an Order denying the petition for the issuance of an emancipation patent as CLT No. 0-064711 issued in favor of Balbino dela Cruz had already been cancelled by virtue of the Order dated April 19, 1989, which was supported by substantial evidence, and that said Order had long become final. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that another Order be issued declaring as null and void the Order dated April 19, 1989, which was issued allegedly without giving them a day in court, hence, there was absence of due process of law, considering that Balbino dela Cruz was already deemed owner of the subject property as of October 21, 1972. They sought the reinstatement of CLT No. 0-064711 and the issuance of an emancipation patent in their favor as compulsory heirs of the late Balbino dela Cruz. The motion was denied even by the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argued that it was incorrect for the Court of Appeals to hold that they were accorded due process when the validity of the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 was resolved in the Order dated April 19, 1989; and that their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent is a different proceeding from the petition filed by Herminio Abille wherein Regional Director Antonio Nuesa ordered the cancellation of their predecessors (Balbino dela Cruz) Certificate of Land Transfer; that in the said petition filed by Herminio Abille, they were not notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners maintained that they were denied due process so that the Order dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa cancelling the Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz is null and void, and cannot be used to deny their petition for the issuance of an emancipation patent. Petitioners also assert that they became the owners of the lands they till as of the date of effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972; that they have religiously paid the annual rent of the property to the late Herminio Abille, that is, continuously after October 21, 1972 until 1991 or for nineteen (19) years; that by virtue of P.D. No. 27 in relation to the second paragraph, section 2 of Executive Order No. 228, the price of said property had been fully paid thereby entitling them to the issuance of an emancipation patent. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process of law HELD: No. We agree with the Court of Appeals that although the petitioners were not given the opportunity to be heard when Regional Director Antonio Nuesa in his Order dated April 19, 1989 ordered the cancellation of Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 on the retained area, nevertheless, in their petition for issuance of an emancipation patent, petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT, which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis in his Order dated October 21, 1992,and also in their (petitioners) motion for reconsideration, which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of (emphasis supplied). Further, the petition filed by landowner Herminio Abille, which was for exemption of his property from the coverage of Operation Land Transfer, cognizable by Region I Director Antonio M. Nuesa of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance, did not require notice to petitioners. The subsequent Order dated April 19, 1989 of Regional Director Nuesa denying the petition for exemption and instead granting to Herminio Abille the right of retention of not more than seven (7) hectares,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) and to select the retention area, and cancelling the Certificates of Land Transfer issued to the tenants on the retained area, including CLT No. 0-064711, directing the MARO of Infanta, Pangasinan to prepare Agricultural Leasehold Contracts between the petitioner and the tenants, and directing the PARO to implement said Order, became final even before Herminio Abille selected on July 24, 1989 the 7 hectares retained area which includes the 2.84 hectares covered by Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0-064711 in the name of Balbino dela Cruz. Nevertheless, petitioners were able to question the validity of said Order (cancelling CLT No. 0-064711) in their petition for issuance of emancipation patent, which was resolved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform in his Decision dated June 20, 1994. Hence, petitioners were given an opportunity to be heard. The landowner Herminio Abille having selected as part of his seven-hectare retention the area tilled by Balbino de la Cruz, covered by a certificate of land transfer in his name, the CLT was correctly cancelled. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the owner Herminio Abille of his right of retention and to select the portion he wanted to retain. The portion tilled by Balbino de la Cruz having been chosen by the owner Herminio Abille as part of his sevenhectare retention, petitioners as heirs of Balbino de la Cruz are not entitled to an emancipation patent over the same. Balbino de la Cruz was entitled to an agricultural leasehold contract to the area tilled by him and this is what petitioners inherited. Even the issuance of an emancipation patent does not bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1994 provides: Emancipation patents or certificates of land ownership award issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. This includes cases of lands which are found to be exempted/excluded from P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 of CARP coverage, or part of the landowners retained area. 44.

Vivo vs PAGCOR G.R. No. 187854

November 12, 2013

Facts: The petitioner was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from office. On February 21, 2002, he received a letter, advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence; that he should submit a written explanation of the charges; and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension .On February 26, 2002, the petitioner’s counsel, replying to Ela’s letter, assailed the propriety of the show-cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. On March 14, 2002, the petitioner received the summons for him to attend an administrative inquiry, instructing him to appear before PAGCOR’s Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) on March 15, 2002.8. The memorandum of charges was based on the statements of PAGCOR personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. However, when his counsel requested to be furnished copies of the statements, PAGCOR rejected the request on the ground that he had already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront, hear, and answer the charges against him during the administrative inquiry. The petitioner was then allowed to submit his answer on March 26, 2002. Thereafter, the CIU tendered its investigation report to PAGCOR’s Adjudication Committee. After the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration vis-àvis the resolution of the PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissing him from the service was denied, he appealed his dismissal to the CSC. In its resolution dated April 11, 2007, the CSC ruled that PAGCOR had violated the petitioner’s right to due process, and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service Issue: 1. Whether or not the petitioner right to due process is violated? 2. Whether or not the petitioner right to counsel is violated? Held:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 1. No. Petitioner could not dispute the observance of his right to due process by PAGCOR as set forth herein. He made no credible showing of the supposed violation of his right to due process. He was heard through the written statement he submitted in response to the memorandum of the charges against him. He actively participated in the administrative inquiry conducted by the CIU at his own residence. He was afforded the opportunity to clarify his position in the proceedings before the Adjudication Committee. He was also able to appeal the adverse decision to dismiss him from the service to the CSC. There is also no question that PAGCOR complied with the twin-notice requirement prior to the termination of his employment, the first notice being made through Ela’s letter dated February 21, 2002 informing him on his being administratively charged for the offenses mentioned, and the second being through the letter dated May 15, 2002 advising him that PAGCOR’s Board of Directors had resolved to dismiss him from the service. It is settled that there is no denial of procedural due process where the opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded 2. No. It is underscored that PAGCOR denied his request to re-schedule the conference before the Adjudication Committee because his counsel would not be available on the day fixed for that purpose. In its letter denying the request, the Adjudication Committee asserted that the presence of counsel was not indispensable in the conduct of its proceedings. We find nothing objectionable in the denial of the request. In an administrative proceeding like that conducted against the petitioner, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel. As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are themselves inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service. 45. GLOBE TELECOM, INC, vs. THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER JOSEPH A. SANTIAGO G.R. No. 143964. July 26, 2004 FACTS: Globe filed a complaint before the NTC praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks, particularly their respective SMS or texting services pursuant to the provisions of the Philippine Telecommunication Commission. Accordingly, the NTC issued an Order requiring SMART and Globe to interconnect their SMS service. SMART and Globe eventually interconnected their services. Meanwhile, in the same Order, the NTC also required Smart and Globe to secure authority from it for providing SMS services. According to the NTC, SMS services fall squarely within the definition of value-added service (VAS) or enhanced-service given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95). Accordingly, Section 420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 requires PTEs (ie Smart and Globe) intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative process. The NTC directed the parties to secure the requisite authority to provide SMS within thirty (30) days, subject to the payment of fine in the amount of two hundred pesos (P200.00) from the date of violation and for every day during which such violation continues. Globe and SMART argued that SMS is a deregulated special feature of the telephone network and therefore does not require the prior approval of NTC as held in earlier NTC ruling on Islacom. [27] They also alleged that the the issue on SMS as VAS was beyond the scope of their complaint, hence, the Order of the NTC penalizing them should they fail to secure the required authorization from NTC for operating SMS service is void for violating their right to administrative due process particularly prior notice and hearing. ISSUES: 1. WON the NTC had sufficient legal basis to denominate SMS as VAS under the Philippine Telecommunication Act and NTC MC No. 14-11-97, hence, ordering Globe and Smart to secure prior authority from NTC in order to operate SMS? NTC MC No. 14-11-97? 2. WON the NTC violated the rights of Globe and SMART to due process for ordering them to secure prior authorization to operate SMS service without prior notice and hearing? HELD: 1. NONE. The Court held that while it usually accords great respect to the technical findings of administrative agencies in the fields of their expertise, even if they are infelicitously worded, a deep and cursory

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) reading of NTC’s Order revealed that there is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS. The Court explained that the assailed NTC’s Order revealed that no deep inquiry was made as to the nature of SMS or what its provisioning entails. In fact, the Court is unable to find how exactly does SMS fits into a nicety with NTC M.C. No. 8-9-95, which defines enhanced services as analogous to format, media conversion, encryption, enhanced security features, computer processing, and the like. The NTC merely notes that SMS involves the transmission of data over [the] CMTS, a phraseology that evinces no causal relation to the definition in M.C. No. 8-9-95. Neither did the NTC endeavor to explain why the transmission of data necessarily classifies SMS as a VAS. Moreover, the Court noted that the NTC had told Islacom that SMS was a special feature, then subsequently held that it was a VAS. Given these actions of NTC, the Court concluded that the legal basis invoked b,y NTC in claiming that SMS is VAS has not been duly established. The Court reminded that every party subject to administrative regulation deserves an opportunity to know, through reasonable regulations promulgated by the agency, of the objective standards that have to be met. Such rule is integral to due process, as it protects substantive rights. Such rule also promotes harmony within the service or industry subject to regulation. It provides indubitable opportunities to weed out the most frivolous conflicts with minimum hassle, and certain footing in deciding more substantive claims. 2. YES. The assailed Order violates due process for 1) failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, 2) for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and 3) for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf. The Court mentioned the requirements of due process attendant to the exercise of quasi-judicial power. Among them are the seven cardinal primary rights in justiciable cases before administrative tribunals, as enumerated in Ang Tibay v. CIR.[73] They are synthesized in a subsequent case, as follows: There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. 46. Arroyo vs. Rosal Homeowners Association GR No. 175155 October 22, 2012 The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. FACTS: Petitioners were among the actual occupants of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Rosal, Taculing, Bacolod City. They occupied the land by mere tolerance long before the said land was acquired by PCIB. To evade eviction from PCIB and in order to avail of the benefits of acquiring land under the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), the said occupants formally organized themselves into an association, the RHAI. Respondent Rosal Homeowners Association, Incorporated (RHAI) is a nonstock, nonprofit organization duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. Its membership is composed mainly of occupants of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Rosal, Taculing, Bacolod City, and formerly owned by Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCIB). RHAI was able to obtain a loan from the NHMFC and acquired the subject land from PCIB. As a consequence, the Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City issued a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T202933, in the name of RHAI. By virtue of the land acquisition by RHAI, all the occupants of the land became automatic members of RHAI.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) To fully avail of the benefits of the CMP, the NHMFC required the RHAI members to sign the Lease Purchase Agreement (LPA) and to maintain their membership in good standing in accordance with the provisions of the ByLaws of RHAI. Petitioners, however, refused to sign the LPA as a precondition under the CMP. They likewise failed to attend the regular meetings and pay their membership dues as required by the RHAI ByLaws. As a result, RHAI through its Board of Directors, approved a resolution to enforce the eviction of petitioners and recover possession of the portions of land which they were occupying. Pursuant to the said resolution, RHAI, through written letters of demand, called for petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession thereof to RHAI. Petitioners, however, ignored the demand. Petitioners insist that they cannot be ejected by RHAI being the actual occupants of the portions of the subject land long before the same was acquired by the latter. They opine that RHAI, in filing the ejectment case against them, violated the very purpose for the creation and existence of the socialized housing program, that is, to allow actual beneficiaries, like them, to own the portions of the land they were actually occupying. ISSUE: WON due process was observed in this case (YES) HELD: YES. The record shows that petitioners were accorded a fair trial in the RTC. In fact, they were properly represented by a counsel who was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses presented by RHAI. They had ample opportunity to substantiate their claim that they were not expelled as members and to present witnesses. Unfortunately, petitioners did not present their own evidence to bolster their defense. Thus, they cannot feign denial of due process where they had been afforded the opportunity to present their side. Petitioners, having chosen not to avail of the opportunity to present evidence to rebut the charges against them, cannot complain of denial of due process. As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met. What is offensive to due process is the denial of this opportunity to be heard. Petitioners, however, must be reminded that they have to comply with certain requirements and obligations to qualify as beneficiaries and be entitled to the benefits under the program. Their unreasonable refusal to join RHAI and their negative response to comply with their obligations compelled RHAI to either expel them or declare them as nonmembers of the association. Petitioners cannot now claim that they were denied the right to own the portions of land they were occupying for their homes under the CMP. 47. Mendoza vs COA GR NO 195395, SEPT 10 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Mendoza is the general manager of Talisay Water District in Talisay City, Negros Occidental. The Water District was formed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, otherwise known as the "Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973." The Commission on Audit disallowed a total amount of Three Hundred Eighty Thousand Two Hundred Eight Pesos (P3 80,208.00) which Mendoza received as part of his salary as the Water District's general manager from 2005 to 2006.4 The Commission found that petitioner Mendoza's salary as general manager "was not in consonance with the rate prescribed under [Republic Act No.] 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and the approved Plantilla of Position of the district."5 The Commission also found that petitioner Mendoza's claim of salary was "not supported with an Appointment duly attested by the Civil Service Commission."6 Payment to petitioner Mendoza was, therefore, "illegal. On July 6, 2009, the Commission on Audit issued the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision"8 informing petitioner Mendoza of the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s. The Commission then instructed the Talisay Water District cashier to withhold petitioner Mendoza's salaries corresponding to the amount disallowed and apply them in settlement of the audit disallowance in accordance with Rule XII, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Procedure

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) of the Commission on Audit.9cralawlibrary Petitioner Mendoza filed his Motion for Reconsideration10 of the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision."11He assailed the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s, arguing that he had not personally received a copy of this. This deprived him of the opportunity to answer the Notice immediately. He also argued that Section 23 of the Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973 gives Talisay Water District board of directors the right to fix and increase his salary as general manager and is an exception to the Salary Standardization Law. Finally, he argued that he had relied on Section 23 in good faith. As such, he cannot be ordered to refund the salaries he had received. The Commission on Audit denied petitioner Mendoza's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. 12It found that the Notice of Disallowance/s had been received by petitioner Mendoza's employee and ruled that petitioner Mendoza is deemed to have received, the Notice of Disallowance/s constructively. It likened the service of the Notice of Disallowance/s to the service of summons. As a general rule, summons must be personally served on the person to whom it is directed, but substituted service is allowed in certain cases. The Commission also noted that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied" 13 in administrative proceedings; therefore, petitioner Mendoza "cannot invoke the defense of technicality." ISSUE: WON the COA decision is final and executor. Ruling: YES Petitioner Mendoza argued that the Commission on Audit gravely abused its discretion in issuing the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision."24 He stated that the Notice of Disallowance/s never became final and executory considering that he was never personally served a copy of the Notice. Petitioner Mendoza is mistaken. The Commission on Audit issued the Notice of Disallowance/s on May 28, 2007. The 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit governed pleading and practice in the Commission during this period. Sections 5 and 6 of Rule IV state:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Sec. 5. Number of Copies and Distribution. - The report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, notice of disallowances and charges, and order or decision of the Auditor shall be prepared in such number of copies as may be necessary for distribution to the following: (1) original to the head of agency being audited; (2) one copy to the Auditor for his record; (3) one copy to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency of the government under audit; (4) other copies to the agency officials directly affected by the audit findings. Sec. 6. Finality of the Report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, Order or Decision. - Unless a request for reconsideration in filed or an appeal is taken, the report, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, order or decision of the Auditor shall become final upon the expiration of six (6) months after notice thereof to the parties concerned.chanrob1esvirtualawlibrary In this case, copies of the Notice of Disallowance/s were received on May 29, 2007 by "the Agency Head," "Accountant," and "Persons Liable" with their signatures appearing beside the three designations.25 Petitioner Mendoza never disputed this fact. After his receipt of the Notice of Finality of COA Decision on August 27, 2009, petitioner Mendoza filed the Motion for Reconsideration dated September 10, 2009. The Commission on Audit gave due course to the Motion for Reconsideration and issued the assailed Decision two (2) years after the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance/s. It ruled that petitioner Mendoza's salary is covered by the Salary Standardization Law. These circumstances show that the Notice of Disallowance/s was served on the necessary officers in accordance with the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Audit. Moreover, this Court En Banc in Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission26 ruled that:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

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Time and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as. applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.27 (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner Mendoza was afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration. The Commission gave due course to the Motion and ruled on the merits. Petitioner Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to explain his side and seek a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the "essence of administrative due process."28cralawlibrary For these reasons, We rule that the Commission on Audit issued the "Notice of Finality of COA Decision"29 without grave abuse of discretion, and the Notice of Disallowance/s had become final and executory. 48. Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencia GR No. 183890 13 April 2011 FACTS: Not satisfied that the entries made by Valencia in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) were reflective of his actual net worth, Napoleon P. Guenero (Guerrero), Intelligence Officer V of the Department of Finance, filed a complaint/motion for Subpoena/Subpoena Duces Tecum with the Ombudsman against him for violation of RA No. 13798 in relation to Section 8, R.A. No. 3019. The criminal aspect of the complaint was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0447-H, while the administrative aspect was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0275-H. In his complaint, Guerrero alleged that Valencia maintained two (2) US dollar time deposit accounts with the Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). The first account with the amount of US$2,013,248.80 was covered by Certificate No. 962460, while the second, with the amount of US$1,812,165.38, was covered by Certificate No. 962461. According to Guerrero, these huge amounts were “the actual fruits of his illegal transactions and activities of as an employee of the Bureau of Customs.” In support of his allegation that Valencia maintained these accounts, Guerrero attached two (2) Letters of Agreement placing the two US dollar time deposit accounts under the custody of FEBTC and authorizing said bank to apply the proceeds of the accounts to the forward contracts entered into by Valencia and FEBTC. The complaint also alleged that the house and lot declared by Valencia in his SALNs was grossly undervalued considering that the house, described as “impressive,” was erected on a parcel of land consisting of 5 contiguous lots. Finally, it was alleged that from the credit card billings of his Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Mastercard, it could be inferred that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle. Answering the charges hurled against him, Valencia alleged in his Consolidated Counter-Affidavit that at the time he joined the Bureau of Customs on October 1, 1982, his family had been in the textile and garment business for more than 15 years; and that because of their business, his family was able to purchase a house and lot in Dasmarinas Village, Makati City, then valued at P400K. The house and lot was later on sold for P1.5M. His family then transferred to B.F. Homes in Parañaque and rented a house. Then, sometime in 1985, his family transferred again to a house and lot belonging to his aunt, Paulina Potente (Potente), also in B.F. Homes, Paranaque. As his aunt preferred to live in General Trias, Cavite, he offered to lease-purchase the house to which she agreed. From 1985 to 1987, he introduced improvements to the house worth P600,000.00. At the rear portion of r house of Potente, 2 vacant lots belonging to one Rosalinda B. Silva were being offered for sale. Being adjacent to the house of his aunt, he purchased the same on August 24, 1988 for a total consideration of P268,950. Consequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 12695 and 12696 were eventually issued in his name.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) After fully paying the 3 lots owned by his aunt, he obtained a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 26, 1988 executed by Potente in his favor. As a result, TCT Nos. 14704, 14705 and 14706 were issued in his name. When declared for real property tax purposes, the Assessor’s Office of Paranaque assigned a market value in the amount of P641,870 and assessed value of P513,500 for the house. It was Valencia’s contention that his properties were accurately valued in his SALNs, and that his house, which may look impressive, was a result of regular maintenance and minor additions or renovations introduced from time to time. Valencia denied that he had been maintaining the 2 US dollar time deposits pointing out that the Letters of Agreement did not even bear his signature. Thus, the agreements were mere scraps of paper with no probative value. On October 14, 2003, on the basis of the complaint of Guerrero, the Ombudsman placed Valencia under preventive suspension for 6 months without pay. He sought the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, but his request was denied by the Ombudsman in its Order (November 14,2003). On April 6, 2004, for the purpose of verifying the complaint, the Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces lecum against the BPI Card Customer Service Department. It requested for the clear and certified copies of Valencia’s Mastercard transactions from 2003 backward. After receiving the photocopies of the monthly statements for Valencia’s Mastercard transactions, the Ombudsman required Valencia to file his Comment. Valencia, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Order dated July 16, 2004 and for Early Resolution of Cases., According to him, the said order of the Ombudsman requiring him to file his comment after 8 long months of inaction was “irregular, unprocedural and in violation of his constitutional right to due process.” He further pointed out that the monthly statements of the BPI Mastercard transactions were not original documents, thus, the authenticity and due execution of which must first be proven. On August 27, 2004, Ernesto N. Olaguer (Olaguer), the Service Manager of BPI in charge of the records of all deposit accounts, submitted an affidavit stating that “[d]espite diligent efforts, and given the limited information on the US Dollar Time deposits, wherein only the number of the time deposit certificates and the amount were specified, [he was] not able to locate any time deposit records belonging to Manuel P. Valencia, Jr.” In its September 2, 2004 Order, the Ombudsman required Olaguer and the counsel for BPI to appear before it for clarificatory hearing. On September 30, 2004, being of the view that Valencia maintained a lavish lifestyle and lived beyond the modest means that his salary as a government official could offer, the Ombudsman opined that he must have derived income from unlawful sources. This, according to the Ombudsman, constituted deception and dishonesty which warranted his dismissal from office. Thus, finding Valencia guilty of dishonesty and warranted dismissal from office. Valencia sought reconsideration of the Decision of the Ombudsman, but the same was denied. At the CA, however, the decision of the Ombudsman was reversed. According to the CA, the charge of Unexplained Wealth under R.A. No. 1379 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No, 3019 was separate and distinct from the offense of Dishonesty under Section 36 of Article IX of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. The CA reasoned out that to hold Valencia liable for Dishonesty when in fact the charge against him was for Unexplained Wealth, violated Valencia’s right to due process, especially his right to be informed of the charges against him and to be convicted only of the offense charged. Furthermore, it added that even if the offense of Dishonesty were to be considered, there was no substantial evidence on record to hold Valencia administratively liable. CA also opined that even assuming the evidence of the prosecution were admissible, the same was insufficient to hold Valencia guilty of the charges against him. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman’s decision finding that private respondent is administratively liable for dishonesty is an error of law considering that – a. the rules of procedure of the office of the ombudsman & settled administrative law principles allow the office of the ombudsman to render its decision in administrative disciplinary cases based on the affidavits & documents constituting the evidence on record.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) b. the documentary evidence showing private respondent valencia’s non‑declaration in his SALNs of his acquisition of real properties & lavish lifestyle, grossly disproportionate to his income as a government employee, constituted substantial evidence of his administrative liability for dishonesty. (NO) HELD: No. The Court sustains the finding of the CA that there is no substantial evidence to hold Valencia liable for Dishonesty. Administrative proceedings are governed by the “substantial evidence rule.” Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold Valencia liable for the charges against him is one of fact, which is not generally subject to review by the Court. A review of the facts, however, is in order not only because the findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the CA were diametrically opposed, but also because the Ombudsman decision was alleged to have been grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures. It should be noted that other than the SALNs of Valencia, the evidence of the prosecution consists of photocopies of 1] the unsigned letters of agreement alluding to Valencia’s dollar time deposit accounts; and 2] the monthly statements of the BPJ Mastercard transactions of Valencia. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence. Substantial evidence is enough. This presupposes, however, that the evidence proferred is admissible under the rules. With respect to photocopied private documents, the rule is that before it can be considered admissible in evidence, its due execution or genuineness should be first shown. Failing in this, the photocopies are inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value. As the records bear out, the due execution and genuineness of the photocopied letters of agreement and monthly statements of the BPI Mastercard transactions of Valencia were never verifed and confirmed. The basic rule is that these photocopied private documents are secondary evidence which are inadmissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of the originals. Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. The Court cannot rightly appreciate fiirsthand the genuineness of an unverified and unidentified document, much less, accord it evidentiary value. Regarding the photocopied letters of agreement, these were not even signed by Valencia. Thus, these letters of agreement relating to the alleged dollar time deposits of Valencia and his credit card billings are incompetent pieces of evidence unworthy of any probative value. As to the US dollar deposits, the Ombudsman did try to verify them. On August 27, 2004, however, as earlier stated, Olaguer, the Service Manager of BPI in charge of the records of all deposit accounts, stated in his affidavit that “[d]espite diligent efforts, and given the limited information on the US Dollar Time deposits, wherein only the number of the time deposit certificates and the amount were specified, [he was] not able to locate any time deposit records belonging to Manuel P. Valencia, Jr.” To dismiss a public officer or employee on the basis of photocopies of private documents which are questioned and disputed is to set a dangerous precedent. It can be abused by oppressive or abusive superiors who may want their own protege to replace the charged officers or employees or by any individual who may want to harass a public employee for no legitimate reason at all. Photocopies should only be considered as evidence if they are not contested, if they are admitted, or if they constitute matters which need not be proved. Unverified photocopied private documents are not evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Nevertheless, granting that these pieces of evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman are admissible in evidence, the Court still finds the same insufficient to establish the liability of Valencia for Dishonesty.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) As observed by the CA, the Ombudsman totally ignored the affidavit of BPI Service Manager Olaguer certifying that he could not locate any time deposit record belonging to Valencia. Being a responsible officer in custody of the supposed time deposits, his attestation is the best evidence that the bank does not have a record of any time deposit in the name of Valencia. In sum, with the presented SALNs being the only competent evidence for the prosecution, the Court upholds the finding of the CA that there is no substantial evidence that respondent Manuel P. Valencia [1] acquired property though unlawful means, [2] maintained US time deposit accounts, and [3] lived a lavish lifestyle. 49. PASCUAL vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS GR 25018 May 26, 1969 FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge. Petitioner objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants; he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board. ISSUE: Is compelling the petitioner to be the witness of the complainants in violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause? HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. 50. DUMARPA vs. DIMAPORO, COMELEC GR 87014-16 September 13, 1989

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Datu Jamil Dimaporo was proclaimed by the Board of Canvassers Mayor-elect of Marogong, Lanao del Sur. The annulment of the proclamation and the canvass on which it was based was sought in two (2) separate petitions filed by defeated mayoralty candidates. While these petitions were pending, the Secretary of Local Governments issued on May 1-.9, 1988 a memorandum addressed to the Regional Director, Region XII of the Department of Local Governments, designating Maclis Balt "Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Mayor of Marogong, Lanao del Sur vice Abdullah Imam." The petitions seeking annulment of Datu Dimaporo's proclamation were dismissed by the First Division of the COMELEC. Motions for reconsideration thereof were seasonably presented by both petitioners. These were brought up to the Commission en banc for resolution. Datu Dimaporo lost no time in seeking official recognition of his status as mayor-elect of Marogong, as confirmed by the First Division's Decision of July 11, 1988. Under date of July 18, 1988, his counsel, Mangurun Batuampar sent a formal communication to Provincial Governor Saidamen B. Pangarungan. This letter, and other related documents collated by the Office of the Governor, were later referred to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur. The Provincial Fiscal acted promptly on the request. The opinion sought was communicated to the Vice Governor. It was signed by 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal Maranao C. Danganan, with the conformity ("conforme") of Provincial Fiscal Salic B. Dumarpa which states that the decision of the Commission En Banc is not yet even final until and after 5 days whenever no restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court. On learning of this legal opinion, Datu Dimaporo filed with the COMELEC en banc a motion to hold Fiscals Dumarpa and Danganan, as well as Vice-Governor Alauya, in contempt. In its Resolution of

October 28, 1988 anent the contempt incident, the Commission en banc condemned the fiscal's conception of "the First Division's jurisdiction of the pre- proclamation controversy" as a "distortion of the law and jurisprudence." Stressing that under the law "it is solely the Commission that can suspend or annul any proclamation made," the Resolution pointed out that the respondents Alauya, Dumarpa and Danganan in effect did was to suspend the effects of the proclamation of intervenor Dimaporo made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Marogong, to prevent him from discharging the duties of his office, and pave the way for the appointment of or assumption to office by an Officer-in-Charge, who is the wife of one of the parties to the instant petitions' which are acts constituting 'unauthorized and illegal assumption of powers that pertain exclusively to the Commission, an unlawful interference with its processes and proceedings, and improper conduct that tends directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in this case." ISSUE: WON COMELEC’s conviction of petitioners for contempt is valid? HELD: No. It appears that the Fiscals are being sanctioned for rendering an opinion that in the view of the COMELEC en banc was "a distortion of law and jurisprudence." That opinion was rendered in answer to the inquiry of the Acting Governor as to whether or not, in view of the judgment by the First Division of the COMELEC upholding the proclamation by the Board of Canvassers of Datu Dimaporo as Mayor-Elect of Marogong, the duly designated OIC Mayor, therefore acting as such, Datu Maclis Balt, could still be recognized as the Mayor of the Municipality. The inquiry had been made necessary in view of the conflict in claims to the mayoralty then being asserted by both Datu Dimaporo and Datu Balt, which conflict had to be swiftly and legally resolved to prevent its resolution by arms and bloodshed. Nor may the Acting Governor be faulted for consulting the lawyers of the province as to the effects of a judgment on the authority and actuations of municipal or provincial officials, or the fiscals for advising him on such matters. The power to hold in contempt, it has time and again been held, must be exercised, not on the vindictive, but on the preservative principle. In a word, petitioners have been found in contempt because, to put it baldly, their opinion did not sit well with the Commission and failed to conform to its own views. All things considered, the contempt ruling here cannot be justified on the preservative principle, there being no clear showing, either in the terms of the allegedly contumacious opinion or from the circumstances that

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) led to its issuance, of any intent to denigrate the authority of the respondent Commission or erode the faith and respect due its decisions, orders or other actuations. 51. Encinas vs Agustin and Caubang GR No. 187317 11 April 2013 Facts: Respondents Encinas and Caubang were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija. They claim that petitioner Encinas – who was then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless they gave him five thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas. Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay petitioner. Respondents came up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents. Respondents filed with the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990. On the basis of similar facts, respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City, their Complaint (CSCRO Complaint). This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section 4(c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. After a fact-finding investigation was conducted in connection with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. The CSCRO found petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from service. Petitioner appealed with the CSC main office. In his Appeal, he argued that respondents were guilty of forumshopping for having filed two (2) separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the one hand, and before the BFP/DILG on the other. Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO only had appellate jurisdiction or authority to decide cases brought before it by the head of agency or, in this case, the BFP. He explained that the administrative Complaint was investigated and heard by the BFP/DILG. The BFP department head or fire director, Asignado, by virtue of the Resolution, dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. There being no appeal or petition filed on the dismissal, the CSCRO Complaint should have been dismissed as well. Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO erred in concluding that the resolution of the fact-finding committee was not a judgment on the merits. The BFP being an agency of the government, any decision or resolution it arrives at is also a judgment on the merits. Petitioner’s appeal was subsequently denied by CSC. Petitioner then filed a Rule 43 Petition with the CA which denied petitioner’s appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the letter-complaint filed by respondents that commenced the administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely triggered the CSCRO’s fact-finding investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain a certification of non-forum-shopping. The CA similarly ruled that respondents’ act of simultaneously filing Complaints against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did not constitute forum-shopping since they were nonetheless based on different causes of action—more specifically, the BFP Complaint was for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC Complaint was for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.

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Issue: Whether petitioner is administratively liable? YES. Held: Petitioner is administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the Administrative Code of 1987; thus, the Court affirmed his dismissal from service. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents. A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point." In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with finality. The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and judgment.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner. It can be gleaned from the Resolution itself that the purpose of the BFP proceedings was to determine whether there was sufficient ground to warrant the filing of an appropriate administrative offense against petitioner. The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutor’s preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed. The preliminary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was definitely not a quasi-judicial proceeding. 52. FELIPE YSMAEL, JR. & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT and TWIN PEAKS DEVELOPMENT AND REALTY CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 79538 October 18, 1990 Facts:

Petitioner made the following allegations:

That on October 12, 1965, it entered into a timber license agreement designated as TLA No. 87 with the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources

That on August 18, 1983, the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development [hereinafter referred to as "Bureau"], Director Edmundo Cortes, issued a memorandum order stopping all logging operations in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino provinces, and cancelling the logging concession of petitioner and nine other forest concessionaires, pursuant to presidential instructions and a memorandum order of the Minister of Natural Resources Teodoro Pena.

That after the cancellation of its timber license agreement, it immediately sent a letter addressed to then President Ferdinand Marcos which sought reconsideration of the Bureau's directive, citing in support thereof its contributions to alleging that it was not given the forest conservation and opportunity to be heard prior to the cancellation of its logging 531, but no operations (Annex "6" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 50 favorable action was taken on this letter;

That barely one year thereafter, approximately one-half or 26,000 hectares of the area formerly covered by TLA No. 87 was re-awarded to Twin Peaks Development and Reality Corporation

Acting on petitioner's letter, the MNR through then Minister Ernesto Maceda issued an order dated July 22, 1986 denying petitioner's request. The Ministry ruled that a timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) welfare so demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983 Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The MNR however denied this motion. On November 26, 1986, petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Meanwhile, per MNR Administrative Order No. 54, series of 1986, issued on November26, 1986, the logging ban in the province of Quirino was lifted. Petitioner subsequently appealed from the orders of the MNR to the Office of the President. In a resolution dated July 6, 1987, the Office of the President, acting through then Deputy Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, denied petitioner's appeal for lack of merit. The Office of the President ruled that the appeal of petitioner was prematurely filed, the matter not having been terminated in the MNR. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on August 14, 1987. Hence, petitioner filed directly with this Court a petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction Issue: Whether or not a writ of certiorari may be issued by the Court Held: The Court finds several factors which militate against the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner.

Firstly, the refusal of public respondents herein to reverse final and executory administrative orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioner's letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dated March 17, 1986 and April 2, 1986, respectively, sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984.

But as gleaned from the record, petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law, i.e. Section 8 of Pres. Dec. No.705 as amended, for attacking the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986. By the time petitioner sent its letter dated April 2, 1986 to the newly appointed Minister of the MNR requesting reconsideration of the above Bureau actions, these were already settled matters as far as petitioner was .

Moreover, petitioner is precluded from availing of the benefits of a writ of certiorari in the present case because he failed to file his petition within a reasonable period. The fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to have the earlier administrative actions reviewed by the courts through a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. For although no specific time frame is fixed for the institution of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the same must nevertheless be done within a "reasonable time". The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) "reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to annul the same"

Finally, there is a more significant factor which bars the issuance of a writ of certiorari in favor of petitioner and against public respondents herein. It is precisely this for which prevents the Court from departing from the general application of the rules enunciated above.

A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing public policy issue of forest conservation. For this Court recognizes the wide latitude of discretion possessed by the government in determining the appropriate actions to be taken to preserve and manage natural resources, and the proper parties who should enjoy the privilege of utilizing these resources. In fine, the legal precepts highlighted in the foregoing discussion more than suffice to justify the Court's refusal to interfere in the DENR evaluation of timber licenses and permits issued under the previous regime, or to pre-empt the adoption of appropriate corrective measures by the department 53. NHA v. Pascual, G.R. No. 158364, November 28, 2007 Facts: On August 3, 1959, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2616 was enacted providing for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate and the sale of the lots to present bonafide occupants. Thereafter, the National Housing Authority (NHA) was designated as administrator of the Tatalon Estate Housing Project by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1261. Pursuant thereto, petitioner NHA awarded in 1983 Lot 3, Block 12 of the Tatalon Estate Urban Bliss Project (TEUBP), to Dolores Maranan, since she was included in the 1958 Araneta Census List of Occupants. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No. 303230 in favor of Maranan who executed in December 1984 a Special Power of Attorney in favor of Perlita Canedo with respect to the property and thereafter left the Philippines. Full payment was given by Perlita Canedo hence, NHA executed a Deed of Cancellation and Release of Real Estate Mortgage and released TCT No. 303230. Later on, Maranan sold the lot to Perlita Canedo for which TCT No. 127373 was issued. Respondent Pascual however, assailed the award of the subject lot to Maranan by filing a lettercomplaint before the General Manager of NHA, alleging that she is the rightful beneficiary of the said lot being the actual occupant thereof and for having resided in the Tatalon Estate since 1968. Pascual averred that after marrying Aurelio Pascual in 1975, they used the subject lot for their domicile and operated a motor shop as well and were included in the 1976 Census. However, sometime in 1983, their house was demolished and relocated to an inner lot. The Inspector General of NHA recommended to the General Manager that the subject lot be awarded to Pascual considering that she was included in the 1976 Census and her house structure appeared in the aerial photo. On the other hand, the Project Manager recommended to award the lot to Maranan and to transfer respondent to an inner lot. The General Manager sustained the position of the Project Manager to award the lot to Maranan and to relocate respondent to an inner lot and dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of merit. Pascual appealed to the Office of the President but NHA maintained the propriety of the award of the lot to Maranan. The Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Public Assistance Center wrote a letter to the General Manager of NHA to reconsider the case of respondent in view of the allegations that Maranan was an absentee awardee. It stated that an inquiry from the United States Department of Justice Immigration and Naturalization Service reveals that Maranan became a lawful resident of Honolulu, Hawaii on September 6, 1979. Hence, it appears that the subject lot which was originally occupied by Pascual was awarded to Dolores Maranan under fraudulent circumstances. Thereafter, a series of conferences for a possible swapping of homelots was conducted by the NHA. Further conferences were made but no settlement was reached between the parties and no ruling was made as

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) to the disqualification of Maranan as an absentee awardee. Hence respondent brought the matter before the courts for redress. Issue: Whether Pascual is correct in appealing the decision of NHA. (YES) Holding: It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. In the case at bar, since petitioner's decision was seasonably appealed by respondent, the same has not attained finality and the principle of res judicata does not apply. Consequently, the ruling of the trial court dismissing respondent's complaint on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies must be reversed. Respondent correctly resorted to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President and obtained a favorable decision therefrom. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to reconsider and review, as directed by the Office of the President, the qualification and/or disqualification of respondent and Dolores Maranan. The record is bereft of any evidence that petitioner reviewed the qualification of Maranan and issued a ruling thereon. Instead of correcting its own lapse or mistake by reviewing the case, particularly on the qualifications of the intended beneficiaries, it sustained its decision by conducting several conferences and hearings for a possible swapping of homelots between the parties.

JUDICIAL REVIEW 54. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINDUQUE MINING & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, THE HON. GERONIMO VELASCO in his capacity as Minister of Energy and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents. G.R. No. 88550 April 18, 1990

FACTS: Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which, together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called "Giporlos Area.” In line with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal supply-demand balance, IEI was then advised that the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to MMIC. Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the subject of IEI's coal operating contract. Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the RTC Makati, alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks even before the Memorandum of Agreement was finalised and approved by BED; that MMIC discontinued work thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the reimbursements agreed upon and to assume IEI's loan obligation as provided in the Memorandum of Agreement. IEI then prayed that Energy Minister be ordered to approve return of the coal operating contract to IEI. Trial Court- ordered recession of the Memorandum of agreement and declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in favour of IEI; ordered BED the immediate return to IEI of the operation of the coal blocks.

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Court of Appeals- revered the Trial Court’s decision it held that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that, under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks. ISSUE: WON the civil court (RTC) has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks HELD: NO. The jurisdiction of the BED should be sustained. In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied). Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency. The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served. 55. Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-33146, May 31, 1977 Facts: Commissioner of Customs sought to nullify and set aside in order Judge Pedro C. Navarro issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary to law and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of the Tariff and Customs Code. In a detailed and specific fashion, petitioners pointed out how violative was the assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Judge over an incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which, as held in a number of decisions, was a matter falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities. Issue: Whether the Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction over the seized and forfeited goods. (YES)

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Holding: The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by this Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. More specifically, in Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, a 1959 decision, this Court affirmed a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals and categorically announced that respondent Commissioner of Customs could "seize [the importation of goods lacking the release certificates of the Central Bank] and order their forfeiture under the [appropriate] provisions of the Revised Administrative Code." That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia, decided in 1966. This Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: "This original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture proceedings." The court "should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs." Such a ruling, as pointed out by Justice Zaldivar in Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax Appeals, promulgated less than a year later, could be traced to Government v. Gale, a 1913 decision, where there was a recognition in the opinion of Justice Carson that a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the law expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of the subject matter of such proceedings. The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, decided in 1971. Thus: "The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter." Reference was then made in the opinion to previous cases. Then it continued: "Papa v. Mago likewise deserves to be cited. The opinion of Justice Zaldivar for the Court emphatically asserted the doctrine anew in the following language: 'It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods." Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, as well as Luna v. Pacis, both 1971 decisions, speak to the same effect. The latest categorical declaration of such a rule appears in the opinion of Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, in Señeres v. Frias in these words: "It is the settled law and jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that the customs authorities acquire exclusive jurisdiction over goods sought to be imported into the Philippines, for the purpose of enforcement of Philippine customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually under their possession and control, even if no warrant for seizure or detention thereof has previously been issued by the port collector of customs." 56. Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 139583, May 31, 2000 Facts: Petitioner Crusaders Broadcasting System, Inc. was the grantee of a Temporary Permit to operate DWCD-FM at a frequency of 97.9 Mhz. Its chairman sent a letter to the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) requesting a permit to allow them to stop their broadcasting for around a month in order to renovate its broadcast booth and the entire facilities of the station. The Temporary Permit to operate of the Crusaders was renewed covering the period from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1996.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On December 12, 1996, Crusaders applied for another renewal of its Temporary Permit. The NTC conducted an ocular inspection and it found out that the station is inoperative, thus, the NTC denied the application for the renewal of its Temporary Permit. Crusaders presented a motion for reconsideration explaining that Crusaders was not able to resume its operation because of a case filed by Conamor Broadcasting Corporation against Crusaders and the subsequent issuance of an injunction order by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City enjoining Crusaders from operating its radio station. By reason thereof, on July 14, 1997, the NTC issued a show-cause order directing Crusaders to explain why its application for renewal of Temporary Permit for the station should not be denied; why its station should not be closed; and why the assigned frequency of the station should not be recalled. Crusaders failed to submit a responsive pleading, consequently, the NTC issued an order, declaring Crusaders in default and thereafter, handed down its decision recalling the assigned frequency. Later, the NTC granted the motion for new trial filed by Crusaders. But despite the evidence presented, NTC still denied Crusaders' request for renewal of its Temporary Permit to operate DWCD-FM. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the NTC. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the NTC properly denied the application for renewal of Crusaders' temporary permit to operate DWCD-FM, and validly ordered the withdrawal of the latter's assigned frequency. (YES) Holding: It should be noted that by virtue of Executive Order (E.O) No. 546, creating the Ministry of Public Works and Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the regulation of radio communications is a function assigned to, and being performed by, the NTC. Petitioner does not deny and in fact, uses it as the reason for the stoppage of its broadcast that it was the filing of the aforementioned civil case against it (petitioner) which grounded DWCD-FM's broadcasting. It is not disputed, either, that what prompted Conamor to bring a complaint against petitioner was the latter's rescission of a "Programming and Marketing Agreement". In order to settle the civil case, Crusaders and Conamor later entered into a "Compromise Agreement" which superseded the programming and marketing agreement. Conamor has been given the right to operate and manage a radio station despite the clear mandate of the Radio Law that only holders of a legislative franchise can do so. Even on this ground alone, Crusaders can be prevented by the NTC from broadcasting. That the said ground was not reflected in the show-cause order does not mean that the same cannot be raised thereafter by the NTC, as it has done in the present case, when it gleaned a basis therefor during the administrative proceedings, from the evidence presented by the petitioner itself the substance of the agreement between petitioner and Conamor. The said findings were not rebutted by petitioner which kept on harping only on the alleged unfairness of NTC in the application of its procedures as well as on the existence of the said civil case against it and on the refusal of NTC to approve its application for the acquisition of a new transmitter. On the matter of factual findings by the NTC as to the inoperativeness of subject radio station, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the said findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 57. Caballes et al v Perez-Sison GR No. 131759 March 23, 2004 Facts: In 1994, the Samahan ng mga Optometrist sa Pilipinas, through its President Charlie L. Ho, filed a letter-affidavit with the Board of Optometry of the PRC charging Ma. Teresita Caballes and others with unethical and/or unprofessional conduct. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action but the Board denied the motion. Their motion for reconsideration is likewise denied by the Board. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed their petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioners erred in their recourse to the Courts Ruling: Yes, petitioners’ recourse to the Courts is erroneous. RA8050 vests the Board of Optometry with the power to conduct hearings and investigations to resolve complaints against practitioners of optometry. If a decision is for

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) revocation of a certificate or suspension of a professional license, it may be appealed to the PRC within 15 days from receipt of the decision. Premature resort to court became fatal to petitioner’s cause of action. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, would decide the same correctly or correct any previous error committed in its forum. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity, and convenience prevent courts from entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. 58. Regino vs. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology FACTS: Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. In February 2002, PCST held a fund raising campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to pay for the tickets. On March 14 and March 15, 2002, the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, her teachers -- Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad -- allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. According to petitioner, Gamurot made her sit out her logic class while her classmates were taking their examinations. The next day, Baladad, after announcing to the entire class that she was not permitting petitioner and another student to take their statistics examinations for failing to pay for their tickets, allegedly ejected them from the classroom. Petitioner’s pleas ostensibly went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly defended their positions as compliance with PCST’s policy. On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint for damages against PCST, Gamurot and Baladad. In her Complaint, she prayed for P500,000 as nominal damages; P500,000 as moral damages; at least P1,000,000 as exemplary damages; P250,000 as actual damages; plus the costs of litigation and attorney’s fees. On May 30, 2002, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to respondents, the question raised involved the determination of the wisdom of an administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should have been initiated before the proper administrative body, the Commission of Higher Education (CHED). ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled, Respondents anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner’s alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the propriety of PCST’s academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under Republic Act No. 7722 to implement the state policy to “protect, foster and promote the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate steps to ensure that education is accessible to all.” In Factoran Jr. v. CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine: “The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given the exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could not have commenced her case before the Commission. The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts. In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed Orders REVERSE

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59. PAAT, et. al. vs. CA, et. al. (LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE GUZMAN) G.R. No. 111107 January 10, 1997

FACTS:

Sometime on May 19, 1989, the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. However the private respondents failed to submit the required explanation. As a result, Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan’s action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of reconsideration to the said order, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order. Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the DENR Secretary pursuant to private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the Secretary. Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present petition.

ISSUE 1:

ISSUE 2:

RULING 1:

Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines? Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?

No. The Supreme Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative proceedings. Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez, this Court held: Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

RULING 2:

Yes. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277 provides that: Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. Private respondents miserably failed to convince the Court that a wrongful detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products without the required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence, no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.

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60. Shell Philippines Exploration v Jalos GR 179918 September 8, 2010 Facts: In 1990, Shell and the Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for exploration and extraction of petroleum in Northwestern Palawan. In 1992, Shell discovered natural gas in Camago-Malampaya area and installed a pipeline from Shell’s production platform to its gas processing plant in Batangas, spanning 504 kilometers and crossing the Oriental Mindoro Sea. In 2003, Efren Jalos and 77 other individuals filed a complaint for damages against Shell before the RTC alleging that their livelihood as substinence fishermen was adversely affected by the construction and operation of Shell’s natural gas pipeline. As a result, their average net income per month fell from P4,848 to only P573. Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint alleging that it is a pollution case and should be filed under the Pollution Adjudication Board pursuant to RA3931. Issue: Whether or not the complaint is a pollution case that falls within the primary jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication Board Ruling: Yes, the Pollution Adjudication Board has primary jurisdiction over the instant case. Although the complaint of Jalos, et al does not use the word pollution in describing the cause of the alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Sea, it is unmistakable based on their allegations that Shells pipeline produced some kind of poison or emission that drove the fish away from the coastal areas. The pipeline, they said, greatly affected or altered the natural habitat of fish and affected the coastal waters natural function as fishing grounds. Inevitably, in resolving Jalos, et als claim for damages, the proper tribunal must determine whether or not the operation of the pipeline adversely altered the coastal waters properties and negatively affected its life sustaining function. The power and expertise needed to determine such issue lies with the PAB. Jalos, et al had, therefore, an administrative recourse before filing their complaint with the regular courts. The laws creating the PAB and vesting it with powers are wise. The definition of the term pollution itself connotes the need for specialized knowledge and skills, technical and scientific, in determining the presence, the cause, and the effects of pollution. These knowledge and skills are not within the competence of ordinary courts. Consequently, resort must first be made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters. 61. Pimentel Jr v Senate Committee of the Whole GR No. 187714 March 8, 2011 Facts: On September 15, 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson, through a privilege speech entitled “Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!”, called attention to congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act the P200 million appropriated for construction of C.P. Garcia Ave. Ext. from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in Paranaque City with double entry leading to Senator Villar. P.S. Resolution 706 was introduced by Senator Madrigal to investigate on this issue. However, due to accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator Villar’s case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. Said motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. et al, however, filed a petition with the Supreme Court assailing the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondents contend in their Comment that petitioners failed to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or prior resort Issue: Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction Ruling: No, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inapplicable to this case. The Court has ruled that if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, relief must first be obtained in an

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the Senate to resolve. As for respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court held that the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is a duty imposed on the Court by the Constitution and that it would be remiss in the performance of that duty if the Court declines to look behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers. The Court, therefore, is not precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. 62 SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA) vs. PERLITA BATHAN-VELASCO G.R. No. 108765. August 27, 1999 FACTS: Respondent Alert and Concerned Employees for Better SSS (ACCESS) and petitioner Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA) (PSLINK-TUCP) participated in a certification election conducted to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of respondent Social Security System (SSS). The certification elections were held, with ACCESS garnering 1,378 votes, SSSEA obtaining 1,116 votes, and No Union collecting 40 votes. The SSSEA filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations, an election protest and/or motion to annul the result of the certification election. The Bureau of Labor Relations denied the protest and/or motion. The SSSEA also filed an Election Protest and/or Motion to Nullify Certification Elections in the SSS Regional Office, the petition was also denied and ACCESS was declared the winner in the certification election. ACCESS was certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank and file employees of SSS for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with the latter. A motion for reconsideration was filed but eventually denied. The petitioner then filed to the Court a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order to nullify the result of the said certification election. ISSUE: Is the resort to Court through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 a proper remedy? HELD: NO. The rule is well-entrenched that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting to the courts. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action. This rule would not only give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but would also prevent the unnecessary and premature resort to courts. In this case, petitioner failed to take an appeal from the order of the Director, Bureau of Labor Relations to the Secretary of Labor, pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code. Absent a showing that petitioner had availed itself of an exhausted the appropriate administrative remedies, a premature resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition. Moreover, the issues raised by petitioner call for a review of the factual findings of public respondent. Petitioner argues that the certification election should not have proceeded because of the pendency of a formal charge of a company-initiated, dominated, or supported union with the bureau of Labor Relations. [8] Petitioner further contends that no certification election was held in the regional offices of respondent SSS on October 11, 1991, resulting in incomplete certification election, thereby rendering null and void the proclamation of ACCESS as the winner of the election. Unfortunately for petitioner, factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials.[9] Judicial review does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor officer or office based his or its determination. [10] 63. Zabat v. Court of Appeals 338 SCRA 551 Facts: In 1977, the NHA conducted a census of residents and discovered that two (2) structures, one owned by plaintiffappellant Marylou Zabat and the other by the Mauris, were constructed on the controverted lot. Nonetheless, Marylou Zabat was included in the census as owner of a structure and given a tag number for the purpose.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Subsequently, in 1981 a census verification was conducted again by the NHA which found that the structure owned by the plaintiffs-appellants was being rented out to a certain Conrado Briones and on the basis thereof, plaintiffs-appellants were declared as absentee structure owners and under Section 1 (a) of Memo Circular No. 13 issued by the NHA, an absentee structure owner is disqualified from a lot award. The lot was subsequently awarded to Mauris. Marylou Zabat raised the matter on appeal to the Awards and Arbitration Committee )of the NHA on March 15, 1983 but was denied. Eight (8) days later or on August 24, 1985, the lot was awarded to the Mauris and a conditional contract to sell was executed by the NHA in the formers favor. On October 22, 1992, plaintiffs-appellants filed for Injunction with Prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendants-appellees and the persons working under them to refrain from demolishing the structure of the plaintiffs-appellants. But TRC denied her motion. The CA affirmed RRTCs Descion. Issue: Whether petitioner can File for injunction. Held: As a rule, injunction is not granted to take property out of the possession or control of one party to be placed into that of another whose title has not been clearly established by law. For the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[11] In our view, petitioners have not clearly and unmistakably shown why they were entitled to co-own the lot with the Mauris. . Additionally, it should be stressed that the remedy of injunction could no longer be availed of where the act to be prevented had long been consummated.[12] In their complaint before the trial court and in the present petition, petitioners pray that the NHA be enjoined from evicting them and from demolishing their structure. What they truly and ultimately desire, however, is to overturn the award of the lot solely to the Mauris.[13] This, in our view, is not legally feasible. The award of the lot has already been accomplished. The NHA awarded the subject lot to the Mauris on August 24, 1985, while petitioners complaint for injunction was filed only on October 22, 1992.A span of seven years has intervened. Injunction here would just be an exercise in futility. [14] Moreover, the long period which has elapsed, from the time of the award of the lot to the Mauris in 1985 to the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction in 1992, has made petitioners claim upon the subject lot a stale demand. Laches already set in. Petitioners failed, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. Their negligence or omission to assert their right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that they have either abandoned or declined to assert it.. Here we find applicable the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Before a party mayseek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes.[20] A party aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief, but must also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to court.

64. INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. DUMA SINSUAT etc., et al., respondents-appellees. G.R. No. L-29171 April 15, 1988

NARVASA, J.: Facts The Bureau of Supply Coordination of the Department of General Services advertised two Invitations to Bid:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 1. First Invitation a. Eight units trucks b. Line Construction c. Left-hand drive d. Complete and special factory built e. Series of 1965 f. Brand new g. Limited to foreign made products on a CIF basis 2. Second Invitation a. Amended the first notice on the bases of suggestions contained in letters of Industrial Power Sales, Inc. b. Said letters proposed that the invitation include locally manufactured trucks in an FOB Manila basis c. Acting Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications Lachica addressed a 3rd Indorsement to the Director of Supply Coordination advising that the Office would not have any objection to locally manufactured utility truck bodies The bidding took place and the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc. and Delta Motor Corporation. IPSI won the bid. DELTA then protested the award to IPSI by telegram to the Bureau of Telecommunications, claiming that the trucks offered by IPSI were not factory built. The decision of DELTA’s protest was in IPSI’s favor. However, Acting Undersecretary Lachica tried to reverse himself by recalling his 3 rd Indorsement on the ground that it was “found out that the requisition as approved by the Secretary calls for special factory built Line Construction Trucks, and not utility trucks. The reply of the Acting Director of Supply only reaffirmed the previous decision. DELTA filed a protest with the Office of the Secretary of General Services. Secretary Sinsuat, ina his 1 st Indorsement addressed to the Director of the Bureau of Supply, stated that only DELTA has complied with the specifications and that Acting Undersecretary Lachica has no authority to modify the requisition. When Secretary Sinsuat settled the issue in DELTA’s favor, IPSI filed with the CFI of Quezon City a petition for prohibition and mandamus. However, the court rendered a decision to dismiss IPSI’s petition. IPSI filed the present case, alleging that Secretary Sinsuat acted with grave abuse of discretion. Issue W/N Secretary Sinsuat acted with grave abuse of discretion? Held Yes, Secretary Sinsuat acted with grave abuse of discretion. Several material circumstances were considered of no moment by Secretary Sinsuat. Furthermore, the Secretary also ignored applicable provisions of law conferring preferential status to locally manufactured equipment and supplies. 65. 65. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., vs. POEA G.R. No. 76633, October 18, 1988

FACTS: In this case, there was a certain Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo, Japan on March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Fund Insurance. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

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HELD: No. The High Court ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices." Further, the Court said that it is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

66. Nazareno vs CA 267 SCRA 589 FACTS: Sometime in 1979, private respondents Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. In the latter part of 1982, private respondents allegedly stopped paying rentals. As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 4. A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20. The case was remanded to the municipal trial court for execution of judgment after the same became final and executory. Private respondents filed a case for annulment of judgment before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 24 which dismissed the same. Antonio Nazareno and petitioners again moved for execution of judgment but private respondents filed another case for certiorari with prayer for restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 25 which was likewise dismissed. The decision of the lower court was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied. Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan designated as Plan Csd-106-00571 with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau of Lands. In compliance with the order of respondent District Land Officer Alberto M. Gillera, respondent Land Investigator Avelino G. Labis conducted an investigation and rendered a report to the Regional Director recommending that Survey Plan No. MSI-10-06-000571-D (equivalent to Lot No. 36302, Cad. 237) in the name of Antonio Nazareno, be cancelled and that private respondents be directed to file appropriate public land applications. Based on said report, respondent Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands Roberto Hilario rendered a decision ordering the amendment of the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas occupied by the private respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications covering their respective portions. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with respondent Rolleo Ignacio, Undersecretary of the Department of Natural Resources and Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands who denied the motion. Respondent Director of Lands Abelardo Palad then ordered him to vacate the portions adjudicated to private respondents and remove whatever improvements they have introduced thereon. He also ordered that private respondents be placed in possession thereof. Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) execution by respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the complaint. Applying Section 4 of C.A. No. 141, as amended, it contended that the approval of the survey plan belongs exclusively to the Director of Lands. Hence, factual findings made by the Metropolitan Trial Court respecting the subject land cannot be held to be controlling as the preparation and approval of said survey plans belong to the Director of Lands and the same shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Furthermore, the appellate court contended that the motion for reconsideration filed by Antonio Nazareno cannot be considered as an appeal to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as mandated by C.A. No. 141 inasmuch as the same had been acted upon by respondent Undersecretary Ignacio in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Lands and not as Undersecretary acting for the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued and executed. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have exhausted administrative remedies before resorting to the Court? HELD: Yes. The administrative remedies have been exhausted. Petitioners could not have intended to appeal to respondent Ignacio as an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. The decision being appealed from was the decision of respondent Hilario who was the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands. Said decision was made "for and by authority of the Director of Lands." It would be incongruous to appeal the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for the Director of the Bureau of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands. In any case, respondent Ignacio's official designation was "Undersecretary of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources." He was only an "Officer-In-Charge" of the Bureau of Lands. When he acted on the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration by affirming or adopting respondent Hilario's decision, he was acting on said motion as an Undersecretary on behalf of the Secretary of the Department. In the case ofHamoy vs. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, this Court held that the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may modify, adopt, or set aside the orders or decisions of the Director of Lands with respect to questions involving public lands under the administration and control of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. He cannot, therefore, be said to have acted beyond the bounds of his jurisdiction under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. 67. TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY 125 SCRA 302 FACTS: Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with nine others submitted their application in due form. The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension) Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director of Forestry .

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tan’s OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion. ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No) HELD: Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents-appellees, the failure of the petitionerappellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to exhaust his administrative remedies. When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the government the courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. The administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be reviewed and modified by them" 68. Calo vs Fuertes 5 SCRA 39929 June 1962 FACTS: In Cadastral Case No. 84, Butuan City entitled Francis C. Calo, claimant-contestant, vs. Delfin C. Fuertes, applicant-respondent, the Director of Lands rendered an opinion denying and dismissing former's claim and contest against the homestead application of Delfin C. Fuertes and ordered him to vacate the premises within 60 days from receipt of a copy of the opinion and stating that, upon finality thereof, the homestead patent would be issued to Fuertes. His request for reconsideration having been denied by the Director of Lands, Francisco C. Calo brought to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources the case, who modified the opinion of the Director of Lands, ordering Fuertes to reimburse Calo of the difference between the value of the improvements that the latter introduced on the land in controversy and the value of the consequential benefits derived by him therefrom. Still dissatisfied with the opinion, Calo appealed to the President of the Philippines, but withdrew it before the President could act thereon. He later filed in the Court of First Instance of Agusan a petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction praying that the enforcement of the opinions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources be enjoined among others. For failure to state a cause of action, for lack of jurisdiction and for not exhausting all the administrative remedies available to the petitioner in the ordinary course of law, the Court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the herein petition with costs against petitioner. The petitioner then appeals to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the appeal to the President is a condition precedent to the appeal to the Courts of Justice. HELD: Yes. The appellant’s contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of Lands, he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable. The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal because the appeal to the President is the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) last step he should take in an administrative case. Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. Therefore, the judgment appealed from had already become final and cannot be reviewed. The appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant. 69. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS vs. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 110526, February 10, 1998, MENDOZA, J. FACTS: On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut processing companies belonging to the APCD brought suit to enjoin the PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the establishment of new desiccated coconut processing plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were seeking permits to operate in areas considered "congested" under the administrative order. On November 6, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order and, on November 25, 1992, a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA from processing and issuing licenses to Primex Products, Inc., Coco Manila, Superstar (Candelaria) and Superstar (Davao) upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. Subsequently and while the case was pending in the Regional Trial Court, the Governing Board of the PCA issued on March 24, 1993 Resolution No. 018-93, providing for the withdrawal of the Philippine Coconut Authority from all regulation of the coconut product processing industry. While it continues the registration of coconut product processors, the registration would be limited to the "monitoring" of their volumes of production and administration of quality standards. The PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated coconut processing plants, prompting petitioner to appeal to the Office of the President of the Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the resolution in question. Despite follow-up letters sent on May 25 and June 2, 1993, petitioner received no reply from the Office of the President. The "certificates of registration" issued in the meantime by the PCA has enabled a number of new coconut mills to operate. Hence this petition. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated in the case at bar. 2. Whether or not PCA's Board Resolution No. 018-93 is null and void for being an undue exercise of legislative power by an administrative body. HELD: 1. No. The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek judicial review has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rulemaking or legislative power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine. The exhaustion doctrine stands as a bar to an action which is not yet complete and it is clear, in the case at bar, that after its promulgation the resolution of the PCA abandoning regulation of the desiccated coconut industry became effective. To be sure, the PCA is under the direct supervision of the President of the Philippines but there is nothing in P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 961, P.D. No. 1468 and P.D. No. 1644 defining the powers and functions of the PCA which requires rules and regulations issued by it to be approved by the President before they become effective. In any event, although the APCD has appealed the resolution in question to the Office of the President, considering the fact that two months after they had sent their first letter on April 26, 1993 they still had to hear from the President's office, meanwhile respondent PCA was issuing certificates of registration indiscriminately to new coconut millers, we hold that petitioner was justified in filing this case on June 25, 1993. 2. Yes. The power given to the Philippine Coconut Authority — and before it to the Philippine Coconut Administration — "to formulate and adopt a general program of development for the coconut and other palm oils

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) industry" is not a roving commission to adopt any program deemed necessary to promote the development of the coconut and other palm oils industry, but one to be exercised in the context of this regulatory structure. In plain disregard of this legislative purpose, the PCA adopted the questioned resolution which allows not only the indiscriminate opening of new coconut processing plants but the virtual dismantling of the regulatory infrastructure whereby, forsaking controls theretofore placed in its keeping, the PCA limits its function to the innocuous one of "monitoring" compliance by coconut millers with quality standards and volumes of production. In effect, the PCA would simply be compiling statistical data on these matters, but in case of violations of standards there would be nothing much it would do. At all events, any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. It would seem that instead of defending its decision to allow new entrants into the field against petitioner's claim that the PCA decision violated the guidelines in Administrative Order No. 002, series of 1991, the PCA adopted the resolution in question to render the case moot. In so doing, the PCA abdicated its function of regulation and left the field to untrammeled competition that is likely to resurrect the evils of cut-throat competition, underselling and overproduction which in 1982 required the temporary closing of the field to new players in order to save the industry. 70. MARIA NATIVIDAD VDA. DE TAN, petitioner-appellee, vs . VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION, respondent-appellant. EN BANC [G.R. No. L-12944. March 30, 1959.] FACTS: 1. That the petitioner is of legal age, a widow and a resident of the Philippines and that the respondent is a government instrumentality or agency, duly vested with authority to implement the provisions of Backpay Law, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 897, further amending Republic Act No. 304; 2. That the petitioner is the widow of the late Lt. Tan Chiat Bee alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese national, and bonafide member the 1st Regiment, United State-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines; died in a battle at Rizal Province; and certified by the Armed Forces of the Philippines as having rendered aritorious military services during the Japanese occupation; 3. That petitioner as widow of the said recognized deceased veteran, filed an application for back pay 4. The Secretary and Chief of Office Staff the Veterans Back Pay Commission sent a letter to General Vicente Lopez of the United States-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines apprising the latter that the Commission has reaffirmed its solution granting the back pay to alien members; the AFP certified certified that deceased veteran has rendered service as a recognized guerrilla 5. That after due deliberation respondent revoked its previous stands and ruled that aliens are not entitled to back pay; 6. That on February 13, 1957, the respondent Veterans Back Pay Commission, through its Secretary & Chief of Office Staff, made a formal reply to the aforesaid claim of the herein petitioner denying her request on the ground that aliens are not entitled to backpay; 7. That upon refusal of the Veterans Back Pay Commission the petitioner brought the case direct to this Honorable Court by way of mandamus; The trial court ordered respondent Commission to give due course to the claim of herein petitioner. Against the decision, the respondent instituted this appeal and it further contended by the Commission that the petitioner should have first exhausted her administrative remedies by appealing to the President of the Philippines, and that her failure to do so is a bar to her action in court.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: WON petitioner’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies bars subsequent action in courts HELD: ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; RULE OF EXHAUSTION NOT TO BE INVOKED IF PARTY IS IN ESTOPPEL. — The respondent Commission is in estoppel to invoke the rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared that the opinions of the Secretary of Justice were “advisory in nature, which may either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved party has the court for recourse”, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only a final judicial ruling in her favor would be accepted by the Commission. 71. CASTRO VS GLORIA GR NO. 132174; AUGST 20, 2001 FACTS: Porfirio Gutang, Jr. filed with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) a complaint for disgraceful and immoral conduct against petitioner Gualberto Castro, a teacher in Guibuangan Central School, Cebu. It was alleged that he has an illicit affair with Gutang's wife, petitioner's co-teacher at the same school. After hearing, the DECS rendered a decision declaring petitioner guilty. He was meted the penalty of dismissal from the service. The DECS Central Office affirmed decision. CASTRO filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of resolving the motion, the DECS Central Office directed the School Division of Cebu to comment on the motion. The School Division Superintendent recommended that the motion be resolved favorably. However, the recommendation was opposed by the DECS Region VII. CASTRO asked the incumbent DECS Secretary to resolve his motion for reconsideration. But his letters remained unheeded. Thus, he filed with the DECS Central Office a "Motion for Review Setting Aside/Modifying the Decision of Regional Director of DECS Region VII." DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria (respondent) referred the motion to the Regional Director of Region VII for comment. Regional Director Eladio C. Dioko issued a 2nd Indorsement sustaining the decision of Assistant Superintendent Concillo, thus: In his 3rd Indorsement, respondent Secretary denied petitioner' s motion for review. Thrice thwarted, CASTRO filed a petition for mandamus with the RTC, implored the reduction of his penalty from dismissal to (1) year suspension. His action, however, was dismissed on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, for failure to appeal to the Civil Service Commission before coming to the court. Hence, this petition for certiorari.||| ISSUE: W/N doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies should be applied in this case. RULING: No. While, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. It is settled that non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The doctrine, however, is not absolute. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) When the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small; 6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and 10) in quo warranto proceedings.|||

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to petitioner. But where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. In Cortes v. Bartolome, a case involving a petition for mandamus, we ruled that "while it may be that non-judicial remedies could have been available to respondent in that he could have appealed to the then Secretary of Local Government and Community Development and thereafter to the Civil Service Commission, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies need not be adhered to when the question is purely legal." This is because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility.||| It is settled that for a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well known. There is a question of law when the doubt or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or differences arise as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.||| In the case at bench, petitioner no longer disputes the administrative finding of his guilt for the offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct. It is settled and final insofar as he is concerned. What petitioner only impugns is the correctness of the penalty of "dismissal from the service." He is convinced that the proper penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspension from the service. Undoubtedly, the issue here is a pure question of law. We need only to look at the applicable law or rule and we will be able to determine whether the penalty of dismissal is in order.||| The penalty of dismissal imposed upon petitioner is reduced to one (1) year suspension from office without pay. In view of the length of time petitioner has been out of the service, we consider the penalty of suspension to have been fully served. He must, therefore, be REINSTATED to office immediately.||| 72. Cabada et al., v Alunan III et al.,G.R. No. 119645. August 22, 1996 FACTS: On 29 October 1993, a complaint against the petitioners for Grave Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was filed with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez. On 7 April 1994, the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 (Philippine National Police Eighth Regional Command ) handed down a decision finding the petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order No. 174, dated 23 April 1994, was issued ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the petitioners from the service. The petitioners claimed that they were not formally furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were able to secure a copy thereof thru their own effort and initiative only on 13 June 1994. However, they received a copy of Special Order No. 174 on 26 April 1994. Although they insist that the basis of the appeal before RAB 8 (Regional Appellate Board of the Eighth Regional Command) was Special Order No. 174,petitioner Cabada stated under oath in his Appeal filed with the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) that he in fact seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8, who, however, failed or refused to act on the said motion, and that he asked that the said motion be treated as an appeal to the RAB. In its decision of 15 August 1994, the RAB 8 affirmed the decision of the Regional Director. In its resolution of 25 October 1994, it denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of its decision. The petitioners received a copy of this resolution on 26 January 1995. Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the NAPOLCOM their Appeal dated 5 February 1995 and Petition for Review dated 4 February 1995, respectively.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In its decision of 24 March 1995, the NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners appeal and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction it appearing x x x that both the Decision and the Resolution of the Regional Appellate Board had long become final and executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed to decide respondents appeal within the reglementary period of sixty (60) days. In support thereof, the NAPOLCOM cited Section 23, Rule IV of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-002 and Section 5, Rule III of NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular No. 91-006, which provide as follows: Section 23. Effect of Failure to Decide Appeal. Failure of the Regional Appellate Board to decide the appeal within the reglementary period shall render the decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government. Section 5. Finality of Decision/Resolution. The decision of the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case shall become final and executory after ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the appellant, if no Motion for Reconsideration is filed within said period. A motion for Reconsideration may be filed by either party from a Decision rendered by the Regional Appellate Board on an appealed case, provided that the same is filed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the decision in question. However, only one (1) Motion for Reconsideration may be allowed. *The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this petition on the ground of prematurity because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they should have instead appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia, dismissal from office. ISSUE/S: (1) WON the NAPOLCOM committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course, for lack of jurisdiction, the petitioners appeal from and petition for review of the decision and resolution of the RAB 8; and (2) WON this special civil action was prematurely filed for failure of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies. HELD: 1. In light of the foregoing, the petitioners could properly invoke our original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annual and set aside the NAPOLCOMs decision of 24 March 1995. It being a patent nullity, the filing of a motion for its reconsideration before the institution of this special civil action may be dispensed with. If a RAB fails to decide an appealed case within sixty days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and executory, and the aggrieved party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the Secretary of the DILG. Likewise, if the RAB has decided the appeal within the sixty-day period, its decision may still be appealed to the Secretary of the DILG. In the instant case, Cabadas appeal was addressed to the Honorable Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government x x x as Chairman and Presiding Officer of the National Police Commission, while De Guzmans petition for review was addressed to the Honorable Secretary, Department of the Interior and Local Government and Chairman, National Police Commission, Makati City, Metro Manila. We consider the appeal and the petition for review as appeals to the Secretary of the DILG under Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990.

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Only the Secretary of the DILG can act thereon, one way or the other. The NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review, and just because both mentioned the Secretary of the DILG as Chairman or Presiding Officer of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM. The latter does not have such jurisdiction because Section 14 of the DILG Act of 1990 pertinently provides as follows: Functions of the Commission. x x x xxx xxx xxx (j) Affirm, reverse or modify, through the National Appellate Board, personnel disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed upon members of the Philippine National Police by the Chief of the Philippine National Police; (k) Exercise appellate jurisdiction through the regional appellate boards over administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. x x x This section clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate jurisdiction only on the following cases and THROUGH (a) the NAB in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or dismissal from the service imposed by the Chief of the PNP, and (b) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions on claims for police benefits. It has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB. 2. The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner De Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections 31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners claim in their Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. 73. Republic of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan, et al G. R. Nos. 112708-09, March 29, 1996 Facts: Petitioner PCGG issued separate orders against private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as SIPALAY and ALLIED) to effect their sequestration. Two (2) separate petitions were filed by SIPALAY and ALLIED before this Court assailing the sequestration orders. After the consolidation of these petitions and the filing of the comments, other pleadings and certain motions by the parties, this Court referred the cases to public respondent SANDIGANBAYAN for proper disposition, where SIPALAY's petition was docketed as S.B. 0095, and that of ALLIED as S.B. 0100. At the presentation of their evidence, PCGG Secretary Ramon Hontiveros appeared as the lone witness for SIPALAY and ALLIED. He produced and identified excerpts of the minutes of the PCGG meetings held on March 13 and 12, 1986 in response to a subpoena duces tecum. For the PCGG's part, its witnesses were Commissioner Dr. Quintin Doromal, former PCGG Commissioner Mary Concepcion Bautista, now deceased, and Atty. Benjamin Alonte, Director IV, Legal Department of the PCGG who headed the team that served the search and seizure order on ALLIED. Commissioner Doromal identified voluminous documents. Former Commissioner Bautista died midway her cross-examination. The PCGG almost failed to present Atty. Alonte, had the SANDIGANBAYAN not reconsidered its Order of March 8, 1993 declaring the cases submitted for decision after the PCGG was deemed to have waived presentation of its evidence for its

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) repeated postponements of the hearing. After Atty. Alonte's testimony and upon the PCGG's manifestation that it was no longer presenting any witness, the SANDIGANBAYAN gave the PCGG twenty (20) days (from July 1, 1993) within which to submit its formal evidence in writing. SIPALAY and ALLIED were given the same period (20 days) from receipt of such written formal offer of evidence within which to file their formal comments and/or objections thereto, and after which, the incident will be deemed submitted for resolution. What the PCGG filed on July 7, 1993 was not a written formal offer of its evidence as directed by the SANDIGANBAYAN, but a "Motion To Dismiss" the SIPALAY and ALLIED petitions. Admittedly, this motion to dismiss came nearly seven (7) years after SIPALAY and ALLIED originally filed their petitions before this Court on September 16, 1986 and August 26, 1986, respectively. The ground was SIPALAY's and ALLIED's alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The PCGG argued that SIPALAY and ALLIED should have first appealed the sequestration orders to the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking Sections 5 and 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations. An "Opposition" and a "Reply" were filed in relation to the motion Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan denial of motion to dismiss prosper? Held: Yes. Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action.. As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads (Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the defendant from filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of the proceedings when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action . . . Another equally forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss is that this case falls under two recognized exceptions to the general rule of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the SANDIGANBAYAN's brief but lucid disquisition on one exception merits this Court's approval. Two. The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative (sic) remedies does not apply to petitioners' case. This rule, which is based on sound public policy and practical considerations, is not inflexible. It is subject to many exceptions, to wit: (i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice . . there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGG's resolution to the Office of the President, as purportedly required by Section 6 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to have exhibited indifference towards petitioners' pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and search and seizure orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore intimated, is one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence, under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for seeking relief directly from the courts. The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., "where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine", consisting in the PCGG's being guilty of estoppel by laches which has just been discussed in great length. In answer therefore to the first key issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the PCGG's motion to dismiss was in order. 74. NATIONAL FOOD AUTHORITY and ROMEO G. DAVID vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. Nos. 115121-25, February 9, 1996, PUNO, J.

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FACTS: In 1990, the NFA, through then Administrator Pelayo J. Gabaldon, conducted a public bidding to award security contracts for the protection of its properties and facilities all over the country. Twelve security agencies were awarded one-year contracts, among whom were private respondents Col. Felix M. Manubay (doing business under the name Greenview Investigation and Security Agency), Continental Watchman and Security Agency, Alberto T. Lasala (doing business under the name PSF Watchman and Investigation Agency) and Norman D. Mapagay (doing business under the name People's Protective and Security Agency). In August 1992, petitioner Romeo G. David became NFA Administrator. He caused a review of all security service contracts, procedures on the accreditation of private security agencies and the bidding for security services. Pending this review, Administrator David extended the services of private respondents and the other incumbent security agencies on a periodic basis.The review was completed in March 1993 and new terms for accreditation, bidding and hiring of security agencies were made. The bidding areas were also reclassified and reduced from fourteen NFA regions to only five NFA areas nationwide. A special order was thereafter issued for the implementation of the new rules and procedure. On April 6, 1993, Special Order No. 04-07 was issued under which Administrator David created a Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) to undertake the prequalification of prospective bidders, conduct the bidding, evaluate the bids tendered and recommend to the Administrator the bids accepted. Notices for prequalification and bidding for security services were published in a newspaper of national circulation. All incumbent security contractors were required to prequalify and only those prequalified were to be allowed to participate in the prebidding and bidding scheduled on June 4 and 18, 1993, respectively. The prebidding and bidding dates were later reset to June 18 and 30, 1993 to give more time for the participants to comply with documentary requirements. Forty-one security agencies, composed of the incumbents and new applicants, including private respondent Masada Security Agency, submitted the necessary documents for prequalification. Upon a review of the documents submitted, the PBAC disqualified respondent Mapagay for failure to submit proof of his financial capability to support his bid. It also disqualified respondent Lasala for alleged failure to meet the five-year service requirement. Only respondents Manubay, Continental and Masada participated in the prebidding and were declared on June 17, 1993 prequalified to bid. Meanwhile, however, two of the applicants who failed to prequalify, namely Lanting Security and Watchman Agency and respondent Lasala to restrain Administrator David and the PBAC from proceeding with the public bidding. As prayed for, restraining orders were issued by the two courts on June 29, 1993 which the NFA received on June 30, 1993, the day of the scheduled bidding. No bidding thus took place on said date. On respondent Lasala's application, the trial court issued on July 20, 1993 a preliminary injunction ordering the PBAC to refrain from proceeding with the bidding until the merits of the case shall have been heard and resolved. During the effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction, Administrator David sent to all incumbent security agencies, including four of herein private respondents, notices of termination dated July 30, 1993. Private respondents were informed that their services were to end on August 16, 1993 inasmuch as their respective contracts had expired and they no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the NFA. They were thus instructed to withdraw their security guards from all NFA installations. On August 4, 1993, Administrator David contracted the services of seven new security agencies starting August 16, 1993 on a month-to-month basis pending resolution of the injunction against the bidding. ISSUES: Whether or not private respondents did not exhaust available administrative remedies thereby rendering their complaint premature and legally deficient to merit the grant of judicial relief. HELD: No. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents' contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements hired barely five days after their termination. Indeed, an appeal to the NFA

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 was not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The urgency of the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation of these negotiated security contracts. The Court is neither impressed by petitioners' claim that the subject contracts were negotiated as a necessity to stave off a crisis that gripped the NFA. Assuming arguendo that an emergency actually existed and the negotiated contracts were justified, petitioners' continued failure to conduct a public bidding and select the bidder within a reasonable time casts doubts on the good faith behind the negotiated contracts. This Court, on May 18, 1994, specifically ordered petitioners to conduct a public bidding and report the results within thirty days from holding thereof. In compliance, a public bidding was conducted on June 21, 1994 but until now no bidder has been chosen and no contract has been awarded. Petitioners' manifest reluctance to hold a public bidding and award a contract to the winning bidder smacks of favoritism and partiality toward the security agencies to whom it awarded the negotiated contracts and cannot be countenanced. A competitive public bidding aims to protect the public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages thru open competition. 75. DAR vs. APEX Investment and Financing Corp GR No. 149422 April 10, 2003 FACTS: Respondent APEX Investment owns several lots in Cavite. However, Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings over these lots pursuant to RA 6657. Copies of notices were sent to APEX Investment’s office. APEX however, denied having received these Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition. They learned of a lot (TCT No. T-90476) has been placed under the compulsory acquisition program, only from issue of the “Balita” and filed a Protest on the ground that their lots were classified as residential even before the effectivity of the law, thus, are not covered by R.A. No. 6657. Only after more than one year from said Protest was it forwarded to the DAR. In the meantime, APEX Investment’s title had been cancelled and a new one issued to another. Thus, APEX Investment filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, but DAR contended that APEX Investment failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. ISSUE: WON APEX Investment violated the principle of exhaustion of remedies HELD: NO. This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Records show that the PARO did not take immediate action on respondent’s Protest filed on January 12, 1998. It was only on February 15, 1999, or after more than one year, that it forwarded the same to petitioner DAR. Since then, what petitioner has done was to require respondent every now and then to submit copies of supporting documents which were already attached to its Protest. In the meantime, respondent found that the PARO had caused the cancellation of its title and that a new one was issued to an alleged farmer-beneficiary. In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, 6 we held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial process. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests. In the same vein, respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondent’s lots during the pendency of its protest. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that on the basis of the circumstances of this case, respondent need not exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition

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76. MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR) G.R. No. 190566, December 11, 2013, Villarama, Jr., J. DOCTRINE: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch which was operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident. On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino’s Branch Manager, Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-explanation. On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latter’s factual findings. In a letter-reply, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion. Subsequently, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is another Memorandum issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Human Resource and Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting on May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA. The CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. HELD: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days. There being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside. 77. Pagara v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96882, March 12, 1996 Facts: In 1967, private respondents acquired from Santiago Ceniza parcels of land, each with an average area of five (5) hectares, in Taguitic, Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur, evidenced by transfer certificates of title. Originally, the parcels were part of a large tract of land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-9515. The property was later subdivided into twenty-four (24) sub-lots under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-187203 which, on 10 September 1973, was approved by the Land Registration Commission. On 22 December 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform, through a certain Honorio Tequero, sent a telegram to private respondent Jorge C. Paderanga informing him that the several parcels had been placed under the Operation Land Transfer of the Land Reform Program of the government. In February 1974, a parcellary map was prepared by the Department of Agrarian Reform in collaboration with the Bureau of Lands. Forthwith, the parcels were adjudicated to private petitioners and corresponding OLT certificates were issued to them. Private respondents thereupon filed their complaint with the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Pagadian City and Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, vehemently contesting the issuance of the OLT certificates. On 23 October 1978, after the local agency had failed to act on the protest, private respondents elevated their case to the Minister of Agrarian Reform. The matter remained pending with the agency. On 03 September 1986, private respondents finally decided to file a complaint against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City to regain possession of the parcels of land, as well as for the annulment and/or cancellation of the OLT certificates, and for recovery of damages. Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint due allegedly to the failure of private respondents "to (first) refer the matter to the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Department of Agrarian Reform." The motion was denied by the trial court. Petitioners thereupon filed their answer reiterating, by way of affirmative defenses, the grounds that they relied on in their motion to dismiss. Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the case. (YES) Holding: Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 946, 10 promulgated on 17 June 1976, expressed the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. On 14 August 1981, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, also known as Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, took effect and vested on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions and special proceedings theretofore falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations. When, accordingly, the complaint was filed by private respondents on 03 September 1986, jurisdiction thereover was already and appropriately with the Regional Trial Court. Petitioners assail, nevertheless, the exercise of jurisdiction by the court a quo on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies and for failure to secure a referral from the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 12 of P.D. 946. The court, however, has correctly pointed out that — "The rule regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It is not applicable (1) where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, or (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or (3) where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him, or (4) where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, — Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, October 22, 1963, 9 SCRA 230; Abaya vs. Villegas, L-25641, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA; Mitra vs. Subido, L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127. "Said principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, (Cipriano vs. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291), when there is no due process observed (Villanos vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299), or where the protestant has no other recourse (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 637). "The foregoing jurisprudence when applied to the case at bar will point out that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. First, the issue of tenancy involves legal questions as 'tenancy is not purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenants does upon the land, but it is also a legal relationship' (Tuazon vs. Court of Appeals, 118 SCRA 484). Second, one of the principal respondents herein is the Secretary of Agrarian Reform who acts as the alter ego of the President, and whose act of issuing land transfer certificate is the subject matter of this case. Third, plaintiffs' claims of denial of due process in the issuance of the land transfer certificates finds merit in this case for it was only after the certificates were issued that they were able to protest. Finally, there is an exhaustive presentation of evidence that plaintiffs availed of the administrative processes, (testimonies of Attys. Jorge and Goering Paderanga and exhibits 'J,' 'K,' 'L,' 'L-1' to 'L-3' and 'L-4' to 'L-11' that fourteen (14) years had already elapsed and Department Secretary had not yet resolved plaintiffs' protest leaving plaintiffs with no other recourse but to seek the relief of this Court as there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law." 78. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Comelec [G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004] FACTS: Petitioners were participating bidders questioning the identity and eligibility of the awarded contractor Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) where the competing bidder is Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI) as signed by Mr. Willy Yu of the latter. Private respondent claims that MPEI is the lead partner tied up with other companies like SK C&C, WeSolv, Election.com and ePLDT. Respondent COMELEC obtained copies of Memorandum of Agreements and Teaming Agreements. ISSUE:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Whether or not there was an existence of a consortium. RULING: NO. There was no documentary or other basis for Comelec to conclude that a consortium had actually been formed amongst MPEI, SK C&C and WeSolv, along with Election.com and ePLDT. The president of MPEI signing for allegedly in behalf of MPC without any further proof, did not by itself prove the existence of the consortium. It did not show that MPEI or its president have been duly pre-authorized by the other members of the putative consortium to represent them, to bid on their collective behalf and, more important, to commit them jointly and severally to the bid undertakings. The letter is purely self-serving and uncorroborated. 79. PHILIPPINE SINTER CORPORATION vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO GR 127371 April 25, 2002 FACTS: President Corazon Aquino approved a Cabinet Reform Policy for the power sector and issued a Cabinet Memorandum, Item No. 2 of which provides: “The National Power Corporation (NPC) is no longer necessary in the franchise area of the specific utility or cooperative.” Pursuant to a Cabinet Memorandum, Cagayan Electric Power and Light, Co. (CEPALCO), grantee of a legislative franchise to distribute electric power to certain municipalities of Misamis Oriental, filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition seeking the discontinuation of all existing direct supply of power by the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) within CEPALCO's franchise area. After due notice and hearing, the ERB granted the petition and ordered all existing NPC direct supply of power to industrial consumers within the franchise area of CEPALCO to be discontinued. NAPOCOR filed a motion for reconsideration, which the ERB denied. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the motion for reconsideration filed by NAPOCOR with the ERB was out of time and, therefore, the assailed decision became final and executory. The SC affirmed the ruling of the CA. To implement the decision of ERB, CEPALCO advised Philippine Sinter Corporation (PSC) of its desire to have the power supply of PSC, directly taken from NAPOCOR, disconnected, cut and transferred to CEPALCO. PSC is an entity operating its business within the PHIVIDEC Industrial Estate located in Misamis Oriental. The Estate is managed and operated by the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA). PSC refused CEPALCO’s request, citing the contract for power supply with NAPOCOR was still effective for 3 years. PSC and PIA filed a complaint for injunction against CEPALCO which was granted by the RTC. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Hence, this petition. HELD: NO. The SC ruled that an injunction to stay a final and executory decision is unavailing except only after a showing that facts and circumstances exist which would render execution unjust or inequitable, or that a change in the situation of the parties occurred. Here, no such exception exists as shown by the facts earlier narrated. To disturb the final and executory decision of the ERB in an injunction suit is to brazenly disregard the rule on finality of judgments. To justify the injuctive relief prayed for, the movant must show: 1. The existence of a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and 2. The act against which injuction is to be directed is a violation of such right. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show any clear legal right which would be violated if the power supply of PSC from the NAPOCOR is disconnected and transferred to CEPALCO. Wherefore, the petition is denied. Decision of CA is affirmed. 80. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. FACTORAN GR 75501 September 15, 1987 FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Atlas Consolidated Mining registered the location of its “Master VII Fr.” With the Mining Recorder of Toledo City, while Private Respondent Asterio Baqueron also registered his “St. Mary Fr.” And “St. Joseph Fr.” mining claims. Later, Atlas also registered the location of its “Carmen I Fr.” to Carmen V. Fr.” with the same Mining Director. After a survey, Atlas filed an adverse claim against Baqueron’s mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims. After hearing, the Director of Mines ruled that Baqueron is given preferential right to possess, lease, explore, exploit and operate the areas covered by “St. Mary Fr.” and “St. Joseph Fr.” Mining claims, except the area covered thereby in conflict with Atlas’ “Master VII Fr.”. On appeal, Minister of Natural Resources ruled that St. Mary and St. Joseph mining claims of Baqueron are null and void, and that Carmen I to Carmen V mining claims of Atlas are valid and that it be given preferential right to posses, explore, exploit, lease and operate the areas covered thereby. Deputy Secretary, Office of the President, reversed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources and ruled in favor of Baqueron. Petitioner would like the Court to look into the finding of the Director of Mines because of the open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining conflict involving highly contentious issues which warrant appellate review ISSUE: WON the discovery of the disputed mining claims is a question of fact best left to the determination of administrative bodies HELD: Yes. The Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is subject to guide posts laid down by many decided cases. Thus for instance, findings of fact in such decisions should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when there has been denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collision of arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest. A careful study of the records show that none of the above circumstances is present at the case at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact by the Director of Mines which were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing principle that “in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing court cannot re-examine the sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned,” the findings of fact in this case must be respected. They will not be disturbed as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant. 81. Arboleda v. NLRC G.R. No. 119509 11 February 1999 Doctrine: The principle that factual findings of administrative bodies are binding upon the Court may be sustained only when no issue of credibility is raised. Thus, when the factual findings of the NLRC do not agree with those of the Labor Arbiter, the Court must, of necessity, review the records to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts Facts: Enrique A. Arboleda was an employee of Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for twenty-five (25) years. He served from 1963 to 11 February 1988 when he was dismissed by MERALCO under Sec. 7, par. 1, of its Company Code of Employee Discipline for misappropriating or withholding company funds. His record shows that he rose from the ranks to become branch clerk, and later, radio operator of MERALCO's Novaliches branch. On 21 October 1987 Atty. Anecito A. Mejorada of MERALCO's Special Presidential Committee wrote petitioner Arboleda notifying him that on 27 October 1987 an investigation would be conducted against him for misappropriation of FC bills, but petitioner sought a postponement of the investigation. On 7 November 1987 he was suspended pending his investigation. On 9 November 1987 the investigation proceeded with Juanito Rivera, Chief Steward and Vice-President of the employees' labor union, as petitioner's representative. In the investigation, Arboleda made a general denial about knowing Sy, "Adu" and "Mulong." He claimed that sometime thereafter Brigido Anonuevo went to his house bringing his Affidavit of Justification, Certificate of Attendance at a MERALCO Seminar and Sy's Affidavit of Desistance. On 21 November 1987 petitioner wrote the MERALCO investigators Jose Benalla and Eligio Reonal, Jr., informing them of the visit of Anonuevo and his wife to Sy's house along with Sylvia Cruz. Despite his suspension which lasted until his dismissal, petitioner continued to receive his salary of P11,332.50 from 20 December 1987 to 11 February 1988.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On 20 April 1988 Arboleda filed a case against MERALCO for illegal dismissal. He was subsequently sustained by the Labor Arbiter on three (3) grounds: (a) Sy's accusation against him was only prompted by Umali; (b) Sy's credibility was suspect since he was apprehended thrice for illegal use of electric current; and, (c) Sy's motive was malicious and his testimony was made only to save his own skin. Issue: WON the dismissal is valid Held: No. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Before an employee can be validly dismissed, the Labor Code requires the employer to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices: (a) a written notice containing a statement of the cause for termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires; and, (b) if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee, the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him, stating clearly the reasons therefor. This MERALCO more than substantially complied with when it notified Arboleda in a letter dated 21 October 1987 of the charges against him and of his right to be represented by a lawyer or representative, and when it gave him notice by letter dated 11 February 1988 of his dismissal and the reasons therefor. The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not connote full adversarial proceedings as elucidated in numerous cases decided by this Court. Actual adversarial proceedings become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon. In termination cases the settled rule is that the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer. Thus, MERALCO must not only rely on the weakness of petitioner's evidence but must stand on the merits of its own defense. 82. ASTURIAS SUGAR CENTRAL INC. vs COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS G.R. No. L-19337, September 30, 1969 Doctrine: Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state. Facts: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. exports sugar produced in Philippines. The sugar is stored in jute bags. Under Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, “xxx containers xxx which are, in the opinion of the collector of customs, of such a character as to be readily identifiable may be delivered to the importer thereof upon identification and the giving of a bond with sureties satisfactory to the collector of customs in an amount equal to double the estimated duties thereon,” On December 6, 1940, the Commissioner of Customs issued Administrative Order 389, in implementing Sec 23 of PH Tariff Act of 1909, which provided that “bonds for the re-exportation of cylinders and other containers are good for 12 months without extension,” In addition, Administrative Order 66 dated August 25, 1948 was issued to apply the same provisions to jute bags in particular. In 1957, the petitioners made 2 importations of jute bags. It was imported in compliance with the law. Quantity

Re-exportation

Special Import Tax Bond (SITB)

1st batch (entry 48)

44,800

P25,088

P2,464.50 (SITB 1)

2nd batch (entry 243)

75,200

P42,112

P7,984.44 (SITB 6)

However, only 8,647 of the first batch and 25,000 of the second batch were exported within the period of one year. The remaining 86,353 bags were exported after the expiration of the one-year period but within three

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) years from their importation. As a consequence of not selling within the one year period, the Special Import Tax Bond would’ve been due. On February 6, 1958 the petitioner, thru its agent Theo. H. Davies & Co., Far East, Ltd., requested the Commissioner of Customs for a week's extension of Re-exportation and Special Import Tax Bond 6 (SITB 6). They allege that the delay of exportation was due to typhoons and severe floods; picketing of the Central railroad line by certain union elements in the employ of the Philippine Railway Company, which hampered normal operations; and (c) delay in the arrival of the vessel which the petitioner was to ship its sugar which was then ready for loading. It was denied by the respondent Commissioner. On March 17, 1958, petitioners paid under protest the amount of P28,629.42, representing the customs duties and special import tax due thereon. Then, petitioners filed a petition for refund from the Collector of Customs (Iloilo) on grounds that the failure to export was due to force majeure. However, it was denied. The petitioners appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals was also denied. Issues: 1. W.O.N the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction" would apply 2. W.O.N the Commissioner of Customs has discretion to extend the period of one year Held: 1. No. Under the law, the doctrine of "judicial respect for administrative construction" would apply if statutory provisions in question have not yet been the subject of previous judicial interpretation. "Only where the court of last resort has not previously interpreted the statute is the rule applicable that courts will give consideration to construction by administrative or executive departments of the state." (Ahlers v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 264 NW 894) "The formal or informal interpretation or practical construction of an ambiguous or uncertain statute or law by the executive department or other agency charged with its administration or enforcement is entitled to consideration and the highest respect from the courts, and must be accorded appropriate weight in determining the meaning of the law, especially when the construction or interpretation is long continued and uniform or is contemporaneous with the first workings of the statute, or when the enactment of the statute was suggested by such agency." In this case, the doctrine applies because it is the first time that the Customs Administrative Order 389 is put in question. Considering that the Bureau of Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of our tariff and customs code, the construction placed by it thereon should be given controlling weight. 2. No. Section 23 of the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 and the superseding sec. 105(x) of the Tariff and Customs Code, fixed the period at one year the period within which the containers therein mentioned must be exported, but are silent as to whether the said period may be extended. In this case, the administrative orders, 389 and 66, in question appear to be in consonance with the intention of the legislature to limit the period within which to export imported containers to one year, without extension, from the date of importation. Otherwise, in enacting the Tariff and Customs Code to supersede the Philippine Tariff Act of 1909, Congress would have amended section 23 of the latter law so as to overrule the long standing view of the Commissioner of Customs that the one-year period therein mentioned is not extendible.

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LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

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THE CONCEPT OF PUBLIC OFFICE 1. SALVADOR C. FERNANDEZ and ANICIA M. DE LIMA, petitioners, vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, Chairman, and HON. RAMON B. ERENETA, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, respondents. G.R. No. 116418 March 7, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil Service Commission in Quezon City. While petitioners were so serving, Resolution No. 94-3710 signed by public respondents Sto. Tomas and Ereneta, Jr., Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Commission, was issued. Resolution No. 94-3710 effects changes in the organization, specifically in the Central Offices (The OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and OPR [Office of Personnel Relations] are merged to form the Research and Development Office (RDO)specifically) Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, alleging that petitioners had received Office Orders from the Commission assigning petitioner Fernandez to Region V at Legaspi City and petitioner de Lima to Region III in San Fernando, Pampanga and praying that public respondents be restrained from enforcing these Office Orders. The Court granted this Motion and issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue Resolution No. 94-3710 to the extent it merged the OCSS [Office of Career Systems and Standards], the OPIA [Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit] and the OPR [Office of Personnel Relations], to form the RDO [Research and Development Office] HELD: YES. Petitioners argue that Resolution No. 94-3710 effected the "abolition" of public offices, something which may be done only by the same legislative authority which had created those public offices in the first place. The Court is unable, in the circumstances of this case, to accept this argument. The term "public office" is frequently used to refer to the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by that individual for the benefit of the public. We consider that Resolution No. 94-3710 has not abolished any public office as that term is used in the law of public officers. It is essential to note that none of the "changes in organization" introduced by Resolution No. 94-3710 carried with it or necessarily involved the termination of the relationship of public employment between the Commission and any of its officers and employees. We find it very difficult to suppose that the 1987 Revised Administrative Code having mentioned fourteen (14) different "Offices" of the Civil Service Commission, meant to freeze those Offices and to cast in concrete, as it were, the internal organization of the commission until it might please Congress to change such internal organization regardless of the ever changing needs of the Civil Service as a whole. To the contrary, the legislative authority hadexpressly authorized the Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need [for such changes] arises." Assuming, for purposes of argument merely, that legislative authority was necessary to carry out the kinds off changes contemplated in Resolution No. 94-3710 (and the Court is not saying that such authority is necessary), such legislative authority was validly delegated to the Commission by Section 17 earlier quoted. The legislative standards to be observed and respected in the exercise of such delegated authority are set out not only in Section 17 itself (i.e., "as the need arises"), but also in the Declaration of Policies found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 1 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code which required the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency of the Government [to] establish a career service, adopt measures to promote — efficiency — [and] responsiveness . . . in the civil service . . . and that personnel functions shall be decentralized, delegating the corresponding authority to thedepartments, offices and agencies where such functions can be effectively performed. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 27 September 1994 is hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioners.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 2. Preclaro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 111901, 21 August 1995 Facts: Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical Mineral Division, Industrial Technology Development Institute, Department of Science and Technology, a component of the Industrial Development Institute which is an agency of the DOST. He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction undertook the construction. The structure is jointly funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments. While the said construction has not yet been completed, accused either directly requested and/or demanded for himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of the expected profit of the contractor. Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for committing said offense in relation to the performance of his official duties. Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a public officer because he was neither elected nor appointed to a public office, but merely a private individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a particular project and for a specified period. Hence the Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case. Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to “include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government…” Issue: WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by the government is a public officer. Held: Yes. The word “includes” used in defining a public officer indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms “classified, unclassified or exemption service” were the old categories of position in the civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission by the Administrative Code of 1987. A private individual hired on a contractual basis as Project Manager for a government undertaking falls under the non-career service category of the Civil Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b) of RA 3019. Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, non-career service in particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career Service It shall include Contractual personnel or those employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. 3. LAUREL vs. DESIERTO GR 145368 APRIL 12, 2002 FACTS: President Corazon C. Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 223 constituting a Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebration. The Committee was mandated to take charge of the nationwide preparations for the National Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos Congress. Subsequently, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order No. 128, reconstituting the Committee for the preparation of the National Centennial Celebrations in 1998. It renamed the Committee as the National Centennial Commission (NCC). Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel was appointed to chair. Presidents Diosdado M. Macapagal and Corazon C. Aquino were named Honorary Chairpersons. It is also characterized as an ad-hoc body and shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the Centennial Celebrations. It is also

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) tasked to prepare, a Comprehensive Plan for the Centennial Celebrations within six (6) months from the effectivity of the Executive Order. Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo 98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created. Laurel was among the nine (9) Expocorp incorporators, who were also its first nine (9) directors. Laurel was elected Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. On August 5, 1998, Senator Ana Dominique Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project and such was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation (The Blue Ribbon Committee) and several other Senate Committees for investigation. President Joseph Estrada created an ad hoc committee to investigate the project. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for the prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ of Dr. Salvador Laurel, chair of NCC and of EXPOCORP for violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of centennial contracts to AK (Asia Construction & Development Corp.); for exhibiting manifest bias in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to Proceed) to AK to construct the FR (Freedom Ring) even in the absence of a valid contract that has caused material injury to government and for participating in the scheme to preclude audit by COA of the funds infused by the government for the implementation of the said contracts all in violation of the anti-graft law. Petitioner Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of said office. Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because: (1) Expocorp, the corporation chaired by petitioner Laurel which undertook the freedom ring project in connection with which violations of the anti-graft and corrupt practices were allegedly committed, was a private corporation, not a government-owned or controlled corporation. (2) The national centennial commission (NCC) was not a public office. (3) Petitioner, both as chairman of the NCC and of Expocorp was not a public officer as defined under the anti-graft & corrupt practices act. Petitioner submits that some of these characteristics are not present in the position of NCC Chair, namely: (1) the delegation of sovereign functions; (2) salary, since he purportedly did not receive any compensation; and (3) continuance, the tenure of the NCC being temporary. ISSUES: (1) WON NCC is a Public Office (2) WON Laurel is a Public Officer HELD: (1) YES. The Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his Deputies as protectors of the people, who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Among the awesome powers, functions, and duties vested by the Constitution upon the Office of the Ombudsman is to [i]nvestigate any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. Neither the Constitution nor the Ombudsman Act of 1989, however, defines who public officers are. A definition of public officers cited in jurisprudence is that: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The characteristics of a public office, include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. The delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government as [t]he most important characteristic in determining whether a position is a public office or not.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer. We hold that the NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. Neither is the fact that the NCC was characterized by E.O. No. 128 as an ad-hoc body make said commission less of a public office. The term office, it is said, embraces the idea of tenure and duration, and certainly a position which is merely temporary and local cannot ordinarily be considered an office. But, says Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, -- it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer. (2) YES. Clearly, the NCC performs sovereign functions. It is, therefore, a public office, and petitioner, as its Chair, is a public officer. That petitioner allegedly did not receive any compensation during his tenure is of little consequence. A salary is a usual but not a necessary criterion for determining the nature of the position. It is not conclusive. The salary is a mere incident and forms no part of the office. Where a salary or fees is annexed, the office is provided for it is a naked or honorary office, and is supposed to be accepted merely for the public good. Hence, the office of petitioner as NCC Chair may be characterized as an honorary office, as opposed to a lucrative office or an office of profit, i.e., one to which salary, compensation or fees are attached. But it is a public office, nonetheless. A public officer, under R.A. No. 3019, is defined by Section 2 of said law as follows: SEC. 2. Definition of terms. As used in this Act, the term (b) Public officer includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph. Moreover, the question of whether petitioner is a public officer under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act involves the appreciation of evidence and interpretation of law, matters that are best resolved at trial. To illustrate, the use of the term includes in Section 2 (b) indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act is just one of several laws that define public officers. Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, provides that a public officer is: any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the Government of Philippines, or performs in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE SCOPE OF CIVIL SERVICE AND AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION 4. National Service Corporation v. NLRC GR. No. L-69870 Facts: Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming from her non-compliance with Lloren's memorandum, dated 11 October 1983, regarding certain entry procedures in the company's Statement of Billings Adjustment. Said charges alleged that Credo "did not comply with Lloren's instructions to place some

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) corrections/additional remarks in the Statement of Billings Adjustment; and when [Credo] was called by Lloren to his office to explain further the said instructions, [Credo] showed resentment and behaved in a scandalous manner by shouting and uttering remarks of disrespect in the presence of her co-employees." On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General Manager of NASECO, to explain her side before Perez and NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs in connection with the administrative charges filed against her. After said meeting, on the same date, Credo was placed on "Forced Leave" status for 1 5 days, effective 8 November 1983. The committee recommended Credo's termination, with forfeiture of benefits. On 1 December 1983, Credo was called age to the office of Perez to be informed that she was being charged with certain offenses. Notably, these offenses were those which NASECO's Committee on Personnel Affairs already resolved, on 22 November 1983 to have been committed by Credo. Respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which, on 28 November 1984, rendered a decision: 1) directing NASECO to reinstate Credo to her former position, or substantially equivalent position, with six (6) months' backwages and without loss of seniority rights and other privileges appertaining thereto, and 2) dismissing Credo's claim for attorney's fees, moral and exemplary damages. NASEC also argued that NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo’s reinstatement alleging that the terms and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Issue: WON the dismissal was proper WON NLRC has jurisdiction over NASECO Held: 1. No. In the case at bar, NASECO did not comply with these guidelines in effecting Credo's dismissal. Although she was apprised and "given the chance to explain her side" of the charges filed against her, this chance was given so perfunctorily, thus rendering illusory Credo's right to security of tenure. That Credo was not given ample opportunity to be heard and to defend herself is evident from the fact that the compliance with the injunction to apprise her of the charges filed against her and to afford her a chance to prepare for her defense was dispensed in only a day. This is not effective compliance with the legal requirements aforementioned. 2. Yes. the 1987 Constitution provides that: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter. The 1987 Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled corporations under the general corporation law. On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter. 5. JUCO V. NLRC FACTS: Benjamin C. Juco hired as a project engineer of respondent National Housing Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975, he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal w/ DOLE but his case was dismissed by the labor arbiter on the ground that the NHC is a government-owned corp. and jurisdiction over its employees is vested in the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision and remanded the case to the labor arbiter for further proceedings. NHC in turn appealed to the SC. ISSUE: Whether or not NHC, a GOCC without original charter, is covered by the Labor Code. RULING: YES. NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On June 1, 1990, respondent NHC filed its appeal before the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code. Hence, Article 277 of the Labor Code (PD 442) then provided: “The terms and conditions of employment of all government employees, including employees of governmentowned and controlled corporations shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations x x x.” The 1973 Constitution, Article II-B, Section 1(1), on the other hand provided: “The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision and instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.” Although SC had earlier ruled in National Housing Corporation v. Juco that employees of governmentowned and/or controlled corporations, whether created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the said Constitution now provides: The civil service embraces all branches, subdivision, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charter. (Article IX-B, Section 2[1]) From the aforequoted constitutional provision, it is clear that respondent NHC is not within the scope of the civil service and is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this board. Moreover, it is pertinent to state that the 1987 Constitution was ratified and became effective on February 2, 1987. 06. MATHAY vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR. vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION) G.R. No. 130214

FACTS:

August 9, 1999

Petitioner Ismael Mathay, Jr. was the former Mayor of Quezon City. In view of the enactment of City Ordinance No. SP-33, S. 92, creating an Electrical Division under the Engineering Department with thirty-six new plantilla positions to complement the staffing requirements, Petitioner Mathay appointed several persons to man the positions. One of those newly created positions was Electrical Engineer V, which required a Professional Electrical Engineer to fill it up and which became the subject of a heated competition by two licensed professional electrical engineers, Olegario S. Tabernilla and Jose I. Enriquez. Conformably to the long existing city policy of providing preferential consideration to Quezon City residents in the filling up of positions in the city office, the Personnel Selection Board of the city government recommended the appointment of Tabernilla, who had in his favor the advantage of being a Quezon City resident. Petitioner Mathay extended to Tabernilla a permanent appointment, which was approved by the CSC Regional Field Office Acting Director II, Ligaya I. Caya. Tabernilla thereafter took his oath of office and assumed the duties of his new position. Enriquez disputed the "promotional" appointment before the CSC, claiming it was issued in clear violation of CSC MC No. 42, s. 1991, which prescribes a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering as the educational requirement for the service-wide position of Engineer V. Tabernilla, a mere Associate Electrical Engineer and not a holder of a Bachelor's Degree, clearly failed to meet the qualifications of the position and, therefore, could not be validly appointed thereto. In its Resolution No. 95-1218, the CSC recalled and revoked the appointment of Tabernilla. Mathay moved for the reconsideration of the said Resolution, alleging that the Ordinance which was the law that created the office unequivocally specified a Professional Electrical Engineer as its only requirement; hence, the appointee needed only to comply therewith. Mathay thereafter filed a supplemental motion manifesting that under Republic Act No. 184, the educational requirement for admission to the Electrical Engineering Board Examinations is only two years of resident collegiate engineering training.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Since Tabernilla completed the two-year Associate in Electrical Engineering course and passed the board examinations, he was qualified for the contested position. Undaunted, MATHAY filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court contending that the CSC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition in a Resolution promulgated on 16 July 1997 "for being the wrong remedy and for being time-barred." Hence, this petition.

ISSUE 1:

Whether the Civil Service Commission has jurisdiction to recall appointments of public officers.

ISSUE 2:

Can Tabernilla be reinstated to his former position after his new appointment was revoked by the CSC?

RULING 1:

Under Section 12 (11) of Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," the CSC has the power to "[h]ear and decide administrative cases instituted before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its agencies and of the agencies attached to it." Moreover, Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws provides that notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled for "[v]iolation of other existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations." As held in Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission, the CSC is empowered to take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel actions and that such power "includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations." Accordingly, it cannot be said that the CSC did not have jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion in recalling the appointment of TABERNILLA, which was issued in violation of existing civil service rules prescribing a Bachelors Degree in Engineering as one of the minimum qualifications for the questioned position.

RULING 2:

Yes. Section 19, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, as well as Sections 43 and 48 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigations, specifically provides that in case the protest is finally resolved against the protestee, his appointment shall become ineffective and he shall be reverted to his former position.

7. University of the Philippines, et. al. vs. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. 132860, 3 April 2001 FACTS: Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is a Professor of the UPLB who went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he served as the Philippine Government official representative to the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the] Pacific (CIRDAP).When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire, CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave,vbut was denied. He was advised to report for duty and that if he failed to report within 30 days he would be dropped from the rolls of personnel. Dr. De Torres did not report to work. After almost five years of absence without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the Chancellor of UPLB that he was reporting back to duty. However De Torres was informed that in the absence of any approved application for leave of absence, he was considered to be on AWOL. Thus, he was advised to re-apply with UPLB. Dr. De Torres then sought for reconsideration with regard to said decision. Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report for duty. Members of Academic Personnel Committee, ACCI UPLB, requested the Civil Service Commission regarding the employment status of Dr. De Torres. The Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 stating that De

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989 since his request for extension of leave of absence for one year was denied. De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989, De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as ordered caused his automatic separation from the service. The CA upheld the decision of the CSC. ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic separation of Dr. Alfredo de Torres from the civil service due to his prolonged absence without official leave is valid HELD: The CSC predicated its ruling on Section 33, Rule XVI of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which was in effect at the time. The provision states: "Under no circumstances shall leave without pay be granted for more than one year. If an employee who is on leave without pay for any reason fails to return to duty at the expiration of one year from the effective date of such leave, he shall be considered automatically separated from the service; Provided, that he shall, within a reasonable time before the expiration of his one year leave of absence without pay, be notified in writing of the expiration thereof with a warning that if he fails to report for duty on said date, he will be dropped from the service." UPLB Chancellor had advised petitioner of the possibility of being dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for duty. This action constituted sufficient notice. The pivotal issue herein, however, is whether petitioner was indeed dropped from the service by the University. In the case at bar, however, Petitioner De Torres was never actually dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to return to work within a stated period. UPLB records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the contrary, UPLB records show Private petitioner was not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest governing body of UP. All these circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner from its employ. Thus, we hold that by opting to retain private petitioner and even promoting him despite his absence without leave, the University was exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or, more precisely, who may continue to teach in its faculty. Even in the light of the provision of the Revised Civil Service Law, the respondent CSC had no authority to dictate to UP the outright dismissal of its personnel. The former could not have done so without trampling upon the latter's constitutionally enshrined academic freedom. Moreover, in Chang v. Civil Service Commission, the Court stressed that "the CSC is not a co-manager, or surrogate administrator of government offices and agencies. Its functions and authority are limited to approving or reviewing appointments to determine their concordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Law." In short, on its own, the CSC does not have the power to terminate employment or to drop workers from the rolls. Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP. 8. Light Rail Transit Authority v Venus G.R. No. 163782 FACTS: LRTA entered into a ten year agreement for the management and operation of the metro manila light transit system with his co petitioner Metro Transit Organization. Such agreement was Metro would take over the authority of LRTA as to the management, maintenance and operation of the commissioned and tested portion of the LRT system. As well as, the hiring of employees and officers it deems fit to carry such task. Likewise to shoulder all of its expenses. Metro then entered into a collective bargaining agreement with Pinag-isang lakas ng Manggagawa sa Metro, Inc (PIGLAS-METRO, INC-NFL-KMU (union). On July 25,2000 or almost 16 years pass, the Union filed a notice of strike with the national conciliation and mediation Board. Due to the deadlock in the collective bargaining negotiation. Soon after, the Union picketed the various substation and turned off the power supply switches of different substation, paralyzing the operation of the entire light rail transit system. The secretary of labor then assumed jurisdiction and order the union to return to work immediately upon receipt of this order and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) for the company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prevailing prior to the strike. Secretary of DOLE then issued a return-to-work order which respondent failed to follow. METRO then fired all of those who strike for failing to return to work after the DOLE order therefore such workers abandon their job. Workers then filed to NLRC against LRTA and METRO for Illegal Dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC has jurisdiction on the case against LRTA and METRO? HELD: METRO: YES. Metro is covered by the Labor Code therefore NLRC has jurisdiction against it. METRO was originally organized under the Corporation Code, and only became a government-owned and controlled corporation after it was acquired by petitioner LRTA. Even then, petitioner METRO has no original charter, hence, it is the Department of Labor and Employment, and not the Civil Service Commission, which has jurisdiction over disputes arising from the employment of its workers. Consequently, the terms and conditions of such employment are governed by the Labor Code and not by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations LRTA: NO. The Civil Service Commission is the one who has jurisdiction over LRTA, this is for the reason that LRTA is a government owned or controlled corporation with original charter. Under Section 2 (1), Article IX – B, 1987 Constitution, expressly provides that "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters." Corporations with original charters are those which have been created by special law and not through the general corporation law ELIGIBILITY, QUALIFICATION, AND INHIBITIONS

9. [G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996] JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. [G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996] RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: Facts Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the 1995 elections. Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying for the disqualification of Frivaldo from seeking or holding any public office or position since he is not yet a citizen of the Philippines. Lee also prayed that Frivaldo’s COC be cancelled. The COMELEC granted Lee’s petition. Frivaldo filed a MR which was not acted upon until the elections, so his candidacy continued and he won the elections. Lee, garnering the next highest number of votes, filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon. Lee was then proclaimed Governor of Sorsogon. Frivaldo filed a petition praying for the annulment of Lee’s proclamation and for his own proclamation. The court granted Frivaldo’s petition. Issue W/N Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid and legal? Held Yes, Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid and legal. The factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. 10. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,1995 elections. However, his opponent, Raul Lee, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying that Frivaldo be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldo alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2PM, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under PD725 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. As a result, there wouldn’t be any legal impediment as to his proclamation as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon. In the end, the COMELEC ruled in favor Frivaldo but Lee filed a petition before the SC and as such a issued a resolution directing the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Frivaldo’s repatriation is valid and legal, thereby, curing his lack of citizenship to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor HELD: Yes, it is valid. The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials. In this case, Frivaldo has been declared a non-citizen twice and, thus disqualified to hold any office. However, this time he contends that he had successfully passed the thru the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under PD725. Lee, on the other hand, contends that such repatriation was tainted with serious defects such as that PD725 was effectively repealed by a memorandum issued by then Pres. Corazon Aquino directing the Special Committee on Naturalization to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within their functional area of responsibility. The Court ruled that such memorandum cannot be construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing the repeal of PD725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and that it may be express or implied. As to the contention that Frivaldo’s repatriation was only effective starting from the time he took his oath and not from the time of election. The Court ruled that under Sec. 39 of the LGC, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that of he be a citizen of the Philippines. It will be noted that the law did not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, and the purpose of this is to ensure that no alien shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory. Now, an official begins to govern or discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30,1995 – the very day the term or office of governor began – he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern. It should be noted that Sec. 39 of the LGC speaks of qualifications of ELECTIVE OFFICIALS, not of candidates. Literally, such qualifications – unless otherwise expressly conditioned – should thus be possessed when the elective official begins to govern. 11. MAQUERA VS BORRA G.R. No. L-24761 September 7, 1965 Republic Act No. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office COMELEC required all candidates for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives to file a surety bond. This, in effect, prevent or disqualify from running for President, VicePresident, Senator or Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although having the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore, cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property necessary for said counter-bond. ISSUE: WON imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office is constitutional. HELD: NO No property qualification of any kind is thereunder required. Since the effect of Republic Act 4421 is to require of candidates for Congress a substantial property qualification, and to disqualify those who do not meet the same, it goes against the provision of the Constitution which, in line with its democratic character, requires no property qualification for the right to hold said public office. 12. Flores vs Drilon G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 Facts: Petitioners, employees of the US Facility at Subic, Zamabales questioned or challenged the appointment of the Olongapo Mayor Richar Gordon as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) pursuant to RA 7227 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992." Under such law it provides that “the President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority...Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)." Petitioners contend that the said paragraph infringes some Constitutional and omnibus election provisions of the State: 1.) " No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position" 2.) Prohibited acts which lead to be guilty of an election offense, being appointment of new employees, creation of new position, promotion or giving salary increase during the period of 45 days before a regular election. The appointment of Respondent Gordon was within the 45 day period prior to the May 11 1992 Elections. Issue: Whether RA 7227 appointing Gordon as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the SBMA violates constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts? Held: Yes. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: “No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may service full time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public officer is a fulltime job.“

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Said section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, he should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without any distraction of other governmental duties or employment. Since this particularly what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of that imagination to conclude that the provision contravenes the Constitution. The first sentence appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other governmental posts except as particularly recognized by the Constitution. The Second sentence authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position. The distinction being clear from the deliberation of the drafters of the Constitution that the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph. 13. [G.R. No. 130872. March 25, 1999.] FRANCISCO M. LECAROZ and LENLIE LECAROZ, petitioners, vs . SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, while his son and copetitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz, and currently a member of its Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red won as the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e) of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019; the Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE WON an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. RULING The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. In the instant case, although BP Blg. 51 does not say that a Sanggunian member can continue to occupy his post after the expiration of his term in case his successor fails to qualify, it does not also say that he is proscribed from holding over. Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is appointed or chosen and has qualified. The legislative intent of not allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the law-making body favors the same. Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions. This is founded on obvious considerations of public policy, for the principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a hiatus in the performance of government functions. The Sandiganbayan maintained that by taking his oath of office before Assemblywoman Reyes in 1985, Red validly assumed the presidency of the KB upon the expiration of the term of Lenlie Lecaroz. It should be noted however that under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force, specifically Sec. 21, Art. VI thereof, members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths. It was only after the approval of RA No. 6733 on 25 July 1989 and its subsequent publication in a newspaper of general circulation that members of both Houses of Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Jowil Red before a member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was invalid and amounted to no oath at all. To be sure, an oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. Only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. Until then, he has none at all. And for as long as he has not qualified, the holdover officer is the rightful occupant. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an intruder and liable for encroachment of public office. 14. DUMLAO VS COMELEC 95 SCRA 400

FACTS: Petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Dumlao questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. "Sec. 4. Special Disqualification. — In addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XII-C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired." (Paragraphing and emphasis supplied) Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the other statutory provisions of BP 52 pertaining the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution. ISSUE: 1. Did petitioners have standing 2. Are the statutory provisions violate of the Constitution? RULING: 1. No 2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted. Petition granted Ratio: 1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites are present: - actual case and controversy - proper party - existence of a constitutional question a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question. b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes. c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that his suit be dismissed. However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent elections. 2. The legislature has the right to prescribe disqualifications n the same manner it can prescribe qualifications, provided that the prescribed qualifications do no violate the Constitution. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable. The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to politics. But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does it permit such denial.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those belonging to the same class. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies. Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious. That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that ". . . the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.||| 15. National Amnesty v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004 Doctrine: The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. A de facto officer derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. (He is) one who is in possession of an office and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent be not a mere volunteer. Facts: Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.[6] It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038. On September 1, 1998, the NGAO upheld the auditors order and notices of disallowance were subsequently issued.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Meanwhile, on April 28, 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was approved by then President Joseph Estrada on October 19, 1999. Section 1, Rule II thereof provides: Section 1, Composition The NAC shall be composed of seven (7) members: a) A Chairperson who shall be appointed by the President; b) Three (3) Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President; c) Three (3) Ex-officio Members 1. Secretary of Justice 2. Secretary of National Defense 3. Secretary of the Interior and Local Government The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor and the NGAO disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members representatives, to no avail. Issue: Whether or not Administrative Order No. 2 is valid? Held: No. The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions. First, the NAC ex officio members representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and authorizing additional compensation therefor. Second, the ex officio members representatives are also covered by the strict constitutional prohibition imposed on the President and his official family.Again, in Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from, collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem, honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA[17] and Bitonio vs. COA,[18] we upheld COAs disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per diems to the officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates. The agent, alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the ex officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover the ex officio member apply with equal force to his representative. In short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his representative likewise restricted. 16. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317 FACTS: Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows: Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor. Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two positions other than his primary position. Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or undersecretary, or assistant secretary. The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional. HELD: No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. Ratio: In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII. 17. Adaza v. Pacana, 135 SCRA 431 Facts: Petitioner, Homondo Abanza was the Governor of Misamis Oriental. Respondent, Fernado Pacana Jr. was the Vice-Governor of the same province. They were both elected in the January 30, 1980 elections. Under the law, their terms of office were until March 3, 1986. Both of them ran in the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections. Petitioner Abanza won a seat. On July 23, 1984, respondent Vice-Governor Pacana, took his oath of office to serve as governor of Misamis Oriental to fill the vacancy left by Abanza when the latter won a seat in the Batasan Pambansa. Petitioner Abanza contends that he is the lawful occupant of the governor's office since his term was until March 3, 1986. He contends that he did not abandon his post as governor citing the parliamentary systems of France, Great Britain and New Zealand, where a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. Furthermore, he contends that Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections. Issue: 1. W.O.N a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as Mambabatas Pambansa can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously 2. W.O.N a vice-governor can continue serving as such and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated. Held: 1.

No. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:

"Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. x x x" The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office."

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In this case, petitioner’s contention that no incompatibility exists in the nature of the two offices such as in other parliamentary systems of government is unavailing because it is the Constitution itself which provides the incompatibility. 2. Yes. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Vice governors were not explicitly mentioned since they were considered members of Sanggunian as shown by the exchange between Assemblymen San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said legislation. In this case, respondent reassumed his position as Vice-Governor. He is also the lawful successor to the governorship in accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the Local Government Code. "SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges: 1] x x x 2] He shall: a] Assume the office of the governor for the unexpired term of the latter in the cases provided for in Section 48, paragraph 16 of this Code;" 18. In Re: Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 Facts: Judge Manzano filed a petition allowing him to accept the appointment by Ilocos Sur Governor Rodolfo Farinas as the member of Ilocos Norte provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to a Presidential Order. He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial region and as a member of judiciary. Issue: What is an administrative agency? Where does it draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned? Ruling: The petition is denied. The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the Judiciary to any agency performing Quasi-Judicial or Administrative functions (Sec.12, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecomin g indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Notes: Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct & affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. “Administrative functions” as used in Sec. 12 refers to the Government’s executive machinery and its performance of governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Gutierrez: Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence “we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is purely advisory. A member of the judiciary joining any study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy litigants-or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation. 19. Laurel v. Civil Service Commission 203 SCRA 195 FACTS: Jose P. Laurel, the duly elected Governor of the Province of Batangas, upon assuming office on 3 March 1980, appointed his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Senior Executive Assistant in the Office of the Governor, a non-career service position which belongs to the personal and confidential staff of an elective official. On 31 December 1980, the position of Provincial Administrator of Batangas became vacant due to the resignation of Mr. Felimon C. Salcedo III. Allegedly for lack of qualified applicants and so as not to prejudice the operation of the Provincial Government, petitioner designated his brother, Benjamin Laurel, as Acting Provincial Administrator effective 2 January 1981 and to continue until the appointment of a regular Provincial Administrator, unless the designation is earlier revoked On 28 April 1981, he issued Benjamin Laurel a promotional appointment as Civil Security Officer, a position which the Civil Service Commission classifies as "primarily confidential" pursuant to P.D. No. 868. On 10 January 1983, private respondent Lorenzo Sangalang wrote a letter to the Civil Service Commission to bring to its attention the "appointment" of Benjamin Laurel as Provincial Administrator of Batangas by the Governor, his brother. He alleges therein that: (1) the position in question is a career position, (2) the appointment violates civil service rules, and (3) since the Governor authorized said appointee to receive representation allowance, he violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. He then asks that the matter be investigated. In his letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission dated 18 January 1983, Jose A. Oliveros, Acting Provincial Attorney of Batangas, for and in behalf of herein petitioner, asserts that the latter did not violate the provision prohibiting nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 because, with respect to the positions of Senior Executive Assistant and Civil Security Officer, both are primarily confidential in nature; and, with respect to the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) position of Provincial Administrator: Appointment is generally permanent, hence the officer appointed cannot be removed except for cause; designation is merely temporary and the new or additional powers may be withdrawn with or without cause. ISSUE: Whether

or

not

nepotism

applies

to

designation.

RULING: YES. The court ruled that petitioner could not legally and validly appoint his brother Benjamin Laurel to said position because of the prohibition on nepotism under Section 49 of P.D. No. 807. They are related within the third degree of consanguinity and the case does not fall within any of the exemptions provided therein. The exemption in the said section covering confidential positions cannot be considered since the said position is not primarily confidential for it belongs to the career service. Petitioner’s contention that the designation of his brother is not covered by the prohibition cannot be accepted for by legal contemplation, the prohibitive mantle on nepotism would include designation, because what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. His specious and tenuous distinction between appointment and designation is nothing more than either a ploy ingeniously conceived to circumvent the rigid rule on nepotism or a last-ditch maneuver to cushion the impact of its violation. Section 49 of P.D. No. 807 does not suggest that designation should be differentiated from appointment. Reading the section with Section 25 of said decree, career service positions may be filled up only by appointment, either permanent or temporary. Hence a designation of a person to fill it up because it is vacant, is necessarily included in the term appointment, for it precisely accomplishes the same purpose. *FOR REFERENCE: On 12 July 1983, the Civil Service Commission handed down the aforesaid Resolution No. 83-358 7 which, inter alia, revokes the designation of Benjamin as Acting Provincial Administrator on the ground that it is "nepotic", or in violation of Section 49, P.D. No. 807 on nepotism. The relevant portion of said section reads as follows: SECTION 49. Nepotism. — (a) All appointments in the national, provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited. As used in this Section, the word "relative" and members of the family referred to are those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or affinity. (b) The following are exempted from the operation of the rules on nepotism: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity, (2) teachers, (3) physicians, and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment shall be made to the Commission 20. Civil Service Commission v. Cortes, G.R. No. 200103, 23 April 2014 FACTS: On February 19, 2008, the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued Resolution A 2008-19 approving the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V) of respondent Maricelle M. Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent's appointment. In a Memorandum dated March 31, 2008, CHR Legal Division Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G. Lamorena rendered an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to assume her position because her appointment is not yet complete. On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not valid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under Section 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc. Respondent Cortes appealed the ruling of Director Cornelio but the same was denied on September 30, 2008. Consequently, respondent Cortes filed a petition for review on November 24, 2008 before the CSC. On

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) March 2, 2010 the CSC issued Resolution 10-0370 where it denied the petition and affirmed the nepotic character of respondent Cortes’ appointment. Respondent Cortes filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied in Resolution 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010. Consequently, CHR Commissioner and Officer-in-Charge Ma. Victoria V. Cardona terminated respondent’s services effective August 4, 2010. Respondent Cortes filed a Petition for Review with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA rendered its Decision granting the petition and nullified Resolution 10-0370 dated March 2, 2010 and 10-1396 dated July 12, 2010. The CA also ordered that Cortes be reinstated to her position as IO V in the CHR. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 10, 2012. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism. RULING: Yes. In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari. By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the present case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law. In her defense, respondent Cortes merely raises the argument that the appointing authority referred to in Section 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual Commissioners who compose it. The purpose of Section 59 on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. APPOINTMENT/ELECTION 21. Triste vs Leyte State Colleges GR NO. 78623 17 December 1990 Facts: In February 1986, there was a total revamp in the composition of the Board of Trustees of the Leyte State College. Among others, Dr. Purificacion M. Flores was designated officer-in-charge and later appointed as the new College President vice Magdalena S. Remo who retired as president of the college on May 1,1986. Anticipating moves to replace her as vice-president, on July 18, 1986, petitioner submitted to the Board of Trustees a position paper, asserting that the Board could not appoint a vice-president because the position was not vacant, the vice-president's term was not co-terminus with that of the recommending president who had retired, and the incumbent was not replaceable at the pleasure of the Board. In fact, she stated therein that she is qualified for the college presidency. Alleging that the appointment of Dr. Crescencia (Cres) V. Chan-Gonzaga to the position of vice-president in effect eased her out of said position. She contended that her constitutional and legal rights to security of tenure had been violated. She alleged therein that since her ouster as vicepresident, she had been demoted to the position of Director of Research and that the 20% salary increase granted to all academic personnel of government schools was not given to her because under the plantilla

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) approved by the Office of Budget and Management, her salary was reduced by one step since she was no longer the college vice-president. She argued that she was terminated and stripped of her rank and status without legal cause and due process; Private respondent, Dr. Gonzaga and public respondent, Dr. Flores contend that petitioner was merely "designated" and not "appointed" to the college vice-presidency. They aver that petitioner's "designation" to said position was "purely an internal arrangement which does not require the approval or confirmation by the Civil Service Commission." 19 They maintain that petitioner's term of office being co-terminus with that of the retired college president, petitioner may not complain that she was illegally dismissed from the vice-presidency. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was merely designated or permanently appointed Held: While in a line of cases, the term “APPOINT” applied to the nomination or designation of an individual. Common usage, however oftentimes puts a distinction in such that “APPOINTMENT” connotes permanency. While “DESIGNATION” implies temporariness. A public officer to another position may mean to vest him with additional duties while he performs the functions of his permanent office; or in some cases, a public officer may be “designated” to a position in an acting capacity 22. BINAMIRA vs. GARRUCHO (RAMON P. BINAMIRA vs. PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR.) G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramon Binamira was delegated as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) by virtue of the Communication dated April 7, 1986 sent by the Minister of Tourism, Jose Antonio Gonzales. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date. Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General Manager. This approval was given by the President on the same date. Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and ViceChairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government offices, including the Office of the President. He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho as the new Secretary of Tourism. President Corazon Aquino sent respondent Garrucho a Memorandum stating that “It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as General Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to serve in the said office in a permanent capacity.” Garrucho having taken over as General Manager of the PTA in accordance with this memorandum, the petitioner filed this action against him to question his title. Subsequently, while his original petition was pending, Binamira filed a supplemental petition alleging that on April 6, 1990, the President of the Philippines appointed Jose A. Capistrano as General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority. Capistrano was impleaded as additional respondent.

ISSUE 1:

Is the designation made by the Minister invalid?

ISSUE 2:

Can Petitioner Binamira claim for a security of tenure and be reinstated as General Manager of the PTA?

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) RULING 1:

Yes. Section 23-A of P.D. 564, which created the Philippine Tourism Authority, provides as follows: SECTION 23-A. General Manager-Appointment and Tenure. — The General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines and shall serve for a term of six (6) years unless sooner removed for cause; Provided, That upon the expiration of his term, he shall serve as such until his successor shall have been appointed and qualified. (As amended by P.D. 1400) It is not disputed that the petitioner was not appointed by the President of the Philippines but only designated by the Minister of Tourism. There is a clear distinction between appointment and designation that the petitioner has failed to consider. The designation of the petitioner cannot sustain his claim that he has been illegally removed. The reason is that the decree clearly provides that the appointment of the General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority shall be made by the President of the Philippines, not by any other officer. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was not possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. The appointment (or designation) of the petitioner was not a merely mechanical or ministerial act that could be validly performed by a subordinate even if he happened as in this case to be a member of the Cabinet.

RULING 2:

No. The petitioner's claim of security of tenure must perforce fall to the ground. His designation being an unlawful encroachment on a presidential prerogative, he did not acquire valid title thereunder to the position in question. Even if it be assumed that it could be and was authorized, the designation signified merely a temporary or acting appointment that could be legally withdrawn at pleasure, as in fact it was (albeit for a different reason). In either case, the petitioner's claim of security of tenure must be rejected.

NOTE: APPOINTMENT vs. DESIGNATION (delegation) Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature. Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named. 23. Costin vs. Quimbo [120 SCRA 159, G.R. No. L-32271, January 27, 1983] FACTS: Petitioner Estanislao Lajer was a member of the municipal police force of Abuyog, Leyte since Jan 1, 1949. He was extended a promotional appointment as sergeant of police on Oct 15, 1958. On Nov 25, 1959, the outgoing municipal mayor of Abuyog accorded him another promotional appointment as chief of police. This last appointment was not attested and approved as required by law. On Jan 14, 1960, the new municipal mayor dismissed Lajer and 8 other policemen and extended to respondent Higinio Verra a permanent appointment as Chief of Police. Verra’s appointment was eventually approved as permanent in accordance with Sec. 24 (b) of Republic Act 2260 by the Commissioner of Civil Service.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On Jan 19, 1960, Lajer, et al filed an action for mandamus (Civil Case No. 2713) against the mayor, treasurer and the municipal council of Abuyog, contesting their separation from the service. While this petition for mandamus was pending, there was a change in the admin as a result of the 1963 local elections. The newly elected mayor dismissed Verra and appointed petitioner Marcial Costin as chief of police. On Dec 29, 1964, Verra filed Civil Case No. 3606 for quo warranto with mandamus against Costin, the mayor, and the treasurer, questioning the legality of his separation alleging that he could not be dismissed because he was a civil service eligible and was in possession of a permanent appointment attested by the CSC. The mandamus suit (Civil Case No. 2713) filed by Lajer, et al prospered and was appealed to the CA. On Jan 22, 1966, CA held that Lajer and 2 others were illegally removed from office and are entitled to reinstatement with payment of the back wages. Thus, petitioner (then mayor) Tisado reinstated Lajer as chief of police on April 1, 1966. On Dec 2, 1969, respondent judge rendered his decision in Civil Case No. 3606, declaring Verra to be entitled to immediate reinstatement with back salary. Petitioners then brought this decision to the SC in a petition for review, seeking its annulment or reversal. ISSUES: 1. W/N the appointment of Verra to the position of Chief of Police of Abuyog was valid and consequently his removal therefrom illegal. 2. Whether the CA in its decision in the Civil Case No. 2713 ordered the reinstatement of Lajer to the position of Sergeant of Police or Chief of Police. 3. W/N Verra is bound by the decision of the lower court in Case No. 2713 for mandamus, not being a party to it. HELD: 1. No. The validity of Verra’s appointment hinges on the legality of Lajer’s removal. It is elementary in the law of public officers that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position, may be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The incumbent must first be legally removed or his appointment validly terminated. The lower court overlooked the fact that Verra could not have been permanently appointed to the position because no less than the CA had declared that his predecessor, Lajer, was illegally terminated from office and must be reinstated. Verra argues that Lajer’s appointment was temporary and terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power as it could not be considered final or complete, not having been attested by the prov. treasurer in accordance with Sec. 20 of RA 2260 and not having been certified by the Commissioner of Civil Service as provided for in Section 2(a) of Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules implementing Section 16(g) of RA 2260. However, said requirements could not be complied with because Lajer who have been appointed on Nov. 25, 1959 was replaced on Jan 14, 1960 by the new mayor who appointed Verra. Citing Dichoso vs. Valdepenas, SC stated that the incoming mayor should have awaited the action of the prov. treasurer and the Commissioner, before appointing his own protégé. Thus, Verra cannot rely on the absence of an attestation and certification because by the fact of Verra’s appointment, these requirements could no longer be fulfilled. Mayor Traya took the appointment away from the Office of the Prov. Treasurer and subsequently from the Commissioner before they could be acted upon. 2. Lajer was reinstated to the position of chief of police. Mr. Lajer did not go to court to contest the position of police sergeant. Lajer filed a petition for mandamus to be reinstated as chief of police. When the decision of the CFI of Leyte ordering Lajers reinstatement was appealed to the CA, the CA specifically described petitioner Lajer as chief of police. 3. Yes. The issue before the CFI and the CA in the Mandamus suit was WON the Mayor, Municipal council, Treasurer, and the Municipality of Abuyog illegally terminated the chief of police, sergeant, and six other members of the police and WON mandamus may issue to compel their reinstatement. Mandamus having issued,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) any person whether Verra or any other appointee to the contested position must give up the office in favor of the officer adjudged by the courts to be entitled to it. 24. Gayatao v Civil Service Commission 210 SCRA 183 FACTS: Private respondent Bayani Fernandez was holding the position of Customs Operations Chief I in the Bureau of Customs in a permanent capacity. He was assigned to the aircraft operations division and was later reassigned as acting chief of the export dicision at the NAIA. Commissioner Mison, purportedly acting pursuant to EO No. 127 implementing the reorganization of the Department of Finance, Bureau of Customs, appointed petitioner Gayatao then a Supervising Customs Trade Examiner to the position of Customs Operations Chief at the NAIA Customhouse. Thereafter, petitioner Gayatao was designated as COC of the Export Division at NAIA while private respondent was designated as Customs Operations Assistant Chief of the Aircraft Operations Division. Aggrieved by the actions of said commissioner, private respondent filed a letter of protest on May 18, 1988 before the Merit System Protection Board of respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) questioning the appointment of petitioner as COC and his demotion to the position of COAC. In assailing the action of the appointing authority, private respondent alleged in substance that (1) he was unjustifiably demoted since he had been holding the contested position prior to the reorganization; and (2) he is more qualified than herein petitioner. The CSC revoked petitioner’s appointment and directed the Bureau of Customos to appoint Fernandez. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent commission committed grave abuse of discretion in revoking the appointment of petitioner and ordering the appointment of private respondent in her place. HELD: NO. The CSC is not actually directing the appointment of private respondent but simply ordering his reinstatement to the contested position being the first appointee thereto. Further, private respondent was already holding said position when he was unlawfully demoted. The CSC, after finding that the demotion was patently illegal, is merely restoring private respondent to his former position, just as it must restore other employees similarly affected to their positions before the reorganization. It is within the power of public respondent to order the reinstatement of government employees who have been unlawfully dismissed. The CSC, as the central personnel agency, has the obligation to implement and safeguard the constitutional provisions on security of tenure and due process. In the present case, the issuance by the CSC of the questioned resolutions, for the reasons clearly explained therein, is undubitably in the performance of its constitutional task of protecting and strengthening the civil service. We find no reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the CSC that respondent Bayani I. Fernandez was illegally demoted. As earlier noted, private respondent was holding the position of Customs Operations Chief in a permanent capacity since 1984. His non-reappointment to that position amounts to a removal without cause from an office which has not been abolished nor reorganized. In the instant case, the guidelines and standards provided in those laws were not observed. The position of private respondent as COC of the Export Division was not abolished with the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. What happened was that another person, herein petitioner who is lower in rank, was appointed in his stead. Such fact is a clear indication of bad faith which would entitle herein private respondent to reinstatement pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6656. 25. [G.R. No. 114795. July 17, 1996] LUCITA Q. GARCES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION, respondents. Facts

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte, replacing Claudio Concepcion, who was transferred to Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Both appointments were approved by the CSC. However, Concepcion refused to transfer as he did not request for it. Despite Concepcion’s refusal, Garces was still directed by the Office of the Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post, but she was not able to do so since a Memorandum was issued by Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado prohibiting her from assuming office in Gutalac as Concepcion is still occupying the post. Garces filed a petition for mandamus and preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion. While the COMELEC issued a Resolution recognizing Concepcion as the Election Registrar of Gutalac and that the new appointments of Garces and Concepcion be cancelled. Issue W/N Garces has a clear legal right to the Gutalac post? Held No, Garces does not have a clear legal right to the Gutalac post. There are five grounds for separation or replacement of elective and appointive officials under Art. III Sec. 2 of the Provisional Constitution: a. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the Civil Service Law; b. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned; c. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions; d. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; e. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of the service. Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by Garces. 26. Lacson vs Romero G.R. No. L-3081, October 14, 1949 FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Lacson was appointed as the provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. Said appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and he took office on August 10, 1946. It was then recommended to the President of the Philippines that he be made the provincial fiscal of Tarlac. The president then nominated Lacson as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and respondent Honorio Romero was nominated as provincial fiscal of Negros. Both nominations were simultaneously confirmed by the Commission on Appointments but Lacson never accepted the appointment nor assumed the office of the fiscal of Tarlac. However, Romero took his oath of office and upon arrival at Dumaguete City, notified Lacosn of his intention to take over the office the following day. Twice Romero appeared before certain judges and twice Lacson objected to such acts and asked that Romero’s appearance be stricken from the record but eventually, that was denied. His request for the payment of his salary was also denied and it was Romero who was paid as provincial fiscal of Negros. Lacson then filed a petition directly to the SC praying, among others, the recognition of his right to hold and occupy the position of provincial fiscal of Negros Oriental. ISSUE: Whether or not Lacson’s position as provincial fiscal of Negros was made vacant upon his appointment in the same position at a different province HELD: No. The appointment to a government post like that of a provincial fiscal involves several steps to be complete. First would the nomination by the President. Then, to make said nomination valid and permanent, the Commission on

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Appointments of the Legislature has to confirm it. The final step would be made by the appointee himself – that is, whether he accepts it or not. In this case, since Lacson has declined to accept his appointment as provincial fiscal of Tarlac and no one can compel him to do so, no vacancy for his position was made, unless he had been lawfully removed as such. The removal cannot be made without valid cause even if the President and the Commission on Appointments concurred. Respondent’s contention that the power of removal is inherent in the power to appoint cannot be considered because there is a Constitutional limitation which fobids the removal of a civil service official of employee except for causes provided by law (Art. XII, Sec. 4; reiterated in Sec. 694(1) of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by CA No. 177, Sec. 122). 27. TOMALI vs. CSC G.R. No. 110598 December 1, 1994 On 01 July 1990, petitioner Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs ("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA Executive Director Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the duties and functions of the office four months later, or on 01 November 1990, at which time, the appointment had not yet been transmitted to the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") for approval. On 16 July 1991, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman, revoking the previous incomplete appointment of petitioner, appointed private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the position in question (DMO II). Petitioner, on 29 July 1991, sent public respondent OMA a letter protesting her replacement. On 01 August 1991, the Chief of the Human Resources Management Division of the OMA communicated to petitioner the disapproval/expiration of her appointment. Forthwith, private respondent took her oath of office and assumed the duties and functions of DMO II. On 12 August 1991, petitioner reiterated her protest. The Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), acting thereon, rendered a decision, dated 23 July 1992, dismissing the protest/complaint for lack of merit. MSPB held: Glaring is the fact that protestant's appointment to the contested position was not approved by the Civil Service Commission, hence, incomplete. In this regard, Section 11, Rule V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and explicit. Said provision reads, thus: Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission, within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance, which shall be the date appearing on the face of the instrument, shall be ineffective. As applied to the case of the herein protestant, it appears that the latter has no basis in law to cling to the contested position. Her prior continuous stay in office was at most by mere tolerance of the appointing authority. As her appointment is incomplete for lack of the requisite approval of the Civil Service Commission or its proper Regional or Field Office, no right to security of tenure as guaranteed by law and the Constitution attaches thereto or for incumbent to invoke. . . . . That being so, the proper appointing authority, in this case, the OMA Executive Director may, in the exercise of sound discretion, cancel or revoke the said incomplete appointment and appoint another person. The circumstance showing that the non-approval of protestant's appointment was due to the belated transmittal thereof to this Commission is of no consequence nor improve her lot as a holder of an incomplete appointment. There is no showing that the non-submission was motivated by bad faith, spite or malice or at least attributable to the fault of the newly-installed OMA Executive Director. Her request for reconsideration having been denied on 27 November 1992, petitioner appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-945, dated 12 March 1993, the Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, the instant recourse to this Court. ISSUE: WON petitioner was properly appointed. HELD:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) No. We fail to see any merit in the petition. An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed; thus: An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed; thus: Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions: (h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter. The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, among other things, provides: Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing to the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. . . . . Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully effective.Without the favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure. Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed the position four months after her appointment was issued or months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date of her assumption to office. The CSC, such as to be expected, disapproved the appointment in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807. It was well within the authority and discretion of the new OMA Director, therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such prerogative could not be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better qualified for the position. The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according to his best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should possess all the qualifications required therefor. There is nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner. In sum, we see no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents in their questioned dismissal of petitioner's protest. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No special pronouncement on costs. SO ORDERED. 28. Luego v. Civil Service Commission G.R. No. L-69137 August 5, 1986

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Facts: Luego was appointed Administrative Officer 11 (AO 11), Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent" but the CSC approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by Tuozo and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment CSC found Tuozo better qualified than Luego for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Tuozo be appointed to the position of AO 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Luego whose appointment as AO 11 is hereby revoked." Tuozo was so appointed by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. Luego, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now questiong that order and the private respondent's title. Issue: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? Held: No. The appointment of Luego was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. The stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY" did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly described as "Permanent" in the space provided for in Civil Service Form No. 33, dated February 18, 1983. What was temporary was the approval of the appointment, not the appointment it sell And what made the approval temporary was the fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and authorizing the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. It is understandable if one is likely to be misled by the language of Section 9(h) of Article V of the Civil Service Decree because it says the Commission has the power to "approve" and "disapprove" appointments. Thus, it is provided therein that the Commission shag have inter alia the power to: 9(h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional to positions in the civil service, except those presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. (emphasis supplied) However, a full reading of the provision, especially of the underscored parts, will make it clear that all the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on--or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the proper authorities. 29. EN BANC [G.R. No. 92403. April 22, 1992.] VICTOR A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and LEONARDA D. DE LA PAZ, respondents Facts: Petitioner was designated as Officer-in-charge of the Division Supply Office by the DECS Regional Director in view of the retirement of the Supply Officer I. Two years thereafter, the Division Superintendent of City

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Schools issued a promotional appointment to private respondent as Supply Officer I in the DECS division. The Civil Service Regional Office IV approved her appointment as permanent. Petitioner filed a protest with DECS Secretary questioning the qualification and competence of private respondent for the position of Supply Officer I. Finding the petitioner better qualified than the respondent, the DECS Secretary in a decision sustained the protest and revoked the appointment of private respondent, and petitioner was issued a permanent appointment as Supply Officer by the DECS Regional Director. Said appointment was approved by the Civil Service Regional Office IV. In an appeal to the CSC, public respondent CSC found the appeal meritorious, thus revoking the appointment of petitioner and restoring private respondent to her position under her previously approved appointment. In the case at bar, petitioner assailing the revocation of his appointment, invokes the rulings in previous jurisprudence that the CSC has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position for that would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. Issue: Whether or not appointment of the respondent can be revoked. Held: No.The Court ruled (Luego v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 69137, August 5, 1986, 143 SCRA 327, Central Bank v. CSC, G.R. No. 80455-56, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 744, Patagoc v. CSC, G.R. No. 90229, May 14, 1990, 185 SCRA 411), that the Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it (CSC) believed that another person is better qualified than the appointee for it would constitute an encroachment on the discretion solely vested on the appointing authority. The situation is different, as in the instant case, where the Civil Service Commission revoked the appointment of the successful protestant, petitioner herein, principally because the right to security of tenure of the prior appointee, private respondent herein, to the contested position had already attached. It must be noted that public respondent CSC did not direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. It merely restored the appointment of private respondent who was first appointed to the contested position. In consonance with the doctrine laid down in Villanueva v. Balallo, G.R. No. L-17745, October 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 407 that an appointment is complete when the last act required of the appointing power has been performed, but later qualified in Favis v. Rupisan, G.R. No. L-22823, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 190, that the acts of the head of a department or of􀁃ce making the appointment and the Commissioner of Civil Service acting together, though not concurrently, but consecutively, are necessary to make an appointment complete, the permanent appointment extended to private respondent, under the circumstances of the case, is deemed complete. As such, she is entitled to the protection of the law against unjust removal. It is well-settled that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing (Mitra v. Subido, G.R. No. L-21691, September 15, 1967, 21 SCRA 127. There is also authority for the rule that when the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has accepted the office and done what is required of him upon its acceptance, his title to the of􀁃ce becomes complete, and he can then be removed only in the regular

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) way. The appointing power can not effect his removal indirectly by rescinding or revoking his appointment after it is complete. There is thus reasonable ground for the rule that the moment the discretionary power of appointment has been exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, the said appointment cannot be revoked by the appointing authority on the ground merely that the protestant is more qualified than the first appointee, subject however to the condition that the first appointee should possess the minimum qualifications required by law. Otherwise, the security of tenure guaranteed by Article IX-B, Section 2 par. (3) of the 1987 Constitution would be rendered meaningless if the appointing authority is allowed to flip flop in exercising its discretionary power of appointment. 30. LOPEZ VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GR NO. 92140, FEBRUARY 9, 1991 FACTS:

Petitioner Reynaldo Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was appointed as Assistant Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal, Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 125, the Ministry, now DOTC was reorganized. Hence, the reduction of the number of Assistant Harbor Masters (now designated as Harbor Masters) in the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) from three (3) to two (2). A re-evaluation of the qualifications of petitioner Lopez, Luz, and Abellana was conducted by a placement committee of the PPA to determine who should assume the two positions. The PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, appointed petitioner Lopez as Harbor Master for the South Harbor after considering the evaluation conducted by the Placement Committee of the PPA the results of which reveal that petitioner was the most outstanding among the three. The evaluation was formally conducted and superseded the one earlier handled by a task force. It took into account the following: education and training; experience, physical characteristics and personality traits; and performance of each candidate. The records show that respondent Luz rated third. Luz protested Lopez's appointment after it was approved by the Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office, Guillermo R. Silva. The protest/appeal was denied by the PPA General Manager who explained that Luz was not qualified for any of the two slots according to the over-all standing of the contenders. Luz then appealed to the (CSC) which ruled that while the candidates were all qualified, "there was no finding who among the three contenders is considered the most qualified and competent to merit appointment . . ., the previous assessments of the candidates having been found defective and not in accordance with the law and implementing regulations." The CSC directed that `comparative assessments' be made by an appropriate Placement Committee. These assessments would then be the basis of the appointments. CSC denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the PPA and ordered the submission of the results of the reassessment. PPA submitted to the Commission the results of the re-assessment conducted by its Placement Committee which was reconvened for that purpose. The results explained that the Committee utilized evaluation instruments that have been validated for use in promotions to assess performance of the candidates, their education and training, experience and outstanding accomplishments.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Despite this compliance by the PPA, the Commission, found that the reassessment was not in order. It ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in the best position to assess the competence of the respondent and not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely a contractual employee and susceptible to partiality. The Commission stressed that the Placement Committee's current assessment ignored some of the performance appraisal ratings previously made on respondent Luz, as well as the PPA 201 files containing only Luz's record of achievements. Thus, it directed the appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the petitioner. Lopez now alleges that his constitutional right to due process of law has been violated because he was never informed or notified of the appeal of respondent Luz, the entire proceedings held on the case, and the resolutions of the Commission. He allegedly learned about the appeal only after being informed by the PPA that his appointment had been revoked and that respondent Luz was directed to assume the position.

ISSUE: W/N The CSC gravely and seriously erred in nullifying his appointment and instead substituting its decision for that of the PPA.

RULING: The role of the Civil Service Commission in establishing a career service and in promoting the morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil servants is not disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to the heads of departments or agencies of the government is not controverted by the respondents. In the appointment, placement and promotion of civil service employees according to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially where it is assisted by a screening committee composed of persons who are in the best position to screen the qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the integrity, performance and capabilities of the future appointees. The law limits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power of the appointing authority and to give to the Commission a task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of approving or disapproving becomes ministerial. The authority given to the Commission, therefore, is very far from a mere mechanical act in which no discretion or exercise of judgment is allowed. The Court has defined the parameters within which the power of approval of appointments shall be exercised by the respondent Commission. In the case of Luego v.Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission is actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the appointing authority. The Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority. (Central Bank v. CivilService Commission, 171 SCRA 744 [1989]). The Court is not the least bit convinced by the contentions of the public and private respondents. It is apparent from the records that the PPA disclosed all the instruments used, the limitations and the adjustments made to the end that the results would be fair to all the candidates alike. The hiring of an independent psychiatristconsultant, for instance, proves the inclination of the committee towards impartiality. More important, the Court emphasizes that the Commission has no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the Philippine Ports Authority when it comes to evaluating the performance, personality, and accomplishments of candidates who all have the necessary eligibility and legal qualifications. Petition granted, petitioner Reynaldo Lopez is declared to be entitled to the office in dispute.

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31. Civil Service Commission v. De La Cruz, G. R. No. 158737, August 31, 2004 Doctrine: It is elementary in the law of public officers that the power to appoint is in essence discretionary on the part of the proper authority. In Salles vs. Francisco, et al.,[18] we had occasion to rule that, in the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. Consequently, the appointing authority has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Judges should not substitute their judgment for that of the appointing authority. Facts: Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office, DOTC, presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. Respondent was promotionally appointed to the said position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). But prior thereto, he was a Check Pilot II in the Air Transportation Office (ATO).In a letter dated February 9, 1995, Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the promotional appointment of respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position. Issue: Whether or not the protestee meets the minimum experience requirements as of the date of the protestees appointment to the contested position. The contested position requires four years of work experience in position/s involving management per Qualification Standards Manual prescribed by MC No. 46, s. 1993 and/or four years of experience in planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools per ATO Qualification Standards Held: Yes. Petitioners insistence that respondent failed to meet the four-year managerial and supervisory experience requirement is misplaced. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term and/or means that the word and and the word or are to be used interchangeably.[7] The word or is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from another.[8] Thus, the use of the disjunctive term or in this controversy connotes that either the standard in the first clause or that in the second clause may be applied in determining whether a prospective applicant for the position under question may qualify. Respondent would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993. However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his appointment. These positions, spanning more than 13 years, in four of the five sections of the Aviation Safety Division of the ATO definitely met the minimum supervisory experience required of respondent for the position. Second, respondents promotional appointment was issued in accordance with petitioners selection process. Respondent passed the rigid screening of the ATO Personnel Selection/Promotion Board as well as the oral and written examinations of the DOTC Selection Board. Because of respondents excellent credentials, DOTC Assistant Secretary for Administrative and Legal Affairs Wilfredo M. Trinidad, chair of the Personnel Selection Board, strongly recommended his promotional appointment to the contested position. Third, respondents multifarious experiences and trainings[12] in air transportation were taken into account when he was chosen for the subject position. Respondent not only showed a continuing interest to improve his

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) expertise in the field of air transportation, he also acquired an Airline Transport Pilots License in 1998.[13] As a privileged holder of such license, respondent exercised administrative supervision and control over pilots, cabin and crew members to ensure compliance with air safety laws, rules and regulations. In addition, respondents dedication to the service was demonstrated by his conceptualization and establishment of the Airport Crash Rescue Organization (ACRO) procedure in various national airports in the country to ensure the security of both airport personnel and passengers. Respondent also organized the Air Transportation Office Operations Center which now provides air service assistance on a 24-hour basis. Because of respondents commendable performance, he was designated Chief of the Air Transportation Office Operations Center in 1993 per Office Order No. 178-93,[14] in addition to his duties as Check Pilot II. He was also designated Acting Chief, Aviation Safety Division, of the ATO per Office Order No. 211-93. 32. Anzaldo vs. Clave L-54597 15 December 1982 Facts Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II and directing the appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48. The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not filled up. Issue W/N Anzaldo was denied due process in appointment? Held Yes, Anzaldo was denied due process. Clave is not the one in authority to appoint Dr. Venzon, for such is the duty of the President of the Philippines. 33. ESPAÑOL v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: In September, 1986, the position of Regional Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, Regional Office No. 2, Cauayan, Isabela, became vacant. At that time, petitioner Perfecto Español was Chief of the Engineering Division, while private respondent Orlando L. Bulseco was Chief Design Engineer. In the organizational chart of NIA, the position of Chief Design Engineer is below the Chief of the Engineering Division, and the latter is considered next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager. Subsequently, Bulseco was appointed to the vacant position of Regional Manager pursuant to Resolution No. 5302-86 passed by Board of Directors, NIA. Petitioner Español filed his protest with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) alleging that petitioner is the employee next-in-rank and that he has promotional priority over Bulseco. MSPB referred the protest to NIA Administrator, who dismissed the same for lack of merit and on ground that after evaluation, Bulseco has advantage over Español on the factors of performance and potential. Petitioner appealed to MSPB, ruling that Bulseco exceeded the qualifications required however, by virtue of petitioner’s ranking in the organizational chart of NIA and pursuant to the Rules of Promotion of the Civil Service Commission, Español should thus be appointed to the position. Bulseco appealed to CSC, who reversed the decision of MSPM. ISSUE: WON the appointment of Bulseco is valid HELD: YES. Fundamental is the rule that appointment is an essential discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whom it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee shall possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. CSC has acknowledged that both parties were qualified for the position that recognition alone functus officio in the case and prevented it from acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the appointment made by the head of the office. In the case at bar, there is no dispute that both exceed the qualification standards for appointment to the position of Regional Manager. It is likewise not denied that, as originally found by the Administrator, Bulseco is more qualified. The fact alone that both contestants meet the minimum qualification required by law should have restrained MSPB from acting on, much less in granting, the appeal of petitioner except of course, to affirm the appointment of private respondent. Unfortunately, MSPB opted to disregard the choice made by the appointing authority and appointed Español instead, invoking the next-in-rank rule under PD 807 and CSC Resolution 83343. The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the department authority and not CSC. Given the demands of a certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied. CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the head of office in this regard.

34. [G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015] ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA- GARAFIL, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents. [G.R. No. 206290] ATTY. DINDO G. VENTURANZA, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, LEILA M. DE LIMA, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CLARO A. ARELLANO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL, AND RICHARD ANTHONY D. FADULLON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE OFFICER-INCHARGE OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, Respondents. [G.R. No. 209138] IRMA A. VILLANUEVA AND FRANCISCA B. ROSQUITA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents. [G.R. No. 212030] EDDIE U. TAMONDONG, Petitioner, v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondent. FACTS: Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President MacapagalArroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads: Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an exception to the ban on midnight appointments only "temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety." None of the petitioners claim that their appointments fall under this exception. To summarize, the pertinent dates for each petitioner are as follows: G.R. No.

Date of Appointment Letter

Date Transmittal Letter

of

Date Receipt MRO

of by

Date of Oath of Office

Assumption of Office

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 203372 (Atty. VelicariaGarafil) 206290 (Atty. Venturanza) 209138 (Villanueva) 209138 (Rosquita) 212030 (Atty. Tamondong)

5 March 2010

8 March 2010

13 May 2010

22 2010

23 February 2010 3 March 2010

9 March 2010

12 March 2010 4 May 2010

15 March 2010 13 April 2010

13 May 2010

18 March 2010 25 March 2010 and 6 July 2010

5 March 2010 1 March 2010

March

6 April 2010

15 March 2010

On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments. Even though the same issues were raised in the different petitions, the CA promulgated separate Decisions for the petitions. The CA consistently ruled that EO 2 is constitutional. The CA, however, issued different rulings as to the evaluation of the circumstances of petitioners' appointments. In the cases of Attys. Velicaria-Garafil and Venturanza, the CA stated that the OP should consider the circumstances of their appointments. In the cases of Villanueva, Rosquita, and Atty. Tamondong, the CA explicitly stated that the revocation of their appointments was proper because they were midnight appointees. ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution (Yes, they are midnight appointees) (2) Whether EO 2 is constitutional. (Yes, Constitutional) HELD: The petitions have no merit. (1) Yes, All of petitioners' appointments are midnight appointments and are void for violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the facts in all these cases show that "none of the petitioners have shown that their appointment papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued (and released) before the ban." The dates of receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the appointment papers by President Macapagal-Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the dissent both agree that all the appointments in these cases are midnight appointments in violation of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. (2) Yes, EO 2 is constitutional. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, appointment to a government post is a process that takes several steps to complete. Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a vacant office, the official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office. The President exercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate the exercise of the President's appointing power outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to exercise the power of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and disallows (subject to an exception) the President from exercising the power of appointment during the period covered by the appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the appointment process is admittedly required for appointments outside the appointment ban. There is no justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a requirement in the appointment process for appointments just before the start of the appointment ban, or during

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the appointment ban in appointments falling within the exception. The existence of the appointment ban makes no difference in the power of the President to appoint; it is still the same power to appoint. In fact, considering the purpose of the appointment ban, the concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly applied on appointments made just before or during the appointment ban. The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step. And, unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further distinguish between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an appointment is valid. Paragraph (b ), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end of his term. Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban. Petitioners have failed to raise any valid ground for the Court to declare EO 2, or any part of it, unconstitutional. Consequently, EO 2 remains valid and constitutional. Note: It is not enough that the President signs the appointment paper. There should be evidence that the President intended the appointment paper to be issued. It could happen that an appointment paper may be dated and signed by the President months before the appointment ban, but never left his locked drawer for the entirety of his term. Release of the appointment paper through the MRO is an unequivocal act that signifies the President's intent of its issuance. For purposes of verification of the appointment paper's existence and authenticity, the appointment paper must bear the security marks (i.e., handwritten signature of the President, bar code, etc.) and must be accompanied by a transmittal letter from the MRO. Note: Acceptance is indispensable to complete an appointment. Assuming office and taking the oath amount to acceptance of the appointment. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Excluding the act of acceptance from the appointment process leads us to the very evil which we seek to avoid (i.e., antedating of appointments). Excluding the act of acceptance will only provide more occasions to honor the Constitutional provision in the breach. The inclusion of acceptance by the appointee as an integral part of the entire appointment process prevents the abuse of the Presidential power to appoint. It is relatively easy to antedate appointment papers and make it appear that they were issued prior to the appointment ban, but it is more difficult to simulate the entire appointment process up until acceptance by the appointee. 35. Pamantasan ng Lungson ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court G.R. No. L-65439; November 13, 1985 FACTS: Dr. Hernani Esteban had been a permanent employee in the government service for twenty five (25) years. Sometime in 1973, Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-President for Administration in the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila. (He was initially extended an ad interim temporary appointment because at that time the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended which went on until 1975.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On July 26, 1975, Dr. Esteban discovered that he was not included in the list of employees recommended for permanent appointments. He wrote Dr. Consuelo Blanco requesting the conversion of his temporary appointment to a permanent one, considering his two and half (2½) years service. On July 26, 1975, Dr. Esteban received an answer to his request from President Blanco who indicated various reasons for her not acting favorably on his request. On August 1, 1975, Dr. Esteban received a ‘Notification of Ad Interim Appointment notifying him that the president of the university had approved his appointment as Professor III ‘effective August 1, 1975’. He was further designated as Director of the Institute of Continuing Education and Community Service likewise effective August 1, 1975. (He was supposed to be Vice President for Administration.) On August 7, 1975, Dr. Consuelo Blanco issued a memorandum circular terminating Dr. Esteban’s appointment as Vice-President for Administration effective July 31, 1975. His appointment dated June 26, 1975 and effective until June 30, 1976 had been withdrawn before it could be confirmed by the Pamantasan Board of Regents. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial court. ISSUE: Whether or not Dr. Hernani Esteban’s appointment as vice-president is considered a permanent appointment RULING: YES. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment, and its being subject to confirmation does not alter its permanent character. Not only is the appointment in question an ad interim appointment, but the same is also a confirmed ad interim appointment. In its Resolution No. 485, dated June 20, 1973, the Pamantasan Board of Regents verified respondent Esteban’s appointment without condition nor limitation as to tenure. As of that moment, it became a regular and permanent appointment. In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the Pamantasan President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee’s term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. Additionally, there is nothing in the Pamantasan Board of Regents’ Resolution No. 485 which suggests that respondent Esteban’s appointment was temporary. The Board’s action was to confirm or reject an existing ad interim appointment. If respondent’s appointment was intended to be temporary, it should have been expressly stated. It cannot be made to rest on inconclusive evidence, specially because a temporary appointment divests the temporary appointee of the constitutional security of tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil service eligible.” 36. Ulpian P. Sarmiento III V. Salvador Mison G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987 FACTS: Sarmiento seek to enjoin respondent Mason from performing the function of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Custom, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of Bureau of Custom is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. ISSUE: Whether or not such appointment must have the consent of the commission of Appointments? HELD: No. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are: First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The First group must have the consent of the Commission on Appointments while the second, third and fourth does not require to do so. Therefore the position of Commission of Bureau of Custom is not one of those within the first group of appointments where consent of the Commission on Appointment is required.

37. Bautista vs. Salonga [172 SCRA 169, G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989] FACTS: On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as acting chairman and on December 17, 1988 petitioner was appointed as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such. On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review. Consequently, CoA disapproved petitioner Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairperson of the CHR, likewise CoA denied the motion for reconsideration on the matter. Bautista filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the immediate issuance of a restraining order, to declare "as unlawful and unconstitutional and without any legal force and effect any action of the Commission on Appointments as well as of the Committee on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights, on the lawfully extended appointment of the petitioner as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, on the ground that they have no lawful and constitutional authority to confirm and to review her appointment. While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides "The Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their tenure in office shall be at the pleasure of the President" Thus, Bautista may be subsequently removed as well. ISSUES: 1. W/N Bautista's appointment is subject to COA's confirmation 2. W/N Bautista's appointment is an ad interim appointment 3. W/N EO- 163A is valid HELD:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 1. No. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7 of the Constitution, which provides that the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. Rather, it is within the authority of President, vested upon her by Constitution (2nd sentence of Sec. 16 Art 7), that she appoint executive officials without confirmation of COA. Ex gratia argumenti, that the Executive MAY VOLUNTARILY allow the CoA to exercise the power of review over an appointment otherwise solely vested by the Constitution in the President. Yet, when the President appointed petitioner Bautista on December 17, 1988 to the position of Chairman of the CHR with the advice to her that by virtue of such appointment (not, until confirmed by the Commission on Appointments), she could qualify and enter upon the performance of her duties after taking her oath of office - the presidential act of appointment to the position, was then and there, under the Constitution, a complete and finished act. The Commission on Appointments, by the actual exercise of its constitutionally delimited power to review presidential appointments, cannot create power to confirm appointments that the Constitution has reserved to the President alone. 2. No. Under the Constitutional design, ad interim appointments do not apply to appointments solely for the President to make. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the COA, cannot be ad interim appointments. 3. No. The Court found it extremely difficult to conceptualize how an office conceived and created by the Constitution to be independent as the Commission on Human Rights-and vested with the delicate and vital functions of investigating violations of human rights, pinpointing responsibility and recommending sanctions as well as remedial measures therefor, can truly function with independence and effectiveness, when the tenure in office of its Chairman and Members is made dependent on the pleasure of the President. Executive Order No. 163-A, being antithetical to the constitutional mandate of independence for the Commission on Human Rights has to be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits, privileges and emoluments of said office. 38. QUINTOS-DELES vs. COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS G.R. No. 83216 September 4, 1989

FACTS:

Sometime on April 6, 1988, Petitioner Deles and three (3) others were appointed as Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Article XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution. Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. transmitted by letter, the appointment of the said sectoral representatives to Speaker Ramon Mitra, Jr. On April 18, 1988, said sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths before Speaker Mitra, Jr. at the Session Hall of Congress after the Order of Business. However, the sectoral representatives-appointees were not able to take their oaths and discharge their duties as members of Congress due to the opposition of some congressmen-members of the Commission on Appointments, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the respondent Commission before they could take their oaths and/or assume office as members of the House of Representatives. This opposition compelled Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. to suspend the oath-taking of the four (4) sectoral representatives. In view of this development, Executive Secretary Macaraig, Jr. transmitted a letter of the President addressed to the Commission on Appointments submitting for confirmation the appointments of the four sectoral representative. Meanwhile, petitioner in a letter addressed to Speaker Ramon V. Mitra, Jr. appealed to the House of Representatives alleging, among others, that since 41 no attempt was made to subject the sectoral representatives* already sitting to the confirmation process, there is no necessity for such confirmation and subjection thereto of the present batch would certainly be

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) discriminatory." In reply, Speaker Mitra in a letter informed petitioner that since "President Corazon C. Aquino has submitted your appointment to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation in a letter. . . the Commission on Appointments now has sole jurisdiction over the matter." In May 1988, Petitioner Deles received an invitation to attend a Commission on Appointments Committee Meeting scheduled for May 12, 1988 for the deliberation of her appointment as sectoral representative for women. But instead of attending, she sent a reply explaining her position and questioning the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments over the appointment of sectoral representatives. Consequently, the Committee of the Constitutional Commissions and Offices of the Commission on Appointments, chaired by Sen. Edgardo J. Angara, the Committee ruled against the position of petitioner Deles. Hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus praying that respondent Commission on Appointments be enjoined from subjecting to confirmation process the petitioner's appointment as sectoral representative for the women's sector and as member of Congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the appointment as a Sectoral Representative for Women by the President pursuant to Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments to qualify a seat in the House of Representatives.

RULING:

Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, as follows: SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison) Nevertheless, there are appointments vested in the President in the Constitution which, by express mandate of the Constitution, require no confirmation such as appointments of members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts (Sec. 9, Art. VIII) and the Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI). No such exemption from confirmation had been extended to appointments of sectoral representatives in the Constitution. Petitioner was appointed on April 6, 1988 pursuant to Art. XVIII, Section 7 and Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, as evidenced by the letter dated April 6, 1988 of Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The reference to paragraph 2, Section 16 of Article VII as additional authority for the appointment of petitioner is of vital significance to the case at bar. The records show that petitioner's appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the appointment extended to her. The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process.

39. CALDERON v CARALE G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992 FACTS: Sometime in March 1989, RA 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), amending the Labor Code (PD 442) was approved. It provides in Section 13 thereof as follows: “The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the sector which nominated the predecessor. The Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters shall also be appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, and shall be subject to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.” Pursuant to said law, President Corazon Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. Petitioner insists on a mandatory compliance with RA 6715 which has in its favor the presumption of validity. RA 6715 is not, according to petitioner, an encroachment on the appointing power of the executive contained in Section 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the Mison and Bautista rulings are not decisive of the issue in this case for in the case at bar, the President issued permanent appointments to the respondents without submitting them to the CA for confirmation despite passage of a law (RA 6715) which requires the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of such appointments. The Solicitor General contends that RA 6715 which amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. Mison and Bautista laid the issue to rest, says the Solicitor General, with the following exposition: confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments – No. Whether or not Republic Act 6715 is constitutional – No. HELD: No. The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because: 1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and 2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with the President. Deciding on what laws to pass is a legislative prerogative. Determining their constitutionality is a judicial function. The Court respects the laudable intention of the legislature. Regretfully, however, the constitutional infirmity of Sec. 13 of RA 6715 amending Article 215 of the Labor Code, insofar as it requires confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over appointments of the Chairman and Member of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is, as we see it, beyond redemption if we are to render fealty to the mandate of the Constitution in Sec. 16, Art. VII thereof. No doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting en banc. The rulings in Mison, Bautista and Quintos-Deles have interpreted Article VII, Sec. 16 consistently in one manner. Can legislation expand a constitutional provision after the Supreme Court has interpreted it? The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied). The legislature cannot, upon passing law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am., Jur., 919, emphasis supplied). It cannot be overlooked that Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of such power of confirmation. The deliberate limitation on the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments over presidential appointments, embodied in Sec. 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, has undoubtedly evoked the displeasure and disapproval of members of Congress. The solution to the apparent problem, if indeed a problem, is not judicial or legislative but constitutional. A future constitutional convention or Congress sitting as a constituent (constitutional) assembly may then consider either a return to the 1935 Constitutional provisions or the adoption of a hybrid system between the 1935 and 1987 constitutional provisions. Until then, it is the duty of the Court to apply the 1987 Constitution in accordance with what it says and not in accordance with how the legislature or the executive would want it interpreted.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Therefore, Article 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect. 40. MANIEBO vs. CA

G.R. No. 158708 August 10, 2010

FACTS Justina M. Maniebo was issued a promotional appointment as Cashier III in the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro because she appeared to posses the qualifications for the position. But when the CSC Regional Office No. IV verified her name against the Masterlist of Eligibles, she was found out to have actually failed in the examination for obtaining a rating of only 60%. She was then charged with possessing of spurious report of rating, falsification, grave misconduct and dishonesty after having indicated in her Personal Data Sheet that she had passed the CSC (professional) examination with a rating of 74.01%. ISSUES: 1. Whether the CSC was correct in imposing the penalty of dismissal in view of the circumstances obtaining in the case? 2. Whether or not the petitioner had acquired civil service eligibility by operation of law under RA No. 6850 HELD: 1. Under Rule 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 197, dishonesty and falsification are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense. The use of a false certificate constitutes an act of dishonesty under Civil Service rules and the act of making a false statement in the personal data sheet renders a person administratively liable for falsification. 2.Petitioner has no basis in her contention that she could still be deemed to have acquired eligibility by operation of law under the terms of R.A. No. 6850, a law granting civil service eligibility to employees efficiently serving the Government for at least seven years; that she was already a civil service eligible as of February 8, 1990, the date of approval of the law, and was no longer dismiss from the civil service by then; and any defect in her appointment as a permanent government employee was cured by her acquisition of eligibility in 1990. R.A. No. 6850 was never meant to cure an appointment void from the very beginning for being based on a false representation of eligibility, like that of the petitioner. A contrary construction of the statute will, in effect, reward dishonesty Sec 1 and 2 of RA No. 6850 provide that not every temporary or provisional employee is automatically deemed to be a permanent employee after rendering at least seven years of service in the Government. The CSC still needs to evaluate whether the employee is qualified to avail himself or herself of the privilege granted by the statute. Moreover, that an appointee obtains a civil service eligibility later on does not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. A new appointment is still required, because a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment; the two are distinct acts of the appointing authority. Accordingly, any temporary employee who has served for the required duration of seven years must first be found by the CSC to continuously possess the minimum qualifications for holding the position, except the required eligibility, before he or she may be granted civil service eligibility. Among the minimum qualifications is the continuous observance of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees Besides, pursuant to Section 20, Rule VI of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Section 20. Notwithstanding the initial approval of an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following grounds. a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agencys Merit Promotion Plan: b) Failure to pass through the agencys Selection/Promotion Board; c) Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. Even an appointment initially approved by the CSC may be subsequently recalled when found to be invalid. R.A. No. 6850 was never meant to cure an appointment void from the very beginning for being based on a false representation of eligibility, like that of the petitioner ADDENDUM: the petitioner’s 20 years of service in the government was not considered as mitigating circumstance. The Court said the petitioner did not even owned up to her dishonesty, nor showed regret for it, hence, the State would surely face greater risks were she now allowed to continue in public office despite her having been found guilty of dishonesty. 41. De Castro vs. Carlos G.R. No. 194994, 16 April 2013 Facts: On 29 July 2009, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed petitioner as AGM0. His appointment was concurred in by the members of the Metro Manila Council in MMDA Resolution No. 09-10, Series of 2009. He took his oath on 17 August 2009 before then Chairperson Bayani F. Fernando. Meanwhile, on 29 July 2010, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued Office of the President (OP) Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2010, amending OP Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 2010. On 30 July 2010, Atty. Francis N. Tolentino, chairperson of the MMDA, issued Office Order No. 106, designating Corazon B. Cruz as officer-in-charge (OIC) of the Office of the AGMO. Petitioner was then reassigned to the Legal and Legislative Affairs Office, Office of the General Manager. The service vehicle and the office space previously assigned to him were withdrawn and assigned to other employees. Subsequently, on 2 November 2010, Chairperson Tolentino designated respondent as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of Memorandum Order No. 24, which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis. Thereafter, the name of petitioner was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning November 2010. Petitioner sought a clarification from the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) as to the proper classification of the position of AGMO. In her reply, Executive Director Maria Anthonette Allones (Executive Director Allones), CESO I, stated that the position of AGMO had not yet been classified and could not be considered as belonging to the Career Executive Service (CES). She further stated that a perusal of the appointment papers of petitioner showed that he was not holding a coterminous position. In sum, she said, he was not covered by OP Memorandum Circular Nos. 1 and 2. Petitioner was later offered the position of Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services and/or MMDA consultant. He turned down the offer, claiming that it was a demotion in rank. Issue: Whether or not petitioner Emmanuel A. de Castro is entitled to the position of AGMO Ruling: A perusal of the MMDA Charter readily reveals that the duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial functions. An AGMO performs functions that are managerial in character; exercises management over people, resource, and/or policy; and assumes functions like planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and overseeing the activities of MMDA. The position requires the application of managerial or supervisory skills necessary to carry out duties and responsibilities involving functional guidance, leadership, and supervision. For the foregoing reasons, the position of AGMO is within the coverage of the CES.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Entrance to different levels requires corresponding civil service eligibilities. Those at the third level (CES positions) require career service executive eligibility (CSEE) as a requirement for permanent appointment. Evidently, an AGMO should possess all the qualifications required by third-level career service within the CES. In this case, petitioner does not have the required eligibility. Therefore, we find that his appointment to the position of AGMO was merely temporary. Amores v. Civil Service Commission is instructive as to the nature of temporary appointments in the CES. The Court held therein that an appointee cannot hold a position in a permanent capacity without the required CES eligibility: We begin with the precept, firmly established by law and jurisprudence that a permanent appointment in the civil service is issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with law and the rules issued pursuant thereto. An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility. xxxx With particular reference to positions in the career executive service (CES), the requisite civil service eligibility is acquired upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board and the subsequent conferment of such eligibility upon passing the examinations. Once a person acquires eligibility, he either earns the status of a permanent appointee to the CES position to which he has previously been appointed, or he becomes qualified for a permanent appointment to that position provided only that he also possesses all the other qualifications for the position. Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. Petitioner does not possess such eligibility, however, it cannot be said that his appointment to the position was permanent. Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. This rule, according to De Leon v. Court of Appeals, Dimayuga v. Benedicto, Caringal v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and Achacoso v. Macaraig, is invariable even though the given appointment may have been designated as permanent by the appointing authority. Even granting for the sake of argument that the position of AGMO is yet to be classified by the CESB, petitioner’s appointment is still deemed coterminous pursuant to CESB Resolution No. 945 issued on 14 June 2011, which reads: xxxx WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Board RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, to issue the following guidelines to clarify the policy on the coverage of CES and its classification: 1. For career service positions requiring Presidential appointments expressly enumerated under Section 7(3), Chapter 2, Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 namely: Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, and Chief of Department Service, no classification of position is necessary to place them under the coverage of the CES, except if they belong to Project Offices, in which case a position classification is required, in consultation with the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). 2. For positions requiring Presidential appointments other than those enumerated above, a classification of positions is necessary which shall be conducted by the Board, upon request of the head of office of the government department/agency concerned, to place them under the coverage of the CES provided they comply with the following criteria: i.) The position is a career position; ii.) The position is above division chief level; and, iii.)The duties and responsibilities of the position require the performance of executive and managerial functions. All appointments to positions which have not been previously classified as part of the CES would be deemed coterminus with the appointing authority. (Emphasis supplied)

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Therefore, considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino. Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial. 42. Marohombsar vs Alonto G.R. No. 93711, February 25, 1991 FACTS: Petitioner Emily Marohombsar was designated as officer-in-charge of the Office of Vice Vhancellor for Academic Affairs (OVCAA) of Mindanao State University (MSU) in a concurrent capacity with her position then as Vice President for External Studies. The Office of the VP for External Studies was then merged with the OVCAA and as a result, the functions of the former were to be exercised by the latter. Marohombsar was appointed acting Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs which was approved by the Board of Regents of MSU. Respondent Ahmad Alonto, MSU president informed Marohombsar that he has decided to tap her as VP for Academic Affairs, which position is under his administrative staff. She respectfully declined the offer since she has already started several projects in the OVCAA which she wants to see through. Alonto then designated Corazon Batara as OIC of the OVCAA. Marohombsar now assails to the Court her removal as Vice Chancellor by Alonto. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Marohombsar may be removed from office even without cause HELD: No. Petitioner asserts that her appointment was permanent, thus, she can be removed only after hearing and for a cause. The Court took time to explain that a bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in character and the holder of such appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause. It is a stop gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until a permanent appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen. A person who accepts an appointment in such capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation and who acts thereunder for a considerable time cannot latter be heard to say that the appointment was, in reality, permanent and therefore there can be no removal except for a cause. However, the appointing power cannot use the principle of temporary appointment to evade or avoid the security of tenure principle in the Constitution and the Civil Service Law. In this case, the intent to make Marohombsar serve at the pleasure of Alonto is obvious. She is a career official of MSU for over 27 years. The effect of the merger of the two offices was to abolish petitioner’s permanent office and give her a temporary appointment in the supposedly new office which replaced or absorbed the former office. Another result was the loss by the petitioner of her permanent status. The Court also distinguished between the power to designate and power to appoint as provided by the Code of Governance of the MSU. The power to designate is vested in the MSU President and such designation must be less than a year. It must also be reported to the Board of Regents at the next regular meeting. If no permanent appointment was made, another designation must be issued. On the other hand, the power to appoint rests with the Board of Regents. When the Board of Regents confirmed petitioner’s appointment, it was acting on an ad interim appointment effected by the President. If it was a mere designation, it needs no confirmation. An ad interim appointment is one made during the time when the appointing or confirming body is not in session and there is an existing clear and present urgency caused by an impending obstruction of the functions assigned to the office if no immediate appointment is made. In this case, the abolition and merger of the Office of the VP for External Affairs with the OVCAA was an ad interim appointment. The respondent cannot use the device of an

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ambiguous designation to go around the security of tenure principle. Under the MSU Code, a designation requires a fixed period of not less than one year. The petitioner’s appointment was indefinite. Petitioner shall remain as the lawful occupant in a permanent capacity of the position of Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs of MSU until the end of her term or her tenure is otherwise lawfully terminated. 43. G.R. No. 104639 July 14, 1995 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR through its GOVERNOR, SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and PROVINCIAL TREASURER, petitioner, Vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TITO B. DATO, respondent. FACTS: On January 1, 1960, private respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Private Agent by the then governor of Camarines Sur, Apolonio Maleniza. On October 12, 1972, he was promoted and was appointed Assistant Provincial warden by then Governor Felix Alfelor, Sr. Because he had no civil service eligibility for the position he was appointed to, Dato could not be legally extended a permanent appointment. Hence, what was extended to him was only a temporary appointment. Thereafter, the temporary appointment was renewed annually. On January 1, 1974, Governor Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was appointed to. His appointment therefore remained temporary. Thereafter, no other appointment was extended to him. On March 16, 1976, Dato was indefinitely suspended by Governor Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him and a prison guard for allegedly conniving and/or consenting to evasion of sentence of some detention prisoners who escaped from confinement. Two years after, the request for change of status was made, Mr. Lope B. Rama, head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission, wrote the Governor of Camarines Sur a letter informing him that the status of Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having passed the examination for Supervising Security Guard. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974, the date of release of said examination. In the meantime, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, suppressed the appropriation for the position of Assistant Provincial Warden and deleted private respondent's name from the petitioner's plantilla. Dato was subsequently acquitted of the charges against him. Consequently, he requested the Governor for reinstatement and backwages. His request was not heeded. He then files an action before the RTC. RTC: Ordered te payment of backwages equivalent to 5 years. CA: Affirmed RTC’s Decision. ISSUE: Whether or not Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976 HELD: No. Private respondent does not dispute the fact that at the time he was appointed Assistant Provincial Warden on January 1, 1974, he had not yet qualified in an appropriate examination for the aforementioned position. Such lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In cases such as the one at bench, what is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority.

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44. Department of Labor and Employment v. Maceda G.R. No. 185112. January 18, 2010 Facts: Maceda, a deck marine officer, joined the National Maritime Polytechnic (NMP), a government school, with a permanent appointment as Instructor I. He rose to the permanent positions of Assistant Professor I and later Associate Professor I. He studied law in the meantime and passed the bar in 1996. In 1998, the NMP again promoted respondent Maceda to the rank of Professor I but this time under a mere temporary appointment. He subsequently wrote the NMP Executive Director, submitting justifications for changing his temporary status to a permanent one. Yearly, from January 7, 2000 to January 7, 2003, the NMP renewed Maceda’s temporary appointment as Professor I. In 2002 the NMP completed the revision of the Qualification Standard (QS) for its staff. Maceda claimed, however, that nothing has since been heard of that revised QS after the NMP submitted the same to the CSC for approval. Later on the Human Resources Management of NMP wrote Maceda, advising him that the school would be putting him under contractual employment until such time as the CSC shall have already approved the NMP Maritime Training Revised Qualification Standard. NMP Executive Director Devanadera, wrote Maceda, informing him that his temporary appointment as Professor I was being renewed and that the succeeding renewal of his appointment would be subject to his meeting the requirements of the position. On December 23, 2003, the NMP OIC wrote Maceda, informing him that his appointment as Professor I would be renewed on contractual status effective from January 5 to June 30, 2004. Maceda agreed and signed a contract of employment on January 5, 2004. On the same date, however, Maceda filed a complaint with the CSC regarding his demotion in employment status. The Administrative Office of the CSC regional office convinced him, however, that the renewal of the appointments of temporary employees is a prerogative of the head of the agency. NMP OIC informed Maceda that, on instructions from Devanadera, he was not to report for work anymore on the following day. Maceda charged Devanadera and NMP before the DOLE of oppression leading to his illegal termination however the DOLE Secretary dismissed his complaint. Maceda then appealed to the CSC but the latter dismissed the same for lack of jurisdiction, pointing out that, since Devanadera was a presidential appointee, the power to discipline him belonged to the President. Maceda filed an MR but the CSC denied the same. The CSC held that, as a holder of a temporary and contractual employment, Maceda did not enjoy security of tenure. The CSC further held that it was his fault that he did not take steps to remedy his deficiency, namely, a shipboard experience on license, after holding the position of Professor I for five years. This prompted Maceda to seek recourse with the CA. The CA rendered a decision, granting the petition, ordering the NMP to reinstate Maceda to his previous position as Professor I, and directing it to pay his salary and other benefits from July 1, 2004 until he is reinstated. The DOLE and the NMP moved for reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied the same, hence, this petition. Issue: Whether NMP illegally terminated Maceda from his employment? Held: No. The CA erred when it pointed out that the NMP ignored Macedas solid work, expertise, and experience when it said that he was not qualified to become a permanent professor. But Macedas so-called

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) accomplishments cannot count for much where, as in this case, do not in fact meet the uniform standards set by the school for its permanent professors. The CA was also wrong when it be said that the NMP did not give Maceda sufficient leeway to meet those standards. The CA’s finding that the NMP disregarded Macedas request that he be allowed to avail himself of the schools training privileges, so he could comply with the requirements of the Shipboard Rotation Scheme, is not supported by evidence. Devanadera approved Macedas request through his a memorandum order. Maceda simply did not avail himself of the schools Shipboard Rotation Scheme nor submit the papers needed under that program. The CA also faults the NMP for not appointing Maceda as Administrative Officer V or DED III if he could not be given a permanent appointment as professor. But the power to appoint rests essentially on free choice. The appointing authority has the right to decide who best fits the job from among those who meet the minimum requirements for it. As an outsider, quite remote from the day-to-day problems of a government agency such as NMP, no court of law can presume to have the wisdom needed to make a better judgment respecting staff appointments. Lastly, the CA assumed the power and discretion to declare Macedas 15 years of teaching experience sufficient compliance with the shipboard experience on license requirement of the NMP. But under the relevant NMP QS then in force, a Professor I, who was a Marine Merchant Officer with a rank of a 3rd Mate Officer, must possess a two-year sea experience (on license) and three years of teaching experience. Maceda had sufficient teaching experience but he did not have the required shipboard experience. In fact, he did not board any vessel as a licensed 3rd Mate Officer. The records show that, despite the repeated efforts of the NMP Human Resource Management to get him on board, Maceda still did not bother to complete the required shipboard experience. Because of this, the NMP could only give him temporary appointment that did not provide any security of tenure. Such appointment is of course terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power with or without a cause. Maceda contends that the NMP demoted him from a temporary to a contractual position. But, as both the DOLE and the CSC uniformly held, no such demotion took place since a contractual appointment is of the same nature as a temporary appointment. Thus, when the NMP did not further renew Macedas contractual appointment, the same cannot be regarded as a dismissal but an expiration of his term. 45. [G.R. No. 127182. January 22, 2001.] HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P. GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON. RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, and SECRETARY RAFAEL M. ALUNAN, III, Department of Interior and Local Government, petitioners, vs . HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACOB F. MONTESA, respondents. FACTS Private respondent Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer (CESO) nor a member of the Career Executive Service, was appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel-CESO IV in the Ministry of Local Government" (now Department of Interior and Local Government). Meanwhile, RA No. 6758 (Salary Standardization Law) took effect on July 1, 1989. Pursuant thereto, the position of "Department Service Chiefs," which include the Department Legal Counsel, was re classified and ranked with "Assistant Bureau Directors" under the generic position title of "Director III". In 1994, when Secretary Alunan III reassigned private respondent

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) as "Director III (Assistant Regional Director-Region XI), private respondent refused to report to his new post and instead filed a 90-day sick leave. On October 10, 1995, the Department directed private respondent to report to his new post in Region XI, otherwise, he shall be considered on Absence Without Leave (AWOL) and as a consequence, drop him from the rolls. Instead of complying therewith, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. The CA subsequently reinstated private respondent, ruling that his reassignment was actually an unconsented transfer which changed his appointment from permanent to temporary and violated his right to security of tenure. ISSUE WON the appointment is valid. RULING The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision, ruling that since the position of Ministry Legal Counsel-CESO IV is embraced in the Career Executive Service, a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the Career Executive Service eligibility prescribed. Private respondent admittedly does not have the required CES eligibility, thus, his appointment as Ministry Legal Counsel-CESO IV was merely temporary. Such being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned without violating his right to security of tenure. 46. ROMUALDEZ III VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. Nos. 94878-94881, [May 15, 1991]

FACTS: Petitioner, Norberto Romualdez III was appointed and served as a Commercial Attache of the Department of Trade continuously for twelve years. His civil service eligibilities are: Patrolman of the City of Manila and a Commercial Attache He was transferred to the respondent PCA whereby he was extended an appointment as Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development. The nature of his appointment was "reinstatement" and his employment status was "temporary," for the period covering September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1988. His appointment was renewed for another six months from September 1, 1988 to February 28, 1989 also on a "temporary" status and subject to certain conditions to which petitioner agreed. When his appointment expired on February 28, 1989, the Governing Board did not renew the same so he was promptly informed thereof by the Acting Chairman of the Board of the PCA, Apolonio V. Bautista. Petitioner appealed to respondent CSC. He requested reinstatement to his previous position in PCA and in support of the request; he invoked the provisions of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 dated July 19, 1989. Respondent CSC denied petitioner's request for reinstatement his reappointment was essentially discretionary on the part of the proper appointing authority. Respondent PCA appointed Mr. Roman Santos to the contested position. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 90-407 but it was denied by respondent CSC. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order

ISSUE/S: Whether it is mandatory for an appointing authority to extend permanent appointments to selected appointees with corresponding civil service eligibilities

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) RULING: No doubt the appointment extended to petitioner by respondent PCA as PCA Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development was temporary. Although petitioner was formerly holding a permanent appointment as a commercial attache, he sought and accepted this temporary appointment to respondent PCA. His temporary appointment was for a definite period and when it lapsed and was not renewed on February 28, 1987, he complains that there was a denial of due process. This is not a case of removal from office. Indeed, when he accepted this temporary appointment he was thereby effectively divested of security of tenure. A temporary appointment does not give the appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the pleasure of the appointing power. Thus, the matter of converting such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. Respondent CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make such an appointment if it is not so disposed. The duty of respondent CSC is to approve or disapprove an appointment. Its attestation is limited to the determination whether the appointee possesses the required qualifications for the position as the appropriate civil service eligibility. As aptly observed by respondent CSC said circular cannot be given retrospective effect as to apply to the case of petitioner who was separated from the service on February 28, 1989. And even if the said circular may apply to petitioner's situation, under said circular it is recognized that "the appointing authority is given a wide latitude of discretion in the selection of personnel of his department or agency." Respondent PCA exercised its discretion and opted not to extend the appointment of petitioner. It cannot be compelled to extend petitioner's appointment, much less can it be directed to extend a permanent appointment to petitioner. A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus. More so when as in this case petitioner has not shown a lawful right to the position. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, clear and certain, the petition must be dismissed. 47. Felix vs Buenaseda, G.R. No. 109704, July 17, 1995 Facts: In 1988, the Department of Health issued Department Order No. 347 which required board certification as a prerequisite for renewal of specialist positions in various medical centers, hospitals and agencies of the said department. Specifically, Department Order No. 347 provided that specialists working in various hospitals and branches of the Department of Health be recognized as "Fellows" of their respective specialty societies and/or "Diplomates" of their specialty boards or both. The Order was issued for the purpose of upgrading the quality of specialties in DOH hospitals by requiring them to pass rigorous theoretical and clinical (bedside) examinations given by recognized specialty boards, in keeping up with international standards of medical practice. Upon representation of the Chiefs of Hospitals of various government hospitals and medical centers, (then) Secretary of Health Alfredo Bengzon issued Department Order No. 347 providing for an extension of appointments of Medical Specialist positions in cases where the termination of medical specialist who failed to meet the requirement for board certification might result in the disruption of hospital services. Petitioner was one of the hundreds of government medical specialist who would have been adversely affected by Department Order No. 347 since he was no yet accredited by the Psychiatry Specialty Board. Under Department Order No. 478, extension of his appointment remained subject to the guidelines set by the said department order. On August 20, 1991, after reviewing petitioner's service record and performance, the Medical Credentials Committee of the National Center for Mental Health recommended non-renewal of his appointment as Medical Specialist I, informing him of its decision on August 22, 1991. He was, however, allowed to continue in the service, and receive his salary, allowances and other benefits even after being informed of the termination of his appointment. On November 25, 1991, an emergency meeting of the Chiefs of Service was held to discuss, among other matters, the petitioner's case. In the said meeting Dr. Vismindo de Grecia, petitioner's immediate supervisor, pointed out petitioner's poor performance, frequent tardiness and inflexibility as among the factors responsible for the recommendation not to renew his appointment. 9 With one exception, other department heads present in the meeting expressed the same opinion, 10 and the overwhelming concensus was for non-renewal. The matter was thereafter referred to the Civil Service Commission, which on February 28, 1992 ruled that "the temporary

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) appointment (of petitioner) as Medical Specialist I can be terminated at any time . . ." and that "[a]ny renewal of such appointment is within the discretion of the appointing authority." 11 Consequently, in a memorandum dated March 25, 1992 petitioner was advised by hospital authorities to vacate his cottage since he was no longer with said memorandum petitioner filed a petition with the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) complaining about the alleged harassment by respondents and questioning the non-renewal of his appointment. In a Decision rendered on July 29, 1992, the (MSPB) dismissed petitioner's complaint for lack of merit, Issue: whether or not the petitioner’s change in designation from permanent resident physician to temporary resident physician is valid? Held: The patent absurdity of petitioner's posture is readily obvious. A residency or resident physician position in a medical specialty is never a permanent one. Residency connotes training and temporary status. It is the step taken by a physician right after post-graduate internship (and after hurdling the Medical Licensure Examinations) prior to his recognition as a specialist or sub-specialist in a given field. It bears emphasis that at the time of petitioner's promotion to the position of Medical Specialist I (temporary) in August of 1988, no objection was raised by him about the change of position or the temporary nature of designation. The pretense of objecting to the promotion to specialist rank apparently ca We lay stress to the fact that petitioner made no attempt to oppose earlier renewals of his temporary Specialist I contracts in 1989 and 1990, clearly demonstrating his acquiescence to — if not his unqualified acceptance of the promotion (albeit of a temporary nature) made in 1988. Whatever objections petitioner had against the earlier change from the status of permanent senior resident physician to temporary senior physician were neither pursued nor mentioned at or after his designation as Medical Specialist I (Temporary). He is therefore estopped from insisting upon a right or claim which he had plainly abandoned when he, from all indications, enthusiastically accepted the promotion. His negligence to assert his claim within a reasonable time, coupled with his failure to repudiate his promotion to a temporary position, warrants a presumption, in the words of this Court in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 20 that he "either abandoned (his claim) or declined to assert it." A change was necessary, overall, to rectify a ludicrous situation whereby some government resident physicians were erroneously being classified as permanent resident physicians in spite of the inherently temporary nature of the designation. The attempts by the Department of Health not only to streamline these positions but to make them conform to current standards of specialty practice is a step in a positive direction. The patient who consults with a physician of specialist rank should at least be safe in the assumption that the government physician of specialist rank: 1.) has completed all necessary requirements at least assure the public at large that those in government centers who claim to be specialists in specific areas of Medicine possess the minimum knowledge and skills required to fulfill that first and foremost maxim, embodied in the Hippocratic Oath, that they do their patients no harm. Primium non nocere. Finally, it is crystal clear, from the facts of the case at bench, that the petitioner accepted a temporary appointment (Medical Specialist I). As respondent Civil Service Commission has correctly pointed out 23, the appointment was for a definite and renewable period which, when it was not renewed, did not involve a dismissal but an expiration of the petitioner's term. 48. Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, 6 October 1995 FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) which was created by virtue of PD 1078 on January 26, 1977. Under the said decree, the Board of Trustees is vested with authority, among others, to appoint, as it did appoint, officials and employees of the college, except the members of the Board of Trustees themselves and the President of the college. In line with this authority, the PAFCA Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 91-026 on April 1, 1991, which declared that "All faculty/administrative employees are also subject to the required civil service eligibilities", in accordance with pertinent civil service law, rules and regulations. Thus, herein private respondents were issued only temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards for their respective positions.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo, specifically, was issued a one-year temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of PAFCA (now PSCA), that is, from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. This appointment went along the line enunciated by the Civil Service Commission in a letter, dated March 25, 1992. The letter emphasized that temporary appointments were good and renewable only up to 1992. On March 24, 1992, private respondent Cerillo was relieved as Board Secretary of the PAFCA in accordance with Board Resolution No. 92-017 by reason of loss of confidence. Subsequently, however, she was designated as "Coordinator for Extension Services". On June 3, 1992, RA 7605 was enacted into law. It converted PAFCA into a state college to be known as the Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA). The Board of Trustees likewise was the governing body of the PSCA. The power to make appointments was retained by the Board. Petitioner Col. Julian J. Loleng, Jr. remained as Officer-in-Charge by virtue of a designation made anew by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño on June 8, 1992. Only on December 7, 1992 did Col. Loleng inform private respondents that they shall be deemed separated from the service upon the expiration of their temporary appointments. Had private respondent Cerillo not been summarily dismissed as Board Secretary on March 24, 1992, her temporary appointment as such was supposed to have lasted until December 31, 1992. On June 25, 1993, barely five months after the lapse of the terms of their temporary appointments as determined by the PSCA administration, the herein private respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, presided over by respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., a "Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement, with Back Wages and Damages". The complaint in effect prayed that then DECS Secretary Armand Fabella complete the filling up of positions for Board of Trustees and order the Board of Trustees to reinstate the respondents in the case at bench to their respective positions. In their Answer, the herein petitioners opposed the petition upon the ground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because the reappointment prayed for is discretionary on the part of the appointing power. Besides, it was the claim of Secretary Fabella that a writ of mandamus should be unavailing to private respondents because of their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ISSUE: Is private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo entitled to reinstatement to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services"? RULING: NO. The judgment of respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. which orders the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it finds no support as to facts and the law. Respondent Cerillo, although temporarily extended an appointment as Board Secretary II, was dismissed therefrom because of loss of confidence. This dismissal was neither contested nor appealed from by Ms. Cerillo. There is no question, therefore, that her dismissal as Board Secretary II could not have been the subject of the petition for mandamusand reinstatement filed before respondent Judge. The fact is that private respondent's assignment as "Coordinator for Extension Services" was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. Furthermore, even granting that Ms. Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator for Extension Services", her reinstatement thereto would not be possible because the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not have made any valid appointment for this inexistent position. This could very well be the reason why she was merely designated as Coordinator. As a mere designee, she could not have acquired any right to the position even if the position existed. At any rate, a mere "designation" does not confer upon the designee security of tenure in the position or office which he occupies in an acting capacity only. The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power. As We said earlier, the position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as it does "not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." In other words, the choice of an appointee from among those who possessed the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the Head of the office concerned. It cannot be overemphasized that the PSCA Board Resolution No. 91-026 must yield to the Civil Service Commission policies on the issuance of temporary appointments. When the Civil Service Commission directed that temporary appointments were to be effective only up to 1992, it did so in pursuance of the general purpose of the civil service law, as stated under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2260, as amended, which is "to ensure and promote the constitutional mandate regarding appointments only according to merit and fitness and to provide within the public service a progressive system of personal administration to ensure the maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and courteous civil service in the Philippines. For that matter, it is vested with the function, among others, to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the civil service and adopt plans and programs to promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government. We hold that reappointment to the position of Board Secretary II is an act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. 12 Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority. The questioned order of reinstatement amounts to an undue interference by the Court in the exercise of the discretionary power of appointment vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees. 49. ORCULLO V. CSC GR No. 138780, May 22, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Norberto A. Orcullo, Jr. was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP)-BOT Center effective March 11, 1996. His employment was contractual and coterminous with the said project which was to end on January 30, 2000. On September 23, 1996 or six (6) months from his assumption to office, petitioner received a Memorandum, dated September 20, 1996, from one Jorge M. Briones, Assistant Director of CCPAP, terminating petitioner's contractual employment with said agency effective September 30, 1996. In a Letter dated September 20, 1996, Undersecretary Francisco F. del Rosario, Executive Director of CCPAP, confirmed petitioner's termination as project manager of CCPAP. Aggrieved by his dismissal, petitioner appealed the same to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On April 2, 1997, the respondent CSC issued Resolution No. 972309 dismissing petitioner's appeal. The CSC found that: x x x the appointment of Orcullo is contractual and co-terminous with the Philippine Assistance Program Support Project and that it carries the stipulated condition "Unless terminated sooner.” Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. On June 17, 1997, the CSC denied said motion in its Resolution No. 973099. On July 30, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. CA dismissed. ISSUE: Whether employees in the public service, regardless of their status of employment, are protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the Constitution.

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RULING: It is undisputed that petitioner's employment with CCPAP is contractual and co-terminous in nature. Such a coterminous employment falls under the non-career service classification of positions in the Civil Service: Sec. 9. Non-Career Service. - The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made. (Underscoring ours) The Non-Career Service shall include: xxx (4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency. xxx Additionally, Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides: Sec. 14. An appointment may also be co-terminous which shall be issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the duration of project or subject to the availability of funds. (Underscoring ours) The co-terminous status may thus be classified as follows: (1) Co-terminous with the project - when the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same; (2) Co-terminous with the appointing authority - when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure; (Underscoring ours) (3) Co-terminous with the incumbent - when the appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and (4) Co-terminous with a specific period - appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration and upon thereof, the position is deemed abolished. A perusal of petitioners employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is qualified by the phrase unless terminated sooner. Thus, while such employment is co-terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract. We agree with the appellate courts intepretation of the phrase unless terminated sooner to mean that his contractual job as Project Manager IV from March 11, 1996 to January 30, 2000 could end anytime before January 30, 2000 if terminated by the other contracting party-employer CCPAP. 50. G.R. No. 95244 September 4, 1991 DRS. ELLEN AMBAS, JOANNE DE LEON, MARIE ESTELLA GUNABE, NERISSA BERNAL, RICARDO TOLENTINO and RAUL CHRIZALDO E. MORENA, petitioners, vs. DRS. BRIGIDA BUENASEDA and EFREN REYES; THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH; MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD; AND CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondents. FACTS: Prior to their termination from employment, which is the subject of the petition at bar, petitioners were employed and retained as resident trainee physicians by the Department of Health, assigned to the National Center for

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Mental Health NCMH for purposes of brevity), under the Residency Program of the government. By authority of the Secretary of Health, petitioners were issued temporary appointments as resident trainees in an undated confidential report, 3 the NCMH Medical Training Officer, Dr. Efren Reyes, recommended the termination of petitioners' services because of poor academic performance and low ranking. In addition to the foregoing grounds cited, petitioner Dr. Raul Chrizaldo Morena was also found to have violated the Code of Conduct of Resident Physicians. The recommendation of the Training Officer for the termination of petitioners' services was based on the result of an evaluation conducted by the Residency Evaluation Committee on 16 June 1989 of all NCMH resident trainees. In letters 4 dated 16 June 1989, petitioners were individually informed of the termination by the Residency Evaluation Commission committee of their services effective 1 July 1989, with the approval of the NCMH Chief. Twice, petitioners wrote to the Secretary of Health questioning their termination. When they received no reply, they wrote a letter-complaint to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) also failed to act on their letter-complaint, thus prompting them to assail their termination before the Merit Systems Protection Board (referred to hereinafter as the Board), docketed as MSPB Case No. 299. They alleged that the termination of their services by NCMH was arbitrary and violative of the existing civil service laws, regulations and the provisions of PD 1424 governing the residency training program in government hospitals. In an indorsement dated 17 August 1989, the letter-complaint filed by petitioners with the Secretary of Health was referred by the latter to the CSC for appropriate action. In the same indorsement, the Secretary of Health confirmed the action of NCMH in terminating petitioners' services as resident trainees. On 28 August 1989, the Board rendered a decision declaring petitioners' termination as not valid and ordered their reinstatement to their former positions. It was the opinion of the Board that the power to remove petitioners belongs to the appointing authority, namely, the Secretary of Health, and that, therefore, the NCMH through its representative has no power to remove the petitioners. Petitioners contended that the renewal of appointment of a resident trainee is discretionary upon the Secretary of Health; that the designation in their appointment as "temporary' does not remove the permanency of petitioners' appointment during the period of their training; and that the motion for reconsideration filed by NCMH was a "mere scrap of paper" because petitioners were not furnished with a copy of said motion. On 5 September 1990, the CSC affirmed the resolution of the Board, holding that since the nature of their appointment was temporary, their services could be terminated with or without cause. The CSC declared that the contract signed by petitioners with NCMH bound them to the condition stated therein that their training may be terminated on the ground of poor performance, or in case of failure on their part to meet the standards of medical ethics and behavior; and that as authorities in their own field of specialization, the evaluation conducted by the Committee as to petitioners' performance during their training is presumed' regular. Under the Hospital Residency Law governing the residency program in government service, the appointment of resident trainees is limited to a period of one (1) year, renewable every year not exceeding the duration of the training program in a particular field of medicine, at the discretion of the Secretary of Health or National Defense, as the case may be. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the NCMH has the power to terminate the petitioners; and 2. Whether or not the Secretary of Health committed grave abuse of discretion in terminating herein petitioners. HELD: The training of petitioners under the Psychiatric Residency Program with NCMH involved a special field of medicine. Because of the nature of their training in psychiatry, the NCMH had the right to set a standard to be met by the resident trainees, to produce graduates who are qualified and skilled in the said field. To attain this purpose, the NCMH recommended to the Secretary of Health the termination of resident trainees who failed to come up to the standard set for such program. However, the NCMH had no power to terminate the trainees. Only the Secretary of Health, as the appointing authority, had the power to remove them from the service. Thus, the removal of petitioners by NCMH effective 1

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) July 1989 was not valid. But, the confirmation on 17 August 1989 made by the Secretary of Health of petitioners' termination had the force and effect of a valid removal, effective on the date such confirmation was made. The Secretary of Health did not commit grave abuse of discretion in terminating petitioners from the service because the same was done with just cause, i.e., the petitioners' poor academic performance and low ranking in the evaluation conducted by the Residency Evaluation Committee of NCMH. Under the circumstances, the valid removal of petitioners took effect only 17 August 1989, and, therefore, they are entitled to backwages from 1 July 1989 to 17 August 1989. There is no merit to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of due process because they were not given notice of the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Dr. Buenaseda, on behalf of NCMH. Although petitioners were not duly furnished any notice of said motion, they were nonetheless able to file their arguments or opposition to the allegations raised therein, before the said motion for reconsideration was resolved by the Board, reversing its original decision. 51. Sta. Maria vs. Lopez [G.R. No. L-30773, February 18, 1970] FACTS: Petitioner Felixberto C. Sta.Maria was the Dean of the College of Education, University of the Philippines (UP), and the respondent Salvador P. Lopez was the University President. Sta. Maria, a professor of English and Comparative Literature, was elected as Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents, on nomination by the UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the position in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines. On February 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the general academic program and the physical plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In response, President Lopez created a committee which met with Sta. Maria regularly. As a result of the dialogues and recommendations by Sta. Maria to the president, the students were not appeased. The students went on to boycott their classes which infected the other colleges and the newly installed members of the UP Student Council voted to support the education students' strike. Until the day that all academic activity in the university came to a complete stand still so that the UP President called a meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit. Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, President Lopez issued the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. The order, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria and simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College of Education, without additional compensation. ISSUES: 1. W/N the transfer of Sta. Maria constitutes a removal 2. W/N "unless sooner terminated" mean that the position of Ricardo is terminable at will? HELD: 1. Yes, Sta. Maria was removed from his position as dean. Having an appointment with a fixed term, he cannot, without his consent, be transferred before the end of his term. The transfer was a demotion because deanship in a university, being an academic position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists the President, as the title indicates. In this case, the appointment of Sta. Maria is that of "Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines." He is not merely a dean "in the university". His appointment is to a specific position; and, more importantly, to a specific station. A line of distinction must be drawn between the office of dean and that of professor, say, of English and Comparative Literature. A professor in the latter capacity may be assigned to handle classes from one college to another or to any other unit in the university where English is offered. He may even be transferred

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) from graduate school to undergraduate classes. He cannot complain if such was done without his consent. He has no fixed station. As for him, it can always be argued that the interests of the service are paramount. But a college dean holding an appointment with a fixed term stands on a different plane. He cannot, without his consent, be transferred before the end of his term. He cannot be asked to give up his post. Nor may he be appointed as dean of another college. Much less can he be transferred to another position even if it be dignified with a dean's rank. A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary." A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position", cannot be done without the employee's consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent unless the officer or employee is transfer can take place unless the officer of the employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position. The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university, being an academic position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists the President, as the title indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative decisions. Second. The position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of staff position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university charter, and cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of the university president. It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of Dean". In actual administrative practice, the terms "with rank of" dean is meaningless. He is no dean at all. He of course, basks, in the trappings of the dean. A palliative it could have been intended to be. But actually he is a dean without a college. 2. No, his position is not terminable at will. Sta. Maria’s contract of employment has a fixed term of five years. It is not an appointment in an acting capacity or as officer-in-charge. A college dean appointed with a term cannot be separated without cause. Sta. Maria, with a definite term of employment, may not thus be removed except for cause. CLASSES OF SERVICE 52. PEZA Board of Directors v. Gloria Mercado, G.R. No. 172144, 9 March 2010 FACTS: Respondent Gloria J. Mercado was appointed as Group Manager for Policy and Planning of PEZA on September 16, 1998. Her appointment was temporary in nature. On May 16, 1999, respondent was promoted to the position of Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning. Her appointment indicated the same as on permanent basis, but with the following annotation: NO SECURITY OF TENURE UNLESS HE/SHE OBTAINS CESO OR CSEE ELIGIBILITY. CESO is the acronym for Career Exercutive Service Officer, while CSEE is the acronym for Career Service Executive Eligibility. On June 1, 2000, petitioner Lilia B. de Lima, in her capacity as PEZA Director General, by letter of even date, advised respondent of the termination of her appointment effective on the closing hours of the day. On even date, petitioner PEZA Board convened in an executive session and passed a Resolution appointing Wilhelm G. Ortaliz (Ortaliz), a CESO eligible, as Deputy Director General for Policy and Planning effective immediately. Respondent thereupon filed on June 7, 2000 with the RTC of Pasay City a petition for prohibition, quo warranto and damages with preliminary prohibitory /mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order against herein petitioners and Ortaliz. In the main, respondent alleged in her complaint that her degree in Master in National Security Administration (MNSA) automatically conferred upon her Career Executive Service (CES) eligibility; that Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8748, which amended R.A. 7916 or the PEZA Charter, did away with the CES eligibility requirement for the position of Deputy Director General; and that the termination of her appointment was actuated with bad faith to entitle her to moral and exemplary damages. Petitioners countered that respondents MNSA degree at best merely granted her a CESO rank, not eligibility, and since she had not acquired CES eligibility, she had no

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) security of tenure with respect to her position and could, therefore, be replaced at any time by Ortaliz who is a CES eligible. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Mercado should be reinstated HELD: NO. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law provides: (1) Permanent status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. Clearly, for an examinee or an incumbent to be a member of the CES and be entitled to security of tenure, she/he must pass the CES examinations, be conferred CES eligibility, comply with the other requirements prescribed by the CES Board, and be appointed to a CES rank by the President. Admittedly, before and up to the time of the termination of her appointment, respondent did not go through the four stages of CES eligibility examinations. By respondents attainment of an MNSA degree, she was not conferred automatic CES eligibility. It was, as above-quoted portions of CESB Resolution No. 204 state, merely accredited as equivalent to passing the Management Aptitude Test Battery. For respondent to acquire CES eligibility and CES rank, she could proceed to the second stage of the eligibility examination process . . . and the other stages of the examination . . . in accordance with existing policies and regulations; and that if respondent as MNSA degree holder passed the three other stages of the CES eligibility examinations and is conferred CES eligibility, she could qualify for appointment to CES ranks, PROVIDED that she meets and complies with other requirements of the CES Board and the Office of the President to qualify for rank appointment. Since, it is admitted that respondent, who acquired an MNSA degree in 1993, had not undergone the second, third and fourth stages of the CES eligibility examinations prior to her appointment or during her incumbency as Deputy Director General up to the time her appointment was terminated, she was not a CES eligible, as indeed certified to by the CES Board. Not being a CES eligible, she had no security of tenure, hence, the termination by the PEZA Board on June 1, 2000 of her appointment, as well as the appointment in her stead of CES eligible by Ortaliz, were not illegal. As correctly held by the trial court, removing the CES eligibility requirement for the Deputy Director General position could not have been the intention of the framers of the law. It bears noting that the position is a highranking one which requires specialized knowledge and experience in certain areas including law, economics, public administration and similar fields, hence, to remove it from the CES would be absurd. The Civil Service Commission CESB in fact has certified that the position requires the appropriate CES eligibility. It is settled that the construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts. Respondents subsequent passing in late 2000 of the CES examinations did not retroact to consider her a CESO at the time her appointment was terminated on June 1, 2000. DIGESTED BY: Pelausa 53. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 185766, 23 November 2010 FACTS: These are two consolidated petitions. In GR No. 185766, Josefina A. Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II of the Internal Audit Department (IAD) of Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) under temporary status. Thus, on the same day, PCSO General Manager Rosario Uriarte issued a temporary appointment to Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Civil Service Commission Field Office Office of the President (CSCFO-OP) disapproved the temporary appointment of Sarsonas as she failed to meet the eligibility requirement for the position. CSCFO-OP certified that there were qualified individuals who signified their interest to be appointed to the position, namely, Mercedes Hinayon and Reynaldo Martin. PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC-NCR but the latter affirmed the disapproval. PCSO filed an appeal with the CSC but the same was dismissed. PCSO elevated the case to the CA, which reversed the CSC resolution. CSC filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In GR No. 185767, PCSO Board of Directors resolved to appoint Lemuel G. Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II of its Planning and Production Department. The same events transpired as in G.R. No. 185766. In both petitions to the CA, it was ruled that CSC erred in finding that the position of Assistant Department Manager II requires CSE eligibility, rendering improper the temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega, respectively. In G.R. No. 185766, the CA held that the resolution of the PCSO Board to appoint Sarsonas as Assistant Department Manager II was a policy decision and an exercise of management prerogative over which the CSC has no power of review. In G.R. No. 185767, the CA similarly ruled that the Career Executive Service does not cover the position of Assistant Department Manager II in the Planning and Production Department of the PCSO. ISSUE: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside the CSC resolutions disapproving the temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega as Assistant Department Manager Ii for lack of the required third level eligibility. HELD: No. Following the ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission cases and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation v. Civil Service Commission, the Court is of the position thatthe CES covers presidential appointees only. Corollarily, as the position of Assistant Department Manager II does not require appointment by the President of the Philippines, it does not fall under the CES. Therefore, the temporary appointments of Sarsonas and Ortega as Assistant Department Manager II do not require third level eligibility pursuant to the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. In order for a position to be covered by the CES, two elements must concur. First, the position must either be (1) a position enumerated under Book V, Title I, Subsection A, Chapter 2, Section 7(3) of the Administrative Code of 1987, i.e. Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service,or (2) a position of equal rank as those enumerated, and identified by the Career Executive Service Board to be such position of equal rank. Second, the holder of the position must be a presidential appointee. Failing in any of these requirements, a position cannot be considered as one covered by the third-level or CES. In the case at bench, it is undisputed that the position of Assistant Department Manager II is not one of those enumerated under the Administrative Code of 1987. There is also no question that the CESB has not identified the position to be of equal rank to those enumerated. Lastly, without a doubt, the holder of the position of Assistant Department Manager II is appointed by the PCSO General Manager, and not by the President of the Philippines. Accordingly, the position of Assistant Department Manager II in the PCSO is not covered by the third-level or CES, and does not require CSE eligibility. 54. GENERAL vs. ROCO (LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL vs. RAMON S. ROCO G.R. No. 143366

January 29, 2001

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THE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION and COMMUNICATIONS, UNDERSECRETARY FOR STAFF SERVICES of the DOTC and the ASSISTANT SECRETARY for LAND TRANSPORTATION vs. RAMON S. ROCO)

G.R. No. 143524

FACTS:

January 29, 2001

Sometime on August 26, 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed respondent Ramon S. Roco as Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO) in Region V, a position equivalent to CES rank level V. On September 7, 1999, petitioner Luis Mario General, who is not a CES eligible, was appointed by President Estrada as Regional Director of the LTO in Region V, the same position being occupied by respondent. Aggrieved, respondent Roco filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for quo warranto with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. The CA issued a TRO enabling respondent Roco to re-assume the disputed office. After the lapse of 60 days, there being no writ of preliminary injunction issued, petitioner General again assumed the said office. The CA rendered a decision affirming the appointment of respondent Roco to the Office of Regional Director of the LTO, Region V, nullified the appointment of petitioner General and ordered him to vacate the subject post in favor of respondent Roco. Upon motion of respondent Roco, the CA issued a writ of execution pending appeal. From the CA’s decision, two separate petitions for review under Rule 45 were filed before this Court. The first one, which was filed by General against Roco; while the second petition was filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary, Undersecretary and Assistant Secretary of the DOTC, also against Roco. On June 26, 2000, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 143366 directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante. The same were consolidated, hence, these petitions. The thrust of respondent's argument is that a career executive service (CES) eligibility is all that an employee needs to acquire security of tenure in the service; and that appointment to a CES rank is not necessary for the acquisition of such security of tenure. On the other hand, petitioners claim that CES eligibility alone will not suffice. Petitioners contended that unless and until an employee in the career executive service is appointed to the appropriate CES rank, he acquires no security of tenure.

ISSUE 1:

Whether respondent Roco has acquired security of tenure.

ISSUE 2:

Can Petitioner General validly assume the position even without the CES eligibility?

RULING 1:

The petitions are impressed with merit. Section 27 (1), of the Civil Service Law (Subtitle A, Tittle I, Book V of E.O. No. 292), provides: (1) Permanent status. - A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. In the career executive service, the acquisition of security of tenure which presupposes a permanent appointment is governed by the rules and regulations promulgated by the CES Board, thus: Career Executive Service Eligibility Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligibles. Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board through a formal

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Board Resolution after an evaluation is done of the examinees performance in the four stages of the CES eligibility examinations. xxxxxxxxx Appointment to CES Rank Upon conferment of a CES eligibility and compliance with the other requirements prescribed by the Board, an incumbent of a CES position may qualify for appointment to a CES rank. Appointment to a CES rank is made by the President upon the recommendation of the Board. This process completes the officials membership in the CES and most importantly, confers on him security of tenure in the CES. In addition, it must be stressed that the security of tenure of employees in the career executive service (except first and second-level employees in the civil service), pertains only to rank and not to the office or to the position to which they may be appointed. Thus, a career executive service officer may be transferred or reassigned from one position to another without losing his rank which follows him wherever he is transferred or reassigned. In fact, a CESO suffers no diminution of salary even if assigned to a CES position with lower salary grade, as he is compensated according to his CES rank and not on the basis of the position or office he occupies. In the case at bar, there is no question that respondent Ramon S. Roco, though a CES eligible, does not possess the appropriate CES rank, which is - CES rank level V, for the position of Regional Director of the LTO (Region V). Falling short of one of the qualifications that would complete his membership in the CES, respondent cannot successfully interpose violation of security of tenure. Accordingly, he could be validly reassigned to other positions in the career executive service. Thus, in Achacoso v. Macaraig, the Court held that: It is settled that a permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the requirement for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. Achacoso did not. At best, therefore, his appointment could be regarded only as temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority and at a moments notice, conformably to established jurisprudence. xxxxxxxxx The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.

RULING 2:

Yes. The absence, however, of such CES eligibility is of no moment. As stated in Part III, Chapter I, Article IV, paragraph 5(c), of the Integrated Reorganization Plan c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate classes in the Career Executive Service shall be made by the President from a list of career executive eligibles recommended by the Board. Such appointments shall be made on the basis of rank; provided that appointments to higher ranks which qualify the incumbents to assignments as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and offices and equivalent positions shall be with the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. The President may, however, in exceptional cases, appoint

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) any person who is not a Career Executive Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher class until he qualifies in such examination. Evidently, the law allows appointment of those who are not CES eligible, subject to the obtention of said eligibility, in the same manner that the appointment of respondent who does not possess the required CES rank (CES rank level V) for the position of Regional Director of the LTO, is permitted in a temporary capacity. 55. Dimayuga v. Benedicto, G.R. No. 144153, 16 January 2002 FACTS: On October 26, 1992, then Secretary of Public Works and Highways Jose P. Dimayuga issued a permanent appointment in favor of petitioner Chona M. Dimayuga as Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board (Board, for brevity). As its highest-ranking working official, the petitioner exercised supervision and control over the board’s three divisions. She also oversaw the Board’s Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects. At the time, the position of Executive Director II was not deemed part of the Career Executive Service (CES), that is until June 4, 1993, when it was included therein. On May 31, 1994, the Civil Service Commission issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, providing among others, that “incumbents of positions which are declared to be CES positions are for the first time pursuant to this resolution who hold permanent appointment thereto shall remain under permanent status in their respective positions. However, upon promotion or transfer to other CES positions, these incumbents shall be under temporary status in said positions until they qualify.” Petitioner alleges that she had been a subject of several administrative and criminal complaints which were all designed to coerce her removal. As a consequence of such complaints, DPWH Secretary Vigilar issued a first 90-day suspension order which was followed by another 90-day suspension issued this time by Executive Secretary Alexander Aguirre. After the expiration of the last suspension order, petitioner was directed by DPWH Secretary Vigilar to the Legal Service Department to assist in the implementation of P.D. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines). As a gesture of protest to such order of the Secretary, the petitioner filed a leave of absence rather than assume a position which she considered as a demotion. On September 28, 1998, while she was on leave, petitioner received a letter from Secretary Vigilar informing her that President Estrada had appointed Mariano Benedicto II as the new Executive Director II of the Board. As a consequence thereof, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto before the Court of Appeals which the latter tribunal dismissed. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent inclusion of the petitioner’s position under the CES would automatically qualify the latter for the said position even in the absence of the required eligibility. HELD: NO. The mere fact that a position belongs to a Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure o its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depend on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be so regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. In the doctrinal case of Cuevas vs. Bacal, the Court emphasized two (2) salient points, to wit: First, in order to qualify an appointment as permanent, the appointee must possess the rank appropriate to the position. Failure in this respect will render the appointment merely temporary. Second, security of tenure in the Career Executive Service (CES) is thus acquired with respect to rank and not to position. The guaranty of security of tenure to the members of the CES does not extend to the particular positions to which they may be appointed— a concept which is applicable only to first and second level employees in the civil service—but to the rank to which they are appointed by the President.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The Court reiterates the above points if only to serve as a contradistinction to petitioner’s arguments. If a career executive officer’s security of tenure pertains only to his rank and not to his position, with greater reason then that petitioner herein, who is not even a CESO eligible, has no security of tenure with regard to the position of Executive Director II of the Toll Regulatory Board which was earlier classified on June 4, 1993 as part of the CES or prior to the issuance of the CSC Memo. Circ. No. 21 dated May 31, 1994. Lastly, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor-General, non-eligibles holding permanent appointments to CES positions were never meant to remain immobile in their status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a premium vesting them with permanency in the CES positions, a privilege even their eligible counterpart do not enjoy. 56. MONTECILLO vs CSC, GR NO. 131954 FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, Series of 1991, on the ground that its issuance amounted to an abuse of respondents power to promulgate rules and regulations pursuant to the Civil Service Law. Employee positions in the Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) were re-classified during the latter part of 1995 to conform with position descriptions and corresponding salary grades in the civil service. Accordingly, while the personnel structure of the MCWD was being modified, three of its employees -- petitioners Asela B. Montecillo, Marilou Joan V. Ortega and Charrishe Dosdos -- applied for promotional appointment to the position of Secretary to the Assistant General Manager or Private Secretary C, as the position later came to be known. At the time of their application, petitioners had been occupying the position of Department Secretary and were employed in the MCWD for six to seven years. When their appointments were forwarded to the Civil Service Commission Field Office (CSC FO) by MCWD General Manager Dulce Abanilla, the CSC FO refused to approve petitioners appointments as permanent on the ground that the position applied for was a primarily confidential and co-terminous position. This ruling was upheld by the CSC Regional Office and affirmed on appeal by respondent. ISSUE: W/N CSC abused its rule-making power? HELD: Respondent was expressly empowered to declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be classified as primarily confidential under Section 12, Chapter 3, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. To our mind, this signifies that the enumeration found in Section 6, Article IV of the Civil Service Decree, which defines the non-career service, is not an exclusive list. Respondent could supplement the enumeration, as it did when it issued Memorandum Circular No. 22, s. of 1991, by specifying positions in the civil service, which are considered primarily confidential and therefore their occupants are co-terminous with the official they serve. The assailed memorandum circular can not be deemed as an unauthorized amendment of the law. On the contrary, it was issued pursuant to a power expressly vested by law upon respondent. As such, it must be respected by this Court as a valid issuance of a constitutionally independent body. Digested by: Tolentino, Fatima 57. [G.R. No. 138780. May 22, 2001] NORBERTO ORCULLO, JR., petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and COORDINATING COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINE ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Norberto A. Orcullo, Jr. was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP)-BOT Center effective March 11, 1996. His employment was contractual and coterminous with the said project which was to end on January 30, 2000. On September 23, 1996 or six (6) months from his assumption to office, petitioner received a Memorandum, dated September 20, 1996, from one Jorge M. Briones, Assistant Director of CCPAP, terminating petitioner's contractual employment with said agency effective September 30, 1996. In a Letter dated September 20, 1996, Undersecretary Francisco F. del Rosario, Executive Director of CCPAP, confirmed petitioner's termination as project manager of CCPAP. Aggrieved by his dismissal, petitioner appealed the same to the Civil Service Commission (CSC).

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On April 2, 1997, the respondent CSC issued Resolution No. 972309 dismissing petitioner's appeal. The CSC found that: x x x the appointment of Orcullo is contractual and co-terminous with the Philippine Assistance Program Support Project and that it carries the stipulated condition "Unless terminated sooner." The latter condition has not been qualified by any safeguard. Appellant Orcullo, when he accepted said contractualcoterminous appointment, was aware that his services might be terminated anytime. He is, thus, not protected by the security of tenure clause of the Constitution. The contract is the law between the parties. And whatever is stipulated therein governs the relationship between the parties. Said stipulations in the contract may include the mode or manner of separations. And the cause therefore includes and is not proscribed to derogatory record, misbehavior or incompetence or hostile attitudes. In the instant case, appellant was separated from the service particularly for unsatisfactory performance. (Underscoring ours) On the issue of the proper official who should effect such termination, the next lower official of the Center may do so. In this case, said separation was later validated by the confirmation of the head office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. On June 17, 1997, the CSC denied said motion. On July 30, 1997, petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On August 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. ISSUE: Whether employees in the public service, regardless of their status of employment, are protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the Constitution. HELD: NO. Petitioner argues that, contrary to the findings of the CSC, the phrase "unless terminated sooner" refers not to the duration of his employment, but the duration of the PAPS support project itself. He claims that since the PAPS project was still ongoing, his services cannot be terminated without just cause and without the observance of due process. He asseverates that even co-terminous employees like himself enjoy security of tenure as embodied in the Constitution.It is undisputed that petitioner's employment with CCPAP is contractual and coterminous in nature. Such a co-terminous employment falls under the non-career service classification of positions in the Civil Service. Granting arguendo that said disputed phrase refers not to the duration of petitioners employment, but to the project itself, nevertheless, petitioner was validly terminated for cause. The records will show that petitioner garnered an unsatisfactory rating during the probationary period of his employment. After due notice, he was subsequently dismissed because of his inability to work with the other staff members of the project and to participate effectively in meetings regarding the project, resulting in loss of trust in him by his superiors. 58. PAGCOR vs Rilloraza G.R No. 141141, June 25, 2001 FACTS: Respondent Carlos Rilloraza, casino operations manager who was recalled to the branch for only 3 weeks, was administratively charged with dishonestly, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of confidence resulting to his dismissal. Petitioner PAGCOR alleged that Rilloraza was an employee occupying a confidential position under Sec. 16 of PD1869, and therefore, exempt from the provisions of the Civil Service Law and shall be governed by the personnel management policies set by the petitioner’s Board of Directors. However, Rilloraza maintained that he followed protocol and did not commit any misconduct in the execution of hi work. He contended that he followed procedures when he was asked to exchange checks for gambling chips. He even asked his immediate supervisor and another high-ranking official to verify and confirm said transaction, to which they both agreed. As to the allegation that he failed to stop a top-ranking officer for gambling chips in violation of PAGCOR’s rules and regulations, he maintained that he accorded respect and credence to the word of the said officer since he was only his subordinate. The CSC found him guilty of only simple neglect which was also affirmed by the CA and ordered his reinstatement with payment of full backwages and other monetary benefits.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was a confidential appointee whose term had expired by reason of loss of confidence HELD: No. Petitioner’s argued that Rilloraza was primarily a confidential appointee. Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him by the latter. Such would not amount to a removal but only the expiration of his term. Citing their decision in CSC vs. Salas, the Court held that the last portion of Sec. 16 of PD 1869, which provides that “employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as ‘confidential’ appointees.” Three important points must be considered with regard to this. First, the classification of a particular position as primarily confidential, policy-determining, or highly technical amount to no more than an executive or legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-determining, or highly technical, the exemption provided in the Charter pertains to exemption from competitive examination to determine merit and fitness to enter the civil service. Such employees are still protected by the mantle of security of tenure. Lastly, insofar as Sec. 16 of PD1869 declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily confidential, such is not absolutely binding on the courts. 59. DE LOS SANTOS VS MALLARE 87 PHIL 289 Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. It is the petitioner's contention that under the Constitution he cannot be removed against his will and without cause. The complaint against the other respondents has to do merely with their recognition of Mallare as the lawful holder of the disputed office and is entirely dependent upon the result of the basic action against the last-mentioned respondent (Mallare). ISSUE: WON petitioner can be removed against his will and without cause. HELD: NO. As has been seen, three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involved the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category determinable at the will of the officer that makes them. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. x x x" (Emphasis supplied). Several factors lead to the conclusion that private respondent does not enjoy such "close intimacy" with the appointing authority of PAGCOR which would otherwise place him in the category of a confidential employee because he performs routinary duties.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Based on the nature of such functions of herein private respondent and as found by respondent Court of Appeals, while it may be said that honesty and integrity are primary considerations in his appointment as a member of the ISS, his position does not involve "such close intimacy" between him and the appointing authority, that is, the Chairman of PAGCOR, as would ensure "freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust." The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. Incidentally, the last discussion answers and disposes of the proposition that in accepting appointment under section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioner must be deemed to have accepted the conditions and limitations attached to the appointment. If the clause of section 2545 which authorized the President to remove officers of the City of Baguio at pleasure had been abrogated when petitioner's appointment was issued, the appointee can not presumed to have abided by this condition. We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause, and that respondent Mallare's appointment is ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges. 60. Civil Service Commission v. Salas G.R. No. 123708. June 19, 1997 Facts: Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff (ISS) member and assigned to the casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. However, his employment was terminated by the Board of Directors of PAGCOR on December 3, 1991, allegedly for loss of confidence, after a covert investigation conducted by the Intelligence Division of PAGCOR. The summary of intelligence information claimed that Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting as detailed in the affidavits purportedly executed by two customers of PAGCOR who claimed that they were used as gunners on different occasions by Salas. On December 23, 1991, Salas submitted a letter of appeal to the Chairman of PAGCOR, requesting reinvestigation of the case since he was not given an opportunity to be heard, but the same was denied. On February 17, 1992, he appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which denied the appeal on the ground that, as a confidential employee, Salas was not dismissed from the service but his term of office merely expired. On appeal, the CSC issued a resolution which affirmed the decision of the MSPB. Salas initially went to this Court on a petition for certiorari assailing the propriety of the questioned CSC resolution. However, the case was referred to the CA. The CA rendered its questioned decision with the finding that Salas is not a confidential employee, hence he may not dismissed on the ground of loss of confidence. In so ruling, the appellate court applied the "proximity rule" enunciated in the case of Griño, et al. vs. Civil Service Commission, et al. It likewise held that Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 has been superseded and repealed by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Issue: Whether Salas is considered a confidential employee? Held: No. The CA opined that the provisions of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. This is not completely correct. On this point, the Court approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that "Section 16 of PD 1869 insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of Civil Service Law and Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987)". However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section 16 which provides that "all employees of the casino and related services shall be classified as 'confidential appointees.'" While such executive declaration emanated merely from the provisions of Section 2, Rule XX of the implementing rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the power to declare a position as policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in Section 12(9), Book V of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869. Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and all-encompassing. Thus, the aforecited case was decided on the uncontested assumption that the private respondent therein was a confidential employee, for the simple reason that the propriety of Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 1869 was never controverted nor raised as an issue therein. That decree was mentioned merely in connection with its provision that PAGCOR employees hold confidential positions. Evidently, therefore, it cannot be considered as controlling in the case at bar. Even the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid in cases where its validity was not challenged does not preclude the court from later passing upon its constitutionality in an appropriate cause where that question is squarely and properly raised. Such circumstances merely reinforce the presumption of constitutionality of the law.

61. [G.R. No. L-22562. October 22, 1966.] PIÑERO v HECHANOVA FACTS The thirty-two petitioners, at the time of their dismissal, were employees occupying positions in various capacities in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs. With the exception of petitioners Jose Guerrero, Eleuterio Medrano and Ismael Hernandez, they were holding their positions under permanent appointments. The petitioners have rendered services in the Bureau of Customs which ranged individually from two years to twentysix years. They were all insured with the Government Service Insurance System. On various dates between the first week of December, 1962 up to the last week of January, 1963, the petitioners were ordered dismissed or separated from the Bureau of Customs by the respondent Acting Secretary of Finance and Acting Commissioner of Customs, based an the ground that said respondent had lost confidence in them. After their dismissal, the petitioners individually and collectively demanded in writing for their immediate reinstatement, but their demands were unheeded. Instead, the other respondents (except Rodrigo D. Perez, Jr., and the Auditor of the Bureau of Customs) were appointed in the positions previously held by the petitioners. On July 27, 1963, the petitioners filed this action before this Court." ISSUE whether claimants may be dismissed without cause or hearing for mere lack of confidence, in view of the fact that the positions occupied by them in the Customs Patrol Service are "primarily confidential", having been so declared by Executive Order No. 397, series of 1941, and Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947. RULING Under Section 5 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, what determines ultimately whether an administrative position is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical, is the nature of the functions attached to the position. Executive pronouncements can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of conflict. It must be so, or else it would lie within the discretion of the Chief Executive to deny to any officer, by executive fiat, the protection of Section 4, Article XII of the Constitution. The mere fact that the members of the Port Patrol are part of the Customs police forces does not by itself indicate that their positions are primarily confidential, so as to dispense with security of tenure for the incumbents. In the case of De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, it was held that the phrase "primarily confidential" denotes "not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." There are no proven facts to show that there is any such close intimacy and trust between the appointing power and the appellees as would support a finding that confidence was the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) primary reason for the existence of the positions held by them or for their appointment thereto. It is extremely improbable that the service demands any such close trust and intimate relation between the appointing official and, not one or two members alone but the entire Customs Patrol (Harbor Police) force, so that every member thereof be concluded that the positions formerly occupied by appellees were not primarily confidential in nature, so as to make their terms of office co-terminal with the confidence reposed in them. Hence, they were not subject to dismissal or removal, except for cause specified by law and with due process (Civil Service Law, Republic Act 2260, section 32). 62. Provincial Government of Camarines Norte v. Beatriz Gonzales Facts: Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991. Her appointment was on a permanent capacity. On March 8, 1999, Governor Jess B. Pimentel sent Gonzales a memorandum directing her to explain in writing why no administrative charges should be filed against her for gross insubordination/gross discourtesy in the course of official duties, and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that she be held administratively liable. On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation Committee’s recommendation and dismissed Gonzales. Gonzales appealed Governor Pimentel’s decision to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC issued resolution modifying Governor Pimentel’s decision, finding Gonzales guilty of insubordination and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied. Gonzales then filed a motion for execution and clarification, in which she claimed that she had already served her six-month suspension and asked to be reinstated. The CSC issued resolution directing Gonzales’ reinstatement. Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12, 2000, but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence. He then wrote a letter to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and Gonzales’ subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee. In his letter, Governor Pimentel he cited the resolution where the CSC ruled that the provincial administrator position is highly confidential and is coterminous in nature. The CSC responded which again directed Gonzales’ reinstatement as provincial administrator. It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position coterminous and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as administrators prior to the new law’s effectivity. According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position. The conversion of the provincial administrator position from a career to a non-career service should not jeopardize Gonzales’ security of tenure guaranteed to her by the Constitution. As a permanent appointee, Gonzales may only be removed for cause, after due notice and hearing. Loss of trust and confidence is not among the grounds for a permanent appointee’s dismissal or discipline under existing laws. In a letter dated February 17, 2005, Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines Norte’s incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her. The CSC responded which ordered Gonzales’ reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position. Thus, the petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before the CA, seeking to nullify the CSC’s resolution. Issues: 1) Whether Congress has re-classified the provincial administrator position from a career service to a primarily confidential, non-career service position; and 2) Whether Gonzales has security of tenure over her position as provincial administrator of the Province of Camarines Norte. Held: 1.) Yes. Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily confidential, noncareer position. SC supported the CSC’s conclusion that the provincial administrator position has been classified into a primarily confidential, non-career position when Congress, through RA 7160, made substantial changes to it. 2. ) No. Gonzales has security of tenure, but only as a primarily confidential employee. To be sure, both career and non-career service employees have a right to security of tenure. All permanent officers and employees in the civil service, regardless of whether they belong to the career or non-career service

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) category, are entitled to this guaranty; they cannot be removed from office except for cause provided by law and after procedural due process. The concept of security of tenure, however, labors under a variation for primarily confidential employees due to the basic concept of a "primarily confidential" position. Serving at the confidence of the appointing authority, the primarily confidential employee’s term of office expires when the appointing authority loses trust in the employee. When this happens, the confidential employee is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office; his term merely "expires” and the loss of trust and confidence is the "just cause" provided by law that results in the termination of employment. In the present case where the trust and confidence has been irretrievably eroded, we cannot fault Governor Pimentel’s exercise of discretion when he decided that he could no longer entrust his confidence in Gonzales. 63. Pacete v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 185 SCRA 1 Facts: On July 22, 1968, petitioner Elias V. Pacete was appointed by the then Mayor Antonio C. Acharon of General Santos City as City Attorney of the said city. On June 24, 1971, Mayor Acharon was charged with murder in the Court of First Instance of General Santos City and was detained without bail. A few months later, on November 8, 1971, Mayor Acharon ran for and was reelected as City Mayor of General Santos City pending the criminal case against him and even while he was in jail. On January 1, 1972, Mayor Acharon issued Administrative Order No. 1 designating Vice Mayor Erlindo R. Grafilo as Acting Mayor. On June 29, 1972, Acharon, while still in prison, issued another memorandum which had the effect of revoking the aforementioned January 1, 1972 memorandum. In the meantime, acting Mayor Erlindo Grafilo suspended petitioner Elias V. Pacete as City Attorney for a period of ten (10) days effective July 11, 1972. Finally, on July 20, 1972, notice was served on petitioner that he had been removed as the City Attorney of General Santos City on the ground of loss of confidence. Ostensibly, the Acting Mayor's loss of confidence in petitioner was the result of the legal opinion of the latter impugning the authority of Acting Mayor Grafilo to act as such and upholding the authority of Mayor Acharon to discharge the functions of the Office of the Mayor even while the latter was in prison. On October 15, 1974, petitioner filed the present petition with essentially the following prayers: (1) payment of backwages from the time petitioner was suspended on July 11, 1972 until the final termination of his case; and (2) payment by respondent City Auditor Miguel Penalosa, Jr. of damages for his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for backwages. Petitioner did not pray for reinstatement. Issue: whether or not the position of City Attorney is confidential, for which loss of confidence is a valid ground for termination. Held: This is not the first time that this question has been raised before the Court. In Besa v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-26838, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 331, the Court ruled that the position of Chief Legal Counsel of the Philippine National Bank is both confidential and technical in nature. In Claudio v. Subido, G.R. No. L30865, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 481, 484, the Court likewise ruled that "[t]he position in question, that of the City Legal Officer, in one that requires the utmost confidence on the part of the Mayor." The Court, after a careful consideration of the instant case, finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the aforecited cases that the position of Legal Counsel or City Attorney is confidential in nature, for which loss of confidence is a valid ground for termination. Hence, the Court must rule that petitioner is not entitled to the backwages claimed. Moreover, having determined the legality of petitioner's termination from service as City Attorney, the Court must likewise hold that respondent City Auditor Miguel Peñalosa Jr. cannot be held liable for damages since his refusal to pass in audit petitioner's claim for backwages was pursuant to a lawful order made by the respondent Acting Commissioner on Audit. PERSONNEL ACTIONS 64. Jaime Panis vs. CSC G.R. No. 102948, February 2, 1994 FACTS: The CCMC, formerly known as the Cebu City Hospital, is operated and maintained by the local government of Cebu City. Petitioner was employed as Administrative Officer of the Hospital, while private respondent was Administrative Officer of the City Health Department detailed at the said hospital.

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Ordinance No. 1216, passed by the Cebu City Sangguniang Panglunsod on June 17, 1986, amended the charter of the Cebu City Hospital for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies and improving the performance of said institution. The hospital's name was changed to CCMC, and the departments and offices therein were reorganized. The Office of Hospital Administrator was created and granted such powers as were deemed in line with the objectives of the Ordinance On November 9, 1987, the Mayor of Cebu City appointed private respondent to the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration of CCMC. Petitioner, a candidate for the said position, promptly protested the appointment before the Regional Office of the Civil Service Commission. The CSC regional office forwarded it to the office of the mayor, wherein it referred it to the office of the city Attorney, wherein it renders a decision dismissing the petition, which affirmed by the Regional office of the CSC likewise the CSC when petitioner appealed. Petitioner contends that the appointment of private respondent was made in violation of law, existing civil service rules and established jurisprudence because (1) the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration was not legally created; (2) assuming that it was, there was no qualification standard or valid screening procedure; and (3) the seniority and next-in-rank rules were disregarded ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner’s contention that he should be appointed following the rule on “next-in-rank”? HELD: NO. The "next in rank" rule specifically applies only in cases of promotion. The instant controversy, however, involves a new office and a position created in the course of a valid reorganization. Under the law, a vacancy not filled by promotion may be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by reemployment of those separated from the service, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service eligibility, but not necessarily in this order. Likewise, the concept of "next in rank" does not impose any mandatory or peremptory requirement to appoint the person occupying the next lower position in the occupational group of the office. What the Civil Service Law and the Administrative Code of 1987 provide is that if a vacancy is filled up by the promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion”. In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferential consideration for promotion to the vacant position, but it neither does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be appointed. There is no vested right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority to promote the holder to the vacant position. An appointment, whether to a vacancy or to a newly created position, is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. Once a candidate possesses the minimum qualities required by law, sufficient discretion, if not plenary, is granted to the appointing authority. 65. Abad vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 207422, 18 March 2015 DOCTRINE: Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are next in rank to a vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a vested right to a government position. Seniority and salary grades should be given their due weight but should not trump the public interest. FACTS: This case resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Angel Abad assailing the Court of Appeals Decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Civil Service Commission Resolution. This Resolution affirmed the permanent appointment of Herminio Dela Cruz as City Government Department Head III. Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi appointed Herminio Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) as City Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa in a permanent capacity on December 28, 2006. The City Assessor is given the item of City

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Government Department Head III. In Resolution No. 06-361, majority of the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City Government of Muntinlupa concurred in the appointment of Dela Cruz as City Government Department Head III. Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 02-1235 granting the City Government of Muntinlupa the power to take final action on its appointments, the appointment of Dela Cruz was considered attested to by the Civil Service Commission. Angel A. Abad, Local Assessment Operations Officer V in the Office of the City Assessor, wrote the Civil Service Commission and requested the disapproval of Dela Cruz's appointment as City Government Department Head III. Abad alleged that the position of City Government Department Head III corresponded to Salary Grade 27, nine (9) salary grades higher than Dela Cruz's former position as Local Assessment Operations Officer III with Salary Grade 18. According to Abad, Dela Cruz's appointment violated Item 15 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 3, Series of 2001, which prohibits the promotion of an employee to a position more than three (3) salary grades above his or her former position. Abad added that being a qualified next-in-rank, he applied for the position of City Government Department Head III. However, he and three (3) other qualified applicants were allegedly excluded from the selection process, in violation of Item 10 of Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 3, series of 2001. According to Abad, the appointment of Dela Cruz caused "demoralization within [their] ranks." In the meantime, newly elected Mayor Aldrin San Pedro (Mayor San Pedro) assumed his office in the City Government of Muntinlupa on July 1, 2007. On August 3, 2007, the main building of Muntinlupa City Hall was gutted by fire, destroying the Office of the City Personnel. The City Government of Muntinlupa, therefore, failed to act on Abad's Letter. Abad filed with the Mayor's Office the letter-complaint reiterating his request for disapproval of Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III. Mayor San Pedro referred Abad's letter-complaint to the City Government of Muntinlupa's Personnel Department The Grievance Committee recommended the invalidation of Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III. Mayor San Pedro's approval to this recommendation was then referred to the CSC-NCR. CSC-NCR: invalidated Dela Cruz's permanent appointment as City Government Department Head III. CSC reversed this decision on dela Cruz’s appeal. CSC ruled that Dela Cruz's appointment was an exception to the three-salary-grade rule. Dela Cruz underwent a deep selection process rendering his appointment "very meritorious[.]" CA: dismissed petition for review and affirmed the appointment. CA held that the three-salary-grade rule "only gives preference to the person occupying the position next in rank to a vacancy, but does not by any means give [the employee next in rank] [the] exclusive right to be appointed to the said vacancy." As long as the employee appointed to the position possesses the minimum qualifications for the position, the appointment is valid. ISSUE: W/N respondent Dela Cruz's promotion to the position of City Government Department Head III is void because it violated the next-in-rank rule SC RULING: No. SC found that the present petition must be denied. Appointments in the civil service are made fundamentally on the basis of merit. Both the Constitution and law ensure that those appointed are fit for the position. While those who are next in rank to a vacant position may be given some preference, no one has a vested right to a government position. Seniority and salary grades should be given their due weight but should not trump the public interest. The Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region and the Civil Service Commission agree that respondent possesses the minimum qualifications under the law for the position of City Government Department Head III. Moreover, the appointment of Dela Cruz was confirmed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Muntinlupa in Resolution No. 06-361. The next-in-rank rule is a rule of preference on who to consider for promotion. The rule does not give employees next in rank a vested right to the position next higher to theirs should that position become vacant. Appointment is a discretionary power of the appointing authority. So long as the appointee possesses the qualifications required by law, the appointment is valid. To successfully protest the issuance of an appointment, the employee next in rank must prove his or her status as a qualified next-in-rank; otherwise, the protest shall be dismissed. Being next in rank is a legal conclusion that would be the result of inference from evidence properly alleged and proven. The burden of proof rests on the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) employee alleging that he or she is next in rank. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden of proving that he was a qualified next-in-rank. He failed to prove that his position of Local Assessment Operations Officer V has been previously determined to be next-in-rank to the position of City Government Department Head III in the Office of the City Assessor of the City Government of Muntinlupa. Petitioner, therefore, has no right to protest the appointment of respondent. Who to appoint is "a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide." For the betterment of government service, the appointing authority may consider other "abstract criteria[,]" aside from the minimum qualifications set by law in making appointments. 66. G.R. No. 110954 May 31, 1995 DELFIN N. DIVINAGRACIA, JR., AND ALEXIS D. SAN LUIS, vs. HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, RAMON P. ERENETA, JR., and PRESCILLA B. NACARIO, FACTS: On 14 March 1983 when the Local Government Code took effect, the office was renamed Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC). 1 On 28 March 1983 the Sangguniang Bayan of Pili approved Resolution No. 38 creating and organizing the Office of MPDC. 2 Mancita held over the position until 1985. On 1 January 1985 the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration approved the reorganization plan and staffing pattern of the Municipality of Pili. 3 In a letter dated 17 June 1985 Mayor Anastacio M. Prila notified Mancita that her services were being terminated effective at the close of office hours on 1 July 1985 on the ground that the Office of MDC was abolished as a result of the reorganization of the local government of Pili. Private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who was then the Municipal Budget Officer was appointed MPDC on 10 June 1985 to take effect on 1 July 1985. 4 Nacario was replaced by Digna Isidro as Municipal Budget Officer. Isidro was succeeded a year later by Eleanor Villarico who served until 1990. On 1 October 1991, petitioner Alexis D. San Luis, Cashier II of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), was temporarily appointed Municipal Budget Officer of Pili by Secretary Guillermo N. Carague of the Department of Budget and Management. When control over the Local Government Officers Services was returned to the local government units by virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160 as implemented by E.O. 503), San Luis was reappointed to the same position on 22 June 1992, this time in a permanent capacity, by petitioner Delfin N. Divinagracia, Mayor of Pili. San Luis started in the career civil service in 1977 as a casual clerk in the DENR, rising from the ranks until he was appointed Cashier II based in Legaspi City, the position he was holding when appointed Municipal Budget Officer of Pili. Meanwhile, Mancita appealed her termination to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB). On 20 June 1989 the MSPB declared her separation from the service illegal, holding that the Office of the Municipal Development Coordinator was abolished by the Local Government Code of 1991 and not by the reorganization of the Municipality of Pili as claimed by Mayor Prila. According to the MSPB, Mancita was in fact qualified for the newly-created position of MPDC since the powers and duties of the two positions were essentially the same. The MSPB ordered Mayor Divinagracia to reinstate Mancita to the position of MPDC or to an equivalent position, and to pay her backwages from the date of her separation. The decision of MSPB was appealed by Mayor Divinagracia to the Civil Service Commission but the appeal was dismissed on 16 July 1990 per CSC Resolution No. 90-657. On 15 October 1990, Mayor Divinagracia informed private respondent Nacario that she was being relieved of her position as MPDC effective 16 November 1990 in order to comply with the MSPB decision to reinstate Mancita as MPDC. On 8 November 1990 private respondent Prescilla B. Nacario filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Br. 31, docketed as Civil Case No. P17819, against CSC Chairperson Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, Mayor Delfin N. Divinagracia, Jr., Elium Banda, Regional Director of CSC in Region 5, and Filomena R. Mancita, praying for the annulment of CSC Resolution No. 90-657. Presiding Judge Ceferino P. Barcinas of Br. 31 issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the questioned CSC resolution and set the date for the hearing of the application for

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) preliminary injunction. Mancita filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Her motion was denied. Mancita then filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 before this Court questioning the denial of her motion. Through Mr. Justice Teodoro R. Padilla we granted the petition and held that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case since all decisions, orders and resolutions of the Civil Service Commission were subject to review only by this Court on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On 15 March 1993 Mayor Divinagracia wrote to CSC Chairperson Patricia A. Sto. Tomas seeking a reconsideration of her opinion of 8 December 1992. On 27 May 1993 public respondent issued CSC Resolution No. 93-1996 denying the request of Mayor Divinagracia for a reconsideration. Upholding Nacario's right to security of tenure the CSC held that the reinstatement of Mancita to the position of MPDC could not be a valid cause for the termination of Nacario. Petitioners have come to us for relief praying that CSC Resolution No. 93-1996 be nullified for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. On 5 October 1993, upon motion of petitioners, this Court issued a status quo ante order enjoining the enforcement of the questioned CSC order. Petitioners contend that Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Revised Administrative Code (E.O. 292) does not apply to the present case because the rule covers only appointments in a chain of promotions and not where a public officer was merely transferred to another position of the same rank, grade and level. For their part, public respondents Sto. Tomas and Ereneta, Jr., insist on the application to the present case of the automatic reversion rule provided under Sec. 13, Rule VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292. They submit that the term "chain of promotions" must not be interpreted in a literal, rigid and narrow sense but must be construed liberally in favor of private respondent who merely accepted the position of MPDC to accommodate her superior unaware that her new appointment thereto would be infirmed. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not Petition San Luis can hold the position of Municipal Budget Officer (NO); and 2. Whether or not Respondent Nacario is protected by law in her security of tenure (YES) HELD: We deny the petition. Petitioner Alexis D. San Luis cannot hold on to the position of Municipal Budget Officer. On the other hand, respondent Prescilla B. Nacario who is protected by law in her security of tenure should be reinstated thereto. In Sec. 13 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 provides that, before a public official or employee can be automatically restored to her former position, there must first be a series of promotions; second, all appointments are simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval; and third, the CSC disapproves the appointment of a person proposed to a higher position. The essential requisites prescribed under Sec. 13 do not avail in the case at bench. To start with, the movement of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC cannot be considered a promotion for the term connotes an increase in duties and responsibilities as well as a corresponding increase in salary. 19 Conformably therewith, we find the movement of Nacario one of lateral transfer. Aside from the lack of a series of promotions, the other two (2) requisites are not also present, i.e., the appointments of the parties concerned were not simultaneously submitted to the CSC for approval — the appointment (permanent) of Nacario was approved by the CSC on 13 June 1985 while the appointment (permanent) of San Luis was approved by the CSC on 9 February 1993 — and, the ouster of Nacario from the Office of MPDC was a result of the MSPB decision directing the reinstatement of Mancita and not because the CSC disapproved her appointment as MPDC. Sta. Maria v. Lopez: A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level and salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and is usually accompanied by an increase in salary" . . . A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position," cannot be done without the employees' consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent transfer can take place unless the officer or employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Clearly then, the unconsented lateral transfer of Nacario from the Budget Office to the Office of MPDC was arbitrary for it amounted to removal without cause hence, invalid as it is anathema to security of tenure. When Nacario was extended a permanent appointment on 1 August 1980 and she assumed the position, she acquired a legal, not merely an equitable, right to the position. Such right to security of tenure is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution and cannot be taken away from her either by removal, transfer or by revocation of appointment, except for cause, and after prior notice. The guarantee of security of tenure is an important object of the civil service system because it affords a faithful employee permanence of employment, at least for the period prescribed by law, and frees the employee from the fear of political and personal prejudicial reprisal. Considering that the separation of Nacario who was the former incumbent was not in order, San Luis should relinquish his position in favor of private respondent Nacario. This is, of course, without prejudice to San Luis' right to be reinstated to his former position as Cashier II of the DENR, he being also a permanent appointee equally guaranteed security of tenure. A final word. Petitioners cannot claim that they have been denied due process of law by public respondent. The records reveal that petitioners had the opportunity to question the adverse opinion rendered by CSC Chairperson Sto. Tomas in a letter dated 15 March 1993. The correspondence which was in the nature of a motion for reconsideration constitutes sufficient opportunity for petitioners who felt aggrieved to inform the CSC of their side of the controversy. What is sought to be safeguarded in the application of due process is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of opportunity to be heard. Before we write finis to this ponencia, we remind those public officials who flaunt their authority — and those similarly inclined — to faithfully abide by the Constitution and observe honestly and in good faith the tenurial security of public servants who serve the government with sincerity and dedication. They should not be moved or removed from their established positions without any lawful cause and pushed at will like pawns on the bureaucratic chessboard. 67. PALMA-FERNANDEZ vs. DE LA PAZ, 160 SCRA 751 G.R. No. 78946 April 15, 1988 FACTS: On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical Center) by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. As Chief of Clinics, petitioner exercised direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in the Medical Center. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. In partial implementation of this new set-up, respondent Dr. Adriano de la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, issued Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, on 8 August 1986, designating petitioner as Assistant Director of Professional Services. As such, she continued to exercise direct control and supervision over all heads of departments in the Medical Center. On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health" was promulgated. On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief issued Hospital Order 21 and 22, which he designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services whereby petitioner was relieved of her present duties and responsibilities as she will be transferred to the Research Office. Said order was purportedly issued "in the interest of the hospital service." Petitioner filed a letter-protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission.

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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent De la Paz has the power or authority to issue the two Hospital Orders in question; HELD: No. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center Chief. The latter's function is confined to recommendation. Respondent Medical Center Chiefs argument that petitioner was not appointed but was merely transferred in the interest of the public service to the Research Office pursuant to Section 24 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines will not alter the situation. Even a transfer requires an appointment, which is beyond the authority of respondent Medical Center Chief to extend. Besides, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any legal effect. A removal without cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law" Petitioner's "designation" as Assistant Director for Professional Services on 8 August 1986 in accordance with the organizational structure of the Department of Health under Hospital Order No. 30, Series of 1986, issued by respondent Medical Center Chief did not make her occupancy of that position temporary in character. It bears stressing that the positions of Chief of Clinics and Assistant Director for Professional Services are basically one and the same except for the change in nomenclature. Petitioner's permanent appointment on 1 May 1985 to the position of Chief of Clinics, therefore, remained effective. The argument that, on the basis of this provision, petitioner's term of office ended on 30 January 1987 and that she continued in the performance of her duties merely in a hold over capacity and could be transferred to another position without violating any of her legal rights, is untenable. The occupancy of a position in a hold over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to 2 February 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon, et al. vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et al., G.R. No. 78059, 31 August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern. And while it may be that the designation of respondent Aguila as Assistant Director for Professional Services and the relief of petitioner from the said position were not disapproved by respondent Secretary of Health, it by no means implies that the questioned acts of respondent Medical Center Chief were approved by the former official.

68. Quisumbing vs Judge Gumban FACTS: On or before 1979, private respondent Esther B. Yap was appointed District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools and assigned to the District of Glan, South Cotabato. On February 11, 1987, in view of the agitation of teachers and concerned citizens of Glan, then Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing issued a Memorandum Order, directing Regional Director Teofilo E. Gomez to reassign or transfer Esther B. Yap to another district (Rollo, p. 24), which was effected by Director Teofilo E. Gomez in his Memorandum Order dated February 12, 1987, ordering the transfer of private respondent Esther B. Yap as a public school district supervisor from Glan District to Malapatan District and for Crisanto B. Delamin, another public school district supervisor, to assume that of respondent's position at Glan (Rollo p. 25). The latter in turn issued a Memorandum Order to the principals and headteachers of different public schools at Glan informing them of his assumption of office (Rollo, p. 26). However, private respondent Esther B. Yap defied the orders of her superiors and she continued to perform the functions of public school district supervisor of Glan (Rollo, p. 5).

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On February 20, 1987, Yap filed a petition (docketed as Special Civil Case No. 230) for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction/restraining order with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23m, General Santos City against the Hon. Lourdes R. Quisumbing, et al. (Rollo, pp. 27-33) who filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss (Rollo, pp. 45-47), which was denied by respondent Judge Manuel Luis Gumban in his order dated August 17, 1987. ISSUE: WON respondent Yap can be validly transferred to another assignment? HELD: YES. After a careful scrutiny of the records, it is to be underscored that the appointment of private respondent Yap is simply that of a District Supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools which does not indicate a specific station (Rollo, p. 13). As such, she could be assigned to any station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific station. Submitted by Emil Samaniego 69. Chato v. Natividad, G.R. No. 113843, 2 June 1995 Doctrine: Civil Service Law; Transfer; Objective of reassignment is to “strengthen the decentralization of the Bureau’s set-up for the purpose of maximizing tax assessments and revenue collections.”—Indeed, private respondent’s transfer is part of a nationwide reshuffle or reassignment of revenue district officers designed to improve revenue collection. More specifically the objective of the reassignment, as stated in Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-93, is “to strengthen the decentralization of the Bureau’s set-up for the purpose of maximizing tax assessments and revenue collections, intensifying enforcement of revenue laws and regulations and bringing the revenue service closer to the taxpaying public.” Employee who questions validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission.—Moreover, under the law, any employee who questions the validity of his transfer should appeal to the Civil Service Commission. FACTS: President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order entitled "Approving the Streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue." Pursuant to this Order, Commissioner Liwayway Chato issued Revenue Travel Assignment Order, directing ninety district officers to report to new assignments in the redesignated and renumbered revenue district offices nationwide. Among those affected by the reassignment was Salvador Blas. He was transferred as a revenue officer from Pampanga to Cagayan. He wrote the Commissioner of Internal Revenue requesting a reconsideration of his transfer, for he felt that his accomplishments and performance had not been taken into consideration in the reshuffle. He claimed that he was among the top ten examiners for six consecutive years and was once a model employee. In addition, he mentioned that he was diabetic and that he needed to be near his doctor, and should not endure long travels, but his letter was unacted upon. So he filed with the RTC a verified complaint. He alleged that his transfer without his consent to Cagayan which has a smaller pool of personnel and only one-fourth of the revenue capacity of Pampanga, would cause his dislocation and demotion or a diminution in rank, status, and span of duties and responsibilities. He has earned through hard work the position as revenue district officer in Pampanga which has a larger staff and revenue capacity and is much closer to Manila. Before resolving the issue whether or not there was a reduction in duties and responsibilities, or whether or not there was a demotion and dislocation on the part of Salvador Blas, the court, to maintain status quo, issued a preliminary injunction ordering and directing Commissioner Chato to cease and desist in enforcing the Assignment Order. The BIR Commissioner not pleased with Hon. Eli Natividad’s ruling and order, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court asking to annul the order of the RTC judge as there was an abuse of discretion on his part for issuing the preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether or not the reassignment was valid. HELD: The Court found the BIR Commissioner’s petition to be meritorious. They issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge to cease and desist from implementing his order. The Court said that the preservation of the status quo is not alone sufficient to justify the issuance of an injunction. The plaintiff must show that he has a clear legal right; that such right has been violated; and that he is entitled to the relief he demands, consisting in restraining the commission of the acts complained of. Further, they sustained the legality

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) of the reassignment of Blas. The Court found that Salvador Blas failed to show patent illegality in the action of the BIR Commissioner, saying that to sustain his contention that his transfer was a demotion simply because the new assignment is not to his liking would be to subordinate government projects to individual preferences and opinions of civil service employees; and this would negate the principle that public office is a public trust. Moreover, the Court ruled that if an employee believes his transfer to be unjustified, he should have questioned the validity of his transfer by appeal to the Civil Service Commission. So, the lower court in this case should have dismissed the action for failure of Salvador Blas to exhaust administrative remedies. In any event, the movement was held to be a reassignment, made in the exigency of the service --- and not a demotion. 70. TEOTICO VS. AGDA FACTS: Democrito Agda Sr. was appointed on June 16, 1984, as Chief, Fiber Industry Development Authority by Cesar C. Lanuza, former Administrator of FIDA and was designated Acting Regional Administrator for FIDA Regions I and II. On November 13, 1987, three months before the local elections, which was held on January 18, 1987, Agda was reassigned by former FIDA Administrator Lanuza to the FIDA main office and designated Epitacio E.Lanuza, Jr. as officer-incharge (OIC) of FIDA Region 1. On December 15, 1987, Agda Requested the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to stay the implementation of Special OrderNo. 219. On January 7, 1988, Teotico implemented said Special Order 219, despite the fact that Agda requested the Civil Service Commission to stop the implementation of the said Special Order 219. On January 12, 1988, Agda requested Teotico to defer the implementation of said Special Order No. 219. Teotico again implemented Special Order 219, requiring petitioner to submit his accomplishment report. Agda requested Teotico to defer the implementation of said special order, considering that the same has not yet been resolved by the Secretary of Agriculture. On December 11, 1987, former FIDA Administrator designated Wilfredo G. Siguritan as officer-incharge of FIDA Region 1. On March 9, 1988, FIDA Region1 administrator Siguritan requested the Agda through Teotico to require Agda to turn over to him the keys of the vault in FIDA Region 1 and on March 14, 1988, Teotico implemented Special Order No. 219, requiring Agda to turn over said keys to OIC Seguritan. On March 16,1988, Agda requested the Secretary of Agriculture to defer the implementation of said special order pending resolution of said office. On March 23, 1988, Teotico implemented Special Order 219 by instituting administrative charges against Agdape for insubordination prejudicial to the best interest of the service. On April 4, 1988, Teotico placed Agda under preventive suspension, effective April 6, 1988. Agda requested respondent Teotico to give him twenty(20) days from April 11, 1988, within which to submit his explanation to the formal administrative charges. Teotico granted him an extension of only five days from receipt of memorandum. Agda sent a letter to the Commission on Elections, inquiring if Special OrderNo. 219, series of 1987, of Administrator Lanuza was referred and submitted to it for approval three days before its implementation. The Commission, informed private respondent that records of the Department do not show that aforesaid Special Order was submitted or referred to this Commission for approval. Agda filed with the court a Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Injunction with preliminary injunction and restraining order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDAAC. The court granted said petition and ordered to immediately reinstate Democrito O. Agda, Sr., from his previous position as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, with full back wages and allowances mandated by law. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Agda was appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region? 2. Whether or not Agda failed to exhaust administrative remedy as mandated by P. D.807. HELD: 1. No. Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but as CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER, he was not appointed to any specific station. He Was merely designated as Acting Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I and II. Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be transferred or assignedto any other place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more effectively. Temporary appointments or appointments in an acting capacity are terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Agda can neither claim a vested right to the station to which he was assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. Accordingly, private respondent could be reassigned to any place and Special Order No. 219 dated 13 November 1987 assigning private respondent at

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the Office of the Administrator of the FIDA "in the interest of the service" was in order. Although denominated as "reassignment", it was in fact a mere detail in that office. 2. Yes. Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No.807, allows transfer, detail and re-assignment. If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify the Special Order in question with the Civil Service Commission. It does not, however, appear to that he exerted genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof. What appears to be clear is that he used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandum of Teotico. Again Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. In his Urgent Petition to Stay Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, nothing is mentioned about a violation of the ban on transfer or detail. The reason seems too obvious. Until he filed the Amended Petition before the court below he did not consider his re-assignment per Special Order No. 219 as a violation of the ban on transfer or detail during the three-month period before election having yet fully exhausted the existing adequate administrative remedy which he already took advantage of, Agda cannot be permitted to abandon it at his chosen time and leisure and invoke the jurisdiction of regular courts. 71. Causing v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199131, 9 September 2014 FACTS: On January 1, 1993, Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010, which reads:Cjh”...”...you are hereby detailed at the Office of the Municipal Mayor effective upon receipt of this Order and shall likewise receive direct orders from the undersigned as to particular functions our office may require from time to time…” On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V. Belonio (Belonio), another municipal employee, to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate. On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series of 2010, and Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010, respectively directing Causing to report to the Mayor’s office. Causing filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009. In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior in dealing with her co-employees and with the public transacting business in her office had been received; 8 that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to take personnel actions and other management prerogatives for the good of public service; that Causing was not being stripped of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or detailed to another office in order to perform a different function; and that she was not demoted to a lower position that diminished her salary and other benefits. ISSUE: Whether or not the relocation of the petitioner by respondent Municipal Mayor during the election period from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constituted a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the Commission on Elections. HELD: NO. In the instant case, Causing is not stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar (MCR). She was merely required to physically report to the Mayor’s Office and perform her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar therein. Definitely, she is still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically outside of her usual work station. She is

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) also not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff as she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her staff, that by itself, however, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. That difficulty, nonetheless, is not tantamount to constructive dismissal. That Mayor Biron prefers to ensure that Causing faithfully discharging her duties as MCR is principally an exercise of his sound judgment and discretion. He alone has the discretion to decide when to resort to the necessity of implementing changes in the workplace as he occupies the ideal vantage point and is in the best position to determine the needs of his agency and how to satisfy those needs. Besides, contrary to the allegations of Causing, none of the elements of constructive dismissal is present. 72. CUEVAS V BACAL GR No. 139382 6 December 2000 Facts Josefina Bacal is a holder of the CESO III ranking. She was appointed to the position of Chief Public Attorney in the Public Attorney’s Office, which has a CES Rank Level I. She was then transferred without her consent to the Office of the Regional Director of the PAO because of the appointment of Atty. Carina Demaisip to the position of Chief public Defender, formerly Chief Public Attorney. Issue W/N the unconsented transfer of Bacal constitutes a demotion? Held No, the unconsented transfer of Bacal does not constitute a demotion. Petitioners are, therefore, right in arguing that respondent, as a CESO, can be reassigned from one CES position to another and from one department, bureau or office to another. Further, respondent, as a CESO, can even be assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade. In the instant case, respondent, who holds a CES Rank III, was correctly and properly appointed by the appointing authority to the position of Regional Director, a position which has a corresponding CES Rank Level III. Indeed, even in the other branches of the civil service, the rule is that, unless an employee is appointed to a particular office or station, he can claim no security of tenure in respect of any office.This rule has been applied to such appointments as Director III or Director IV or Attorney IV or V in the Civil Service Commission since the appointments are not to specified offices but to particular ranks; ]Election Registrars; Election Officers, also in the Commission on Elections; and Revenue District Officers in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Reiterating the principle in Sta. Maria v. Lopez, this Court said: . . . [T]he rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. The use of approved techniques or methods in personnel management to harness the abilities of employees to promote optimum public service cannot be objected to. . . . For the foregoing reasons, we hold that respondents appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. 73. Gloria v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 116183, 6 October 1995 Facts: On January 26, 1977, Presidential Decree No. 1078 created the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA). The Board of Trustees is vested with authority to appoint officials and employees of the college, except the members of the Board of Trustees themselves and the President of the college. On April 1, 1991, the PAFCA Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 91-026 which declared that "All faculty/administrative employees are also subject to the required civil service eligibilities", in accordance with

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) pertinent civil service law, rules and regulations. As a consequence, private respondents were issued only temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards for their respective positions. Republic Act No. 7605 converted PAFCA into Philippine State College of Aeronautics (PSCA). Private respondent, Rosario V. Cerillo, was issued a one-year temporary appointment to the position of Board Secretary II of PAFCA (now PSCA), that is, from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992. On March 24, 1992, Cerillo was relieved as Board Secretary of the PAFCA in accordance with Board Resolution No. 92-017 by reason of loss of confidence. However, she was designated as "Coordinator for Extension Services". Then on December 7, 1992 Cerillo was informed by Col. Loleng of the termination of the former’s temporary appointment. On June 25, 1993 Cerillo filed before the RTC of Pasay City, presided over by respondent Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr., a "Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement, with Back Wages and Damages.” It was granted. Thus, this petition where petitioners contend that mandamus cannot be availed of to compel reinstatement because the reappointment prayed for is discretionary on the part of the appointing power. In addition, petitioners contend that administrative remedies have not been exhausted. Issue/s: W.O.N private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo entitled to reinstatement to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services"? Held: No. A mere designation does not confer security of tenure, as the person designated occupies the position only in an acting capacity. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential, requiring as it does "not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state." In other words, the choice of an appointee from among those who possessed the required qualifications is a political and administrative decision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which can best be made by the Head of the office concerned. In this case, Cerillo was dismissed as Board Secretary II because of loss of confidence. Then, she was designated as Coordinator for Extension Services. As a mere designee, she could not have acquired any right to the position. Furthermore, even granting that Ms. Cerillo could be validly reinstated as "Coordinator for Extension Services", her reinstatement thereto would not be possible because the position is not provided for in the PSCA plantilla. The PSCA could not have made any valid appointment for this inexistent position. 74. MONSANTO vs. FACTORAN 170 SCRA 190 FEBRUARY 9, 1989 FACTS: On March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3, 500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4, 892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the decision of the Sandiganbayan. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, on December 17, 1984, President Marcos extended to her absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984. Petitioner then wrote the Calbayog City treasurer and requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. The letter was referred to the Ministry of Finance (MF),

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) which ruled that petitioner might be reinstated to her former position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Not fully satisfied with the MF decision, petitioner wrote the Ministry for a reconsideration contending that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension on August 1, 1982. The MF however referred petitioner’s letter to the Office of the President through Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran who ruled that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction. Petitioner then elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment HELD: In the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality. Full pardon relives the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man", and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. We do not subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. We are in full agreement with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office. Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardon. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. 75. Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, G.R. No. L-75025, 14 September 1993 FACTS: Petitioner was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. Petitioner was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in Adm. Case No. 975 for the loss of several telegraph poles. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner with the CFI of Quezon. The trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner of the offense charged. Consequently, petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. Petitioner pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency, which was granted. Petitioner was also reinstated but the records do not show whether petitioner's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries from the date of his dismissal from the service. This was denied by COA on the ground that the executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he has not been reinstated in the service. ISSUE: Whether he is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

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HELD: YES. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. The bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. Petitioner's automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. To rule otherwise would defeat the very intention of the executive clemency, i.e., to give justice to petitioner. Moreover, the right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them. There is no doubt that petitioner's case falls within the situations aforementioned to entitle him to back wages. 76. Republic v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 86147 February 26, 1990 Facts: Petitioner Corpuz and Respondent Lopez, Jr., were the former Director and Assistant Director, respectively, of the now defunct Child and Youth Research Center (CYRC) of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Minister Laya "temporarily detailed" Lopez to the MECS Legal Office until further advice "in the exigencies of the service." Sometime later, he was transferred to the Planning Service Office of the MECS, it appearing that he was facing charges before the Legal Division, which he, however, denied. After about 6 months of re-assignment, Lopez wrote a letter to Minister Laya expressing his intention to resume his official position as CYRC Assistant Director. Having received no response, he returned to the CYRC as Assistant Director without official authorization. This prompted Corpuz to issue 2 Memoranda: The first was addressed to the CYRC Staff advising that Lopez would not be considered an active member of the Staff until he first secured the proper authorization for his transfer. The other was addressed to Lopez himself requesting him to submit an official order terminating his "detail." In his reply, Lopez insisted on the validity of his resumption of office stating that "no one can be detailed for more than three (3) months without the written consent of the employee concerned" and that "detailed assignment beyond six (6) months has to be approved by the CSC and the Office of the President." He also admonished Corpuz to recall and/or rectify her memoranda. Corpuz again issued two Memoranda, one disputing Lopez's reply and the other reiterating her stand that until he secured an authorization from the MECS Minister to return to the CYRC, she would not consider him an active member of its Staff. Lopez wrote a letter to the then MECS Deputy Minister requesting clarification on the matter. The same advice as to the necessity of prior authorization was given. Corpuz addressed another memorandum to Lopez insisting on his compliance with her directive and requiring him, effective on the same date, to submit a record of his attendance duly signed by the Chief of the MECS Planning Service or an approved application for leave of absence before he could be entitled to his salary. Just the same, Corpuz allowed the payment of Lopez’s salaries and allowances for the period 18 February 1985 to 22 April 1985, but withheld those corresponding to the period 23 April to 14 August 1985 because of latter's refusal to comply with her directive to return to the MECS Central Office.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Issue: Whether Corpuz was justified in refusing to take official cognizance of Lopez's attendance as Assistant Director at the CYRC and in withholding his salaries corresponding to the period? Held: Yes. It will be recalled that Lopez returned to the CYRC at his own instance without any authorization from higher authorities. Corpuz as CYRC Director, officially advised him to secure that clearance, but he adamantly refused to obey a directive from his immediate superior. Under the circumstances, Corpuz as head of the office, was left with no alternative but to withhold recognition of his attendance at the CYRC. To maintain discipline in the office, and in the interests of the service, she could do no less. The CA, however, affirmed the finding of the RTC that the DECS Minister's directive to Lopez was "defective" in that the term "detail" was used instead of "re-assignment," which would have been the proper terminology. Indeed, a "detail" is the movement from one Department or Agency to another which is temporary in nature whereas a "re-assignment" is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same Department or Agency . Be that as it may, the official intent of the directive was clear to move Respondent Lopez away from the CYRC and locate him in the head office, "in the exigencies of the service." Besides, proper rectification was made by Minister Laya on 7 August 1985 retroactive to 3 September 1984. Both lower Courts opined, however, that the "re-assignment" was stage-managed by Corpuz under the pretext of "exigencies of the service." Notably, the directive to Respondent Lopez was not issued by her but by the Education Minister himself. It is inconceivable that the latter official would have allowed himself to have been used as such an unwitting tool. On the contrary, he must have been aware of the "sick situation" in the CYRC, hence, the re-assignment of Respondent Lopez to another unit in the Education Ministry. 77. FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 163109. January 22, 2014.] MARICHU G. EJERA, petitioner, vs . BEAU HENRY L. MERTO and ERWIN VERGARA, respondents. FACTS The petitioner held the position of Agricultural Center Chief I in the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist in Negros Oriental.3 Her position was equivalent to the position of Senior Agriculturist, the next-in-rank to the position of Supervising Agriculturist. Upon the retirement of the Supervising Agriculturist, she applied for that position, but one Daisy Kirit was eventually appointed. She filed a protest against the appointment of Kirit before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office in Cebu City,4 but that said office dismissed her protest on May 24, 2000.5 The Central CSC Office affirmed the dismissal on July 25, 2001 under its Resolution No. 011253. Meanwhile, on September 11, 2000, respondent Provincial Agriculturist Beau Henry L. Merto issued Office Order No. 008 (Amending Office Order No. 008, Series of 2000, Re: Assignment/Re-assignment of BADC Area Coordinators and Development Team Members)7 The petitioner was one of the personnel re-assigned under Office Order No. 008. She was designated therein as the team leader in Lake Balanan and Sandulot in the Municipality of Siaton. When she refused to obey the office order, Merto ordered her on March 12, 2001 to explain in writing within 72 hours why no administrative disciplinary action should be taken against her.9 After she did not submit her explanation, Merto and respondent Atty. Erwin B. Vergara, the Provincial Legal Officer, summoned her to a conference. She and her counsel, Atty. Lenin R. Victoriano, attended the conference, but later on walked out allegedly because Vergara refused to record her objections to the questions she was being asked to answer. On April 16, 2001,10 the petitioner filed in the RTC. ISSUE WON the re-assignment is valid.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) RULING Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 lists the personnel actions that may be taken in the government service, namely: (1) appointment through certification; (2) promotion; (3) transfer; (4) reinstatement; (5) reemployment; (6) detail; and (7) reassignment. The subject of the assailed office orders was a reassignment, which is not to be confused with a transfer. The office orders themselves indicated that the personnel action involved was a reassignment, not a transfer, for, indeed, the petitioner was being moved from the organizational unit of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist in Dumaguete City to that in the barangays of the Municipality of Siaton. Section 26, Chapter 5, Title I-A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines transfer and reassignment thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary xxxx (3) Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. It shall not be considered disciplinary when made in the interest of public service, in which case, the employee concerned shall be informed of the reasons therefor. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the transfer, he may appeal his case to the Commission. The transfer may be from one department or agency to another or from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency: Provided, however, That any movement from the non-career service to the career service shall not be considered a transfer. (Emphasis supplied.) xxxx (7) Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. (Emphasis supplied.) xxxx The foregoing definition of reassignment has been adopted by the CSC in Section 10 of Rule VII (Other Personnel Action)33 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Omnibus Rules), declaring that a reassignment “is the movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment.”34chanrobleslaw Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998 (Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions) includes reassignment in the enumeration of personnel movements that do not require the issuance of a new appointment, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SEC. 6. Other Personnel Movements. The following personnel movements which will not require issuance of an appointment shall nevertheless require an office order by duly authorized official. a. Reassignment – movement of an employee from one organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary. If reassignment is without the consent

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) of the employee being reassigned, it shall be allowed only for a maximum period of one year. Reassignment is presumed to be regular and made in the interest of public service unless proven otherwise or if it constitutes constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal exists when an employee quits his work because of the agency head’s unreasonable, humiliating, or demeaning actuations which render continued work impossible. Hence, the employee is deemed to have been illegally dismissed. This may occur although there is no diminution or reduction of salary of the employee. It may be a transfer from a position of dignity to a more servile or menial job. No reassignment shall be undertaken if done indiscriminately or whimsically because the law is not intended as a convenient shield for the appointing/disciplining authority to harass or oppress a subordinate on the pretext of advancing and promoting public interest. Reassignment of small salaried employees is not permissible if it causes significant financial dislocation. Sufficient reasons to warrant the continued reassignment of the employee and performance of functions other than those attached to the position must be established. (Emphasis in the original; bold italics supplied.) That the reassignment was made without the petitioner’s consent can be deduced from her refusal to report to the station of her new assignment. Nonetheless, there is no record showing that she ever claimed that the reassignment involved a reduction in rank, status or salary. In addition, she was but one of several employees re-assigned pursuant to the questioned office orders. In view of these circumstances, she could not decline the reassignment unless she would have a valid personal reason to refuse to abide by the office orders. Yet, it was only during the trial that she revealed that her refusal to accept the re-assignment had been because of her poor health condition, i.e., due to her having had three caesarean sections and a myoma extraction, her obstetrician had advised her to refrain from extraneous activities including riding in the habal-habal (hired motorcycle) which was the only means of transportation to the barangays of the Municipality of Siaton. 35 But she lost the opportunity to ventilate her reason for refusing the reassignment by walking out of the conference instead of explaining her refusal to follow Office Order No. 008. 78. PADOLINA V FERNANDEZ GR No. 133511 10 October 2000 Facts Respondent Ofelia D. Fernandez was the PAGASA Finance and Management Division Chief of the DOST. On April 2, 1996, petitioner Padolina issued SO 129 providing for the reassignment of Branch/Division/Section Chiefs and other personnel in PAGASA. Pursuant to this order, respondent was reassigned to the Finance and Management Service Director's Office in Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Respondent requested petitioner Padolina to lift SO 129 stating that such order was tantamount to her constructive dismissal, thus, a violation of her security of tenure. However, petitioner Padolina denied the said request inasmuch as he found no compelling reason to lift SO 129. Instead, he advised the respondent to comply with the order of reassignment. Issue W/N SO 129 is valid? Held No, SO 129 is not valid. SO 129 violates the security of tenure of personnel. Furthermore, an examination of SO 129 also shows that the questioned order contains no definite date or duration of the reassignment. 79. Pastor vs City of Pasig, G.R. No. 146873, May 9, 2002

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Doctrine: Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, 26(7) of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, provides: Reassignment. An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to another in the same agency: Provided, That such reassignment shall not involve a reduction in rank, status, or salary. It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service Facts: Petitioner Remedios Pastor is Budget Officer of the Municipality (now City) of Pasig. In 1992, she was reassigned to the Office of the Municipal Administrator pending investigation of reports against her concerning the issuance of Advice of Allotments by her. In 1995, after three years with no case filed against her, she asked for reinstatement to her former position. But she was instead reassigned to another unit of the now city government. Upon her complaint, the Civil Service Commission ordered her reinstatement as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. However, on appeal of the city government, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Issue: Whether or not the reassignment of the petitioner is valid? Held: No.It has been held that a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status, and salary is in effect a constructive removal from the service.[21] In this case, contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, petitioners reassignment to different offices in the local government of Pasig City is indefinite. Petitioner has been on virtual floating assignments which cannot but amount to a diminution of her rank, hence impermissible under the law.[22] As already noted, her reassignment began in 1992 with her detail to the Office of the (now) City Administrator pending investigation of reports that she had issued Advice of Allotments without sufficient cash collections. However, no investigation appears to have ever been conducted on the said charge. To justify her continuing reassignment, respondent City Mayor claimed that the same was due to petitioners long years of experience in finance which especially fitted her for studies regarding the citys revenues. For the same reason, petitioners reassignment to various offices should be considered more than merely a temporary one. For all intents and purposes, her reassignment, lasting nearly ten years now, is a removal without cause as Budget Officer of the City of Pasig. In contrast, as head of the Pasig City Hall Annex, petitioners budget proposals for the same will be subject to review by the City Budget Officer. Moreover, the position of City Budget Officer is created by statute, while that of the head of the Pasig City Hall Annex is created by mere ordinance. We agree with the CSC that petitioner should now be returned to her original position for her indefinite detail to other positions would amount to her removal without cause from the position to which she has been permanently appointed. As we said in Cruz v. Navarro:[26] There is no question that we recognize the validity and indispensable necessity of the well established rule that for the good of public service and whenever public interest demands, [a] public official may be temporarily assigned or detailed to other duties even over his objection without necessarily violating his fundamental and legal rights to security of tenure in the civil service. But as we have already stated, such cannot be undertaken when the transfer of the employee is with a view to his removal and if the transfer is resorted to as a scheme to lure the employee away from his permanent position because such attitude is improper as it would in effect result in a circumvention of the prohibition which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the civil service. 80. Carino v. Daoas, G.R. No. 144493, 9 April 2002 FACTS: On 16 August 1995, Cristina Jenny Cariño was appointed Accountant III in the Office of the Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC), now known as the National Commission for Indigenous People. On 05 November 1996, Cariño was reassigned by Atty. David Daoas, ONCC Executive Director, to the position of Technical Assistant of the Socio-Economic Division of the ONCC. Cariño alleged that her reassignment was an offshoot of her refusal to sign1 a Disbursement Voucher for the travel expenses to Indonesia of ONCC Regional Director Rosalina Bistoyong. She further alleged that the position was non-existent. Thereafter, Cariño filed an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct, Oppression and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against Bistoyong. Bistoyong allegedly asked Cariño a number of times to withdraw the case in

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) exchange for reinstatement to her former position. Cariño refused whereupon Bistoyong threatened to reassign her to the ONCC Region II in Cagayan or in Manila. In 14 March 1997, Cariño received a faxed memorandum from Bistoyong directing her to report to the ONCC Region II office, effective 17 March 1997, in view of the reassignment of one Milagros Bonnit to the central office. On 17 March 1997, petitioner inquired with the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) regarding the propriety and legality of her reassignment. On 18 March 1997, the CSC Regional Director rendered a legal opinion that the reassignment was not in order. Atty. Daoas and Bistoyong appealed to the Civil Service Commission. Meanwhile, Cariño requested for a deferment of her reassignment to Region II. At the same time, she inquired on the possibility of her going on leave. Her request to go on leave was denied. On 14 April 1997, Atty. Daoas issued a memorandum to petitioner, reprimanding her for her failure to report at the Region II office, and stating that she was considered Absent Without Leave (AWOL) since 17 March 1997. Still, Cariño continued to report for work in Region I everyday despite the fact that she was not given any assignment. On 29 April 1997, Bistoyong issued a memorandum ordering Cariño to refrain from reporting for work in Region I and to comply with her reassignment in Region II. Henceforth, petitioner stopped reporting for work. Meanwhile, Atty. Daoas issued a Notice/Order of Separation, dated 25 April 1997, and received by Cariño on 13 May 1997 informing her that she was dropped from the rolls because of her absence without leave for more than thirty (30) days. ISSUE: Whether or not Cariño's termination was valid? HELD: No. As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, the validity of the reassignment of petitioner was already settled by the pronouncement of the Civil Service Commission that such reassignment was not valid and that she could not be transferred to another region without her consent. It is true that the transfer or detail of a public officer or employee is a prerogative of the appointing authority and that it can be done as the exigencies of the public service may require. As such, this Court in a number of cases allowed the reassignment of personnel but in such instances, they were not appointed to a specific station or particular unit or agency.The rule proscribes transfers without consent of officers appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station,such as in the case of herein petitioner who was appointed as Accountant III in Region I. Hence, she could not be reassigned to another station or region without her consent. Otherwise, the unconsented transfer would amount to a removal. It was not petitioner who appealed to the Commission as there was no need for her to do so. The situation prevailing in the case at bar was that the CSC Regional Officer issued a legal opinion that petitioners reassignment was not in order and that her present assignment at the ONCC Regional Office No. 1 must not be disturbed. It was in fact due to this legal opinion that private respondents went to the Commission on appeal, which appeal was eventually denied. As we stated earlier, the Commission eventually declared the reassignment of petitioner as not valid, and respondent Daoas was directed to return petitioner to Region I. The CSC Regional Office must be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of its duties. Hence, when it rendered a legal opinion as regards the reassignment of petitioner, it must be considered in order and should be respected pending appeal by private respondents. Petitioner is thus justified in not heeding her reassignment order because her basis was not, as stated by the appellate court, her firm belief that her transfer was illegal, but the legal opinion of a regional office of the Civil Service Commission. Petitioner could not therefore be considered AWOL because she was in fact reporting for work in Region I until 29 April 1997 when Bistoyong issued a memorandum ordering her to refrain from reporting for work therein. 81. ORTIZ vs. COMELEC, 162 SCRA 812 G.R. No. 78957 June 28, 1988 FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioner Mario D. Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections COMELEC by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992." He took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. The Freedom Constitution was promulgated which reorganized the government. On April 16,1986, the members of the COMELEC, which included Mario D. Ortiz, adopted a Resolution approving the application for retirement of Commissioners Savellano and Opinion. Seven days later, the same body passed another resolution approving the application for retirement of Commissioner Guro. On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the information to Commissioners that the President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations,effective immediately." After the presidential acceptance of said "resignations," there was a new composition of the COMELEC. It was to this body that Commissioners Ortiz and three more members submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for retirement. The COMELEC revoked the two Resolutions, and denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor. Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, contending that he was entitled to the benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. He averred therein that he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had in fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his] office and eventual replacement," and that he was entitled to retirement benefits under the aforementioned law because Article 1186 of the Civil Code which states that "the condition [with regard to an obligation] shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment." He invoked the aforequoted provisions of Proclamation No. 3 and cited the cases of former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and Associate Justice Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. who were allowed to retire by this Court and receive retirement benefits. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s act is considered as an act of resignation HELD: No. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25,1986 when she called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in public administration. Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power.

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DE FACTO OFFICERS 82. Torres vs Ribo 81 Phil 44 FACTS: The protestant, Bernardo Torres, and the defendants, Mamerto S. Ribo and Alejandro Balderian, were opposing candidates for provincial governor of Leyte in the general elections held on November 11, 1947. As Mamerto S. Ribo, who was provincial governor, and two members of the provincial board were candidates, they are disqualified to form parts of the provincial board of canvassers of which they were to be members under section 158 of the Revised Election Code. Consequently, and in pursuance of Section 159, the Commission on Elections, in a telegram to the provincial treasurer dated November 20 and received on November 21 in Tacloban, Leyte, appointed the division superintendent of schools, the district engineer and the district health officer to replace the disqualified members, with advice that they might assume office upon receipt of their appointments. It so happened that the division superintendent of schools and the district engineer were on that date on the west coast of the province and did not return to Tacloban until the 24th. In the meantime, on November 22, F. Martinez, provincial treasurer, as chairman, Gregorio Abogado, provincial fiscal, Vicente Tizon, assistant civil engineer in the district engineer's office, Evaristo Pascual, chief clerk in the office of the division superintendent of schools, and W. Enage, acting district health officer, canvassed the votes for provincial governor and other officers and proclaimed "Mamerto S. Ribo as Governor-elect." Vicente Tizon and Evaristo Pascual sat as members "representing the district engineer and the division superintendent of schools respectively. On November 24, 1947, the provincial board of canvassers again met, the meeting this time being attended by the provincial treasurer, the provincial fiscal, the district health officer, the division superintendent of schools, the district engineer and the provincial auditor. In that meeting the board made a new canvass of the votes and proclaimed Mamerto S. Ribo elected to the office of provincial governor. ISSUE: 1. WON assistant civil engineer Vicente Tizon and chief clerk Evaristo Pascual lawful members of the provincial board of canvassers? 2. WON Tizon and Pascual can be considered as de facto officers? HELD: 1. NO. It does not appear, and there is no pretense on the part of the protestee, that the division superintendent of schools and the district engineer delegated their authority to Pascual and Tizon. Upon whose instance or suggestion these two presumed to act in representation of their chiefs is nor shown. Section 158 of the Revised Election Code designates the officers who are to comprise the provincial board of canvassers, and section 159 enumerates the officers to be appointed substitute members by the Commission on Elections in case of the absence or incapacity of any of the members named in the next preceding section. They are the division superintendent of schools, the district health officer, the register of deeds, the clerk of the Court of First Instance, and the justice of the peace of the provincial capital. This express enumeration excludes other officers. Expresio unius est exclusio alterius. Not even the Commission on Elections may lawfully appoint any of the person or officer outside of those mentioned. Much less may any one other than this officers act as the member of the provincial board of canvasser by delegation by a substitute members, by the indication of other members of the board, or of his own volition. The appointment of a substitute member is personal and restricted and his powers must be performed directly and in person by the appointee. To hold otherwise would be to authorize the appointment, say, by the provincial treasurer, the provincial auditor, or the provincial fiscal of another person to act in his stead and thus take away from the hands of the Commission on Elections the authority to appoint under section 159. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted can not delegate it to another. The powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial, as the court below erroneously holds. The board excercise quasi judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determined whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers. Thus, where what purports to be two or more returns from the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) same municipality are received, the canvassing board must necessarily determine from the face of the papers which one shall be regarded as the true and genuine return. (20 C. J., 201-202.). 2. NO. An officer de facto is one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law. He must have 1) acted as an officer for such a length of time, 2) under color of title and 3) under such circumstances of reputation or acquiescence by the public and public authorities, as to afford a presumption of appointment or election, and induce people, without injury, and relying on the supposition that he is the officer he assumes to be, to submit to or invoke his action. (46 C. J., 1053.) Tizon and Pascual did not possess any of these conditions. They acted without any appointment, commission or any color of title to the office. There was no acquiescence, public or private, in their discharge of the position. In fact the very person most greatly affected by their assumption of the office, Bernardo Torres, was not notified and was not unaware of it. 83. G.R. No. L-23258

July 1, 1967

ROBERTO R. MONROY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and FELIPE DEL ROSARIO, respondent. FACTS: Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per resolution,1 approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. Upon these facts, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, held in the suit for injunction instituted by petitioner against respondents that (a) the former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed on September 15, 1961; (b) respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such on September 21, 1961; (c) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office; and (d) petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages. This judgment was, on appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, affirmed in t o t o except for the award of moral damages which was eliminated. The same Court reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's filing a motion to reconsider. Hence, this petition for certiorari to review the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner first argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals had done what they had no jurisdiction to do — review a resolution of the Commission on Elections. Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming a lower court judgment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor. In support of this he relies solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan , 91 Phil. 724, holding that a senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against the successful protestant. Petitioner's factual premise is the appellate court's finding that he was a de facto officer when he continued occupying the office of mayor after September 15, 1961. ISSUES: 1. WON petitioner is de facto officer who can retain his salaries and not pay Del Rosario 2. WON lower court and CA can review a resolution of Comelec HELD: That the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title"that applies in the present case. The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the de facto officer who did actual work is recognized; but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de fact o doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.7 The question of compensation involves different principles and concepts however. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the d e j u r e officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office. The only interest and for that matter, jurisdiction, of the Commission on Elections in this regard is to know who are the running candidates for the forthcoming elections, for that affects the conduct of election. So when petitioner withdrew the certificate announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the Commission could be concerned, petitioner was no longer interested in running for that seat. The matter of his having forfeited his present position and the possible legal effect thereon by the withdrawal of his certificate was completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly fell within the cognizance of the courts. 84. REYNALDO TUANDA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 249 SCRA 342 FACTS: Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of the Department of Local Government. They took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. The latter, however, denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral representatives. Undaunted, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives. Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against petitioners for violation of section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on the ground that petitioners refused to give them their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitioners filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a prejudicial question exists in the civil case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by petitioners. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioners' motion for suspension of their arraignment. ISSUE: Whether or not the designated officers are entitled to salaries for services actually rendered. HELD: NO. Petition was granted. We find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered. The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: 1) There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the aforestated elements are present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office. Digested by Tolentino, Fatima 85. FELIPE TAYKO vs. NICOLAS CAPISTRANO G.R. No. L-30188, October 2, 1928, FACTS: The petitioners allege that Capistrano was appointed judge of the CFI of Oriental Negros, to hold office during good behavior and until he should reach the age of 65 years; that he now has reached that age and, therefore,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) under the provisions of section 148 of the Administrative Code as amended, is disqualified from acting as a judge of the Court of First Instance.The petitioners further allege that in view of the many election protests and criminal cases for violation of the election law filed in the CFI of Oriental Negros arising in the from the last election, de la Costa was duly designated and acted as auxiliary judge. There was an understanding that de la Costa would hear and take cognizance of all election protests and criminal actions then pending or to filed arising from the said last general election, and that Capistrano would try and hear the ordinary cases pending. Notwithstanding the understanding, Capistrano tried and is still trying to take cognizance of the election protests and criminal actions in said court; declared in open court that he will try the criminal cases for the reason that de la Costa refused to try the same on the ground that the preliminary investigations were held before him, when, in truth and in fact, the d la Costa did not make the statement imputed to him and was and is still willing to try the election protests and criminal cases for violation of the election law pending in the court.Additionally that Capistrano, in spite of the fact that he was holding and is now pretending to hold the office of judge took great interest and active part in the filing of criminal charges against the petitioners to the unjustifiable extent of appointing a deputy fiscal, who then filed the proper informations, when the provincial fiscal refused to file criminal charges against the petitioners for violation of the election law for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain the same. Finally, that Capistrano is neither a judge de jure nor de facto, but that he continues to hold the office of judge and pretends to be duly qualified and acting judge of the said province; and that he has tried, and continues to try, to act as such judge. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Capistrano, upon reaching the age of 65, can still continue public office? Is he considered a de facto judge? RULING: Yes. Yes. Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto (Brown vs. O'Connell, 36 Conn., 432). He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act officially without any color of right, and on the other hand, from a judge de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose term of office has not expired. Apart from any constitutional or statutory regulation on the subject there seems to be a general rule of law that an incumbent of an office will hold over after the conclusion of his term until the election and qualification of a successor. When a judge in good faith remains in office after his title has ended, he is a de facto officer. Applying the principles stated to the facts set forth in the petition before us, we cannot escape the conclusion that, on the assumption that said facts are true, the respondent judge must be considered a judge de facto. His term of office may have expired, but his successor has not been appointed, and as good faith is presumed, he must be regarded as holding over in good faith. The contention of counsel for the petitioners that the auxiliary judge present in the district must be considered the regular judge seems obviously erroneous.Accordingly, it is a well established principle, dating from the earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. The principle is one founded in policy and convenience, for the right of no one claiming a title or interest under or through the proceedings of an officer having an apparent authority to act would be safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the title of such officer up to its original source, and the title or interest of such person were held to be invalidated by some accidental defect or flaw in the appointment, election or qualification of such officer, or in the rights of those from whom his appointment or election emanated; nor could the supremacy of the laws be maintained, or their execution enforced, if the acts of the judge having a colorable, but not a legal title,were to be deemed invalid. As in the case of judges of courts of record, the acts of a justice de facto cannot be called in question in any suit to which he is not a party. Petition is sustained. 86. RODRIGUEZ V TAN 91 PHIL 724 Facts Eulogio Rodriguez claims that Carlos Tan usurped the office of the Senator of the Philippines and collected salaries, emoluments and privileges attendant to that office. Issue

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) W/N Carlos Tan may be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency to Eulogio Rodriguez? Held No, Carlos Tan may not be ordered to reimburse the salaries and emoluments he has received during his incumbency. There is no question that the defendant acted as a de facto officer during the time he held the office of Senator. He was one of the candidates of the Liberal Party in the elections of November 11, 1947, and was proclaimed as one of those who had been elected by the Commission on Elections, and thereafter he took the oath of office and immediately entered into the performance of the duties of the position. Having been thus duly proclaimed as Senator and having assumed office as required by law, it cannot be disputed that defendant is entitled to the compensation, emoluments and allowances which our Constitution provides for the position (article VI, section 14). This is as it should be. This is in keeping with the ordinary course of events. This is simple justice. The emolument must go to the person who rendered the service unless the contrary is provided. There is no averment in the complaint that he is linked with any irregularity vitiating his election. This is the policy and the rule that has been followed consistently in this jurisdiction in connection with positions held by persons who had been elected thereto but were later ousted as a result of an election protest. The right of the persons elected to compensation during their incumbency has always been recognized. We cannot recall of any precedent wherein the contrary rule has been upheld. 87. LINO LUNA vs. RODRIGUEZ (JOSE LINO LUNA vs. EULOGIO EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, appellant) G.R. No. L-12647

FACTS:

RODRIGUEZ

and

SERVANDO

DE

LOS

ANGELES

November 26, 1917

In an earlier case (Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-12581), it appears from the record that an election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held it on the 6th day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast in the various municipalities were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of canvassers, who, after a canvass of said returns, the provincial board of canvassers declared that the respondent herein had received a majority of the votes cast, and duly proclaimed him elected as governor of said province, and thereafter issued to him a certificate to that effect. After securing the certificate of election the protestee (respondent herein) took the oath of office and duly entered into the possession of the same on the 16th day of October, 1916. A protest was duly presented, an answer was filed, and a trial was had which closed on the 5th day of October, 1916, and the cause was submitted to the court for decision. The record shows that the opinion of the judge was signed by him on the 14th day of January, 1917, but was not filed with the clerk of the court until the 17th day of January, 1917. Notice of said opinion was given to the respective parties on the 17th day of January, 1917. The appellant alleges that at the time said opinion was filed and the decision promulgated, the judge who wrote the opinion was not then judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal. The appellant asserts that the judge who wrote the opinion was not judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Rizal at the time said opinion was filed with the clerk; that he had theretofore vacated his office as judge of said court and had become "Secretary of Finance," in the executive department of the Government. These are the facts which constituted the basis of the motion for a new trial presented by the appellant in the court below and the facts which he desired an opportunity to prove.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not the judge who wrote the opinion was either a judge de jure or de facto at the time the same was promulgated as a decision of the court. If not, what will be the effect of his opinion?

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and declared that the decision signed by Judge Alberto Barretto is void. In order that a court may promulgate a legal decision or judgment two things are essential and necessary: (a) There must be a court legally organized or constituted; and (b) there must be a judge, or judges, legally appointed or elected and actually acting, either de jure or de facto. If either of these essentials is absent then the judgment promulgated is a nullity. If there is no legal court there can be no legal judgment. The same is true if there is no judge. It is sufficient that there has been a judge of the court. There must be no one actually acting either de jure or de facto. Under said section 13 (Act No. 867), it is clear the Legislature intended that the judge, when he was given permission to prepare his opinion in the manner therein indicated, should still be judge at the time of the promulgation thereof, or otherwise it would not have provided that the opinion should be promulgated in the same manner as if he were present at the time of the promulgation. If he had ceased to be judge and had ceased to be acting as judge, then, of course, he could not be present as judge at the time of the promulgation of the opinion as a decision. In order to be a de facto judge he must still be actually acting under some color of right. He cannot be actually acting under any color of right when he has ceased to be judge and has actually vacated the office by the acceptance of another office and by actually entering upon the duties of the other office. His acceptance of another office is not inconsistent with the idea of his actually continuing to act in his former office; but when he actually accepts another incompatible office and actually enters upon the performance of the other office, his vacation of the former office is established thereby, unless there is some proof to the contrary. No attempt is made, even now, to show that the judge who prepared the opinion in the present case had not actually ceased to act as judge before the promulgation of the opinion in question. The rendition of a judgment or decree is the judicial act of a court in pronouncing its decision, as distinguished from the ministerial act of the clerk in recording the same. The judgment is the act of the court. The clerk records the judgment of the court, but does not thereby render the judgement. The rendition of a judgment is necessarily a judicial act of a court. It is essential to the validity and conclusiveness of a judgment or decree that there should be some judicial action, but the court, constituting a rendition. It is also essential to the validity and conclusiveness of a judgment or decree that there shall be a legally constituted judge or judges, either de jure or de facto, at the time said judgment is rendered. It is essential element to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some color of right. If he has ceased to be judge by actually accepting and entering into some other office and has actually entered upon the performance of the duties of the other office, it is difficult to understand how he can still be considered as actually occupying and performing the duties of the office which he had abandoned and vacated. An abandonment and a vacation of an office is inconsistent and repugnant to the idea of actually continuing to perform the duties of such office. There may be cases, however, where the judge de jure has been appointed or elected to some other office and has accepted said other office without actually entering upon the performance of the duties of the other office and continues to act as judge. In such a case he will be considered as a judge de facto.

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*A judge de jure is one who is exercising the office of a judge as a matter of right. He is an officer of a court which has been duly and legally elected or appointed. He is an officer of the law fully vested with all of the powers and functions conceded under the law to a judge which relate to the administration of justice within the jurisdiction over which he presides. *A judge de facto is an officer who is not fully invested with all of the powers and duties conceded to judges, but is exercising the office of judge under some color of right. A judge de facto may be said to be one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law — that is, there exists some defect in his appointment or election and in his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time. 88. GARCHITORENA vs. CRESCINI 37 PHIL 675 FACTS: An election was held in Ambos Camarines for governor, and other provincial and municipal officers on July 6, 1916. Andres Garchitorena, Manuel Crescini, Engracio Imperial, and Francisco Botor were candidates for the office of governor. Immediately upon notice of proclamation of winners, Andres Garchitorena presented a protest against said election, alleging that many frauds and irregularities had been committed in various municipalities of said province. Said protest was filed in the Court of First Instance in the said province. After trial, Judge Mina filed a decision with the clerk of court on April 27, 1917. Appellant Crescini contended that at the time the said decision was filed with the clerk, Judge Mina, the judge who prepared and filed it was not a judge of the court, neither de jure nor de facto. Crescini said that the judge who filed the decision was one of the auxiliary judges of the Court of First Instance but on January 27, 1917, he was appointed as Director of the Bureau of Lands, took the oath of such office and began to draw his salary as such on March 28, 1917. Crescini added that since a certain Candelario Borja, having been appointed auxiliary judge of the Court of First Instance of Ambo Camarines on March 16, 1917, the decision of the former judge should be considered null and void because the judge cannot be considered a judge de jure/de facto. ISSUE: WON the judge who filed the decision can be considered a judge de jure/de facto HELD: No, the judge who filed the decision cannot be considered a judge de jure/de facto. The said judge had ceased to be auxiliary judge of said province on March 28, 1917 when he took his oath of office for the position of Director of Lands. He cannot be considered a judge de jure for the reason that another judge was actually acting in his place and stead and had been for nearly a month prior to promulgation of the decision in question on April 27, 1917. Neither can he be considered a judge de facto for the reason that there was a de jure judge actually discharging the functions of the office in question. THERE CANNOT BE A DE FACTO JUDGE WHEN THERE IS A DE JURE JUDGE IN THE ACTUAL PERFORMANCE of the duties of the office. In order to be a de facto judge, he must still be acting under some color of right. He cannot be actually acting under any color of right when he has ceased to be judge and has actually vacated office by the acceptance of another office. SC: The decision of the judge was revoked. The records of the case returned to the court

89. Solis v. Court of Appeals, 38 SCRA 53 FACTS: Petitioner Gregorio Solis and several other co-accused were indicted, tried and found guilty of malversation of public funds. The judgment was penned and signed on 19 June 1954 by the Honorable Jose N. Leuterio, then Judge-at-Large assigned to Camarines Sur. Subsequently, RA 1186, which abolished all existing positions of Judges-at-Large, took effect without Executive approval.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The defendants appeared before the court; this time, the court was presided over by Honorable Perfecto R. Palacio, judge of another sala of the court. Judge Palacio promulgated the judgment of Judge Leuterio, against the objections of herein petitioner. ISSUE: Whether the decision of the CFI is valid HELD: NO. Upon the facts heretofore stated, the judgment of trial judge Jose N. Leuterio was promulgated (on 21 June 1954) one (1) day after his position as Judge-at-Large was abolished (on 20 June 1954) by Republic Act 1186. The judgment is, therefore, void, for it is now firmly established in our jurisprudence that a decision is void if promulgated after the judge who rendered it had permanently ceased to be a judge of the court where he sat in judgment. Thus, a judgment is a nullity if it had been promulgated after the judge had actually vacated the office and accepted another office; or when the term of office of the judge has ended; or when he has left the Bench; or after the judge had vacated his post in view of the abolition of his position as Judge-at-Large under Republic Act 1186; or after the cessation or termination of his incumbency as such judge. Section 6 of Rule 116 of the old Rules of Court, allowing the dispensing with the presence of the judge in the reading of a sentence, applies only to the physical absence of the judge, being construed to mean that the decision of the judge may be promulgated even without his presence, as long as he is still a judge of that court. A sentence has been set aside where the judge who presided in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija had been extended an ad interim appointment to the Court of First Instance of Manila, to which position he qualified before the judgment was filed with the Clerk of the former court. Nullity likewise attached to a dismissal order when the temporary assignment of the judge that rendered it had been terminated before the order was issued, because a new judge for the same court qualified. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, supra, a judge de facto was defined as one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and yet is not a good officer in point of law because there exists some defect in his appointment or his right to exercise judicial functions at the particular time; but it is "essential to the validity of the acts of a de facto judge, that he is actually acting under some color of right". In the present case, Judge Leuterio did not actually act or perform or exercise the duties of judge when his decision was promulgated as he had ceased to be one, and the decision was promulgated under another presiding judge. FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur are hereby voided and set aside.lâwphî1.ñèt The record of the criminal cases are hereby ordered returned to the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for new adjudication by the judge presiding therein, in accordance with the evidence already introduced, and for further proceeding conformable to law. No costs.

90. MONA A. TOMALI vs. CSC FACTS: On 01 July 1990, petitioner Mona A. Tomali was appointed Development Management Officer II ("DMO II") in the Office on Muslim Affairs ("OMA"). The appointment was extended by then OMA Executive Director Dimasangcay A. Pundato. She assumed the duties and functions of the office four months later, or on 01 November 1990, at which time, the appointment had not yet been transmitted to the Civil Service Commission ("CSC") for approval. On 16 July 1991, the new Director of the OMA, Dr. Ali Basir Lucman, revoking the previous incomplete appointment of petitioner, appointed private respondent Rocaina M. Lucman to the position in question (DMO II). Petitioner, on 29 July 1991, sent public respondent OMA a letter protesting her replacement. On 01 August 1991, the Chief of the Human Resources Management Division of the OMA communicated to petitioner the disapproval/expiration of her appointment. Forthwith, private respondent took her oath of office and assumed the duties and functions of DMO II. On 12 August 1991, petitioner reiterated her protest. The Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), acting thereon, rendered a decision, dated 23 July 1992, dismissing the protest/complaint for lack of merit. MSPB held:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Glaring is the fact that protestant's appointment to the contested position was not approved by the Civil Service Commission, hence, incomplete. In this regard, Section 11, Rule V, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, Administrative Code of 1987 is clear and explicit. Said provision reads, thus: Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission, within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance, which shall be the date appearing on the face of the instrument, shall be ineffective. As applied to the case of the herein protestant, it appears that the latter has no basis in law to cling to the contested position. Her prior continuous stay in office was at most by mere tolerance of the appointing authority. As her appointment is incomplete for lack of the requisite approval of the Civil Service Commission or its proper Regional or Field Office, no right to security of tenure as guaranteed by law and the Constitution attaches thereto or for incumbent to invoke. . . . . That being so, the proper appointing authority, in this case, the OMA Executive Director may, in the exercise of sound discretion, cancel or revoke the said incomplete appointment and appoint another person. The circumstance showing that the non-approval of protestant's appointment was due to the belated transmittal thereof to this Commission is of no consequence nor improve her lot as a holder of an incomplete appointment. There is no showing that the non-submission was motivated by bad faith, spite or malice or at least attributable to the fault of the newly-installed OMA Executive Director. Her request for reconsideration having been denied on 27 November 1992, petitioner appealed to the CSC. In its Resolution No. 93-945, dated 12 March 1993, the Commission dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. Hence, the instant recourse to this Court. ISSUE: WON petitioner was properly appointed. HELD: NO. An appointment to a position in the civil service is required to be submitted to the CSC for approval in order to determine, in main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to hold the position and whether or not the rules pertinent to the process of appointment are followed; thus: Sec. 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. — The Commission shall administer the Civil Service and shall have the following powers and functions: (h) Approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service, except those of presidential appointees, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, police forces, firemen, and jailguards, and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualifications. An appointment shall take effect immediately upon issue by the appointing authority if the appointee assumes his duties immediately and shall remain effective until it is disapproved by the Commission, if this should take place, without prejudice to the liability of the appointing authority for appointments issued in violation of existing laws or rules: Provided, finally, That the Commission shall keep a record of appointments of all officers and employees in the civil service. All appointments requiring the approval of the Commission as herein provided, shall be submitted to it by the appointing authority within thirty days from issuance, otherwise the appointment becomes ineffective thirty days thereafter. The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987, among other things, provides: Sec. 11. An appointment not submitted to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of issuance which shall be the date appearing to the face of the appointment, shall be ineffective. . . . . Compliance with the legal requirements for an appointment to a civil service position is essential in order to make it fully effective. Without the favorable certification or approval of the Commission, in cases when such approval is required, no title to the office can yet be deemed to be permanently vested in favor of the appointee, and the appointment can still be recalled or withdrawn by the appointing authority. Until an appointment has become a completed act, it would likewise be precipitate to invoke the rule on security of tenure.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioner herself would not appear to be all that blameless. She assumed the position four months after her appointment was issued or months after that appointment had already lapsed or had become ineffective by operation of law. Petitioner's appointment was issued on 01 July 1990, but it was only on 31 May 1991 that it was submitted to the CSC, a fact which she knew, should have known or should have at least verified considering the relatively long interval of time between the date of her appointment and the date of her assumption to office. The CSC, such as to be expected, disapproved the appointment in consonance with Presidential Decree No. 807. It was well within the authority and discretion of the new OMA Director, therefore, to appoint private respondent, and such prerogative could not be questioned even on a showing that petitioner might have been better qualified for the position. The rule has always been that an appointment is essentially a discretionary act, performed by an officer in whom it is vested according to his best judgment, the only condition being that the appointee should possess all the qualifications required therefor. There is nothing on record to convince us that the new OMA Director has unjustly favored private respondent nor has exercised his power of appointment in an arbitrary, whimsical or despotic manner.

91. FLORES V. DRILON, GR NO. 104732, JUNE 22, 1993 FACTS: The case is about the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). Paragraph (d) reads — (d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied). According to the petitioner, said provision infringes on the following constitutional and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure," 3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", 4 since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; 5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits appointment of new employees or creation of new positions forty five days before election. ISSUE: W/N Mayor Gordon may be considered as a de facto officer RULING: As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered ade facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 92. MENZON VS PETILLA G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991 Doctrine: Right of a de facto officer to salary: Where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer who, in good faith, has possession of the office and has discharged the duties thereof, is entitled to salary. On February 16, 1988 the Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte. On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. The petitioner took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo on March 29, 1988. On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. Rubillar stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of the petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently assume the functions of both offices. Due this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. The petitioner clarified the matter to USec Rubillar, The fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan member was temporarily designated to perform the functions of the vice-governor could not be considered that the Sangguniang member succeeds to the office of the latter, for it is basic that designation is merely an imposition of additional duties to be performed by the designee in addition to the official functions attached to his office. Thus, Resolution No. 505 was modified to include the payment of salary of petitioner while was acting as ViceGovernor. In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte. On May 16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor. However, on September 6, 1990, respondent Leopoldo Petilla, by virtue of the above resolution requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte all the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. ISSUE: WON petitioner, as a de facto officer, is entitled to salary. HELD: The Court held that since there was a vacancy in the position of Vice-Governor, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. The petitioner, for a long period of time, exercised the duties attached to the Office of the Vice-Governor. He was acclaimed as such by the people of Leyte. Upon the principle of public policy on which the de facto doctrine is

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) based and basic considerations of justice, it would be highly iniquitous to now deny him the salary due him for the services he actually rendered as the acting Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. 93. Sampayan vs Daza 213 SCRA 807 Facts: On February 18, 1992, the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of Northern Samar on the ground that the latter is a green card holder and a permanent resident of the USA. Petitioners allege that Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of BP. 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners manifested before us that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. Daza filed his comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States and claiming that he long waived such status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. Issue: Whether Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code? Held: No. This case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. A writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. As a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 94. General Manager, PPA VS Montserate FACTS: PPA was reorganized in 1988. Monserate applied for a permanent position of Manager II of Resource Management Division and she was appointed as such. However, upon the protest of Anino, Monserate‘s appointment was rendered ineffective without any explanation. She was not notified of any hearing for the said replacement. She was reappointed to a lower position as Administrative Officer with lower salary grade than what she was already receiving. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CSC. She subsequently filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review which the latter rendered a Decision nullifying the twin Resolutions of the CSC. The CA concluded that her reassignment from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the position of Administrative Officer was a demotion violative of her constitutional right to security of tenure and due process. ISSUE: Whether or not Monserate was validly replaced HELD: No. In the first place, the PPA reorganization in 1988 has nothing to do with respondents demotion from the contested position of Manager II, Resource Management Office (SG-19), to the lower position of Administrative Officer (SG-15). Antithetically, it was precisely because of the said reorganization that respondent applied to the higher position of Division Manager II. In fact, the Comparative Data Sheet accomplished by the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) PPA Reorganization Task Force itself shows that respondent ranked No. 1, while petitioner Anino ranked No. 2, from among the six (6) contenders to the said post. Respondent was eventually issued a permanent appointment as such Division Manager on February 1, 1988 by then PPA General Maximo Dumlao, Jr., during which time she actually assumed office and discharged its functions. This appointment was later approved on July 8, 1988 by the CSC, through Assistant Director Guillermo R. Silva of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA. Clearly, it was only after the reorganization and upon the issuance of the August 11, 1988 Resolution of the PPA Appeals Board when respondent was demoted to the lower position of Administrative Officer. This is further shown by the following orders and appointments subsequently issued by then PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan. Therefore, contrary to petitioners claim, respondent was demoted, not by reason of the PPA reorganization in 1988, but due to the PPA Appeals Board Resolution dated August 11, 1988 sustaining petitioner Aninos protest against respondents appointment. From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural irregularities attended respondents demotion from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the lower position of Administrative Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and due process. Concededly, the appointing authority has a wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondents security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of the appointing power. 95. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 194 SCRA 317 FACTS: In sum, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by Pres. Cory Aquino is being challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution. According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII thereof; and (2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII. Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents may be considered as de facto officers in this case

RULING: Finding Executive Order No. 284 to be constitutionally infirm, the court hereby orders respondents Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos, Secretary of National Defense Fidel V. Ramos, Secretary of Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon and Secretary of the Budget Guillermo Carague to immediately relinquish their other offices or employment, as herein defined, in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) With respect to the other named respondents, the petitions have become moot and academic as they are no longer occupying the positions complained of. During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. This doctrine is, undoubtedly, supported on equitable grounds since it seems unjust that the public should benefit by the services of an officer de facto and then be freed from all liability to pay any one for such services. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them

96. MALALUAN VS COMELEC G.R. 120193, March 6, 1996 Facts: Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against petitioners 9,792 votes. Evangelista was, thus, said to have a winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court decision to the COMELEC. Just a day thereafter that is, on February 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial court, in an order, dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed the office of MunicipaJ Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluans continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision. Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. However, the question as to damages remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorneys fees, actual expenses for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en mUsse denominated as actual damages, default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial. Issue: Whether or not the the award of salaries and other emoluments to be improper and lacking legal sanction because the private respondent is a usurper? Held: We hold that petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act officially without any color of right,[31] the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color of election thereto.[32] It matters not that it was the trial court and not the COMELEC that declared petitioner as the winner, because both, at different stages of the electoral process, have the power to so proclaim winners in electoral contests. At the risk of sounding repetitive, if only to emphasize this point, we must reiterate that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) for a winning candidates right to assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. We deem petitioner, therefore, to be a de facto officer who, in good faith, has haa possession of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto[33] and is thus legally entitled to the emoluments of the office.[34] To recapitulate, Section 259 of the Omnibus Election Code only provides for the granting in election cases of actual and compensatory damages in accordance with law. The victorious party in an election case cannot be indemnified for expenses which he has incurred in an electoral contest in the absence of a wrongful act or omission or breach of obligation clearly attributable to the losing party. Evidently, if any damage had been suffered by private respondent due to the execution ofjudgment pending appeal, that damage may be said to be equivalent to damnum absque injuria, which is, damage without injury, or damage or injury inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage without violation of a legal right, or a wrong done to a man for which the law provides no remedy.[35]

AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER 97. Kilusang Bayan v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92 FACTS: The KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the New Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa pursuant to PD No. 175. The Municipal government of Muntinlupa entered into a contract with KBMBPM for the management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. It provided for a 25-year term, renewable for the same period, unless terminated by the mutual agreement of the parties. Ignacio Bunye, as acting Mayor, ordered a review of the said contract for being contrary to BP 337 (Local Government Code). The COA and the Metro Manila Commission urged to take the appropriate steps to rescind the contract. Thus, subsequently, Bunye and the Municipal Council approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. Thereafter, Bunye announced to the stallholders that they should pay their market fees to the Market Commission and no longer the KBMBPM. KBMBPM filed a complaint in the RTC of Makati contending that the Bunye’s acted in excess of his authority in illegally taking over the public market, and thus constitutes a breach of contract and duty as a public official. Thereafter, two petitions were filed (but only the first one is connected to Admin, the second one is about Criminal Law): FIRST PETITION: G.R. No. 85439 Mayor Bunye and his companions allegedly through force, violence and intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of petitioners at the second floor of the KBS Building to serve the Order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture, which provides that the KBMBPM is not operating in accordance with PD No. 23, and thus, shall be placed under the MANAGEMENT TAKE-OVER of the Department of Agriculture to preserve the financial interest of its members. Subsequently, petitioners contend that Respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order. 1. Petitioners filed aMotion praying that respondent Atty. Rogelio Madriaga, who had assumed the position of Chairman of the Management Committee, be ordered to stop and/or cancel the scheduled elections of the officers of the KBMBPM and desist from scheduling any election of officers or Members of the Board of Directors thereof until further orders on the Court. The elections were,nevertheless, held and a new board of directors was elected. 2.Bunye denies the allegations and contends that the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 3. The Office of the Solicitor General asserts the following:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) a. The individual petitioners, who were not allegedly elected by the members or duly designated by the BACOD Director, have no right or authority to file this case; b. The assailed Order of the Secretary was valid and was issued pursuant to P.D. No. 175, which authorizes him "(d) to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative after hearing and when in its judgment and based on findings, such cooperative is operating in violation of this Decree, rules and regulations, existing laws as well as the by-laws of the cooperative itself;" c. The Order is reasonably necessary to correct serious flaws in the cooperative and provide interim measures until election of regular members to the board and officers thereof; d. The elections conducted are valid; and e. That the motion to dismiss filed by the new board of directors binds the cooperative. It prays for the dismissal of the petition. ISSUES: 1. WON petitioners can bring the present action 2. WON petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies 3. WON the Order of the Secretary of Agriculture was valid HELD: 1. YES. Respondents challenge the personality of the petitioners to bring this action, set up the defense of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, and assert that the Order was lawfully and validly issued under the above decree and Executive Order. Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning precisely the act of respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors; they then pray that this Court restore them to their prior stations. 2. NO. The rule is well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners, which, as hereinafter shown, is correct. 3. NO. Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives. The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution. The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. Likewise, even if We grant, for the sake of argument, that said power includes the power to disband the board of directors and remove the officers of the KBMBPM, and that a hearing was not expressly required in the law, still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due process to the affected parties, herein petitioners.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well, not even a semblance of a hearing. The Order was based solely on an alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. There was then a clear denial of due process. 98.

JANDAYAN

vs.

RUIZ 95

SCRA

562

FACTS: A resort to a habeas corpus proceeding would not have been necessary had there been a little more attention paid to the authoritative doctrine. Petitioner, Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan, had to be confined in the Bohol provincial jail on July 16, 1973 when respondent Judge Fernando S. Ruiz of the court of the First Instance of Bohol 1 promulgated the sentence in the accordance with a decision of the then judge Paulino Marquez, dated June 22, 1973, notwithstanding the undeniable fact that such judge had retired by reason of age as far back as June 27, 1973. This, then is essentially a proper case for the invocation of the great writ of liberty, although counsel for petitioner did likewise label his pleading as one for certiorari and mandamus. It is regrettable that respondent judge failed to yield deference to the authoritative controlling doctrine as to the competence of a judge to continue discharging the functions of his office after retirement. It is commendable of Solicitor General E Estelito P. Mendoza 2 then, that when required to comment, he made clear that he was in agreement with petitioner and that the promulgation of the sentence made on July 16, 1973 by respondent Judge on the basis of what purportedly was a decision of the retired Judge Paulino Marquez should be set aside and that petitioner should be released from confinement without prejudice to the proceedings being continued according to law. That, in the opinion of the Court, is likewise the proper disposition of this case. The facts, as succinctly set forth in the comment of the Solicitor General follows: "On May 10, 1973 petitioner was convicted of Serious Physical Injuries through Reckless Imprudence by the Municipal Court of Loay, Bohol and sentenced to suffer three (3) months of Arrests Mayor. On appeal, the case (Crim. Case No. 706) was raffled to the CFI of Bohol, Branch 1, presided over by the Honorable Paulino Marquez. On June 26, 1973, an order was served on petitioner that the promulgation of the decision would take place on July 6, 1973. On June 27, 1973, Judge Paulino Marquez retired from service. ... Upon motion of counsel for petitioner, the promulgation of decision was postponed from July 6 to July 12. Finally on July 16, 1973, the decision dated June 22, 1973 as prepared and signed by Judge Marquez was promulgated by respondent Judge." What other conclusion, then. could such facts lead to except the following, as set forth in the above comment of the Solicitor General: "In the light of ... settled rulings, the promulgation made by respondent judge on July 16, 1973 of the decision dated June 22, 1973, signed and prepared by Judge Marquez who retired on June 27, 1973 is submitted to be null and void." ISSUE: W/N the action of retired Judge Marquez was valid? HELD: NO. There are areas in the juristic sphere where the dividing line is obscure, but certainly not this one, except, it would seem. for respondent Judge. As so tersely put by the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Cesar Bengzon: "We have then that, legally, the decisions of Judge Mañalac were promulgated on July 3, 1954. Wherefore, because he had left the Bench before that date, his decisions have no binding effect." Jurisprudence held that a decision rendered by a retired Judge cannot be validly promulgated and acquire a binding effect for the same has become null and void under the circumstances. That is all then that this case presents, and it is quite obvious that there was no justification not even a plausible explanation, for the unwarranted action taken by respondent Judge in the face of such compelling juristic norm. This Court did not feel the need for deciding the petition earlier considering the comment filed by the respondent Chief of Police of Anda, Bohol, in the light of its last two paragraphs. Thus: "That as a municipal prisoner, petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan had served the rest of his sentence in the municipal jail of Anda Bohol from August 14, 1973 to October 5, 1973 when the undersigned respondent in his capacity as and Chief of Police of Anda Bohol released prisoner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan for having fully served out his sentence; and that the undersigned only knew of petitioner's present petition and received the different copies of the pleadings and, resolutions from the Honorable Supreme Court [only after] the undersigned has already released petitioner Dulcisimo Tongco Jandayan who had already fully served his sentence as said above." Hence the habeas

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) corpus aspect was rendered moot and academic. Nonetheless, this opinion is handed down to remove any doubt that this Court adheres to the well-settled doctrine on the matter at issue.

99. G.R. No. 76597 February 26, 1988 TOMAS LAO, petitioner, vs. LETICIA ABIANDA TO-CHIP, RAMON TO-CHIP and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. FACTS: 1. On the basis of private respondent Leticia Abianda To-Chip's letters-complaint addressed to the Land District Officer of the Bureau of lands, the Supervising Land Examiner of said Bureau filed a complaint against petitioner Tomas Lao with the Provincial Fiscal of Samar for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and other similar acts. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Fiscal dismissed the charges for lack of merit. 2. Alleging that the filing of said complaint publicly put him to shame as he is a businessman with a gross annual income of forty million pesos, petitioner filed in the then Court of First Instance of Samar an action for damages based on Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code against Private Respondent To-Chip and her husband Ramon ToChip, the latter as a nominal party. The lower court rule in favor of the petitioner. Both parties appealed to CA. 3. On August 1, 1986, the Court of Appeals, thru its First Civil Cases Division composed of justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., Ma. Rosario Quetulio-Losa and Leonor Ines Luciano, with Justice Luciano as ponente, promulgated a decision reversing the lower court's decision and dismissing the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the validity of the Court of Appeals decision on the ground that on August 1, 1986, the appellate court had no jurisdiction to issue said decision as two of the three members of the first Civil Cases Division had been "effectively disempowered to sit thereon as of July 31, 1986" as a result of the reorganization of said court. 4. In its resolution of November 7, 1986, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration. Said resolution which was also penned by Justice Luciano and concurred in by Justices Jorge R. Coquia and Emeterio C. Cui states that the justices who were not re-appointed because of the reorganization held office in a hold-over capacity until the newly appointed as well as re-appointed justices took their oath of office before the President at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 1, 1986. As the questioned decision was promulgated at 11:45 A.M. of August 1, 1986, the justices who were not re-appointed were still validly performing judicial functions including the promulgation of decisions. 5. petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari raising, among others, the issue of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to promulgate the decision of August 1, 1986 as "there was no existing quorum and hence no authority to exercise any judicial power pertaining to the Court of Appeals." ISSUE: Whether or not it is valid for the Court of Appeals to promulgate the decision of August 1, 1986 HELD: No. In line with the reorganization of the Court of Appeals, all the justices tendered their resignation. The records of the Office of the Court Administrator reveal that on July 30,1986, President Aquino accepted the resignations of the justices of the Court of Appeals. The following day, July 31, 1986, the President appointed the Presiding Justice and forty-one (41) Associate Justices of said court. At 5:20 o'clock in the afternoon of July 31, 1986, this Court received the communication of the President regarding her acceptance of the resignations of the Justices of the Court of Appeals. This Court then informed the justices concerned about said communication. Hence, the office of Justice Gaviola received the notice of the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) President's acceptance of his resignation at 8:15 P.M. of the same day while the office of Justice Quetulio-Losa received such notice at 8:30 A.M. of the following day, August 1, 1986. From these facts, it is clear that when the decision in question was promulgated at 11:45 A.M. on August 1, 1986, Justices Gaviola and Quetulio-Losa had both ceased to be members of the Court of appeals since at that time, they had been informed that their resignations had been accepted by the President. It is therefore, immaterial that the newly appointed and re-appointed justices took their oath of office at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of August 1, 1986. What is crucial is that when the questioned decision was promulgated, two of the three justices necessary to constitute a quorum in a division had lost their authority to act as justices by reason of the presidential acceptance of their resignations. To endorse the opinion of the Court of Appeals that the justices who were not re-appointed were acting in a hold-over capacity until their replacements shall have taken their oath of office, will abet, rather than avoid, a disorderly administration of justice. A judgment must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the judge who signed it. Thus, the promulgation of a decision after a judge retires is null and void. Fairness, equity and justice demand that the same rulings, although they involved judges of the lower courts, should be applied with equal force to cases involving decisions promulgated by the higher courts the justices of which have resigned. 100. PEOPLE V GARCIA GR No. 126252 30 August 1999 Facts That on or about the 28th day of November, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Jesus Garcia, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control five (5) kilos of compressed marijuana dried leaves, without the authority of law to do so, in violation of the law. Garcia then contests that there were irregularities in the way the police apprehended him. Issue W/N there were any irregularities in the way Jesus Garcia was apprehended by the police? Held No, there was no irregularity in the way Jesus Garcia was apprehended by the police. First, he openly admitted to the court that he lied about physical abuse done to him by the police. Secondly, the court found that it was impossible for Garcia not to carry luggage and personal belongings during a visit. Lastly, it runs counter to common experience that an innocent person, wrongly accused of a crime and subjected to alleged physical abuse by the authorities would keep mum about his plight. Yet, appellant, through all the sufferings he supposedly underwent, would have us believe that he has not confided to anyone, not even to his brother, his version of the incident, not to mention the maltreatment he supposedly endured in the hands of the police authorities. 101. Lamb v. Phipps, G.R. No. 7806, July 12, 1912, 22 Phil 456 Facts: On January 2, 1912 petitioner Caroll Lamb resigned as superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony due to ill health. He served the Government of the Philippine Islands for twelve years, as soldier, as provincial treasurer of Marinduque, as provincial treasurer and supervisor of Mindoro, as provincial treasurer of Laguna. However, Respondent Phipps, auditor general of the Gov’t of the Philippine Islands did not give Lamb clearance to leave despite, allegedly, Lamb’s proper accounting of for all government property and funds which have come into his possession during the time of said employment. Lamb alleges that Phipps’ omission and neglect of legal duty, led to an institution of three charges for against him for malversation of public funds.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Thus, he comes to this court to pray for mandamus to compel Auditor General Phipps to give him clearance. Phipps contends that the court has no jurisdiction to issue mandamus to the Auditor for the Philippine Islands. Issue/s: W.O.N. mandamus may be issued to compel Auditor. Held: No. The duties of the Auditor for the Philippine Island are as follows: (a) He has exclusive jurisdiction to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts from whatever source of the Insular Government, the city of Manila, the provinces, the municipalities, the townships, the settlements, or any other governmental branch; and (b) his decisions are final and conclusive except when an appeal is taken therefrom within one year. The Auditor for the Philippine Islands is possessed with exclusive and final jurisdiction to audit all accounts of the Philippine Government, and if his judgment is final unless an appeal therefrom is taken and finally reversed by the Secretary of War, it would seem to be a reasonable conclusion to hold that he has at least a certain discretion in arriving at an uncontrolled and independent conclusion as to any accountability of any accountable employee or official of the Philippine Government. Auditors and comptrollers, as accounting officers, are generally regarded as quasi-official officers. They perform mere ministerial duties only in cases where the sum due is conclusively fixed by law or pursuant to law. Except in such cases, the action of the accounting officers upon claims coming before them for settlement and certification of balances found by them to be due, is not ministerial merely but judicial and discretionary. For the courts to require an auditor to allow or disallow a claim against or in favor of the Government would be to substitute the courts as the auditing officers of the Government. Such a result was not contemplated by a law, which conferred upon another department of the Government the final and exclusive jurisdiction to consider claims. Therefore, the writ of mandamus cannot be used to control the judgment and discretion of an officer in the decision of a matter which the law gave him the power and imposed upon him the duty to decide for himself. 102. Sharp International Marketing vs CA G.R. No. 93661. September 4, 1991. FACTS: UCPB entered into a Contract to Sell to Sharp International Marketing, the agreement to be converted into a Deed of Absolute Sale upon payment by the latter of the full purchase price of P3,183,333.33. On May 14, 1988, even before it had acquired the land, the petitioner offered to sell to the Government for P56,000,000.00, (later increased to P65,000,000.00). The offer was processed, resulting in the recommendation by the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution in the DAR for the acquisition of the property at a price of P35,532.70 per hectare, or roughly P67,000,000.00. Subsequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed between UCPB and Sharp by virtue of which the former sold the estate to the latter for the stipulated consideration of P3,183,333.33. DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines created a Compensation Clearing Committee (CCC) to expedite processing of the papers relating to the acquisition of the land and the preparation of the necessary deed of transfer for signature by the DAR Secretary and the LBP President. Eventually, The DAR Secretary Juico issued an order directing the acquisition of the estate for the recommended amount and requiring LBP to pay the same to Sharp. On January 9, 1989, Secretary Juico and petitioner Lina signed the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, the LBP President Vistan discovered that Sharp had acquired the property from UCPB for only P3.1 million, requested Secretary Juico to reconsider his December 29, 1988 order. As a result, Vistan informed Juico that LBP would not pay the stipulated purchase price Sharp then filed a petition for mandamus with this court to compel the DAR and LBP to comply with the contract. This Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it.

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The petitioners are now back with this Court, this time to question the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES: 1. WON there is a perfected agreement between the petitioners and the Government. 2. WON the petitioners are entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the LBP President to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. 3. WON the LBP President has the authority to refuse to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. HELD: 1.

NO. There is no perfected agreement between the petitioners and the Government.

R.A. 6657, Sec. 18, "the LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided in Secs. 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just compensation for the land." Without the signature of the LBP President, there was simply no contract between Sharp and the Government. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 9, 1989, was incomplete and therefore had no binding effect at all. Consequently, Sharp cannot claim any legal right thereunder that it can validly assert in a petition for mandamus.

2. NO. The petitioners are not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the LBP President to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale since the Deed of Absolute Sale had no binding effect. Likewise, respondents cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus to discharge a duty that involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, especially where disbursement of public funds is concerned. It is established doctrine that mandamus will not issue to control the performance of discretionary, non-ministerial, duties, that is, to compel a body discharging duties involving the exercise of discretion to act in a particular way or to approve or disapprove a specific application 3.

YES. The LBP President has the authority to refuse to sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.

The Court ruled that the act required of the LBP President is not merely ministerial but involves a high degree of discretion. The LBP has the discretion to agree on the amount stated in the DAS, after its review and evaluation because it becomes its duty to sign the deed. But not until then. For, it is only in that event that the amount to be compensated shall have been "established' according to law. In this case, the compensation to be approved was not trifling but amounted to as much as P62 million of public funds, to be paid in exchange for property acquired by the seller only one month earlier for only P3 million. Thus, in the exercise of such power of review and evaluation, it results that the amount of P62,725,077.29 being claimed by petitioner is not the "amount to be established by the government." Consequently, it cannot be the amount that LBP is by law bound to compensate petitioner.

103. ASUNCION, et. al. vs. DE YRIARTE (NORBERTO ASUNCION, ET AL. vs. MANUEL DE YRIARTE) G.R. No. 9321

FACTS:

September 24, 1914

The chief of the division of archives, the respondent, refused to file the articles of incorporation, hereinafter referred to, upon the ground that the object of the corporation, as stated in the articles, was not lawful and that, in pursuance of section 6 of Act No. 1459, they were not registerable.

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The proposed incorporators began an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to compel the chief of the division of archives to receive and register said articles of incorporation and to do any and all acts necessary for the complete incorporation of the persons named in the articles. The court below found in favor of the defendant and refused to order the registration of the articles mentioned, maintaining ad holding that the defendant, under the Corporation Law, had authority to determine both the sufficiency of the form of the articles and the legality of the object of the proposed corporation. This appeal is taken from that judgment.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the Corporation for registration, to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the articles, but also as to the lawfulness of the purpose of the proposed corporation.

RULING:

Section 6 of the Corporation Law reads in part as follows: Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the Philippine Islands, may form a private corporation for any lawful purpose by filing with the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trademarks if the Executive Bureau articles of incorporation duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, . . . . Simply because the duties of an official happens to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow that he may not, in the administration of his office, determine questions of law. The Supreme Court is of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when articles of incorporation are presented for registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation as expressed in the articles are lawful. We do not believe that, simply because articles of incorporation presented foe registration are perfect in form, the division of archives must accept and register them and issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no matter what the purpose of the corporation may be as expressed in the articles. We do not believe it was intended that the division of archives should issue a certificate of incorporation to, and thereby put the seal of approval of the Government upon, a corporation which was organized for base of immoral purposes. The Court is of the opinion that he may be mandamused if he act in violation of law or if he refuses, unduly, to comply with the law. While we have held that defendant has power to pass upon the lawfulness of the purposes of the proposed corporation and that he may, in the fulfilment of his duties, determine the question of law whether or not those purposes are lawful and embraced within that class concerning which the law permits corporations to be formed, that does not necessarily mean, as we have already intimated, that his duties are not ministerial. On the contrary, there is no incompatibility in holding, as we do hold, that his duties are ministerial and that he has no authority to exercise discretion in receiving and registering articles of incorporation. He may exercise judgment — that is, the judicial function — in the determination of the question of law referred to, but he may not use discretion. If, therefore, the defendant erred in determining the question presented when the articles were offered for registration, then that error will be corrected by this court in this action and he will be compelled to register the articles as offered. If, however, he did not commit an error, but decided that question correctly, then, of course, his action will be affirmed to the extent that we will deny the relief prayed for.

SALARY AND PREREQUISITES 104. RAMON R. YAP, Petitioner, v. COMMISION ON AUDIT

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Ramon R. Yap is holder of a regular position of Department Manager of the National Development Company (NDC), a government-owned and controlled corporation with original charter. He was appointed by the Board of Directors, Manila Gas Corporation (MGC), a subsidiary of NDC as Vice-President for Finance effective June 14, 1991 while remaining as a regular employee of NDC. The additional employment entitled him to honoraria equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of his basic salary at NDC and various allowances attached to the office. In the course of the regular audit, the Corporate Auditor, MGC issued notices of disallowances against Mr. Ramon R. Yap which were predicated on the ground that appellant’s appointment to MGC in addition to his regular position as Department Manager III of NDC and the subsequent receipt of the questioned allowances and reimbursements from the former directly contravened the proscription contained in Section 7 (2) and Section 8, Article IX-b of the Constitution. Mr. Yap appealed the Auditors disallowances primarily contending that the questioned benefits were all approved by the MGC Board of Directors. Petitioner’s appeal was denied by the CAO II, which affirmed the MGC Corporate Auditors findings. Unperturbed, petitioner sought a reconsideration of the CAO II ruling from respondent COA arguing that his assignment to MGC was required by the primary functions of his office and was also authorized by law, namely Executive Order No. 284 issued on July 25, 1987. In turn, respondent COA denied petitioner’s appeal in herein assailed COA Decision No. 2002-213.It upheld the CAO II’s ruling that characterized the disallowed allowances and reimbursements as prohibited by the Constitution. Furthermore, it also ruled that the said allowances and reimbursements claimed by petitioner failed to pass the test of public purpose requirement of the law and further emphasized that it is not enough that payments made to petitioner be authorized by the Board of Directors of the MGC but it is likewise necessary that said payments do not contravene the principles provided for under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 on the use of government funds, more specifically on the public purpose requirement that is provided in Section 4(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. A Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently filed by petitioner, but this was likewise denied by respondent COA in COA Decision No. 2003-087. ISSUE: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it used as a basis the public purpose requirement in affirming the questioned disallowances. HELD: NO. Any disbursement of public funds, which includes payment of salaries and benefits to government employees and officials, must (a) be authorized by law, and (b) serve a public purpose. Public purpose in relation to disbursement of public funds means any purpose or use directly available to the general public as a matter of right. Thus, it has also been defined as an activity as will serve as benefit to the community as a body and which at the same time is directly related function of government. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere, the idea that public use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been discarded. In fact, this Court has already categorically stated that the term public purpose is not defined, since it is an elastic concept that can be hammered to fit modern standards. It should be given a broad interpretation; therefore, it does not only pertain to those purposes that which are traditionally viewed as essentially government functions, such as building roads and delivery of basic services, but also includes those purposes designed to promote social justice. Thus, public money may now be used for the relocation of illegal settlers, low-cost housing and urban or agrarian reform. In short, public use is now equated with public interest, and that it is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. In view of the public purpose requirement, the disbursement of public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the government officers and employees. Petitioner’s theory that the compensation and benefits of public officers are intended purely for the personal benefit of such officers, or that the mere payment of salaries and benefits to a public officer satisfies the public purpose requirement is wrong. That theory would lead to the anomalous conclusion that government officers and employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without any justification necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste. 105. NITAFAN V. CIR, 152 SCRA 284

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FACTS: Petitioners, David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano, Jr., the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that "(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased," even as it is anathema to the Ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution." ISSUE: W/N the members of the Judiciary are exempt from income taxes RULING: No. The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. it may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. Besides, construing Section 10, Articles VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, which, for clarity, is again reproduced hereunder: The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Emphasis supplied). it is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission. With the foregoing interpretation, and as stated heretofore, the ruling that "the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a dimunition thereof, and so violates the Constitution" in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be declared discarded. The framers of the fundamental law, as the alter ego of the people, have expressed in clear and unmistakable terms the meaning and import of Section 10, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution that they have adopted. Stated otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.

106. G.R. No. L-32312 November 25, 1983 AURELIO TIRO, as City Superintendent of Schools of Cebu City, petitioner-appellant, vs. HONORABLE AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, ZAFRA FINANCING ENTERPRISE and MARCELINO ZAFRA, respondents-appellees. Facts Zafra Financing Enterprise sued Aurelio Tiro in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools in Cebu City. Zafra extended loans to public school teachers in Cebu, and the teachers executed promissory notes and SPAs in favour of Zafra to collect their salary checks from the Division Office of the Bureau of Public Schools.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) However, Tiro forbade the collecting of salary checks on the basis of Circular No. 21, Series of 1969, which prohibits the payment of salary to persons other than the employee concerned. Zafra sought to compel Tiro to honor the SPAs; to declare Circular No. 21 illegal; and to make Tiro pay attorney’s fees and damages. The Court granted Zafra’s prayer. Tiro now seeks a reversal of the Court’s decision. Issue W/N Circular No. 21, Series of 1969 is valid and enforceable? Held Yes, Circular No. 21, Series of 1969 is valid and enforceable. The Circular in question is authorized by relevant statutes extant when it was issued such as the following: SEC. 79(b). Power to regulate. — The Department Head shall have power to promulgate, whoever he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations, orders, circular, memorandums, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties. All rules, regulations, orders or instructions of a general and permanent character promulgated in conformity with this section shall be numbered by each Department consecutively each year, and shall be duly published. Chiefs of Bureaus or offices may, however, be authorized to promulgate circulars of information or instructions for the government of the officers and employees in the interior administration of the business of each Bureau or office, and in such case said circulars shall not be required to be published. (Revised Administrative Code.) SEC. 21. Deductions Prohibited. — No person shall make any deduction whatsoever from the salaries of teachers except under specific authority of law authorizing such deductions: Provided, however, that upon written authority executed by the teacher concerned, (1) lawful dues and fees owing to the Philippine Public School Teachers Association, and (2) premiums properly due on insurance policies, shall be deductible. (Magna Carta For Teachers, R.A. No. 4670.) Zafra's claim that the Circular impairs the obligation of contracts with the teachers is baseless. For the Circular does not prevent Zafra from collecting the loans. The Circular merely makes the Government a non-participant in their collection which is within its competence to do. 107. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, 21 April 1999 FACTS: This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-outs staged by public school teachers on different dates in September and October 1990. The issue in this case is the right to back salaries of teachers who were either dismissed or suspended because they did not report for work but who were eventually ordered reinstated because they had not been shown to have taken part in the strike, although reprimanded for being absent without leave. Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six months effective December 4, 1990.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems and Protection Board (MSPB) which found him guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed on him a six-month suspension. The other respondents also appealed to the MSPB, but their appeal was dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal memorandum on time. CSC: affirmed the decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file applications for leave of absence and, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former positions. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in this Court. The case was referred to the Court of Appeals. CA: rendered a decision (1) affirming the decision of the CSC with respect to Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang but (2) reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the suspension of Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations only and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand. Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending that they should be exonerated of all charges against them and that they be paid salaries during their suspension. In its resolution, the CA, while maintaining its finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries during their suspension beyond ninety (90) days. Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the CA ordered the payment of private respondents salaries during the period of their appeal. His motion was, however, denied by the appellate court in its resolution of October 6, 1997. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the administrative investigation of respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of preventive suspension, implying that the continued suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal, hence, the government should not be held answerable for payment of their salaries. Moreover, petitioner lays so much store by the fact that, under the law, private respondents are considered under preventive suspension during the period of their appeal and, for this reason, are not entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension. ISSUE: Is an employee entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of suspension? RULING: As already stated, the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their salaries, allowances, and other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive suspension. In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated. Although employees who are preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, the Court does not agree with the government that they are not entitled to compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent. Preventive suspension pending investigation, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, the respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins. On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed, i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspension becomes part of the final penalty of suspension or dismissal. RATIO: The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment of salaries in case of exoneration where such employee shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of suspension. However, the law was revised and the provision on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) on Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation was reproduced in 52 of the present Civil Service Law and that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) also categorically provides that preventive suspension shall be without pay. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) in computing the period of suspension herein provided. In the case at bar, it is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries for the period of suspension. Disposition: Wherefore, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, as amended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and October 6, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of salaries to private respondents shall be computed from the time of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years. 108. CONSTANTINO-DAVID VS PANGADAMAN-GANIA G.R. No. 156039. August 14, 2003 Respondent Zenaida D. Pangandaman-Gania is a Director II and Manila Information and Liaisoning Officer of the Mindanao State University (MSU). She has been holding this position after the confirmation of her appointment by the MSU Board of Regents on 1 June 1995. Special Order No. 477-P dated 28 September 1998 designating a certain Agnes Mangondato as Acting Director in her place in view of the alleged expiration of her term and was no longer allowed to report for work. She verified the status of her appointment and found out that her appointment was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for attestation. Respondent immediately brought the matter to the CSC for a ruling on the validity of the termination of her employment. In Resolution No. 00-1265 dated 24 May 2000 the CSC upheld her dismissal for lack of attestation and prolonged absence without official leave from the time she was removed from her post in September 1998 as a result of Special Order No. 477-P. Upon respondents motion for reconsideration, Resolution No. 01-0558 dated 8 March 2001 the CSC found merit in her motion, declared her removal from office as illegal and ordered here reinstatement but disallowed the payment of back salaries for the period she was not working as a result of the illegal dismissal. However, MSU refused to employ her back. ISSUE: WON the respondent has the right to back salaries since she was illegally dismissed. HELD: YES The Court held that an illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his reinstatement. This is only fair and sensible because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left his office and should be given a comparable compensation at the time of his reinstatement. Respondent cannot be faulted for her inability to work or to render any service from the time she was illegally dismissed up to the time of her reinstatement. The policy of no work, no pay cannot be applied to her, for such distressing state of affairs was not of her own making or liking even as her family suffered tremendously as a consequence of her removal and while she was jobless. Verily, to withhold her back salaries and other benefits during her illegal dismissal would put to naught the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure for those in the civil service. 109. Galang vs. Land Bank G.R. No. 175276 May 31, 2011 Facts: Galang, the Branch Manager of Land Bank Baliuag, Bulacan was charged with Dishonesty, Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, among other things. Allegedly, Galang demanded money from four borrowers of the bank, in return for a reduction of interest rates and condonation of penalty charges on their overdue loans. The complaint further accuses Galang of making unauthorized disbursements for the repair of the company car.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The Hearing Officer of Land Bank issued a Resolution dismissing the charges for insufficiency of evidence which was reversed by Land Banks General Counsel who recommended Galang ‘s dismissal. The Board of Directors issued a resolution which approved Del Rosario’s recommendation but modified the penalty to forced resignation with forfeiture of all benefits. Aggrieved, Galang appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The MSPB sustained the penalty imposed upon Galang and Ocampo but absolved Galang of the charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Violation of Rules and Regulations. Galang filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Before the CSC, Galang’s appeal was dismissed for lack of merit and his MR was likewise denied. Galang then filed a petition for certiorari with the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the CSC which was reffered to the CA. The CA rendered a decision nullifying the CSC’s resolutions. The CA excluded the affidavits of the complainants as inadmissible in evidence for lack of cross-examination. Without them, it found no substantial evidence to hold Galang administratively liable. Subsequently, Galang filed a Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration with a prayer for the CA to order his reinstatement and the payment of his back wages, bonuses and other fringe benefits reckoned from the date of his dismissal. Land Bank, likewise, moved for reconsideration. The CA granted Galang’s motion and directed Land Bank to reinstate him and to pay him back salaries not exceeding five years. Land Bank received notice of said resolution on September 15, 1997, but filed no appeal. Consequently, Galang filed a Motion to Effect Entry of Judgment. Land Bank then filed before the SC a Petition for Certiorari which dismissed the petition. The Court concluded that Land Bank’s petition for certiorari was merely an afterthought considering that it failed to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The bank moved for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, the SC issued an Entry of Judgment. In the meantime, Galang was reinstated in the payroll on August 16, 2001. However, Galang wrote Land Bank President Teves, complaining that he has yet to receive Personnel Economic Relief Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA), Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy. He claimed that since this Court found Land Bank’s petition for certiorari to be a mere afterthought, he should have been reinstated on October 1, 1997 after the fifteen (15)-day period to appeal the Resolution dated September 5, 1997 had lapsed. Galang also insisted that his back salaries be computed based on the current salary rate prescribed for his previous position. Land Bank expressed its willingness to pay Galang Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy but refused to include the PERA and the RATA as part of his back salaries for 1990 to 1995; the former, because it was authorized to be paid to LBP employees only in 1997 and the latter, because he was unable to discharge the functions of his office. Land Bank further explained that Galang could not be reinstated, or his back wages paid from October 1, 1997 since there was yet no final and executory decision of the court then. Thus Galang filed a Motion for Clarification with the SC. The SC then issued a resolution which noted without action Galang’s motion for clarification in view of the Entry of Judgment. Galang then filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution with the CSC to enforce the decision which ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his backwages for five years. The CSC however denied said motion. It held that execution will not lie because Land Bank had complied with the decision. Galang then filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA granted said petition and declared Galang entitled to PERA, RATA and other benefits attached to his position. However, it upheld his reinstatement on August 16, 2001 and sustained the computation of his back wages based on the prevailing rate at the time of his dismissal. The motions for reconsideration respectively filed by Galang and Land Bank were likewise denied by the CA.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Issue: When should Galang be considered reinstated? Held: Reinstatement is defined as the issuance of an appointment to a person who has been previously appointed to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or misconduct, been separated therefrom, or to the restoration of one who has been exonerated of the administrative charges filed against him. In the present case, Galang was absolved of the administrative charges against him. Upon motion, the CA issued a Resolution which ordered his reinstatement and the payment of his back salaries for five years. It is settled that an illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. Hence, in Galangs case, he is entitled to back salaries from July 1990 to June 1995. This is not disputed by the parties. Rather, the uncertainty centers on when he should be reinstated. The records show that Galang was reinstated in Land Banks’ payroll on August 16, 2001. He argues, however, that he should have been reinstated on October 1, 1997, after the fifteen (15)-day period to appeal the Resolution dated September 5, 1997 had lapsed. Galangs position on the effective date of his reinstatement is correct. In this case, Land Bank received notice of the CA Resolution dated September 5, 1997 on September 15, 1997. Thus, it had fifteen (15) days from September 15, 1997, or until September 30, 1997 to file an appeal. Yet, Land Bank did not do so. Instead, it filed a petition for certiorari with this Court on November 14, 1997. Land Banks failure to interpose an appeal within 15 days from its receipt on September 15, 1997 of the Resolution dated September 5, 1997, rendered the same final and executory on October 1, 1997. Galang’s reinstatement therefore must be reckoned, not from August 16, 2001 but from October 1, 1997. This entitles him to receive back wages as well from the date when he should have been reinstated on October 1, 1997 to August 15, 2001, one day before he was actually reinstated. 110. Balitaosan vs Secretary GR No. 138238 02 Septermber 2003 FACTS: The case is a petition for review of the April 15, 1999 resolution of the Court of Appeals denying petitioners motion for partial reconsideration of its decision dated November 9, 1998 which ordered petitioners reinstatement, without backwages. Petitioner was among the public school teachers who were dismissed by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cario for ignoring the return to work order while participating in the teachers mass strike at Liwasang Bonifacio from September to October, 1990. Records reveal that an administrative complaint was filed against petitioner, together with a certain Dalangin Sarmiento and Filomeno Rafer, charging them with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law and Rules of Reasonable Office Regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service and absence without leave. Petitioner failed to give his explanation on the charges against him despite due notice. Thus, he was meted preventive suspension for 90 days and consequently dismissed from the service in a DECS decision dated November 29, 1990. ISSUE: WON the petitioners are entitled with backwages upon his reinstatement? HELD: NO. The fact is that petitioner participated in the mass action which in turn resulted in the filing of charges against him and his subsequent dismissal later on. His reinstatement was not the result of exoneration but an act

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) of liberality by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, petitioners claim for backwages for the period during which he was not allowed to work must be denied. The general rule is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. No work, no pay. Since petitioner did not render any service during the period for which he is now claiming his salaries, there is no legal or equitable basis to order the payment thereof 111. Request of CTA Presiding Judge Alex Reyes FACTS: Former Presiding Court of Tax Appeals Judge Alex Z. Reyes asks for a reconsideration and recomputation of his accumulated vacation and sick leave credits. In particular, Judge Reyes requests the following: 1. The inclusion of 57.625 days vacation leave and 57.625 days sick leave which he earned for services with the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 1941 to 1946, and 2. The exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays from his total accredited vacation and sick leaves of 322 days for the period beginning February 17, 1954 to July 19, 1980, during which he was with the Department of Finance. Judge Reyes was compulsory retired on November 24, 1991, with 37 years, 9 months and 7 days in the government service, the last 11 years, 3 months and 23 days of which were continuously rendered in the judiciary. His record shows a gap in his government service of seven years, from December 1946 to February 16, 1954. In processing the terminal leave application of Judge Reyes, the Supreme Court Administrative Office did not include Judge Reyes' accumulated leave credits earned for services with the AFP by virtue of the application of a 1st endorsement of the Bureau of Civil Service, that the transfer of leave credit is allowed only when there is no gap in the service of the officer or employee concerned.| In his request for reconsideration, Judge Reyes cites Memorandum Circular No. 54 of the Office of the President. It is evident that said Memorandum Circular No. 54 supersedes the 1957 indorsement of the Bureau of Civil Service. Under said Circular, government officers and employees are now entitled to the commutation of all leave credits exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned, provided the claimant was in the service as of January 9, 1986. ISSUE: Whether or not the phrase without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned is applicable to the judiciary||| RULING: Such phrase may be so applicable on the condition provided in the circular itself, that the judiciary is "not otherwise covered by special law. The special laws provide the boundaries by which the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by "justices and other government officials covered by special law" are to be limited. Again, there is no special law governing the specific issue addressed by Memorandum Circular No. 54. And absent any implementing rules and regulations yet promulgated, the general provision must be applied there being no reason to discriminate against the judiciary and deprive judges of the benefits of commutation without limitation and regardless of the period when the credits were earned. In other words, there is no special law governing the commutation of leave credits of Judges and, therefore, they are entitled to benefits under Memorandum Circular No. 54. c The second issue on the non-exclusion of Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays is governed by the same principle. As there is likewise no special law on the specific issue, Memorandum Circular No. 54 must be

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) applied. And even assuming that there is such a special law, it cannot provide for lesser privileges or nonapplication of general laws to work a disadvantage against Judges. Statutes and administrative rules governing the commutation of leave benefits of judges must be interpreted in the light of the special protections given by the Constitution to the judiciary. 112. Profeta vs Drilon G.R. No. 104139, December 22, 1992 Facts: After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extend her services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall have fulfilled the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant of Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered the sufficient number of years of service on the date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service was only twelve (12) years and two (2) months. As things stood, she could only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year of creditable service or to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS. On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of Trustees of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as President of EARIST until she shall have completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65) years on the date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days. 2 In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the Office of the President furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary, who was duly authorized to conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending investigation of the complaint, petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. 3 After serving the period of suspension, petitioner re-assumed her duties and functions as President of EARIST After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision 7 dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the President dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office of the President also declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October 1991. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitle to the old-age pension plan? Held: Yes. the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August 1992. 15 Thus, the extension of service granted to petitioner by the Office of the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days which brought her services only up to January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow the Office of the President to shorten the extension of service of petitioner by three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and service as lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service with the government. Such reduction from petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the oldage pension plan, based on the computation of the GSIS. We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the government. 16 The computation of a member's service includes not only full time but

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) also part time and other services with compensation as may be included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. 17 The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer f approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be considered as part of her service with the government and it is only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said period of service. 113. G.R. No. 186560: November 17, 2010 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO P. DE LEON, Respondent. FACTS: Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. Thereafter, and for more than nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension. Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. The CA granted the petition. Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform an act that is contrary to law. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition for mandamus HELD: No. This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of social legislation. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. In this case, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. In stopping the payment of respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant retirement law. This is flawed logic. Respondents disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any other existing retirement law. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146. In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire under P.D. No. 1146, since this law provides for higher benefits, and because the same was the latest law at the time of his retirement in 1992. Under P.D. No. 1146, to be eligible for retirement benefits, one must satisfy the following requisites:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Section 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who: (1) has at least fifteen years of service; (2) is at least sixty years of age; and (3) is separated from the service. Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not dispute this. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section 12 of the same law. To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondents claim, in substitution of R.A. No. 910. It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court. One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioners interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer the governments retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing. Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be prejudiced by the same. DENIED

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS 115. G.R. No. 141309 December 23, 2008 LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO, petitioner, vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondent. FACTS: This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against Liwayway as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged an ad valorem tax of “55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per pack.” Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying “Champion,” “Hope,” and “More” (all manufactured by Fortune) as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part, Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying the motion to dismiss was elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision. After respondent

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution, denied with finality petitioners motion for reconsideration. Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable Court En Banc. She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-judicial powers. ISSUES: o Whether or not the petitioner is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of her duty. (No, the complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner. The complaint is in the nature of a suit against the state.) HELD: 







It must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. (See notes.) For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, [t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability. When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an individual. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political. The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. In the instant case, what is involved is a public officers duty owing to the public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, we declared as having fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance. A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rulemaking power, owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule. to have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase financial and business difficulties mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a particular injury. In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.



With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach 

of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.

NOTES: There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing to the public collectively (the body politic), and the duty owing to particular individuals, thus: 1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury. The officers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed, that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and assert that they were duties owing to him alone. So, members of the legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise and proper laws, but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself rather than to another. Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will be governed only by considerations of the public good in deciding upon the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a dut y to any particular individual of the community. These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they are sufficient to define the general doctrine. 2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to includes those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them. A sheriff or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of official good conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due performance. 116. Chavez v. Sandiganbayan (1991) Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., En Banc Facts: On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and damages. After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him. The motion was granted in a resolution. Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section 4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Issue: May the Solicitor General and PCGG official be impleaded as a defendant in a counterclaim. (No) Holding: Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office. The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of bad faith. Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the charges being automatically dropped. Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic. Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General, acts in bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him. High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21, and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The issue is whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory counterclaim in the case filed against him. Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct civil action for damages against the Solicitor General. 117. Shauf vs Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 713 FACTS: Petitioner, Loida Shauf, a Filipino by origin and married to an American who is a member of the US Air Force, was rejected for a position of Guidance Counselor in the Base Education Office at Clark Air Base. According to applicable regulations, where there are qualified dependents of military or civilian personnel, who are locally available, appointments to positions shall be limited to the dependents. As per records, she possessed all the qualifications for the job at that time. Instead of hiring Shauf, however, one Mr. Isakson was selected for the position who was not a dependent of a military or civilian personnel. In addition, Mr. Isakson apparently lacked certain qualifications. Shauf was offered a temporary position as a temporary Assistant Education Adviser for a 180-day period with the condition that if a vacancy occurs, she will be automatically selected to fill the vacancy. Shauf accepted the offer. During that time, Mrs. Mary Abalateo’s was about to vacate her position. But Mrs. Abalateo’s appointment was extended. Thus, Shauf was never appointed to said position. She claims that the Abalateo’s stay was extended indefinitely to deny her the appointment as retaliation for the complaint that she filed against Persi. Persi denies this allegation. He claims it was a joint decision of the management & it was in accordance of with the applicable regulation. By reason of her non-selection, she filed a complaint for damages and an equal employment opportunity complaint against private respondents, Don Detwiler (civillian personnel officer) and Anthony Persi (Education Director), for alleged discrimination by reason of her sex(female), color (brown) and national origin (Filipino by birth).

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RTC ruled in favor of Shauf. Both parties appealed to the CA. Shauf prayed for the increase of the damages to be collected from defendants. Defendants on the other hand, continued using the defense that they are immune from suit for acts done/statements made by them in performance of their official governmental functions pursuant to RP-US Military Bases Agreement of 1947. CA reversed RTC’s decision. According to the CA, defendants are immune from suit. Shauf claims that the respondents are being sued in their private capacity thus this is not a suit against the US government which would require consent. Respondents still maintain their immunity from suit. They further claim that the rule allowing suits against public officers &employees for criminal & unauthorized acts is applicable only in the Philippines & is not part of international law. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are immune from suit being officers of the US Armed Forces HELD: NO. The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II, Section 2. This latter provision merely reiterates a policy earlier embodied in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and also intended to manifest our resolve to abide by the rules of the international community. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has been formally impleaded. It must be noted, however, that the rule is not also all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As we clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. Vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. 118. WYLIE V. RARANG 209 SCRA 357 FACTS: Petitioner M. H. Wylie was the assistant administrative officer while petitioner Capt. James Williams was the commanding officer of the U. S. Naval Base in Subic Bay, Olongapo City. Private respondent Aurora I. Rarang was an employee in the office of the Provost Marshal assigned as merchandise control guard. M. H. Wylie, in his capacity as assistant administrative officer of the U.S. Naval Station supervised the publication of the "Plan of the Day" (POD), which was published daily by the US Naval Base station. The POD featured important announcements, necessary precautions, and general matters of interest to military personnel. One of the regular features of the POD was the "action line inquiry." On February 3, 1978, the POD made a publication, under the "NAVSTA ACTION LINE INQUIRY" which mentioned a certain person named “Auring” who is described as a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal. The private respondent was the only one who was named "Auring" in the Office of the Provost Marshal and was subsequently proven that it was her being referred to when petitioner M. H. Wylie wrote her a letter of apology for the "inadvertent" publication. The private respondent the filed an action for damages alleging that the article constituted false, injurious, and malicious defamation and libel tending to impeach her honesty, virtue and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) reputation exposing her to public hatred, contempt and ridicule; and that the libel was published and circulated in the English language and read by almost all the U. S. Naval Base personnel. The defendants however contended by filing a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that the defendants M. H. Wylie and Capt. James Williams acted in the performance of their official functions as officers of the United States Navy and are, therefore, immune from suit; and the United States Naval Base is an instrumentality of the US government which cannot be sued without its consent. ISSUE: Whether or not the officials of the United States Naval Base are immune from suit. HELD: The subject article in the US Newsletter POD dated February 3, 1978 mentions a certain "Auring" as "... a disgrace to her division and to the Office of the Provost Marshal." The same article explicitly implies that Auring was consuming and appropriating for herself confiscated items like cigarettes and foodstuffs. There is no question that the Auring alluded to in the Article was the private respondent as she was the only Auring in the Office of the Provost Marshal. Moreover, as a result of this article, the private respondent was investigated by her supervisor. Before the article came out, the private respondent had been the recipient of commendations by her superiors for honesty in the performance of her duties. It may be argued that Captain James Williams as commanding officer of the naval base is far removed in the chain of command from the offensive publication and it would be asking too much to hold him responsible for everything which goes wrong on the base. This may be true as a general rule. In this particular case, however, the records show that the offensive publication was sent to the commanding officer for approval and he approved it. The factual findings of the two courts below are based on the records. The petitioners have shown no convincing reasons why our usual respect for the findings of the trial court and the respondent court should be withheld in this particular case and why their decisions should be reversed. Article 2176 of the Civil Code prescribes a civil liability for damages caused by a person's act or omission constituting fault or negligence, to wit: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission, causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. "Fault" or "negligence" in this Article covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent." Moreover, Article 2219(7) of the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. In effect, the offended party in these cases is given the right to receive from the guilty party moral damages for injury to his feelings and reputation in addition to punitive or exemplary damages. Indeed, the imputation of theft contained in the POD dated February 3, 1978 is a defamation against the character and reputation of the private respondent. Petitioner Wylie himself admitted that the Office of the Provost Marshal explicitly recommended the deletion of the name Auring if the article were published. The petitioners, however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the name "Auring." Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act which ridiculed the private respondent. As a result of the petitioners' act, the private respondent, according to the record, suffered besmirched reputation, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, specially so, since the article was baseless and false. The petitioners, alone, in their personal capacities are liable for the damages they caused the private respondent. 119. RAMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al. (OSMUNDO G. RAMA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.) G.R. No. L-44484 March 16, 1987

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (RENE ESPINA, PABLO P, GARCIA, REYNALDO M. MENDIOLA and VALERIANO S. CARILLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FROILAN FRONDOSO and JEREMIAS LUNA) No. L-44842 March 16, 1987 (RENE ESPINA, PABLO P. GARCIA, REYNALDO M. MENDIOLA and VALERIANO S. CARILLO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and [same respondents as in L-44484]) No. L-44591 March 16, 1987 (PROVINCE OF CEBU and its SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FROILAN FRONDOSO and JEREMIAS LUNA) No. L-44894 March 16, 1987

FACTS:

This involves four (4) consolidated cases having arisen out of the same issues and factual background. However, the Supreme Court is bound by the dismissal of case L-44572 and so L44894 was likewise dismissed. During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu, Osmundo G. Rama as vice-governor and Pablo P. Garcia, Reynaldo M. Mendiola and Valerians S. Carillo as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, said officials adopted Resolution No. 990,which, the provincial government of Cebu under the aforementioned officials, declared its policy "to mechanize the maintenance and repair of all roads and bridges of the province (including provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid "JJ"), to economize in the expenditure of its Road and Bridge Fund for the maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges receiving national aid "JJ" and to adopt a more comprehensive, systematic, efficient, progressive and orderly operation and maintenance of the Office of the Provincial Engineer." To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to abolish around thirty positions. Aggrieved by these turn of events, the employees whose positions were abolished filed separate petitions for mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees aimed at the annulment of Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement and the recovery of damages. The aforementioned provincial officials who, together with the provincial auditor, provincial treasurer, provincial engineer and the province of Cebu, were named respondents in said action, were sued "both in their official and personal" capacities as a result of their alleged "unjust, oppressive, illegal and malicious' acts. In Civil Case No. R-10704, the Court of First Instance of Cebu declared Resolution No. 990 null and void and ordered the respondent officials to re-create the positions abolished, to provide funds therefore, to reinstate the 56 petitioners headed by Jose Abala, and to pay them back salaries. All the parties appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's decision with the modification that respondents were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their "individual and personal capacity" P1,000.00 moral damages to each of the petitioners considering that the case involved a quasi-delict.

ISSUE:

Whether Espina, Rama, Garcia, Mendiola and Carillo are personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants thereof.

RULING:

The Supreme Court has held that, at least, in principle, a public officer by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of oppression. It held that the petitioners in the instant three cases are personally liable for damages because of their precipitate dismissal of provincial employees through an ostensibly legal means.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The Court of Appeals, whose factual findings are binding on this Court, found that the provincial employees concerned were "eased out because of their party affiliation." i.e., they belonged to the Liberal Party whose presidential candidate then was Sergio Osmena Jr. Such act of the petitioners reflected their malicious intent to do away with the followers of the rival political party so as to accommodate their own proteges who, it turned out, even outnumbered the dismissed employees. Indeed, municipal officers are liable for damages if they act maliciously or wantonly and if the work which they perform is done rather to injure an individual than to discharge a public duty. As held in Vda de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, L-26882, April 5, 1978, 82 SCRA 294, 307-308, a public officer is civilly liable for failure to observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public officers or for wilfully or negligently causing damage to another (Article 20, Civil Code) or for wilfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and/or public policy (Article 21, New Civil Code). Neither can petitioners shield themselves from liability by invoking the ruling in the cases of Carino vs. Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration L-23966, May 22, 1969, 28 SCRA 268. In those cases, the erring public officials were sued in their official capacities whereas in the instant cases, petitioners were specifically sued in their personal capacities. For their part, the dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they have suffered a special and peculiar injury from the wrongful act of which they complain (Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers, p. 391). It is an undeniable fact that the dismissed employees who were holding such positions as foremen, watchmen and drivers, suffered the uncertainties of the unemployed when they were plucked out of their positions. That not all of them testified as to the extent of damages they sustained on account of their separation from their government jobs, cannot be used as a defense by the petitioners. Suffice it to state that considering the positions they were holding, the dismissed employees concerned belong to a low-salaried group, who, if deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic hardships. 120. PILAR V SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF DASOL, PANGASINAN 128 SCRA 173 FACTS: Petitioner was elected vice mayor of Dasol, Pangasinan in 1980 local elections. Elected with him were Lodovico Espinosa as the municipal mayor. Soon after the Sanguniang Bayan adopted Resolution No. 1 which increased the salaries of the mayor and municipal treasurer, however the resolution did not provide for an increase in salary of the vice mayor despite the fact that such position is entitled to an annual salary. Petitioner questioned the failure of the Sanguniang Bayan to appropriate an amount for the payment of his salary. He wrote letters to the proper authorities complaining about the matter and asking that something should be done to correct it. As respond to the letters, the Sangguniang Bayan issued a resolution increasing the salary of the vice mayor, herein petitioner. Another resolution was passed for the payment of the unpaid salaries due to the vice-mayor, before the sangguiniang bayan pass a resolution to increase its salary due to petitioner. However, the mayor vetoed the resolution for payment of unpaid salaries. ISSUE: WON the action of the mayor, in vetoing the resolution, is legal? HELD: NO. Respondent Hon. Mayor Lodovico Espinosa alone should be held liable and responsible for his action. Respondent Mayor vetoed without just cause on October 26, 1982 the Resolution of the Sanguniang Bayan appropriating the salary of the petitioner.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) While "to veto or not to veto involves the exercise of discretion" as contended by respondent Mayor, however, exceeded his authority in an arbitrary manner when he vetoed the resolution since there exists sufficient municipal funds from which the salary of the petitioner could be paid. Respondent Mayor’s refusal, neglect or omission in complying with the directives of the Provincial Budget Officer and the Director of the Bureau of Local Government that the salary of the petitioner be provided for and paid the prescribed salary rate, is reckless and oppressive, hence, by way of example or correction for the public good, respondent Mayor is liable personally to the petitioner for exemplary or corrective damages.

121. G.R. No. L-46096 July 30, 1979 EUFEMIO T. CORREA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN (BRANCH 11), CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, BULACAN, HON. ARMANDO ENRIQUEZ, as the Incumbent Mayor of Norzagaray, Bulacan, CANDIDO P. CRUZ, ISABELO SAPLALA, TOMAS PALAD, ANTONIO SILVERIO, MELANIO ESTEBAN, ELIGIO PUNZAL, CELEDONIO PRINCIPE, ANTONIO ANCHETA, and JUANITO SARMIENTO, respondents. ANTONIO, J.: Facts The CFI of Norzagaray, Bulacan rendered judgment in favor of Candido Cruz, et al, ordering Eufemio Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan, respectively, to personally pay the salaries which Cruz, et al failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually reinstated. Said judgment was affirmed by the CA and the motion for reconsideration filed by Correa and Sarmiento were denied. Correa filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and to Direct Execution, alleging that at the time the writ was served on him, he was no longer the mayor of Norzagaray, therefore constituting substantial change in the situation of the parties which makes the issuance of the writ of execution inequitable. Correa further prays that judgment be rendered declaring that the payment of back salaries of Cruz et al should be made by the incumbent mayor and the by the municipality of Norzagaray. Issue W/N Correa and Sarmiento should be personally liable to Cruz, et al? Held Yes, Correa and Sarmiento should be personally liable to Cruz, et al. A Public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor lie any private individual. 9 This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official authority." 122. Alinsugay, et.al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. G.R. No. L-48639, March 16, 1987 FACTS: Petitioners Eliseo Alinsugay, Purita Villaflor, Paz Gandiongco, and Celso Remo were appointed laborers in various offices of the provincial government of Cebu. Upon submission of their appointments by then governor Rene Espina, the Cebu provincial auditor advised the provincial treasurer that the appointments of the four petitioners and forty-four others whose positions belonged to the unclassified civil service should be approved by the provincial board pursuant to Section 2081 of the Administrative Code, as amended by RA No. 528, otherwise, their salaries would not be allowed in audit. The provincial treasurer sent a letter to the provincial board requesting for the “approval or disapproval” of the appointments. The said letter was part of the agenda of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the provincial board’s regular session and in the minutes of the meeting, the board expressed their opinion that they were for the approval of the appointments. However, the action on the appointments was delayed since the provincial board did not meet as the governor was concerned with the coming elections. After the elections, the governor decided to submit the appointments of the 48 laborers to the new provincial board. Some of the appointments were approved but others, including those of the petitioners, were not. Petitioners’ request for reconsideration was denied. They filed a petition for mandamus and damages against the governor, vice-governor, members of the provincial board, provincial treasurer and provincial auditor praying that the respondents be ordered to “continue all petitioners in their employment”, to include them in the provincial plantilla or any supplement budget and to appropriate necessary funds to cover all the salaries due them. They also prayed for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees. The CFI of Cebu dismissed the petition for lack of merit ruling that their appointments should have been made in accordance with Section 2081 of the Administrative Code and that the disapproval of their appointments was lawful. On appeal, the CA affirmed the CFI’s decision. ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents are liable for moral damages for the alleged illegal dismissal of the petitioners HELD: The Court held that private respondents cannot be held liable for the disapproval of the petitioner’s appointments. The power and authority conferred by law on a body to approve appointments, carries with it the power to disapprove. In the absence of proof of malice on the part of the private respondents, they cannot be held liable for their official act. As such, there is no reason to continue the mistake, if there was, in the payment of salaries of the petitioners considering that the petitioners do not have legal right over their positions 123. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO [ G.R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001 ]

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life’s adversity. Both petitioner and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. In October 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”. The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office. At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the Philippines. At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace. A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.” Issue: (1) Whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign - YES (2) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits - NO HELD: (1) The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution, wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, the question of whether the previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political. For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oathtaking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. (2) As to the issue of the petitioner’s contention that he is immune from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure (the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) not his term (time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another).

124. Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco G.R. No. L-6157 July 30, 1910 Facts: plaintiffs in this case are W. Cameron Forbes is the Governor-General of the Philippines, Chief of Police J. E. Harding and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila C. R. Trowbridge. The defendants are A. S. Crossfield ,one of the judges of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila and Chuoco Tiaco ,a foreigner of Chinese nationality and a resident of the Philippines for the last 35 years having a family in the country and some properties. Chuoco Tiaco filed a case for damages alleging that defendants forcibly deported the plaintiff to China and forcibly prevented his return for some months in violation of the right of the said plaintiff herein to be and to remain in the Philippine Islands as established by law. Crossfield issued an inhibition against Forbes et al from spelling or deporting or threatening to expel or deport Chuoco Tiaco. Forbes, Harding, and Trowbridge sued for writs of prohibition against the judge and the respective plaintiffs, alleging that the expulsion was carried out in the public interest and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese government in the Philippines, and was immediately reported to the Secretary of War. The complaints were demurred to, but the Supreme Court overruled the demurrers, granted the prohibition, and ordered the actions dismissed. The judge, having declined to join in the applications for writs of error, was made a respondent, and the cases are here on the ground that the plaintiffs have been deprived of liberty without due process of law. Issue: Whether the Governor General, as Chief Executive, can be sued in a civil action? Held: The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and restrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governor-general, like the judges of the courts and the members of the legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an executed in the performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived of his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary cannot do is to mulct the Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it. 125. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant vs.RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, respondent A.M. No. P-89-290. January 29, 1993 FACTS On 1 February 1989, then Court Administrator Meynardo A. Tiro, pursuant to this Court's en banc resolution of 12 March 1981 and on the basis of the Information filed with the Sandiganbayan, administratively charged the herein respondent with the crime of falsification of a public document and with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In its resolution dated May 15, 1989, the Sandiganbayan, on the basis of stipulation (sic) of facts and the evidence adduced, held that on May 23, 1986, the highest bidder Rolando Patriarca offered the three (3) vessels M/V Dadiangas, T/B Marinero and T/B Timonel out of several other personal properties bidded (sic), to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian, a businesswoman engaged in the sale of scrap iron. These vessels were sold to Cailian for the price of P1,325,000.00. Cailian, highest bidder Patriarca and his wife repaired to the Navotas Branch of the Philippine National Bank that same day. Cailian bought cashier's check No. 273290 dated May 23, 1986 for P1,325,000.00, which, upon request of Patriarca, who said he had no money to pay for the vessels, was made payable to the order of "Genstar Container c/o Atty. Jose C. Sison" the judgment creditor (resolution, p. 4, p. 84, rec.). This piece of evidence is certainly eloquent proof of the fact that there was no payment of the bid price by the bidder Rolando Patriarca on May 12, 1986 to the sheriff amounting to P1,325,000.00. As found by the Sandiganbayan, it was the bidder's buyer (sic) Rizalina Ingco-Cailian who paid the bid price directly to the judgment creditor. This took place on May 23, 1986. Indeed, if the bid price was given to the respondent deputy sheriff on May 12, 1986, it was his duty to deposit the amount immediately with the court's cashier. He did not do this. He did not also require the judgment creditor to pay the sheriff's percentage of collection. Consequently, the inevitable conclusion is that the respondent sheriff was remiss in his duties and that the sheriff's certificate of sale was falsified because the truth is that the bid price was not paid by the highest bidder on May 12, 1986. In fact, there was no auction conducted on that date because it was already past 4:00 o'clock, the (sic) sheriff was not yet at the place of auction which was indeed scheduled at 10:00 a.m., May 12, 1896. The bid price was actually paid by a third who bought the three (3) vessels out of several other properties levied upon. She paid therefor directly to the judgment creditor. The sheriff 's percentage of commission was not paid. ISSUE: WON the Enriquez is administratively liable. (YES) RULING: The court added, however, that from the facts surrounding the case, it appears that (a) no bidding was held on 12 May 1986; even if one was conducted, the alleged highest bidder, one Rolando Patriarca, did not have the money to pay for his bid of P1,325,000.00, thereby resulting in a failure of the proceedings; or (b) the sale was consummated only on 23 May 1986, without the requisite bidding, to Rizalina Ingco-Cailian to whom Patriarca allegedly "sold" what he bought during the "bidding" of 12 May 1986. In his Notice of Levy and Sale dated 3 May 1986, the respondent expressly stated that he "will sell at PUBLIC AUCTION to the highest bidder for CASH and in Philippine Currency on May 12, 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning or soon thereafter at El Varadero de Manila, Sangley Point, Cavite" the vessel M/V Dadiangas, Tugboat Timonel, Tugboat Marinero and the other properties therein described. Clearly, therefore, if indeed the public auction was held on 12 May 1986 and Patriarca was the highest bidder therein, he did not at such time have the cash, corresponding to his submitted bid, for delivery to the respondent and eventually, the judgment creditor. He falsified his Sheriff's Certificate of Sale upon entering therein the fact that Patriarca "thereupon did pay" to him the bid price of P1,325,000.00 which was credited to the partial satisfaction of the writ of execution. Assuming that Patriarca truly paid the purchase price, there could be no possible explanation for the belated Sheriff's Partial Report dated 23 May 1986. The Sandiganbayan, in dismissing the same, was simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction 2 because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantee an accused. 3 Lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases; this is preponderance of evidence. 4 Then too, there is the "substantial evidence" rule in administrative proceedings which merely requires in these cases such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 5

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Finally, the court has no doubt that the respondent (a) falsified the Minutes of Sale and the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale; (b) violated Sections 22 and 25, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by not conducting another bidding — assuming one was held on 12 May 1986 — after the alleged highest bidder, Patriarca, failed to pay the bid price, by executing in the latter's favor a certificate of Sheriff's Sale and by delivering the auctioned vessels despite the failure to pay: (c) illegally sold the vessels to Cailian on 23 May 1986 without a public bidding; and (d) maliciously connived and conspired with Patriarca, Cailian and others to cover up such illegal acts by making it appear, by means of an antedated deed of sale, that Patriarca sold the vessels to Cailian. Respondent is therefore guilty of gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. He not only deliberately violated the integrity of official acts of an employee of the court, but also undermined the faith and trust of the public in the Judiciary. He has transgressed the constitutional command that as a public office is a public trust, all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives. 6 In Jereos vs. Reblando, 7 We laid down the rule that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, such as the court of which the herein respondent is the assigned sheriff, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized with propriety and decorum, but above all else must be beyond suspicion. The Court resolves to DISMISS from the service, effective immediately, respondent RAMON G. ENRIQUEZ, for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except the monetary value of his leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or service of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. 126. MOLLANEDA VS UMACOB G.R. No. 140128, June 6, 2001 FACTS: Respondent, Leonida Umacob, filed an affidavit-complaint for sexual harassment against petitioner, Arnold Mollaneda, with the CSC. The alleged sexual harassment incident occurred when Umacob made a follow up on her request to be transferred from her present assignment. However, the Admin Officer 2 of Davao City School, Rolando Suase, was not around at that time and it was Mollaneda, the Division Superintendent, who was in the office of Suase because at that time his adjacent office was being cleaned. Umacob, handed to Mollaneda the letter of recommendation and advised by the latter to return next week, but Umacob was not satisfied with the answer she got, that is why she insisted Mollaneda to give her a note to fix the time and date of their next meeting/appointment. After the making of the note, as Umacob was about to leave the office, Mollaneda hugged her and kiss her in a torrid manner and mashed her breast. She tried to resist but her neck was forcibly held. The said acts were done several times and was warned by Mollaneda not to tell anybody in the office. Umacob reported the incident to the police station reported the incident to the police station and filed acomplaint for acts of lasciviousness before the Municipal TrialCourt. She also filed an administrative complaint as well with theCivil Service Commission - Regional Office XI, Davao City (CSCROXI). She furnished the Department of Education, Culture andSports - Regional Office XI, Davao City (DECSRO XI) a copy of heraffidavit-complaint A DECS investigating committee was formed, which laterrecommended to the DECS Regional Director "the dropping of thecase" for lack of merit. Meanwhile, the case before the CSC was heard before Atty. Anacleto Buena, which hearing was attended by both parties and their counsel. CSC found Mollaneda guilty,which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Thus Mollanedaelevated the case to the SC. Mollaneda

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) alleges that 1) Umacobwas guilty of forum shopping, 2) He was denied due process, and3) witnesses' testimonies were hearsay. Pending the SC case, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed the case of acts of lasciviousness. ISSUE: W/N Mollaneda may still be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of the criminal case before the MTC RULING: Petitioner cannot find solace in the dismissal of the criminal case against him. Long-ingrained in our jurisprudence is the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case against an accused who is a respondent in an administrative case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not foreclose the administrative proceeding against him or give him a clean bill of health in all respects. In dismissing the case, the court is simply saying that the prosecution was unable to prove the guilt of the respondent beyond reasonable doubt, a condition sine qua non for conviction because of the presumption of innocence which the Constitution guarantees an accused. However, in administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. After a more incisive scrutiny of the records, we are convinced that petitioner’s culpability has been proven by substantial evidence. Respondent's testimony was found by the Commission to be "natural, straightforward, spontaneous and convincing." Unlike petitioner's testimony, that of respondent is replete with details consistent with human nature. Clearly, the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City cannot bind this Court in the disposition of the instant administrative case. In sum, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. While it is unfortunate that petitioner will lose his job because of a moment's indiscretion, this Court shall not flinch in imposing upon him the severe penalty of dismissal. As School's Division Superintendent, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethics. By succumbing to his moral perversity, he failed to live up to such standard. Indeed, he provided a justifiable ground for his dismissal from the service. proven by substantial evidence. Respondent's testimony was found by the Commission to be "natural, straightforward, spontaneous and convincing." Unlike petitioner's testimony, that of respondent is replete with details consistent with human nature. Clearly, the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 5, Davao City cannot bind this Court in the disposition of the instant administrative case. In sum, we find no reason to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. While it is unfortunate that petitioner will lose his job because of a moment's indiscretion, this Court shall not flinch in imposing upon him the severe penalty of dismissal. As School's Division Superintendent, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethics. By succumbing to his moral perversity, he failed to live up to such standard. Indeed, he provided a justifiable ground for his dismissal from the service. 127. Rodriguez vs. Gloria Arroyo GR No. 191805 15 November 2011 Facts: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency. Issue: 1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit 2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. 4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for his abduction. Held: 1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez. 2. Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict”. Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. In the case at bar, the doctrine may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this court from applying the doctrine in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever process an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within theses foregoing definitions. 3. Yes. To hold someone liable under the command responsibility, the following elements must obtain: 1. The existence of superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime is his subordinate 2. The superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and 3. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. 4. No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the “Melo Commission” and the “Alston Report”, respondents already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators. While the ALston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’ general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it. 128. CARPIO-MORALES vs. CA and BINAY GR No. 217126-27 10 November 2015 FACTS: On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Officecof the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative casesfor Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases 18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati: Binay’s 1st term: On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract22 on September 28, 2010,23 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 24 and approved the release of funds therefor On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award 40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of architectural design, 43 and approved the release of the funds therefor Binay’s 2nd term: On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012 contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97; On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract 48 with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P429,011.48. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic. ISSUE: Whether or not Binay’s second term condoned his administrative liability HELD: No. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL RELATIONS 129. Astraquillo vs Manglapus, G.R. No. 88183, October 03, 1990 Facts: These are 5 consolidated cases of termination of public officers. Astraquillo: On July 22, 1986, Asraquillo was appointed by the President as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission (II) to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Atty. Roy Seneres, the Philippine Labor Attache to the United Arab Emirates, accused Astraquillo, his wife and cousin-in-law of improper interference with his functions. On April 11, 1989, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul Manglapus recommended to the President the termination of Astraquillo's services as ambassador. The recommendation was "APPROVED by authority of the President." Glang: On September 11, 1986, Alunan Glang was appointed by President Aquino as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and Chief of Mission (Class I) to Kuwait. On May 27, 1989, he received a message from the Secretary Manglapus informing him that his services as ambassador and chief of mission to Kuwait had been terminated and directing him to vacate his post "on or before June 30, 1989." The message also contained “BY AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT." Melchor: Alejandro Melchor, Jr. was also appointed by President Aquino Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on June 27, 1986. He was then assigned to Russia. Eventually, he was eventually appointed as Chief of Mission, Class 1. On July 25, 1988, 7 officers and employees of the Philippine Embassy in Moscow filed a complaint with the Department of Foreign Affairs against Melchor and two others for "acts inimical to the foreign Service, in violation of the Foreign Service Code and blatant disregard of COA rules and regulations and the Civil Service Code." Secretary Manglapus, issued Memorandum No. 4230 that Melchor: (a) be allowed to forthwith return to his Moscow post to prepare for the President's state visit, (b) be thereafter transferred to another post, and (c) be reprimanded on account of the four charges against him. However, on May 29, 1989, Manglapus submitted a Memorandum to the President recommending the termination of the services of Melchor -- described as "a political (non-career) Ambassador" -- "as Chief of Mission and as Ambassador" to the U.S.S.R, and that he "should vacate his post by 30 June 1989." This was "APPROVED by authority of the President" Melchor argues that his appointment as chief of mission had given him security of tenure as regards this latter position. Petitioner’s Contentions: 1) that the removals from the service were not made by that President personally and directly;

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 2) that the removals did not state a cause explicitly prescribed by the Foreign Service Act or the Civil Service Law; 3) that the removals were effected without due process; 4) the petitioners were appointed right after the so-called "EDSA Resolution," and when Vice-President Laurel was Minister of Foreign Affairs; and 5) all were appointed Chief of Mission Class I (except Astraquillo, who was named Class II Chief) and came into Foreign Service "through lateral entry." Issue: 1. W.O.N petitioners may be validly removed 2. W.O.N Melchior, as chief of mission had security of tenure Held: 1. Yes. Under Section 6 of PD 807, Non-Career Service shall be characterized by: "(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purposes employment was made." In this case, petitioners were appointed to the Non-Career Service. Their appointments to the Foreign Service were made on "bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service;" their entrance was not "based on merit and fitness determined by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications." Thus, their "tenure was coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasures." 2. No. Section 3, Title I of the Foreign Service Act defines the chief of mission as "a principal officer appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, to be in charge of the embassy and legation and other diplomatic mission of the Philippines or any other person assigned under the terms of this act to be minister resident, charge d'affaires, commissioner or diplomatic agent." Appointments as chief of missions in their respective posts, simply meant that they were ambassadors being placed in charge of the embassy or legation therein. As ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary, appointed by the President, their positions still pertain to the non-career service. As such, when a public officer holds office at the pleasure of the appointing authority, his being replaced shall be regarded as termination through expiration of term, not removal. Digested by: Emmanuel M. Acosta 130. Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan & People of the Philippines March 25, 1999G.R. No. 130872 FACTS: Francisco Lecaroz (father): Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque. Lenlie Lecaroz (son): outgoing chairman of Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Santa Cruz & member of Sangguniang Bayan (SB) representing the federation of KBs. 1985 election of KB: Jowil Red won as Chairman of Barangay Santa Cruz (Lenlie did not run ascandidate as he was no longer qualified, having passed the age limit). Red was appointed by President Marcos as member of SB of Santa Cruz, representing the federation of KBs. He received his appointment powers when Aquino was already in power. However, he was not allowed by Mayor Lecaroz to sit as sectoral rep in the SB. Subsequently, Mayor Lecaroz prepared and approved on different dates the payment to Lenlie Lecaros of payrolls covering period of January 1987 to January 1987. Sandiganbayan: guilty on 13 Informations for Estafa through falsification of Public Documents. Red assumed position of KB presidency upon expiration of term of Lenlie Lecaroz. Thus, when Mayor Lecaroz entered the name of his son in the payroll, he deliberately stated a falsity.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: WON accused are guilty of estafa through falsification? NO. RATIO: KB Constitution: “In the case of the members of the sanggunian representing the association of barangay councils and the president of the federation of kabataang barangay, their terms of office shall be coterminous with their tenure is president of their respective association and federation.” Theory of accused: Red failed to qualify as KB sectoral representative to the SB since he did not present an authenticated copy of his appointment papers; neither did he take a valid oath of office. Resultantly, this enabled petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz to continue as member of the SB although in a hold-over capacity since his term had already expired. Theory of Sandiganbayan: the hold-over provision under Sec. 1 quoted above pertains only to positions in the KB, clearly implying that since no similar provision is found in Sec. 7 of B.P.Blg. 51, there can be no hold-over with respect to positions in the SB. SC: Sandiganbayan is incorrect! The concept of hold-over when applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. 131. Osmeña v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750 FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity and constitutionality of RA 7056, "An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor," for the following reasons: 1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992. 2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution. 3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. 4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of Section 9, Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution. 5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less, valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all, Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its amendment or revision. On the merits of the case, the Solicitor General contends that Republic Act 7056 is a valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions. ISSUE: Whether RA 7056 is unconstitutional HELD: YES. At the core of this controversy is Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution, which reads —

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Sec. 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Of the Senators elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three years. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992. It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1987 Constitution that the terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30, 1992. On this point, it has to be stressed that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, is fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec. 8, Art. X). The incumbent local officials were elected in January 1988. Therefore, their term would have expired on February 2, 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon of June 30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well as those of the Senators, members of the House of Representatives, President and Vice-President, is the same — to synchronize the national and local elections. On the other hand, RA 7056 provides for two (2) separate elections in 1992 as follows: Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization — To start the process of synchronization of election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore declared there shall be held: (a) An election for President and Vice-President of the Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all elective Members of the House of Representatives on the second Monday of May, 1992, and (b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal elective officials on the second Monday of November, 1992. With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized (simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May, 1992, the inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of a desynchronized election. Stated differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the 1987 Constitution. But this is not all. There are other provisions of the Constitution violated by RA 7056. For one, there is Section 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. It has been held that: It is not competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond that period, even though the successors fail to qualify with the time. (See 67 CJS p.379, Emphasis supplied) Also, there is Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which provides that: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, UNCONSTITUTIONAL, hence, NULL and VOID.

Republic

Act

7056

is

hereby

declared

132. GSIS V. FERNANDO DE LEON FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1992, after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A. No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges. Thereafter, and for more than nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he failed to receive his monthly pension. Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement benefits provided thereunder. Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be compelled to continue paying his monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. The CA granted the petition. Petitioner GSIS is now before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS argues that the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform an act that is contrary to law. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition for mandamus HELD: NO. This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which are in the class of social legislation. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose. In this case, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. In stopping the payment of respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910, GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other extant retirement law. This is flawed logic. Respondent’s disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not mean that he is disqualified from receiving any retirement benefit under any other existing retirement law. Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A. No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or P.D. No. 1146. In his Comment, respondent implicitly indicated his preference to retire under P.D. No. 1146, since this law provides for higher benefits, and because the same was the latest law at the time of his retirement in 1992. Under P.D. No. 1146, to be eligible for retirement benefits, one must satisfy the following requisites: Section 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who: (1) has at least fifteen years of service; (2) is at least sixty years of age; and (3) is separated from the service. Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not dispute this. Accordingly, respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section 12 of the same law. To grant respondent these benefits does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondents claim, in substitution of R.A. No. 910.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid down by this Court. One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioners interpretation of the pertinent retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer the governments retirement system. He had the right to assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing. Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of respondent, he cannot be prejudiced by the same. 133. RABOR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION GR. No. 111812 FACTS: Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years. Sometime in May 1991, Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13) years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" issued by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91." Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission, Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on this matter." Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte that said extension of services is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted: Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be retained the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall not exceed six (6) months. Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter, asking for extension of his services in the City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about two (2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President." This request was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991. Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March 1992. In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part: In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement under P.D. 1146. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part: 1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for retirement, his request for further extension of service cannot be given due course. ISSUE: W/N Rabor may be granted extension of service to be able to avail of the 15-year service requirement under PD 1146 RULING: No. We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five (65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Griño-Aquino, J. in her dissenting opinion in Cena v. CSC: Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension. Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time, however, we are bound to note that there should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other government employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Griño-Aquino in her dissenting opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point. A person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and that opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. 134. CSC VS PILILLA WATER DISTRICT GR. NO. 190147 MARCH 5, 2013 FACTS: Paulino J. Rafanan was first appointed General Manager on a coterminous status under Resolution No. 12 issued on August 7, 1998 by the Board of Directors (BOD) of respondent Pililla Water District (PWD). His appointment was signed by the BOD Acting Chairman and attested by the CSC Field Office-Rizal. Petitoner CSC amending and clarifying Section 12, Rule XIII of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 15, s. 1999, as follows: Section 12. a) No person who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years can be appointed to any position in the government, subject only to the exception provided under sub-section (b) hereof. b) A person who has already reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 can still be appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position in the government. A person appointed to a coterminous/primarily confidential position who reaches the age of 65 years is considered automatically extended in the service until the expiry date of his/her appointment or until his/her services are earlier terminated.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On June 16, 2004 The BOD approved resolution no 19. Extending the service of Paulino Rafanan as General manager upon reaching the age of 65 and is co terminus with the term of the last Director appointed. CSC denied such appointment for rafanan is already at the age of 65 and is under compulsory retirement, likewise CSC deciding that the position of General Manager is not a confidential position therefore not under the exception. ISSUE: WON the position of General Manager is a confidential position? HELD: Yes. The position of General Manager in a water district is considered as a confidential position due to the intimate relation between the GM and the Board of Directors of the Water district, and the power of the BOD to terminate the services of the GM on the ground of loss of confidence. Following the rule that a person who reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 may still be appointed to a government position provided that it is a coterminous or primarily confidential position. Therefore Rafanan being a GM, which such position is a confidential position, such appointment is valid. 135. Ortiz vs. COMELEC (162 SCRA 812; June 28, 1988) FACTS: Petitioner Mario Ortiz was appointed COMELEC Commissioner by then President Ferdinand Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992." He took his oath of office on July 30, 1985. On March 5, 1986, together with Commissioners Quirino Marquinez and Mangontawar Guro, petitioner sent President Corazon C. Aquino a letter which reads as follows: “The undersigned Commissioners were appointed to the Commission on Elections on July 30, 1985. Following the example of Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court, on the premise that we have now a revolutionary government, we hereby place our position at your disposal.” Thereafter, or on March 25,1986, the Freedom Constitution was promulgated through Proclamation No. 3, Artide III thereof provides: SECTION 1. In the reorganization of the government, priority shall be given to measures to promote economy, efficiency, and the eradication of graft and corruption. SEC. 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986. SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and other benefits accruing thereunder. On April 16,1986, the COMELEC, then composed of Chairman Ramon Felipe, Jr. and Commissioners Froilan Bacungan, Quirino Marquinez, Mario Ortiz (petitioner herein), Ruben Agpalo and Jaime Layosa, adopted Resolution No. 86-2364 approving the application for retirement of Commissioners Victorino Savellano and Jaime Opinion. Seven days later, the same body passed Resolution No. 862370 approving the application for retirement of Commissioner Mangontawar Guro. On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary requested Acting Chairman Felipe to convey the information to Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective resignations, effective immediately." After the presidential acceptance of said "resignations," the new COMELEC was composed of Ramon Felipe, Jr. as Chairman and Commissioners Froilan Bacungan, Leopoldo Africa, Haydee Yorac, Andres Flores, Dario Rama and Anacleto Badoy, Jr., as members. It was to this body that Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for retirement. They were followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986. To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement benefits, all seven former COMELEC Commissioners invoked Republic Act No. l568 as amended by Republic Act No. 3595 and reenacted by Republic Act No. 6118. In its en banc Resolution, COMELEC revoked and denied the applications for retirement of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz and Layosa on the ground that they were "not entitled

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended" without specifying the reason therefor. Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution, contending that he was entitled to the benefits. He averred therein that he did not resign but simply placed his position at the disposal of the President; that he had in fact completed his term as Commissioner by the "change in the term of [his] office and eventual replacement". Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the COMELEC, petitioner appealed the denial of his claim to the Chairman of the Commission on Audit [COA]. The COA referred the matter to the COMELEC resident auditor for comment and recommendation. Having failed to receive any communication from the COA for some six months, on June 3, 1987, petitioner reiterated his appeal thereto. Again, the matter was referred to the COMELEC resident auditor with a request for immediate action thereon. A month later, or on July 9, 1987, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC's "arbitrary and unjust denial" of his claim for retirement benefits and of his subsequent motion for reconsideration constitutes "grave and whimsical abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction". ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the completion of his term of office, and, therefore, having rendered only sixteen years of service to the government, he is not entitled to retirement benefits RULING: No. Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by competent and lawful authority. From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically state therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1, when the President called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to restore confidence in public administration. Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power. A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be observed, particularly in cases involving constitutional officials like the petitioner whose removal from office entails an impeachment proceeding. For even if working for the government is regarded as no more than a privilege, discharge for disloyalty or for doubt about loyalty may involve such legal rights as those in reputation and eligibility for other employment. The curtailment of his term not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term albeit much ahead of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case should be placed in the same category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no removal but an expiration of his term. As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be considered retired from the service. And, in the absence of proof that he has been found guilty of malfeasance or misfeasance in office or that there is a pending administrative case against him, petitioner is entitled to a life pension under Republic Act No. 1568 as amended and reenacted by Republic Act No. 6118. WHEREFORE, respondent Commission on Elections denial of petitioner's application for retirement benefits is hereby reversed and set aside. The Commission on Audit and other public offices concerned are directed to facilitate the processing and payment of petitioner's retirement benefits. 136. Ejercito-Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, 2 March 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Both petitioner

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) and the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The exposẻ immediately ignited reactions of rage. Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign. The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment. January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people. On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacañang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine. At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. He issued the following press statement: xxx At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society. xxx It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: "Sir: By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. After Estrada's fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. Issue: Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. HELD: Estrada was deemed resigned. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her oath as President. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.

137. G.R. No. 169604

March 6, 2007

NELSON P. COLLANTES, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondents. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts Nelson Collantes was conferred Career Executive Service Eligibility. Then President Ramos accorded him CESO II. One year later, he was appointed as the Undersecretary for Peace and Order of DILG. After which, then President Estrada appointed him to the position Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of DND. Collantes’ stint with DND was shortlived as he was supposedly ordered by then Secretary Orlando Mercado to renounce his post to give way to another appointee. Collantes therefore resigned, believing that he will be given a new assignment. However, when no new assignment was given, Collantes requested for tenure as CESO. Then President Estrada accorded Collantes the highest rank in Career Executive Service, which is the CESO I. still, no new appointment was given to him, and Estrada appointed Mr. Batenga for Undersecretary for Civil Relations of DND. Collantes instituted a Petition Quo Warranto and Mandamus claiming that he was constructively dismissed from work without due process of law and thus, the DND pot was never vacated. He further prayed that Batenga’s appointment be nullified and that he be reinstated with full back salaries or a post of equivalent rank to CESO I if reinstatement is not possible. CSC favored Collantes, but the CA reversed the CSC’s decision. The CSC later reversed its own decision, concluding that Collantes effectively resigned from his post as Undersecretary for Civilian Relations of DND. Issue

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W/N Collantes may be appointed to a new position? Held No, Collantes may not be appointed to a new position. Although he was accorded with the highest Career Exceutive Service rank, Collantes’’s arguments presuppose that he had been removed from his position as Undersecretary of the DND. He, however, did not present any evidence to that effect, whether in this Petition or in his earlier Petition for Quo Warranto and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals. If he is implying that he was removed from office by virtue of his account that he was approached by persons close to President Joseph Estrada who asked him to relinquish his post, which he did, then this Petition must fail, for, by his own deliberate deed, he resigned from his position. There are no special legal effects when a resignation is one of a courtesy resignation. The mere fact that the President, by himself or through another, requested for someone’s resignation does not give the President the obligation to appoint such person to another position. A courtesy resignation is just as effectual as any other resignation. There can be no implied promises of another position just because the resignation was made out of courtesy. Any express promise of another position, on the other hand, would be void, because there can be no derogation of the discretion of the appointing power, and because its object is outside the commerce of man. 138. Joson vs. Nario G.R. No. 91548, July 13, 1990 FACTS: The position of the Governor of Nueva Ecija was temporarily vacated when incumbent Governor Eduardo Joson took an indefinite sick leave on December 7, 1989. As Vice Governor, respondent Narciso Nario took over as Acting Vice Governor pursuant to the Local Government Code. Unfortunately, Nario, himself, fell ill shortly afterwards, and so executed a “waiver” of his “right” to the office of the Governor. Petitioner Tomas Joson took his oath as Acting Governor. Respondent Nario felt that his illness had worsened and so sent a letter to the Secretary of Local Government tendering his resignation as Vice Governor of Nueva Ecija. The following day, Acting Governor Tomas Joson took his oath as Vice Governor of Nueva Ecija. He then sent an official communication to the Secretary forwarding Nario’s resignation and advising of his assumption of the office of Vice-Governor pursuant to the provisions of Section 49(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337. Respondent Nario discovered that his illness was not that serious at all and so withdrew his Letter of Resignation as Vice Governor and waiver as Acting Governor. He requested that they be considered as without legal force and effect. The Secretary acted promptly on Nario’s letter and on the same day, Nario took his oath of office as Acting Provincial Governor before the Secretary. The latter wrote a letter addressed to petitioner Joson addressed as First Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member stating that he should cease and desist from discharging any and all powers, duties, and functions appertaining to the office of Provincial Governor. Because of this, petitioner file with the RTC a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for restraining order. His case was rendered premature because petitioner deviated from the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. He then filed with the SC a petition for review on certiorari praying for the reversion of the decision made by the RTC, declaring illegal and without force and effect respondent’s withdrawal of his voluntary resignation, and declaring null and void the designation of Nario as Acting Governor. ISSUE: Whether or not the office of the Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija was rendered vacant by the voluntary resignation of the person duly elected thereto HELD:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) No. The Court ruled that apart from legal provision, mere presentation of resignation does not work a vacancy, and a resignation is not complete until accepted by the proper authority. And until that acceptance, the tender or offer to resign is revocable, unless otherwise provided by law. In our jurisprudence, the Court has held that acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Art. 238 of the RPC. The respondent Judge was thus correct in refusing to issue the writ of prohibition sued for by petitioner Joson. It was not within the power of respondent Nario to dictate the time of the effectiveness of his resignation, or otherwise impose conditions thereon. That that was the prerogative of the Secretary, as the proper authority to act thereon. It was well within the Secretary’s power and discretion to accept or reject the resignation. Respondent Nario therefore continued as Vice Governor despite his tender of resignation and despite his absence from office for a few days on account of sickness. Never having lost the office of Vice-Governor, it was also lawful and logical for him to assume the position of Acting Governor, temporarily vacant due to the infirmity of the incumbent, as he eventually did on instructions of the Secretary of Local Government. 139. ANGOBUNG versus COMELEC G. R. No. 126576 (March 5, 1997) FACTS: Petitioner Ricardo M. Angobung was the elected Mayor of the Municipality of Tumauini, Isabela in the local elections of 1995. Private respondent de Alban was also a candidate in said elections. In September 1996, de Alban filed with the Local Election Registrar of Tumauini, Isabela, a Petition for Recall against Angubong. Said petition was forwarded to the Regional Office in Tuguegarao, Cagayan and then to the main office of COMELEC in Manila, for approval. Deputy Executive Director for Operations Pio Jose Joson then submitted to the COMELEC en banc, a Memorandum (08 October 1996) which recommends the approval of the petition for recall filed by de Alban and its signing by other qualified voters in order to garner at least 25% of the total number of registered voters as required by Section 69[d] of the Local Government Code of 1991. The COMELEC en banc, acting on said Memorandum, issued the herein assailed Resolution No. 96-2951. Petitioner now attacks the aforementioned resolution as being unconstitutional and therefore invalid. ISSUES 1. Whether the Resolution violated the one-year bar on recall elections; 2. Whether the Resolution violated the statutory minimum requirement of 25% as to the number of signatures supporting petition for recall. HELD, RATIO 1. NO. The recall election scheduled on 02 December 1996 is not barred by the May 1997 Barangay Elections. The one-year bar finds no application in the case; Resolution No. 96-2951 is therefore valid on this ground. Section 74 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides that "no recall shall take place within one year immediately preceding a regular local election." For the time bar to apply, the approaching regular local election must be one where the position of the official to be recalled is to be actually contested and filled by the electorate. 2. YES. Private respondent de Alban filed the petition for recall with only herself as the filer and initiator. She claims in her petition that she has, together with many others in Tumauini, Isabela, lost confidence in the leadership of petitioner. The petition, however, does not bear the names of all these other citizens of Tumauini who have reportedly also become anxious to oust petitioner from the post of mayor. Section 69 [d] of the Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that "recall of any elective municipal official may also be validly initiated upon petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected". The law is plain and unequivocal as to what initiates recall proceedings: only a petition of at least 25% of the total number of registered voters may validly initiate recall proceedings. The law does not state that the petition must be signed by at least 25% of the registered voters but rather it must be "of" or by, at least 25% of the registered voters, i.e., the petition must be filed, not by one person only, but by at least 25% of the total number of registered voters.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy Recall was intended to be an effective and speedy remedy to remove an official who is not giving satisfaction to the electorate regardless of whether or not he is discharging his full duty to the best of his ability and as his conscience dictates. It is a power granted to the people who, in concert, desire to change their leaders for reasons only they, as a collective, can justify. It must be pursued by the people, not just by one disgruntled loser in the elections or a small percentage of disenchanted electors. Otherwise, its purpose as a direct remedy of the people shall be defeated by the ill motives of a few among them whose selfish resort to recall would destabilize the community and seriously disrupt the running of government. While the people are vested with the power to recall their elected officials, the same power is accompanied by the concomitant responsibility to see through all the consequences of the exercise of such power, including rising above anonymity, confronting the official sought to be recalled, his family, his friends, and his supporters, and seeing the recall election to its ultimate end. The procedure of allowing just one person to file the initiatory recall petition and then setting a date for the signing of the petition, which amounts to inviting and courting the public which may have not, in the first place, even entertained any displeasure in the performance of the official sought to be recalled, is not only violative of statutory law but also tainted with an attempt to go around the law. The Supreme Court (1) granted the Petition for Certiorari; (2) declared COMELEC Resolution No. 962951 null and void; (3) set aside the same; made permanent the restraining order it issued.

140. Paras vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996 Facts: Paras was the incumbent Punong Barangay in Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election“. Issue: Whether the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections, where the recall election is for Barangay post? Held: No. Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election.It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 141. CSC vs. Magnaye GR No. 183337 23 April 2010 Facts: In March 2001, Mayor Roman H. Rosales of Lemery, Batangas, appointed Magnaye as Utility Worker I at the Office of Economic Enterprise [Operation of Market] (OEE). After a few days, Mayor Rosales detailed him to the Municipal Planning and Development Office (MPDO). In the May elections of that year, Mayor Rosales was defeated by Bendaa, who immediately assumed office. Thereafter, Magnaye was returned to his original assignment at the OEE. Bendaa also placed him on detail at the MPDO to assist in the implementation of a Survey. The new mayor served him a notice of termination from employment effective the following day for unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity. Magnaye questioned his termination before the CSC head office on the ground that Mayor Bendaa was not in a position to effectively evaluate his performance because it was made less than one and one-half months after his (Mayor Bendaas) assumption to office. He added that his termination was without basis and was politically motivated. The CSC head office dismissed, without prejudice, Magnayes complaint because he failed to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping. Thereafter, Magnaye filed a complaint with the regional office of the Civil Service (CSCRO-IV). The CSCRO-IV dismissed Magnayes complaint for lack of merit. It upheld his dismissal from the service on the ground that Mayor Bendaas own assessment, together with the evaluation made by his supervisors, constituted sufficient and reasonable grounds for his termination. Magnaye sought recourse through a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, citing CSCRO-IVs alleged errors of fact and of law, non-observance of due process, and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Adopting the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General, the CA ruled in Magnayes favor, mainly on the ground that he was denied due process since he was not informed of what constituted the alleged unsatisfactory conduct and want of capacity that led to his termination. With that, petitioners alleged the said reversal of decision. Issue: Do probationary employees enjoy security of tenure? Held: Yes. The CSC position is contrary to the Constitution and the Civil Service Law itself. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution guarantees the rights of all workers not just in terms of self-organization, collective bargaining, peaceful concerted activities, the right to strike with qualifications, humane conditions of work and a living wage but also to security of tenure, and Section 2(3), Article IX-B is emphatic in saying that, "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Our Constitution, in using the expressions all workers and no officer or employee, puts no distinction between a probationary and a permanent or regular employee which means that both probationary and permanent employees enjoy security of tenure. Probationary employees enjoy security of tenure in the sense that during their probationary employment, they cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to qualify as regular employees. The constitutional and statutory guarantee of security of tenure is extended to both those in the career and noncareer service positions, and the cause under which an employee may be removed or suspended must naturally have some relation to the character or fitness of the officer or employee, for the discharge of the functions of his office, or expiration of the project for which the employment was extended. Further, well-entrenched is the rule on security of tenure that such an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable right (to the position), which is protected not only by statute, but also by the Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, paragraph (3)] and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing.

142. DEL CASTILLO VS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 112513. August 21, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner, Edgar Del Castillo, an employee of the PRC was placed under preventive suspension for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. After investigation, Del Castillo was found guilty of grave misconduct and was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits. Del Castillo appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) who exonerated him of the charge and ordered his reinstatement to his former position. On appeal by the PRC, however the CSC found Del Castillo guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Del Castillo’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court which reversed the Civil Service Commission and reinstated the decision of the MSPB. Petitioner was eventually reinstated, but his claim for backwages was denied by the PRC Chairman. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarificatory Relief seeking a clarification of the decision of the Supreme Court and praying for an award of backwages and other benefits accruing the petitioner as a result of his illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Del Castillo should be awarded backwages

RULING: YES. The Supreme Court granted petitioner's motion and ordered that he be paid back salaries and other benefits due him from the time of his preventive suspension until his actual reinstatement. Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should be awarded back salaries. When an official or employee was illegally dismissed and his reinstatement has later been ordered, for all legal purposes he is considered as not having left his office. Therefore, he is entitled to all the rights and privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office he held (Tañada v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 [1965]). Back salaries may be ordered paid to said officer or employee (City Mayor of Zamboanga v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]). Having been exonerated of the charges against him, petitioner should clearly be awarded back salaries, the silence of the MSPB's decision notwithstanding. 143. GM PPA V MONSERATE GR No. 139616 Facts: On February 1, 1988, Maximo Dumlao, Jr., then General Manager of the PPA, appointed[5] respondent to the position of Manager II (Resource Management Division). On even date, respondent assumed office and discharged the functions thereof. On July 8, 1988, the CSC, through Guillermo R. Silva (Assistant Director of the Civil Service Field Office-PPA) approved her appointment. Meanwhile, on April 18, 1988, petitioner Ramon Anino, who ranked second to respondent per the Comparative Data Sheet earlier quoted, filed an appeal/petition with the PPA Appeals Board, protesting against respondents appointment. The PPA Appeals Board, in a Resolution[6] dated August 11, 1988, sustained the protest and rendered ineffective respondents appointment based on (1) CSC MC No. 5, s. 1988, Par. 3;[7] (2) CSC MC NO.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 10, s. 1986, Par. A, 1.2 and Par. B;[8] and (3) Civil Service Eligibility. These grounds were not explained or discussed in the Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Board upholds the appointment of Ramon A. Anino as Resources Management Division Manager of the Port Management Office of Iloilo. Aggrieved, respondent filed with the PPA General Manager an appeal/request for clarification dated November 2, 1988.[10] She questioned her replacement under PPA Special Order No. 479-88, claiming that the proceedings before the PPA Appeals Board were irregular because (1) she was not notified of the hearing before it; (2) she was not furnished a copy of the August 11, 1988 PPA Appeals Board Resolution or a copy of the protest filed by petitioner Anino;[11] (3) she was not informed of the reasons behind her replacement; and (4) their Port Manager (in Iloilo City), who was then an official member of the Board, was not included in the said proceedings. On November 8, 1988, pending resolution of her appeal/request for clarification, respondent received a copy of PPA Special Order No. 492-88[12] dated October 21, 1988, also issued by General Manager Dayan. This PPA Order officially reassigned her to the position of Administrative Officer (SG-15) which was petitioner Anino's former position and was lower than her previous position as Finance Officer (SG 16) before she was appointed as Division Manager. Apparently at a loss with the turn of events, coupled by the inaction of PPA General Manager Dayan on her earlier appeal/request for clarification, respondent filed on November 25, 1988 a precautionary appeal[13] with the CSC. She manifested that as of said date (November 25), she has not yet been furnished a certified copy of the PPA Appeals Board Resolution. On January 2, 1989, respondent received a copy of her new appointment as Administrative Officer dated October 1, 1988.[14] It was also during this time when she learned that PPA General Manager Dayan had just issued petitioners appointment dated October 21, 1988 as Manager II in the Resource Management Division effective February 1, 1988. Issue: Whether or not there was due process when respondent was replaced by petitioner Anino from her position as Manager II, Resource Management Division, and demoted as Administrative Officer. Held: No. From all indications, it is indubitable that substantial and procedural irregularities attended respondents demotion from the position of Manager II, Resource Management Division, to the lower position of Administrative Officer. Indeed, her demotion, tantamount to a revocation of her appointment as Manager II, is a patent violation of her constitutional rights to security of tenure and due process. In Aquino vs. Civil Service Commission,[20] this Court emphasized that once an appointment is issued and the moment the appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely equitable, right (to the position) which is protected not only by statute, but also by the constitution, and cannot be taken away from him either by revocation of the appointment, or by removal, except for cause, and with previous notice and hearing. Concededly, the appointing authority has wide latitude of discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant positions in the civil service. However, the moment the discretionary power of appointment is exercised and the appointee assumed the duties and functions of the position, such appointment cannot anymore be revoked by the appointing authority and appoint another in his stead, except for cause. Here, no iota of evidence was ever established to justify the revocation of respondent's appointment by demoting her. Respondents security of tenure guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution [Article IX-B, Section 2, par. (3)] should not be placed at the mercy of abusive exercise of the appointing power. Parenthetically, when the Court of Appeals reinstated respondent to her legitimate post as Manager II in the Resource Management Division, it merely restored her appointment to the said position to which her right to security of tenure had already attached. To be sure, her position as Manager II never became vacant since her demotion was void. In this jurisdiction, "an appointment to a non-vacant position in the civil service is null and void ab initio." 144. Palma-Fernandez v. De la Paz G.R. No. 78946

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Facts: On 1 May 1985, petitioner was extended a permanent appointment to the position of Chief of Clinics at the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan (now East Avenue Medical Center) by then Minister of Health and Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Center, Jesus C. Azurin. In 1986, the new organizational structure of the Center retitled the position of Chief of Clinics to Assistant Director for Professional Services. On 30 January 1987, Executive Order No. 119 known as the "Reorganization Act of the Ministry of Health" was promulgated. On 29 May 1987, respondent De la Paz, as Medical Center Chief, designated respondent Dr. Aguila, who was then Medical Specialist I, as Assistant Director for Professional Services while Dr. Nenita Palma-Fernandez will be transferred to the Research Office. Upon receipt of Hospital Order No. 22, petitioner filed on 1 June 1987 a letter-protest with respondent Secretary of Health, furnishing copies to respondents De la Paz and Aguila, as well as to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the Chairman of the Government Reorganization Commission. Failing to secure any action on her protest within a month's time, petitioner filed on 8 July 1987 the instant Petition for Quo Warranto with Preliminary Injunction against respondents Dr. de la Paz, Dr. Aguila, and the Secretary of Health. Issue: WON the transfer of petitioner to the Research Office is illegal and tantamount to removal Held: Yes. Since the East Avenue Medical Center is one of the National Health Facilities attached to the Department of Health, the power to appoint and remove subordinate officers and employees, like petitioner, is vested in the Secretary of Health, not the Medical Center Chief. The latter's function is confined to recommendation. Furthermore, the transfer was without petitioner's consent, was tantamount to removal without valid cause, and as such is invalid and without any legal effect (Garcia, et al. vs. Lejano, et al., 109 Phil. 116). A removal without cause is violative of the Constitutional guarantee that "no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law" (Article IX, B, Section 2(3),1987 Constitution). Submitted by ALIH 145. G.R. No. 196201 : June 19, 2012 FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. FLORENTINO VELOSO, Respondent. BRION, J.: FACTS: Respondent, then District Supervisor of Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was administratively charged with three (3) counts of dishonesty in connection with his unauthorized withdrawals of money deposited by Juanito Quino (complainant), a client of Quedancor. The complainant applied for a restructuring of his loan with Quedancor and deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Quedancors cashier for his Manila account. In three (3) separate occasions, the respondent, without notice and authority from the complainant and with the assistance of Quedancor's cashier, managed to withdraw the P50,000.00 deposit. Upon the discovery of the withdrawals, the complainant demanded the return of the money and called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in Cagayan de Oro City, who issued to the respondent a memorandum requiring him to explain the withdrawals and to return the money. From the established facts, the respondent was charged by Quedancor with dishonesty, and was subsequently found guilty of the charges and dismissed from the service. The CSC affirmed the findings and conclusions of Quedancor on appeal.

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Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor and the CSC, the respondent elevated his case to the CA which adjudged him guilty of dishonesty, but modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year suspension from office without pay. The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the applicable law and jurisprudence which penalize the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the service. The CSC also argues that there are no mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction of the penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not dishonesty is the proper administrative penalty to be imposed on the respondent? HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: civil service; termination of employment Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a first offense. The aforesaid rule underscores the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules provides the application of mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances in the imposition of administrative penalties. Section 53, Rule IV applies only when clear proof is shown, using the specific standards set by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalty. While in most cases, length of service is considered in favor of the respondent, it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious or grave; or when the length of service helped the offender commit the infraction. The factors against mitigation are present in this case. The circumstance that this is the respondent's first administrative offense should not benefit him. By the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the commission of an administrative offense classified as a serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first time. In other words, the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV does not consider a first-time offender as a mitigating circumstance. Likewise, under statutory construction principles, a special provision prevails over a general provision. Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances, must thus yield to the provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules which expressly provides for the penalty of dismissal even for the first commission of the offense. We reject as mitigating circumstances the respondent's admission of his culpability and the restitution of the amount. As pointed out by the CSC, the respondent made use of the complainants money in 2001 while the restitution was made only in 2003, during the pendency of the administrative case against him. Under the circumstances, the restitution was half-hearted and was certainly neither purely voluntary nor made because of the exercise of good conscience; it was triggered, more than anything else, by his fear of possible administrative penalties. The admission of guilt and the restitution effected were clearly mere afterthoughts made two (2) years after the commission of the offense and after the administrative complaint against him was filed. With these circumstances in mind, we do not find it justified to relieve the respondent of the full consequences of his dishonest actions. Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service. GRANTED. 146. FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III vs. FLORENTINO VELOSO GR No. 196201 19 June 2012

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Respondent Florentino Veloso, then District Supervisor of Quedan and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was administratively charged with three (3) counts of dishonesty in connection with his unauthorized withdrawals of money deposited by Juanito Quino (complainant), a client of Quedancor. The complainant applied for a restructuring of his loan with Quedancor and deposited the amount of P50,000.00 to Quedancor’s cashier for his Manila account. In three (3) separate occasions, the respondent, without notice and authority from the complainant and with the assistance of Quedancor's cashier, managed to withdraw the P50,000.00 deposit. Upon the discovery of the withdrawals, the complainant demanded the return of the money and called the attention of the manager of Quedancor in Cagayan de Oro City, who issued to the respondent a memorandum requiring him to explain the withdrawals and to return the money. From the established facts, the respondent was charged by Quedancor with dishonesty, and was subsequently found guilty of the charges and dismissed from the service. The CSC affirmed the findings and conclusions of Quedancor on appeal. Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor and the CSC, the respondent elevated his case to the CA, which adjudged him guilty of dishonesty, but modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year suspension from office without pay. The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the applicable law and jurisprudence which penalize the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the service. The CSC also argues that there are no mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction of the penalty. ISSUE: Whether or not dismissal is the proper administrative penalty to be imposed on the respondent HELD: YES. Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty imposed by Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty even as a first offense. The aforesaid rule underscores the constitutional principle that public office is a public trust and only those who can live up to such exacting standard deserve the honor of continuing in public service. It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules provides the application of mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances in the imposition of administrative penalties. Section 53, Rule IV applies only when clear proof is shown, using the specific standards set by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalty. While in most cases, length of service is considered in favor of the respondent, it is not considered where the offense committed is found to be serious or grave; or when the length of service helped the offender commit the infraction. The factors against mitigation are present in this case. The circumstance that this is the respondent's first administrative offense should not benefit him. By the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, the commission of an administrative offense classified as a serious offense (like dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal from the service even for the first time. In other words, the clear language of Section 52, Rule IV does not consider a first-time offender as a mitigating circumstance. Likewise, under statutory construction principles, a special provision prevails over a general provision. Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or alternative circumstances, must thus yield to the provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules which expressly provides for the penalty of dismissal even for the first commission of the offense. We reject as mitigating circumstances the respondent's admission of his culpability and the restitution of the amount. As pointed out by the CSC, the respondent made use of the complainant’s money in 2001 while the restitution was made only in 2003, during the pendency of the administrative case against him. Under the circumstances, the restitution was half-hearted and was certainly neither purely voluntary nor made because of the exercise of good conscience; it was triggered, more than anything else, by his fear of possible administrative penalties. The admission of guilt and the restitution effected were clearly mere afterthoughts made two (2) years after the commission of the offense and after the administrative complaint against him was filed. With these circumstances in mind, we do not find it justified to relieve the respondent of the full consequences of his dishonest actions.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working standards by all in the public service. 147. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. AMPONG AM No. P-13-3132 4 June 2014 Facts: Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21, 1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her, the CSC rendered a resolution3 dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such, she posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampong’s motion was later denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA). Notwithstanding said Decision, the Financial Management Office (FMO) of the OCA, which did not receive any official directive regarding Ampong’s dismissal, continued to release her salaries and allowances. However, in view of Judge Infante’s letter notifying the OCA of such situation, the FMO issued a Memorandum7 dated September 7, 2011 informing the OCA that starting June 2011, it had started to withhold Ampong’s salaries and allowances. The OCA recommended that Ampong be found guilty of Dishonesty for impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers in behalf of Decir and, thus, be dismissed from the service on the ground that she no longer possesses the appropriate eligibility required for her position, with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits except accrued leave credits and with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency or instrumentality, including any government-owned and controlled corporation or government financial institution. Issue: Whether or not Ampong had been dismissed from her employment as Court Interpreter III of the RTC. Ruling: Yes. As the records show, in the August 26, 2008 Decision, the Court had already held Ampong administratively liable for dishonesty in impersonating and taking the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility Examination for Teachers on behalf of Decir. It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Pursuant to its administrative authority, the CSC is granted the power to “control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service examinations.” This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations. However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The present case involves a similar violation of the Civil Service Law by a judicial employee. But this case is slightly different in that petitioner committed the offense before her appointment to the judicial branch. At the time of commission, petitioner was a public school teacher under the administrative supervision of the DECS and, in taking the civil service examinations, under the CSC. Petitioner surreptitiously took the CSC-supervised PBET exam in place of another person. When she did that, she became a party to cheating or dishonesty in a civil service-supervised examination. That she committed the dishonest act before she joined the RTC does not take her case out of the administrative reach of the Supreme Court. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Pursuant to the doctrine of immutability of judgment, which states that “a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,”18 Ampong could no longer seek the August 26, 2008 Decision’s modification and reversal. Consequently, the penalty of dismissal from service on account of Ampong’s Dishonesty should be enforced in its full course. It must be stressed that every employee of the Judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty. Like any public servant, she must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties but also in her personal and private dealings with other people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court personnel have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of justice. Here, Ampong failed to meet these stringent standards set for a judicial employee and does not, therefore, deserve to remain with the Judiciary. 148. Heirs of Celestino Teves v. Felicidario, A.M. No. P-12-3089, 13 November 2013 FACTS: Complainants alleged that they are the successors-in-interest of the late Celestino Teves to two parcels of land, initially identified as Lots 263 and 264 of the Sampaloc Townsite in Tanay, Rizal, distributed under the Department of Agrarian Reform DAR Resettlement Project. Lots 263 and 264 measured 965 square meters and 648 square meters, respectively, or 1,613 square meters combined. The late Celestino Teves and complainants have been in possession of Lots 263 and 264 since 1960. Lots 263 and 264 are adjacent and contiguous to Lot 268, which has been occupied by respondent and with an area of 838 square meters. In May 2003, upon the approval of a new subdivision plan, Lots 263 and 264 were clustered into one lot, designated as Lot 190; while Lot 268 was designated as Lot 189.2 Under the same plan, the area of Lot 189 was erroneously increased from 838 square meters to 941 square meters. Respondent knew of this error but being dishonest, he concealed it from the DAR. Respondent was eventually issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-01182, pursuant to Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00222161, for Lot 189, with a total area of 941 square meters. On the basis of OCT No. M-01182 (CLOA No. 00222161), respondent started to unlawfully and forcibly acquire 117 square meters of complainants’ Lot 190 (disputed area) by (a) altering and installing concrete boundaries; (b) destroying the riprap and cyclone wires which served as boundary between respondent’s Lot 189 and complainants’ Lot 190; (c) destroying the comfort room, dirty kitchen, warehouse, and trees in the disputed area; and (d) constructing a concrete fence with steel gate around Lot 189 and the disputed area. Complainants were helpless in preventing respondent from performing the aforementioned acts as respondent bragged that he is a Sheriff of the RTC of Manila and threatened complainants with bodily harm This lead to the filling of a complaint by the petitioner against respondent of a crime of of Grave Misconduct, Dishonesty and Conduct Unbecoming an Officer of the Court. Respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the instant complaint against him since the acts subject thereof are not related to his official functions as Deputy Sheriff and are not grounds for administrative action. ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty? HELD: Yes. Respondent’s dishonesty was committed through his silence and/or inaction, when the circumstances demanded otherwise, this is when the DAR officials during the 2003 re-survey increase the respondents lot and decrease the petitioners lot, rather than his active and/or express misrepresentation to the complainants and concerned public officials; and that respondent committed the dishonesty in his private life and not in the course of performance of his official functions, the Court holds him guilty of only simple dishonesty Conduct Prejudicial to the best Interest of the Service need not be related to or connected with the public officer’s official function, As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office, the corresponding penalty may be imposed on the erring public officer or employee. 149. Advincula vs. Dicen (G.R. No. 162403, May 16, 2005) FACTS: On July 27, 2000, the Office of the Governor of Samar, through Acting Provincial Administrator, Engr. Leo Dacaynos, issued a Memorandum to all Provincial Chiefs of Offices, requiring all personnel of the province to submit one copy of an updated Personal Data Sheet (PDS), otherwise known as Civil Service Commission Form 212, to the Personnel Section on or before August 31, 2000. In compliance therewith, petitioner Florencio

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Advincula, the Provincial Agriculturist, submitted his PDS, declaring therein that there were no pending administrative and criminal cases against him and that he had not been convicted of any administrative offense. However, the records reveal that at that time, the following cases against the petitioner were pending: (a) Criminal Case entitled People v. Florencio Advincula filed with the Sandiganbayan and (b) Dominador Garalza v. Florencio Advincula, an administrative case pending before the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. Moreover, it was later on discovered that the petitioner had already been convicted of an administrative offense for simple misconduct, the penalty for which was a months suspension from office without pay. Thereafter, Romeo Dicen, an Agricultural Technologist in the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist, filed a LetterComplaint before the Office of the Ombudsman in Visayas, charging the petitioner with violation of the pertinent provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The respondent, likewise, requested that the corresponding charges for the criminal offense of falsification of public or official document, and the administrative offense of misconduct in office or dishonesty be filed against the petitioner. In a Counter-Affidavit, the petitioner averred that (a) the complaint was filed in retaliation to the administrative case for falsification he filed against the respondent; (b) the omission to disclose his pending cases and prior conviction was an oversight on his part due to his numerous daily tasks; (c) the PDS was accomplished by Personnel Officer Micaela Rosales, a regular employee of the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist, in her intention to submit the PDS of the petitioner before the scheduled deadline; (d) the document was not executed under oath, therefore, eliminating the basis for criminal and administrative prosecution; and (e) the complaint was not accompanied by a certification against forum shopping, thereby warranting the dismissal of the case. Rosales claimed that she was the one who accomplished the petitioners PDS in her honest intention to submit the same before the given deadline. According to her, after completing the PDS form, she immediately gave it to the petitioner for his signature. The petitioner, she added, signed the accomplished PDS without scrutinizing and reading the same, for he was very busy at that time. The respondent contends that the petitioners omission could not be considered as a mere oversight; as the head of his office, he was charged by law to review all the documents for his signature and to exercise prudence and caution in the signing thereof. Furthermore, the respondent argued that the PDS is an official document required for all government employees. He averred that the PDS must be individually prepared by the employee, whose personal history is known only to him. During the formal investigation, it was specified that the criminal case against the petitioner was perjury, while the administrative offense was for dishonesty. On May 29, 2002, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas rendered judgment finding the petitioner guilty of misconduct. On June 2, 2003, the Office of the Governor of Samar directed petitioner to cease and desist from the performance of the functions and responsibilities of his office for six months without pay from receipt thereof. As a consequence, the petitioner filed a motion to implead the Office of the Governor of Samar and the Office of the Ombudsman in the petition before the CA on June 18, 2003. On September 29, 2003, the CA affirmed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s non-disclosure in his updated PDS of his pending cases and previous administrative conviction only calls for a reprimand and not suspension RULING: The issue on the improper execution of the penalty involving the petitioners suspension is moot. In view of the fact that the petitioner is indeed liable for misconduct and that he has served out the penalty, the Court finds no need to still resolve the same. As a general rule, courts should not take cognizance of moot and academic questions. Further, Section 7 of the Ombudsmans Administrative Order No. 14-A, Series of 2000 states that: “Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration. An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.”

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Furthermore under Section 1(i), Rule III of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, otherwise known as the Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions, as amended, provides in part, (t)he appointees Personal Data Sheet which should be properly and completely accomplished by the appointee, shall be attached to the appointment. Said PDS shall contain an authorization from the job applicant/employee that the agency head or his authorized representative can verify/validate the contents therein. As regular member of the career service, petitioner is bound by the Civil Service Law and Rules. The concealment of a previous charge, albeit, dismissed, constitutes a mental dishonesty amounting to misconduct. The conviction of petitioner for misconduct must therefore be affirmed. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. 150. Miranda v. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, 11 April 2003 FACTS: In the early part of 1988, Vice Mayor Amelita Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of Mayor Jose Miranda, appointed the above-named respondents to various positions in the city government. Their appointments were with permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB) created pursuant to Republic Act No. 7160. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments. When Mayor Jose Miranda reassumed his post on March 5, 1998 after his suspension, he considered the composition of the PSPB irregular since the majority party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented. He then formed a three-man special performance audit team. to conduct a personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those on probation. After conducting the evaluation, the audit team submitted to him a report dated June 8, 1998 stating that the respondents were found wanting in (their) performance. On June 10, 1998, or three months after Mayor Miranda reassumed his post, he issued an order terminating respondents services effective June 15, 1998 because they performed poorly during the probationary period. Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on probation, they can be dismissed from the service on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of six months, not after three (3) months. They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the service violated their right to due process. On October 19, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No. 982717 reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and ordering that respondents be reinstated to their former positions with payment of backwages. In this petition, petitioner Joel G. Miranda contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the CSC Resolution declaring that the termination of respondents services is illegal and ordering their reinstatement to their former positions with payment of backwages. In their comment, respondents claim that since petitioner ceased to be Mayor of Santiago City, he has no legal personality to file the instant petition and, therefore, the same should be dismissed. They insist that they were not actually evaluated on their performance. But assuming there was indeed such an evaluation, it should have been done by their immediate supervisors, not by those appointed by former Mayor Jose Miranda. In his reply, petitioner contends that as a taxpayer, he has a legal interest in the case at bar, hence, can lawfully file this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the termination of respondents is illegal HELD: Yes. The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government officer or employee may be removed from the service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2) want of capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil Service Law (Presidential Decree No. 807, as amended) provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the service. Among these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, respondents were dismissed on the ground of poor performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for dismissing a government official or employee from the service.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the probationary period of six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to observe his performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this case. As aptly stated by the CSC, it is quite improbable that Mayor Jose Miranda could finally determine the performance of respondents for only the first three months of the probationary period. Not only that, we find merit in respondents claim that they were denied due process. 151. FERNANDEZ V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN [ G.R. No. 193983, 14 March 2012 ]

Facts: On 25 November 1994, the then Aklan Governor Cabagnot entered into a contract with Jireh Construction, for the construction of the Alibagon-Baybay Bridge (Phase II) for a total contract price of P933,335.90 to be completed within 90 calendar days from 28 November 1994 to 25 November 1995. On 15 February 1995, petitioner Victory M. Fernandez, the provincial engineer, endorsed to Cabagnot for her approval the request of Jireh Construction for a contract time extension of 30 calendar days to complete the AB Bridge Project since the original contract period did not take into account the work stoppage caused by tide variations of the river. Thereafter, Cabagnot approved the requested 30-day extension. Meanwhile, the provincial government of Aklan launched four government infrastructure projects. Public bidding for the Four Projects was conducted and after the submission and evaluation of the bids, the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) awarded the construction of the Four Projects to Jireh Construction, as the best qualified bidder with the bid most advantageous to the government. On July 5, 1995, respondent Governor Miraflores issued Memorandum No. 004 directing the petitioner to temporarily suspend the implementation of the AB Bridge Project and the Four Projects awarded to Jireh Construction. After COA conducted an audit and ocular inspection of Aklan spending government projects, it found out that Jireh Construction had abandoned the construction of the AB Bridge Project and the Four Projects. All five projects were incomplete and could not be used for their designated purpose at their current state of completion. The Summary of Actual Accomplishment and Costing as submitted and certified by Fernandez showed that the AB Bridge Project was already almost halfway completed with an accomplishment rating of 48.57%. However, the COA auditors found the AB Bridge Project to be only 22.89%completed based on the Statement of Time Elapsed and Percentage Accomplishment dated 20 December 1994. Moreover, the COA auditors found that the provincial government did not take any action against Jireh Construction. Thus, the COA auditors recommended the filing of a case for neglect of duty against the responsible government officers. On 10 November 2003, Miraflores, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) an administrative complaint for gross neglect of duty against Evan L.Timtiman, as Provincial Treasurer and regular member of the PBAC. The Office of the Ombudsman likewise impleaded the other government officials including the petitioner. The Office of the Ombudsman found Fernandez and his co-respondents administratively liable. It also found that petitioner was the one who presented documents to the PBAC showing that Jireh Construction did not have any abandoned project at the time of the bidding for the Four Projects. On appeal, the CA found no reversible error on the part of the Ombudsman. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but such was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of gross neglect of duty? Held: Yes. Jireh Construction started work on the AB Bridge Project on 28 November 1994. The contract provided that the bridge should be completed within 90 calendar days or specifically on 25 February 1995. However, due to some unforeseen circumstances, Jireh Construction requested for an extension of 30 calendar days to complete the project. The provincial governor promptly approved the 30-day extension. At the time of the bidding for the Four Projects, held on 24 February, 28 February, 7 March and 15 March 1995, the completion period for the AB Bridge Project had not yet expired due to the 30-day extension. The 30-day extension meant that the construction of the bridge was supposed to have been completed on 27 March 1995, twelve days after the completion of all the bidding for the Four Projects. However, petitioner based his premise that the construction of AB Bridge Project was ongoing during the bidding of the Four Projects on two grounds: (1) the request for 30-day extension by Jireh Construction, and (2) the approval of the extension by the governor. Petitioner did not submit any other evidence to show that the construction of the AB Bridge Project took place continuously and without interruption. From 20 December 1994, the COA auditors found that no further work was made. Thus, regardless of the 30-day extension to complete the AB Bridge Project, it is clear that Jireh Construction abandoned the construction of the AB Bridge Project since 20 December 1994. Petitioner, as the provincial engineer who oversees all the infrastructure projects of the province, has direct knowledge of the status of each projects progress. Clearly, he was in a position to inform the PBAC that Jireh Construction not only had not met the required deadline of the completion of the AB Bridge Project but also had abandoned the project, with only 22.89% completion and not the 48.57% completion that petitioner had certified. Petitioner gave a false report to the PBAC when he attested that Jireh Construction had no abandoned project at the time of the bidding of the Four Projects. It is sufficiently evident that petitioner was grossly negligent in failing to give a complete and truthful report to the PBAC of Jireh Constructions actual progress and abandonment of the AB Bridge Project, which could have been a crucial element in awarding the Four Projects to a qualified and capable contractor. Also, petitioner had been remiss in his duties to monitor slippages of Jireh Constructions performance and to take the necessary steps to ensure minimal loss to the provincial government. Given the short time frame of 45 to 90 days for the completion of the projects, petitioner should have immediately reported the poor performance of Jireh Construction to the governor. Moreover, petitioner could have recommended the take over of the construction of the projects and the termination of the contracts to prevent further loss of funds to the province. Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. (Brucal v. Desierto, 501 Phil. 453) In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. In sum, the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the CA, finding petitioner equally responsible with the members of PBAC for gross neglect of duty, is correct. Pursuant to Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, gross negligence in the performance of duty is classified as a grave offense for which the penalty of dismissal is imposed. Section 9 of the said Rule likewise provides that the penalty of dismissal shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits and disqualification from reemployment in government service. 152. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES –VERSUS- ARTEMIO SAN JUAN GR NO. 168279 APRIL 2, 2013

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BRION, J.: Facts Esmayatin Bonsalagan approached Artemio San Juan, bank manager of Land Bank to encash a check worth P26B, which was issued by China Banking Corporation. San Juan informed Acsa Ramirez and Leila Amparo, both employees of of LBP, of Bonsalagan’s desire to withdraw said amount, but Ramirez expressed reservation to client’s request, because the check must first be cleared. San Juan suggested that Bonsalagan open a checking account where the China Bank check would be desposited. After investigation, the LBP discovered that the check was spurious and unfunded. LBP then issued a formal charge against San Juan with the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel for gross neglect of duty. OGCC found San Juan guilty. CSC affirmed OGCC’s decision. CA found San Juan guilty of simple neglect of duty, therefore, no dismissal from service is needed, only 1 to 6 months suspension. LBP contends that there was gross neglect of duty due to the nature of the banking business. Issue W/N San Juan may be dismissed from service? Held Yes, San Juan may be dismissed from service. The Court held that he was guilty of gross neglect of duty for three reasons: 1) he allowed and even prodded employees to bypass bank procedures to accommodate Bonsalogan’s check; 2) he allowed the issuance of a check to Bonsalogan without waiting for the three-day clearing requirement; and 3) he failed to exert prompt efforts in confirming the genuineness of the P26B check. The banking business is imposed with trust and higher degree of diligence is required. 153. Tanjay Water District, et.al. vs. Quinit G.R. No. 150502, April 27, 2007 FACTS: Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors of Tanjay Water District namely: Carmelito Limbaga, Nenita pilas, Adelina Limabga, Godofredo Borromeo, and Richard Regalado while respondent Cesar Quinit, Jr. is the water district’s General Manager. Respondent was appointed as such by the Board of Directors in 1987 subject to the terms and conditions of the Appointment Proposal and was attested by the Civil Service Commission as a permanent appointment. At that time Sec. 23 of PD No. 194, as amended by Sec. 9 of PD No. 768, provided that ‘the General Manager of the local water districts shall serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors of such local water districts.” However, in 1996, respondent had disagreements with the members of the BoD relative to the management of the water district. In his letter to the Administrator of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), he requested for the replacement of all the members of the BoD for committing the following irregularities: (1) passing of several resolutions appropriating for themselves the funds of the water district; (2) circumventing the law mandating its policy-making function by creating a Prequalification, Bidding and Awards Committee which interfered and intervened with the day-to-day affairs of the management of the water district; (3) violation of several CSC memorandum circulars; (4) non-implementation of the executive order for salary adjustment of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) employees; and (5) “slashing” of the salary and benefits of the General Manager. Respondent also likened the petitioners to “dogs” who will exhaust all the district’s resources. Thereafter, the Board approved a resolution terminating the services of respondent as General Manager citing the disrespect and humiliation the Board suffered because of the respondent’s acts. Respondent then filed a complaint for illegal termination against the Board before the Regional Office No. VII of the CSC alleging that the Board failed to justify his termination and observed due process. He also said that because of his permanent appointment attested by the CSC, he could only be removed for cause. The CSC affirmed the validity of the resolution issued by the Board and ruled that respondent’s position as General Manager was primarily confidential in nature and terminable at the pleasure of the board and that his tenure would only last for as long as he enjoyed the trust and confidence of the Board. On appeal, the CA repealed the CSC’s decision and ordered the petitioners to pay respondent his back salaries. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s termination is valid HELD: No. The Court ruled that the respondent’s term as General Manager of Tanjay Water District merely expired when the Board passed the resolution rather than his contention that it was terminated. Indeed, no officer or employee in the CSC shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. The phrase “cause provided by law,” however, includes “loss of confidence.” It is an established rule that the tenure of those holding primarily confidential positions ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures. Their termination can be justified on the ground of loss of confidence, in which case, their cessation from office involves no removal but the expiration of their term of office. Petitioners are also correct in stating that the appellate court took an inconsistent position when it ruled that the respondent was a confidential employee who served at the pleasure of the TWD Board, but declared that he was entitled to back salaries because he was denied due process. As held in one case, there is no need of prior notice or due hearing before the incumbent can be separated from office. It is enough that he was informed of the Board Resolution terminating his services for loss of confidence. In this case, the Board afforded respondent due process when they notified him of the approval of Board Resolution No. 49, Series of 1996. Accordingly, respondent is not entitled to back salaries. The rule is settled that back salaries may be awarded to civil servants only if they have been illegally dismissed and henceforth ordered reinstated, or to those acquitted of the charge against them. 154. A Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demegillo, G.R. No. 176343, 18 September 2012; DOCTRINE: Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August 31, 1999. Section 19 and Section 20 of Rule II of the Uniform Rules defined the guidelines in the issuance of an order of preventive suspension and the duration of the suspension It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service. Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites. FACTS: The Board of Directors of Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP), a wholly owned government corporation, formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. TIDCORP alleged that Demigillo engaged in a verbal tussle with Mr. Joel Valdes (Valdes), President and CEO of TIDCORP. Allegedly, Demigillo also sent a memorandum addressed to Valdes which contained discourteous and arrogant words. Pending the investigation, TIDCORP placed Demigillo under preventive suspension for 90 days.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Demigillo assailed her preventive suspension in the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC ruled that her suspension was not proper because under Section 19(2), Rule II, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Uniform Rules), a civil service officer like Demigillo might be preventively suspended by the disciplining authority only if any of the two grounds were present, to wit: (1) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might unduly influence or intimidate potential witnesses against him; or (2) there was a possibility that the civil service employee might tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. On appeal, the CA affirmed the CSC . ISSUE: W/N Demigillo’s 90- day preventive suspension is proper? YES. HELD: The 90-day preventive suspension order issued against Demigillo was valid. Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code, the imposition of preventive suspension by the proper disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive suspension may issue there must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office. Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August 31, 1999. Section 19 and Section 20 of Rule II of the Uniform Rules defined the guidelines in the issuance of an order of preventive suspension and the duration of the suspension It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the proper disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service. Proof showing that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites. In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that preventive suspension pending investigation “is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.” As such, preventing the subordinate officer or employee from intimidating the witnesses during investigation or from tampering the documentary evidence in her office is a purpose, not a condition, for imposing preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word “intended.” 155. Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole G.R. No. 108072 December 12, 1995 Facts: On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against respondents Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. Said respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Articles 170 and 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713. Respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue. Respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension. Issue: Whether the Ombudsman under RA 6770 has been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160? Held: No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991. There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, “interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi,” i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President. 156. SOCRATES VS SANDIGANBAYAN GR No. 116259-60 20 February 1996 Facts Salvador Socrates is the incumbent governor of Palawan. He was first elected as governor in 1968 and was reelected in 1971 and 1980 until he was replaced by Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution. Socrates and Rodriguez ran for governor in 1988 and Rodriguez won. In 1992, they again went against each other, this time, Socrates prevailed. At the time Rodriguez was still the OIC Governor of the province, the Provincial Government of Palawan, as represented by Rodriguez and the Provincial Board Members of Palawan, filed before the Office of the Tanodbayan two (2) complaints both dated December 5, 1986 and docketed as TBP No. 86-01119. The first complaint charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the second charged petitioner, together with several other provincial officers, with violation of Section 3(a) and (g) of the same law (Annexes A & A-I , respectively, Petition). Issue W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending Socrates? Held No, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Upon a proper determination of the validity of the information, it becomes mandatory for the court to immediately issue the suspension order. The rule on the matter is specific and categorical. It leaves no room for interpretation. It is not within the courts discretion to hold in abeyance the suspension of the accused officer on the pretext that the order denying the motion to quash is pending review before the appellate courts. Its discretion lies only during the pre-suspension hearing where it is required to ascertain whether or not (1) the accused had been afforded due preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the information against him, (2) the acts for which he was charged constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the provisions of Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or (3) the informations against him can be quashed, under any of the grounds provided in Section 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court

157. VILLASEÑOR VS OMBUDSMAN G.R. No. 202303, June 4, 2014 FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioners, Gerardo Villaseñor (electrical inspector) and Rodel Mesa (inspector from the Electrical Engineering Office), along with several others, were administratively charged in connection with the Manor Hotel fire tragedy that took place on August 18, 2001, killing 74 people and causing injury to others. petitioner Villaseñor was charged with grave misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and gross negligence. In OMB-ADM-00390, both petitioners were charged with violation of Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees Pending resolution of Mesa’s appeal and Villasenor’s motion for reconsideration, the Ombudsman directed the Mayor of Quezon City and the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government to enforce the Joint Decision immediately upon receipt of the order. Villasenor and Mesa now question such Order of the Ombudsman despite the pendency of their motion for reconsideration and appeal, respectively. Mesa further argued that Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 17 which makes appealable decisions of the Ombudsman immediately executory, amending Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, should not be applied to his case because it was promulgated long after the rendition of the order of his suspension on June 17, 2003. ISSUE: Can the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the service and suspension of one year be implemented pending resolution of Villasenor’s motion for reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and Mesa’s appeal before the CA? RULING: Yes. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. In appealable cases, Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of course. Mesa was ordered suspended for one year without pay, while Villasenor was ordered dismissed from the service. These are plainly appealable decisions which are immediately executory pending appeal. The same is true that the filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing Ombudsman decisions, order, or resolutions. Furthermore, on Mesa’s additional contention, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are procedural in nature and therefore, may be applied retroactively to his and Villasenor’s cases which were pending and unresolved at the time of the passing of A.O. 17. No vested right is violated by the application of Section 7 because the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. It is UST Law Review, Vol. LIX, No. 1, May 2015 important to note that there is no such thing as vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. 158. Dale Cruz vs CA GR. No. 126183 Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariio of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), in decisions issued by him which uniformly read This is a motu-propio administrative complaint separately filed by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports against the following public school teachers x x x x based on the report submitted by their respective school principals wherein it was alleged that the above-named teachers participated in the mass action/illegal strike on Sept. 19-21, 1990 and subsequently defied the return-to-work order dated September 17, 1990 issued by this Office, which acts constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Required to explain within a period of not less than 72 hours but not more than 5 days from receipt of the complaint, respondents failed to submit the required answer within the given time up to the present, and despite the denial of their request for extension of 30 days within which to submit their answers dated September 25,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 1990 filed by their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Fabros, in a letter of this Office to him dated September 28, 1990, respondents failed to submit the same, which failure, is considered a waiver on their part of their right to answer the charges and to controvert the same. Wherefore, after a careful evaluation of the records, this Office finds the respondents guilty as charged. In accordance with Memorandum Circular 30 s. 1989 of the Civil Service Commission on Guidelines in the Application of Penalty in Administrative Cases, the herein respondents are dismissed from Office effective immediately. The decisions dismissing petitioners were immediately implemented. Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the petitioners were violated? Held: As early as 18 December 1990 we have categorically ruled in the consolidated cases of Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio Jr.[16] and Alliance of Concerned Teachers v. Hon. Isidro Cario[17] that the mass actions of September/October 1990 staged by Metro Manila public school teachers "amounted to a strike in every sense of the term, constituting as they did, a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of or absence from work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons -- to protest and pressure the Government to correct what, among other grievances, the strikers perceived to be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the salary standardization law insofar as they were concerned, the nonpayment or delay in payment of various fringe benefits and allowances to which they were entitled, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours." In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission,[18] we denied the claim that the teachers were thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best interest of the service by staging the mass protests on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends or holidays to dramatize their grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme Court - could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions. With respect to our ruling in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc.,[20] invoked by petitioners, we have likewise already ruled in the Rolando Gan case[21] that the PBM ruling - that the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties - was not applicable to defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions because what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and of assembly were inferior property rights while the higher consideration involved in the case of the striking teachers was the education of the youth which must, at the very least, be equated with the freedom of assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances. We affirmed the foregoing rulings in Bagana v. Court of Appeals[23] by denying a similar petition filed by another group of teachers who participated in the 1990 mass actions but who claimed to have been merely exercising their constitutional right to free assembly. We held in Bagana that the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in affirming the CSC resolutions finding the teachers guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing penalties of six (6) months' suspension without pay. In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals[24] we added that the persistent refusal of the striking teachers to call the mass actions by the conventional term "strike" did not erase the true nature of the mass actions as unauthorized stoppages of work the purpose of which was to obtain a favorable response to the teachers' economic grievances. We again stressed that the teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible. But herein petitioners contend that classes were not actually disrupted because substitute teachers were immediately appointed by Secretary Cario. Besides being a purely factual assertion which this Court cannot take cognizance of in a petition for review, the fact that the prompt remedial

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) action taken by Secretary Cario might have partially deflected the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioners for the intended consequences thereof which were the very reason why such prompt remedial action became necessary. 159. Civil Service Commission v. Gentallan, G.R. No. 152833, 9 May 2005 FACTS: On December 14, 1994, then Mayor Jose Salcedo appointed Jocelyn Gentallan as local civil registrar of the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Commissioner Thelma Gaminde of the CSC, when queried about Gentallans qualifications, confirmed that Gentallans work experience was more than enough to meet the minimum requirement of three (3) years experience for the position of local civil registrar. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days without any action rendered by the Sangguniang Bayan of Jasaan, the appointment was eventually deemed approved. On January 5, 1995, the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 10 (CSCRO-10) approved her appointment as permanent. However, Rosalina Asis, a research aide in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, filed a protest. It was dismissed by the CSC in a Resolution because the protestant was not a qualified next-in-rank. In the same resolution, however, the CSC reviewed the appointment of respondent Jocelyn Gentallan. It held that Gentallan was not qualified as she failed to fulfill the required three-year experience relevant to the position of local civil registrar. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed a petition for review before the CA. Meanwhile, Mayor Paurom, pursuant to the CSC resolutions, ordered respondent to vacate the post as Local Civil Registrar and directed her to assume her former position as Assistant Registration Officer. The CA rendered a decision and found respondent qualified to the position. The decision became final and executory. The Mayor was informed of the appellate courts decision and was advised to implement the same and reinstate respondent to the position of Local Civil Registrar. However, the mayor did not. Respondent, wrote the CSCRO10 requesting for an order directing the municipality to reinstate her and pay her backwages. Still, respondent was not reinstated. Thus, respondent was constrained to file a case for mandamus with damages, and indirect contempt before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Consequently, the parties reached an agreement. On December 21, 1998, the mayor issued a memorandum, directing respondent to assume office as the local civil registrar, and a notice of respondents salary adjustment was issued. Thereafter, respondent asked the CSCRO-10 if she was entitled to back salaries, RATA and bonuses. The CSCRO-10 granted the entitlements. When consulted by the mayor, the provincial attorney agreed that respondent was indeed entitled pursuant to the Court of Appeals decision that had already become final. However, the mayor still did not give respondent her back salaries, RATA and bonuses. Respondent requested the CSC for the execution of the CSCRO-10 Order but the CSC reversed it in CSC Resolution No. 001264 dated May 24, 2000. It said that respondent was not entitled to back salaries and other emoluments as she was not illegally dismissed from the service. ISSUE: Whether Jocelyn Gentallan is entitled to back salaries, RATA and bonuses. HELD: YES. As a permanent appointee to the position, she enjoys security of tenure. She is likewise entitled to all benefits, rights and privileges attached to the position. She cannot be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process. An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that malice or bad faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally accountable for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should disburse funds to answer for her claims resulting from dismissal. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 26, 2001 is hereby MODIFIED. The Civil Service Commission is declared with legal standing to file its appeal and/or motion for reconsideration in this case. But we hereby sustain the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it declares that Jocelyn S. Gentallan should be reinstated to her position with backwages, RATA, and bonuses to be paid by the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. SO ORDERED. 160. FRANCISCO ABALOS VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FACTS: After assuming office as Provincial Governor of Lanao del Norte, the petitioner, by resolution of the provincial board, filed with the Tanodbayan a complaint for malversation against his predecessor, Arsenio A. Quibranza, for having used for personal purposes several bulldozers belonging to the province. Cited as witnesses were the operators of the bulldozers, private respondents Villabona and Yap, who allegedly executed on September 6, 1986, affidavits in support of the complaint. These sworn statements were disowned in a joint affidavit executed on September 25, 1986, by the private respondents, who claimed that the earlier statements were spurious. As a consequence, identical memoranda were issued by the petitioner to Villabona and Yap on September 24, 1987, reading as follows: You are hereby ordered to explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt hereof why no disciplinary action be taken against you for having recanted your Sworn Statement which was made the basis for the filing of a criminal complaint against the late Governor Arsenio A. Quibranza, thereby causing embarrassment to the Office of the Provincial Governor. In the meantime you are hereby suspended from work effective upon receipt thereof, until after the termination of the investigation to be conducted in accordance with law. On October 14, 1987, the private respondents were informed in another memorandum that formal charges for "dishonesty and intentionally making false statements in material facts" had been filed against them, which they should answer within 72 hours. Curiously, however, they were informed in a separate memorandum issued on that same date that their services as equipment operators had been terminated. The resolution of CSRO No. 12 declaring their dismissal illegal having been sustained by the Civil Service Commission, the petitioner now pleads to this Court on certiorari that: 1. The charge against the private respondents did not have to be investigated because they had themselves already admitted their guilt; and 2. They could be summarily dismissed under Section 40 of the Civil Service Decree. The petitioner stresses that on September 28, 1987, the private respondents admitted their guilt in affidavits which he said he submitted later to the Civil Service Commission as an annex to his formal appeal. Such sworn confessions rendered the usual investigation unnecessary as, according to him, "it will just be a waste of government time and money to investigate a charge that has already been admitted by the respondents. By pleading guilty, respondents waived whatever rights to a formal investigation they had." ISSUE: Whether or not Civil Service Commission is correct in affirming the order of Civil Service Regional Office No. 12 directing the reinstatement in the Provincial Engineer's Office, Lanao del Sur, of Sergio Villabona and Eduardo Yap, Jr. on the ground that they had been illegally dismissed.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) HELD: YES. The problem with this argument is that the private respondents have rejected their supposed confession as having been extracted from them without benefit of legal assistance. They invoke Article III, Section 17, of the Constitution, which, together with Section 12(l), might have been the reason for the dismissal by the Ombudsman on February 1, 1990, of the complaint for people filed against them by the petitioner. The results of the proceedings before the Ombudsman are, of course, not decisive of the administrative charges. Nevertheless, the private respondents should have been given a chance to prove in an investigation duly called that they did not execute the affidavits against former Governor Quibranza and that they were tricked into admitting the offense imputed to them. They were not accorded this opportunity. Instead they were simply informed that, in view of the charge and their supposed admission thereof, they were being summarily dismissed from the service. The petitioner also invokes Section 40 of P.D. No. 807 and argues that in view of the private respondents' admission of the charge against them, they could be summarily dismissed under this section. Section 40 read: Sec. 40. Summary Proceedings. — No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present: (a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong. (b) When the respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge. (c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable. Resort to summary proceedings by the disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed. Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by the President, himself, or upon his order, may be appealed to the Commission. It is the petitioner's contention that the private respondents come under Item (a) because the charge against them was serious and the evidence of their guilt was strong, being no less than their own sworn confessions. There was therefore no need of a formal investigation and no hindrance to their summary dismissal. We do not have to rule at this time on the degree of the offense imputed to the private respondents. But we will say here that, in view of their rejection of the confessions supposedly made by them, the evidence of their guilt cannot by any standard be regarded as strong. Indeed, that guilt had yet to be established by preponderant evidence, especially against the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the perjury charge against them. Consequently, we cannot find that Item (a) of Section 40 could be validly applied against the private respondents to justify their summary dismissal. The Court had earlier entertained serious misgivings about the constitutionality of Section 40 as against strong protests that it was violative of due process in so far as it deprived the civil servant of the right to defend himself against the ex parte decision to dismiss him. While it is true that this section had been upheld in earlier decisions (albeit not very categorically), there was a growing sentiment that the law should be re-examined more closely in deference to the right to a hearing that it was foreclosing. Fortunately, the question has been rendered moot and academic by the Congress of the Philippines, which has itself seen fit to remove it from our statute books. The Court is happy to note the little-known fact that at the instance of Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, a recognized constitutionalist with a vigilant regard for due process, and Representative Narciso D. Monfort, himself an avowed advocate of fair play, Section 40 was repealed by Republic Act No. 6654, which was approved on May 20, 1988, and published in the Official Gazette on May 30, 1988. The private respondents were dismissed on October 14, 1987, when Section 40 was still in force. But as already explained, it was not applicable even then in the case at bar. There is no question that the repeal of Section 40 will further bolster the independence and integrity of the Civil Service and protect its members from the arbitrary exercise of authority by officials with less than the proper respect for due process of law. -CHING

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 161. [G.R. No. 118883. January 16, 1998] SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, CATANDUANES, Represented by VICE MAYOR NENITO AQUINO and MAYOR LYDIA T. ROMANO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AUGUSTO T. ANTONIO, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: FACTS Antonio, priate respondent, was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay Catanduanes on March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Council(ABC) for the Municiplity of San Andres Catanduanes. Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the President as Member of the Sanguniang Bayan of the sid municipality. Meanwhile, DILG Sec. declared the election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Council(FABC) void for lack of quorum. As a result, the provincial council was reorganized. DILG Sec then designated private respondent as a temporary member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of Catanduanes effective on 15 June 1990. Because of his designation, private respondent tendered his resignation as a member of the Sanguniang Bayan dated 14 June 1990 to the Mayor of San Andres Catanduanes. Copies of his letters were also forwarded to the provincial governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer. Subsequently, Aquino then the Vice President of ABC was appointed by the provincial governor as member of the Sanguniang Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office on 18 July 1980 after taking his oath. Subsequently, the ruling of the DILG annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the Supreme Court and declared the appointment of private respondent void for lacking the essential qualification of being the president of FABC. On 31 March 1992, private respondent wrote to the Sanguniang Bayan(SB) of San Andres regarding his re-assumption of his original position. SB refused. ISSUE 1. Whether Antonio’s resignation was complete. 2. W/N respondent abandoned his membership in the SB. HELD The resignation was not complete for lack of acceptance thereof of the proper authority however, an office may still be deemed relinquished through voluntary abandonment which needs no acceptance. In Ortiz vs Comelec, resignation is defined as the “act of giving up of an officer by which he declines his office and renounces the further right to use it”. It can be express or implied. To constitute a complete and operative resignation the following must be present. (1) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. In the case at bar, there was no evidence that the private respondent’s resignation was accepted by the proper authority. Although the Local Government Code of 1983 was silent as to whom specifically should accept the resignation it provides that the position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of resignation and should be acted upon by the Sanggunian concerned. The resignation letter was tendered to the mayor and copies were sent to the governor, DILG and the municipal treasurer but none of them expressly acted on it. Furthermore, under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom it should be submitted, should be submitted to the appointing power. Therefore, the resignation should have been submitted to the president or to the DILG as the president’s alter ego. Tackling the second issue, abandonment has been defined as the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. It is a species of resignation. While resignation is the formal relinquishment, abandonment is the voluntary relinquishment by non-user. There are 2 essential elements of abandonment: (1) an intention to abandon and (2) an overt act by which intention is carried on. In the case at bar, the first element was manifested on the following instances: (1) private respondent’s failure to perform his function as SB; (2) his failure to collect the corresponding renumeration for the position, (3)his failure to object to the appointment of Aquino as his replacement to SB and (4) his prolonged

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) failure to initiate any act to reassume his post in the SB after SC had nullified his designation as member of Sanguniang Panlalawigan. The second element was demonstrated by the following: (1) his letter of resignation, (2) his assumption of office as member of the Sanguniang Panlalawigan, (3) his faithful discharge of his duties and functions of SP and (4) his recept of renumeration for such post.

162. Canonizado v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 133132, 15 February 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Alexis Canonizado who is the NAPOLCOM Commission was ousted in pursuant to Sec 8 f RA 8551 which states that the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired which shall constitute a bar to their reappointment or an extension of their terms in the Commission except for current Commissioners who have served less than two (2) years of their terms of office who may be appointed by the President for a maximum terms of two (2) years. Petitioner then was appointed as Inspector General of the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of the PNP. However, petitioner filed a complaint on its removal as NAPOLCOM commission as it is against its Security of tenure. During the pendency of the case, petitioner took its oath of being an Inspector General. Respondents Felicidario now contends that Petitioner cannot seek for legal remedies to recover the position of the NAPOLCOM commission, as petitioner based from its acts has abandoned its former position upon accepting his appointment as inspector general. ISSUE: 1. WON petitioner has abandoned his former position? 2. WON petitioner acceptance of the Inspector General will constitute a termination of his former position? HELD: 1. No. There are two essential elements of abandonment: first, an intention to abandon and second, an overt or external act by which the intention is carried into effect. There was no intention to abandon the former position. Petitioner was ousted as napolcom commissioner pursuant to Sec 8, of RA 8551, which was soon declares as unconstitutional by the Supreme court due to such provision is tantamount to deprivation of the right to security of tenure. Therefore the petitioner has no intention to abandon his former position. Likewise, upon being ousted he pursue legal remedies to recover his former position. 2. NO. Acceptance of incompatible office ipso facto vacates the former position. To determine if such position is incompatible, the test is when the nature and relation of the two office to each other, they ought not to be held by one person from the contrariety and antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other. In the case at bar, the position of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and the position of Inspector General is incompatible with each other. This is also is in pursuant to RA 8551 prohibits any personnel of the IAS from sitting in a committee charged with the task of deliberating on the appointment, promotion, or assignment of any PNP personnel, whereas the NAPOLCOM has the power of control and supervision over the PNP. Therefore the two position is incompatible. However, the rule on acceptance of incompatible office ipso facto vacates the former position does not apply in the case at bar. Because at no point did Petitioner discharge the functions of the two offices simultaneously. Petitioner was forced out of his first office by the enactment of section 8 of RA 8551. Thus, when Petitioner was appointed as Inspector General on 30 June 1998, he had ceased to discharge his official functions as NAPOLCOM Commissioner. Thus, to reiterate, the incompatibility of duties rule never had a chance to come into play for petitioner never occupied the two positions, of Commissioner and Inspector General, nor discharged their respective functions, concurrently 163. Adaza vs. Pacana (135 SCRA 431, March 18, 1985) FACTS: Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor for said province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost. Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor. ISSUES: 1) W/N a provincial governor Adaza who was elected as Mababatas Pambansa (MP) can exercise the functions of both simultaneously 2) W/N vice governor Pacana who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor RULING: 1) No. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: “Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governmentowned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .” The provision is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions. 2) Yes. Adaza contentions that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his office and as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984. Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code. Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code. 164. Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 FACTS: Immediately after President Cory Aquino was sworn into office, she issued Proclamation No. 1 declaring as policy the reorganization of the government. Thereafter, the President issued Executive Orders directing the reorganization of various different departments of the government which affected their employees, among those affected was Francisco Mendoza.

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Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City who was reappointed by respondent Quisumbing as such with a "permanent" status. He has served the Department of Education for forty-two (42) years, moving up the ranks in the public schools system. Subsequently, petitioner received the letter-order informing him that he would be considered separated from the service without prejudice to availment of benefits. The letter stated that consistent with the mandate of reorganization to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness, all incumbent officials/personnel are on 'holdover' status unless advised otherwise. In the meantime, the petitioner, in a letter wrote Secretary Quisumbing requesting reconsideration of the letterorder. The letter was forwarded to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB). The motion for reconsideration remained unacted upon. ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-order of then Secretary Quisumbing which terminated his employment as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City was valid. HELD: No. The dismissal of all employees and their being placed on holdover status is particularly objectionable in the DECS. There could have been no intention to get rid of hundreds of thousands of school teachers. The use of “reorganization” even under the concept advocated by the Solicitor General appears trivial if not unnecessary. Division Superintendents usually start as classroom teachers and move up to principals, district supervisors, and assistant superintendents usually over more than thirty years of service before appointment as Division heads. At each rung of the promotional ladder, there are qualifying examinations and rigid background checks. The big number of competitors insures some degree of safeguards against abuses. To use “reorganization” of the biggest Department in the government in order to avoid the hassles of bringing administrative charges against Mendoza and perhaps a few other alleged persona-non-gratas like him is precisely what this Court rejects when we apply the bona-fide rule. One does not burn down a house if his purpose is to roast alleged pests. The petitioner was appointed in a “PERMANENT STATUS” besides having a rating of 79% for the rating period of May 1986 to April 1987, which is considered “Very Satisfactory” under the “Rating Sheet for Key MEC Officials.” There was grave abuse of discretion when the petitioner’s services were terminated by a mere letterorder on the justification that the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of the DECS, was only in a holdover capacity. If the petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to file charges against him instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in order to run after him. The dismissal of all employees and their being placed on holdover status is particularly objectionable in the DECS. There could have been no intention to get rid of hundreds of thousands of school teachers. The use of “reorganization” even under the concept advocated by the Solicitor General appears trivial if not unnecessary. Division Superintendents usually start as classroom teachers and move up to principals, district supervisors, and assistant superintendents usually over more than thirty years of service before appointment as Division heads. At each rung of the promotional ladder, there are qualifying examinations and rigid background checks. The big number of competitors insures some degree of safeguards against abuses. To use “reorganization” of the biggest Department in the government in order to avoid the hassles of bringing administrative charges against Mendoza and perhaps a few other alleged persona-non-gratas like him is precisely what this Court rejects when we apply the bona-fide rule. One does not burn down a house if his purpose is to roast alleged pests. The petitioner was appointed in a “PERMANENT STATUS” besides having a rating of 79% for the rating period of May 1986 to April 1987, which is considered “Very Satisfactory” under the “Rating Sheet for Key MEC Officials.” There was grave abuse of discretion when the petitioner’s services were terminated by a mere letterorder on the justification that the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of the DECS, was only in a holdover capacity. If the petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to file charges against him instead of placing the entire DECS on hold-over status in order to run after him. If an executive department is bloated with unnecessary employees, there can be no objection to a law abolishing the useless or non-essential items. In the instant case, however, all items, including the essential ones, were declared vacant. There is absolutely no showing that the positions of tourism field coordinator, bus driver, bookkeeper, accounting clerk, librarian, nurse, telephone operator, messenger in fact, any of the items occupied by the petitioners—are unnecessary and must be chopped off.

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165. TUMULAK V. EGAY [ No. L-2451, February 24, 1949; 82 Phil 828 ] Facts: In December, 1932, Jose M. Tumulak (petitioner) became the duly appointed judge of the town of Gigaquit and Bacuag, Province of Surigao and acted accordingly until August 1942, when the Japanese seized the province; that after liberation, and in January, 1946, Tumulak received from President Sergio Osemeña an appointment ad interim for the same position; that in May, 1946, he duly qualified and assumed the office; that thereafter he went to Cebu to fetch his family, but upon returning, he found the (respondent) Protolico Egay occupying the post beginning July, 1946; that he “had no other remedy” but to “accept the situation”; that in February, 1948, he asked the Department of Justice for reinstatement; and that, having failed to obtain relief, he instituted this litigation to vindicate his right to the office. Respondent submits a motion to dismiss the case, asserting that the action has lapsed because it was commenced more than one year after the cause of action had accrued. Issue: Whether or not respondent Egay may be wrest from the questioned position? No. Held: The Supreme Court dismisses the petition. Rule 68 of the Rules of Court provides that: Section 16. Limitations.- Nothing contained in this rule shall be construed * * * to authorize an action against an officer for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold office, arose; * * *” There is no question that petitioner’s right of action, if any, accrued in July 1946, when respondent allegedly usurped the office. From that day to August 1948, more than one year has elapsed. This petitioner is, therefore, out of time and may not be entertained. Constitutional rights may certainly be waived, and the inaction of the officer for one year could be validly considered as a waiver, i.e., a renunciation which no principle of justice may prevent, he being at liberty to resign his position anytime he pleases. There is good justification for the limitation period: it is not proper that the title to public office should be subjected to continued uncertainty, and the people's interest requires that such right should be determined as speedily as practicable. 166. QUINTO vs COMELEC GR No. 189689 22 February 2010 FACTS: The case was based on the motion of reconsideration filed by respondents against the earlier decision of the Court which declared COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and Sec. 13 of RA 9369 or the Omnibus Election Code- in so far as they provide that public appointive officials shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy- as unconstitutional for being overbreadth and violative of the equal protections clause. The Court reversed this decision on the present case. The assailed COMELEC resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) According to the petitioners, the said provisions of the law were discriminatory against appointive officials since pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. The petitioners were two incumbent government officials- Eleazar P. Quinto (DENR Secretary) and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections. ISSUE: WON the provisions of the law that appointive official including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy shall be considered unconstitutional for being overbreadth and violative of the equal protection clause? HELD: NO. There was no violation of the equal protection clause whose requisites were the following: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.[37] The classification between elective and appointive officials in the law was valid-- it passed the test of equal protection clause. The said laws and regulations only implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.[21] This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. [22]Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included. Moreover, the rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions arises from the fact that unlike appointive officials, elective officials were lected in office for a definite term and that there should be a complete deference to the will of the electorate by allowing said officials to end of the term for which they were elected. Hence, the dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

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ELECTION LAW

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GENERAL PRINCIPLES 1. MACALINTAL vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003 FACTS: Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines. ISSUE: Does Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution? HELD: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under existing election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting. The Court, however, declared certain provisions of the law unconstitutional, namely, portions of Secs. 17.1, 19 and 25, as they trampled on the constitutional mandate of independence of the Commission on Elections. The Court also upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court likewise upheld Sec. 5 (d) of the law. It also declared that pursuant to Sec. 30 of the law the rest

2.

Roque,

Jr.

vs.

Commission

on

Elections,

G.R.

No.

188546,

10

September

2009

FACTS: (1) Petitioners filed a petitioner for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction and are suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens. They seek to nullify respondent COMELEC’s award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information anagement Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic)1 and to permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the corresponding contract-award. (2) On Dec 22, 1997 Congress enacted RA 8346 authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and onwards. However during 1998, 2001 and 2004, purely manual elections were done. (3) On Jan 23, 2007, the amendatory of RA 9369 was passed authorizing again the COMELEC to use the AES. Sec 5 of that law authorised the COMELEC to:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) “Use an automated election system or systems in the same election in different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording automated election system as it may deem appropriate and practical for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the regular national and local election, which shall be held immediately after effectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, to be chosen by the Commission x x x x In succeeding regular national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented nationwide.” (4) However, the COMELEC did not use any AES in the May 14 2007 elections. (5) On July 19, 2009, the COMELEC and the TIM and Smartmatic (provider) signed the contract for the automated tallying and recording of votes cast nation-wide in the May 2010 elections. (6) For around P7 billion, the COMELEC leased 82,200 optical scanners, related equipment and hired ancillary services provider to be used in the May 2010 elections. (7) Hence this petition was filed to enjoin the signing of the Contract or its implementation and to compel disclosure of the terms of the contract and other agreements between the provider and its subcontractors. (8) Petitioners sought the Contract's invalidation for non-compliance with the requirement in Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended, mandating the partial use of an automated election system before deploying it nationwide. To

further

support

their

claim

on

the

Contract's

invalidity,

petitioners

alleged

that:

(1) the optical scanners leased by the COMELEC do not satisfy the minimum systems capabilities" under RA 8436, as amended (he was claiming that the COMELEC must pilot test in 12 areas in the country in the national elections of 2010, before doing fully computerized elections in the national elections after 2010) (2) the Provider not only failed to submit relevant documents during the bidding but also failed to show "community of interest" among its constituent corporations as required in Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech). ISSUE: - Is there a need for pilot testing of the PCOS machines offered by Smartmatic and TIM? NO. - Was there an invalid joint venture agreement between COMELEC and the provider during the bidding that would be in violation of the SC’s holding in the Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (Infotech) which requires a joint venture to include a copy of its JVA DURING the bidding? NONE - Was there an infringement of the constitutional right of the people to secrecy of the ballot? NONE HELD: Pilot testing - The plain wordings of Republic Act No. 9369 (that amended RA 8436) commands that the 2010 elections shall be fully automated, and such full automation is not conditioned on “pilot testing” in the May 2007 elections. Congress merely gave COMELEC the flexibility to partially use the AES in some parts of the country for the May 2007 elections. - Any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full automation of the 2010 regular elections can validly proceed without a pilot run of the Automated Election System (AES) should be put to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of Republic Act No. 9525, in which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to automate the 2010 elections—the Republic Act No. 9525 is a compelling indication that it was never Congress’ intent to make the pilot testing of a particular automated election system in the 2007 elections a condition precedent to its use

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) or Joint

award

of

the

2010

Automation

Project. venture

As petitioners observed, that the TIM- Smartmatic joint venture remained an unincorporated aggroupment during the bid- opening and evaluation stages. It ought to be stressed, however, that the fact of non-incorporation was without a vitiating effect on the validity of the tender offers. For the bidding ground rules, as spelled out primarily in the RFP and the clarificatory bid bulletins, does not require, for bidding purposes, that there be an incorporation of the bidding joint ventures or consortiums In fact, Bid Bulletin Nos. 19 and 20 recognize the existence and the acceptability of proposals of unincorporated joint ventures. In response to a poser, for example, regarding the 60% Filipino ownership requirement in a joint venture arrangement, the SBAC, in its Bid Bulletin No. 22, stated: “In an unincorporated joint venture, determination of the required Filipino participation may be made by examining the terms and conditions of the [JVA] and other supporting financial documents submitted by the joint venture.” And the Court held that petitioners have not shown that incorporation is part of the pass/fail criteria used in determining eligibility Infringement on secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and the possible violation of the Anti-Dummy Law Petitioners were contending that the COMELEC relinquished its supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated elections since the COMELEC would not be the one holding possession of the public and private keys pair of the machines. But Court held that the role of Smartmatic TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for the automation project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and the technical services pertaining to their operation. As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide assistance with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes. And if only to emphasize a point, Comelec’s contract is with Smartmatic TIM Corporation of which Smartmatic is a 40% minority owner, per the JVA of TIM and Smartmatic and the Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Accordingly, any decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will not be binding on Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the board room voting arrangement that Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as joint venture partners, inclusive of the veto vote that one may have power over the other, should really be the least concern of the Comelec. As to petitioner’s contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot because the voter would be confronted with a “three feet” long ballot: The Court held that, surely, the Comelec could put up such infrastructure asto insure that the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to make his voteknown. As to the issue of the possible violation of the Anti Dummy Law given that the RFP requirement of a joint venture bidder to be at least be 60% Filipino: The winning bidder, TIM-Smartmatic joint venture, has Smartmatic, a foreign corporation, owning 40% of the equity in, first, the joint venture partnership, and then in Smartmatic TIM Corporation.

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The Anti-Dummy Law has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. For liability for violation of the law to attach, it must be established that there is a law limiting or reserving the enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise,privilege, or business to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. In the case at bench, the Court is not aware of any constitutional or statutory provision classifying as a nationalized activity the lease or provision of goods and technical services for the automation of an election. In fact, Sec.8 of RA 8436, as amended, vests the Comelec with specific authority to acquire AES from foreign sources, thus: SEC 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials.—To achieve the purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure, xxx, by purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other services, from local or foreign sources xxx.” Petitioners cite Executive Order No. (EO) 584,98 Series of 2006,purportedly limiting “contracts for the supply of materials, goods andcommodities to government- owned or controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal corporation” to corporations that are 60% Filipino. But the Court did not see the governing relevance of EO 584. For let alone the fact that RA 9369 is, in relation to EO 584, a subsequent enactment and,therefore, enjoys primacy over the executive issuance, the Comelec does fall under the category of a government-owned and controlled corporation,an agency or a municipal corporation contemplated in the executive order.

3. BANAT v. COMELEC G.R. No. 177508, 7 August 2009 Facts: This is a petition for Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party List (petitioner) assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9369 (RA 9369)and enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing the statute. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006.On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369.According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. Petitioner argues the following: 1. the title of RA 9369 is misleading because it speaks of poll automation but contains substantial provisions dealing with the manual canvassing of election returns.Petitioner also alleges that Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43are neither embraced in the title nor germane to the subject matter of RA 9369. 2. Sections 37 and 38 violate the Constitution by impairing the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET).According to petitioner, under the amended provisions, Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the election of President and Vice President (Congress), and the COMELECen banc as the National Board of Canvassers (COMELEC en banc), for the election of Senatorsmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases in the election of the President, Vice President, and Senators.Petitioner concludes that in entertaining pre-proclamation cases, Congress and the COMELEC en banc undermine the independence and encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET.

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3. Section 43 is unconstitutional because it gives the other prosecuting arms of the government concurrent power with the COMELEC to investigate and prosecute election offenses. 4. section 34 which fixes the per diem of poll watchers of the dominant majority and dominant minority parties at Pon election day.Petitioner argues that this violates the freedom of the parties to contract and their right to fix the terms and conditions of the contract they see as fair, equitable and just. Petitioner adds that this is a purely private contract using private funds which cannot be regulated by law.

Issue/s: Whether or not RA 9369 is unconstitutional. -Sections 37 and 38 violate Section 17, Article VI and Paragraph 7, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; -Section 43 violates Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution -Section 34 violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution Held: The petition is denied.RA 9369 is constitutional. 1. RA 9369 is an amendatory act entitled An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled An Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes.Clearly, the subject matter of RA 9369 covers the amendments to RA 8436, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (BP 881),Republic Act No. 7166 (RA 7166),and other related election laws to achieve its purpose of promoting transparency, credibility, fairness, and accuracy in the elections.The provisions of RA 9369 assailed by petitioner deal with amendments to specific provisions of RA 7166 and BP 881, specifically: (1) Sections 34, 37 and 38 amend Sections 26, 30 and 15 of RA 7166, respectively; and(2) Section 43 of RA 9369 amends Section 265 of BP 881.Therefore, the assailed provisions are germane to the subject matter ofRA 9369 which is to amend RA 7166 and BP 881, among others. 2. The COMELEC maintains that the amendments introduced by Section 37 pertain only to the adoption and application of the procedures on pre-proclamation controversies in case of any discrepancy, incompleteness, erasure or alteration in the certificates of canvass.The COMELEC adds that Section 37 does not provide that Congress and the COMELEC en bancmay now entertain pre-proclamation cases for national elective posts. 3. Section 2(6), Article IX-C of the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute election offenses, it likewise authorizes the COMELEC to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. In the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the authority of the COMELEC was subsequently qualified and explained. 4. The OSG argues that petitioner erroneously invoked the non-impairment clause because this only applies to previously perfected contracts.In this case, there is no perfected contact and, therefore, no obligation will be impaired. Both the COMELEC and the OSG argue that the law is a proper exercise of police power and it will prevail over a contract.According to the COMELEC, poll watching is not just an ordinary contract but is an agreement with the solemn duty to ensure the sanctity of votes.The role of poll watchers is vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of its police power.The OSG further argues that the assurance that the poll watchers will receive fair and equitable compensation promotes the general welfare.The OSG also states that this was a reasonable regulation considering that the dominant majority and minority parties will secure a copy of the election returns and are given the right to assign poll watchers inside the polling precints.

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5. Bagumbayan VNP v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 222731, 8 March 2016 Facts: This case involves the printing of receipts by the Vote Counting Machine in the 2016 elections. On February 9, 2016, ABS-CBN News reported that the Commission on Elections En Banc decided not to implement the VVPAT for the 2016 Elections. It was also reported that printing of receipts were not done in the 2010 and 2013 elections. Petitioner Bagumbayan Volunteers for a New Philippines (VNP) Movement and its chairman Richard “Dick” Gordon, filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to implement the Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) security feature of the Vote Counting Machines (VCM). According to petitioner, Republic Act No. 8436, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, provides several safeguards or Minimum System Capabilities to ensure the sanctity of the ballot. Among these is the VVPAT security feature. Furthermore, petitioners said that during the Senate deliberations, where Senator Dick Gordon was a proponent, the law prescribes the “minimum” criteria of adopting VVPAT as one of the security features. The use of the word “must” makes it mandatory to have a paper audit “separate and distinct from the ballot.” Petitioner adds that COMELEC Resolution No. 10057 promulgated on February 11, 2016 did not include mechanisms for VVPAT. Respondents were not able to file their answer on time and instead filed a motion for additional time to file a comment. It was denied. However, based on petitioner’s allegations and several news articles, COMELEC Chairman Andres Bautista said that the paper receipts would be used for vote buying. Issues: W.O.N COMELEC may be compelled to issue voting receipts. Held: Yes. Section 2, Article XI, of the Constitution empowered the Commission of Elections to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election.” RA. 8436, as amended by RA. 9369, is a law which requires the automated election system to have the capability of providing a voter-verified paper audit trail. The VVPAT security feature, as found in Section 6(e), (f), and (n), provides. “SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. — The automated election system must at least have the following functional capabilities: (e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail; (f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for verifying the correctness of reported election results; (n) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not the machine has registered his choice;” The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory. These functions constitute the most basic safeguards to ensure the transparency, credibility, fairness and accuracy of the upcoming elections.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Furthermore, the same law provides that “it is considered a policy of the state that the votes reflect the genuine will of the People.” In Maliksi v. COMELEC the digital count of votes could not be audited since the ballots were tampered. It could have been avoided had the VVPAT been implemented. In this case, COMELEC is given ample discretion to administer the elections, but it is also its constitutional duty to enforce the law. The law provides that the VVPAT requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and (b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based. Therefore, Mandamus is granted.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 6. CAYETANO VS. MONSOD, G.R. NO. 100113 SEPTEMBER 3, 1991 FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 1 (1) of the 1987 Constitution. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination. Subsequently, respondent took his oath and assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not Christian Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years as required by the Constitution? HELD: YES. ―Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill (III ALR 23).‖ Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term ―practice of law," particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 7. Gaminde vs COA, GR 140335 13 December 2000 FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President Appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. Her appointment paper explicitly states that her term expires on February 2, 1999. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office.The Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999. Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04, 1999, Chairman de Leon, wrote the COA requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Gaminde and her coterminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. The General Counsel of COA opined that the term of Comm. Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment. Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Felipe issued notice of disallowance, disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the COA en banc. The COA dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. ISSUE: Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. HELD: EXPIRED ON FEBRUARY 02, 1999. The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term. Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. On the other hand, Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions, 1987 Constitution provides: SEC. 15. The incumbent Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) to a new term thereunder. In no case shall any Member serve longer than seven years including service before the ratification of this Constitution. What the above quoted Transitory Provisions contemplate is tenure not term of the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term thereunder. On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Corona clarifying that her term would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006. WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff. ACCORDINGLY, we REVERSE the decisions of the Commission on Audit insofar as they disallow the salaries and emoluments of Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her coterminous staff during her tenure as de facto officer from February 02, 1999, until February 02, 2000. 8. ESTRELLA vs. COMELEC GR 160465, May 27, 2004 FACTS: Petitioner sought the nullification of a Status Quo Ante Order issued by the COMELEC. In the issuance of said Order, five (5) out of the seven (7) incumbent members of the COMELEC participated (Commissioners Abalos, Javier, Tangcangco, Borra, and Lantion). Out of the five present, four (4) commissioners voted for the issuance of the said order (Abaos, Javier, Tangcangco, and Lantion), while the Borra dissented. Subsequently, Commissioner Lantion was deemed to not have been fit to participate and vote in the issuance of the questioned order, thus leaving 3 members concurring therewith. The necessary votes of four (4) or majority of the members of the COMELEC was not attained, so it failed to comply with the votes necessary for the pronouncements of an order, as required under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Private respondent alleges that 3 votes would have been sufficient to issue the order since this is the majority of the commissioners present at the time of the voting. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC shall decide a case or matter by a majority of the vote of “all its members” HELD: Yes. Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which provides: SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision states "all of its members," without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 9. DUMAYAS v. COMELEC, GR No. 141952-53, April 20, 2001 FACTS: Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of Mayor in Carles, Iloilo last 11 May 1998 synchronized elections. During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precincts nos. 61A, 62A, and 63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan were protested for inclusion in the canvass before the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same- that is, violation of Secs. 234, 235, 236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law. Appellant Dumayas, Jr. submitted his evidence to the Board of Canvassers on 14 May 1998. On the other hand, respondent Bernal, Jr. in vehemently denying the allegations of petitioner, submitted joint affidavits of the members of the different Boards of Election Inspectors for precinct nos. 61A, 62A and 63A/64A. All the supplemental affidavits of the different BEIs categorically declared that the elections in their respective precincts starting from the start of the voting to its closing, to the counting of votes and to the preparation and submission of election returns were peaceful, clean, orderly and no acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion and similar acts prohibited by law was (sic) exerted on anybody including the voters and members of the BEIs. In the afternoon of May 14, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers denied petitioner’s objection to the inclusion of the contested returns and proceeded with the canvass. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal before the MBC on May 15, 1998. The appeal was given due course by the COMELEC Second Division which rendered a resolution excluding the subject election returns. On August 10, 1998, private respondent Felipe Bernal, Jr., filed a motion for reconsideration of the above-cited resolution with the COMELEC en banc. On August 12, 1998, an order certifying that the motion for reconsideration and records of the case were elevated to the COMELEC en banc was signed by Commissioner Julio F. Desamito and issued by the Clerk of the Commission. Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration and pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, Election Officer Rolando Dalen set the reconvening of the MBC on August 13, 1998, for the continuation of canvass proceedings and proclamation of winning candidates for Vice-Mayor and Municipal Councilors of Carles, Iloilo. No winner for the position of Mayor was proclaimed since private respondent was able to present a copy of his motion for reconsideration before the MBC. The MBC then reset the date for reconvening of the board on August 17, 1998, after confirming by phone with COMELEC-Manila that a motion for reconsideration was indeed filed by private respondent. Thereafter, the MBC ruled that proclamation of the winning candidate for Mayor would proceed on August 17, 1998 unless private respondent could present a certification from the COMELEC that the motion for reconsideration was elevated to the COMELEC en banc. On August 17, 1998, despite presentation of the August 12, 1998 order, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the election after excluding from the canvass the election returns from the three contested precincts in accordance with the COMELEC Second Division Resolution. The MBC, with its Vice-Chairman dissenting, justified its act by reasoning that it did not receive an official copy of the order directing the elevation of the case to the banc. The following day, private respondent immediately filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the proclamation of petitioner on the ground that the resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was not yet final and executory. Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold Betita filed an action for quo warranto against petitioner before the RTC-Iloilo, said petition included respondent Bernal as one of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita. On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a motion to expunge respondent Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation void ab initio. In a resolution dated August 24, 1999 but promulgated on March 2, 2000, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioners motion to expunge. On March 13, 2000, respondent Bernal, Jr. was proclaimed by the newly-constituted Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles, thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas. ISSUES: (1) Should respondent Bernal, who was named as petitioner in the quo warranto proceedings commenced before the regular court, be deemed to have abandoned the motions he had filed with respondent Commission? (2) Did the COMELEC err in ordering the inclusion of the contested election returns in the canvassing of ballots?

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (3) In view of the retirement of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani before the date of the promulgation of the assailed resolution on March 2, 2000, should said resolution be deemed null and void for being violative of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution? HELD: (1) See Doctrine for General Rule and Exceptions. An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor an election protest. A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate. It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office. The allegations contained in Betita’s petition before the regular court do not present any proper issue for either an election protest or a quo warranto case under the Omnibus Election Code. The special civil action appears to be in the nature of an action for usurpation of public office brought by Betita to assert his right to the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on succession of local government officials contained in the Local Government Code. Although said petition is also denominated as a quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, it is different in nature from the quo warranto provided for in the Omnibus Election Code where the only issue proper for determination is either disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent therein. Neither can it be considered as an election protest since what was put forth as an issue in said petition was petitioners alleged unlawful assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of his alleged illegal proclamation as the winning candidate in the election. A closer look at the specific allegations in the petition disclose that it is actually an action for the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation on the ground of illegality and prematurity. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the nature of the action is determined by the averments in the complaint or petition and not the title or caption thereof. Thus, respondent Commission did not err, much less abuse its discretion, when it refused to consider as abandoned Bernal’s motion for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare petitioner’s proclamation as void ab initio. (2) Although petitioner’s proclamation was undertaken pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC’s Second Division, it appears plain to us that the latter grievously erred in ordering the exclusion of the contested returns from Precincts 61A, 62A and 63A/64A (clustered). On this score, the Comelec en banc correctly reversed the Second Division by holding that petitioner Dumayas failed to justify the exclusion of said returns on the ground of duress, intimidation, threat or coercion. We note that the only evidence submitted by petitioner to prove said irregularities were self-serving affidavits executed by his watchers and supporters. Aside from the fact that these allegations were countered by opposing affidavits made by the members of the Boards of Election Inspectors who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties and who categorically denied the allegations, the election returns were also observed to be genuine, clean, signed and/or thumbmarked by the proper officials and watchers. In the present case, petitioner barely alleged that the preparation of said returns was attended by threats, duress, intimidation or coercion without offering any proof, other than the affidavits mentioned above, that these had affected the regularity or genuineness of the contested returns. Absent any evidence appearing on the face of the returns that they are indeed spurious, manufactured or tampered with, the election irregularities cited by petitioner would require the reception of evidence aliunde which cannot be done in a preproclamation controversy such as the one initiated by petitioner. Returns can not be excluded on mere allegation that the returns are manufactured or fictitious when the returns, on their face, appear regular and without any physical signs of tampering, alteration or other similar vice. If there had been sham voting or minimal voting which was made to appear as normal through falsification of the election returns, such grounds are properly cognizable in an election protest and not in a pre-proclamation controversy. (3) Petitioner claims that March 2, 2000 Resolution of the COMELEC is void because Commissioners Manolo Gorospe and Japal Guiani have already retired on the date of its promulgation, even if they had participated earlier in the deliberations of the case and signed the resolution dated August 24, 1999. Petitioner submits that this defect invalidated the entire decision of the Commission and that accordingly, a new vote should be taken to settle the matter.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In Jamil vs. Commission on Elections, we held that a decision becomes binding only after its promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the reason that their retirement preceded the resolutions promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had not signed the resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be properly considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy. However, unless the withdrawal of the votes would materially affect the result insofar as votes for or against a party is concerned, we find no reason for declaring the decision a nullity. In the present case, with the cancellation of the votes of retired Commissioners Gorospe and Guiani, the remaining votes among the four incumbent commissioners at the time of the resolutions promulgation would still be 3 to 1 in favor of respondent. Noteworthy, these remaining Commissioners still constituted a quorum. In our view, the defect cited by petitioner does not affect the substance or validity of respondent Commissions disposition of the controversy. The nullification of the challenged resolution, in our view, would merely prolong the proceedings unnecessarily. 10. Sevilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 202833, March 19, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Sevilla and private respondent So were candidates for Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Election. After the Election, the Board of Election Declared Sevilla as winner, beating respondent with a difference of 628 votes. Thereafter, respondent filed to the MeTC an election protest against petitioner on the ground of election fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precincts or 20% of the total precincts. MeTC dismiss the election protest, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of notice of appeal. He also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. Then respondent filed a certiorari to the Comelec, on the ground for grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge, when the Judge failed to appreciate the rule on ballots where there should be a clear and distinct presentation of the specific details of how and why a certain group of ballots should be considered as having been written by one or two persons. Comelec Second Division take cognizance of the certiorari, stating that certiorari can be granted despite the availability of appeals when the question order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Comelec En Banc affirmed the decision of the Second Division, stating that proceduaral technicalities should be disregarded for the immediate and final resolution of election cases in as much as ballots should be read and appreciated with the utmost liberality so that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may be not defeated by technical infirmities. Petitioner now files with the court, stating that the comelec second division and en banc gravely abused its discretion when it takes cognizance of the petitioner of certiorari of respondent. Petitioner contention is that respondent should have filed an appeal within 5 days from the dismissal order, rather than a Motion for reconsideration which is a prohibited pleading. Likewise respondent is bar to file a certitorari because it is not a substitution for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Respondent Comelec contented that the petition of certiorari filed by the petitioner is premature, for the Comelec en banc decision was an equal decision or a 3-3 decision. The Comelec en banc is still needs to re-hear the case, for a re-voting of the petition. ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is Valid? HELD: NO, the certiorari is premature. The comelec procedure follows: 1. When a decision was made by the Comelec Division, the comelec en banc takes cognizance of such decision when appealed therewith. 2. When sitting en banc, four members Commissioners shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. A concurrence of majority of the members of the commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. (Section 5(a), Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure) 3. When the members fails to constitute a concurrence of majority vote or an equal vote. The remedy is for the Comelec en banc to re-hear the case. This re-hearing will give opportunity to the parties to strengthen their

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) respective positions or arguments and convince the members of the Comelec en banc of the merit of their cases. (Sec 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure). 4. When after re-hearing, and the decision is still equal. The petition shall be dismiss if originally commenced in the Commission; or in appealed cases, the judgement or ordered appealed from shall stand firmed; and in all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Sec 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure). In the case at bar, the Comelec En Banc did not yet re-hear the case for appeal on the decision of the comelec second division, therefore the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner is still premature. Likewise, the court orders the Comelec En Banc to re-hear its decision, being a decision garnering equal votes, in order to comply with its rules of procedure. 11. IBRAHIM vs. COMELEC, GR 192289, January 14, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner Kamarudin Ibrahim (Ibrahim) filed his certificate of candidacy to run as municipal Vice-Mayor. Thereafter, respondent Rolan G. Buagas (Buagas), then Acting Election Officer in the said municipality, forwarded to the COMELECs Law Department (Law Department) the names of candidates who were not registered voters therein. The list included Ibrahims name. Consequently, COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution dated December 22, 2009 disqualifying Ibrahim for not being a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected without prejudice to his filing of an opposition. It prompted Ibrahim to file Petition/Opposition but was denied by the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated May 6, 2010. In this resolution, the COMELEC declared that the Resolution dated December 22, 2009 was anchored on the certification, which was issued by Buagas and Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of Maguindanao, Estelita B. Orbase, stating that Ibrahim was not a registered voter of the municipality where he seeks to be elected. On the day of the election, during which time the Resolution dated May 6, 2010 had not yet attained finality, Ibrahim obtained the highest number cast for the Vice-Mayoralty race. However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC), which was then chaired by Buagas, suspended Ibrahims proclamation. Thus, this petition. ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC en banc acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions HELD: The petition is meritorious. The COMELEC en banc is devoid of authority to disqualify Ibrahim as a candidate for the position of Vice-Mayor. In the case at bar, the COMELEC en banc, through the herein assailed resolutions, ordered Ibrahims disqualification even when no complaint or petition was filed against him yet. Let it be stressed that if filed before the conduct of the elections, a petition to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC is the appropriate petition which should have been instituted against Ibrahim considering that his allegedly being an unregistered voter of his municipality disqualified him from running as Vice-Mayor. His supposed misrepresentation as an eligible candidate was an act falling within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a proper petition had been filed, the COMELEC en banc still acted with grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of a matter, which by both constitutional prescription and jurisprudential declaration, instead aptly pertains to one of its divisions. 12. Jaramilla v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155717, 23 October 2003 DOCTRINE: COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. The COMELEC therefore has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it. FACTS: [Respondent] Antonio Suyat and [petitioner] Alberto J. Jaramilla both ran for the position of Member of the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Ilocos Sur in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, proclaimed the winning candidates for the offices of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and eight (8) members of the Sangguniang Bayan. In the tabulated results issued by the Election Officer and Chairperson of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Sta. Cruz, it is shown that [respondent Suyat] obtained Four thousand seven hundred seventy nine (4,779) votes and was ranked no. 9. Upon review by [respondent Suyat], he discovered that [petitioner] was credited with only twenty three (23) votes per Election

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Return from Precinct No. 34A1. However, when the figures were forwarded to the Statement of Votes by Precinct, [petitioner] was credited with seventy three (73) votes for Precinct No. 34A1 or fifty (50) votes more than what he actually obtained. On June 13, 2001, respondent Suyat filed before the COMELEC en banc an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Order to Reconvene, which the latter treated as a Petition for Correction of Manifest Error. Petitioner countered in his Answer that said petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time and for lack of the required certification of non-forum shopping. The motion was granted by COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in not dismissing the case HELD: No. Petitioner bewails the fact that the COMELEC took cognizance of respondent Suyats petition for correction despite its having been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period fixed in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and its lack of certification against forum-shopping.[12] Petitioner overlooks the fact that the COMELEC has the discretion to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. Section 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules expressly provides that: SEC. 4. Suspension of the Rules In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission. The COMELEC therefore has authority to suspend the reglementary periods provided by the rules, or the requirement of certification of non-forum shopping for that matter, in the interest of justice and speedy resolution of the cases before it. Petitioner next points out respondent Suyats omission to pay the prescribed filing fees. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, the COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-payment of filing fees. Section 18, Rule 40 the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states: SEC 18. Nonpayment of Prescribed Fees If the fees above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. The use of the word may in the aforecited provision readily shows that the COMELEC is conferred the discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-payment of legal fees. And even if it were not afforded such discretion, as discussed above, it is authorized to suspend its rules or any portion thereof in the interest of justice. It is noteworthy that petitioner only raised issues on the foregoing technicalities, without questioning the COMELECs finding of manifest error in the tabulation of votes. Even at the COMELEC stage, his denial in his Answer was unsubstantiated by any rebuttal evidence to disprove the submitted photocopies of the election returns and statement of votes, which clearly showed the erroneous addition of 50 votes in his favor. The COMELECs unquestioned findings of fact are therefore sustained. The Court reiterates that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are given conclusive weight in the absence of arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Adherence to technicality that would put a stamp on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the peoples will, can never be countenanced. 13. TYPOCO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 186359, 5 March 2010 Facts:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the 2007 National and Local Elections, Jesus O. Typoco (petitioner) and private respondent Edgardo A. Tallados vied for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte. After the counting and canvassing of votes, petitioner Jesus O. Typoco was proclaimed winner with 80,830 votes, as opposed to respondent Edgardo A. Tallado's 78,287 votes. Respondent Tallado filed before the COMELEC a petition for correction of manifest error, docketed as SPC No. 07-312. He claimed that, after he reviewed and examined the figures in the Statement of Votes by Precinct (SOVP) vis-à-vis the Certificate of Canvass of Votes (COC) in the municipalities in the province, he found that, in the municipalities of Labo and Jose Panganiban, errors were committed in the transposition of votes from the SOVP to the COC. Respondent contended that if the errors were corrected, he would obtain a total of 80,697 votes and petitioner, 79,904 votes; thus, he would be the true winner in the gubernatorial race in the province. After due proceedings, the COMELEC First Division, on April 30, 2008, rendered the assailed Resolution 9 granting respondent Tallado’s petition. It ruled that, based on the COMELEC copies (in the custody of the Election Records and Statistics Division [ERSD] of the Commission) of the concerned SOVPs and COCs, the votes in Labo, as recorded in the said documents, did not correspond. Correcting the figures in Labo, while retaining those in the latter municipality, led to the following results: Tallado, 79,969 votes; and Typoco, 79,904 votes. The COMELEC partially GRANTED the petition and annulled the proclamation of private respondent Typoco as the winning gubernatorial candidate. Consequently, a New Municipal Board of Canvassers for the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte and a New Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Camarines Norte was constituted. The petitioner filed, on March 2, 2009, the instant petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid resolutions of the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc issued an Order, 14 appointing the members of a new municipal board of canvassers in the subject locality and members of a new provincial board of canvassers for purposes of, respectively, tabulating the votes for Governor for the municipality of Labo, and proclaiming respondent. Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse Held: This Court held that Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a petition for declaration of failure of elections. We find that the COMELEC, in ordering the correction of manifest errors in the SOVP and COC, merely exercised its bounden duty to ascertain the true will of the electorate of the province. Proven during the proceedings before it were errors or discrepancies in the recording or transferring of votes from the SOVP of Labo to the COC, such that the votes in the latter document did not reflect the true and correct votes received by the candidates. SOVPs are the basis of COCs; 27 the two must jibe with each other. Certainly, an error in transposing the contents of one to the other only calls for a clerical act of reflecting in the said election documents the true and correct votes received by the candidates. This does not involve the opening of the ballot boxes, examination and appreciation of ballots and/or election returns. All that is required is to reconvene the board of canvassers for it to rectify the error it committed in order that the true will of the voters will be given effect. The previous proclamation of petitioner will not be a hindrance to the said correction. The proclamation and assumption of office of petitioner based on a faulty tabulation is flawed right from the very beginning, and may, therefore, be annulled. The appreciation of election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the COMELEC, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. The findings of fact of administrative bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and non-reviewable by courts of justice. The Court is not a trier of facts. The Court's function, as mandated by the Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it simply erred or has a different view. The COMELEC, not the NBI, is the agency that has the competence to determine the genuineness of election documents.

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14. Villarosa vs COMELEC, G.R. No. 212953, 5 August 2014 Facts: The case arises from the decisjon of the COMELEC disallowing the use by petitioner of the nickname JTV for the purpose of her candidacy in the May 11, 1998 elections, The petitioner was a congressional candidate of the lone district of Occidental Mindoro. It was alleged the nickname JTV is not one by which petitioner is popularly known-- that the JTV was the nickname of her husband, former Congressman, Jose Tapales Villarosa, and that her real nickname is Girlie. The petitioner sought the dismissal of the COMELEC decision on the ground that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion since there was a violation of her right to due process and that the decision did not go through the COMELEC division (It went straight to COMELEC en banc). Issue: Whether or not the decision of the COMELEC should be dismissed? Held: YES. The court found that there was a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process, it declared: “It stands uncontested that petitioner came to know of the letter-petition lodged against her by private respondent Restor only upon receipt of a copy of the COMELEC Resolution issued on May 11, 1998, which she received by fax at 5:32 in the afternoon of the same day. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Commission passed upon the letter-petition without affording petitioner the opportunity to explain her side and to counter the allegations of private respondent Restors letter-petition. Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case, the twin requirements of notice and hearing must be observed.[6] Evidently, the conclusion of the Commission in the assailed Resolution dated May 11, 1998, that JTV is not a nickname by which petitioner is generally or popularly known, was drawn purely from the allegations of the letter-petition and for this reason, the Commission acted in excess of its jurisdiction.” Moreover, the Court also held that the COMELEC en banc also erred in taking cognizance of the case without first referring it to its divisions. It declared. “The question of whether the Commission may decide cases en banc without first referring them to any of its divisions has been consistently answered in the negative since Sarmiento vs. COMELEC[10], which interpreted Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution[11] as requiring all election cases to be first heard and decided by a division of the Commission, before being brought to the Commission en banc on reconsideration. Conformably, we hold that the Commission exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction when it took cognizance of private respondent Restors letter-petition at the first instance, thus rendering its May 11, 1998 Resolution void. To the above rule, private respondents take exception by stating that the subject letter-petition posed issues which were administrative in character, and, thus, not subject to the requirement of referral to division which applies only in the Commissions exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions. In the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio in University of Nueva Caceres vs. Martinez, 56 SCRA 148, he noted that (t)he term administrative connotes, or pertains, to administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.[12] Thus, in Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 10 SCRA 46,[13] we held that where the fixing of power rates, which are to apply exclusively to a particular party, is based upon a report of the General

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Auditing Office, and which fact is denied by the affected party, the making of such finding of fact by respondent administrative agency is a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character. A directive by the Commission to disallow petitioners use of the nickname JTV for purposes of her candidacy, on the basis of Resolution No. 2977[14], clearly necessitates a determination of whether petitioner is in fact not generally or popularly known as such in the locality of Occidental Mindoro. Indubitably, since it involved the application of law or rules to an ascertained set of facts, it called for the Commissions exercise of its adjudicatory powers and falls within the concept of an election contest in the sense contemplated by Section 3, Article IX(C) of the Constitution. We cannot agree with the view advanced by private respondents that because the petition below cannot be classified as a case falling under Rules 20 to 33 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure[15], it is not a quasijudicial matter and may thus be dealt with firsthand by the Commission en banc. Private respondent Restors letter-petition clearly asks, not only for the invalidation of JTV as petitioners authorized nickname, but also the nullification of all votes cast in that name.[16] We are hard put to treat the issue as administrative when petitioner stands to be so adversely affected by the relief asked for. That the petition below was in the form of a letter does not make the issues posed therein less substantial. As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, (t)o sustain the ruling of the COMELEC is to open venues for commission of fraud, as one simply needs to write a letter to the COMELEC asking that votes for a candidate be nullified on the ground that the nickname used is inappropriate or not valid. Note: the court did not have to decide the validity of the petitioner’s JTV nickname since an eletion protest has been filed in the HRET (House of Representative Electoral Tribunal).

15. Mayor Gamal Hayudini v. COMELEC, Gr. No. 207900, April 22, 2014 Facts: On Oct. 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of candidacy as Mayor of South Ubian, Tawiu-Tawi. Ten days after Mustapha Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC, asserting that the latter should be disqualified for making false representations regarding his residence, as Hayudini actually resides in Zamboanga City. Thereafter Hayudini filed a petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in South Ubian, but it was opposed by Ignacio Baki. However the MCTC granted said petition. When Baki elevated the case with the RTC, the trial court reversed the decision of the MCTC, ordering the deletion of Hayudini’s name in the list of voters. On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoral race and was proclaimed and took oath. On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC granted Omar’s petition to cancel Hayudini’s Coc. Hayudini filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the COMELEC denied the motion and affirmed the earlier decision. Corollary thereto, Omar was proclaimed the dully-elected Mayor of South Ubian, being the qualified candidate with the highest number of votes. Thus Hayudini filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition claiming that Omar’s petition failed to comply with the rules of procedure of the COMELEC, requiring that the petition must be filed within 5 days from last finding, but should not be later than 25 days; as well as the failure of Omar to personally furnish the Petition to him. Issue: Did COMELEC Erred in holding Omar as the rightful winner? Held: No. In this case, Hayudini filed his CoC the last day of filing of CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March 26, 2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel CoC must be filed within five days from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition. Clearly, Omar’s petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period. Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served personally to Hayudini. However the Court sustained the COMELEC’s Liberal treatment of Omar’s petition. As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on procedural deficiencies, South Ubian would have a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality he is supposed to govern, thereby creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the COMELEC was accurate in cancelling Hayudini’s certificate of candidacy. Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the COMELEC to have declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning candidate is also a legitimate outcome – a necessary legal consequence – of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant to Section 78. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case.

16. Abs-Cbn v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem. ISSUE:

W/N

the

Comelec,

in

the

exercise

of

its

powers,

can

absolutely

ban

exit

polls?

ABS-CBN:The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press HELD: 1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." 2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy." 3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case. 4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process." SUPREME COURT:

The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices. 3)

Violation

of

Ban

Secrecy

The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for. In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

17. Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205720, 21 January 2015 FACTS: On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.” Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review. 2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its divisions. 3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made by private citizens. 4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to freedom of expression. 5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation. 6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to property. 7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.

HELD: FIRST ISSUE: No. The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.. The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression. Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are dutybound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court. In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings. SECOND ISSUE: No. The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case. Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this case, organ of government before a court may come into the picture.” Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech. THIRD ISSUE: No. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a noncandidate in this case. FOURTH ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered. The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political speech.

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FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech. The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure. Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.” Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights. SIXTH ISSUE: Yes. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the Constitution. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.” Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. SEVENTH ISSUE: No. The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech. Doctrine of benevolent neutrality With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.” 18. Lorin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193808, 26 June 2012 FACTS: Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act. As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service. Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections. On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections. The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the partys acting secretarygeneral. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively. On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the official representative of said partylist/coalitions/sectoral organizations. On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC. Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretarygeneral, when she was not even a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination on its behalf. In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings. Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of the Rules of Court. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list. HELD: POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled that the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce election laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v. Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which uniformly upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:

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The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. ELECTION LAW: party-list system law Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state: Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that: The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent, which may include but not limited to the following: a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active participation of the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to represent; b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such other positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations); c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not only an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector. The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of this resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list of nominees.

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Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc. The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting secretary-general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to submit its Certificate of Nomination. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. This Court AFFIRMS the judgment of the COMELEC expunging from its records the Certificate of Nomination filed on 26 March 2010 by Pia B. Derla. 19. Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209185, 25 October 2013 Facts: Marc Douglas Cagas along with Franklin Bautista, representatives of Davao del Sur, filed House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451) creating the province of Davao Occidental. It was signed into law as Republic Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360) on 14 January 2013. Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides that the plebiscite for the creation of the province would be held “within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter,” and that the COMELEC would conduct, supervise, and provide funds. It was published in the Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin only on 21 January 2013. Considering that R.A. No. 10360 shall take effect 15 days after its publication in at least two newspapers of general and local circulation, COMELEC, therefore, only had until 6 April 2013 to conduct the plebiscite. However, COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections to save on expenses. Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition contending that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because it has no power to amend or modify Section 46 of RA. 10360 and change the date of election. Respondent COMELEC, as represented by its chairperson Sixto Brillantes Jr., through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends: 1. The 1987 Constitution does not fix the period to hold a plebiscite for the creation of a local government unit; 2. There was logistical and financial impossibility for the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite at a mere two months’ notice; Issue: W.O.N COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28 October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections Held: No. The COMELEC’s power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by law. Constitutional Provision: Sec. 2, ART. IX-C, of the Constitution, grants the COMELEC the power to “enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” Omnibus Election Code

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Sec. 52, B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code provides that The COMELEC has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections.” The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX-C is to give COMELEC “all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.” In particular Sec. 5 and 6, B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the COMELEC has power to set elections on another date. “Sec. 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. Sec. 6. Failure of election.- If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.”

This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In Pangandaman v. COMELEC, the Court “admonished against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’” In Sumulong v. COMELEC, we ruled that “Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from the standpoint of pure theory.” “the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with.” Guided by the above-quoted pronouncement, the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that “clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy.” In this case the logistic and financial impossibility of holding a plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. Therefore, the COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to synchronize it with the Barangay Elections. 20. National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA

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FACTS: This is a consolidation of three cases filed before the Supreme Court which involves the same issue. Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression. Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression of mediabased campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 runs contradictory to Articles III [4] and IX (C) (4) of the Constitution. HELD: The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." Section 11 (b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for campaign or other political purposes" except to the Commission on Elections ("Comelec"). Upon the other hand, Sections 90 and 92 of the Omnibus Election Code require the Comelec to procure "Comelec space" in newspapers of general circulation in every province or city and "Comelec time" on radio and television stations. Further, the Comelec is statutorily commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time" on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio and television station involved. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press (Article III [4], Constitution) has to be taken in conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period." It is important to note that the restrictive impact upon freedom of speech and freedom of the press of Section 11 (b) is circumscribed by certain important limitations: [1] Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in time to election periods. By its Resolution No. 2328 dated 2 January 1992, the Comelec, acting under another specific grant of authority by the Constitution (Article IX [C] [9]), has defined the period from 12 January 1992 until 10 June 1992 as the relevant election period; [2] Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation, 4 of print space and air time for "campaign or other political purposes." Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of government; [3] Section 11 (b) exempts from its prohibition the purchase by or donation to the Comelec of print space or air time, which space and time Comelec is then affirmatively required to allocate on a fair and equal basis, free of charge, among the individual candidates for elective public offices in the province or city served by the newspaper or radio or television station. Some of the petitioners are apparently apprehensive that Comelec might not allocate "Comelec time" or "Comelec space" on a fair and equal basis among the several candidates. Should such apprehensions materialize, candidates who are in fact prejudiced by unequal or unfair allocations effected by Comelec will have appropriate judicial remedies available, so long at least as this Court sits. Until such time, however, the Comelec is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that official duty will be or is being regularly carried out. It seems appropriate here to recall what Justice Laurel taught in Angara v. Electoral Commission 7 that the possibility of abuse is no argument against the concession of the power or authority involved, for there is no power or authority in human society that is not susceptible of being abused. Should it be objected that the Comelec might refrain from procuring "Comelec time" and "Comelec space," much

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the same considerations should be borne in mind. As earlier noted, the Comelec is commanded by statute to buy or "procure" "Comelec time" and "Comelec space" in mass media, and it must be presumed that Comelec will carry out that statutory duty in this connection, and if it does fail to do so, once again, the candidate or candidates who feel aggrieved have judicial remedies at their disposal. The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly proving that assertion. Petition denied for lack of merit. 21. Chavez v. COMELEC, GR No 162777, 31 August 2004

FACTS: Petitioner Chavez assails Sec 32 of Resolution 6520 enforced by the COMELEC, which states that: Section 32. All propaganda materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Chavez, on various dates, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products before he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator. Respondent COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6520, which contained Section 32, the provision assailed herein. On January 2004, petitioner was directed to comply with the said provision by the COMELECs Law Department. He replied, by requesting the COMELEC that he be informed as to how he may have violated the assailed provision, and in a separate letter, he asked for exemption, considering that the billboards adverted to are mere product endorsements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning under the rules. The COMELEC ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards, or to cover them from public view pending the approval of his request. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner Chavez asks this Court that the COMELEC be enjoined from enforcing the assailed provision. He urges this Court to declare the assailed provision unconstitutional as the same is allegedly (1) a gross violation of the non-impairment clause; (2) an invalid exercise of police power; (3) in the nature of an expost facto law; (4) contrary to the Fair Elections Act; and (5) invalid due to overbreadth. ISSUE: Whether Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is unconstitutional HELD: NO. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, or safety, and the general welfare of the people. To determine the validity of a police measure, two questions must be asked: (1) Does the interest of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of police power? and (2) Are the means employed reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals? A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning: Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the campaign period. x x x [4] Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides: Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. There is no blanket prohibition of the use of propaganda materials and advertisements. During the campaign period, these may be used subject only to reasonable limitations necessary and incidental to achieving the purpose of preventing premature campaigning and promoting equality of opportunities among all candidates. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520 is declared valid and constitutional. 22. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI) vs. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") assailed the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, also known as the “ Comelec Space”, which reads in part: Sec. 2. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. Sec. 3. "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. "Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. ISSUE: WON the resolution is valid HELD: No. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties in hearing in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. Similarly, Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission.

23. SWS v. COMELEC (GR No. 147571, May 5, 2001). FACTS: Petitioner, Social Weather Stations, Inc. (SWS), is a private non-stock, non-profit social research institution conducting surveys in various fields, including economics, politics, demography, and social development, and thereafter processing, analyzing, and publicly reporting the results thereof. On the other hand, petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation publishes the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general circulation, which features newsworthy items of information including election surveys. Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides: Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. The term election surveys is defined in 5.1 of the law as follows: Election surveys refer to the measurement of opinions and perceptions of the voters as regards a candidate’s popularity, qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in relation to the election, including voters preference for candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign period (hereafter referred to as Survey). To implement 5.4, Resolution 3636, 24(h), dated March 1, 2001, of the COMELEC enjoins Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before an election. Petitioner SWS states that it wishes to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Petitioner Kamahalan Publishing Corporation, on the other hand, states that it intends to publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995, and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by election surveys. They point out that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the results of election surveys which are relatively objective. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the restrictions in 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the election.

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ISSUE: W/N 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 and 24(h) of COMELEC Resolution 3636, dated March 1, 2001, are unconstitutional RULING: YES. We hold that 5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, expression, and the press. To be sure, 5.4 lays a prior restraint on freedom of speech, expression, and the press by prohibiting the publication of election survey results affecting candidates within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days immediately preceding a national election and seven (7) days before a local election. What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of 5.4? The United States Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Warren, held in United States v. OBrien: A government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech, expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Our inquiry should accordingly focus on these two considerations as applied to 5.4. First. Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the OBrien test because the causal connection of expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest not unrelated to the suppression of free expression. By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, 5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers. In effect, 5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. The inhibition of speech should be upheld only if the expression falls within one of the few unprotected categories dealt with in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, thus: There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. [S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Thus, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by 5.4 cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen (15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately before a local election. Second. Even if the governmental interest sought to be promoted is unrelated to the suppression of speech and the resulting restriction of free expression is only incidental, 5.4 nonetheless fails to meet criterion [4] of the OBrien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, 5.4 aims at the prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, junking of weak or losing candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called dagdag-bawas. Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech creates the danger of such evils. To summarize then, we hold that 5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the suppression of freedom of expression. 24. 181

Sanidad

vs. SCRA

Comelec 529

FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Republic act No. 6766, entitled “An act providing for an Organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region was enacted into Law. Which mandated that the different provinces in the Cordillera Region must take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act. Comelec then issued Resolution No 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite. Petitioner Sanidad, a columnist in a newspaper in Baguio called Midland Courier. Assailed the constitutionality of the Comelec resolution , mainly Sec 19, which states the Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers, that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Which such section of the resolution is void and unconstitutional for it violates the constitutional right of freedom of expression and press. Petitioner also contended that such acts of the columnist is an expression of his opinion, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. ISSUE: WON the assailed section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 “Prohibition on Columnist, Commentators or Announcers” is unconstitutional? HELD: YES. Art IX-C of the 1987 Constitution granted the Comelec power to supervise and regulate the use and employment of franchises, permits, or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to extinguish by this power is for franchise holders to favour a candidate over the other in terms of advertising space, radio, or television time, which would prevent an equal opportunity for all candidates. Therefore this court cannot construed that Comelec has been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite period. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite are neither franchise holders nor the candidates.

25. GMA NETWORK vs. COMELEC (GR 205357, September 2, 2014 ) DOCTRINE: COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 introduced a radical departure from the previous COMELEC resolutions relative to the airtime limitations on political advertisements. This essentially consists in computing the airtime on an aggregate basis involving all the media of broadcast communications compared to the past where it was done on a per station basis. Thus, it becomes immediately obvious that there was effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air. The question is accordingly whether this is within the power of the COMELEC to do or not. The Court holds that it is not within the power of the COMELEC to do so. FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections. The heart of the controversy revolves upon the proper interpretation of the limitation on the number of minutes that candidates may use for television and radio advertisements, as provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 otherwise known as the Fair Elections Act. Petitioners ABS-CBN, ABC, GMA, MBC, NBN, and RMN are owners/operators of radio and television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national organization of broadcasting companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and television stations and said stations. They sent their respective letters to the COMELEC questioning the provisions of the aforementioned Resolution, thus, the COMELEC held public hearings. Thereafter, on February 1, 2013, respondent issued Resolution No. 9631 amending provisions of Resolution No. 9615. Nevertheless, petitioners still found the provisions objectionable and oppressive, hence, the present petitions. All of the petitioners assail the following provisions of the Resolution:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) a) Section 7 (d), which provides for a penalty of suspension or revocation of an offender's franchise or permit, imposes criminal liability against broadcasting entities and their officers in the event they sell airtime in excess of the size, duration, or frequency authorized in the new rules; b) Section 9 (a), which provides for an "aggregate total" airtime instead of the previous "per station" airtime for political campaigns or dvertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates' television and radio guestings and appearances; and c) Section 14, which provides for a candidate's "right to reply." Respondent maintains that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit is in accordance with R.A. No. 9006 as this would truly give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during elections. It sees this as a more effective way of levelling the playing field between candidates/political parties with enormous resources and those without much. Moreover, the COMELEC's issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the Constitution which vests on the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate, during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass media. ISSUE: W/N Section 9(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, as amended by Resolution No. 9631, constitutional HELD: No. There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations - or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis. Based on the transcripts of the hearing conducted by the COMELEC after it had already promulgated the Resolution, the respondent did not fully explain or justify the change in computing the airtime allowed candidates and political parties, except to make reference to the need to "level the playing field." If the "per station" basis was deemed enough to comply with that objective in the past, why should it now be suddenly inadequate? And, the short answer to that from the respondent, in a manner which smacks of overbearing exercise of discretion, is that it is within the discretion of the COMELEC. The COMELEC went beyond the authority granted it by the law in adopting "aggregate" basis in the determination of allowable airtime. The legislative history of R.A. 9006 clearly shows that Congress intended to impose the per candidate or political party aggregate total airtime limits on political advertisements and election propaganda. This is evidenced by the dropping of the "per day per station" language embodied in both versions of the House of Representatives and Senate bills in favour of the "each candidate" and "not more than" limitations now found in Section 6 of R.A. 9006. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits also goes against the constitutional guaranty of freedom of expression, of speech and of the press. The guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability to communicate and disseminate what is said. And where there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to access the means and media for such dissemination becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast media come along. At the same time, the right to speak and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with substantially reasonable means by which the communicator and the audience could effectively interact. Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech and of the press. Section 9 (a) of Resolution 9615 is violative of the people's right to suffrage fundamental to the idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine their own destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for the intelligent exercise of such birthright.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 26 Sison v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134096, 3 March 1999 DOCTRINE: Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes. FACTS: It appears that while the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections. The said petition was supposedly filed pursuant to Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of massive and orchestrated fraud and acts analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect. In support of his allegation of massive and orchestrated fraud, petitioner cited specific instances. While the petition was pending before the COMELEC, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the winning candidate for the post of vice mayor. On June 22, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation issues set fourth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in dismissing the petition HELD: No. At the outset, we notice that petitioner exhibits an ambivalent stand as to what exactly is the nature of the remedy he availed of at the time he initiated proceedings before the COMELEC in SPC No. 98-134. At the start, he anchors his initiatory petition under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code regarding failure of elections but he later builds his case as a pre-proclamation controversy which is covered by Sections 241-248 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7166. In this respect, the rule is, what conjointly determine the nature of a pleading are the allegations therein made in good faith, the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed, and the primary objective of the party filing the same. Under the pertinent codal provision of the Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism , fraud, or other analogous causes. We have painstakingly examined petitioners petition before the COMELEC but found nothing therein that could support an action for declaration of failure of elections. He never alleged at all that elections were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioners claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of any substantive support to describe just exactly how the failure to elect came about.

27. SOLIVA v. COMELEC [G.R. No. 141723, April 20, 2001]

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Doctrine: The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote. Section 4 of Republic Act 7166, or the Synchronized Elections Law of 1991, states: Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Elections and Special Elections. - The postponement, declaration of failure of elections and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. Xxx Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code also provides: Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect. The COMELEC may declare a failure of election and call for the holding of a special election. First, when the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. Second, when the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting. And third, after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. Parties: Nilo D. Soliva, Rogelio B. Doce, Hernanita M. Bacquial, Ulysses B. Sucatre, Antonio D. Duron, Eduardo Hinunangan, Monica P. Lasala, Carlos E. Martinez, And Rosiana L. Popadera (Petitioners) Commission On Elections, Alexander C. Bacquial, Ismael O. Tito, Faustino A. Abatayo, David P. Alejo, Mamerto L. Bacon, Cesar C. Osa, Prudencio L. Pabillore, Armando S. Pangadlin, Eniceto U. Salas, And Quintin A. SayAo (Respondents) Facts: Herein petitioners and private respondents vied for the local posts in Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del Norte during the local elections of May 11, 1998. On May 12, 1998, all the LAKAS candidates (herein petitioners) were proclaimed as the winning candidates. On May 18, 1998, respondent Alexander Bacquial filed a petition to declare a failure of election due to alleged "massive fraud, terrorism, ballot switching, stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes by respondent Soliva, his wife and men from several precincts to the supposed canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in the precincts or polling places upon instructions of respondent Soliva and other anomalies or irregularities, not to mention the alleged attempt of one of Soliva’s men to assasinate Mr. Bacquial when he was about to cast his vote. On February 11, 2000, the COMELEC rendered the assailed resolution declaring a failure of election in the municipality of RTR and consequently the proclamation of LAKAS candidates as null and void. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC erred in declaring a failure of election Held: No. The Supreme Court agree with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of election in the municipality of RTR, as the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the election returns was clearly

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism and harassment. Findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are afforded great weight and respect by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and should not be disturbed. The counting of the votes was transferred from the polling places to the multi-purpose gymnasium without the knowledge and permission of herein private respondents or their representatives and that the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the election returns were done without the latter’s presence, thus making the election returns and the statements of votes not worthy of faith and credit and not reliable documents to gauge the fair and true expression of the popular will. To add, the transfer of the counting from the polling places to the multi-purpose gymnasium was without the authority of the COMELEC as required by law. Findings of fact of administrative bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are afforded great weight and respect by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its field that its findings and conclusions are generally respected and even given finality. The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates three instances when the COMELEC may declare a failure of election and call for the holding of a special election: First, when the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. Second, when the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting. And third, after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect. 28. Brillantes vs COMELEC G.R. No. 163193 Doctrine: The COMELEC haa no power to exercise unofficial quick count of election results for the President and Vice President because that is a derogation of the power of Congress as national board of canvassers for the presidential and vice presidential election. Nonetheless, NAMFREL (or PPCRV) is authorized by law to conduct unofficial quick count. Facts: For the 2004 national election, the COMELEC issued a resolution implementing Phase III of the AES (automatic election system) through an electronic transmission of advanced "unofficial" results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count." Senate President Franklin Drilon had misgivings and misapprehensions about the constitutionality of the proposed electronic transmission of results for the positions of President and Vice-President, and apprised COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos of his position during their meeting on January 28, 2004. He also wrote Chairman Abalos on February 2, 2004. The letter reads: Dear Chairman Abalos, This is to confirm my opinion which I relayed to you during our meeting on January 28th that the Commission on Elections cannot and should not conduct a "quick count" on the results of the elections for the positions of President and Vice-President. Under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, it is the Congress that has the sole and exclusive authority to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President. Thus, any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of the Congress, but also would be lacking of any Constitutional authority. You conceded the validity of the position we have taken on this point.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In view of the foregoing, we asked the COMELEC during that meeting to reconsider its plan to include the votes for President and Vice-President in the "quick count", to which you graciously consented. Thank you very much. The COMELEC still issued the assailed resolution for the unofficial quick count. Hence, the petition. Issue: Whether or not it is within the scope of the COMELEC’s power to conduct an unofficial quick count? Held: No. Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII): "any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority." The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be established. Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices, after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712.

29. Cerafica vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 205136 December 2, 2014 Doctrine: Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. However, COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs. The Court emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Note: A verification with the COMELEC database yielded the finding that Olivia was not among the official candidates for the 2013 Elections and, thus, was not voted for. As such, a ruling on the petition would no longer be of practical use or value. Even if the Court were to resolve the petition for the purpose of determining Olivia’s legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public office, such purpose has been rendered inconsequential as a result of the proclamation of the winning councilors for the 2013 elections. Be that as it may, the Court deemed it opportune to address the merits of the case, if only to caution the COMELEC against the precipitate cancellation of COCs. In short the case is moot and academic already at the time the case was decided, but the Court still chose to look into it as a way to chastise the COMELEC of said practice. Facts: Kimberly Cerafica filed her COC for Councilor for the City of Taguig for the 2013 Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 29, 1992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least 23 years old on the day of the elections as set out in Sec. 9C of R.A. No. 8487 (Charter of the City of Taguig). As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age qualification. Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly opted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, Olivia Cerafica filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. Owing to these events, the clarificatory hearing no longer pushed through. In a Memorandum dated December 18, 2012, Director Amora-Ladra of the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia. Relying on COMELEC Resolution No. 9551, Director Amora-Ladra opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted. In a Special En Banc Meeting of the COMELEC on January 3, 2013, the COMELEC adopted the recommendation of Director Amora-Ladra, cancelled Kimberly’s COC, and denied the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC. Issue: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolution resulting in the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly and the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia as an effect of the cancellation of the COC of Kimberly? Held: Yes Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. In Cipriano v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs. It had been emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for the procedure of substitution of candidates. Under the express provision of Sec. 77, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly substituted. Court held that Olivia complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day. Moreover, in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court founf that the COMELEC once more gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminded the COMELEC that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi judicial functions of the COMELEC, the COMELEC in Division should have first decided this case.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. The Court cautioned the COMELEC against its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing.

30. AKBAYAN Youth vs . COMELEC G.R. No. 147066 FACTS: On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000. AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of pre-election acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed. ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters registration? HELD: No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner – one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189’s provision is explicit as to the prohibition. Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset. Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized voter’s list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the update and distribute it – by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youth’s pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

33. Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, 25 June 2013 Doctrine: To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.” Facts: Petitioner, Regina Ongsiako Reyes ran as representative of Marinduque. On 31 October 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations including her alleged American Citizenship. Petitioner filed her answer in COMELEC denying all allegations. However, on 8 February 2013, Tan filed a “Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits” consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an article published on the internet on indicating that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of indicating that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad. On March 27, 2013 COMELEC declared her ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque. On 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality. However, on the same day, Petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte in the House of Representatives. The term of officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013. Petitioner comes to this Court for Certiorari against COMELEC on the grounds that: 1. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has jurisdiction over her and not COMELEC 2. Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Tan’s alleged “newly-discovered evidence” without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of the case Issues: 1. W.O.N HRET has jurisdiction 2. W.O.N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Tan’s alleged “newly-discovered evidence” 3. W.O.N she proved that she is no longer an American Citizen Held: 1. No. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution: Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. In a very long line of cases, Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC, Limkaichong v. COMELEC, Gonzalez v. COMELEC, this court ruled that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. In this case, the HRET has no jurisdiction over her because she is not yet a member.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) First, the oath was invalid. A valid oath requires to be done (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with. Sceond, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins only “at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. 2.

No.

Finality of decision Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides: Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. Petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 64 of the Rules of Court by filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do so. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality. Admission of Evidence COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure “shall be liberally construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.” In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the “newly discovered evidence” was properly admitted by respondent COMELEC. Administrative Due Process. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. Thus, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. 3.

No.

First, she is raising her alleged oath taking in this Court for the first time and not introduced as evidence in COMELEC. Second, as correctly found by the COMELEC, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice. “Petitioner has never regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.” Therefore, she has not proven that she is no longer an American Citizen. 34. SAHALI vs. COMELEC GR 201796 June 15, 2013

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) DOCTRINES: 1. Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof. This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. (Not absolute; see ruling for exceptions) 2. The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia does not mean that the COMELEC First Division is barred from issuing an order for the conduct. The power of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its “exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials”. FACTS: Sadikul and private respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four candidates who ran for the position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-Governor wherein the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the province. Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC both of which prayed for the technical examination of the ballots, Election Day Computerized Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration Record (VRR), and the Book of Voters in all the protested precincts of the province of Tawi-Tawi. COMELEC issued an Order which directed the retrieval and delivery of the ballot boxes containing the ballots in the protested clustered precincts as well as the election paraphernalia therein. COMELEC First Division ordered the recount of the contested ballots, directing the creation of five recount committees for the said purpose. Private respondents Matba and Usman averred that, instead of recounting the ballots in the pilot precincts constituting 20% of the protested precincts, the COMELEC First Division should order the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia from the 38 clustered precincts that are the subject of both election protests filed by them. Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion for Reconsideration arguing that: (1) COMELEC First Division cannot just order a technical examination in the absence of published rules on the matter. The First Division denied the motion for reconsideration ruling that the intention of respondents to ask for a technical examination of the said election documents had always been apparent from the filing of their separate election protests. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC First Division is authorize to order technical examinations of the said election paraphernalia despite the lack of sanction and published rules governing such examination HELD: Petition is denied. Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review election cases falling within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof. Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident in the main case. Thus, the proper recourse for the petitioners is to await the decision of the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration. Court may take cognizance of a certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following circumstances are present: first, the order was issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which (1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc The Court agrees with the petitioners that Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 does not expressly authorize the conduct of technical examination of election paraphernalia. However, it does not mean that the COMELEC First Division does not have the power to order the conduct of such technical examination.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia does not mean that the COMELEC First Division is barred from issuing an order for the conduct. The power of the COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from its “exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials”. COMELEC First Division did not commit any abuse of discretion when it allowed the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia.

35. Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, 22 February 2011 DOCTRINE: Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. FACTS: On May 12, 2010, at 12:37 p.m., petitioner was proclaimed winner for the mayoralty race during the May 10, 2010 Automated Elections for the Municipality of Cajidiocan, Province of Romblon. The proclamation was based on the Certificate of Canvass (COC), but without the official signed Certificate of Canvass for Proclamation (COCP). This was done with the approval of the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) Chairman. Subsequently, private respondent Nicasio Ramos, who was also a mayoralty candidate in the same election, requested the COMELEC to conduct a manual reconciliation of the votes cast. The COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 8923, granting said request. The manual reconciliation was done on May 20, 2010 at the Sangguniang Bayan Session Hall, after which proceedings the eight winning Sangguniang Bayan Members were also proclaimed. The MBOC made erasures and corrections using correction fluid on the COCP for the Sangguniang Bayan Members to reflect the results of the manual reconciliation. As for the COCP for the previously proclaimed mayoralty and vice-mayoralty candidates, the total number of votes for each of the candidates remained the same even after the manual reconciliation; hence, only the date was erased and changed to read May 20, 2010 to correspond with the date of the manual reconciliation. On May 27, 2010, private respondent filed an election protest case against petitioner before the RTC. The following day, the court sheriff went to petitioner's residence to serve summons with a copy of the petition. The Sheriff's Return of Summons stated that the sheriff was able to serve Summons on petitioner by leaving the same and the attached copy of the protest with a certain Gerry Rojas, who was then at petitioner's residence. On June 8, 2010, petitioner, together with his then counsel of record, Atty. Abner Perez, appeared in court and requested a copy of the summons with a copy of the election protest. During the hearing on said date, respondent judge directed petitioner to file the proper pleading and, on June 11, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit Answer, to which was attached his Answer with Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim. One of his affirmative defenses was that the electoral protest was filed out of time, since it was filed more than ten (10) days after the date of proclamation of the winning candidate. The trial court then issued the assailed Order, finding the service of Summons on petitioner on May 28, 2010 as valid, and declaring the Answer filed on June 11, 2010, as filed out of time. ISSUE: Whether the protest was filed out of time and whether the protest was filed in the proper court HELD: NO. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, which provides when and where a petition for certiorari should be filed, states thus: “SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” The question then is, would taking cognizance of a petition for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of the regional trial court in an electoral protest case be considered in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC? The Court finds in the affirmative. Interpreting the phrase in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, the Court held in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. that if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This was reiterated in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated that a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court. Note that Section 8, Rule 14 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials states that: Sec. 8. Appeal. - An aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the COMELEC within five (5) days after promulgation, by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the decision, with copy served on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party who is not represented by counsel. Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

36. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE (PPI) vs. COMELEC 244 SCRA 272 DOCTRINE: 1. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by COMELEC and signed by its member presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. The Commission may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection. 2. There being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or imperious public necessity for the taking of print space, nor was the resolution the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity. [This was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent domain, albeit invalid, because the Comelec would not pay for the space to be given to it by the newspapers. FACTS: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") assailed the constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC). On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, also known as the “ Comelec Space”, which reads in part: Sec. 2. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. Sec. 3. "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. "Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. ISSUE: WON the resolution is valid HELD: No. That Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media company to supply free print space, dispatched by a government (here a constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the Commission presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties in hearing in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious constitutional objection. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. Similarly, Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or purposes. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission. 37. Lloren v. COMELEC G.R. No. 196355, 18 September 2012 DOCTRINE: The rules on the timely perfection of an appeal in an election case requires two different appeal fees, one to be paid in the trial court together with the filing of the notice of appeal within five days from notice of the decision, and the other to be paid in the COMELEC Cash Division within the 15-day period from the filing of the notice of appeal. FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Rogelio Pua, Jr. (Pua) were the candidates for Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Pua as the winning candidate with a plurality of 752 votes for garnering 5,682 votes as against petitioner’s 4,930 votes. Alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election- related manipulations, petitioner commenced Election Protest Case (EPC) No. H-026 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Hilongos, Leyte. In his answer with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Pua alleged that the election protest stated no cause of action, was insufficient in form and content, and should be dismissed for failure of petitioner to pay the required cash deposit. On November 12, 2012, the RTC dismissed the election protest for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to pay the required cash deposit. On November 17, 2010, petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the RTC,5 and paid the appeal fee of P1,000.00 to the same court. The RTC granted due course to the appeal on November 24, 2010. On December 2, 2010, the fifteenth day from the filing of the notice of appeal, petitioner remitted the appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) by postal money order. Through the first assailed order of January 31, 2011, however, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal on the ground of petitioner’s failure to pay the appeal fee within the period set under Section 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which mandates that the payment of the appeal fee must be within the period to file the notice of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) appeal or five (5) days from receipt of the decision sought to be appealed, while Sec. 9, Rule 22 of the same Rules provides that failure to pay the appeal fee is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders: firstly, the procedural, which concerns the determination of whether or not petitioner timely paid the appeal fee and motion fee under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and, secondly, the substantive, which delves on whether or not the appeal may still proceed. RULING: The petition is meritorious as to the procedural question, but not as to the substantive question. (1) Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC - Rules of Procedure In Election Contests Before The Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the trial court to the COMELEC within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court that rendered the decision, serving a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party if the party is not represented by counsel. Section 9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15SC prescribes for that purpose an appeal fee of P1,000.00 to be paid to the trial court rendering the decision simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal. It should be stressed, however, that the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC did not supersede the appeal fee prescribed by the COMELEC under its own rules of procedure. As a result, “the requirement of two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions caused a confusion in the implementation by the COMELEC of its procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees necessary for the perfection of appeals.” To remove the confusion, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486, effective on July 24, 2008, whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on the payment of the two appeal fees by allowing the appellant to pay the COMELEC’s appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the COMELEC’s Cash Division through the ECAD or by postal money order payable to the COMELEC within a period of 15 days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court. Following the clarification made by the COMELEC in Resolution No. 8486, the Court declared an end to the confusion arising from the requirement of two appeal fees effective on July 27, 2009, the date of promulgation of the ruling in Divinagracia, Jr. v. Commission on Elections by announcing that “for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable.” In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner perfected his appeal of the decision rendered on November 12, 2012 by the RTC in EPC No. H-026. He filed his notice of appeal and paid the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the RTC on November 17, 2012. Such filing and payment, being done within five days from the promulgation of the decision, complied with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. Thereafter, he paid the appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division through the ECAD on December 2, 2012. Such payment, being done on the fifteenth day from his filing of the notice of appeal in the RTC, complied with Resolution No. 8486. The reliance on Section 4 of Rule 40 of the COMELEC 1993 Rules of Procedure was plainly arbitrary and capricious. The COMELEC First Division thereby totally disregarded Resolution No. 8486, whereby the COMELEC revised Section 4 of Rule 40 of the 1993 Rules of Procedure by expressly allowing the appellant “to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the Commission’s Cash Division through the ECAD or by postal money order payable to the Commission on Elections through ECAD, within a period of fifteen days (15) from the time of the filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court.” In effect, the period of perfecting the appeal in the COMELEC was extended from the original period of five days counted from promulgation of the decision by the trial court to a longer period of 15 days reckoned from the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court. Accordingly, the order issued on January 31, 2011 by the COMELEC First Division was null and void for being contrary to Resolution No. 8486. (2) Petitioner’s election protest lacks merit. Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC pertinently provides as follows: Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition.— xxxx c. An election protest shall also state: (i) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and had been voted for the same office; (ii) the total number of precincts in the municipality;

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (iii) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes are not specified; and (iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts. (Emphasis supplied) As the findings of the RTC show, petitioner did not indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The omission rendered the election protest insufficient in form and content, and warranted its summary dismissal, in accordance with Section 12, Rule 2 of the Rules in A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, to wit: Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests.—The court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10; (c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules; (d) The filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election protest or petition for quo warranto; and (e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5) days from the filing of the protest. (Emphasis supplied) Likewise, the RTC found that the cash deposit made by petitioner was insufficient. Considering that the Court cannot disturb the findings on the insufficiency of petitioner’s cash deposit made by the trial court, that finding was another basis for the summary dismissal of the election protest under Section 12. We note that the summary dismissal of the election protest upon any of the grounds mentioned in Section 12 is mandatory. 38. Nollen vs. Comelec G.R. No. 187635, 11 January 2010 DOCTRINE: Rules on perfecting an appeal and payment of appeal fees: Comelec Resolution No. 8654, promulgated on August 4, 2009: The appeal to the Comelec of the trial court decision in election protest involving Municipal and Barangay officials is perfected upon the filling of the notice of appeal and the payment of Php 1,000 as appeal fee to the court within 5 days. The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of Php 3,200 to the Comelec Cash Division does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. If the appeal filed his appeal before the affectivity of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall be directed to pay the additional appeal fee of Php 3,200 within 15 days from the receipt of notice from the Commission in accordance with Resolution no. 8486. If the latter refuse to comply, then and only then shall the appeal be dismissed FACTS: Respondent Caballes and Petitioner Nollen Jr, where candidateds for Punong Barangay of Gibanga Sariaya, Quezon in the 2007 barangay elections. Nollen won the position of punong barangay, which prompted Caballes to file an election protest with the Municipal Trial Court. Which the court declared that Caballes was the won who won the position of punong barangay. Nollen then filed on June 5, 2008 his notice of appeal and paid the MTC the appeal fee of PhP 1,000. Therefore MTC elevated the records to the Comelec First Division, which the Comelec First division dismiss the case on the ground that the failure of Nollen to pay the appeal fees of Php 3,000 within the reglementary period of 5 days from the notice of decision of the MTC court. Nollen then appeal by a motion for reconsideration to the Comelec en banc, which the en banc denied such MR and affirmed the decision of the first division. On the ground that failure to pay appeal fees in election case is no longer excusable. ISSUE: WON Comelec En Banc dismissal of the Motion for Reconsideration for failure to pay the appeal fees is valid? HELD: NO. 1. Comelec Resolution No. 8486 which was promulgated on July 15, 2008, stated that if the appellant had

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) already paid the amount of Php 1,000 pesos before the Trial Courts, within the 5 days for election protest involving elective municipal and Barangay Officials and his appeal is given due course by the court, said appellant is required to pay the Comelec appeal fee of P3,200 within a period of 15 days from the filling of the notice of appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed. 2. Comelec Resolution No. 8654 which was promulgated on August 4, 2009 stated that that the appeal to the Comelec of the trial court decision in election protest involving Municipal and Barangay officials is perfected upon the filling of the notice of appeal and the payment of Php 1,000 as appeal fee to the court within 5 days. The nonpayment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of Php 3,200 to the Comelec Cash Division does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. Likewise, if the appeal filed his appeal before the affectivity of Comelec Resolution No. 8486, the appellant shall be directed to pay the additional appeal fee of Php 3,200 within 15 days from the receipt of notice from the Commission in accordance with Resolution no. 8486. If the latter refuse to comply, then and only then shall the appeal be dismissed. In the case at bar, the appeal was filed on June 5, 2008 or before the promulgation of Comelec Resolution No. 8486. Therefore, Comelec Resolution No. 8654 will apply. The failure to pay the additional fee of Php 3,200 to the Comelec will not affect the perfection of the appeal of Nollen, on the ground that when Nollen filed his notice of appeal in the MTC and payed the Php 1,000 pesos appeal fee, such act already perfected its appeal. The only thing that Nollen would do is to pay the additional Php 3,200 within 15 days from the receipt of notice from the Commision. Which the Comelec failed to notify him regarding the additional fee on time, which will bar the Comelec to dismiss the case on the ground for refusal to comply. Likewise, Nollen voluntary payed the additional Php 3,200 on October 6, 2008, even without the notice of the Comelec. Therefore, the dismissal of the Comelec en banc of the petition of Nollen is invalid. For Nollen already perfected its appeal when he filed a notice of appeal in the MTC and payed the appeal fee of Php 1,000 pursuant to Comelec resolution No. 8654. 39. RELAMPAGOS vs. CUMBA; GR 118861 April 27, 1995 DOCTRINE: The COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. FACTS: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner. The private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the trial court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal despite the opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which was later on denied. The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The COMELEC granted the petition on February 9, 1995, ordering the petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides: Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. The Commission is

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. ISSUE: W/N the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction HELD: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides: Sec. 282.Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII. B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.Implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon. It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by the Constitution. While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes." The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under the Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases should properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from lower courts. As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII). Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows: The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

40 Balajonda v. COMELEC G.R. No. 166032, 28 February 2005

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) DOCTRINE: Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. FACTS: On 16 July 2002, petitioner Elenita I. Balajonda (Balajonda) was proclaimed as the duly elected Barangay Chairman (Punong Barangay), having won the office in the barangay elections held the previous day.[2] Her margin of victory over private respondent Maricel Francisco (Francisco) was four-hundred twenty (420) votes. Francisco duly filed a petition for election protest, within ten (10) days from the date of proclamation. In answer to the protest, Balajonda alleged that Franciscos petition stated no cause of action and that the allegations of electoral fraud and irregularities were baseless, conjectural, flimsy, frivolous, preposterous and mere figments of the latters wild imagination. She also laid stress on the fact that although the grounds relied upon by Francisco were violations of election laws, not a single person had been prosecuted for violation of the same. After the issues were joined, the MeTC ordered the revision of ballots in sixty-nine (69) ballot boxes, and eventually, the ballots in thirty-nine (39) precincts were revised. After trial, MeTC dismissed the protest with its finding that Balajonda still led Francisco by four hundred eighteen (418) votes. Francisco appealed the MeTC Decision to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). In a Resolution promulgated on 2 February 2004, the COMELEC First Division reversed the MeTC, finding that Francisco won over Balajonda by one hundred eleven (111) votes. The COMELEC First Division thus annulled the proclamation of Balajonda, and declared in her stead Francisco as the duly elected Barangay Chairman. Balajonda seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. In the meantime, Francisco filed a Motion for Execution. Balajonda duly opposed the Motion for Execution, arguing in the main that under Sec. 2(a), Rule 39, only the judgment or final order of a trial court may be the subject of discretionary execution pending appeal. However, in its Order dated 26 November 2004, the COMELEC First Division after due hearing granted the motion and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution, ordering Balajonda to cease and desist from discharging her functions as Barangay Chairman and relinquish said office to Francisco. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting execution pending appeal HELD: No. Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELECs authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

41. CAWASA v. COMELEC G.R. No. 150469, 3 July 2002 Doctrine: The location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the COMELEC after notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and hearing although it may be initiated by a written petition of the majority of voters, or by agreement of the political parties. A public having the requirements prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be preferred as polling place. The Board of Election Inspectors shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are public school teachers. The COMELEC may not appoint military personnel as members of the Board of Election Inspectors. If there are no public school teachers available, then teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed. Facts:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) During the May 14, 2001 elections, petitioner Jun Rascal Cawasa and private respondent Adbulmalik M. Manamparan were among the candidates for mayor in the Municipality of Nunungan, Lanao del Norte (Nunungan for brevity). Out of the forty (40) precincts in Nunungan, only thirty-six (36) functioned, as there was a failure of election in the remaining four (4) precincts. After canvassing the election returns from the 36 precincts, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Nunungan deferred the proclamation of all winning candidates due to the failure of the said 4 precincts to function. The Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 4360 on May 21, 2001 authorizing the conduct of special elections in the affected areas, including barangays Bangko, Cabasaran and Liangan in Nunungan. After the special election, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winning candidates on the basis of the earlier 36 election returns of the May 14, 2001 regular elections and the 4 election returns of the 4 precincts subject of the special elections. The lead of petitioner Cawasa was eighty six (86). After the May 30, 2001 special elections, private respondent Manamparan overcame the margin with a lead of 297 votes. Petitioner Cawasa was proclaimed mayor of Nunungan and his co-petitioners Maasiral Dampa, H. Ackil Mamantuc, Momolawan Macali, Andar Tali, Allan Sanayon and Amin Sangaran were also proclaimed as councilors of Nunungan. On October 24, 2001, the Comelec en banc promulgated a resolution annulling the results of the special elections of the 4 precincts. The Comelec en banc also annulled the proclamation of all winning candidates insofar as the results in the 4 contested precincts affect the standing of candidates. Petitioners insist on the validity of the conduct of the special elections claiming that the political parties and the municipal candidates were notified and in fact agreed on the transfer of venue and the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. They contend that there is substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 153 of the Omnibus Election Code considering that the election officer as the representative of the Comelec reported the matter to the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte and the transfer was not disapproved by the Comelec. Petitioners claim that an election officer has authority to transfer the polling places even four days before the scheduled election Issue: Whether or not: (1) the transfer of the polling places to the adjacent municipalities is legal; (2) the appointment of military personnel as members of the board of election inspectors is legal

Held: Legality of the Transfer of Polling Places and Appointment of Military Personnel as Members of the Board of Election Inspectors The transfer was made not only in blatant disregard of Comelec Resolution No. 4360 issued on May 21, 2001 specifying the polling places but also Sections 153 and 154 of the Election Code. As provided by the law, the location of polling places shall be the same as that of the preceding regular election. However, changes may be initiated by written petition of the majority of the voters of the precinct or agreement of all the political parties or by resolution of the Comelec after notice and hearing. But ultimately, it is the COMELEC which determines whether a change is necessary after notice and hearing. The COMELEC has unequivocally stated that nothing in the records showed that notice was given to the political candidates and registered voters affected by the transfer. Regarding the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI, it was considered as another grave electoral irregularity that attended the special elections held on May 30, 2001. There was absolutely no legal basis for the appointment of military personnel as members of the BEI. Verily, the appointments were devoid of any justification other than the bare assertion, again, that the political parties and municipal candidates agreed on the said arrangement.

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The BEI shall be composed of a chairman and two members, all of whom are public school teachers. If there are not enough public school teachers, teachers in private schools, employees in the civil service or other citizens of known probity and competence may be appointed. It was highly irregular to replace the duly constituted members of the BEI, who were public school teachers. 42. Dumarpa vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 192249 FACTS: Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st District of Lanao del Sur at the 10 May 2010 elections. The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7) municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur. The conduct of special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010. On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special elections to 3 June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed resolution which provided, among others, the constitution of Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts in Section 12. Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on Dumarpas motion. A day before the scheduled special elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant petition alleging that "both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts (Section 12) and constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of Election Inspectors] (Section 4) affect the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur, and will definitely doom petitioner to certain defeat, if its implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court." Parenthetically, at the time of the filing of this petition, Dumarpa was leading by a slim margin over his opponent Hussin Pangandaman in the canvassed votes for the areas which are part of the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur where there was no failure of elections. A temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was not issued. Thus, the special elections on 3 June 2010 proceeded as scheduled. ISSUE:

Whether

or

not

the

petition

has

become

moot

HELD:

and

academic Yes.

Remedial Law- A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. Indeed, the special elections held on 3 June 2010 mooted the issues posed by Dumarpa. The opponent of Dumarpa, Hussin Pangandaman, was proclaimed winner in the 1st Congressional District of Lanao del Sur. We see this as a supervening event which, additionally, mooted the present petition as the issues raised herein are resolvable in the election protest. In

any

event,

the

petition

is

unmeritorious.

Political law- COMELEC's power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks no argument that the COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall,carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

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The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created - to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take into account that COMELEC Resolution No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-clustering of the precincts and the designation of special board of election inspectors, was issued precisely because of the total failure of elections in seven (7) Municipalities in the Province of Lanao del Sur, a total of fifteen (15) Municipalities where there was a failure of elections. Notably, the COMELEC's declaration of a failure of elections is not being questioned by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections on the re-clustering of precincts, and only as regards the Municipality of Masiu. Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in the fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the actual condition prevailing in that area and to make judgment calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.We cannot, however, engage in an academic criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances. Petition dismissed.

PARTY LIST 43. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, 8 April 2010 FACTS: Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered a nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that “the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 ISSUE: WON Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941 HELD:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) YES. Respondent mistakenly opines that the Court’s ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. 1. Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. 2. The Court also finds the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or culpability. 3. As such, the Court hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. 44. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190529, 29 April 2010 FACTS: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed ISSUE: Whether or not PGBI was validly delisted HELD: The law is clear—the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.6 The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) vs. Commission on Elections, 619 SCRA 585, G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010 We are aware that PGBI’s situation—a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election—is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should bring this concern to the legislature’s notice.

45. COCOFED v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207026, 6 August 2013 FACTS: Petitioner COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) is an organization and sectoral party composed of Coconut farmers. On May 29,2012, petitioners manifested with the COMELEC its intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13, 2013 by submitting its two nominees, Atty. Emerito S. Calderon and Atty. Domingo Espina. On Novermber 7, 2012, COMELEC cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation because it failed to comply with Section 8 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7941 that requires the party to submit to a list of not less than five nominees. On December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted another list where Atty. Calderon was replaced by Charles Avila and another person, Efren Villasenor was added as a nominee. Thus, they had 3 nominees, Avila, Villasenor, and Atty. Espina. On May 10, 2013, the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of COCOFED because of failure to comply with RA 7941. On May 20, 2013, COCOFED filed a Manifestation with Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the COMELEC, namely: (i) Felino M. Gutierrez and (ii) Rodolfo T. de Asis. However, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring the cancellation of COCOFED’s accreditation final and executory. COCOFED’s Contention

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 1. That COMELEC abused its discretion. They cite Atong Paglaum, Inc., etc., et al. v. COMELEC, decided on April 2013, where the court ruled that cases be remanded to the COMELEC to implement their ruling In that case the Court said that “National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.” 2.

They claim to be in good faith and believe that they could just add additional nominees.

3. That COMELEC violated its right to equal protection of the laws since at least two other party-list groups were included despite not having 5 nominees. COMELEC’s Contention 1. The case is moot and academic since COCOFED lost in the election garnering only 80,397 (0.36%) votes. 2. That the requirement of Section 8, in relation to Section 6, of RA No. 7941 is 5 nominees. ISSUES: 1. W.O.N the case is moot and academic 2. W.O.N the failure to submit the list of five nominees before the election warrants the cancellation of its registration HELD: 1. No. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy because of supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. In this case, although COCOFED lost the election, there are still issues which could affect COCOFED’s registration and would entitle it, to participate in subsequent elections without need of undergoing registration proceedings anew. 2. Yes. Section 8 of RA No. 7941 provides: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. Under Section 6(5) of RA No. 7941, violation of or failure to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. However, the violation or failure to comply must pertain to the party itself, or where the violation is imputable primarily to the party and not the individual member or nominee. In the case cited by COCOFED, Atong Paglaum, the ruling pertained to party list groups who had nominees disqualified and the COMELEC disqualified the party itself. However, it does not mean that the party list should not comply with the requirement. In this case the violation of failure to submit 5 nominees is imputable to the party itself. First, the language of Section 8 of RA No. 7941 uses the word “shall” and “not be less than five.” The requirement of submission of a list of five nominees is primarily a statutory requirement for the registration of party-list groups and the submission of this list is part of a registered party’s continuing compliance with the law to maintain its registration. A party-list group’s previous registration with the COMELEC confers no vested right to the maintenance of its registration. In order to maintain a party in a continuing compliance status, the party must prove not only its continued possession of the requisite qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with the basic requirements of the law. Thus, it is mandatory. Second, COCOFED was afforded due process because registration of party-list groups involves the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative power. As opposed to a quasi-judicial or judicial proceeding, due process is complied with as they were afforded the opportunity to be heard.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Third, even if party lists would only have 3 seats in Congress, the requirement of the law for five nominees, which is also to be published in two national newspapers of general circulation, is for contingencies in case of vacancies. Furthermore, the required publication satisfies the people’s constitutional right to information on matters of public concern. The need for submission of the complete list required by law becomes all the more important in a party-list election to apprise the electorate of the individuals behind the party they are voting for. Lastly, after the submission of a list of nominees to the COMELEC, the party itself has no discretion to change the names or to alter the order of nomination in the list it submitted. While there are instances when a change of name or alteration of the order is allowed, these circumstances focus on the nominee himself, whether voluntary (the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination) or involuntary (the nominee dies or becomes incapacitated). To allow COCOFED to complete the list of its nominees beyond the deadline set by the law would allow the party itself to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Therefore, the failure to submit 5 nominees warrants the cancellation of COCOFED’s registration. 46. Anad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206987, 10 September 2013 FACTS: On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution canceling petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation. The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of petitioner’s Certificate of Registration and/or Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections. The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC erred in finding that petitioner submitted only three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007Elections HELD: No. We hold that the COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. As found by the COMELEC, ANAD, for unknown reasons, submitted only three nominees instead of five, in violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 7941( An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor). The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention. Moreover, the COMELEC also noted ANAD’s failure to submit a proper Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections, in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476. In any event, the official tally

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) results of the COMELEC show that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes. As such, even if petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it are canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives. 47. Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens, v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206844-45, 23 July 2013 FACTS: The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS). One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Arquiza Group) and the other by Francisco G. Datol (Datol Group). The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant terms of which contained the list of candidates and terms on sharing of the powers. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho). The second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, subsequently tendered his resignation, which was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant position in view of the previous expulsion from the organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr. However, the Board of Trustees headed by Arquiza opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same, and allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue his term. The COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution that the list submitted to them is deemed to be permanent as the law deprives the party the right to change their nominees. Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens party-list remains the same in so far as the COMELEC and the law are concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds mentioned in law for the changing of nominees. And that the resignation of Kho, pursuant to the party nominees term-sharing agreement, cannot be recognized and be given effect so as to create a vacancy in the list and change the order of the nominees. ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of Senior Citizens was violated HELD: Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may properly order the cancellation of the registration and accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v. Commission on Elections the concept of due process as applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that: The appropriate due process standards that apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below: (1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. x x x. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary rights in administrative proceedings. The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as the standards in the determination of the presence or denial of due process. The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial components of decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the totality of the evidence presented which must all be found in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on substantial evidence. Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the "duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to understand how the rule of fairness has been administered in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought through by the decision-maker. Nevertheless, the due process violation was committed when they were not apprised of the fact that the termsharing agreement entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010 would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the organizations qualifications as a party-list group for the May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in support of their position. It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also, during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their conflicts and warned them about the complications brought about by their term-sharing agreement. In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the requirements for party-list accreditation.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) However, E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a partylist group and the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case. Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.

48. ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST vs. COMELEC, GR 206952, 22 October 2013 FACTS: Abang Lingkod is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and fisherfolk. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives. On May 31, 2012, Abang Lingkod manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, inter alia, required previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the requirements under R.A. 7941. After due proceedings, the COMELEC en banc cancelled Abang Lingkod’s registration as a party-list group. It pointed out that Abang Lingkod failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented. It further opined that Abang Lingkod failed to show that its nominees were themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent. Abang Lingkod then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling its registration under the party-list system. The said petition was consolidated with the separate petitions filed by fifty-one (51) other party-list groups whose registration were cancelled or who were denied registration under the party-list system. On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections, laid down new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, viz: (12) Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. x x x 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “welldefined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector x x x Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list groups, including that of Abang Lingkod, to determine whether they are qualified under the party-list system pursuant to the new parameters. Eventually, the COMELEC still affirmed its cancellation of Abang Lingkod’s registration under the party-list system. Moreover, the COMELEC took notice of the photographs Abang Lingkod submitted as evidence of its track record. The photographs submitted appeared to have been edited to show in the banners that Abang Lingkod participated in the activities. Abang Lingkod initially sought a reconsideration but later withdrew the same and instituted the instant petition for certiorari considering that the election returns were already being canvassed and consolidated by the COMELEC. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Abang Lingkod’s registration under the party-list system

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HELD: YES. Essentially, Abang Lingkod’s registration was cancelled on the ground that it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented. Under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are not required to submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions their “constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC.” To the COMELEC’s claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as Abang Lingkod, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. In the dissenting opinion of Justice Leonen, he opines that sectoral organizations must prove their links with the marginalized and underrepresented while national or regional parties or organizations must show that they have been existing as a bona fide organization. In such case, only sectoral organizations would be required to present a track record; while national and regional organizations need not present their track record as they are only required to submit documentary evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations. There is no logic in treating sectoral organizations differently from national and regional parties or organizations as regards their bid for registration under the party-list system. As regards the photographs submitted by Abang Lingkod, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration—it is no longer material to its qualification under the party- list system. Lastly, the fact that two of Abang Lingkod’s nominees do not actually belong to the sector it represents is immaterial and would not result in the cancellation of Abang Lingkod’s registration as a party list group. It was stated in Atong Paglaum that “national, regional and sectoral organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified." At the very least, Abang Lingkod has three (3) other qualified nominees, being farmers by occupation. Abang Lingkod, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior to the May 13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260,215 votes out of the 26,722,131 votes that were cast for the party- list, thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives. 49. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009 FACTS: The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution because the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats. On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBC), promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 which proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties namely: BUHAY - 2, BAYAN MUNA - 1, CIBAC - 1, GABRIELA - 1, APEC - 1. Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, it declared that the petition is now moot and academic because The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results. BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc. (AGAP), Anak Mindanao (AMIN), and An Waray. The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250. ISSUES: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling? 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated? 3. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? RULING: 1.Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives. Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus: Number of seats available to legislative x .20 Number of seats available to party-list districts = representatives .80 This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law. Since the 14 th Congress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list representatives.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature. 2. Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2 below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates. Rank

Party

Votes Garnered

Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Party- Guaranteed List, in % Seat

1

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

1

2

BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

1

3

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1

4

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1

5

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1

6

A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

1

7

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1

8

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1

9

COOPNATCCO

409,883

2.57%

1

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

1

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

1

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

1

13

ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

1

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

1

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

1

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

1

17

AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

1

Total

17

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

0

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

0

20

UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.

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The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the PartyList System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Applying the procedure of seat allocation, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party. 3. The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list elections. Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law. Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors.

50. Atong Paglaum, Inc. V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, 2 April 2013 FACTS: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations (Atong Paglaum et al) assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. HELD: NO, COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners (the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT), all the present petitions were remanded to the COMELEC for the latter to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. I. What is a Party-list System: The party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

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Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution. Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law. II. New Parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution. The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1) and 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector. Section 5(2), mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to nonsectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented." Second, the reservation of one-half of the partylist seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and causeoriented parties from the party-list system.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. The following provisions from RA No. 7941 provides compelling reasons that the law does not require sectoral parties (Sec 5) and national or regional parties (Sec 6) to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented” Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented." The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list system. The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing.

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Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system. Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system." 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “welldefined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

51. ABC Party List v. Comelec, G.R. No. 193256. March 22, 2011 FACTS: On May 25, 2010, private respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children of God International, which is more popularly known asAng Dating Daan.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Private respondent also alleged that ABC made an untruthful statement in its petition for accreditation, as it stated that it does not possess any of the disqualifications provided by the Party-List System Act when it is disqualified for being, in reality, a religious organization. In addition, he alleged that ABC is receiving support from third parties abroad. Petitioner contends that the COMELEC en banc no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the petition for cancellation of registration and accreditation of ABC Party-List after it was already proclaimed as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010 per National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 10009 promulgated on May 31, 2010. Petitioner states that in this case, there is no dispute that ABC Party-List has been proclaimed by the COMELEC as one of the winners in the party-list elections of May 10, 2010; therefore, any question as to its qualification should be resolved by the HRET and not by the COMELEC. Petitioner asserts that once a party-list group has been proclaimed winner and its nominees have taken their oath, the COMELEC should be divested of its jurisdiction over both the party-list group and its nominees. ISSUE: Whether COMECEC has jurisdiction to cancel the registration of ABC Party-List. (YES) HELD: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any political party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. Based on the provision, the Constitution grants the COMELEC the authority to register political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the registration of the ABC Party-List. In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it is the party-list nominee/representative who sits as a member of the House of Representatives. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.

VOTERS AND CANDIDATES 52. Akbayan Youth v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147066, 26 March 2001 FACTS: Petitioner who are representing the youth sector seeks to direct the Commission on Election (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration or two days extension before the 2001 General Election, of a new voters age 1821. According to petitioners, around 4 Million youth failed to register on or before December 27, 2000 which is the deadline set by the respondent COMELEC under RA 8189. Comelec issued a resolution denying the two day special registration, on the ground that under Sec 8 of Ra 8189 it explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities. Hence, petitioner filed with the court for mandamus to compel Comelec to approve such special election. ISSUE:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) WON

Comelec

issuance

of

Resolution

is

valid?

HELD: YES. The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For Registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in the election process. Thus Contrary to petitioner’s argument, registration cannot and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature od mere statutory requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to cote, the state undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election, to incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. Therefore the Resolution issued by COMELEC to deny the special registration is a valid exercise of the police power, and likewise prohibited by the law under Sec 8 of RA 8189, for the special registration will be conducted on February 17-18 or within the 120 days prohibitive period before the May 2001 Election. 53. Asistio v. Trinidad-Pe Aguirre G.R. No. 191124, 27 April 2010 FACTS: On January 26, 2010, private respondent Enrico R. Echiverri (Echiverri) filed against petitioner Luis A. Asistio (Asistio) a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City (Petition for Exclusion) before the MeTC, Branch 52, Caloocan City. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor in the 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Echiverri, also a candidate for Mayor of Caloocan City, was the respondent in a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or Cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Asistio. According to Echiverri, when he was about to furnish Asistio a copy of his Answer to the latters petition, he found out that Asistios address is non-existent. To support this, Echiverri attached to his petition a Certification dated December 29, 2009 issued by the Tanggapan ng Punong Barangay of Barangay 15 Central, Zone 2, District II of Caloocan City. He mentioned that, upon verification of the 2009 Computerized Voters List (CVL) for Barangay 15, Asistios name appeared under voter number 8, with address at 109 Libis Gochuico, Barangay 15, Caloocan City. Echiverri also claimed that Asistio was no longer residing in this address, since what appeared in the latters COC for Mayor in the 2007 elections was No. 110 Unit 1, P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City, but that the address used in Asistios current COC is situated in Barangay 17. He said that, per his verification, the voters duly registered in the 2009 CVL using the address No. 123 P. Zamora St., Barangay 17, Caloocan City did not include Asistio. On February 2, 2010, Asistio filed his Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam with Affirmative Defenses. Asistio alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamora St., Caloocan City, and a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of lease with Angelina dela Torre Tengco (Tengco), which was 123 Interior P. Zamora St., Barangay 15, Caloocan City. This appeal to the RTC assails the February 5, 2010 MeTC Order directing Asistios name to be removed from the permanent list of voters [in Precinct 1811A] of Caloocan City. ISSUE: Whether or not Asistio’s name should be removed from the permanent list of voters in Precinct 1811A of Caloocan City. RULING: No. From Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang 881) and Section 9 of The Voters Registration Act of 1996 (Republic Act No. 8189), the residency requirement of a voter is at least one (1) year residence in the Philippines and at least six (6) months in the place where the person proposes or intends to vote. Residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean domicile, importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a persons acts, activities, and utterances. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each particular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile at a time.To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth or for more than 72 years. His family is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District representative in the House of Representatives, having been elected as such in the 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2004 elections. In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into consideration, gauged in the light of the doctrines above enunciated, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor, both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City. These purported misrepresentations in Asistios COC, if true, might serve as basis for an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due course to the COC. 54. Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era. ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen. RULING: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. 55. Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 FACTS: Sometime on January 20, 1988, Petitioner Ramon Labo was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City. He contends that the petition for quo warranto was filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) when the fee was paid, as this was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC, and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the petition itself. The subject of the petition for quo warranto is the citizenship requirement of herein Petitioner Labo, Jr. On record are two (2) administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. The second was rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the Philippines. For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was filed ahead of time. His point is that when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it. No docket fee was collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo warranto and re-docketed it, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy, the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. These rules could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC. ISSUE 1: Whether the petition for quo warranto against Petitioner Labo was not filed on time, thus, respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into the matter of petitioner’s citizenship. ISSUE 2: Whether the Petitioner should be disqualified for lack of citizenship requirement. RULING 1: The Supreme Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. They agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res. No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed. In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an even less important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon. RULING 2: The Supreme Court declared that Petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He was ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City. The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen." Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the Philippines. Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: ... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.) That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration. And that is also the reason why the Supreme Court denied his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines. The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

56. Rommel Jalosjos v. COMELEC G.R. No. 191970; April 24, 2012 FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009. He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr. but was eventually granted by the ERB. A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A. 9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government code. COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision. ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. RULING: YES. The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time. It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of Zamboanga Sibugay. Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his domicile by operation of law and by choice. When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga Sibugay. While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his favor to breathe life to their manifest will. Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC. 57. Svetlana P. Jalosjos v COMELEC GR No. 193314

February 26, 2013

FACTS: In 2009, Svetlana P. Jalosjos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the May 2010 elections. She indicated her place of birth and residence as Brgy. Tugas, Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental. Asserting otherwise, Edwin Tumpag and Rodolfo Estrellada filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she was in fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous domicile, Dapitan City. On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap while the former was overseeing the construction of her house. Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in her place of birth was committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in a CoC, an error in the declaration of the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law. The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the highest number of votes. She was proclaimed as the winner but later, on June 4, 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent was DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor. The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution on August 2010 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due course to or cancelling her CoC. ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner had failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement RULING: No, the Court held that petitioner failed to comply with the one year residency requirement for local elective officials. There are 3 requisites for a person to acquire a new domicile by choice: first, residence or bodily presence in the new locality; second, an intention to remain there; third, an intention to abandon the old domicile. These circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof. In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence or origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. The date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same standard of evidence. In this case, petitioner failed to establish by clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental one year prior to the May 2010 elections. The Affidavits of Acas-Yap and others are inconsistent. The discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas and that she only stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort and the house.

58. Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, 21 January 2015 FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder. The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is Reclusion Perpetua to Death. Accordingly, the accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. The period within which accused Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada has been under detention shall be credited to him in full as long as he agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada. On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted" the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions in the COMELEC. However, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the COMELEC En banc. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections, however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that ofthe Mayor of the City of Manila. On January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC). Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."11 She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that: Sec. 40, Local Government Code: SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad; (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code: Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. ISSUE:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. HELD: No. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the petition for disqualification filed by Risos-Vidal against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No. 13-211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is, having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes a statement expressing "[h]e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Risos-Vidal theorizes that former President Estrada is disqualified from running for Mayor of Manila inthe May 13, 2013 Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, particularly the restoration of his (former President Estrada) right to vote and bevoted upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her theory. In this jurisdiction, the right toseek public elective office is recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political rights. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225,34 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," reads as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.– Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; (3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath; (4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which theyare naturalized citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens. (Emphases supplied.) No less than the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which the Philippines is a signatory, acknowledges the existence of said right. Article 25(b) of the Convention states: Article 25

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: xxxx (b) To vote and to be electedat genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors 59. Caasi v. COMELEC, 191 SCRA 229 FACTS: These two cases were consolidated for having the same objective of disqualifying Miguel Merito for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. Miguel admits that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service. He further denied that he is a permanent resident of the US and obtained the green card so he may more freely enter the US for periodic medical examination and for visiting his children. He also alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, for he voted during the previous elections and the plebiscite. The COMELEC dismissed the petitions against Miguel, for the green card does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence. ISSUES: 1. W/N the green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US? 2. W/N Miguel waived his status as permanent resident of or immigrant to the US prior to the local elections? HELD: 1. Yes, the green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. 2. No, Miguel did not waive his status as permanent resident of or immigrant to the US prior to the local elections. To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code). WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent. SO ORDERED. 60. Moreno v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168550, 10 August 2006 FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Private respondent Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify petitioner Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the petitioner was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four months and one day to two years and four months by the RTC Branch 28 of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. Petitioner filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was already granted probation and because of that, the imposition of sentence and its accessory penalties was thereby suspended. He also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar recommended that petitioner be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay. The said recommendation was adopted by the COMELEC First Division. Upon filing his motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution. According to the COMELEC en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since the petitioner was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end two years thence. The grant of probation merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. In his petition, Moreno alleges that because he never served a day of his sentence, the disqualification does not apply to him. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Moreno is disqualified from running for a local elective office as stated in the Local Government Code HELD: No. The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase “within two years after serving sentence” found in Sec. 40(a) of the LGC because it seems that the COMELEC have broadened the coverage of the law by including those who did not serve day of their sentence due to the grant of probation to the meaning of this phrase. The Court, citing its pronouncement in the Baclayon vs Mutya case, ruled that the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon petitioner were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. It is with deep regret that the COMELEC and the OSG misapprehended the real issue in this case. They focused on the fact that Moreno’s judgment of conviction attained finality upon his application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served. Given this misinterpretation, this case would be best to clarify that those who have no served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation which should not be equated with service of sentence should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the LGC does not even begin to run. When Moreno was final discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office. Furthermore, the Court also agreed with the petitioner that the Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the LGC since the former is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. 61. Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, 10 August 2012 FACTS: The petitioner, Teodora Sobejana-Condon, is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003." The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. The petitioner ran for Mayor in her hometown of Caba, La Union in the 2007 elections. She lost in her bid. She again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. She took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. Private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista, (private respondents) all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a "personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 and that her act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian citizenship. The RTC held that the petitioner’s failure to comply with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run and hold public office. As admitted by the petitioner herself during trial, the personal declaration of renunciation she filed in Australia was not under oath. The law clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC but the appeal was dismissed by the Second Division for failure to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period. On motion for reconsideration, the appeal was reinstated by the COMELEC en banc. In the same issuance, the substantive merits of the appeal were given due course. The COMELEC en banc concurred with the findings and conclusions of the RTC. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner is eligible to run for public office. HELD: No. Petitioner is disqualified from running for elective office for failure to renounce her Australian citizenship in accordance with Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Under the provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e., Australian and Philippine. On September 18, 2006, or a year before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia. Admittedly, however, the same was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) which provides that “Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath”. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. 62.Maquiling v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013 FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor contending that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration indicating the nationality of Arnado as “USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines. On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued an Order requiring the respondent Arnado to personally file his answer and memorandum within three (3) days from receipt thereof. After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to declare him in default. Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. The petition to disqualify was granted and Arnados proclamation was annulled. Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado. Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public office despite his continued use of a US passport, and praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. ISSUES: (1) Whether intervention is allowed in a disqualification case? (2)Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for public office? (3) Whether Maquiling should be proclaimed winner? RULING (1): Yes. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646: Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. RULING (2): Yes. By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship. Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy.

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The pivotal question to determine is whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship. RULING (3): Yes. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates. 63. Ejercito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 212398, 25 November 2014 FACTS: Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. He alleged in his Petition that: 1. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" as an integral part hereof; 2. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) "Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. –The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as follows: 1. For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. 2. For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political party – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. 3. For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis) 1. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS. 2. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on our party’s official monitoring on the following dates: April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013. 3. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable expenditures for which he paid the sum of P16,611,549; 4. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed an election offense as provided for under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote: "Election Offense. – Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x" 1. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote: "Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing asa candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis ours) Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent. However, these were not acted upon by the COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna. Based on the Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’ 471,209 votes. The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013. The scheduled case conference between the parties on June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27, 2013. In the latter date, all the documentary exhibits were marked in evidence and the parties agreed to file their respective memorandum within ten (10) days.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Ejercito from holding the office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna and to cease and desist from performing the functions of the office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna. The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito. ISSUE: WON the Petitioner should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is allowed by the OEC. RULING: Yes. Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that such contract benefited him, Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent. Citing Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He believes that an advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution. He also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the government. We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because non-compliance is consideredas an election offense. Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states thatit shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct name and address of the donor. This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito’s representation that his signature on the advertising contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally truethat elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be rendered.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent, are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is not a trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of factual allegations. Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus: SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: (a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution. Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government. 64. Penera v. COMELEC G. R. No. 181613, 25 November 2009 FACTS: Rosalinda Penera was one of the mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica during the May 2007 elections. A petition for disqualification was filed against Penera for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. That on March 29 2007, a day before the start of the authorized campaign period of March 30, 2007, Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. The COMELEC dismissed Penera’s petition and granted the disqualification against Penera. Penera moved for reconsideration. She argued that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, “one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period”. ISSUE: Whether or not Peneda’s disqualification should be reconsidered HELD: Yes. The effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. In other words, election offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon the start of the campaign

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) period. Before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature. Section 15 of R.A. 8436, as amended, does not provide that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness. Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly state that campaigning before the start of the campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan political activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The only inescapable and logical result is that the same acts, if done before the start of the campaign period, are lawful. Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that "any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy." Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." 65. Quinto v. COMELEC GR NO. 189698, 22 February 2010 FACTS: The case was based on the motion of reconsideration filed by respondents against the earlier decision of the Court which declared COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 and Sec. 13 of RA 9369 or the Omnibus Election Code- in so far as they provide that public appointive officials shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filing of his certificate of candidacy- as unconstitutional for being overbreadth and violative of the equal protections clause. The Court reversed this decision on the present case. The assailed COMELEC resolution provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.” RA 9369 provides that “For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. According to the petitioners, the said provisions of the law were discriminatory against appointive officials since pursuant to Section 14 of RA 9006 or the Fair Election Act, which repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code and rendered ineffective Section 11 of R.A. 8436 insofar as it considered an elected official as resigned only upon the start of the campaign period corresponding to the positions for which they are running, an elected official is not deemed to have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The petitioners were two incumbent government officials- Eleazar P. Quinto (DENR Secretary) and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections. ISSUE: WON the provisions of the law that appointive official including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy shall be considered unconstitutional for being overbreadth and violative of the equal protection clause? HELD: NO. There was no violation of the equal protection clause whose requisites were the following: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. The classification between elective and appointive officials in the law was valid-- it passed the test of equal protection clause. The said laws and regulations only implement Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign. But Section 2(4), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution and the implementing statutes apply only to civil servants holding apolitical offices. Stated differently, the constitutional ban does not cover elected officials, notwithstanding the fact that [t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. This is because elected public officials, by the very nature of their office, engage in partisan political activities almost all year round, even outside of the campaign period. Political partisanship is the inevitable essence of a political office, elective positions included. Moreover, the rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions arises from the fact that unlike appointive officials, elective officials were lected in office for a definite term and that there should be a complete deference to the will of the electorate by allowing said officials to end of the term for which they were elected. Hence, the dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will. 66. Amora v. COMELEC G.R. No. 192280, 25 January 2011 Facts: On December 1, 2009, petitioner Sergio G. Amora, Jr. (Amora) filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Mayor of Candijay, Bohol. At that time, Amora was the incumbent Mayor of Candijay and had been twice elected to the post, in the years 2004 and 2007. To oppose Amora, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) fielded Trygve L. Olaivar (Olaivar) for the mayoralty post. Respondent Arnielo S. Olandria (Olandria) was one of the candidates for councilor of the NPC in the same municipality. On March 5, 2010, Olandria filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against Amora. Olandria alleged that Amoras COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirements of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Olandria pointed out that, in executing his COC, Amora merely presented his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) to the notary public, Atty. Oriculo Granada (Atty. Granada), instead of presenting competent evidence of his identity. Consequently, Amoras COC had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed. Amora’s contention is that Olandria’s claim does not constitute a proper ground for the cancellation of the COC; The COC is valid and effective because he (Amora) is personally known to the notary public, Atty. Granada, before whom he took his oath in filing the document; Atty. Granada is, in fact, a close acquaintance since they have been members of the League of Muncipal Mayors, Bohol Chapter, for several years; and Ultimately, he (Amora) sufficiently complied with the requirement that the COC be under oath. COMELEC division ruled against Amora. Comelec en banc affirmed it.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: Is the presentation of Community Tax Certificate (not a sworn statement as mandated by the Omnibus Elec Code) a valid ground for disqualification? HELD: (*note: Amora won the 2010 elections before the Comelec dismissed him) No. There is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, it was grave abuse of discretion to uphold Olandrias claim that an improperly sworn COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. Not by any stretch of the imagination can we infer this as an additional ground for disqualification from the specific wording of the OEC in Section 68, which reads: SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the elections laws. And of Section 40 of the LGC, which provides: SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad (f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded. It is quite obvious that the Olandria petition is not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate. Yet, the COMELEC would uphold that petition upon the outlandish claim that it is a petition to disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing some grounds for disqualification. The proper characterization of a petition as one for disqualification under the pertinent provisions of laws cannot be made dependent on the designation, correctly or incorrectly, of a petitioner. The absurd interpretation of Olandria, respondent herein, is not controlling; the COMELEC should have dismissed his petition outright. A petition for disqualification relates to the declaration of a candidate as ineligible or lacking in quality or accomplishment fit for the position of mayor. The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the formal requirement in Section 73 of the OEC that a COC be under oath is not simply a question of semantics as the statutes list the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate. 67. Tagolino G.R. No. 202202, 19 March 2013

v.

HRET

FACTS: November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the COMELEC seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. However, on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.The COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. Richard thereafter manifested that he is accepting the resolution in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) filing of the necessary documents for substitution- HIS WIFE, Lucy Torres-Gomez. Lucy accepted the nomination and endorsement from the LP. Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms. Lucy as Richard’s substitute. Juntilla stated that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for. COMELEC First Division Decision: decided in favor of Juntilla, but said that the substitution was valid. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the First Division’s resolution. The resolution hinges upon the reasoning that Richard is indeed disqualified, but one’s “disqualification does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.” ISSUE:

W/N

the

substitution

of

Richard

Gomez

as

a

candidate

valid?

NO.

HELD: The Supreme Court said no, it is not valid. A substitution is only valid when the candidate is disqualified. If the candidate to be substituted made material misrepresentation in his CoC, it will result to a denial of due course/ cancellation of CoC. In disqualification, there is a candidate to be substituted. In cancellation, there is no candidate to speak of in the first place. Under the Omnibus Election Code, disqualification is provided under Section 68 (pursuant to Section 77), while cancellation is provided under Section 78. Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, “material misrepresentation” cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution. In the case at bar, Richard Gomez committed material representation resulting to the cancellation of his COC. It is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy. Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.” The Court ended: “Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to office. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

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68. Cerafica v COMELEC G.R. No. 205136, 2 December 2014 FACTS: Kimberly Da Silva Cerafica (Kimberly) filed her COC for Councilor in Taguig for the 2013 elections. Her COC state that she was born on October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 years of age on the day of elections in contravention of the requirement that one must be 23 years old on the day of the election. She was then summoned to a clarificatory hearing. However, instead of attending, she filed a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC. Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as substitute of Kimberly. Dir. Amora-Ladra of Comelec recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC, and the denial of the substitution. She opined that it is as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be substituted. The Comelec Special En Banc adopted the recommendation. Olivia filed a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: (1) W/N Comelec gravely abused it’s discretion in canceling the COC of Kimberly and for not allowing Kimberly to be replaced. (2) W/N there was a lack of due process RULING: (1) Yes. Firstly, subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 78, Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. In Cipriano v. Comelec, we ruled that the Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due course to COCs. We emphasized that the duty of the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the Comelec. Furthermore, Under the express provision of Sec. 77 of B.P. Blg. 881, not just any person, but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Party; thus, she can be validly substituted. Olivia also complied with all of the requirements for a valid substitution. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly's COC after the last day for the filing of COCs; second, Olivia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third, Olivia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day. (2) Yes. in simply relying on the Memorandum of Director Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberly's COC and denying the latter's substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC, the Court finds that the Comelec once more gravely abused its discretion. The Court reminds the Comelec that, in the exercise of it adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc. Where a power rests in judgment or discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial. As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the Comelec in Division should have first decided this case. The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. We thus caution the Comelec against its practice of impetuous cancellation of COCs via minute resolutions adopting the recommendations of its Law Department when the situation properly calls for the case's referral to a Division for summary hearing. 69. Aratea v. COMELEC G.R. No. 195229, 9 October 2012 Facts: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009.4 On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 78 of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution5 and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position. On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prisión correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida v. People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December 2009. Pertinent portions of the 11 August 2010 Resolution read: Prescinding from the foregoing premises, Lonzanida, for having served as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for more than three (3) consecutive terms and for having been convicted by a final judgment of a crime punishable by more than one (1) year of imprisonment, is clearly disqualified to run for the same position in the May 2010 Elections. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. On 25 August 2010, Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. She claimed her right to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 elections. In his Comment filed on 26 January 2011, Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor, was mandated by Section 44 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor. Issue: Whether or not Antipolo shall be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. Held: Yes. As early as February 18, 2010, the Commission speaking through the Second Division had already ordered the cancellation of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy, and had stricken off his name in the list of official candidates for the mayoralty post of San Antonio, Zambales. Thereafter, the Commission En Banc in its resolution dated August 11, 2010 unanimously affirmed the resolution disqualifying Lonzanida. Our findings were likewise sustained by the Supreme Court no less. The disqualification of Lonzanida is not simply anchored on one ground. On the contrary, it was emphasized in our En Banc resolution that Lonzanida’s disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the three-term limit; and second, as early as December 1, 2009, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of Falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. In other words, on election day, respondent Lonzanida’s disqualification is notoriously known in fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio, Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. (Boldfacing and underscoring in the original; italicization supplied) Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor.1âwphi1 Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 201 0 elections - Anti polo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

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70. Abcede vs. Imperial 103 Phil 136 FACTS: Alfredo Abcede was a candidate for senator in 1953, again in 1955, in both of which his votes were nil. Prior to September 7, 1957, petitioner Alfredo Abcede filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC. Thereafter, Abcede and other candidates were summoned by the Commission on Elections to appear before them on September 23, 1957, "to show cause why their certificates of candidacy should be considered as filed in good faith and to be given due course," with the admonition that their failure to so appear would be sufficient ground for the Commission to consider said certificates of candidacy as not filed in good faith and not to give due course thereto. It is of record that the Bureau of Posts banned from the use of the Philippine mail matter of whatever class mailed by, or addressed to, the Japanese War Notes Claims Association of the Philippines, Inc., and its agent and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede and Marciana Mesina-Abcede. Such order was based on the findings of the Securities and Exchange Commission, confirmed by the Secretary of Justice that said entity aid its agents and representatives, including Alfredo Abcede. They are engaged in a scheme to obtain money from the public by means of false or fraudulent pretenses. The Commission is convinced that the certificate of candidacy of Alfredo Abcede was filed for motives other than a bona fide desire to obtain a substantial number of votes of the electorate. COMELEC issued a resolution dated October 4, 1957, ordering that the certificates of candidacy "shall not be given due course" because the Commission believes that while Section 37 of the Revised Election Code imposes upon the commission the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge certificates of candidacy, the law leaves to the Commission a measure of discretion on whether to give due course to a particular certificate of candidacy should it find said certificate of candidacy to have been filed not bona fide. The Commission is satisfied with the view that Congress could not have meant to make as a ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course to every certificate of candidacy, no matter how senseless said certificate of candidacy may be, thus in effect authorizing a meaningless expenditure of a considerable amount of public funds, and in the process put added routinary burden on the already heavily burdened election machinery, as well as shear off the election much of its dignity as a solemn process of democracy. . ISSUE: WON the COMELEC erred in declaring that the certificates of candidacy of petitioner was not made in good faith HELD: YES. The action of the Commission as regards petitioner's certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction and hence, void. The Constitution fixes the qualifications for the office of the highest magistrate of the land. All possessors of such qualifications are, therefore, deemed legally fit, at least, to aspire to such office and to run therefor, provided that they file their respective certificates of candidacy within the time, at the place and in the manner provided by law, and petitioner herein has done so. Lastly, as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the President — to which the Constitution has given the "exclusive charge" of the "enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely "administrative questions."(Article X, sec. 2, Constitution of the Philippines.) It has no authority to decide matters "involving the right to vote". It may not even pass upon the legality of a given vote. The question whether a candidate must be capable of "understanding the full meaning of his acts and the true significance of election," and must have — is a matter of policy, not of administration and enforcement of the law, which policy must be determined by Congress in the exercise of its legislative functions.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Section 36 of the Revised Election Code provides that 96 certificates of candidacy of candidates for President . . . shall be filed with the Commission on Elections which shall order the preparation and distribution of copies for the same to all the election precincts of the Philippines. Moreover, pursuant to section 37 of said Code: “The Commission on Election, the secretary of the provincial board, and the municipal secretary, in their respective cases, shall have the ministerial duty to receive the certificates of candidacy referred to in the preceding section and to immediately acknowledge receipt thereof.” The foregoing provisions give the Commission no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. On the contrary, the Commission has, admittedly, the "ministerial" duty to receive said certificate of candidacy. Moreover, in the words of section 37, the Commission "shall immediately send copies" of said certificates to the secretaries of the provincial boards. The compulsory nature of this requirement, evinced by the imperative character generally attached to the term "shall", is stressed by the peremptory connotation of the adverb "immediately." In this particular case, however, the action of the Commission as regards petitioner's certificate of candidacy is beyond the bounds of its jurisdiction, and, hence, void. 71. Loreto-Go v. COMELEC G.R. No. 147741, 10 May 2001 Facts: Petitioner Loreto-Go filed COC for Mayor of Baybay, Leyte and for Governor of the province of Leyte. She filed an affidavit of withdrawal for the position of Mayor with the provincial election officer, which the latter refused to receive stating that she should file the same with the municipal election officer of Baybay, hence, she filed the same with the proper office by fax. However, she filed the withdrawal 28 minutes after the deadline. Respondents Felipe Montejo and Arvin Antoni filed separate petitions to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. The case was referred to the Law Department of COMELEC which gave due course to respondents’ petitions without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard to submit responsive pleadings. Based on the report of the COMELEC’s Law Department, the COMELEC en banc disqualified petitioner to run for both positions; hence, this petition. Issues: 1. Won Loreto-Go is disqualified to be a candidate for governor 2. Was there a valid withdrawal of the COC of Baybay, Leyte? 3. Was there denial to petitioner of procedural due process of Law? Held: 1. NO. Petitioner’s withdrawal of her COC for Mayor was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her COC for governor. 2. YES. Sec. 73, BP Blg. 881, does not mandate that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the COC to be withdrawn was filed. While it may be true that Sec. 12 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer where the COC was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for the convenience. Hence, the filing of petitioner’s affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for Mayor with the provincial supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. 3. YES. Sec.3, Rule 23 of COMELEC Rules of procedure provides that a petition to deny due course to or cancel COC shall be heard summarily after due notice. In the case, the COMELEC Law Department conducted an ex-parte study of the cases without giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard, or requiring her to submit a comment or opposition to the petitions or setting the case for hearing. Hence, the COMELEC en banc deprived the petitioner of due process of law in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department. 72. Romeo Jalosjos v. COMELEC G.R. No. 205033, 10 September 2013

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Petitioner was convicted by final judgement of two (2) counts of statutory rape and six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness and was consequently sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal. Then President Gloria Arroyo issued an order commuting his prison term to 16 years, 3 months, and 3 days and was eventually released from prison. Petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga City. However, because of his previous conviction, his application was denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters (Petition for Inclusion) before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City. Pending resolution, he filed a CoC seeking to run as mayor for Zamboanga City. In his CoC, petitioner stated, inter alia, that he is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay Tetuan, Zamboanga City. MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch 14 (RTC)Five (5) petitions were lodged before the COMELEC's First and Second Divisions (COMELEC Divisions), praying for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of petitioner's CoC. COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution to CANCEL and DENY due course the Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter registration requirement. Petitioner claims that the COMELEC En Banc usurped the COMELEC Divisions' jurisdiction by cancelling motu proprio petitioner's CoC through Resolution No. 9613, contrary to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution): “All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.” ISSUES: WON the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction when it issued motuproprioResolutionin so doing, violated petitioner's right to due process; HELD: SC is not persuaded. The constitutional provision requiring a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc may take action is confined only to cases where the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial power. It finds no application, however, in matters concerning the COMELEC's exercise of administrative functions. The distinction is well defined in the case of Villarosa vs. COMELEC: “[T]he term 'administrative' connotes, or pertains, to 'administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things. It does not entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision or resolution thereon. While a 'quasi-judicial function' is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Accordingly, in such a situation, it is the COMELEC's duty to cancel motu proprio the candidate's CoC, notwithstanding the absence of any petition initiating a quasi-judicial proceeding for the resolution of the same. Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. COMELEC En Banc did not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it issued Resolution No. 9613 asit did not assume jurisdiction over any pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its divisions. Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by his final conviction. In this regard, the COMELEC En Banc was exercising its administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) motion for reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings. 73. Timbol v. COMELEC G.R. No. 206004, 24 February 2015 FACTS: Joseph (Timbol) filed his Certificate of Candidacy for member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod on October 5, 2012. On January 17, 2013, he received a notice from the election officer (Dinah Valencia) for him to appear before her office for a clarificatory hearing on his certificate of candidacy. During the hearing, Joseph, assisted by counsel, argued that he was not a nuisance candidate, alleging that in the 2010 elections, he ranked 8 th among all the candidates for the sangguniang panglunsod, and he had sufficient resources to sustain his campaign. While his name already appeared in the list of nuisance candidates in the Comelec website, the panel assured him that his certificate of candidacy would be given due course and his name deleted in the list of nuisance candidates. Indeed, the election officer thru a Memorandum dated January 17, 2013 recommended that Joseph’s COC be given due course. Despite the recommendation, his name was not deleted from the list, and since the printing of ballots for the automated election will be held on February 4, 2013, he filed before the COMELEC on February 2, 2013 a petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidtaes. By a Minute Resolution issued on February 5, 2013, , the COMELEC denied his petition, averring that it became moot and academic with the beginning of the printing of ballots. Aggrieved, Josph field a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it declared him a nuisance candidate, even before the hearing officer conducted the clarificatory hearing on his certificate of candidacy. In its comment, the Comelec argued that the petition had become moot and academic with the conduct of the 2013 elections. Even assuming it is not yet moot and academic, the Comelec did not deprive him of due process as he was given the opportunity to be heard during the clarificatory hearing. The Supreme Court ordered Joseph to file his Reply, and subsequently his counsel but both failed, hence the court submitted the case for decision even without the Reply. ISSUE: Whether the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to the certificate of candidacy of Joseph. HELD: We deny the Petition. Respondent’s power to motu proprio deny due course to a certificate of candidacy is subject to the candidate’s opportunity to be heard. Under Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution, “[t]he State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service[.]” This, however, does not guarantee “a constitutional right to run for or hold public office[.]” ⁠6 To run for public office is a mere “privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.” ⁠7 Among these limitations is the prohibition on nuisance candidates. Nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy “to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.⁠8 In Pamatong v. Commission on Elections,⁠9 this court explained why nuisance candidates are prohibited from running for public office: . . . The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. . . .

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) . . . The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.⁠ To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may be “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,”⁠ “subject to an opportunity to be heard.”⁠12 The opportunity to be heard is a chance “to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.” In election cases, due process requirements are satisfied “when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.” ⁠ In Cipriano v. Commission on Elections,⁠ this court explained: [T]he determination whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where both parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Because the resolution of such fact may result to a deprivation of one’s right to run for public office, or, as in this case, one’s right to hold public office, it is only proper and fair that the candidate concerned be notified of the proceedings against him and that he be given the opportunity to refute the allegations against him. It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate be notified of the Commission’s inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.⁠ Respondent commits grave abuse of discretion if it denies due course to or cancels a certificate of candidacy without affording the candidate an opportunity to be heard⁠. Respondent declared petitioner a nuisance candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office. Respondent had already issued Resolution No. 9610 on January 11, 2013 when petitioner appeared before Election Officer Valencia in a clarificatory hearing on January 17, 2013. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard. That petitioner was able to file a Petition for inclusion in the certified list of candidates did not cure the defect in the issuance of Resolution No. 9610. First, he would not have to file the Petition had been given an opportunity to be heard in the first place. Second, in the Minute Resolution dated February 5, 2013, respondent denied petitioner’s Petition on the sole ground that the printing of ballots had already begun on February 4, 2013. We understand the “insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs implications”⁠18 of reprinting ballots had respondent ordered the inclusion of petitioner’s name in the certified list if candidates. The ballots already printed would have to be recalled, leading to the waste of the ballots previously printed. It should be noted that these ballots are special as the have the capability of being optically scanned by Precinct Count Optical Scan machines. Reprinting another batch of ballots would, indeed, be costly. Still, “automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process.”⁠ Respondent should also balance its duty “to ensure that the electoral process is clean, honest, orderly, and peaceful” ⁠ with the right of a candidate to explain his or her bona fide intention to run for public office before he or she is declared a nuisance candidate. WHEREFORE, this Petition for Certiorari is DENIED for being moot and academic. Moreover, Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras is ORDERED to show cause within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be the subject of administrative actions for his contumacious attitude towards repeated orders of this court, specifically, for his failure to comply with the Resolutions dated August 6, 2013 and September 2, 2013. The action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras will be docketed as a new and separate administrative case. Let a copy of this decision be given to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the initiation of the proper disciplinary action against Atty. Jose Ventura Aspiras. SO ORDERED. 74. Martinez v. HRET G.R. No. 189034, 11 January 2010 Facts:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Celestino Martinez III, private respondent Benhur Salimbanong, and one Edelito C. Martinez, ran for the position of Representative of the Fourth District of Cebu. Salimbanong was proclaimed the winner with 67,277 votes, while Petitioner Martinez III got 67,173 votes. Prior to the election, on April 3, 2007, Petitioner Martinez III filed a petition to declare Edelito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However, it was resolved 1 month after the elections where COMELEC ruled that Edelito was a nuisance candidate. Petitioner filed an election protest in the HRET on the grounds that several votes in his favor were allegedly not counted. In particular, there were allegedly 300 ballots with the words “MARTINEZ” or “C. MARTINEZ.” The HRET applied Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus Election Code which provided that “votes are valid where only the first name or surname is written provided that there is no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office.” Thus, after the revision by the HRET, Salimbanong was still the winner because the final tally was 66,655 for Martinez III, and 67,108 for Salimbanong. Petitioner comes to the Court seeking to nullify the HRET decision and to declare him as the elected Representative. He contends that HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. He also cites the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura who disagreed with the majority ruling and posited that the final declaration by COMELEC that Edilito C. Martinez was a nuisance candidate and the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy should be deemed effective as of the day of the election. Issue: W.O.N votes indicating only the surname of two (2) candidates should not be considered as stray but counted in favor of the bona fide candidate after the other candidate with a similar surname was declared a nuisance candidate. Held: Yes. COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, provides: “the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.” In the case of Pamatong v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained the prohibition on nuisance candidates. “The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. xxx [it is important] in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].” In the case of Bautista which also included a nuisance candidate, the Court ruled that “the matter [of a nuisance] should have been finally resolved prior to Election Day. Its pendency on Election Day exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to be nuisance candidate.” They made separate tallies for the alleged stray votes in order to make it determinable. In that case, the Court counted the votes in favor of the bona fide candidate because the nuisance candidate was declared as such prior to Election Day. The HRET did not apply the Bautista ruling because, in that case, the nuisance candidate was declared as such prior to Election Day, unlike in this case, where Edelito Martinez was only declared as a nuisance after elections. However, in this case, regardless of when the nuisance candidate was declared as such, the effects would be the same.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In this case, HRET failed to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned from the findings of the Commission on the personal circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to run for the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his sudden absence after such filing. Edilito C. Martinez, a habal-habal driver, did not even file his opposition to the motion to declare him a nuisance candidate. Therefore, Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly establishing that such votes could not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final judgment. 75. Villafuerte v. COMELEC GR. No. 206698, 25 February 2014 Facts: Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of the Province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections. On October 25, 2012, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC that “L–RAY JR.–MIGZ” was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended to appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L–RAY JR.–MIGZ NP; that respondent deliberately omitted his first name “MIGUEL” and inserted, instead “LRAY JR.,” which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of Camarines Sur, “LRay Villafuerte, Jr.” respondent denied the commission of any material misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” and not only “MIGZ”; that the choice of name/word to appear on the ballot was solely his choice or preference; and that the presumption that the voters would be confused on the simple fact that his name would be placed first in the ballot was misplaced. Issue: WON respondent’s COC should be cancelled Held: No. In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of candidate the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of surname, when not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to ones identity is not within the scope of the provision. Respondent’s nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the nickname LRAY JR. MIGZ in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume. Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as the son of the then incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as LRay. Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers and billboards displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son on them. Thus, the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know who respondent is. Moreover, it was established by the affidavits of respondents witnesses that as the father and son have striking similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms, which remained unrebutted, the appellation of LRAY JR. has been used to refer torespondent. Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the name MIGZ16 written as respondent’s nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, as in fact, such name distinguishes respondent from his father, the then incumbent Governor LRAY, who was running for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District of Camarines Sur.

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76. Hayudini v. COMELEC G.R. No. 207900, 22 April 2014 FACTS: On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 2013 National and Local Elections held in the ARMM. Ten days after, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC, on the ground that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City. Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC).which was granted. On that same day, the COMELEC’s First Division dismissed Omar’s earlier petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC for lack of substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency. Subsequently, the case was elevated to the Bongao RTC. The RTC reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of votersIn view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event. The case was appealed to the CA but the same was denied. Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.However, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC. Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a supervening event. He moved to reconsider but the same was denied. Thus, this instant petition for certiorari and prohibiton. ISSUE: Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling Hayudini’s CoC and proclaiming Omar as Mayor HELD: NO. Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day of filing of CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed the subject petition only on March 26, 2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel CoC must be filed within five days from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition. Clearly, Omar’s petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period. Likewise, he failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served personally to Hayudini. Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains the COMELEC’s liberal treatment of Omar’s petition. As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes." Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives − ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. Indeed, Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s CoC. This was dismissed on January 31, 2013, or the same day the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition to be included in the list of voters. However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC reversed the MCTC ruling and, consequently, ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters. Said deletion was already final and executory under the law. Hayudini, however, still appealed the case to the CA, which was subsequently denied. Notably, thereafter, he went to the CA again, this time to file a petition for certiorari. The CA also denied said petition primarily because of Hayudini’s act of engaging in the pernicious practice of forum shopping by filing two modes of appeal before said court. Hence, by virtue of the finality of said RTC decision deleting his name from the voters’ list, Hayudini, who had been previously qualified under the law to run for an elective position, was then rendered ineligible. 77. Jalover vs. Osmena G.R. No. 209286, 23 September 2014 FACTS: On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu. In his COC, Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for 15 years prior to the May 2013 elections. Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification." The petitioners alleged before the COMELEC that Osmeña made material misrepresentations of fact in the latter’s COC and likewise failed to comply with the residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. In particular, the petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Toledo City 15 years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local elections. In his defense, Osmeña argued that even prior to his actual transfer of residence to Ibo, Toledo City, in 2004, he had been able to establish ties with Toledo City in view of his family’s business interests and his political linkages. According to Osmeña, in 1995, he bought a piece of land in Ibo, Toledo City, where he built two (2) houses from 1998 to 2002 and became a permanent resident thereof in 2004. Osmeña further averred that he became a registered voter of Toledo City in 2006 and that he leased at least 2 properties in Toledo City for his headquarters. In addition, he claimed that in December 2011, he bought a 5 hectare parcel of land in Das, Toledo City. The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition on the ground that Osmeña did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC en banc subsequently denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and stated that it is not required that a candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. ISSUE: WON Osmeña committed misrepresentation in his certificate HELD: NO. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Osmeña’s actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeña’s substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the community’s socio-civic and political activities. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate’s will. With the conclusion that Osmeña did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC, the Court sees no reason in this case to appeal to the primacy of the electorate’s will.

78. Codilla v. COMELEC GR No. 150605, 10 December 2002 FACTS: Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII. On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate. On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner] with the COMELEC Second Division. A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto. On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent. A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading. The records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received the motion. On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes. At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) to investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance. On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Petitioners Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001. On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered his disqualification. On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation, SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of votes. On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the dulyelected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district. On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office. On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives (HR), thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the HR of a copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Speaker De Venecia sent a letter stating that it is the implementation of the subject COMELEC Resolution be best adjudged with finality by the Supreme Court, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is valid RULING: We find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void: First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed. (i) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation. The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioners repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never received summons. More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidates guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) that evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification. We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation. (ii) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification. All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest. This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence. Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the petitioner. On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. (iii) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. (iv) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was done with undue haste. Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 2001 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process. Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes. (i) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray. Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution. (ii) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people’s choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his place. 79. Munder v. COMELEC G.R. No. 194076, 19 October 2011 FACTS: Petitioner Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 26 November 2009, four days before the last day for filing on 30 November 2009. Under Sec. 4(a)[1] of COMELEC Resolution 8696, a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy must be filed within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy but not later than twenty-five days from the filing thereof. Respondent Atty. Tago Sarip likewise filed a certificate of candidacy and vied for the same position in the same municipality. On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a Petition for Disqualification with the COMELEC on the ground that Munder was not a registered voter of Bubongand that the latter’s application for candidacy was not accomplished in full. Sarip corroborated his allegation that Munder was not a registered voter of the area. He further argued that the candidate Munder was different from the registered voter Munder in the area, since they had different birth years; and even went so far as to implicate Munder as having committed dishonesty and falsity in stating that the latter was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. For his part, Munder, on the other hand, countered that he was a registered voter of Precinct No. 0033, Barangay Rogero, Municipality of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Moreover, Munder denied committing any misrepresentation in his CoC. He also argued that false representations, dishonesty and mockery of justice were not grounds for disqualification of a candidate under COMELEC Resolution No. 8696. In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly, garnering 4,793 votes over Sarip who came in second with 2,356 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, thus proclaimed Munder as mayor on 15 May 2010. On 29 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division sustained Munder’s arguments and dismissed Sarip’s Petition. It agreed with Munder that the grounds invoked by Sarip were not proper for a petition for disqualification, and that the latter’s petition was actually seeking the purging of Munder’s CoC. The outcome was, however, different when the COMELEC en banc, upon Sarip’s Motion for Reconsideration, which reversed the ruling of the Second Division and disqualified Munder based on the question of the continuing possession by Munder of one of the qualifications of the office of the Mayor – being a registered voter of the municipality where he runs as a candidate. ISSUE: WON the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in concluding that the Alfais Munder in the voters’ list is not the same as Alfais Munder the candidate HELD: Yes, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in concluding that Munder the voter was not Munder the mayoralty candidate. We observe that the COMELEC en banc relied on the Voter's Certification indicating one Alfaiz Tocalo Munder registering for the first time in 2003, with 7 May 1984 as birth date, and stating therein that he was 18 years old at the time of the registration. We find this evidence insufficient to impeach the fact that the petitioner was a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur for one simple reason: the registration was in 2003, while the election was in 2010. It may be true that in 2003, Munder, who was still a minor, registered himself as a voter and misrepresented that he was already of legal age. Even if it was deliberate, we cannot review his past political acts in this petition. Neither can the COMELEC review those acts in an inappropriate remedy. In so doing, it committed grave abuse of discretion, and the act resulting therefrom must be nullified. Regardless of the present evidence, it would not negate the fact that in 2010, Munder had already attained eligibility to run for mayor. In fact, in such a small municipality like Bubong, the likelihood of not being able to know whether one has a namesakeis very slim. Sarip should have proved that another Alfais Tocalo

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Munder is in existence, and that the latter is the registered voter and not herein petitioner. In such a case, Sarip's remedy is not a Petition for Disqualification, but a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy which must comply with the prescriptive period. In the case at bar, however, Sarip miserably failed to comply with the filing period since he filed it one hundred and seven days after the filing of the COC – obviously later than the twenty five day prescriptive period for such. A petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy filed beyond the required period is filed out of time and may be not entertained; as such, Sarip’s remaining remedy is now left to file a quo warranto action with the Regional Trial Court to prove that Munder lacks the eligibility required by law. With this conclusion, Sarip's petition has become moot. There is no longer any issue of whether to apply the rule on succession to an elective office, since Munder is necessarily established in the position for which the people have elected him. 80. Talaga v. COMELEC G.R. No. 196804, 9 October 2012 FACTS: On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon, the official candidate of the Lakas-KampiCMD, declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to. Four days later, or on December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor of Lucena. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena City, still filed his CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections. Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes of the application of the three-term limit rule. In the meantime, on December 23, 2009, the Court promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 8 holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three-term limit rule. Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino. Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC. Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-Kampi-CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon. On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo's 39,615 votes. Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the suspension of Barbara Ruby's proclamation. It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation of its Law Department, gave due course to Barbara Ruby's CoC and CONA through Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of candidates. Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of Lucena City. On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray. On July 26, 2010, Roderick Alcala (Alcala), the duly-elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene, positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara Ruby's substitution had been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: 1. Whether the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband, is valid. (NO) 2. Who among the contending parties should assume the contested elective position? (The Vice Mayor) HELD: 1. Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code. It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn CoC as required by Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Declaration of Ramon's disqualification rendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material representation that is false. It is underscored, however, that a Section 78 petition should not be interchanged or confused with a Section 68 petition. The remedies under the two sections are different, for they are based on different grounds, and can result in different eventualities. A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is prohibited to continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not considered as a candidate at all because his status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC. Miranda v. Abaya has clarified that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. 2. Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in the office. Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should be applied. There, the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification of the first placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will." Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected to the office. There was to be no question that the second placer lost in the election, was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position. No law imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political leader or their representative. The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate's disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of Barbara Ruby's ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the elections.

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81. GR.

Dela No.

Cruz 192221,

v. 13

November

COMELEC 2012

FACTS: Casimira S. Dela Cruz filed here Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Bugasong, Province of Antique. Subsequently, Aurelio N. Dela Cruz likewise file a COC under the position of Vice-Mayor or the same position to the petitioner. Petitioner then filed a petitioner to declare Aurelio as a nuisance candidate on the ground that his filing of the COC is for the mockery and to cause confusion among voters due to the similarity of both their names. The COMELEC First division declared Aurelio as nuisance candidate, however failed to remove his name in the ballot. Petitioner then filed a petition for the deletion of Aurelio name in the ballot and if it is not possible to do so, such votes garner by Aurelio will be counted in favour of petitioner. Before the Election Comelec En Banc Issued a resolution declaring Aurelio a nuisance candidate and that all votes garner by nuisance candidate should be considered stray. Still Aurelio name has not been removed from the ballot. After election and during the canvassing, Pacete who is the opponent of petitioner won. Petitioner filed a petition contending that all votes garner by Aurelio be counted on her favour and for Comelec Resolution that all garners votes by a nuisance candidate be considered stray be made invalid. ISSUE: WON

all

garner

votes

by

a

nuisance

candidate

be

considered

stray?

HELD: No. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favour of the Bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgement only after the election. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing CoCs at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until election are held and the votes counted and canvassing. In the case at bar, Aurelio was declared by final judgement before the election however his name was failed to be remove from the ballot. Therefore all votes garner by Aurelio should be considered in favour of Petitioner, thus declaring her as the winner for the position of Vice- Mayor. 82. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 221697, 221698-700, 8 March 2016 FACTS: In her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005. May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the Philippines for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American passport. Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC. Issue 1: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates Held:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) No. The facts of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be determined. Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC. Issue 2: Whether or not Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Held: Yes. There is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth.” The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) of which effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. The COMELEC also ruled that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. R. A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination. Issue 3: Whether or not Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement Held: Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile. The COMELEC virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy.

CAMPAIGN: PROPAGANDA, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND EXPENSES 83. LANOT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 164858, November 16, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC stating that the latter engaged in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated campaign period, such as (1) addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig City government; (2) uttering defamatory statements against Lanot; (3) causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory; (4) installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across Pasig City; and (5) distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to vote for him. Eusebio won the election and any other complaints was dismissed by the COMELEC. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a pre-campaign offense committed by Eusebio. RULING: There is no dispute that Eusebio’s acts of election campaigning or partisan political activities were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who filed his certificate of candidacy on 29 December 2003, was a "candidate" when he committed those acts before the start of the campaign period on 24 March 2004. Under Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio became a "candidate," for purposes of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on 23 March 2004, the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC First Division - to Section 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio clearly did not violate Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a "candidate," one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the questioned acts.

84. ROSALINDA A. PENERA vs. COMMISSION G.R. No. 181613,

ON ELECTIONS and November

EDGAR 25,

T.

ANDANAR 2009

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rosalinda Penera to the Decision of the Supreme Court dated September 11, 2009, which disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera. Sometime on April 2, 2007, respondent Edgar Andanar filed before the Office of the Regional Election Director (ORED), Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior to the commencement of the campaign period. Andanar claimed that on March 29, 2007 a day before the start of the authorized campaign period on March 30, 2007 Penera and her partymates went around the different barangays in Sta. Monica, announcing their candidacies and requesting the people to vote for them on the day of the elections. Consequently, after due trial, the Supreme Court disqualified Penera from running for the office of Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed Penera.

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ISSUE: Whether petitioner Penera's act of campaigning for votes immediately preceding the filing of her certificate of candidacy on March 29, 2007 violates the prohibition in Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code against premature campaigning, with the result that she is disqualified from holding office in accordance with Section 68 of the Code. RULING: The Supreme Court GRANTED petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. And SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on September 11, 2009. It even declared that Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte. The Decision states that [w]hen the campaign period starts and [the person who filed his certificate of candidacy] proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her intent turning into actuality, we can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her COC and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence, constituting premature campaigning, for which he/she may be disqualified. Under the Decision, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a candidate even before the start of the campaign period. However, in this present Resolution, the SC assailed that said Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the law. The Decision rationalizes that a candidate who commits premature campaigning can be disqualified or prosecuted only after the start of the campaign period. This is not what the law says. What the law says is any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. The law does not state, as the assailed Decision asserts, that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are unlawful, but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the campaign period. Neither does the law state that partisan political acts done by a candidate before the campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes unlawful upon the start of the campaign period. This is clearly not the language of the law. Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision, which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of expression and speech, would be void for vagueness. Congress has laid down the law a candidate is liable for election offenses only upon the start of the campaign period. The Court has no power to ignore the clear and express mandate of the law that any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear language of the law that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period. The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures, is not the Court but the Legislature. The Court has no recourse but to apply a law that is as clear, concise and express as the second

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) sentence, and its immediately succeeding proviso, as written in the third paragraph of Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369.

85. EJERCITO VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 212398, NOVEMBER 25, 2014) FACTS: Emilio Ramon “E.R.” Ejercito, during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called “Orange Card” with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor. It is claimed that the said “Orange Card” could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs as declared by the statements of witnesses. Such giving of cards runs in violation of sec. 68(a) of Omnibus Election Code which provides: Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions. Another alleged violation of the Election Code by Ejercito is overspending. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR ELECTION ACT provides that the aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as follows: For candidates – Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political party – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. A candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (P4,576,566.00) PESOS. Ejercito exceeded his expenditures in relation to his campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, Ejercito already spent the sum of PhP23,730.784 based on the party’s official monitoring. Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by Edgar San Luis before the Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the Province of Laguna. Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and ViceGovernor, respectively, of Laguna. Ejercito prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural and substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Provincial Governor. He countered that the petition was improperly filed because, based on the averments and relief prayed for, it is in reality a complaint for election offenses; thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC First Division granted San Luis’ petition and disqualified Ejercito due to the alleged violations of the Election Code. The COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the COMELEC First Division. ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioner should be disqualified for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of what is allowed by the law RULING: Yes. Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that such contract benefited him,Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent. Citing

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in accordance with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He believes that an advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent must be considered a form of political speech that must prevail against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution. He also stresses that it is clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is presumably because discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the government. We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because non-compliance is consideredas an election offense. Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party. Conformably with the mandate of the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by a written acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized representatives. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states thatit shall be unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate without the written acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed by the true and correct name and address of the donor. Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus: SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty may spend for election campaign shall be as follows: (a) For candidates – Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and (b) For political parties - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax. The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the voters’ rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Article III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation, the law’s concern is not to curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidental and is no more than necessary to achieve the substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.

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Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the essence of a truly democratic form of government.

86. CHAVEZ V COMELEC GR NO. 162777 AUGUST 31, 2004 FACTS: Francisco Chavez, on August 18, October 14, and November 10, 2003, entered into formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products and authorized Andrew So to use his name and image for 96 North and signed Endorsement Agreements with Konka International Plastics Manufacturing Corp. Pursuant to these agreements, 3 billboards were set up along Balintawak Interchange. On December 2003, however, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Senator. On January 2004, COMELEC issued Resolution 6520. Section 32 of said Resolution provides that “all propaganda materials showing the picture, image, or name of a person and all advertisements on print, in radio, and television showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to placement or display becomes a candidate for public official, shall be immediately removed by the candidate and the media within 3 days after effectivity of said Resolution”. Chavez was directed to comply by the COMELEC Law Department but he asked to be exempted from its application considering that the billboards are mere product advertisements and cannot be construed as paraphernalia for premature campaigning. COMELEC ordered him to remove or cause the removal of the billboards. Feeling aggrieved, Chavez asked the Supreme Court to declare the provision unconstitutional ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 32 of Resolution 6520 is valid RULING: Yes. A close examination of the assailed provision reveals that its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and popularity. The latter is a valid reason for the exercise of police power. Moreover, petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code, election campaign or partisan political activity is defined as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models. Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt, would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning.

87. PILAR V. COMELEC 245 SCRA 759 FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be held liable for failure to file statement of contributions and expenditures RULING: YES. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy." Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule. The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same. Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. ade for the purpose of influencing the results of the elections. Thus, laws and regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited or unlawful, and what expenditures are authorized or lawful. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.

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BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, WATCHERS, VOTING, CANVASS AND PROCLAMATION, ELECTION CONTESTS AND ELECTION OFFENSES 88. BIENVENIDO LLOREN –versus- COMELEC AND ROGELIO PUA GR NO. 196355 SEPTEMBER 18, 2012 BERSAMIN, J.: Facts Petitioner Bienvenido Lloren and Respondent Rogelio Pua were the candidates for Vice-Mayor of Inopacan, Leyte in the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Pua was proclaimed as the winning candidate by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Lloren commenced and Election Protest Case in the RTC of Hilongos, Leyte, alleging massive vote-buying, intimidation, defective PCOS machines in all the clustered precincts, election fraud, and other election-related manipulations. Pua, in his answer, alleged that the protest stated no cause of action, was insufficient in form and content, and should be dismissed for Lloren’s failure to pay the required cash deposit. The RTC dismissed the election protest for insufficiency in form and substance and for failure to pay the required cash deposit. Lloren then paid the appeal feel and the RTC granted due course to the appeal. Subsequently, Lloren remitted the appeal fee to the COMELEC Electoral Contests Adjudication Department (ECAD) by postal money order. The COMELEC First Division dismissed the appeal on the ground that Lloren failed to pay the appeal fee within the period set under Section 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, so Lloren moved for the reconsideration of the dismissal and sent a notice that he paid the motion fee by postal money order. The COMELEC En Banc denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Issue W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders? a. W/N Lloren timely paid the fees due? b. W/N the appeal may still proceed? Held a. Yes, Lloren timely paid the fees due. Under Section 8, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the trial court to the COMELEC within five days after promulgation by filing a notice of appeal in the trial court that rendered the decision, serving a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse counsel or on the adverse party if the party is not represented by counsel. Section 9, of Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC prescribes for that purpose an appeal fee of P1, 000.00 to be paid to the trial court rendering the decision simultaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal. It should be stressed, however, that the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC did not supersede the appeal fee prescribed by the COMELEC under its own rules of procedure. As a result, “the requirement of two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions caused confusion in the implementation by the COMELEC of its procedural rules on the payment of appeal fees necessary for the perfection of appeals.” To remove the confusion, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486, effective on July 24, 2008, whereby the COMELEC clarified the rules on the payment of the two appeal fees by allowing the appellant to pay the COMELEC’s appeal fee of P3,200.00 at the COMELEC’s Cash Division through the ECAD or by postal money order payable to the COMELEC within a period of 15 days from the time of the filing of the notice of appeal in the trial court. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that petitioner perfected his appeal of the decision rendered on November 12, 2012 by the RTC in EPC No. H-026. He filed his notice of appeal and paid the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the RTC on November 17, 2012. Such filing and payment, being done within five days from the promulgation of the decision, complied with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules in A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. Thereafter, he paid the appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the COMELEC Cash Division through the ECAD on December 2, 2012. Such payment, being done on the fifteenth day from his filing of the notice of appeal in the RTC, complied with Resolution No. 8486. b. No, the appeal may no longer proceed.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Section 10(c), Rule 2 of the Rules in AM No. 10-4-1-SC provides: Section 10. Contents of the protest or petition.— xxxx c. An election protest shall also state: (i) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and had been voted for the same office; (ii) the total number of precincts in the municipality; (iii) the protested precincts and votes of the parties in the protested precincts per the Statement of Votes by Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes are not specified; and (iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested precincts. (Emphasis supplied) Lloren did not indicate the total number of precincts in the municipality in his election protest. The omission rendered the protest insufficient in form and content and warranted tis summary dismissal in accordance with Sec. 12, Rule 2 of the Rules in AM No. 10-4-1-SC: Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests.—The court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following grounds: (a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10; (c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules; (d) The filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election protest or petition for quo warranto; and (e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within five (5) days from the filing of the protest. (Emphasis supplied) Furthermore, the RTC found out that the cash deposit made by Lloren was insufficient.

89. Nollen v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187635, 11 January 2010 Facts: Private respondent Susana Caballes and petitioner Mateo Nollen were both candidates for punong barangay of Gibanga, Sariaya, Quezon in the October 2007 barangay elections. Having garnered 456 votes against 448 Caballes’ 448 votes, Nollen was declared as the punong barangay elect. Caballes then instituted an election protest with the MTC. The latter rendered a decision declaring Caballes as punong barangay. Nollen then filed his appeal with regard to the MTC’s decision. Petitioner’s case was dismissed upon elevation to the COMELEC First Division due to his failure to pay the appeal fee of P3,000.00 as prescribed by Sections 3 & 4, Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure within the reglementary period of five days. Nollen then filed his motion for reconsideration, praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules. He averred that his payment of the P1,000 appeal fee was sufficient to perfect his appeal and to still require him to pay the additional fee of P3,000 and an additional P200, on top of what he already paid the MTC, would amount to a denial of his right to due process. The COMELEC en banc denied his motion for reconsideration rationalizing that while he timely filed his notice of appeal and simultaneously paid the P1,000 apeeal fee with the MTC, the appeal fee would be deemed duly registered and docketed only upon full payment of the filing fee to the COMELEC. The COMELEC also held that the error in the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioner’s appeal and subsequently denying his motion for reconsideration. Held:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Yes. The Court deemed it right to put things in proper perspective since there are several relevant incidents that transpired bearing on the payment of the appeal fees imposed by different rules in election cases. It may be recalled in Miranda vs. Castillo, the Court held that in election protest cases, the incomplete payment of the filing fee required by the COMELEC Rules is correctible by the payment of the deficiency. Then came the Zamoras case in 2004 in which the petitioner failed to fully pay the COMELEC-prescribed appeal fee of P3,200 exacted under COMELEC Resolution No. 02-0130, Series of 2002. The Court held that the subsequent payment of the filing fee did not relieve petitioner of his mistake. On May 15, 2007, the Court issued A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC providing the “Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials”. Among other things, it required the payment of a P1,000 appeal fee upon the filing of a notice of appeal. To remove the confusion, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8486 on July 15, 2008 providing for the following: “…appellant is required to pay the COMELEC appeal fee of P3,200 within a period of 15 days from the time of filing of the Notice of Appeal with the lower court. If no payment is made within the prescribed period, the appeal shall be dismissed pursuant to Section 9(a) of Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.” Then, on June 30, 2009, the Court, in Aguilar vs. COMELEC, held that the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000 appeal fee perfect the appeal consonant with Sections 10 and 11 of the same Rule. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the records have to be transmitted to the COMELEC within 15 days. In response to this ruling, the COMELEC then again issue Resolution No. 8654 providing that appeals to the COMELEC of trial court’s decision in election contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of the P1,000 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision within the 5day reglementary perio. The non-payment of insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200 to the COMELEC Cash Division does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal. If in case the applicant filed his appeal before the effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 8486, the applicant shall be directed to pay the additional appeal fee of P3,200 within 15 days from receipt of notice from the Commission. Then in another case (Divinagracia case), the Court included a caveat that for notice of appeal filed after the promulgation of the decision, errors in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no longer excusable. But, this warning is said to be inapplicable to the case at bar because the petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed on June 5, 2008. The previous decision finds applicability only in cases where notices of aoppeal were filed after the promulgation of the decision on July 27, 2009. Since the petitioner paid the appeal fee of P1,000 simultaneously with his filing of his notice of appeal on June 5, 2008, the appeal is considered perfected pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8654, taking it beyond the ambit of Divinagracia. His failure to pay the additional P3,200 cannot be taken against him, since the COMELEC failed to notify him regarding the additional appeal fee, as provided by the said resolution. Although he failed to pay the fee, he nonetheless voluntarily paid the remaining P3,200 on October 6, 2008. 90. Rosal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 168253, 16 March 2007

Facts: Petitioner Noel E. Rosal and private respondent Michael Victor C. Imperial were candidates for mayor of Legaspi City in the May 10, 2004 elections. After the counting and canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Legaspi City, having received 44,792 votes over private respondents 33,747 and thereby winning by a margin of 11,045 votes. On May 24, 2004, private respondent instituted a petition to annul the proclamation, assailing the canvass of election returns in the 520 precincts that had functioned during the election. On July 6, 2004, the case was superseded by an election protest filed by private respondent with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) contesting the results of the election in all 520 precincts on the grounds of miscounting, misreading and misappreciation of votes, substitute voting, disenfranchisement of voters, substitution and padding of votes, and other alleged irregularities. The Second Division issued on November 17, 2004 an order directing the collection of the ballot boxes from the contested precincts and their delivery to the Comelec. The report of the revision of the contested ballots indicated a reduction in petitioners vote count from 44,792 votes to 39,752 and an increase in that of private

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) respondent from 22,474 to 39,184 votes. Shortly thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for technical examination of contested ballots on the ground that thousands of ballots revised by the revision committees were actually spurious ballots that had been stuffed inside the ballot boxes sometime after the counting of votes but before the revision proceedings. The Second Division said that “mere allegations cannot suffice to convince this Commission that switching of ballots has occurred, absent any positive and direct evidence in the form of fake ballots themselves being found among genuine ballots. Regardless of any technical examination that may have been conducted or testimonial evidence presented, as emphatically moved by the protestee but denied by the Commission, the best proof of the alleged substitution of ballots is the ballots themselves. And the process by which this proof is established is by way of an evaluation of the ballots by the Commission itself during its appreciation of the revised ballots.” On the basis of this reasoning, the Second Division proceeded with an appreciation and recount of the ballots from over 300 precincts and set aside the physical count of the revised ballots in favor of the election returns only in precincts the ballot boxes of which were found to contain spurious ballots. Issue: Whether the ballots found in the ballot boxes during the revision proceedings were the same ballots that were cast and counted in the elections. Held: NO. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is the true and lawful choice of the electorate. Such a proceeding is usually instituted on the theory that the election returns, which are deemed prima facie to be true reports of how the electorate voted on election day and which serve as the basis for proclaiming the winning candidate, do not accurately reflect the true will of the voters due to alleged irregularities that attended the counting of ballots. In a protest prosecuted on such a theory, the protestant ordinarily prays that the official count as reflected in the election returns be set aside in favor of a revision and recount of the ballots, the results of which should be made to prevail over those reflected in the returns pursuant to the doctrine that in an election contest where what is involved is the number of votes of each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves. It should never be forgotten, though, that the superior status of the ballots as evidence of how the electorate voted presupposes that these were the very same ballots actually cast and counted in the elections. Thus, it has been held that before the ballots found in a box can be used to set aside the returns, the court (or the Comelec as the case may be) must be sure that it has before it the same ballots deposited by the voters. The doctrines on how to address post-election fraud are: (1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution; (2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is on the protestant; (3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of achieving that end; (4) it is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee and (5) only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court or Comelec that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in the election returns. The procedure adopted by the Second Division was a complete inverse of the one outlined above and was contrary to reason. There was complete arbitrariness on its part. First, there was no indication at all that it ever considered the condition of the ballot boxes at the time they were delivered to the Comelec for revision. Second, it placed the burden of proving actual tampering of the ballots on petitioner herein (the protestee below) notwithstanding private respondents previous manifestation that most of the ballot boxes bore overt signs of tampering and only 79 ballot boxes were found intact. Third, instead of diligently examining whether the ballot boxes were preserved with such care as to preclude any reasonable opportunity for tampering with their contents, the Second Division made the probative value of the revised ballots dependent solely on whether spurious ballots were found among them. It failed to recognize that, in view of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) reports that the ballot boxes had been tampered with and allegations that their contents had been switched with genuine but invalid ballots, the question of whether the revised ballots could be relied on as the same ones cast and counted during the elections could not obviously be settled by an examination of the ballots themselves. Clearly, the time when these were deposited in the ballot boxes a detail of utmost importance could not possibly have been determined by that means. These errors on the part of the Second Division were infinitely far from harmless; the proper legal procedure could have made a substantial difference in the result of the election protest and most certainly could have led to a better approximation of the true will of the electorate. This, in the final analysis, is what election protests are all about. Under the circumstances, the question as to who between the parties was duly elected to the office of mayor cannot be settled without further proceedings in the Comelec. In keeping with the precepts laid down in this decision, the Comelec must first ascertain, after due hearing, whether it has before it the same ballots cast and counted in the elections. For this purpose, it must determine: (1) which ballot boxes sufficiently retained their integrity as to justify the conclusion that the ballots contained therein could be relied on as better evidence than the election returns and (2) which ballot boxes were in such a condition as would afford a reasonable opportunity for unauthorized persons to gain unlawful access to their contents. In the latter case, the ballots must be held to have lost all probative value and cannot be used to set aside the official count reflected in the election returns. 91. Vinzons-Chato v. HRET, G.R. No. 199149, 22 January 2013 Facts: Liwayway Vinzons-Chato renewed her bid in the May 10, 2010 elections as representative of the Second Legislative District of Camarines Norte. She lost to Elmer Panotes who was proclaimed the winner having garnered a total of 51,707 votes as against Chato's 47,822 votes. Chato filed an electoral protest before theHRET assailing the results in all the 160 clustered precincts in four (4) municipalities, namely: Daet, Vinzons, Basud and Mercedes. Pursuant to Rule 37 of the 2011 Rules of the HRET, Chato designated 40 pilot clustered precincts, equivalent to 25% of the total number of protested clustered precincts, in which revision of ballots shall be conducted. The initial revision of ballots, conducted on March 21 - 24, 2011, showed a substantial discrepancy between the votes of the parties per physical count visa-vis their votes per election returns. Panotes then moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the case, and prayed that a preliminary hearing be set in order to determine first the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes used in the elections. He further urged that, should it be shown during such hearing that the ballots and ballot boxes were not preserved; the HRET should direct the printing of the picture images of the ballots of the questioned precincts stored in the data storage device for said precincts. Consequently, the HRET directed the copying of the picture image files of ballots relative to the protest. Chato, however, moved for the cancellation of the decryption and copying of ballot images arguing inter alia that there was no legal basis therefor and that the HRET had not issued any guidelines governing the exercise thereof. Notwithstanding her protest, the decryption and copying proceeded as scheduled. Chato then filed an Urgent Motion to prohibit the Use of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images reiterating the lack of legal basis for the decryption and copying of ballot images inasmuch as no preliminary hearing had been conducted showing that the integrity of the ballots and ballot boxes was not preserved. Moreover, Chato alleged that the ballot images were taken from polluted Compact Flash (CF) cards. The Camarines Norte Provincial Elections Supervisor, was said to have admitted during canvassing proceedings that the CF cards for the Municipalities of Labo, Vinzons and Basud were defective and had to be replaced. Panotes, on the other hand, stressed in his Opposition that the decryption and copying of the ballot images was at the authority of the HRET itself, and formally requested on February 10, 2011 the copying of the picture image files of ballots and election returns in 13 election protests pending before it. Should he then decide to use the decrypted and copied ballot images, there is nothing in the HRET rules that prohibit the same. With respect to the allegation that certain defective CF cards were replaced, Panotes argued that it was during the election day, May 10, 2010, that the CF cards were found to be not working so they had to be re-configured. Consequently, the voting in some precincts in the Municipalities of Labo, Vinzons and Basud started late, but the voting period was extended accordingly. For this reason, the canvassing before the Provincial Board of Canvassers was halted in order to wait for the transmission of the results from the Municipal Board of Canvassers, which could not be done until each and every clustered precinct was duly accounted for. The case was subsequently set for preliminary hearing on May 27, 2011.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On June 8, 2011, the HRET issued the assailed Resolution denying Chato's Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images on the ground that she failed to show proof that the CF cards used in the 20 precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with substantial variances were not preserved or were violated. The HRET declared that, although the actual ballots used in the May 10, 2010 elections are the best evidence of the will of the voters, the picture images of the ballots are regarded as the equivalent of the original. Aggrieved, Chato filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied in the Resolution dated September 15, 2011. In another case, the revision of ballots in the remaining 75% protested clustered precints was continued by HRET as requested by Chato. Panotes motion for reconsideration was denied and now Panotes claims grave abuse of discretion on HRET. Issue: 1.) Whether or not the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the "official ballots" or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out? 2.) Whether or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion? Held: 1) YES. The picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise "official ballots" that faithfully captures in electronic form the votes cast by the voter. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. However, the possibility of tampering or substitution of the CF cards did not escape the HRET, which provided in its Guidelines on the Revision of Ballots that: Sec. 11. Printing of the picture images of the ballots in lieu of photocopying. – Unless it has been shown, in a preliminary hearing set by the parties or motu propio, that the integrity of any of the Compact Flash (CF) Cards used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved or the same was violated, as when there is proof of tampering or substitution, the Tribunal, in lieu of photocopying of ballots upon any motion of any of the parties, shall direct the printing of the picture image of the ballots of the subject precinct stored in the data storage device for the same precinct. The Tribunal shall provide a non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Accordingly, the HRET set the instant case for preliminary hearing on May 27, 2011, and directed Chato, the protestant, to present testimonial and/or documentary evidence to show proof that the integrity of the CF cards used in the May 10, 2010 elections was not preserved or was violated. The HRET, however, found Chato's evidence insufficient. To substitute the Court's own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtlessly constitute an intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it. An investigation revealed that the main CF Card for CP No. 44 of the Municipality of Daet could possibly be located inside the ballot box of the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Daet, Camarines Norte , after having been allegedly submitted in an improvised envelope, by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) of said CP 44 to the MBOC. It was, therefore, recommended that said ballot box be opened to retrieve the said CF card. Accordingly, in her January 6, 2012 letter to Chato, Atty. Romero-Cortez submitted certain documents relative to the opening of the ballot box of the MBOC of Daet, Camarines Norte so the main CF Card for CP 44 of Daet may be retrieved and its custody turned over to the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD), COMELEC. Likewise, in her January 6, 2012 letter, ERSD Director Villaflor-Roxas requested that a representative of Chato be present on the day to witness the verification and backing-up of the contents of the main CF card for CP No. 44 of Daet, Camarines Norte. Verily, the case of the alleged missing CF Card for Clustered Precinct No. 44 is no mystery at all. 2) NO The Constitution mandates that the HRET "shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of its members. By employing the word "sole", the Constitution is emphatic that the jurisdiction of the HRET in the adjudication of election contests involving its members is intended to be its own – full, complete and unimpaired. There can be no challenge, therefore, to such exclusive control absent any clear showing, as in this case, of arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power that constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy therefor. Contrary to Panotes' posturing, there existed legal and factual bases for the revision of the remaining 75% of the protested clustered precincts. Rule 37 of the 2011 HRET Rules clearly provides that, after post-revision determination of the merit or legitimacy of the protest, the Tribunal may proceed with the revision of the ballots in the remaining contested precincts. At the risk of unduly encroaching on the exclusive prerogative of the HRET as the sole judge of election contests involving its members, we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the HRET on the issues of whether the evidence presented during the initial revision could affect the officially proclaimed results and whether the continuation of the revision proceedings could lead to a determination of the true will of the electorate. 92. MALIKSI v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203302, 12 March 2013 FACTS: During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit. The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR. Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First Division. The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision. ISSUE: WON the ballot images are secondary evidence. HELD: NO Maliksi assailed the use by the COMELEC First Division of the ballot images in the CF cards. He alleged that the best and most conclusive evidence are the physical ballots themselves, and when they cannot be produced or when they are not available, the election returns would be the best evidence of the votes cast. We do not agree. We have already ruled that the ballot images in the CF cards, as well as the printouts of such images, are the functional equivalent of the official physical ballots filled up by the voters, and may be used in an election protest. In the recent consolidated cases of Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Panotes and Panotes v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Vinzons-Chato,33 the Court ruled that “the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise ‘official ballots’ that faithfully capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369.”34 The Court declared that the printouts of the ballot images in the CF cards “are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.” In short, both the ballot images in the CF cards and the printouts of such images have the same evidentiary value as the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) official physical ballots filled up by the voters. In Vinzons-Chato and Panotes, the Court explained in length: Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines “official ballot” where AES is utilized as the “paper ballot, whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic form.” An automated election system, or AES, is a system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting, consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other electoral process. There are two types of AES identified under R.A. No. 9369: (1) paper-based election system; and (2) direct recording electronic system. A paper-based election system, such as the one adopted during the May 10, 2010 elections, is the type of AES that “use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the vote count. On the other hand, direct recording electronic election system “uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a ballot display provided with mechanical or electro-optical component that can be activated by the voter, processes data by means of computer programs, record voting data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically. As earlier stated, the May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the oval opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast. We agree, therefore, with both the HRET and Panotes that the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise “official ballots” that faithfully captures (sic) in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2 (3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest. It bears stressing that the digital images of the ballots captured by the PCOS machine are stored in an encrypted format in the CF cards. “Encryption is the process of encoding messages (or information) in such a way that eavesdroppers or hackers cannot read it, but that authorized parties can. In an encryption scheme, the message or information (referred to as plaintext) is encrypted using an encryption algorithm, turning it into an unreadable ciphertext. This is usually done with the use of an encryption key, which specifies how the message is to be encoded. Any adversary that can see the ciphertext, should not be able to determine anything about the original message. An authorized party, however, is able to decode the ciphertext using a decryption algorithm, that usually requires a secret decryption key, that adversaries do not have access to.”35 (Citations omitted) Maliksi further alleged that the ballot images in the CF cards should merely be considered as secondary evidence and should be resorted to only when the physical ballots are not available or could not be produced. The ballot images, which are digital, are electronically generated and written in the CF cards when the ballots are fed into the PCOS machine. The ballot images are the counterparts produced by electronic recording which accurately reproduce the original, and thus are the equivalent of the original. As pointed out by the COMELEC, “[t]he digital images of the physical ballots are electronically and instantaneously generated by the PCOS machines once the physical ballots are fed into and read by the machines.”37 Hence, the ballot images are not secondary evidence. The official physical ballots and the ballot images in the CF cards are both original documents. The ballot images in the CF cards have the same evidentiary weight as the official physical ballots. 93. CASTRO vs COMELEC [ G.R. No. 125249; February 7, 1997; 267 SCRA 806]

Facts: Petitioner Jimmy S. De Castro was proclaimed Mayor of Gloria, Oriental Mindoro during the May 8, 1995 elections. Private respondent Amando A. Medrano was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of the same municipality.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On May 19, 1995, Castro’s rival candidate, the late Nicolas M. Jamilla, filed an election protest. During the pendency of said contest, Jamilla died which resulted to the dismissal of the election protest on the ground that the death of the protestant extinguishes the case itself because such action is personal in nature. On January 9, 1995, Medrano learned about the dismissal of the protest from one Atty. Gaudencio S. Sadicon, who, as the late Jamilla’s counsel, was the one who informed the trial court of his clients demise. On January 15, 1996, Medrano filed his Omnibus Petition/Motion (For Intervention and/or Substitution with Motion for Reconsideration). Opposition thereto was filed by Castro on January 30, 1996. In an Order dated February 14, 1996, the trial court denied private respondents Omnibus Petition/Motion and stubbornly held that an election protest being personal to the protestant, is ipso facto terminated by the latter’s death. Issue: Is the election contest a personal action extinguished upon the death of the real party in interest? If not, what is the mandatory period within which to effectuate the substitution of parties? Held: No. It is true that a public office is personal to the public officer and is not a property transmissible to his heirs upon death. Thus, applying the doctrine of actio personalis moritur cum persona, upon the death of the incumbent, no heir of his may be allowed to continue holding his office in his place. But while the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. An election contest, after all, involves not merely conflicting private aspirations but is imbued with paramount public interests. The death of the protestant, as in this case, neither constitutes a ground for the dismissal of the contest nor ousts the trial court of its jurisdiction to decide the election contest. The asseveration of Castro that Medrano is not a real party in interest entitled to be substituted in the election protest in place of the late Jamilla, is utterly without legal basis. “--the Vice Mayor elect has the status of a real party in interest in the continuation of the proceedings and is entitled to intervene therein. For if the protest succeeds and the protestee is unseated, the Vice-Mayor succeeds to the office of Mayor that becomes vacant if the one duly elected can not assume the post.” The filing by Medrano of his Omnibus Petition/Motion on January 15, 1996, well within a period of thirty days from December 19, 1995 when Jamilla’s counsel informed the trial court of Jamilla’s death, was in compliance with Section 17, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. Since the Rules of Court, though not generally applicable to election cases, may however be applied by analogy or in a suppletory character, Medrano was correct to rely thereon. 94. SAMPAYAN vs DAZA (1992) FACTS: On 18 February 1992, petitioners filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Congressman Raul Daza on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974. It was alleged that respondent Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. The petition pertains to the unlawful assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should be given due course? HELD: NO. First, this case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. Since petitioners challenge the qualifications of Congressman Daza, the appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) cancel respondent Daza’s certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within ten (10) days after Daza’s proclamation. Third, a writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. A writ of prohibition is not intended to provide for acts already consummated. Fourth, as a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. 95. Marquez vs COMELEC, GR 112889, April 18, 1995 Facts: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for the elective position for the elective position in the Province of Quezon in the 11th May 1992 elections filed a petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC which dismissed his petition for quo warranto against the winning candidate, herein private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice. It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country. Before the 11th May 1992 elections, a petition for cancellation of Rodriguez's certificate of candidacy, on the ground of that he is a fugitive from justice(Sec. 40[e] of Local Government Code) was filed by Marquez with the COMELEC. On 08 May 1992, the COMELEC dismissed the petition. Marquez's subsequent recourse to the Supreme Court from the 08th May 1992 resolution of COMELEC was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent. The Court held that a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable at this point of time and should be dismissed. The proper remedy of Marquez is to pursue the disqualification suit in a separate proceeding. Rodriguez was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Marquez immediately instituted quo warranto proceedings against private respondent before the COMELEC. In its 02 February 1993 resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the petition. COMELEC en banc denied Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice. Held: INSUFFICIENT FINDINGS. CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC As the petitioner claims, the Local Government Code is rather clear, and it disqualifies "fugitive from justice" which includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term. Rodriguez would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight Committee which was convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy. The Oversight Committee entertained serious apprehensions on the possible constitutional infirmity of Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code if the disqualification therein meant were to be so taken as to embrace those who merely were facing criminal charges. The Oversight Committee came out with Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It provided that a fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment. However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to REMAND the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. 96. RODRIGUEZ vs COMELEC G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996

FACTS: Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were protagonist for the gubernatorial seat in the Province of Quezon. During the 1992 elections, Rodriguez won which was questioned by Marquez through a quo warranto petition (EPC 92-28) with the COMELEC. The protest cited Sec 40 (e) of the LCG as the basis of disqualification. Marquez revealed that a charge was filed against Rodriguez in the US on 12 Nov 1985 for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft. The petition was DISMISSED.Upon appeal to the Supreme Court via certiorari (Marquez vs Rodriguez GR 112889)the court promulgated on 18 Apr 1995 the MARQUEZ decision effectively defining the term “fugitive from justice”: “includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution”. It REMAMDED the case to the COMELEC for its factual determination WON Rodriguez was in fact a fugitive of justice. Motion for Reconsideration filed by Rodriguez and subsequently an Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in support of such motion was filed to which was attached a certification from the Commission on Immigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on 25 Jun 1985 (prior the charge against him was ever filed). Pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration, during the 1995 elections wherein Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position. Marquez this time challenged Rodroguez’ candidacy via a petition for disqualification (SPA 95-089) on the same grounds as EPC 92-28, this was filed on 11 April 1995.Subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration of Rodriguez regarding GR 112889 was DISMISSED. Thereby, the COMELEC promulgated a CONSOLIDATED Resolution dated 7 May 1995 on EPC 92-28 and SPA 95-089, ruling in favor of Marquez Ordered Rodriguez to immediately vacate his position and his certificate of candidacy was set aside.At any rate Rodriguez emerged victorious in the 8 May 1995 elections and he was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as Governor despite the suspension from the COMELEC in relation to the consolidated resolution promulgated in 7 May 1995.This order of suspension of proclamation is the issue of this petition for certiorari (GR 120099) as filed by Rodriquez on 16 May 1995. The decision of the court with regard to this petition DIRECTED COMELEC to receive and evaluate evidence. After the proper proceeding COMELEC declared Rodriguez NOT a fugitive from justice, the intent to evade is material to the definition of “fugitive from justice” in the Marquez Decision, such intent is ABSENT in Rodriguez’s case evidence has established that Rodriquez arrived in the Philippines long before the criminal charge was instituted in the US. But it further stated that it would be more comfortable if the Supreme Court decided on the matter given the conflicting interpretations of the parties as to the definition provided in the Marquez Decision. ISSUE: Whether or not, Rodriguez was a “fugitive from justice” as defined in the Marquez Decision, rendering him ineligible to run for office as provided for in Sec 40(e) of the LGC.

HELD: NO, the element of intent to evade not present in the case of Rodriguez, which is a compelling factor in the Marquez Decision definition, he cannot be held as a fugitive from justice. The definition in the Marquez Decision indicates that the intent to evade is a compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a particular jurisdiction. There can be no intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is NO knowledge of the same by the supposed fleeing subject. One cannot evade something he does not know for a fact. Rodriguez case cannot fit into the said concept (Marquez Decision). The filing of the felony in LA was five (5) months after he left the United States. There was no sufficient evidence to conclude that he attempted to evade the law. His compulsion to return to the country was due to the ouster of Former President Marcos. A broader concept of the definition as espoused by the COMELEC and Marquez i.e., that someone can be considered a “fugitive from justice” by the mere fact that he

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) leaves the jurisdiction were a charge is pending before him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight, cannot be adopted by the Court. Suffice it to say that the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice" (which is at variance with the MARQUEZ Decision) and proceed therefrom in resolving the instant petition. 97. MAQUILING VS COMELEC GR NO 195649; APRIL 16, 2003

FACTS: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor. He again tool his Oath of allegiance and executed affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship. He filed his COC for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed petition to disqualify arnado / cancel his COC with contention that Arnado is not resident of Kauswagan, and he Is a foreigner; and even alleged that travel documents would show that he is still using his US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines.Neither motion was acted upon, Arnado garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently Proclaimed as winner. RULING OF COMELEC first division: instead of treating the petition as an action for cancellation based on misrepresentation it considered it as one of for disqualification. It granted the petition,since the use of US passport is strong indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce his US citizenship.Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Arnado, among the grounds is : 7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is through a petition for quo warranto, which should have been filed within ten days from his proclamation. Petitioner Maquiling, who garnered second highest number of votes, intervened in the case and argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. ISSUE/S: 1. whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. 2. whether or not the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case. RULING: 1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the COMELEC En Banc. The original petition before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the certificate of candidacy and or disqualification, the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification. Effect of disqualification under section 6, R.A. 6646-- shall continue with the trial and hearing of athe action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. 2. Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. With Arnado's disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. A void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) respected. The electorate's awareness of the candidate's disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate's disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates. That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the proclamation. With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. 98. Orceo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190779, March 26,2010 Facts: This is a petition for certiorari questioning the validity of Resolution No. 8714 insofar as it provides that the term firearm includes airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations, which results in their coverage by the gun ban during the election period this year. Resolution No. 8714 is entitled Rules and Regulations on the: (1) Bearing, Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2) Employment, Availment or Engagement of the Services of Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. The Resolution was promulgated by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on December 16, 2009, and took effect on December 25, 2009. Resolution No. 8714 contains the implementing rules and regulations of Sec. 32 (Who May Bear Firearms) and Section 33 (Security Personnel and Bodyguards) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166, entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes. Section 1 of Resolution No. 8714 prohibits an unauthorized person from bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including all public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles or public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, during the election period. Under Section 2 (b) of Resolution No. 8714, the term firearm includes airgun, airsoft guns, and their replica/imitation in whatever form that can cause an ordinary person to believe that they are real. Hence, airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations are included in the gun ban during the election period from January 10, 2010 to June 9, 2010 Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term firearm in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 8714. Held: No. Evidently, the COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the implementing rules and regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms, among others. These details are left to the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses special knowledge and expertise on election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. PNP Circular No. 11 classifies the airsoft rifle/pistol as a special type of air gun, which is restricted in its use only to sporting activities, such as war game simulation. Any person who desires to possess an airsoft rifle/pistol needs a license from the PNP, and he shall file his application in accordance with PNP Standard Operating Procedure No. 13, which prescribes the procedure to be followed in the licensing of firearms. The minimum age limit of the applicant is 18 years old. The Circular also requires a Permit to Transport an airsoft rifle/pistol from the place of residence to any game or exhibition site.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) A license to possess an airsoft gun, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed The inclusion of airsoft guns and airguns in the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714 for purposes of the gun ban during the election period is a reasonable restriction, the objective of which is to ensure the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. However, the Court excludes the replicas and imitations of airsoft guns and airguns from the term firearm under Resolution No. 8714, because they are not subject to any regulation, unlike airsoft guns.

99. CAUSING vs. COMELEC GR 199139 September 9, 2014 FACTS: Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Baratoc, Nuevo, Iloilo. Mayor Biron issued a Memorandum ordering the “detail” of Causing to the Office of the Municipal Mayor due to exigencies of service. Mayor Biron also issued an order detailing Cataliona Belonie to the office of the Local Civil Registrar. Later, another Memorandum was again issued to Causing directing her to report to the Office of the Mayor immediately. Thereafter, Causing filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI in Iloilo City, claiming that the order of detail being made within the election period and without prior authority from the Comelec was illegal and violative Sec 6 (B), Comelec Resolution 8737 (Series of 2009) otherwise known as “In the Matter Enforcing the Prohibition against appointment or hiring of new employees, creating or filing of new positions, giving any salary increase or transferring or detailing any officer or employee in the civil service and suspension of local elective officials in connection with the May 10, 2010 national and local elections” However, Mayor Biron argued that the purpose of the transfer was to closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behaviour in dealing with co-employees and with the public transacting business in her office had been received; that as local chied executive, he was empowered to take personnel actions and other management prerogatives for the good of public service; that she was not being stripped of her functions as Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or detailed to another office in order to perform a different function; and that she was not demoted to a lower position that diminished her salary and other benefits. . ISSUE: WON there was a valid transfer of Causing HELD: Yes. The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment;” while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor “some little steps” away. We cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the phrase “any transfer or detail whatsoever” encompassed “any and all kinds and manner of personnel movement,” including the mere change in office location. Mayor Biron was sought to be charged with an election offense punishable under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Every reasonable doubt must then be resolved in favor of the accused. This means that the courts must not bring cases within the provision of a law that are not clearly embraced by it. In short, no act can be pronounced criminal unless it is clearly made so by statute prior to its commission (nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege Equally material is that Mayor Biron’s act of transferring the office space of Causing was rooted in his power of supervision and control over the officials and employees serving in his local government unit, in order to ensure the faithful discharge of their duties and functions. The issuance of Office Order No. 13 by Mayor Biron detailing Belonio to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) was not proof of Mayor Biron’s “crystal clear intention” to replace and transfer her during the election period. As the COMELEC En Banc found, Belonio did not receive the order, and Causing remained as the Municipal Civil Registrar, leaving the detailing of Belonio uncompleted. Without the actual appointment of Belonio as the Municipal Civil Registrar, it would be unwarranted to criminally charge Mayor Biron of violating Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is interesting to note that aside from the present election offense case, Causing initiated an administrative case in the Civil Service Commission to challenge her “reassignment” pursuant to the same office orders. In that administrative case, she referred to the personnel movement not as a transfer ordetail, but as a reassignment that constituted her constructive dismissal.40 On August 13, 2010, the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Mandurriao, Iloilo City ruled that although Mayor Biron used the word detail in referring to the personnel movement effected, the personnel action that actually took place, albeit a reassignment, was a valid reassignment. Considering that reassignment was not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code, there was no probable cause to criminally charge Mayor Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code.

100. People v. Reyes, 247 SCRA 328

Facts: Respondent Buenaventura C. Maniego, Collector of Customs, issued Manila International Container Port (MICP) Customs Personnel Order No. 21-92 dated January 10, 1992 assigning Jovencio D. Ebio, Customs Operation Chief, MICP to the Office of the Deputy Collector of Customs for Operations as Special Assistant. The actual transfer of Ebio was made on January 14, 1992. On May 4, 1992, Ebio filed with the COMELEC a letter-complaint protesting his transfer. Ebio claimed that his new assignment violated COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 and section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibits the transfer of any employee in the civil service 120 days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized national and local elections. After a preliminary investigation, the COMELEC filed on May 6, 1995 an information with the RTC, charging respondent Maniego with a violation of Section 261 (h) of B. P. Blg. 881. Before the arraignment, respondent Maniego moved to quash the information on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense. He contended that the transfer of Ebio on January 14, 1992 did not violate B.P. Blg. 881 because on that date the act was not yet punishable as an election offense. It purportedly became punishable only on January 15, 1992, the date of effectivity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2333 implementing Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881. Petitioner, through the COMELEC, opposed the motion to quash. On September 23, 1993, the trial court granted private respondent's motion to quash and dismissed Criminal Case No. 93-120275. Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied on January 25, 1995. Petitioner forthwith elevated the case to this Court on a pure question of law. Issue: Whether or not transfer is violative of section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 Held: Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881 does not per se outlaw the transfer of a government officer or employee during the election period. If done to promote efficiency in the government service. Hence, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2333provides that the Comelec has to pass upon the reason for the proposed transfer or detail. Prescinding from this predicate, two elements must be established to prove aviolation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, viz:(1) The fact of transfer or detail of a public officer or employee within the election period as fixed by the Comelec; and(2) The transfer or detail was effected without prior approval of the Comelec in accordance with its implementing rules and regulations. An officer cannot be held liable for violation of Section 261 (h) of B.P. Blg. 881, a penal provision, before the effectivity of Comelec Resolution No. 2333 promulgating the necessary implementing rules.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 101. BANAT vs. COMELEC GR 177508 August 7, 2009 DOCTRINE: Every election statute is deemed constitutional and the presumption always favors the validity of the statute assailed. Those who assail the validity of the statute should prove a clear and unequivocal breach andnot merely a speculative or argumentative one; otherwise the petition must necessarily fail. FACTS: The petitioner, the BANAT party-list, assails some provisions of RA 9369 and asks for a temporary restraining order to be issued against COMELEC to prevent it from implementing the statute. In their petition, they posit that the statute is unconstitutional since the statute itself contains provisions which are not germane RA 9369 since it speaks of poll automation, yet Sec. 34, 37, 38, and 43 speak of devices and methods for manual canvassing of election returns – matters which it claims are not embraced within the title of the statute itself. In addition to the abovementioned reason, BANAT additionally argues that Sections 37 and 38 impairs the powers of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal and the Senate Electoral Tribunal since under the amended provisions, Congress, in the case of the election of a President and Vice-President; and the COMELEC sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers, may exercise the functions of the PET and SET, respectively, when they are given the power to entertain pre-proclamation cases. Since they undermine and encroach upon the independence and jurisdiction of the PET and SEC, the law must be declared unconstitutional. Likewise, BANAT argues that Section 43 of the law is unconstitutional because it gives the different prosecuting arms of the government equal status as COMELEC in dealing with election-related offenses. Moreover, Section 34, which fixes the per diem of poll watchers, is unconstitutional because it violates the freedom of the parties to enter into a contract by fixing the allowance at PHP 400.00. ISSUE: WON RA 9369 IS unconstitutional HELD: No, it is constitutional. The title of RA 9369 is broad enough to encompass topics which deal not only with the automation process but with everything related to its purpose encouraging the conduction of transparent, credible, fair, and accurate elections. On the matter of Sections 37 and 38, Congress and the COMELEC do not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the PET and the SET. There is no conflict of jurisdiction since the powers of Congress and the COMELEC en bancandof the PET and the SET are exercised on different occasions and for different purposes. The PET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President whilethe SET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the Senate. Their jurisdiction can only be invoked once the winning presidential, vice presidential or senatorial candidates have been proclaimed. On the other hand, under Section 37 and 38 of RA 9369, Congress and the COMELEC en banccan determine only the authenticity and due execution of the Certificates of Canvass and Congress and the COMELEC en banccan exercise this power only before the proclamation of the winning presidential, vice-presidential, and senatorial candidates. As to the validity of Sections 43, it is valid. The grant of the exclusive power to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. As such, should the legislature see fit, it can freely amend the provisions of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure and the same act would not violate the Constitution. Lastly, as to Section 34, the same is valid as well. There is no violation of the non-impairment clause because such rule is limited in application only to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. In fixing the per diem of poll watchers, there has yet to be a

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) contract which could be enforced since RA 9369 was enacted three months before any contract for poll watching was even done. Even assuming that there already was a contract formed prior to the election period, the police power is superior to the non-impairment clause. The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the community. RA 9369 is an exercise of such power since it promotes the welfare of poll watchers, a position invested with public interest.

102. Arroyo vs. DoJ FACTS: The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections. The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage. After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is valid? HELD: Yes. Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the enforcement and administration of all election laws is intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same provision of law the authority to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the prosecutors had been conducting preliminary investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated authority given by the Comelec. Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team, should be viewed not as an abdication of the constitutional bodys independence but as a means to fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

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LAW ON PUBLIC CORPORATION Page 413


BASIC PRINCIPLES 1. Basco v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, 14 May 1991 Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of PD 1067-A on January 1, 1977. PD 1067-B granted it a franchise “to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the Philippines. On July 11, 1983, PD 1869 (PAGCOR’s charter) was issued. It provided that all games of chance in the Philippines, regardless of its territory, is placed under PAGCOR. It contained a repealing clause which repealed, amended, or modified all laws inconsistent with it. Furthermore, Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any “tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local.” Petitioners, Atty. Humberto Basco, et al., seek to annul PD 1869 because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy, and order. In particular, they contend that: 1. It is prejudicial to Manila City government’s right to impose taxes and license fees. Thus, it violates the principle of local autonomy. 2. It is contrary to the prohibition on monopolies, equal protection, and State Principles under Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth), Article II of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent PAGCOR alleges that petitioners have no standing. Issues:. Procedural: 1. W.O.N Petitioners have legal standing.

2. 3.

Substantive: W.O.N PD 1869 violates the principle of local autonomy W.O.N PD 1869 violates the Constitution.

Held: 1. Yes. The Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. The requirement is satisfied when petitioners have sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts complained of. Even if they are not strictly within said definition, the Court may waive the requirement. Thus, this Court has taken cognizance of this petition. 2. No. First, the City of Manila’s power to impose license fees on gambling has been revoked. Under PD 771, the power to regulate gambling through the grant of “franchise, licenses, or permits was vested exclusively on the National Government. Second, the City of Manila is a mere Municipal corporation that does not have an inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise, the municipality cannot assume it. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress. The Congress has the power to “create and abolish municipal corporations” due to its “general legislative powers.” Therefore, Congress has the power of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) control over Local Governments; and if the Congress can grant the power to tax, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. Under the doctrine of “supremacy” of the National Government over local government, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. In the words of Justice Holmes, “no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them." Third, the principle of local autonomy simply means decentralization. It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. In this case, PAGCOR, as an instrumentality of the Government, cannot be taxed by a mere local government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded, or subject to control by the local government. Justice Marshall calls the power to tax as the power to destroy. It cannot be allowed to defeat the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. Therefore, it does not violate the principle of local autonomy. 3. No. First, the equal protection clause is not violated because the clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary Second, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Third, the State policies mentioned are mere statements of principles and policies. These are not self-executing and requires a law to be passed. 2. Limbona vs. Mangelin Gr. No. 80391 Facts: On March 12, 1987 petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as their presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take precedence over any pending business in Batasang Pampook. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. Issue: Whether or not the courts have jurisdiction over the autonomous regions? Held: Yes. Aside from the order of reinstatement, the court ruled on the jurisdiction of national courts over the autonomous government of Mindanao. The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein. Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus: SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas: (1) Organization of regional administrative system; (2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region; (3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region; (4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region; (5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region; (6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree; (7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region; (8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities; (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region. The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs. The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. 3. Lina v. Pano, G.R. No. 129093, 30 August 2001 FACTS: Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz because of an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, which states the objection of the council to any form of gambling, especially Lotto. Calvento asked the RTC, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. Respondent judge Pano, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. ISSUE: Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based thereon are valid? HELD: NO. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayors permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the objection of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution. In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455). 4. IMBONG vs. OCHOA GR 204819 April 8, 2014 FACTS: At the core of these 14 petitions (mostly Petitions for Certiorari or Prohibition or both) and 2 petitions-inintervention is R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), which was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Despite previous legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country 72 reached over 76

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the RH Law contending that it violates (1) the right to life; (2) the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products; (3) the right to religious freedom; (4) the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude; (5) the right to equal protection of the law; (6) the due process clause; (7) the right to free speech; (8) the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority; (9) the one-subject/one-bill rule provision; (10) the Natural Law; and (11) the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) The petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. ISSUES: (1) WON the RH Law is unconstitutional (2) WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to the LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A. 9054 (organic act of the ARMM) HELD: (1) The Supreme Court partially granted the petitions. The RH Law is NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL but some of its Implementing Rules and Regulations are UNCONSTITUTIONAL. (2) NO. Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows: SECTION 17.Basic Services and Facilities. — (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein. (b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x xx. While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally- funded projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphasis in the original] Thus: (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

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In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use of the word “endeavor,” the LGUs are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments. The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. 5. DADOLE V. COMMISSION ON AUDIT GR No. 125350 FACTS: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that: xxx xxx xxx 2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160. Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied. On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the petitioner judges. ISSUES: 1. whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 2. whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress. RULING: 1. LBC 55 is null and void. We recognize that, although our Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President pursuant to Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a lawconforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 6. Limbona v. Mangelin, G.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989 FACTS: In October 1987, the Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the Lower House invited both the petitioner and the Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA) or Batasang Pampook (BP) Speaker of Region 9 for consultations and dialogues with different leaders of the two regions as regards different issues affecting the latter. The consultations and dialogues were dated from November 1-15. The members of the BP of both regions (Central Mindanao and Region 9) were also invited. Sultan AlimbusarLimbona (petitioner) was the Speaker of the RLA or BP of Region 12. Petitioner then informed the members of the BP of the said invitation. On November 2, 1987, however, the members of the BP of Region 12 did not heed the invitation. They instead held session in defiance of petitioner’s advice. Consequently, the BP members, through a resolution, expelled petitioner as the Speaker of the BP of Region 12 on the ground that petitioner allowed a resigned member of the BP to continue to receive the latter’s salaries and emoluments. Thus, petitioner filed a case directly to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA) or Batasang Pampook (BP) expelling the petitioner can be assailed in the Supreme Court? HELD: Yes. It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. However, PD No. 1618 organized the autonomous governments of Muslim Mindanao were organized in Regions 9 and 12. The Decree established “internal autonomy” in the two regions within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and the Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities.

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It requires the autonomous regional governments to undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions, except to act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government, which include, but not limited to, the following: (1) National defense and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and sea transport (7) Postal matters and telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine; (9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and naturalization; (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and (12) General auditing. Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. xxxxxxxxx See. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services. 7. Abbas v. Comelec, G.R. No. 89651. November 10, 1989 Facts: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, 1scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional. The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for regional autonomy. Article X, section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989. Issue: Whether Republic Act No. 6734 is valid. (YES) Held: Validity on the number of votes: Under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it. As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. What is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual constituent units. More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they ratified the Constitution.Validity based on the power of the President to merge existing regions: Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among others, states: . . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution which provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions. 8. Cordillera G. R. No. 79956

Broad January

Coalition

vs.

Commission 29,

on

Audit 1990

Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall not undertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political negotiations. A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that they are to: Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras. Par. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel in drafting the Executive Order. Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President Corazon Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR], which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of Baguio. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order, the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Issue: 1. Whether or not E.O. 220 is constitutional? 2. Whether or not the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision? 3. Whether or not the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the province? Held: 1. It is constitutional. E.O. 220 creating the Cordillera Administrative region is the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees from multi-sectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic act for the autonomous region. The organic act

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) shall be passed by the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be created. The creation of the Cordillera autonomous region will take time, The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created. The president enacting EO 220 created a region, covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director. The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras 2. CAR is a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. The CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas. It is the same as the 11 Regions created under PD No. 1 or Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972. 3. CAR does not contravene the local autonomy of the provinces within the CAR. The creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative autonomy these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions. CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. 9. ORDILLO V COMELEC Facts: On January 30, 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region." The official Commission on Elections (COMELEC) results of the plebiscite showed that the creation of the Region was approved by a majority of 5,889 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city above-mentioned. Consequently, the COMELEC, on February 14, 1990, issued Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region has been approved and/or ratified by majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date, the Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution and provided: And considering the proviso in Sec. 13(A) that only the provinces and city voting favourably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao being the only province which voted favourably — then, alone, legally and validly constitutes the CAR." (Rollo, p. 7) As a result of this, on March 8, 1990, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 setting the elections in the Cordillera Autonomous Region of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.: nad

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Even before the issuance of the COMELEC resolution, the Executive Secretary on February 5, 1990 issued a Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No. 220. On March 9, 1990, the petitioner filed a petition with COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for the Region. The COMELEC merely noted said petition. On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160 declaring among others that the Cordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the offices created under Executive Order No. 220 were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.- nad Issue: Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region. Held: No. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region. It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that the keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics. The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.- nad Aside from the 1987 Constitution, a reading of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 strengthens the petitioner's position that the Region cannot be constituted from only one province. Article III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Statute provide that the Cordillera Autonomous Region is to be administered by the Cordillera government consisting of the Regional Government and local government units. From these sections, it can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. Article XII, Section 10 of the law creates a Regional Planning and Development Board composed of the Cordillera Governor, all the provincial governors and city mayors or their representatives, two members of the Cordillera Assembly, and members representing the private sector. The Board has a counterpart in the provincial level called the Provincial Planning and Development Coordinator. The Board's functions (Article XII, Section 10, par. 2, Republic Act No. 6766) are almost similar to those of the Provincial Coordinator's (Title Four, Chapter 3, Article 10, Section 220 (4), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Local Government Code). If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform such functions while on the other hand it takes an entire Board to perform almost the same tasks in the regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the regional level. The respondent's theory of the Autonomous Region being made up of a single province must, therefore, fail. Article XXI, Section 13 (B) (c) alloting the huge amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to the Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements cannot be construed as funding only a lone and small province. There are other provisions of Republic Act No. 6766 which are either violated or which cannot be complied with. Section 16 of Article V calls for a Regional Commission on Appointments with the Speaker as Chairman and are (6) members coming from different provinces and cities in the Region. Under the respondents' view, the Commission would have a Chairman and only one member. It would never have a quorum. Section 3 of Article VI calls for cabinet members, as far as practicable, to come from various provinces and cities of the Region. Section 1 of Article VII creates a system of tribal courts for the various indigenous cultural communities of the Region. Section 9 of Article XV requires the development of a common regional language based upon the various languages and dialects in the region which regional language in turn is expected to enrich the national language. The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region. 10. BAI SANDRA SEMA VS COMELEC GR No. 177597, 16 July 2008 FACTS: The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The 1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1 st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1 st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City – this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s status as a legislative district (or part of any). Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides: No province, city, municipality or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units: province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. 11. MIRANDA vs. AGUIRRE G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999 FACTS: Sometime on May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite. On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Herein petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and Babaran are residents of Santiago City. They all assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528, alleging, among others, as ground, the lack of provision in R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite. In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials, contending that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a component city. It allegedly did not involve any creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units, hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor, Giorgidi B. Aggabao, a member of the provincial board of Isabela. He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991 do not require a plebiscite to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi. Consequently, petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its reclassification. Hence, this petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction. ISSUE: Whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite HELD: The petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law. The Court held that the Constitution requires a plebiscite. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus: "SECTION 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government units belongs to Congress. This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution vested in Congress. The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Its Section 10, Article X addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more autonomy to local government units. The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No. 8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the Constitution when it provides that: "(f) Plebiscite — (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date." xxx xxx xxx." The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in the political and economic rights of its people.

12. TAN vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 73155; July 1, 1986) FACTS: This case was prompted by the enactment of BP 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte. Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite. The plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of Negros del Norte, namely the Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.B. Magalona and Don Salvador Benedicto. Petitioners opposed, on the ground that BP 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: (1) the voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite; and (2) the area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of the Local Government Code. ISSUE: W/N the plebiscite was legal and has complied with the constitutional requisites under Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution HELD: The Supreme Court held that whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. As a consequence thereof, the Court ruled that the plebiscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. * Article XI, Section 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. 13. Padilla v Comelec, GR No. 103328, 19 October 1992 Facts: RESOLUTION 2312 - issued by Comelec pursuant to RA7155, setting the schedule and guidelines of the plebiscite for the creation of municipality of Tulay na Lupa in Camarines Norte. In the plebiscite held December 15, 1991, throughout the municipality of Labo only 2,980 votes favored its creation while 3, 439 voted against it. HON. ROY A PADILLA - the Governor of Camarines Norte who filed this special civil action of certiorari seeking to set aside the plebiscite conducted and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken, on the ground that the plebiscite was a complete failure and the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been conducted only in the political units affected - the 12 barangays namely Tulay Na Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan Bayan, Matanlang, Maot, and Calabasa. He contends that the remaining area of the mother unit of Municipality of Labo should not have been included. He also contends that since the phrase "unit or" was deleted in Art. X Sec. 10 1987 Consti, the Tan ruling is abandoned. Issue: Whether or not the plebiscite is valid? Held: Yes. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Sec 10 Art X 1987 Consti from its precursor Sec 3 Art XI 1973 Constitution has not affected the Tan ruling. As Justice Davide explained in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the words "unit or" were deleted because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected", it means that the residents of political entity who would be economically dislocated by separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-NaLupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 14. Umali v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203974, 22 April 2014 FACTS: On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.183-2011 requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). The President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418 proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991." Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No.12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the GC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of the LGU directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole. Private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago. ISSUE: Whether or not the entire registered voters of the province should vote? HELD: YES. In converting a city into a HUC, Sec 453 of the LGC calls for the conduct of a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. Meanwhile Sec 10, Art X of the Constitution mandates that no LGU shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered without approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected xxx Construing the law in harmony with the Constitution, the court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein." in Sec 452, LGC, to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted to a HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion. 15. Lopez v. Metro Manila Commission, G.R. No. L-56022, 31 May 1985 Facts: This case assails the constitutionality of PD No. 824, which was a response to a felt need for a “central government to establish and administer program and provide services common to” the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, and Caloocan as well as thirteen municipalities in the surrounding area. The basis for the petition is the provision “No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval of the majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. The Local Government Code was not enacted until 1983. Issue: W/N PD No. 824 is constitutional? Held: Yes, PD No. 824 is constitutional. The last vestige of doubt has been removed by the present constitutional provision adopted in the plebiscite on January 27, 1984. Thus in the Article on Batasang Pambansa it is expressly provided: "The Batasang Pambansa which shall be composed of not more than 200 Members unless otherwise provided by law, shall include representatives elected from the different provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities as may be declared by or pursuant to law, and districts in Metropolitan Manila, those elected or selected from the various sectors as may be provided by law, and those chosen by the President from Members of the Cabinet. Each district in Metropolitan Manila shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. The elective representatives shall be apportioned by law among the provinces with their component cities, highly urbanized cities, and the districts of Metropolitan Manila in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, but the provinces with component cities and highly urbanized cities shall have at least one

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) representative each. The provinces and cities shall have at least the same total number of representatives as under the 1935 Constitution." 1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government," with the terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the President. 2. It cannot be argued therefore that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute Metropolitan Manila, having manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code. 3. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was then entrusted with such responsibility. 4. The sole petitioner in the other case is likewise now Assemblyman Gemiliano C Lopez, Jr, of Metropolitan Manila. It is a mandamus petition to require respondent Commission on Elections to order the elections for members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod and Sangguniang Bayan in the four cities and thirteen towns of Metropolitan Manila. 5. To buttress the claim that there is a denial of the equal protection provision of the Constitution, the Court held that “It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the priveleges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.” 6. Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where there is express recognition of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. 7. The creation of the Metropolitan Manila Commission is free from any constitutional objection. There is, however, a question that may arise in connection with the powers of the President over the Commission. According to Presidential Decree No. 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and any official of the Commission shall be under the direct supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding any provision in this Decree, the President shall the power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution or act of the Commission, the General and the Commissioners." 16. Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010 FACTS: Assailed in this petition is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.” This law originated from House Bill No. 4264 and was signed into law by President Macapagal-Arroyo which took effect on October 31, 2099. In substance this law created an additional legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. Upon reapportionment, five (5) municipalities from the 1st district and two (2) from the 2 nd district were combined to form another legislative district. Petitioners assailed that the reapportionment was in violation of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district. They claimed that because of the reconfiguration, the proposed 1 st district will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383. They relied on Sec. 5 (3), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the minimum standard and that for a new legislative district to be valid, this must be complied with. To support their claim, the petitioners pointed to what they claim is the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt the said minimum number of population in the creation of additional legislative seats and that the number is actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.

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Respondents, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of petition on procedural and substantive grounds. Included in the substantive grounds is the apparent distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Sec. 5 (3), Art. VI. They conceded the existence of the 250,000 population condition but argued that the plain and simple reading of the questions provision will show that the same has no application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in provinces. Hence, the 250,000 requirement is only for the creation of a legislative district in a city. ISSUE: Whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province. HELD: No. There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative district. The basis of the petitioners for their contention – Sec. 5 (3), Art. VI – provides that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. This provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city or district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. The Court also discussed the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Sec. 461 of the LGC states the requisites for creation of a province: A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than P20,000,000.00 based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) A contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers , as certified by the Lands Management Bureau or (ii) A population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement. However, the Court clarified that they are not saying that the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional district should not be considered. The Court’s ruling is that population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by the petition. 17. MARIANO VS COMELEC G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995 FACTS: Petitioners are assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." Their grounds are as follows: 1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; 2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. 3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census; (b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and (c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7854 is constitutional. HELD: YES. 1. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. 2. The SC cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51 because petitioners failed to comply with the requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law. 3. In the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos, the SC ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty. Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty. Petitioners cannot also insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative. 18. League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 176951, 15 February 2011 Facts: These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas, assailing the constitutionality of the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) sixteen (16) laws, each converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city (Cityhood Laws), and seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. Note: The Court En Banc has twice changed its position on the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws. The tenor of the ponencias of the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution is that the exemption clauses in the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional because they are not written in the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), particularly Section 450 thereof, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9009, which took effect on June 30, 2001: “Section 450. Requisites for Creation. a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: xxxx (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. Issue: Whether the Cityhood Laws are constitutional? Held: Yes. The Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. The 16 Cityhood Bills do not violate Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution: “Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.” The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest. Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in 1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government unitsincome, population, and land area. Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A. No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for economic growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Congress, who holds the power of the purse, in enacting the Cityhood Laws, only sought the well-being of respondent municipalities, having seen their respective capacities to become component cities of their provinces, temporarily stunted by the enactment of R.A. No. 9009. By allowing respondent municipalities to convert into component cities, Congress desired only to uphold the very purpose of the LGC, i.e., to make the local government units enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals, which is the very mandate of the Constitution. 19. NAVARRO vs. ERMITA GR 180050 April 12, 2011 FACTS: On October 2, 2006, the President approved into law R.A. No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). The COMELEC conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC). With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January 26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007. On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O. Medina, former political leaders of Surigaodel Norte, filed before this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of Surigaodel Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA), and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and of Section 461 of the LGC. On February 10, 2010, the Court, by a vote of 9-6, declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the requirements on population and land area in the creation of a province under the LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and void. The Decision likewise declared as null and void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR), stating that, "[t]he land area requirement (at least 2,000 sq. km.) shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such exemption is not expressly provided in the law. The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but were denied on May 12, 2010. The Republic and Dinagat both filed their respective motions for leave of court to admit their second motions for reconsideration, but these motions were eventually "noted without action" by the Court. The movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 12, 2010. They allege that because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Court denied on the ground that the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, and that the appropriate time to file the said motion was before and not after the resolution of this case. They filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution alleging that, prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, their legal interest in this case was not yet existent. It was only after their election that they acquired legal interest.

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They then filed an Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment for the recall of the entry of judgment and for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration of the July 20, 2010 Resolution which remained unresolved. On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9355 is unconstitutional? HELD: No. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. It must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR. There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. Consistent with the declared policy to provide local government units genuine and meaningful local autonomy, contiguity and minimum land area requirements for prospective local government units should be liberally construed in order to achieve the desired results. It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 533 of the LGC, which expressly included the exemption from the land area requirement with respect to the creation of provinces consisting of one (1) or more islands. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption. Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC. It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake in the outcome of this case. It was COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 which provides, “If the Decision becomes final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be nullified…” that spawned the peculiar circumstances which invested the intervenors with locus standi. Accordingly, they could not have filed their intervention prior to the Court Decision declaring R.A. 9355 unconstitutional. The power to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already declared final. In this case, the compelling concern is not only to afford the movants-intervenors the right to be heard since they would be adversely affected by the judgment in this case despite not being original parties thereto, but also to arrive at the correct interpretation of the provisions of the LGC with respect to the creation of local government units.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 20. THE MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG, LANAO DEL SUR vs. PANGANDAPUN BENITO G.R. No. L-28113; March 28, 1969 Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, while the respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are the councilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. The petitioners brought this action for prohibition to nullify Executive Order 386 and to restrain the respondent municipal officials from performing the functions of their respective office. Petitioners relied on the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General. In Pelaez this Court, through Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion, ruled: (1) that section 23 of Republic Act 2370 [Barrio Charter Act, approved January 1, 1960], by vesting the power to create barrios in the provincial board, is a "statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio [and] implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities," and (2) that section 68 of the Administrative Code, insofar as it gives the President the power to create municipalities, is unconstitutional (a) because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and (b) because it offends against section 10 (1) of article VII of the Constitution, which limits the President's power over local governments to mere supervision. As this Court summed up its discussion: "In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment." On the other hand, the respondents, while admitting the facts alleged in the petition, nevertheless argue that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong. Issue/s: (1) Whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation - No; (2) Whether Executive Order 386 is unconstitutional – No. Held: The mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation. An early article in the Yale Law Journal offers the following analysis: “ xxx I. The color of authority requisite to the organization of a de facto municipal corporation may be: 1. A valid law enacted by the legislature; 2. An unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either (a) been upheld for a time by the courts or (b) not yet been declared void; provided that a warrant for its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potential existence by the general laws or constitution of the state. II. There can be no de facto municipal corporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by some legislative fiat. III. There can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, the invalidity of which is apparent on its face. IV. There can be no de facto corporation created to take the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be a usurper.”

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." For the existence of Executive, Order 386 is "an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored." There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. Thus, Executive Order 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices. 21. PELAEZ vs Auditor General GR L-23835 December 24, 1965 FACTS: In 1964 President pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued EO Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129, creating 33 municipalities. Petitioner Pelaez, as Vice-President and as taxpayer, filed a special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General to restrain him, as well as his representative and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. EOs are null and void on ground that Sec 68 has been repealed by RA No. 2370 and it constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. RA 2370 states that “barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board “upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the “recommendation of the council of the Municipality”. And so, if the President, under this law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality composed of several barrios? Respondent allege that there is no creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer. ISSUE: WON the Executive Orders are null and void HELD: Yes. It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix a common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function". Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices. 22. Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Judge Antonio Mendez, G.R. No. 103702, 6 December 1994 Facts: • 20 Aug 1959 – Pres. C.P Garcia issued EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of San Andres, Mangero, etc. along w/ their respective sitios. o EO 353 issued upon the request of the municipal council of San Narciso in its Res. No. 8 of 24 May 1959. • 05 Oct 1965 – By virtue of EO No. 174 issued by Pres. Diosdado Macapagal, municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a 5th class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Sec 2 of RA 1515. • 05 June 1989 – the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto w/ the RTC in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Mun. of San Andres. o Petition sought declaration of nullity of EO No. 353 & prayed that respondent local officials be permanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties & functions of their respective offices. o As per Pelaez v. Auditor General, municipality contended that EO No. 353 was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature & in violation of the constitutional principle of SOP. • Respondents asked for dismissal of the petition o petitioner deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality; o because Municipality had existed since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer be assailed; and o ptr municipality was not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the SolGen. • TC resolved to defer action on the MTD & to deny a judgment on the pleadings. • Municipality of San Andres filed anew a MTD alleging the case had become moot & academic w/ the enactment of RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. — . . . (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. o Motion opposed by petitioner: above provision inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing municipalities, not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio. • Order of 02 Dec 1991 – LC finally dismissed petition for lack of CoA on a matter that belonged to the State o "whatever defects (were) present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances & EOs, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160” o Petitioner municipality's MR denied. • SC: petition “for review on certiorari" Issue: W/N Municipality of San Andres is a de jure or de facto municipal corporation. Held: EO No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 Aug 1959 but it was only after 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the EO. In the meantime, the Municipal District, & later the Municipality of San Andres, began & continued to exercise the powers & authority of a duly created LGU. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a 1-year period can abrogate an action belatedly filed, so also, if not indeed w/ greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. All doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 Oct 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Rep, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be 1 of the 12 municipalities composing the 3rd District of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Quezon. Equally significant is Sec 442(d) of the LGC to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders & w/c have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Sec 442(d) of the LGC is proferred. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it incorporated Sec 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, w/c in essence are retrospective, & aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied w/," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subj to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. Disposition: Petition is DISMISSED. Digested by: Michaela Sarmiento 26. The Municipality of Candijay Bohol vs. CA, G.R. No. 116702, December 28, 1995 FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA. The RTC declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its possession and ownership over the same barrio". On appeal, CA however concluded that the RTC committed an error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (Candijay)." Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay." Moreover "As aptly pointed out, 'the plaintiff municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with Mabini.'" The respondent Court concluded that "the trial court erred since, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265 creating the latter and that both plans are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between [petitioner] and the Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong, mentioned in the aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located." The CA after weighing and considering the import of certain official acts, EO 265 - which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini and Act No. 968 - which set forth the respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay, concluded that "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay." ISSUE: W/N the respondent municipality's purported lack of juridical personality, as a result of having been created under a void executive order? HELD/RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. The Court noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared unconstitutional.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol.  Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.  WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner. 24. Municipality of Jimenez, Misamis Occidental v. Borja, G.R. No. 195748, 2 December 1996 FACTS: Municipality of Sinacban was created by E.O. No. 258 of Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Admin Code of 1917. By virtue of Municipal Council Reso No. 171, Sincaban laid claim with the Prov. Board of Misamis Occidenal against the Municipality of Jimenez to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, basedn on the tech description in E.O. 258. - southern part of Mun of Jimenez. It its answer, Mun. of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983. The Provincial Board denied the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration. Thus, Jimenez filed this pet for certioari questioning the validity of EO 258. Jimenez alleged that, the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial claim vis-a-vis Jimenez, of which it remains part. Jimenez prayed that Sinacaban be enjoined from assuming control and supervision over the disputed barrios. ISSUE: W/N Sinacban has legal personality duly created in accordance by law to file a claim. RULING: The Court held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. The Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991, Sec. 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Pursuant to the Local Govt Code, it must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 25. City of Manila v. Laguio, G. R. No. 18127, April 12, 2005 Facts: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Enacted by the City Council 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the said Ordinance is entitled: AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder: SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to: 1. Sauna Parlors; 2. Massage Parlors; 3. Karaoke Bars; 4. Beerhouses; 5. Night Clubs; 6. Day Clubs; 7. Super Clubs; 8. Discotheques; 9. Cabarets; 10. Dance Halls; 11. Motels and 12. Inns Issue: Whether or not the City Government has the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the said Ordinance? Held: No. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments. The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be included as among other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants or certain forms of amusement or entertainment which the City Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit. The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers must be construed against the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium. This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise come under the rule of strict construction. 26. WHITELIGHT CORP. vs. CITY OF MANILA, GR 122846 January 20, 2009 FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila”, which aims to minimize, if not eliminate, the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against City of Manila represented by Mayor Lim praying that the ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional Petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC), companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, are intervenors in the said complaint on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotel and motels in Manila. Moreover, that it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. (MTDC withdrew as plaintiff when petitioners in the case at bar are granted in their motion to intervene) RTC favored the petitioner, however CA reversed RTC’s decision thus this petition. ISSUE: WON City Ordinance No. 7774 is constitutional on the ground that it is a valid exercise of police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code HELD: No. It is not a valid exercise of due process, as such it is unconstitutional. The apparent goals of the Ordinance are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees to the people. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila vs Laguio Jr. has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (e) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (f) must not be unfair or oppressive; (g) must not be partial or discriminatory; (h) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (i) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (j) must not be unreasonable. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’”Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. 27. Fernando vs. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, 12 March 2013 Facts: Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted an ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance between the front monument line and the building line of an establishment. The city Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace, and move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the RTC of Marikina. The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari. Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing exercise of police power? Held: No. Police Power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.” Two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny test: Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites: 3) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, requisite its exercise; and 4) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for the use by the public and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of unlawful acts and “unneighborliness” due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid. 28. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties and PAGCOR (G.R. No 111097. July 20, 1994) FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of casino followed by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the youth. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid. HELD: NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed. The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. 30. Parayno v. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, 14 July 2006 Facts: In 1989, Jose Jovellanos and the residents of the Municipality of Calasiao, Pangasinan, requested the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) to close or transfer a gasoline filling station. The SB then passed Resolution no. 50 recommending to the mayor the closure or transfer of said gasoline filling station. Resolution no. 50 provided that the gasoline filling station should be closed or transferred because it: a. Violated the Art. 6, Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao because there was a school and church within 100 meters. b. It is in a thickly populated area c. Residents complained of the smell d. Violates the Building and Fire Safety Code e. Hampers the flow of traffic due to small entrance Petitioner, Concepcion Parayno, the owner of said gasoline filling station, opposed the resolution. She filed a motion for reconsideration with the SB; but it was denied. On appeal to the RTC of Dagupan City, Pangasinan, she alleged that: a. Her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code because the Code distinguishes between “gasoline filling station” and “gasoline service station” b. The case was res judicata because the issue was already settled in an HLURB Case “Jose Jovellanos v. Dennis Parayno (the previous owner) The RTC ruled that Resolution 50 was valid because of the principle of Ejusdem Generis or same kind, class, or nature. Thus, according to the RTC the “gasoline filling station” falls within the ambit of Section 44 of the Official Zoning Code of Calasiao. Issue/s: 1. W.O.N the principle of Ejusdem Generis applies

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 2. W.O.N the Municipality of Calasiao invalidly used its Police Power when it ordered the closure or transfer of the gas station 3. W.O.N the case is res judicata Held: 1. No. Under the zoning ordinance, Section 21 expressly covers “filling station” while Section 42 expressly covers “service station.” The ordinance clearly intended for the two terms to be separate and distinct. In this case, ejusdem generis cannot apply because the maxim provides for a general interpretation of words used to apply to those of the same general nature or class of those enumerated. Therefore, what should be applied is the principle of expression unius est exclusion alterius because the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of the others. This principle applies in this case because the ordinance provided for two distinct and definite meanings for the two. 2. Yes. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. In this case, the second requisite is not present because, when Resolution 50 was passed, there was no evidence that measurements were made which could lead to the conclusion that the gasoline filling station was within 100 meters of a school or church. The gasoline filling station is also not a nuisance per se which would allow its summary removal. Thus, the Municipality of Calasiao invalidly exercised its police power when it lacked the due process requirement. 3. Yes. Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former suit. For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment must be on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. In this case, respondent Municipality claims that it was not a party to the HLURB case but only its co-respondent Jovellanos, hence, the fourth requisite was not met. However, the absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res judicata to apply. A shared identity of interests is sufficient to invoke the application of this principle. Furthermore, the HLURB had already settled these concerns [same grounds raised] and its adjudication had long attained finality. Thus, res judicata applies. 31. GANCAYCO vs. CITY GOV. OF QUEZON CITY, GR 177807 October 11, 2007 FACTS: In the early 1950s, retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco bought a parcel of land located at 746 Epifaniodelos Santos Avenue (EDSA). the Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled "An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof." An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun. Ordinance No. 2904 required the relevant property owner to construct an arcade with a width of 4.50 meters and height of 5.00 meters along EDSA, from the north side of Santolan Road to one lot after Liberty Avenue, and from one lot before Central Boulevard to the Botocan transmission line. The ordinance was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes. The ordinance was amended several times. The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. He sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property. The City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request but the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City pursuant to Metro Manila Council’s (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002. The resolution authorized the MMDA and local government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions." The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building violated the National Building Code of the Philippines (Building Code). Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen (15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall, or what was referred to as the "wing walls," of the ground floor structure. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is constitutional and whether or not MMDA validly demolished the property HELD: Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are valid exercises of police power. To resolve the issue on the constitutionality of the ordinance, we must first determine whether there was a valid delegation of police power. Then we can determine whether the City Government of Quezon City acted within the limits of the delegation. Specifically, on the powers of the city government to regulate the construction of buildings, the Charter also expressly provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them. In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. In the case at bar, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. These arcades provide safe and convenient passage along the sidewalk for commuters and pedestrians, not just the residents of Quezon City. More especially so because the contested portion of the building is located on a busy segment of the city, in a business zone along EDSA. Corollarily, the policy of the Building Code, which was passed after the Quezon City Ordinance, supports the purpose for the enactment of Ordinance No. 2904. To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction. MMDA illegally demolished the property of Justice Gancayco. MMDA alleges that by virtue of MMDA Resolution No. 02-28, Series of 2002, it is empowered to demolish Justice Gancayco’s property. It insists that the Metro Manila Council authorized the MMDA and the local government units to clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila of all illegal structures and obstructions. It further alleges that it demolished the property pursuant to the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904 as amended. The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the autonomy of local government units concerning purely local matters. MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA. There is also no evidence showing that MMDA had been

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code. MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28. Lastly, the MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of the structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare, prevent and abate a nuisance and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner. MMDA’s argument does not hold water. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the destruction of the portion of Justice Gancayco’s building. 32. Rural Bank of Makati v. Municipality of Makati, G.R. No. 150763, 2 July 2004 FACTS: Atty. Valero, then the municipal attorney of the Municipality of Makati, upon request of the municipal treasurer, went to the Rural Bank of Makati to inquire about the banks payments of taxes and fees to the municipality. He was informed, however, by petitioner Magdalena V. Landicho, corporate secretary of the bank, that the bank was exempt from paying taxes under Republic Act No. 720, as amended. The municipality lodged a complaint with the Prosecutors Office, charging petitioners Silva, president and GM of the bank and Landicho for violation of Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3 in relation to Sections 105 and 169 of the Metropolitan Tax Code. An Information for violation of Municipal Ordinance Nos. 122 and 39 for non-payment of the mayors permit fee, was filed with the MeTC of Makati against petitioners. Another Information for non-payment of annual business tax, in violation of Metro Manila Commission Ordinance No. 82-03, Section 21(a), Chapter II, Article 3, was likewise filed with the MeTC. While said cases were pending with the municipal court, respondent municipality ordered the closure of the bank. This prompted petitioners to pay, under protest, the mayors permit fee and the annual fixed tax in the amount of P82,408.66. ISSUE: Whether or not the closure of petitioner bank is valid HELD: YES. Petitioner bank claims that the closure of respondent bank was an improper exercise of police power because a municipal corporation has no inherent but only delegated police power, which must be exercised not by the municipal mayor but by the municipal council through the enactment of ordinances. It also assailed the CA for invoking the General Welfare Clause embodied in Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect in 1992, when the closure of the bank was actually done on July 31, 1991. Indeed the Local Government Code of 1991 was not yet in effect when the municipality ordered petitioner banks closure on July 31, 1991. However, the general welfare clause invoked by the CA is not found on the provisions of said law alone. Even under the old Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) which was then in effect, a general welfare clause was provided for in Section 7 thereof. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. The authority of a local government unit to exercise police power under a general welfare clause is not a recent development. This was already provided for as early as the Administrative Code of 1917. Since then it has been reenacted and implemented by new statutes on the matter. Thus, the closure of the bank was a valid exercise of police power pursuant to the general welfare clause contained in and restated by B.P. Blg. 337, which was then the law governing local government units. No reversible error arises in this instance insofar as the validity of respondent municipalitys exercise of police power for the general welfare is concerned. The general welfare clause has two branches. The first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property. In the present case, the ordinances imposing licenses and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) requiring permits for any business establishment, for purposes of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati, fall within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality imposing the annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local governments. Consequently, the municipal mayor, as chief executive, was clothed with authority to create a Special Task Force headed by respondent Atty. Victor A.L. Valero to enforce and implement said ordinances and resolutions and to file appropriate charges and prosecute violators. 33. BATANGAS CATV vs. CA, GR 138810 September 29, 2004 FACTS: On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210 granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a Community Antenna Television (CATV) or Cable Television system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution No. 210. Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines. ISSUE: WON a local government unit regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction HELD: No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436, the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other bodies. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.) The physical realities of constructing CATV system – the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions – allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. But, while we recognize the LGUs’ power under the general welfare clause, we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well recognized limits of its power. The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are: (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and (2) it violates the State’s deregulation policy over the CATV industry. LGUs must recognize that technical matters concerning CATV operation are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC. 34. Tano v. Socrates, G.R. No. 119249, 21 August 1997 FACTS: On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled: AN ORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND LOBSTER OUTSIDE PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS, PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF. To implement said city ordinance, then Acting City Mayor Amado L. Lucero issued Office Order No. 23, Series of 1993 dated January 22, 1993 requiring a Mayor’s permit for any person engaged in any business, trade or occupation and to conduct the necessary inspection on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa Airport, Puerto Princesa Wharf or at any port within the jurisdiction of the city to any point of destinations. On February 19, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 entitled: A RESOLUTION PROHIBITING THE CATCHING, GATHERING, POSSESSING, BUYING, SELLING AND SHIPMENT OF LIVE MARINE CORAL DWELLING AQUATIC ORGANISMS, TO WIT: FAMILY: SCARIDAE (MAMENG), EPINE PHELUS FASCIATUS (SUNO). CROMILEPTES ALTIVELIS (PANTHER OR SENORITA), LOBSTER BELOW 200 GRAMS AND SPAWNING, TRADACNA GIGAS (TAKLOBO), PINCTADA MARGARITEFERA (MOTHER PEARL, OYSTERS, GIANT CLAMS AND OTHER SPECIES), PENAEUS

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) MONODON (TIGER PRAWN-BREEDER SIZE OR MOTHER), EPINEPHELUS SUILLUS (LOBA OR GREEN GROUPER) AND FAMILY: BALISTIDAE (TROPICAL AQUARIUM FISHES) FOR A PERIOD FIVE (5) YEARS IN AND COMING FROM PALAWAN WATERS. The respondents implemented the said Ordinance No. 2, series of 1993, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. Petitioners were charged criminally. Without seeking redress from the concerned local government units, prosecutors office and courts, petitioners directly invoked our original jurisdiction by filing this petition on 4 June 1993. In sum, petitioners contend that: First, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit; Third, as Ordinance No. 2 took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned, they were unduly prevented from pursuing their vocation and entering into contracts which are proper, necessary, and essential to carry out their business endeavors to a successful conclusion; Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. Public respondents Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No. 2, as a valid exercise of the Provincial Governments power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the Local Government Code of 1991, and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. ISSUE: Whether the challenged Ordinances are valid and constitutional RULING: Yes. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration, development and utilization shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation as necessarily recognized by the framers of the Constitution, imply certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of anyone. What must likewise be borne in mind is the state policy enshrined in the Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature The LGC provisions invoked by private respondents merely seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the General Welfare Clause, expressly mentions this right: “The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance.” Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution. Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned." Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to local government units under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically, these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province," which "shall serve to guide the local government of Palawan and the government agencies concerned in the formulation and implementation of plans, programs and projects affecting said province." 35. LIM vs. PACQUING, GR 15044 January 27, 1995 FACTS: The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409). On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.” On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled “Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments . In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771. ISSUE: WON P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and nonimpairment clauses of the Constitution HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers). Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid franchise, the wellsettled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. 36. Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 118533, October 4, 1995 Facts: On December 15, 1992, Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member Roger de Leon, charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor Dr. Pablo R. Olivarez with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor's permit despite request and follow-ups to implement Parañaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 744, Series of 1992 which petitioner himself approved on October 6, 1992. Resolution No. 744 authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer's fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at Baclaran for 60 days from November 11, 1992 to February 15, 1993 for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of Opena to Rivera Streets. Mayor Olivarez filed his counter-affidavit stating that the charge of violation of Sec. 3(f) of R.A. 3019 has no legal and

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) factual basis because (a) BCCI, which actually started operation, never applied for a mayor's permit as evidenced by his letter reply to Atty. Dilag and the affidavit dated March 11, 1993 of Business Permit and License Office Officer-in-Charge Mrs. Elenita T. Paracale. Moreover, the four letters of Mr. Steve Espina requesting assistance in the issuance of mayor's permit were not filed with the municipal office concerned. Issue: Whether there is probable cause for the Mayor to be charged under R.A. 3019. (YES) Ruling: Petitioner submits that no permit could be issued because BCCI never filed an application therefor with the proper office, that is, the Business Permit and Licensing Office. This is actually begging the question. It is not denied that on November 13, 1992, BCCI, through its general manager, wrote petitioner requesting for a permit to operate, but this was rejected outright by him on the theory that the application should be made with the proper municipal official. The indifference shown by petitioner to BCCI's application taints his actuations with dubiety. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether petitioner was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to Section 444 (b) (3) (iv and v) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160). Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI. On the basis of the foregoing, we are reasonably convinced that there is enough evidence to warrant the filing of a formal charge in court against herein petitioner for a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. 37. Greenhills East Association v. E. Ganzon, Inc., G.R. No. 169741, 20 January 2010 Facts: Petitioner Greenhills East Association, Inc. (GEA) is the homeowners association of Greenhills East Subdivision, a residential subdivision in barangay Wack-Wack, Greenhill’s East, Mandaluyong City. E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) sought to develop a 4,109-square meter lot (the land site) at the corner of EDSA and Ortigas Avenue in in Barangay with its owner, the San Buena Realty and Development Corp. EGI wanted to build on the property a total of 85 storeys: 77 for mixused and 8 for basement. It will be called the SKYCITY Condominium. Petitioner GEAs subdivision has been classified under Section 4, Article IV of the Metropolitan Manila Commission Ordinance 81-01 (MMZO 81-01) as an R-1 low density residential zone. The subdivision consists of about 380 lots, a church (the Sanctuario de San Jose), a school (the La Salle Greenhills), and a private road network. On the other hand, the site on which the project will rise is classified under the same ordinance as C-2 or a Major Commercial Zone. The EGI began the excavation and other works on the land without first getting a clearance from the Barangay. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) eventually issued to EGI a Certificate of Location Viability. The City of Mandaluyong likewise issued to it an Excavation and Ground Preparation Permit. HLURB further issued to EGI a Preliminary Approval and Locational Clearance for its project. GEA wrote oppositions to with HLURB and a separate opposition to the DPWH. On June 4, 1998 the DPWH advised the Building Official of Mandaluyong to require EGI to secure a Development Permit and a valid Location Clearance for its project from the HLURB. In a separate development, EGI applied with the Barangay for clearance covering its project. On July 15, 1998, however, the Barangay denied the Application lack of approval of the project by the homeowners' association or the Barangay precludes it from proceeding. HLURB dismiss the opposition, which prompted GEA to appeal to the Office of the President (OP), which the OP denied, which GEA filed to CA for review on the decision of OP, which CA rendered a decision denying GEA petition.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioners contended that, Lack of approval of the project by the homeowners' association or the Barangay precludes it from proceeding. Likewise it invokes Section 14, Article V of MMZO 81-01 which provides that, where a proposed land use will necessarily affect the character of the residential zone, the proponent needs to get such approval. It is a prerequisite for the issuance of a location clearance and a building permit. Issue: Whether or not there must be a barangay clearance or approval of the homeowners association before a municipal or city license or building permit to be issued? Held: Although Section 152 (c) of the Local Government Code requires a barangay clearance for any activity within its jurisdiction, such clearance cannot be denied when the activity is in a permissible zone. The denial would otherwise be illegal. Here, as discussed above, the applicable ordinance of Mandaluyong City does not preclude the construction of the project on the land site in question over the unreasonable objection of a nearby association of subdivision dwellers. Indeed, the city or municipality to which the barangay unit belongs may still issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of the barangay clearance as had happened in this case. Indeed, the city or municipality to which the barangay unit belongs may still issue the required license or building permit despite the withholding of the barangay clearance as had happened in this case. 40. CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,G.R. No. 199439. April 22, 2014 FACTS: Then mayor of General Santos City, Pedro B. Acharon, Jr., issued Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating management teams pursuant to its organization development program. Mayor Acharon, Jr. declared the city’s byword of "Total Quality Service" in his state of the city address in 2005. Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package." This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on Audit. The ordinance, as amended, provides that qualified employees below sixty (60) years of age but not less than fifty (50) years and sickly employees below fifty (50) years of age but not less than forty (40) years may avail of the incentives under the program. In other words, the ordinance "provides for separation benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached retirement age." Petitioner city alleged that out of its 1,361 regular employees, 50 employees applied, from which 39 employees qualified to avail of the incentives provided by the ordinance. The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021, which explained that Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, partakes of a supplementary retirement benefit plan. In its view, Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, prohibits government agencies from establishing supplementary retirement or pension plans from the time the Government Service Insurance System charter took effect while those plans already existing when the charter was enacted were declared abolished. In fine, since Ordinance No. 08 is in the nature of an ERP [Early Retirement Program] of the City Government of General Santos, a law authorizing the same is a requisite for its validity. In the absence, however, of such law, the nullity of Ordinance No. 08 becomes a necessary consequence. In its opinion, respondent Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor. Moreover, nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early retirement program. ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, an Early Retirement Program, enacted by the City of General Santos, is valid. RULING: The Supreme Court partially granted the petition and declared that Ordinance No. 8, series of 2009, an Early Retirement Program, enacted by the City of General Santos, is invalid, in so far as its Section 5 is concerned; and valid as to Section 6 on post-retirement incentives. It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Section 5 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, "to exclude those GSIS and PAG-IBIG benefits the payment[s] of which are passed on [to] the employer." This was to remove any doubt as to its coverage and applicability and to ensure that no employee will be paid twice. The amended provision reads: Section 5. Gen[S]an SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee, except those benefits the payment of which are passed on to the employer. In which case, the benefits granted under this ordinance shall only be considered as one of the options available to a retiring city employee. According to petitioner city, GenSan SERVES is an initial step pursuant to its organization development master plan, which began with the city mayor’s issuance of Executive Order No. 40, series of 2008, creating change management teams. Respondent Commission on Audit counters that it correctly found Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as invalid in the absence of a law passed by Congress specifically authorizing the enactment of an ordinance granting an early retirement scheme. Respondent Commission on Audit contends that Sections 16 and 76 of the Local Government Code do not confer authority upon any local government unit to create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit plan. As for Republic Act No. 6656, this contemplates situations where a government position has been abolished, or rendered redundant, or a need to merge, divide or consolidate positions for lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law exists. According to respondent Commission on Audit, petitioner city failed to demonstrate arbitrariness on its part as it merely observed the proscription under Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 when it found the ordinance a nullity. 41. Salvador Villacorta vs. Gregorio Bernardo (G.R. No. L-31249, August 19, 1986) FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari raised against CFI Pangasinan’s decision to annul Ordinance 22 (An Ordinance Regulating Subdivision Plans Over Parcels of Land in the City of Dagupan) which in effect requires that every proposed subdivision plan over any lot in the City of Dagupan, shall before the same is submitted for approval and/or verification by the Bureau of Lands and/or the Land Registration Commission,be previously submitted to the City Engineer of the City who shall see to it that no encroachment is made on any portion of the public domain, that the zoning ordinance and all other pertinent rules and regulations are observed, and that subsequent fees be imposed thereafter. CFI annulled it because there was no showing that would justify the enactment of the questioned ordinance since Sections 1 (in requiring plans to be submitted), 2 (imposing service fees) and 3 (certification to be made by City Engineer) of Ordinance 22, are all in conflict with the provisions of Act 496 because it imposes additional conditions. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance 22 is a valid exercise of police power by the local government HELD: NO. The Court AFFIRMED the CFI’s decision since while it takes note of the laudable purpose of the ordinance in bringing to a halt the surreptitious registration of lands belonging to the government, the powers of the board in enacting such a laudable ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local ordinance. To sustain the same would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. As such, the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires. In a democratic state, protecting the rights of the individual is as important as, if not more so than, protecting the rights of the public. This advice especially addressed to the local governments which exercise the police power only by virtue of a valid delegation from the national legislature under the general welfare clause. In the instant case, Ordinance No. 22 suffers from the additional defect of violating this authority for legislation in contravention of the national law by adding to its requirements. 42. Terrado v Court of Appeals GR No. L-58794 August 24, 1984 Facts:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The Sangguinang Bayan of Bayambang passed Resolution no. 35 enacting Ordinance No. 8, s. 1974, establishing the Bayambang Fishery and Hunting Park and Municipal Water Shed which embraces all the vast area of the Mangabul Fisheries. In the same ordinance, the municipality appointed Geruncio Lacuesta as Manager-Administrator for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years, under the condition that he shall pay the municipality a sum equivalent to 10% of the annual gross income. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources disapproved the Ordinance because it grants fishery privileges to Lacuesta without the benefit of public hearing. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance no. 8 series of 1974 is valid Held: No. The legal basis for the disapproval of the Ordinance No. 8 and the Master Plan mentioned above is clear and explicit in Sections 4, 67 and 69 of Act No. 4003 as amended by PD 704 (Fisheries Law). Indeed, the Ordinance is clearly against the provisions of the law for it granted exclusive fishery privileges to the private respondent without benefit of public bidding. Under the Fisheries Act, the Municipality may not delegate to a private individual as Manager-Administrator to "use or dispose of the fisheries portion in accordance with the general law on municipal waters" nor to charge foes for fishing and hunting in the park, much less sell forest products, wild games and fish from the area. Neither can the Municipality grant the exclusive privilege of fishing for a period more than five (5) years, whereas in the instant case, the period granted the Manager-Administrator was for twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five years. 43. Matalin Coconut vs Municipal Council of Malabang FACTS: The Municipal Council of Malabang enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 45-46 imposing a police inspection fee of P0.30 per sack of Cassava Starch produced and shipped out of the said Municipal. Penalties are imposed for violations thereof. Said Ordinance made unlawful for any company, person, or group of persons to ship out goods specifically Cassava Starch or Flour without paying to the Municipal Treasurer or his duly authorized representatives a fee fixed by the Ordinance and a police inspection fee of P0.30. In case of violations, the Ordinance prescribed the payment of a fine of P100 to P1,000; an additional payment of P1.00 per sack that was illegally shipped; or imprisonment of 20 days, or both, depends in the discretion of the Court. The validity of the Ordinance was challenged by Matalin Coconut Inc. alleging that, the said Ordinance is violative of R.A. 2264, unreasonable, oppressive and confiscatory. Purakan Plantation Company is also affected, crippling its operations to transport its goods to the port through the said Municipality. ISSUE: Whether or not said Ordinance is valid HELD: No. A fixed tax denominated as a “police inspection fee” of P.30 per sack of cassava starch shipped out of the municipality is void where it is not for a public purpose, just and uniform because the police do nothing but count the number of cassava sacks shipped out. However, the tax imposed under the ordinance can be stricken down on another ground. According to Section 2 of the abovementioned Act, the tax levied must be “for public purposes, just and uniform” As correctly held by the trial court, the so-called “police inspection fee” levied by the ordinance is “unjust and unreasonable.” Said the court a quo: “x x x It has been proven that the only service rendered by the Municipality of Malabang, by way of inspection, is for the policeman to verify from the driver of the trucks of the petitioner passing by at the police checkpoint the number of bags loaded per trip which are to be shipped out of the municipality based on the trip tickets for the purpose of computing the total amount of tax to be collect (sic) and for no other purpose. The pretention of respondents that the police, aside from counting the number of bags shipped out, is also inspecting the cassava flour starch contained in the bags to find out if the said cassava flour starch is fit for human consumption could not be given credence by the Court because, aside from the fact that said purpose is not so stated in the ordinance in question, the policemen of said municipality are not competent to determine if the cassava flour starch are fit for human consumption. The further pretention of respondents that the trucks of the petitioner hauling the bags of cassava flour starch from the mill to the bodega at the beach of Malabang are escorted by a policeman from the police checkpoint to the beach for the purpose of protecting the truck and its

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) cargoes from molestation by undesirable elements could not also be given credence by the Court because it has been shown, beyond doubt, that the petitioner has not asked for the said police protection because there has been no occasion where its trucks have been molested, even for once, by bad elements from the police checkpoint to the bodega at the beach, it is solely for the purpose of verifying the correct number of bags of cassava flour starch loaded on the trucks of the petitioner as stated in the trip tickets, when unloaded at its bodega at the beach. The imposition, therefore, of a police inspection fee of P. 30 per bag, imposed by said ordinance is unjust and unreasonable.

44. Physical Therapy Organization of the Philippines v. Municipal Board of Manila, G.R. No. L-10448, 30 August 1957 Facts The Physical Therapy Organization of the Philippines, Inc. filed an action in the CFI of Manila for declaratory judgment regarding the validity of Municipal Ordinance No. 3659. PTOPI secured an injunction upon filing a bond in the sum of P1, 000.00. A hearing was held and the parties submitted the case for decision even without introducing any evidence. The CFI dismissed the petition and dissolved the writ of injunction. On appeal, PTOPI contends that the CFI erred in holding that the Ordinance has not restricted the practice of massotherapy in massage clinics to hygienic and aesthetic massage. The main contention of PTOPI in its appeal and the principal ground of its petition for declaratory judgment is that the City of Manila is without authority to regulate the operation of massagists and the operation of clinics within its jurisdiction. Issue W/N the City of Manila has the authority to regulate the operation of massagists and massage clinics within its jurisdiction? Held Yes, the City of Manila has the authority to regulate the operation of massagists and massage clinics within its jurisdiction. The City Fiscal, in representation of the appellees, calls our attention to Section 18 of the New Charter of the City of Manila, Act No. 409, which gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the City and its inhabitants. This is generally referred to as the General Welfare Clause, a delegation in statutory form of the police power, under which municipal corporations, are authorized to enact ordinances to provide for the health and safety, and promote the morality, peace and general welfare of its inhabitants. We agree with the City Fiscal. 45. Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72969, 17 December 1986 FACTS: The case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and the municipal government of Bogo, Cebu, both of which claim the power to issue licenses for the operation of cockpits in the said town. The issue started when Hee Acusar was asked to relocate the lone cockpit in the municipality pursuant to P.D. No. 449 (Cockpit Law of 1974), on the ground that it was situated in a prohibited zone. He was given a grace period of until June 11, 1980 by P.D. 1535 but he also failed to comply with the same and as a result, the Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased out. To add to his problems, the CFI of Cebu, in a petition to compel the municipal mayor to issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waived his right to a renewal thereof because of his failure to relocate. On July 24, 1980, private respondent Santiago Sevilla was granted a license to operate a cockpit by Mayor Celestino Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with subsequent approval of the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law. Because only one cockpit is allowed by law in cities and municipalities

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) with a population of not more than 100,000, Acusar sought the revocation of Sevilla’s license. However, his request was denied by the PC Recom 7 and the CFI of Cebu. He then went to petitioner, Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking the renewal of his cockpit license and the cancellation of Sevilla’s. He succeeded initially with the issuance of by the PGC on August 16, 1984, of an interlocutory order allowing him to temporarily operate his cockpit. The PGC subsequently issued its resolution on the merits of Acusar’s petition and ordered Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan to issue necessary mayor’s permit in favour of Hee Acusar and to cancel and/or revoke the mayor’s permit of Sevilla. This same resolution was declared null and void by the Intermediate Court of Appeals. ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner Philippine Gamefowl Commission has the jurisdiction over the issuance of licenses for the operation of cockpits. HELD: No. The Court first distinguished between the powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) and the city and municipal officials under the applicable laws. The pertinent powers of PGC under Sec. 2 of P.D No. 1802 include among others the promulgation and enforcement of rules and regulations, issuance of licenses for holding international derbies and fixing and revising the rates of license fees and other levies. On the other hand, the LGC provided that the municipal mayor has the power to grant licenses and permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of the conditions upon which they have granted. The Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. From these provisions, it is quite clear that the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. The regulation is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the PGC. The latter’s power to license is limited only to international derbies and only has the power of review and supervision over ordinary cockpits. The Court also defined supervision stating that is it overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. It is a lesser power than control. Review, on the other hand, is a reconsideration or re-examination for purposes of correction. The conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in the municipal authorities is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in Art. II, Sec. 10 and Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution. It is also a recognition of the superior competence of the municipal officials in dealing with local matters with which they can be expected to be more knowledgeable than the national officials. Surely, the PGC cannot claim to know more than the municipal mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo, Cebu, about the issues being disputed by the applicants to the cockpit license. Assuming that the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the issuance of a cockpit license to Sevilla was subject to reversal by the PGC, such action could be justified only if based upon a proven violation of law by the municipal officials. It may not be made only for the purpose of substituting its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the municipal authorities in determining the applicant to which the lone cockpit license should be issued. In conclusion, the Court considered this case as an occasion to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our political subdivisions as “self-reliant communities”. 46. De la Cruz v. Paras, G.R. No. L-42571, 25 July 1983 Facts: Ordinance No. 84 prohibits and ordered the closure of night clubs, cabarets, dance halls which have professional hostesses or hospitality girls under its employment in Bocaue, Bulacan. The ordinance was contended as null and void because as a municipality, Bocaue has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling; that the petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing and that under Presidential Decree No. 189, as

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism. The lower court dismissed the case and upheld the validity of the Ordinance by reason of its exercise of police power . Issue: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. Held: NO. The general welfare clause is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein; ..." There are in addition provisions that may have a bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus the sangguniang bayan shall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of international standards which shall remain under the licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise such authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment; ..." It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

47. Quezon City v. Ericta, G.R. No. L-34915, 24 June 1983 Facts: This petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the decision of Court of First instance of Rizal declaring Ordinance no. 9 of Quezon city as null and void. The ordinance regulates the establishment and operation of private memorial type cemetery. Sec. 9 of which provides that “at least 6% of the total area of memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons with paupers and have been residents of the city for at least 5 years”. It is only after 7 years that a resolution was passed implementing the said ordinance, in which the resolution provides that those memorial parks that have failed to donate 6% of their space should stop from entering transactions. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted to this by filing with CFI of Rizal a petition seeking to annul the ordinance. The court later declared the ordinance as null and void.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Issue: Is Sec. 9 of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power? Held: No, the decision of the CFI is hereby affirmed by the S.C The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit and the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibit the operation of memorial parks because section 13 of which provides that upon conviction thereof, the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled. The police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the confiscation of property with the exception of few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order. The said ordinance is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation depriving the right to due process. The ordinace is a taking without compensation. 48. VELASCO vs. VILLEGAS GR L-24153 February 14, 1983 FACTS: This is an appeal from an order of the lower court dismissing a suit for declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila. The assailed ordinance parenthetically prohibits any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person. The petitioners contended that the assailed ordinance amounts to a deprivation of property and their means of livelihood without due process of law. As noted in the appealed order, petitioners-appellants admitted that criminal cases for the violation of this ordinance had been previously filed and decided. The lower court, therefore, held that a petition for declaratory relief did not lie, its availability being dependent on there being as yet no case involving such issue having been filed. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is within the power of the local government to grant HELD: Yes, it is. Even if such were not the case, the attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: (1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops; and (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers" – all for the general welfare of the public. The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause and made clear the significance and scope of such a clauses which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality.” As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts; and as it was then, so it has continued to be. Having that said, there is, therefore, no showing of the unconstitutionality of such ordinance. 49. Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co. [ G.R. No. L-24670 December 14, 1979 ] Facts: Ortigas & Co., Limited Partnership is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA, Mandaluyong, Rizal. On March 4, 1952, Ortigas entered into separate agreements of sale with Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles over 2 parcels of land (Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31, of the Highway Hills Subdivision). On July 19, 1962 the vendees transferred their rights and interests over the said lots to Emma Chavez.

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The Ortigas executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez upon payment of the purchase price. Both the agreements and the deeds of sale thereafter executed contained the stipulation that the parcels of land subject of the deeds of sale “shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes”. The restrictions were later annotated in the Transfer Certificates of Titles covering the said lots issued in the name of Chavez. Eventually, Feati Bank and Trust Co. acquired Lots No. 5 and 6 with the building restrictions also annotated in their corresponding TCTs. Lot No.5 was bought directly from Chavez “free from all liens and encumbrances” while Lot No. 6 was acquired through a “Deed of Exchange” from Republic Flour Mills. Ortigas claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate where commercial and industrial sites are also designated or established. Feati maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to the Pasig River, has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No.27 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong. It alleges that Ortigas “completely sold and transferred to third persons all lots in said subdivision facing EDSA” and the subject lots thereunder were acquired by it “only on June 23, 1962 or more than 2 years after the area xxx had been declared a commercial and industrial zone”. On or about May 5, 1963, Feati began construction of a building devoted to banking purposes but which it claims could also be used exclusively for residential purposes. The following day, the Ortigas demanded in writing that the construction of the commercial building be stopped but the defendant refused to comply contending that the construction was in accordance with the zoning regulations. Issue: Whether Resolution No. 27 s-1960 is a valid exercise of police power Held: Yes. The validity of Resolution No.27 was never questioned. In fact, it was impliedly admitted in the stipulation of facts, when plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same. Having admitted the validity of the subject resolution, plaintiff-appellant cannot now change its position on appeal. However, assuming that it is not yet too late to question the validity of the said resolution, the posture is unsustainable. Municipalities are empowered by law through Sec.3 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act) to to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for the municipality. The law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No.27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment of the word “regulation” under the provision. An examination of Sec.12 of the same law reveals that the implied power of a municipality should be “liberally construed in its favor” and that “any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power should be interpreted in favor of the local government and it shall be presumed to exist.” An exception to the general welfare powers delegated to municipalities is when the exercise of its powers will conflict with vested rights arising from contracts. The exception does not apply to the case at bar. 50. BALACUIT vs. CFI OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE GR No. L-38429 30 June 1988 FACTS: An issue in the petition for review is the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan , to wit:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ORDINANCE PENALIZING ANY PERSON, GROUP OF PERSONS, ENTITY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF SELLING ADMISSION TICKETS TO ANY MOVIE OR OTHER PUBLIC EXHIBITIONS, GAMES, CONTESTS OR OTHER PERFORMANCES TO REQUIRE CHILDREN BETWEEN SEVEN (7) AND TWELVE (12) YEARS OF AGE TO PAY FULL PAYMENT FOR TICKETS INTENDED FOR ADULTS BUT SHOULD CHARGE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE SAID TICKET Be it ordained by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan in session assembled, that: SECTION 1—It shall be unlawful for any person, group of persons, entity, or corporation engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public exhibitions, games, contests, or other performances to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full payment for admission tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the value of the said tickets. SECTION 2—Any person violating the provisions of this Ordinance shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P200.00) but not more than SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) or an imprisonment of not less than TWO (2) MONTHS or not more than SIX (6) MONTHS or both such firm and imprisonment in the discretion of the Court. If the violator be a firm or corporation the penalty shall be imposed upon the Manager, Agent or Representative of such firm or corporation. SECTION 3—This ordinance shall take effect upon its approval. ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 640 is a valid exercise of police power? HELD: NO. The Court agrees with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. 22 The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves, A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. There is nothing pernicious in demanding equal price for both children and adults. The petitioners are merely conducting their legitimate businesses. The object of every business entrepreneur is to make a profit out of his venture. There is nothing immoral or injurious in charging the same price for both children and adults. In fact, no person is under compulsion to purchase a ticket. It is a totally voluntary act on the part of the purchaser if he buys a ticket to such performances. Lastly, the Court upheld the right of the proprietor of a theater to fix the price of an admission ticket as against the right of the state to interfere. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause."" Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away. In short, Ordinance No. 640 clearly invades the personal and property rights of petitioners 51. SANGALANG vs. IAC GR 71169 December 22, 1988

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FACTS: The mayor of Makati directed Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) to open several street to the general public after a series of developments in zoning regulations. All but Jupiter Street was voluntarily opened. The strong opposition later gave way when the municipal officials force- opened the gates of said street for public use. Because the area ceased to be purely residential, action for damages was brought against Ayala Corporation and BAVA for alleged breach of contract to maintain the purely residential status of the area ISSUE: WON the mayor acted beyond the scope of his authority when he overlooked the contract if homeowners and Ayala Corporation HELD: NO. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the "law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Petitioners cannot successfully rely on the alleged promise by Ayala Corporation to build a fence along Jupiter street with gate for entrance and/or exit as evidence of Ayala’s alleged continuing obligation to maintain a wall between the residential and commercial sections. Assuming there was a contract violated, it was still overtaken by the passage of zoning ordinances which represent a legitimate exercise of police power. The petitioners have not shown why Courts should hold otherwise other than for the supposed “non-impairment” guaranty of the Constitution, which is secondary to the more compelling interests od general welfare. The ordinance has not been shown to be capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable to warrant reversal of the judgments do appealed. Digested by: Mica Sarmiento 52.

JAMAR

KULAYAN,

et

al.

v.

GOV.

ABDUSAKUR

TAN,.G.R.

No.

187298,

03

July

201

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later con rmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-inchief of the armed forces. ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President? NO. HELD: It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) became

known

as

the

calling-out

powers

under

Section

7,

Article

VII

thereof.

While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his. Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The callingout powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another of cial, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justi ed by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code. 53. LEGASPI VS CITY OF CEBU GR. NO. 159110; DECEMBER 10, 2013 FACTS: Consolidated case (1) Jabans (2) Legaspo, both seeking for the declaration of Ordinance No 1644 as unconstitutional, null and void. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801 (Traffic Code of Cebu City). Atty. Jaban, Sr. and his son Atty.Jaban, Jr. brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City seeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages||| Their complaint alleged that, that Jaban Sr. had properly parked his car in a paying parking area on Manalili Street, Cebu City to get certain records and documents from his office; upon his return after less than 10 minutes, he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp; he had been infuriated by the immobilization of his car because he had been thereby rendered unable to meet an important client on that day; that his car was impounded for three days, and was informed at the office of the CITOM that he had first to pay P4,200.00 as a fine to the City Treasurer of Cebu City for the release of his car; fine was imposed without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized; that he had undergone a similar incident of clamping of his car while his car was parked properly in a parking lot in front of the San Nicolas Pasil Market in Cebu City without violating any traffic regulation or causing any obstruction; that he was compelled to pay P1,500.00 without any court hearing and final judgment; Jaban, Jr. parked his car in a very secluded place where there was no sign prohibiting parking; that his car was immobilized by CITOM operative Lito Gilbuena; and that he was compelled to pay the total sum of P1,400.00 for the release of his car without a court hearing and a final judgment rendered by a court of justice. Valentino Legaspi (Legaspi) likewise sued in the RTC the City of Cebu, T.C. Sayson, Ricardo Hapitan and John Does to demand the delivery of personal property, declaration of nullity of the Traffic Code of Cebu City, and damages. He averred that he had left his car occupying a portion of the sidewalk and the street outside the gate of his house to make way for the vehicle of the anay exterminator who had asked to be allowed to unload his materials and equipment from the front of the residence inasmuch as his daughter's car had been parked in the carport, with the assurance that the unloading would not take too long; that while waiting for the anay exterminator to finish unloading, the phone in his office inside the house had rung, impelling him to go into the house to answer the call; that after a short while, his son-in-law informed him that unknown persons had

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) clamped the front wheel of his car; hat he rushed outside and found a traffic citation stating that his car had been clamped by CITOM representatives with a warning that the unauthorized removal of the clamp would subject the remover to criminal charges;and that in the late afternoon a group headed by Ricardo Hapitan towed the car even if it was not obstructing the flow of traffic. RTC rendered a decision declaring the ordinance as null and void. CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: W/N Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the requirements for validity and constitutionality, RULING: YES. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU, and whether it was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy). Judged according to the foregoing enunciation of the guaranty of due process of law, the contentions of the petitioners cannot be sustained. Even under strict scrutiny review, Ordinance No. 1664 met the substantive tests of validity and constitutionality by its conformity with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy. Considering that traffic congestions were already retarding the growth and progress in the population and economic centers of the country, the plain objective of Ordinance No. 1664 was to serve the public interest and advance the general welfare in the City of Cebu. Its adoption was, therefore, in order to fulfill the compelling government purpose of immediately addressing the burgeoning traffic congestions caused by illegally parked vehicles obstructing the streets of the City of Cebu Ordinance No. 1664 was far from oppressive and arbitrary. Any driver or vehicle owner whose vehicle was immobilized by clamping could protest such action of a traffic enforcer or PNP personnel enforcing the ordinance. The release could be ordered by any of such officials even without the payment of the stipulated fine. The immobilization of a vehicle by clamping pursuant to the ordinance was not necessary if the driver or vehicle owner was around at the time of the apprehension for illegal parking or obstruction. In that situation, the enforcer would simply either require the driver to move the vehicle or issue a traffic citation should the latter persist in his violation. The clamping would happen only to prevent the transgressor from using the vehicle itself to escape the due sanctions. And, lastly, the towing away of the immobilized vehicle was not equivalent to a summary impounding, but designed to prevent the immobilized vehicle from obstructing traffic in the vicinity of the apprehension and thereby ensure the smooth flow of traffic. The owner of the towed vehicle would not be deprived of his property. In fine, the circumstances set forth herein indicate that Ordinance No. 1664 complied with the elements of fairness and reasonableness.

54. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Facts: Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. Issue: Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. Held: Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. 55. SOCIAL JUSTICE vs. ATIENZA GR 156052 February 13, 2008 FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and was approved by respondent mayor Lito Atienza on November 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the society. This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state: SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. The Sangguniang Panlungsod

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies. ISSUE: WON respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals HELD: Yes. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by theSanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice because it is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo vs. Mitra Jr., the Court said that these officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it. The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondent’s duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s. 2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

57. ALBON vs. FERNANDO GR 148357 June 30, 2006 FACTS: In May 1999, the City of Marikina undertook a public works project to widen, clear and repair the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. It was undertaken by the city government pursuant to Ordinance No. 59, s. 19933 like other infrastructure projects relating to roads, streets and sidewalks previously undertaken by the city. Petitioner claimed that it was unconstitutional and unlawful for respondents to use government equipment and property, and to disburse public funds, of the City of Marikina for the grading, widening, clearing, repair and maintenance of the existing sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision. He alleged that the sidewalks were private property because Marikina Greenheights Subdivision was owned by V.V. Soliven, Inc. Hence, the city government could not use public resources on them. In undertaking the project, therefore, respondents allegedly violated the constitutional proscription against the use of public funds for private purposes4 as well as Sections 335 and 336 of RA 71605 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner further alleged that there was no appropriation for the project. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is constitutional

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) HELD: Yes. Like all LGUs, the City of Marikina is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes set forth in the Local Government Code (RA 7160). It is expressly vested with police powers delegated to LGUs under the general welfare clause of RA 7160. With this power, LGUs may prescribe reasonable regulations to protect the lives, health, and property of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Cities and municipalities also have the power to exercise such powers and discharge such functions and responsibilities as may be necessary, appropriate or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities, including infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service the needs of their residents and which are financed by their own funds. These infrastructure facilities include municipal or city roads and bridges and similar facilities. Thus, the trial and appellate courts were correct in upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 59, s. 1993. It was enacted in the exercise of the City of Marikina’s police powers to regulate the use of sidewalks. Whether V.V. Soliven, Inc. has retained ownership of the open spaces and sidewalks or has already donated them to the City of Marikina, and whether the public has full and unimpeded access to the roads and sidewalks of Marikina Greenheights Subdivision, are factual matters. There is a need for the prior resolution of these issues before the validity of the challenged appropriation and expenditure can be determined. 58. Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.195770, 17 July 2012 FACTS: v RESPONDENTS: - 2007: the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries “Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino”: pre-pilot tested in the municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; municipalities of Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, Caraga Region; cities of Pasay and Caloocan upon the release of the amount of P50M under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by DBM. DSWD (as the lead agency in implementing the program): issued Administrative Order No. 16, series of 2008 setting the implementing guidelines for the project renamed “Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program” (4Ps) also known as the CCTP, provides cash grant to extreme poor households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human development goals (health assistance, educational assistance) After an assessment, a household beneficiary could receive from the government an annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of P15,000 under conditionalities - Institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network amomng the DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC and LGUs, identifying specific roles and functions in order to ensure effective and efficient implementation of the CCTP. LGU as partner agency to make sure the availability of supply side on health and education in target areas; prepare reports; coordinate with various concerned gov’t agencies at the local level; hold meetings 1. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by DSWD with each participating LGU outlines in detail the obligation of both parties during the intended five-year implementation of the CCTP 2. Congress: provided funding under the GAA of 2008 (P298M+); increased to P5B in 2009; P10B in 2010; GAA of 2011 at P21B+ v PETITIONER PIMENTEL, JR et al: - Joined by President of the Association of Brgy Captains of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and incumbent Brgy Captain of Brgy. Sta. Monica, QC, challenges before the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTp which are alleged to have encroached into the local autonomy of the LGUs. - Admit that the wisdom of adopting the CCTP as a poverty reduction strategy for the Philippines is with the legislature - They take exception, however, to the manner by which it is being implemented, primarily through a national agency like DSWD instead of the LGUs to which the responsibility and functions of delivering social welfare, agriculture and health care services have been devolved pursuant to Section 17 of RA 7160, in relation to Section 25, Article II and Section 3, Article X of 1987 Constitution - Giving DSWD full control over the identification of beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or conditionalities are to be complied with, instead of allocating the P21B CCTP budget directly to the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) LGUs that would have enhanced its delivery of basic services, results in the “recentralization” of basic gov’t functions, which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and avowed policy of decentralization ISSUE: Whether or not the CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD in the GAA 2011 violates the Constitution in relation to Section 17 of the LGC by providing for the recentralization of the National Government in the delivery of basic services already devolved to the LGUs v SUPREME COURT WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. CONCLUSION: NO. Petition is DISMISSED The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments and even devotes a full article on the subject of local governance which includes the following pertinent provisions: Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals, Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities EXCEPTION: · While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services, thus: ‰ (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are NOT covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has NOT completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. AUTONOMY as DECENTRALIZATION OF ADMINISTRATION - There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments more responsive and accountable and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress - The President exercises general supervision over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. AUTONOMY AS DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER - involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities APPLICATION: · A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. · Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the national government itself but implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve the common national goal development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments

59. Civil Service Commission v. Dr. Agnes Quida Yu, G.R. No. 189041, 31 July 2012 Facts: Dr. Fortunata Castillo was the Provincial Health Officer II (PHO II) of DOH Zamboanga and was the head of the Basilan Provincial Health Hospital. Dr. Agnes Yu, respondent, was Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I) of the same province and was assigned at Isabela, Basilan. In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the "The Local Government Code of 1991." Pursuant to the devolution program, the personnel covered, including those in the DOH, would be placed under the LGU of Basilan. Basilan Governor Gerry Salapudin refused to accept Dr. Castillo as incumbent PHO II, which was now under the LGU of Basilan. As a consequence, Dr. Castillo was retained by the DOH until she retired in 1996. However, although she retained by the DOH she was receiving salary from the LGU as a detailed employee. In 1994, Gov. Salapuddin, appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position. In 1998, RA 8543 was passed, which re-nationalized or returned the hospital positions previously devolved to the local government unit of Basilan to the DOH. The said law also reclassified the position of PHO II into Chief of Hospital II (CH II). Although the position of PHO II was reclassified into CH II, Dr. Yu was retained as PHO II. On August 2003, DOH Secretary Manuel Dayrit appointed Dr. Domingo Dayrit as CH II. Dr. Yu filed a protest with the CSC alleging that she had a vested right as CH II. Initially, the CSC ruled in her favor but the former reversed its decision. The CSC ruled that the PHO II position was never devolved to the LGU which means that Dr. Yu had no vested right to the position of CH II and that the PHO II under the LGU was a newly created position. On appeal to the CA, the CA ruled in favor of Dr. Yu. Thus, this appeal. Issue/s: W.O.N the position of PHO II is a devolved position Held: Yes.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) “Devolution" is the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Section 17(i) of the Local Government Code prescribes the manner of devolution, as follows: “Devolution [xxx] shall include the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.” “Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.” President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. 503 to provide for the implementation of the devolution process. EO 503 provides: Section 2. Principles and Policies Governing Transfer of Personnel.a. Coverage, Tenure, Compensation and Career Development. — xxx 2. The absorption of the NGA [National Government Agencies] personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which case, the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it is not administratively viable. 3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions unless the LGU opts to absorb the personnel concerned. 4. The national personnel who are not absorbed by the LGUs under no. 3 above, shall be retained by the NGA concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations. xxx 12. Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. Xxx Highlighting the absence of discretion is the use of the word "shall" both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160 and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, it was mandatory for Gov Salapuddin to absorb the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Castillo. The only exception is if it is not administratively viable. In the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed [Section 2(a)(12)] by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. In this case, it was not shown, that the absorption of Dr. Castillo was not administratively viable. The devolution of Dr. Castillo which, together with that of the PHO II position, took effect by operation of law. The fact that Dr. Castillo was placed on detail and was receiving salary from the LGU does not change the fact that the position was devolved to the LGU. Therefore, Dr. Yu was validly appointed to the position of PHO II in 1994 and, consequently, acquired a vested right to its re-classified designation – Chief of Hospital II. 60. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PH vs. DENR GR 175368 April 11, 2013 FACTS: Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. MGB-RO denied GoldenFalcon’sapplication for FTAA for failure to secure the required area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO). On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO,MCCS filed with the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application. July 16, 2004–MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit covering the same subject area. Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry permits–the contention was the date the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other permit applications from other parties. On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after Golden Falcon received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to permit applications only on that date. Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998(MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’sorder of denial on July 16,2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’sApril 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29. Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary. The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-COdenial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit filed on February 10,2004 were null as these were filed when the area was still closed to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program. ISSUE: 1) WONr DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan. 2) WON Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-Scale Mining Act,which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs. HELD: DENR Secretary’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA 7076 and its IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not unconstitutional. Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. “Control” – the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. “Supervision” – the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance with law. The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following national policies or standards and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X, Section 3.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the small-scale mining law. RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of the law makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary, its powers and functions subject to review by the same. Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the PMRB and the permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral reservations. DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA7076 likewise provides that the DENR Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program, and that the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers and functions shall be subject to review by the DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor through their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that the LGUs in coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares. Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and DENR Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit because the DENR Secretary was granted the power to review in the PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify and cancel the Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its power to review under RA7076 and it's IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. The quasi-judicial power of the DENR can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits nor “control” over said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law. In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear intent and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullify must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the grounds raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Section 17 b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of RA 7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provision of the law.

61. Republic, represented G.R. No. 197111, 23 March 2015

by

the

Department

of

Agriculture

vs.

Daclan

FACTS: Sometime in May 1972, the Agoo Breeding Station (or “breeding station”) was established by the Department of Agriculture, through the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Region I, for the purpose of breeding cattle that would be distributed to the intended beneficiaries pursuant to the livelihood program of the national government. In support of the said project, plaintiffs executed four (4) documents denominated as Deed of Donation in favor of defendant Republic of the Philippines (or “Republic”) donating to the latter four (4) parcels of land. These parcels of land are located at Barrio Nazareno, Agoo, La Union. The donation was subject to the conditions that these parcels of land 1) shall be used solely for the establishment of a breeding station, and 2) shall not be used for any other purpose, except with the previous consent of the donors or their heirs. Sometime in 1991, the powers and functions of certain government agencies, including those of the DA were devolved to the local government units pursuant to RA 7160 otherwise known as the “Local Government Code”. Thus, defendant Province of La Union (or “Province”) assumed the powers and functions of the DA, in the operation of the breeding station.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) All in all, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197267 – Federico Daclan, Josefina Collado, Teodoro Daclan, Jose Daclan (the Daclans) – and several others donated around 13 hectares of land to the Republic. The uniform deeds of donation covering these parcels of land contained the same conditions, including the above stipulations relative to exclusive purpose/use and automatic reversion. Sometime after the donations were made, the La Union Medical Center (LUMC) was constructed on a 1.5hectare portion of the 13-hectare donated property. In a September 4, 2003 Letter to the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, the Daclans and other donors demanded the return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding station has ceased operations and that the land has been abandoned. ISSUE: Whether the devolution violated the provisions of the Deed of Donation RULING: NO. The preponderance of evidence points to the fact that the breeding station remained operational even after its transfer from the Republic to the Province. The activities of the BAI did not cease even after it was dissolved after the government adopted the policy of devolution under the Local Government Code of 1991; these activities were merely transferred to the Province. Devolution cannot have any effect on the donations made by the Daclans to the Republic. As defined, “devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.” It includes “the transfer to local government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.” While the breeding station may have been transferred to the Province of La Union by the Department of Agriculture as a consequence of devolution, it remained as such, and continued to function as a breeding station; and the purpose for which the donations were made remained and was carried out. Besides, the deeds of donation did not specifically prohibit the subsequent transfer of the donated lands by the donee Republic. The Daclans should bear in mind that “contracts take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.” Thus, as a general rule, rights and obligations derived from contract are transmissible. 62. City Of Manila vs. Judge Colet G.R. No. 120051; December 10, 2014 FACTS: The case involves 10 consolidated petitions involving several corporations with principal offices in Metro Manila, and City of Manila’s Ordinance No. 7807 which amended Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code. Sec.21 (B) imposed business tax on the said corporations, while the subject ordinance amended such by lowering the tax rate from 3% per annum to .5% per annum. The City of Manila, through its City Treasurer, began imposing and collecting the business tax under Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code. Because they were assessed and/or compelled to pay business taxes pursuant to Section 21(B) of the Manila Revenue Code before they were issued their business permits for 1994, several corporations questioned the constitutionality of Sec. 21 (B) for being contrary to the Constitution and the Local Government Code, and asked for the refund of what they had paid as business tax. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT Sec. 21 (B) of the Manila Revenue Code is unconstitutional RULING: YES. The power to tax is not inherent in LGUs to whom the power must be delegated by Congress and must be exercised within the guidelines and limitations that Congress may provide. Sec. 5 of Article X of the Constitution granted LGUs the “power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide...” In conformity with said constitutional provision, the Local Government Code was enacted by Congress. The omnibus grant of power to municipalities and cities under Section 143(h) of the LGC cannot overcome the specific exception/exemption in Section 133(j) of the same Code.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the case at bar, the sanggunian of the municipality or city cannot enact an ordinance imposing business tax on the gross receipts of transportation contractors, persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire, and common carriers by air, land, or water, when said sanggunian was already specifically prohibited from doing so. 63. Demaala vs. COA G.R. No. 199752; February 17, 2015 FACTS: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan enacted Provincial Ordinance No. 332-A, Series of 1995, entitled “An Ordinance Approving and Adopting the Code Governing the Revision of Assessments, Classification and Valuation of Real Properties in the Province of Palawan” (Ordinance). Chapter 5, Section 48 of the Ordinance provides for an additional levy on real property tax for the special education fund at the rate of onehalf percent or 0.5%. In conformity with Section 48 of the Ordinance, the Municipality of Narra, Palawan, with Demaala as mayor, collected from owners of real properties located within its territory an annual tax as special education fund at the rate of 0.5% of the assessed value of the property subject to tax. This collection was effected through the municipal treasurer. On post-audit, Audit Team Leader Juanito A. Nostratis issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 03005 dated August 7, 2003 in which he noted supposed deficiencies in the special education fund collected by the Municipality of Narra. He questioned the levy of the special education fund at the rate of only 0.5% rather than at 1%, the rate stated in Section 235 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (Local Government Code). After evaluating AOM No. 03-005, Regional Cluster Director Sy issued NC No. 2004-04-101 dated August 30, 2004 in the amount of P1,125,416.56. He held Demaala, the municipal treasurer of Narra, and all special education fund payors liable for the deficiency in special education fund collections. The Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, filed the Motion for Reconsideration dated December 2, 2004. It stressed that the collection of the special education fund at the rate of 0.5% was merely in accordance with the Ordinance. On March 9, 2005, Regional Cluster Director Sy issued an Indorsement denying this Motion for Reconsideration. Following this, the Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, filed an appeal with the Commission on Audit’s Legal and Adjudication Office. In Local Decision No. 2006-056 dated April 19, 2006, this appeal was denied. The Municipality of Narra, through Demaala, then filed a Petition for Review with the Commission on Audit. In Decision No. 2008-087 dated September 22, 2008, the Commission on Audit ruled against Demaala. ISSUE: Whether a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, a city, or a province may have an additional levy on real property for the special education fund at the rate of less than 1% RULING: YES. We find it to be in keeping with harmonizing these considerations to conclude that Section 235’s specified rate of 1% is a maximum rate rather than an immutable edict. Accordingly, it was well within the power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan to enact an ordinance providing for additional levy on real property tax for the special education fund at the rate of 0.5% rather than at 1%. The limits on the level of additional levy for the special education fund under Section 235 of the Local Government Code should be read as granting fiscal flexibility to local government units. Book II of the Local Government Code governs local taxation and fiscal matters. Title II of Book II governs real property taxation. Section 235 of the Local Government Code allows provinces and cities, as well as municipalities in Metro Manila, to collect, on top of the basic annual real property tax, an additional levy which shall exclusively accrue to the special education fund: Section 235. Additional Levy on Real Property for the Special Education Fund. - A province or city, or a municipality within the Metropolitan Manila Area, may levy and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%) on the assessed value of real property which shall be in addition to the basic real property tax. The proceeds thereof shall exclusively accrue to the Special Education Fund (SEF).

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The operative phrase in Section 235’s grant to municipalities in Metro Manila, cities, and provinces of the power to impose an additional levy for the special education fund is prefixed with “may,” thus, “may levy and collect an annual tax of one percent (1%).” Section 235’s permissive language is unqualified. Moreover, there is no limiting qualifier to the articulated rate of 1% which unequivocally indicates that any and all special education fund collections must be at such rate. Fiscal autonomy entails “the power to create . . . own sources of revenue.” In turn, this power necessarily entails enabling local government units with the capacity to create revenue sources in accordance with the realities and contingencies present in their specific contexts. The power to create must mean the local government units’ power to create what is most appropriate and optimal for them; otherwise, they would be mere automatons that are turned on and off to perform prearranged operations. 64. PH Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality Of Pililia, Rizal G.R. No. 90776; June 3, 1991 FACTS: Petitioner, Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) owns and maintains an oil refinery conducting business within the municipality of Pililia, Rizal. P.D. 231 or the local tax code of 1973 provide for the Municipality to impose taxes on business any article of commerce. Thereafter, Provincial Circular 26-73 was issued directing all provincial, City and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local imposed in petroleum products. In 1974, P.D. 426 amended certain provisions of P.D. 231. The municipality of Pililia, through Municipal Tax Ordinance No.1, S-1974, imposed tax on business. The questioned Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 was reviewed and approved by the Provincial Treasurer of Rizal on January 13, 1975 but was not implemented and/or enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its having been suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73. Provincial Circular No. 6-77 dated March 13, 1977 was also issued directing all city and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on flammable or combustible materials imposed under the local tax ordinance of their respective locality, said fee partaking of the nature of a strictly revenue measure or service charge. Enforcing the provisions of the Ordinance no. 1, the respondent filed a complaint against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees from 1975 to 1984. In the RTC, respondent received a favorable decision, directing herein petitioner to pay the tax and fees impose unto it. Petitioner contended that Provincial Circular 26-73 suspended the effectively of local tax ordinances of the local tax code. Petitioner PPC contends that: (a) Provincial Circular No. 2673 declared as contrary to national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject to specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT petitioner PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) tax on business and (b) storage fees, considering Provincial Circular No. 6-77; and mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fee unto the respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, based on Municipal Ordinance No. 1. RULING: There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valid especially Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax Code as amended by P.D. No. 426." It conforms with the mandate of said law. P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73 issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19 and 19 (a), were carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no exemptions were given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, or dealers in petroleum products.

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Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, the former prevails (Shell Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA 628 [1988]). As aptly held by the court a quo: Necessarily, there could not be any other logical conclusion than that the framers of P.D. No. 426 really and actually intended to terminate the effectivity and/or enforceability of Provincial Circulars Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73 inasmuch as clearly these circulars are in contravention with Sec. 19 (a) of P.D. 426-the amendatory law to P.D. No. 231. That intention to terminate is very apparent and in fact it is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms in the effectivity and repealing clause of P.D. 426 . . . Furthermore, while Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426, wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products contravenes a declared national policy, it should have been expressly stated in P.D. No. 436. The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1) would be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. Thus: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. 65. Estanislao v. Costales G.R. No. 96516; May 8, 1991 FACTS: Ordinance No. 44 was passed by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Zamboanga City imposing a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or bottled within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Zamboanga. The Sanggunian sent a copy of the Ordinance to the then Minister of Finance by registered mail for his review pursuant to P.D. No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code. The Minister of Finance through Deputy Minister Antonino P. Roman, Jr., sent the letter addressed to the Sanggunian, suspending the effectivity of Ordinance No. 44 on the ground that it contravenes Section 19(a) of the Local Tax Code. The City of Zamboanga, represented by its City Mayor, appealed said decision of the Minister of Finance to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, at Zamboanga City. The lower court rendered a decision finding that the tax levied under said Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may impose under the Local Tax Code, but nonetheless, it upheld its validity on the ground that the Minister of Finance did not take appropriate action on the matter within the prescribed period of 120 days after receipt of a copy thereof. ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 44 was valid. RULING: Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues, and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy." Ordinance No. 44 of public respondent Zamboanga City traverses the limitations set by the Local Tax Code. In accordance with Section 44 of the Local Tax Code, the Sanggunian Panglungsod sent a copy of Ordinance No. 44 by registered mail to the then Minister of Finance on February 16, 1982. Apparently, said official failed to act within 120 days after receipt of a copy thereof It was only on December 6, 1982 when the Minister of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Finance, through his deputy, wrote the Sanggunian informing it of the suspension of the effectivity of Ordinance No. 44 as it contravenes Section 19(a) of the Local Tax Code, as amended, without prejudice to the Sanggunian filing an appeal within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof; otherwise the same shall be deemed revoked. Public respondent Zamboanga City concurs in the position of the respondent judge that since the Minister of Finance failed to act or otherwise suspend the effectivity of the tax ordinance within 120 days from receipt of a copy thereof, said Ordinance is valid and remains in force. There is no authority under Section 44 of the Local Tax Code for this conclusion. All that is provided therein is that if the Secretary of Finance "takes no action as authorized in the Section, the tax ordinance shall remain in force." Even if the Secretary of Finance failed to review or act on the Ordinance within the prescribed period of 120 days it does not follow as a legal consequence thereof that an otherwise invalid ordinance is thereby validated. Much less can it be interpreted to mean that the Secretary of Finance can no longer act by suspending and/or revoking an invalid ordinance even after the lapse of the 120-day period. All that the law says is that after said period the tax ordinance shall remain in force. The prescribed period for review is only directory and the Secretary of Finance may still review the ordinance and act accordingly even after the lapse of the said period provided he acts within a reasonable time. Consequently even after the prescribed period has lapsed, should the Secretary of Finance, upon review, find that the tax or fee levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory, or not among those that the particular local government may impose in the exercise of its power in accordance with this Code; or when the tax ordinance, is in whole or in part, contrary to the declared national economic policy; or when the ordinance is discriminatory in nature on the conduct of business or calling or in restraint of trade," the Secretary of Finance may certainly suspend the effectivity of such ordinance and revoke the same, without prejudice to the right to appeal to the courts within 30 days after receipt of the notice of suspension. The same rule should apply to the provincial and city treasurers, as the case may be, under Section 44 of the Local Tax Code. 66. Drilon G.R. No. 112497; August 4, 1994

v.

Lim,

FACTS: Department of Justice Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code, for it founded that it did not comply with the procedural requirement of notice of public hearing. The City of Manila, filed a petition to the regional trial court for a review of the decision of the secretary. The regional trial court declared that the Manila Revenue Code is valid, that there was public hearing, however it declared unconstitutional Section 187 of the Local Government Code, on the ground that it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. ISSUE: Whether or not Section 187 is unconstitutional? HELD: NO. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. In the case at bar Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. 67. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Hon. Ferdinand J. Marcos G.R. No. 120082; September 11, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, . . . and such other Airports as may be established in the Province of Cebu. Since the time of its creation, petitioner MCIAA enjoyed the privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. On October 11, 1994, however, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu, demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to the petitioner in the total amount of P2,229,078.79. Petitioner objected to such demand for payment as baseless and unjustified, claiming in its favor the aforecited Section 14 of RA 6958 which exempt it from payment of realty taxes. It was also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which puts limitations on the taxing powers of local government units. Respondent City refused to cancel and set aside petitioner's realty tax account, insisting that the MCIAA is a governmentcontrolled corporation whose tax exemption privilege has been withdrawn by virtue of Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Governmental Code. As the City of Cebu was about to issue a warrant of levy against the properties of petitioner, the latter was compelled to pay its tax account "under protest" and thereafter filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, but the latter dismissed the petition ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable to pay real property taxes to the City of Cebu. RULING: YES. There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption was granted to private parties based on material consideration of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133 the taxing powers of local government units cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person", as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234. As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. 68. Smart Communications, Inc. vs. Municipality of Malvar G.R. No. 204429; February 18, 2014 FACTS: Smart constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality. The construction of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and transmitting cellular communications within the covered area. On 30 July 2003, the Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18, series of 2003, entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects”. On 24 August 2004, Smart received from the Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality an assessment letter with a schedule of payment for the total amount of P389,950.00 for Smart’s telecommunications tower. Due to the alleged arrears in the payment of the assessment, the Municipality also caused the posting of a closure notice on the telecommunications tower. On 9 September 2004, Smart filed a protest, claiming lack of due process in the issuance of the assessment and closure notice. In the same protest, Smart challenged the validity of Ordinance No. 18 on which the assessment was based in a letter dated 28 September 2004, the Municipality denied Smart’s protest. RTC partially granted Smart’s petition, but did not rule on the legality of Ordinance No. 18. It declared that Smart is only liable for fees starting October 1, 2003, and null and void insofar as the assessment made from 2001 to 2003. MR denied. CTA denied. CTA MR also denied. CTA en banc denied. CTA en banc likewise denied. SMART’s arguments: CTA erred in refusing to take cognizance of the case and for dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction considering the “unique” factual circumstances involved. The fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes since they are not regulatory but rather, revenueraising. Municipality is encroaching on the regulatory powers of the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). Smart cites Section 5(g) of Republic Act No. 7925 which provides that the NTC, in the exercise of its regulatory powers, shall impose such fees and charges as may be necessary to cover reasonable costs and expenses for the regulation and supervision of the operations of telecommunications entities. Thus, Smart alleges that the regulation of telecommunications entities and all aspects of its operations is specifically lodged by law on the NTC. Malvar’s arguments: Said Ordinance is not a tax ordinance but a regulatory fee imposed to regulate the “placing, stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus, and provide for the correction, condemnation or removal of the same when found to be dangerous, defective or otherwise hazardous to the welfare of the inhabitant. It was also envisioned to address the foreseen "environmental depredation" to be brought about by these "special projects" to the Municipality. Pursuant to these objectives, the Municipality imposed fees on various structures, which included telecommunications towers. The fees are not imposed to regulate the administrative, technical, financial, or marketing operations of telecommunications entities, such as Smart’s; rather, to regulate the installation and maintenance of physical structures – Smart’s cell sites or telecommunications tower.

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ISSUE: Whether or not the fees are taxes. RULING: NO. Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified special projects, which included "cell sites" or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of the Municipality, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City: if the generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax. In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias: the purpose and effect of the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax. Ordinance No. 18 expressly provides for the standards which Smart must satisfy prior to the issuance of the specified permits, clearly indicating that the fees are regulatory in nature. 69. City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic G.R. No. Province of Bataan v. Phlippine Economic G.R. No. 187583; 26 November 2014

Zone Zone

Authority Authority

(PEZA) 184203; (PEZA)

FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). In 1995, the PEZA was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 7916 or "the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995" to operate, administer, manage, and develop economic zones in the country. The PEZA was granted the power to register, regulate, and supervise the enterprises located in the economic zones. By virtue of the law, the export processing zone in Mariveles, Bataan became the Bataan Economic Zone and the Mactan Export Processing Zone the Mactan Economic Zone. In the letter dated March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA 32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. It cited Sections 193 and 234 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that withdrew the real property tax exemptions previously granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons. The City pointed out that no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can tax the PEZA. After the City of Lapu-Lapu had demanded payment of real property taxes from the PEZA, the Province of Bataan followed suit. In its letter dated May 29, 2003, the Province, through the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, informed the PEZA that it would be sending a real property tax billing to the PEZA. Arguing that the PEZA is a developer of economic zones, the Province claimed that the PEZA is liable for real property taxes under Section 24 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995. The PEZA filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order. The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Province and its Provincial Treasurer from selling PEZA's properties at public auction scheduled on October 17, 2007. It also ordered the Province to comment on the PEZA’s petition.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) ISSUE: Is PEZA a government agency performing governmental functions and should therefore be exempted from payment of real property taxes? RULING: The Supreme Court held that PEZA is an instrumentality of the national government. It is not integrated within the department framework but is an agency attached to the Department of Trade and Industry. Book IV, Chapter 7, Section 38(3) (a) of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines “attachment” as the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. Attachment, which enjoys “a larger measure of independence” compared with other administrative relationships such as supervision and control. As an instrumentality of the national government, the PEZA is vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law. Congress created the PEZA to operate, administer, manage and develop special economic zones in the Philippines. Special economic zones are areas with highly developed or which have the potential to be developed into agro-industrial, industrial tourist/recreational, commercial, banking, investment and financial centers. Economic viability is "the capacity to function efficiently in business." To be economically viable, the entity "should not go into activities which the private sector can do better." To be considered a government-owned or controlled corporation, the entity must have been organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Government instrumentalities, on the other hand, are also created by law but partake of sovereign functions. When a government entity performs sovereign functions, it need not meet the test of economic viability. The law created the PEZA’s charter. Under the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the PEZA was established primarily to perform the governmental function of operating, administering, managing, and developing special economic zones to attract investments and provide opportunities for preferential use of Filipino labor. Under its charter, the PEZA was created a body corporate endowed with some corporate powers. However, it was not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. Nothing in the PEZA’s charter provides that the PEZA’s capital is divided into shares. The PEZA also has no members who shall share in the PEZA’s profits. The PEZA does not compete with other economic zone authorities in the country. The government may even subsidize the PEZA’s operations. Under Section 47 of the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, "any sum necessary to augment [the PEZA’s] capital outlay shall be included in the General Appropriations Act to be treated as an equity of the national government." The PEZA, therefore, need not be economically viable. It is not a government-owned or controlled corporation liable for real property taxes. The PEZA assumed the non-profit character, including the tax exempt status, of the EPZA. The PEZA’s predecessor, the EPZA, was declared non-profit in character with all its revenues devoted for its development, improvement, and maintenance. Consistent with this non-profit character, the EPZA was explicitly declared exempt from real property taxes under its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, on the other hand, does not specifically exempt the PEZA from payment of real property taxes. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the PEZA is exempt from real property taxes by virtue of its charter. A provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 explicitly exempting the PEZA is unnecessary. The PEZA assumed the real property exemption of the EPZA under Presidential Decree No. 66. Real properties under the PEZA’s title are owned by the Republic of the Philippines. Under Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, real properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property taxes:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) SEC. 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are exempted from payment of real property tax: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person[.] Properties owned by the state are either property of public dominion or patrimonial property. Article 420 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates property of public dominion: Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without belonging for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

70. Percival Moday vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 107916; February 20, 1997 FACTS: On July 23, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur passed Resolution No. 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for Expropriation of a 1 Hectare Portion of a lot along the National Highway owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and Other Government Sports Facilities." The Resolution was approved by then Municipal Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its approval.The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center." The Municipality of Bunawan fled a petition for eminent domain against Moday before the RTC. It also filed a motion to take possession of the property since it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary amount for expropriation. The RTC granted the motion to take possession of the land. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan RULING: YES. The Municipality of Bunawan’s power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided in the LGC. What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved the Resolution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s disapproval of the Resolution is an infirm action which does not render the Resolution void. The LGC grants the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution invalid on the sold ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove the Resolution for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain. The Resolution is binding and could be used to condemn said property.

71. Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corporation G.R. No. 127820; July 20, 1998 Doctrine: A local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a resolution of its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice. There are basic differences between an ordinance and a resolution. An ordinance is a law while a resolution is merely a declaration of sentiment or opinion of lawmaking body on a specific matter. A third reading is needed for an ordinance, not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of the members of the Sanggunian.

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FACTS: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution 93-95 s 1993, the Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against VM Realty Corporation over 2 parcels of land located at Wakas, San Dionisio, Paranaque, for the purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project. The RTC authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property. VM Realty filed its Answer, alleging that the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the Local Government Code. The trial court nullified its previous order and dismissed the case. In this petition for review, petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. ISSUE: Whether or not expropriation can be made pursuant to a resolution RULING: NO. The Court disagrees with petitioner’s position. Section 19 of RA7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, provides that, among others, an ordinance is required for the exercise of the power. In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance. The terms resolution and ordinance are not synonymous. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members 72. Spouses Antonio & Fe Yusay v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 156684; 6 April 2011 FACTS: Spouses Yusay owned a parcel of land situated in Mandaluyong City. Half of their land was used as their residence and they rented out the rest to nine other families. As alleged by the spouses, such land was their only property and only source of income. On October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, authorizing then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 for being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. The City averred that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature. ISSUE: Whether or not the validity of Resolution No. 552 can be assailed even before implementation HELD: NO. The function of prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. The writ of prohibition is directed against proceedings that are done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For grave abuse of discretion to be a ground for prohibition, the petitioner must first demonstrate that the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, has exercised its or his power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, which must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law. On the other hand, the term excess of jurisdiction signifies that the court, board, or officer has jurisdiction over a case but has transcended such jurisdiction or acted without any authority.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The petitioner must further allege in the petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.

73. Department of Agrarian G.R. No. 160554; 24 January 2007

Reform

v.

Saranggani

Agricultural

Co.,

Inc.,

FACTS: Republic Act No. 7228 created the Province of Sarangani, composed of seven municipalities, namely, Alabel, Glan, Maasin, Maitum, Malapatan, Malungon, and Kiamba, which were segregated from the Province of South Cotabato. Alabel was made the capital of the new province in accordance with the said Act. Five years after the creation of Sarangani, the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 97-08 or “Resolution Adopting and Endorsing the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan of the Municipality of Alabel and Its Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance for Adoption and Approval of the Provincial Governor, Honorable Priscilla L. Chiongbian, Thru The Honorable Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani Province." The Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel passed Resolution No. 98-03 reclassifying lots that were located within the built-up areas, based on the 1995-2005 Land Use Plan of the municipality from agricultural to non-agricultural use. Then, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani approved Resolution No. 98-018 or the "Resolution Adopting the Ten-Year Municipal Comprehensive Development Plan (MCDP 1995-2205) and the Land Use Development Plan and Zoning Ordinance of the Municipality of Alabel, Sarangani Per Resolution No. 97-08 and Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08, S. of 1997 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Alabel." A portion of the area involving 376.5424 hectares, however, was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657) commercial farms deferment scheme. The Zoning Certification issued by the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Council showed that Sarangani Agricultural Co., Inc.’s properties located at Brgy, Maribulan, Alabel were among those reclassified from agricultural and pasture land to residential, institutional, light industrial and open space. SACI filed an application for land use conversion for parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1, 005 hectares. Accompanying said application were documents required under DAR AO No. 7, Series of 1997. However, the Sarangani Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association sent a let-petition opposing the conversion of lands, alleging that they were merely forced to sign the waiver of rights. The Provincial Land Use Technical Committee recommended the disapproval of the conversion of the portion of land planted with bananas and coconuts, since it was still viable for agriculture. DAR Secretary Horacio Morales, Jr. eventually denied SACI’s application for land use conversion. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the DAR should use the Comprehensive Land Use Plans and accompanying ordinance of the Local Sanggunian as primary reference? RULING: YES, the DAR should use the Comprehensive Land Use Plans and accompanying ordinance of the Local Sanggunian as primary reference. Construing Sec. 20 of the Local Government Code and the subsequent administrative issuances implementing the same, we are of the opinion that while the DAR retains the responsibility for approving or disapproving applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners on their landholdings, the exercise of such authority should be confined to compliance with the requirements and limitations under existing laws and regulations, such as the allowable percentage of agricultural [area] to be reclassified, ensuring sufficient food production, areas non-negotiable for conversion and those falling under environmentally critical areas or highly restricted for conversion under the NIPAS law. Definitely, the DAR’s power in such cases may not be exercised

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) in such a manner as to defeat the very purpose of the LGU concerned in reclassifying certain areas to achieve social and economic benefits in pursuit of its mandate towards the general welfare. Precisely, therefore, the DAR is required to use the comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances of the local Sanggunian as primary references in evaluating applications for land use conversion filed by individual landowners. In this case, petitioners have already complied with the standard requirements laid down under the applicable rules and regulations of the DAR. 74. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association, Inc. (CREBA) v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform G.R. No. 183409; June 18, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner CREBA is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and supply, and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community planning and development financing. Respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued various administrative issuances as follows: · October 29, 1997 – issued DAR AO No. 07-97 entitled “Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Lands”, which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses after June 15, 1988. · March 30, 1999 – issued DAR AO No. 01-99 entitled “Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Lands Uses”, amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. · February 28, 2002 – issued another administrative order entitled “2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion, which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and replaced all issuances inconsistent therewith. It covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. · August 2, 2007- amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. · April 15, 2008 – issued Memorandum No. 88, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. Because of all these issuances, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment, and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation. CREBA further claims that Sec. 2.19, Art. I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, making reclassification of lands subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion, violates Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR’s approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification. The said provision of the DAR issuance also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local autonomy under Sec. 25, Art. II and Sec. 2, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended violates the local autonomy of LGUs RULING: NO. The Court reiterated that conversion and reclassification differ from each other. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR. Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for nonagricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use conversion. A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes. In the issue of violating the principle of local autonomy, the Court disagreed and held that Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7160 shows that the power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No.6657 to non-agricultural uses has been validly

Page 485

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) recognized by said Sec. 20 of R.A No. 7160 by explicitly providing therein that “nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.” 75. Buklod ng Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos v. E. M. Ramos & Sons, Inc. G.R. No. 131481; 16 March 2011 FACTS: Several parcels of unirrigated land (303.38545 hectares) which from part of a larger expanse with an area of 372 hectares situated at Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Originally owned by the Manila Golf and Country Club, the property was aquired by the [herein repondent EMRASON] in 1965 for the purpose of developing the same into a residential subdivision known as "Traveller's Life Homes". Sometime in 1971, the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite, acting pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2264, otherwise known as the "Local Autonomy Act", enacted Municipal Ordinance No. 1, hereinafter referred to as Ordinance No. 1, entitled "An Ordinance Providing Subdivision Regulation and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof." In May, 1972, [respondent] E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., applied for an authority to convert and development its aforementioned 372-hectare property into a residential subdivision, attaching to the application detailed development plans and development proposals from Bancom Development Corporation and San Miguel Corporation. Acting thereon the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas, Cavite passed on July 9, 1972 Municipal Ordinance No. 29-A (Ordinance "No. 29-A, for brevity), approving [EMRASON's] application. Subsequently, [EMRASON] paid the fees, dues and licenses needed to proceed with property development. It appears, however, that the actual implementation of the subdivision project suffered delay owing to the confluence of events. Among these was the fact that the property in question was then mortgaged to, and the titles thereto were in the possession of, the Overseas Bank of Manila, which during the period material was under liquidation. On June 15. 1988, Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or CARL, took effect, ushering in a new process of land classification, acquisition and distribution. Then came the Aquino government's plan to convert the tenanted neighboring property of the National Development Company (NDC) into an industrial estate to be managed through a joint venture scheme by NDC and the Marubeni Corporation. Part of the overall conversion package called for providing the tenant-farmers, opting to remain at the NDC property, with three (3) hectares each. However, the size of the NDC property turned out to be insufficient for both the demands of the proposed industrial project as well as the government's commitment to the tenant-farmers. To address this commitment, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) was thus tasked with acquiring additional lands from the nearby areas. The DAR earmarked for this purpose the subject property of [EMRASON]. EMRASON filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region IV, Pasig, Metro Manila, petitions to nullify the first three sets of the notices of acquisition. The Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator directed the DAR Region IV, through its Operations Division, to conduct a hearing and/or investigation to determine whether or not the subject property is covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and, if not, to cancel the notices of acquisition. On August 28, 1992, the Legal Division of DAR, Region IV, through Hearing Officer Victor Baguilat, rendered a decision declaring as null and void all the notices of acquisitions, observing that the property covered thereby is, pursuant to Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, exempt from CARP. The DOJ Opinion adverted to, rendered by then Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, clarified that lands already converted to non-agricultural uses before June 15, 1988 were no longer covered by CARP. On September 3, 1992, the Region IV DAR Regional Director motu propio elevated the case to the Office of the Agrarian Reform Secretary, it being his view that Hearing Officer Baguilat's decision ran contrary to the department's official position "to pursue the coverage of the same properties and its eventual distribution to qualified beneficiaries particularly the Langkaan farmers in fulfillment of the commitment of the government to deliver to them the balance of thirty-nine hectares x x x". On January 6, 1993, the herein respondent DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao [(DAR Secretary Garilao)] issued an order affirming the Notices of Acquisition.

Page 486


Its motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied by the DAR Secretary Garilao in his subsequent order of January 6, 1993, [EMRASON] appealed to the Office of the President. On February 7, 1996, the Office of the President, through herein respondent Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona (Deputy Executive Secretary Corona), rendered the assailed decision, dismissing [EMRASON's] appeal. The Court of Appeals declared the parcels of land owned by E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON), located in Barangay Langkaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite (subject property), exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), thus, nullifying and setting aside the Decision dated February 7, 1996 and Resolution dated May 14, 1996 of the Office of hte President (OP). ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality of Dasmarinas, Cavite is authorized under the Local Government Act to classify and/or reclassify lands. RULING: YES. The Local Autonomy Act of 1959, precursor of the Local Government Code of 1991, provided; SEC. 3. Additional powers of provincial boards, municipal boards or city councils and municipal and regularly organized municipal district councils. - x x x xxxx Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances. ” Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be. Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to planning and zoning. Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the Municipal Council of Dasmarinas approved Ordinance No. 1on July 13, 1971, which laid down the general subdivision regulations for the municipality; and Resolution No. 29-A on July 9, 1972, which approved the application for subdivision of the subject property. The Court observes that the OP, the Court of Appeals, and even the parties themselves referred to Resolution No. 29-A as an ordinance. Although it may not be its official designation, calling Resolution No. 29-A as Ordinance No. 29-A is not completely inaccurate. In the Ortigas & Co. case, the Court found it immaterial that the then Municipal Council of Mandaluyong declared certain lots as part of the commercial and industrial zone through a resolution, rather than an ordinance, because: Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations" for the municipality. Clearly, the law does not restrict the exercise of the power through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of the word "regulation" under the provision. As a matter oi' fact the same section declares that the power exists "(A)ny provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding x x x." 76. Spouses. Pilapil vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97619; Nov. 26, 1992 FACTS: Socrates and Rosario Pilapil owns a parcel of land situated in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu, which covers two lots and formerly beliongs to Marcelo Pilapil, the grandfather of Socrates. The Colomidas are owns a parcel of land locates near the land of the Pilapils. The Colomidas claim that they had acquired from Sesenando Longkit a road right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists all the way to the said National Road. In the early part of July of 1981, the Colomidas "tried to improve the road of "camino vecinal"(minor road built and maintained by a local council), for the convenience of the public," but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with "bodily harm from making said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vicinal.

Page 487

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On July 16, 1981, the Colomindas filed a case for against the Pilapils, seeking easement from the former for the amont of P10 per square meter plus damages from the act of preventing and harassing them from using the said passage. The Pilapils deny the existence of the said road and claims that the enclosing was done in the valid exercise of their right of ownership. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the Colmidas, which held that Res. 106 of the Municipal Council of Loloan was passed authorizing the residents of Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan to Repair and Improve a Camino Vecina in their sitio, and shows that there is a "camino vecinal" at Bahak. ISSUE: Does the Municipality of Liloan have a camino vecinal in sitio Bahak of Barangay Poblacion? RULING: YES. While both parties agree that a camino vecinal actually exists, the Colomidas assert that the same traverses the property of the Pilapils. The latter, on the other hand, maintain that it does not. The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property. Under the applicable law in this case, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (The Local Government Code), the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to the provisions of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on them. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road. In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor. By doing so, the said legislative body determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak. During the trial, the testimony of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator was not given due weight, which resulted to the confusion. As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil. This is the proposed road leading to the national highway. 77. Bruno Cabrera vs. CA GR 78673; March 18, 1991 FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes issued a resolution closing the old provincial road and construction of a new one leading to the new Capitol of the province. Deeds of exchange were executed under which the Province conveyed to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road portions of the closed road in exchange for their own respective properties. Petitioner filed a complaint with the CFI for the "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the closure of the old road. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT it is within the Provincial Board can order the closure a provincial road. RULING: YES. There is no reason not to allow the provincial board to order the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: R.A. No. 5185, Section 11 (II) (a):

Page 488

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) II. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from any official of the national government: Provided, That such actions shall be subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246; x xx x xx x xx Sec. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. — With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. 78. Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran G.R. No. 191667, 17 April 2013 FACTS: The Municipality of Agoo, La Union Sangguniang Bayan passed a certain resolution to implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza. To finance the plan, the resolution authorized Mayor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank, incidental to it, mortgaged a portion of the plaza as collateral. It has also authorized the assignment of a portion if the IRA and monthly income in favor of Land Bank to secure the payment. 10 Kiosks were made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too, with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first loan. The commercial loan was opposed by some residents of the municipality embodied in a manifesto launched through a signature campaign by the residents, led by respondent Eduardo M. Cacayuran. Invoking his right as taxpayer, Cacayuran filed a complaint against the officials and Land bank assailing the validity of the loans on the ground that the Plaza lot used as collateral is property of public dominion and therefore beyond the commerce of man. During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the Agoo People’s Center was completed. Later on, the Sangguniang Bayan passed Municipal Ordinance No. 02-2007 declaring the area where such building stood as patrimonial property of the Municipality ISSUE: Whether or not the Subject Loans are ultra vires and are therefore void RULING: YES. Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it by law. There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts: (1) an act utterly beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation; and (2) irregular exercise of a basic power under the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice. In other words, an act which is outside of the municipality’s jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the municipality’s power is considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or inherent powers of the local government unit; and (b) do not comply with the substantive requirements of law e.g., when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and certificate of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs

Page 489

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) those which (a) are entered into by the improper department, board, officer of agent; and (b) do not comply with the formal requirements of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds. In the case at bar the subject loans belong to the 1st kind and so deemed void. This is because conversion of the said plaza is beyond the Municipality’s jurisdiction considering the property’s nature as one for public use and thereby, forming part of the public dominion. Accordingly, it cannot be the object of appropriation either by the State or by private persons. Nor can it be the subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. As public lands, its administration and control belongs to the State, hence the Municipality has no right over it if without express grant by the State of converting such land into a patrimonial property. 79. Beluso vs. G.R. No. 153974; 07 August 2006

Municipality

Of

Panay

(Capiz)

FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Panay issued Resolution No. 95-29 authorizing the municipal government through the mayor to initiate expropriation proceedings of the petitioners’ several landholdings. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the taking is not for public use but only for the benefit of certain individuals; that it is politically motivated because petitioners voted against the incumbent mayor and vice-mayor; and that some of the supposed beneficiaries of the land sought to be expropriated have not actually signed a petition asking for the property but their signatures were forged or they were misled into signing the same. ISSUE: Was there a proper exercise of the power of eminent domain? RULING: NONE. Several requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain, to wit: 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property. 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. 30 The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking body. 31 R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the municipal council will not suffice. 32 A resolution will not suffice for an LGU to be able to expropriate private property; and the reason for this is settled: x x x A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19 of R.A. [No.] 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an ordinance. x x x 33 As respondent’s expropriation in this case was based merely on a resolution, such expropriation is clearly defective. While the Court is aware of the constitutional policy promoting local autonomy, the court cannot grant judicial sanction to an LGU’s exercise of its delegated power of eminent domain in contravention of the very law giving it such power. 34 80. Spouses. G.R. No. 156684; April 6, 2011

Antonio

&

Fe

Yusay

vs.

CA

FACTS: The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Brgy. Mauway, Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their residence, and the rest they rented out to 9 other families. On Oct. 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants. The petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC, praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory, improper, and without force and effect. The City countered that Resolution No. 552 was a mere authorization given to the City Mayor to initiate the legal steps towards expropriation, which included making a definite offer to purchase the property of the petitioners; hence, the suit of the petitioners was premature. RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition, opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government, because the special civil action of certiorari was only available to assail judicial or quasijudicial acts done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the action for certiorari and prohibition was a proper recourse of the petitioners RULING: NO. Based on the foregoing, certiorari did not lie against the Sangguniang Panglungsod, which was not a part of the Judiciary settling an actual controversy involving legally demandable and enforceable rights when it adopted Resolution No. 552, but a legislative and policy-making body declaring its sentiment or opinion. The rule and relevant jurisprudence indicate that prohibition was not available to the petitioners as a remedy against the adoption of Resolution No. 552, for the Sangguniang Panglungsod, by such adoption, was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but only expressing its collective sentiment or opinion. To demonstrate the absence of abuse of discretion, it is well to differentiate between a resolution and an ordinance. The first is upon a specific matter of a temporary nature while the latter is a law that is permanent in character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant circumstances. In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right. Moreover, R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) required the City to pass an ordinance, not adopt a resolution, for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding.

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81. THE LEARNING CHILD, INC. AND SPS. FELIPE AND MARY ANNE ALFONSO, PETITIONERS, VS.AYALA ALABANG VILLAGE ASSOCIATION FACTS: Sometime in 1984, subdivision developer Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) sold a parcel of land to the spouses Jose and Cristina Yuson. In 1987, the spouses Yuson sold the same to the spouses Felipe and Mary Anne Alfonso. A Deed of Restrictions was annotated in the TCT issued to the spouses Alfonso, as had been required by ALI. The Deed of Restrictions indicated that: The property shall be used exclusively for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory (nursery and kindergarten) school, which may include such installations as an office for school administration, playground and garage for school vehicles. ALI turned over the right and power to enforce the restrictions on the properties in the Ayala Alabang Village, to the association of homeowners therein, the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA). In 1989, the spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC), a preparatory school which initially consisted of nursery and kindergarten classes. In 1991, TLC was expanded to include a grade school program, the School of the Holy Cross, which provided additional grade levels as the pupils who initially enrolled advanced. AAVA wrote several letters to TLC and the spouses Alfonso, essentially (1) protesting the TLC's and the spouses Alfonso's violation of the Deed of Restrictions, (2) requesting them to comply with the same, and (3) ordering them to desist from operating the grade school and from operating the nursery and kindergarten classes in excess of the two classrooms allowed by the ordinance. AAVA filed with the RTC of Makati City an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract by the defendant spouses, particularly of the Deed of Restrictions. The RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA. TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that with the passage of Muntinlupa Zoning Ordinance reclassifying the subject property as "institutional," there ceased to be a legal basis for the RTC to uphold the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the spouses Alfonso. The RTC agreed with the spouses Alfonso and set aside its earlier Decision. AAVA moved for a reconsideration, this was denied by the RTC. AAVA appealed, the CA rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA. TLC and the spouses Alfonso moved for a reconsideration,however the CA denied it. TLC and the spouses Alfonso on one hand, and Aquino, et al., on the other, filed separate Petitions for Review with this Court. TLC and the spouses Alfonso's main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions on their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts. ISSUE: WON AAVA is estoppel from enforcing the Deed of Restrictions based on the admissions of their partner ALI? NO. HELD: TLC and the spouses Alfonso's main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions on their property is the AAVA had allegedly abrogated said restrictions by its own acts. TLC and the spouses Alfonso failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the gravity of AAVA's acts so as to bar the latter from insisting compliance with the Deed of Restrictions. AAVA claims that these actions cannot be considered in the case at bar under the res inter alios acta rule, as ALI is not a party to the case. Section 28, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies said rule: Sec. 28. Admission by third party. -- The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. The general Ayala Alabang Village "Deed Restrictions," which was attached to the Deed of Restrictions on the title of the subject property, expressly state that: "2. Compliance with the said restrictions, reservation, easements and conditions maybe enjoined and/or enforced by Court action by Ayala Corporation and/or the Ayala Alabang Village Association, their respective successors and assigns, or by any member of the Ayala Alabang Village Association." As such, it appears that Ayala Corporation is jointly interested with AAVA in an action to enforce the Deed of Restrictions, and is therefore covered under the following exception to the res inter alios acta rule:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. -- The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.The actions of ALI are not at all damaging to the position of AAVA. The alleged assent of ALI to the reclassification of the subject property as institutional, does not amount to a nullification of the Deed of Restrictions. The statement in ALI's July 1991 letter that it believes the expansion of TLC is a "worthy undertaking," it should be pointed out that ALI's purported assent came with conditions. A majority of AAVA's members, voted to ratify the Board of Governors' resolutions that the Deed of Restrictions should be implemented. Therefore, the conditions for ALI's approval of the alteration of the Deed of Restrictions, namelythe concurrence of the AAVA Board and the approval of the affected residents of the village, were clearly not met. 82. ACAAC VS AZCUNA GR. NO. 187378L SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 FACTS: Petitioner People's Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PETAL) is a non-governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island which it rented out to the public and became the source of livelihood of its beneficiaries, among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin. Respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the construction of its buildings in violation of PD 1096, "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued by respondents against it, but still the same remained unheeded. Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 which prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization inside the sanctuaries; and (b) the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government. Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto. A Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual petitioner. Petitioners filed an action praying for the issuance of a TRO injunction and damages against respondents before the RTC, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy and utilize PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by LGC; and (c) it was not approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined. Respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property belonging to the public domain. Further, they maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and enforceable. The RTC rendered a Decision declaring the subject ordinance as invalid/void. CA held that the subject ordinance was deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. ISSUE: W/N the subject ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners RULING: Yes. Section 56 of the LGC provides:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. — (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision. aDSIHc (c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP. ime the said ordinance was submitted to the latter for review by the SB; hence, it should be deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners' contentions that the subject ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC. It is noteworthy that petitioners' own evidence reveals that a public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the publication and posting requirements. While it is true that he likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. 83. City Council of Cebu v. Mayor Carlos Cuizon, G.R. No. L-28972, October 31, 1972 Facts: The seven plaintiffs-appellants "by themselves and representing the City Council of Cebu, as majority members thereof" 1 filed on May 31, 1966 their complaint in the court of first instance of Cebu against defendants-appellees Carlos J. Cuizon, as mayor of Cebu City, Jesus E. Zabate, as acting Cebu City treasurer, Philippine National Bank and Tropical Commercial Company, Inc. , praying inter alia that the contract entered into on February 5, 1966 by and between defendant Mayor Cuizon on behalf of the city for the purchase of road construction equipment from Tropical (for $520,912.00 on a cash basis or $687,767.30 on a deferred payment basis) be declared as null and void ab initio. Among the grounds invoked by plaintiffs-appellants for the nullity of the said contract and the complementary transactions with the bank arising therefrom such as the corresponding letters of credit opened therefor, were that the same were entered into without the necessary authority and approval of the city council, and that the city treasurer had not certified to the city mayor, as required by section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code that funds have been duly appropriated for the said contract and that the amount necessary to cover the contract was available for expenditure on account thereof, and that accordingly, the purported contract entered into by the city mayor was "wholly void" under the provisions of section 608 of the same code, which make "the officer assuming to make such contract ... liable to the government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties." Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs’ complaint is a personal suit? Held: Plaintiffs' suit is patently not a personal suit. Plaintiffs clearly and by the express terms of their complaint filed the suit as a representative suit on behalf and for the benefit of the city of Cebu.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Without passing upon or prejudging the merits of the complaint, it is not disputed that taken by themselves without considering the contrary evidence or defenses that might properly be set up by defendants at the trial, the allegations of the complaint state a sufficient cause of action on the basis of which judgment could be validly rendered by the lower court declaring the nullity of the questioned contract and letters of credit and declaring the City of Cebu exempt and free from any and all liability on account thereof, as prayed for by plaintiffs. Defendant bank in its brief concedes that "we find no ruling that the complaint was dismissed for lack of cause of action against the appellee Philippine National Bank. The lower court entirely missed the point that the action filed by plaintiffs-appellants as city councilors (composing practically the entire city council, at that) and as city taxpayers is to declare null and void the P3million contract executed by defendant city mayor for the purchase of road construction equipment purportedly on behalf of the city from its co-defendant Tropical and to declare equally null and void the corresponding letters of credit opened with the bank by defendant mayor and to prevent the disbursement of any city funds therefor and to exempt the City of Cebu and hold it not liable for any obligation arising from such contract and letters of credit specifically and precisely questioned in the complaint filed by plaintiffs on behalf of the City as having been executed without authority and contrary to law. Plaintiffs' suit is clearly not one brought by them in their personal capacity for the annulment of a particular contract entered into between two other contracting parties, in which situation Article 1397 of the Civil Code may rightfully be invoked to question their legal capacity or interest to file the action, since they are not in such case in anyway obliged thereby principally or subsidiarily. On the contrary, plaintiffs' suit is one filed on behalf of the City of Cebu, instituted by them in pursuance of their prerogative and duty as city councilors and taxpayers, in order to question and declare null and void a contract which according to their complaint was executed by defendant city mayor purportedly on behalf of the city without valid authority and which had been expressly declared by the Auditor-General to be null and void ab initio and therefore could not give rise to any valid or allowable monetary claims against the city. 84. MUN.OF PILILIA, RIZAL vs. CA GR 105909 June 28, 2014 FACTS: The RTC of Tanay, Rizal rendered judgment ordering the Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) to pay the Municipality of Pililla business taxes and other fees. The judgment was affirmed by the SC and became final and executory. The case was remanded to the RTC for execution. In connection with the execution of judgment, Atty. Felix Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of PPC’s gross sales for the purpose of computing its business taxes. PPC filed a manifestation before the RTC to the effect that Mayor Patenia of Pililla received from it P11.5M as full satisfaction of the judgment as evidenced by the release and quit claim documents executed by the said mayor. The RTC issued an order denying Atty. Mendiola’s motion for examination and execution of judgment. Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the total liability amounted to P24.2M while the amount received by the mayor was only P12.7M. He asserted that the mayor cannot waive the balance of the judgment over which his law firm had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services and attorney’s fees amounting to more than P12M. The RTC, however, denied his MR. A petition for certiorari was filed by Atty. Mendiola which was referred to the CA for appropriate action. PPC filed a motion questioning the authority of Atty. Mendiola to represent the municipality. The CA dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of the law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the municipality thru the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. Atty. Mendiola filed a petition before the SC to assail the decision of the CA. ISSUE: WON Atty. Mendiola, a private counsel, can file an action in court in behalf of the municipality of Pililla. HELD: No. Under Section 3, Republic Act No. 2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal; hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel. Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. 85. ANTONIO C. RAMOS, et al, petioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: On April 18, 1990, petitioners filed a petition for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. The Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990. Meanwhile, the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Oliviano D. Regalado, filed an Answer in (sic) behalf of respondent municipality. At the pre-trial conference, Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to- petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction and a written formal offer of evidence for respondent municipality. During the hearing, petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of (sic) the respondent and filed a motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos from appearing as counsel and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion, stating that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel and that Atty. Regalado is adopting the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. Respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which: (1) denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos and to declare null and void the proceedings participated and undertaken by him and; (2) granted Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence' Issues: 1) Under present laws and jurisprudence, can a municipality be represented in a suit against it by a private counsel? NO. 2) If not, what is the status of the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counsel; VALID. 3) Can the provincial attorney of a province act as counsel of a municipality in a suit; YES. 4) Can the provincial attorney adopt with legal effect the proceedings undertaken by an unauthorized private counsel of a municipality; YES. Held: 1. Who is authorized to represent a municipality in its lawsuits? The provincial fiscal's functions as legal officer and adviser for the civil cases of a province and corollarily, of the municipalities thereof, were subsequently transferred to the provincial attorney. The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis, the Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise. None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. Private lawyers may not represent municipalities on their own. Neither may they do so even in collaboration with authorized government lawyers. This is anchored on

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the principle that only accountable public officers may act for and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire private lawyers. 2. Effect on Proceedings by Adoption of Unauthorized Representation Would the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos validate such proceedings? Yes. This Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial prejudice on petitioners. Requiring new trial on the mere legal technicality that the municipality was not represented by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest of justice. After all, this Court does not see any injustice committed against petitioners by the adoption of the work of private counsel nor any interest of justice being served by requiring retrial of the case by the duly authorized legal representative of the town. In sum, although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyer's work cannot bind the municipality. 86. OFFICE OF THE OSG vs. CA GR 199027 June 9, 2014 FACTS: The Municipality of Saguiran was named a respondent in a petition for mandamus filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur by the former members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Saguiran, namely, Macmod P. Masorong, AmrosiMacoteSamporna, Alanie L. Dalama, Hassan P. Amai-Kurot and Cadalay S. Rataban. Therein petitioners sought to compel the Municipality of Saguiran to pay them the aggregate amount of 726,000.00, representing their unpaid terminal leave benefits under Section 5 of the Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular Nos. 41, Series of 1998 and 14, Series of 1999. The Municipality of Saguiran sought the trial court’s dismissal of the petition through its Verified Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim which was signed by Municipal Mayor HadjahRasmia B. Macabago and Municipal Treasurer Hadji MautinterDimacaling. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the act being sought by therein petitioners was not a ministerial duty. The RTC explained that the payment of terminal leave benefits had to undergo the ordinary process of verification, approval or disapproval by municipal officials. It, nonetheless, directed the Municipality of Saguiran to include in its general or special budget for the year 2009 the subject claims for terminal leave benefits. Dissatisfied, the Municipality of Saguiran partially appealed the order of the RTC to the CA. On December 14, 2009, the appellate court issued a notice requiring the OSG to file a memorandum for the Municipality of Saguiran within a non-extendible period of 30 days. The OSG initially moved for a suspension of the period to file the required memorandum, explaining that it had not received any document or pleading in connection with the case. It asked for a period of 30 days from receipt of such documents within which to file the required memorandum. The OSG’s motion was denied by the CA on the ground that the relief sought was not among the remedies allowed under the Rules of Court. So instead, OSG was given a non-extendible period of 90 days from notice within which to file the memorandum. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion requesting to be excused from filing the memorandum on the ground of lack of legal authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran, saying that the Municipality of Saguiran had to be represented by its legal officer, pursuant to Article XI(3)(i) of Republic Act No. 7160. CA denied OSG’s motion, pointing out that there was an error in how the OSG views a local government unit because seemingly does not consider the same part of the Government of the Philippines or an agency or instrumentality thereof; and further supporting said denial by citing the case of the Supreme Court in Province of CamarinesSur vs. Court of Appeals, where it was held that a local government unit, in the performance of its political functions, is an agency of the Republic and acts for the latter’s benefit. ISSUE: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in compelling the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran in its lawsuit HELD: Yes. The OSG’s powers and functions are defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Administrative Code), particularly in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof, which reads:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Sec. 35. Powers and Functions. – The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also represent government-owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party; xxxx A cursory reading of this provision may create the impression that the OSG’s mandate under the Administrative Code is unqualified, and thus broad enough to include representation of a local government unit in any case filed by or against it, as local government units, indisputably, form part of the Government of the Philippines. Towards a proper resolution of the pending issue, however, the OSG’s mandate under the Administrative Code must be construed taking into account the other statutes that pertain to the same subject of representation in courts(IN PARI MATERIA), as the Administrative Code is not the only law that delves on the issue. Specifically for local government units, the LGC limits the lawyers who are authorized to represent them in court actions, as the law defines the mandate of a local government unit’s legal officer. Book III, Title V, Article XI, Section 481 of the LGC provides: Article Eleven The Legal Sec. 481. Qualifications, Term, Powers and Duties. (a) No person shall be appointed legal officer unless he is a citizen of the Philippines, a resident of the local government concerned, of good moral character, and a member of the Philippine Bar. x x x. xxxx The appointment of legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial and city governments and optional for the municipal government. (b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government unit, shall take charge of the office of legal services and shall: xxxx (3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer shall: (i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be deployed to represent the adverse party; x x x x (Emphasis ours) Evidently, this provision of the LGC not only identifies the powers and functions of a local government unit’s legal officer. It also restricts, as it names, the lawyer who may represent the local government unit as its counsel in court proceedings. Being a special law on the issue of representation in court that is exclusively made applicable to local government units, the LGC must prevail over the provisions of the Administrative Code, which classifies only as a general law on the subject matter. Given the foregoing, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions which obligated the OSG to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Such ruling disregarded the provisions of the LGC that vested exclusive authority upon legal officers to be counsels of local government units. Even the employment of a special legal officer is expressly allowed by the law only upon a strict condition that the action or proceeding which involves the component city or municipality is adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality. The mere fact that the OSG initially filed before the CA a motion for extension of time to file the required memorandum could not have estopped it from later raising the issue of its lack of authority to represent the Municipality of Saguiran. Its mandate was to be traced from existing laws. No action of the OSG could have validated an act that was beyond the scope of its authority. It bears mentioning that notwithstanding the broad language of the Administrative Code on the OSG's functions, the LGC is not the only qualification to its scope. Jurisprudence also provides limits to its authority. In Urbano v. Chavez, for example, the Court ruled that the OSG could not represent at any stage a public official who was

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) accused in a criminal case. This was necessary to prevent a clear conflict of interest in the event that the OSG would become the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines once a judgment of the public official's conviction was brought on appeal. 87. Francisco Dacanay v. Mayor Macario Asistio G.R. No. 93654, 6 May 1992 FACTS: This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in accordance with the decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan. January 5, 1979 – Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use of streets for the purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions. 1987 – Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a case against such action. RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales) are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man. After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as is. Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls in their street ISSUE: May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of Metropolitan Manila Commission? HELD: NO 1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract 2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve such as for traveling 3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is going to be contrary to the general law 88. City of Angeles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97882, 28 August 1996 Facts: PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, requires a subdivision owner/developer to donate to the city an open space for parks and playgrounds. Pursuant to said PD 957 as amended, private respondent Timog Silangan Development Corporation donated 51 parcels of land to the City of Angeles, on November 26, 1984. The land is situated in Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles, with an aggregate area of 50,676 square meters, more or less. The pertinent conditions found on the Deed of Donation were: a. properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Center (which excludes cockfighting) b. The properties donated, 5% of the total subdivision, shall constitute the entire open space for DONOR’s subdivision c. Any substantial breach of the foregoing provisos shall entitle the DONOR to revoke or rescind this Deed of Donation On July 19, 1988, petitioners began constructing a Drug Rehabilitation Center on the donated land. Respondents protested and offered an alternative site. However, it was rejected by the petitioners because the alternative site was too isolated and has no electricity or water. Timog Silangan filed a case with the Angeles City RTC. Timog Silangan’s contention Timog Silangan alleged that the City of Angeles breached the conditions imposed on the Deed of Donations and sought the rescission of the contract. City of Angeles’ contention The City of Angeles alleged that the conditions imposed in the amended deed were contrary to Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise known as the Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality of Angeles. The said Municipal Ordinance required subdivisions in Angeles City to reserve at least one (1) hectare in the subdivision as suitable sites known as “open spaces” for parks, playgrounds, playlots and/or other areas to be dedicated to public use. Furthermore, PD 957 requires a donation from said subdivision developer which prohibits the donee from imposing conditions. In addition, prior to the ruling they raised the defenses that:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) a. The case is moot and academic because the plan now was to build a Sports Center rather than a Drug Rehabilitation facility b. Private respondents cannot dictate conditions and that the law allows the buildings provided it is for public use RTC ruling The RTC ruled in favor of Timog Silangan. They said that the condition requiring a Sports Center conforms to the requirement of “open spaces.” Furthermore, the term "public use" in the Subdivision Ordinance should not be construed to include a Drug Rehabilitation Center as that would be contrary to the primary purpose of the Subdivision Ordinance requiring the setting aside of a portion known as "Open Space" for park, playground and playlots, since these are intended primarily for the benefit of the residents of the subdivision. Thus, this instant petition. The petitioners further alleged that the drug facility is 40% complete. Issue/s: 1. W.O.N a subdivision owner or developer is required to donate 2. W.O.N a donor of open spaces in a residential subdivision can validly impose conditions on the said donation 3. W.O.N the city government as donee can build and operate a drug rehabilitation center on the donated land intended for open space 4. W.O.N donee may validly revoke/rescind donation Held: 1. Yes. PD 957, as amended by PD 1216 defines “open space” as “an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.” Section 31, of PD 957 provides “the owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads, alleys and sidewalks. For subdivision projects one (1) hectare or more, the owner or developer shall reserve thirty per cent (30%) of the gross area for open space.” Although Section 31 allows that the donation of the parks and playgrounds may be made to the homeowners association of the project with the consent of the city of municipality concerned, nonetheless, the owner/developer is still obligated under the law to donate. Therefore, respondent is under legal obligation to donate the open space exclusively allocated for parks, playgrounds and recreational use to the petitioner. 2. Yes. The general law on donations does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on a donation so long as the conditions are not illegal or impossible. Under P.D. 1216 (amending PD 957), the requirement is that the recreational areas to be donated be based, on a percentage (3.5%, 7%, or 9%) of the total area of the subdivision depending on whether the subdivision is low, medium, or high-density. It further declares that such open space devoted to parks, playgrounds and recreational areas are non-alienable public land and non-buildable. However, there is no prohibition in either P.D. 957 or P.D. 1216 against imposing conditions on such donation. Therefore, any condition may be imposed in the donation, so long as the same is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. 3. No. P.D. 1216 clearly requires that the 3.5% to 9% of the gross area allotted for parks and playgrounds is "non-buildable." In this case, Timog Silangan’s Timog Park Subdivision falls under the medium density category. It requires at least 7% of the gross area but they donated only 5%. It is less than the area required to be allocated for nonbuildable open space. Therefore there is no "excess land" to speak of. This then means that the condition to build a sports complex on the donated land is contrary to law and should be considered as not imposed. Neither can the drug facility be constructed, in addition to the explanation given by the RTC. 4. Each must bear the consequences of his own acts. The condition to construct a sports complex is contrary to law because the donated space is less than the required open space by law. As a consequence, the stipulation for revocation cannot be implemented because (1) no valid stipulation of the amended deed had been breached, and (2) it is highly improbable that the decree would have allowed the return

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) of the donated land for open space under any circumstance, considering the non-alienable character of such open space, in the light of the second Whereas clause of P.D. 1216 which declares that "xxx such open spaces, roads, alleys and sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men." Further, as a matter of public policy, private respondent cannot be allowed to evade its statutory obligation to donate the required open space. Likewise, petitioner was in bad faith when it continued constructing the Drug Rehabilitation facility despite the RTC ruling. The courts will not aid either party to enforce an illegal contract, but will leave them both where they find them. Neither party can recover damages from the other arising from the act contrary to law, or plead the same as a cause of action or as a defense. The fairest and most equitable solution is to have the City of Angeles remove or demolish the Drug Facility. 89. MUN. OF TIWI vs. ANTONIO BENITO GR 171873 July 9, 2010 FACTS: National Power Corporation (NPC) is liable for unpaid real estate taxes on its properties located in the Province of Albay. These properties included a geothermal plant in the municipality of Tiwi and substations in the municipality of Daraga. The said properties were sold at an auction sale conducted by Albay to satisfyNPC’s tax liabilities. As the sole bidder at the auction, Albay acquired ownership of said properties. The NPC and Albay, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) where the former agreed to settle its tax liabilities. Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi formally requested Governor Salalima to remit the rightful tax shares of Tiwi and its barangays where the NPC’s properties were located relative to the payments already made by NPC to Albay. Governor Salalima replied that the request cannot be granted as the initial payment amounting to P 17,763,000.00 was only an “earnest money” and that the total amount to be collected from the NPC was still being validated. On August 30, 1992, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer to represent Tiwi and its barangays in the recovery of their rightful share in the aforesaid realty taxes. Thereafter, Mayor Corral sought the services of respondent Atty. Antonio B. Betito (respondent) and Atty. Alberto Lawenko (Atty. Lawenko). As a result, on January 25, 1993, Mayor Corral, representing Tiwi, and respondent and Atty. Lawenko entered into a Contract of Legal Services (subject contract). The subject contract provided, among others, that respondent and Atty. Lawenko would receive a 10% contingent fee on whatever amount of realty taxes that would be recovered by Tiwi through their efforts. The Office of the President, through then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T. Carpio, opined that the MOA entered into by NPC and Albay merely recognized and established NPC’s realty taxes. He further clarified that the sharing scheme and those entitled to the payments to be made by NPC under the MOA should be that provided under the law, and since Tiwi is entitled to share in said realty taxes, NPC may remit such share directly to Tiwi. Because of this opinion, NPC President Malixi, through a letter dated December 9, 1992, informed Mayor Corral and Governor Salalima that starting with the January 1993 installment, NPC will directly pay Tiwi its share in the payments under the MOA. As of December 9, 1992, payments made by NPC to Albay reached P40, 724,471.74. On December 19, 1992, in an apparent reaction to NPCs Decision to directly remit to Tiwi its share in the payments made and still to be made pursuant to the MOA, the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Albay passed Ordinance No. 09-92, which, among others: (1) authorized the Provincial Treasurer upon the direction of the Provincial Governor to sell the real properties (acquired by Albay at the auction sale) at a public auction, and to cause the immediate transfer thereof to the winning bidder; and (2) declared as forfeited in favor of Albay, all the payments already made by NPC under the MOA. From Albays refusal to remit Tiwis share in the aforementioned P40,724,471.74 stemmed several administrative complaints and court cases that respondent allegedly handled on behalf of Tiwi to recover the latters rightful share in the unpaid realty taxes, including the case of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. In this case, the Court held, among others, that the elective officials of Albay are administratively liable for abuse of authority due to their unjustified refusal to remit the rightful share of Tiwi in the subject realty taxes The present controversy arose when respondent sought to enforce the Contract of Legal Services after rendering the aforementioned legal services which allegedly benefited Tiwi. In his Complaint for sum of money against Tiwi, represented by then Mayor Patricia Gutierrez, et al, respondent claims that he handled numerous cases which resulted to the recovery of Tiwis share in the realty taxes. As a result of these efforts, Tiwi was able

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) to collect the amount of P110,985,181.83 and another P35,594,480.00 from the NPC as well as other amounts which will be proven during the trial. Under the Contract of Legal Services, respondent is entitled to 10% of whatever amount that would be collected from the NPC. However, despite repeated demands for the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi to pass an appropriate ordinance for the payment of his attorneys fees, the former refused to pass the ordinance and to pay what is justly owed him. Respondent prayed that Tiwi be ordered to pay P11,000,000.00 in attorneys fees and 10% of the other amounts to be determined during trial plus interest and damages; that the Sangguniang Bayan be ordered to pass the necessary appropriation ordinance; that the municipal treasurer surrender all the receipts of payments made by the NPC to Tiwi from January 1993 to December 1996 for the examination of the court; and that Tiwi pay P500,000.00 as attorneys fees. In their Answer,petitioners admitted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi passed Resolution No. 15-92 but denied that said resolution authorized then Mayor Corral to enter into the subject contract. In particular, Mayor Corral exceeded her authority when she bound Tiwi to a gargantuan amount equivalent to 10% of the amount of realty taxes recovered from NPC. Further, the legal services under the subject contract should have been limited to the execution of the decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay as per Resolution No. 15-92. For these reasons, the subject contract is void, unenforceable, unconscionable and unreasonable. Petitioners further claim that they are not aware of the cases which respondent allegedly handled on behalf of Tiwi since these cases involved officials of the previous administration; that some of these cases were actually handled by the Office of the Solicitor General; and that these were personal cases of said officials. ISSUE: WON Mayor Corral is authorized to enter into the contract of Legal Services HELD: Yes. Pursuant to Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC, the municipal mayor is required to secure the prior authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan before entering into a contract on behalf of the municipality. In the instant case, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tiwi unanimously passed Resolution No. 15-92authorizing Mayor Corral to hire a lawyer of her choice to represent the interest of Tiwi in the execution of this Court’s Decision in National Power Corporation v. Province of Albay. The above-quoted authority necessarily carried with it the power to negotiate, execute and sign on behalf of Tiwi the Contract of Legal Services. On its face, and there is no allegation to the contrary, this prior authorization appears to have been given by the council in good faith to the end of expeditiously safeguarding the rights of Tiwi. Under the particular circumstances of this case, there is, thus, nothing objectionable to this manner of prior authorization. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October 19, 2005 Decision and March 10, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 79057 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees which respondent is entitled to in accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision 90. Vicencio v. Villar, G.R. No. 182069, 3 July 2012 FACTS: On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon (SPM), presided over by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003, entitled “An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice- Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern x x x.” On 9 December 2003 and 1 March 2004, the City of Malabon, represented by Hon. Galauran, entered into separate Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms. Jannette O. Vijiga, Mr. Meynardo E. Virtucio and Mr. Hernando D. Dabalus (2003 Consultancy Contracts). Subsequently, during the May 2004 elections, petitioner was elected City Vice-Mayor of Malabon. By virtue of this office, he also became the Presiding Officer of the SPM and, at the same time, the head of the Sanggunian Secretariat. To complement the manpower requirements of the existing Sanggunian Secretariat, petitioner deemed it necessary to hire the services of consultants with the end view of augmenting and upgrading its performance capability for the effective operation of the legislative machinery of the city. On 21 January 2005, the SPM adopted City Ordinance No. 01-2005 entitled “An Ordinance Appropriating Funds to Cover the Various Expenditures and Activities of the Local Government of Malabon City for the Period from January 01, 2005 to December 31, 2005.” The total amount of funds appropriated was P511,070,019 for the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) spending of the entire city government. Out of this amount, P792,000 was earmarked for consultancy services under the Legislative Secretariat. On 1 February 2005, petitioner, representing the City Government of Malabon City, entered into Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms. Jennifer S. Catindig and Atty. Rodolfo C. delos Santos (2005 Consultancy Contracts). On 11 February 2005, another Contract for Consultancy Services was entered into between Mr. Marvin T. Amiana10 and the city government. After the signing of their respective contracts, the three consultants rendered consultancy services to the SPM. Thereafter, they were correspondingly paid for their services pursuant to the contracts therefor. On 19 December 2005, Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-12-01911 was issued by Ms. Atenie F. Padilla, Supervising Auditor of the City Auditor’s Office, Malabon City, disallowing the amount of P384,980 for being an improper disbursement. Aggrieved by the disallowance, petitioner appealed it to the Adjudication and Settlement Board (ASB) of the COA, which subsequently denied it. ISSUE: Whether the COA committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction whein it affirmed ASB Decision No. 2007-030, relative to the disallowance of disbursements concerning the services rendered by hired consultants for the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Malabon HELD: NO. Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, there is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting it. Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be construed as a “continuing authority” for any person who enters the Office of the Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts. Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for interpretation. It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy contracts in the specific areas of concern. Further, the appropriations for this particular item were limited to the savings for the period June to December 2003. This was an additional limitation to the power granted to Vice-Mayor Yambao to contract on behalf of the city. The fact that any later consultancy contract would necessarily require further appropriations from the city council strengthens the contention that the power granted under Ordinance No. 15-2003 was limited in scope. Hence, petitioner was without authority to enter into the 2005 Consultancy Contracts. 91. QC vs. LEXBER, INC. GR 141616 March 15, 2001 FACTS: Tri-Partite Memorandum of Agreement was drawn between petitioner City of Quezon, represented by its then Mayor Brigido R. Simon, Jr., respondent Lexber, Inc. and the then Municipality of Antipolo, whereby a parcel of land located in Antipolo was to be used as a garbage dumping site by petitioner and other Metro Manila cities or municipalities authorized by the latter, for a 5-year period. Meanwhile, a second negotiated contract was entered into by respondent Lexber with petitioner, again represented by Mayor Simon, whereby it was agreed that respondent Lexber shall provide maintenance services in the form of manpower, equipment and engineering operations for the dumpsite for the contract price of P1,536,796.00 monthly. It was further agreed that petitioner shall pay respondent Lexber a reduced fee of fifty percent (50%) of the monthly contract price, or P768,493.00, in the event petitioner fails to dump the agreed volume of garbage for any given month. The petitioner immediately commenced dumping garbage on the landfill site continuously from December 1991 until May 1992. Thereafter, petitioner ceased to dump garbage on the said site for reasons not made known to respondent Lexber. Consequently, even while the dumpsite remained unused, respondent Lexber claimed it was entitled to payment for its services as stipulated in the second negotiated contract. On December 12, 1992, respondent's counsel sent a demand letter to petitioner demanding the payment of at least 50% of its service fee under the said contract, in the total amount of P9,989,174.00. In view of the idle state of the dumpsite for more than a year, respondent also sought a clarification from petitioner regarding its intention on the dumpsite project, considering the waste of equipment and manpower in the meantime, as well as its loss of opportunity for the property.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioner, this time acting through Mayor Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. who succeeded Mayor Simon in the interim, denied any liability under the contract on the ground that the same was invalid and unenforceable. According to Mayor Mathay, the subject contract was signed only by Mayor Simon and had neither the approval nor ratification of the City Council, and it lacked the required budget appropriation. Thus, a complaint for Breach of Contract, Specific Performance or Rescission of Contract and Damages was filed by respondent Lexber against petitioner before the RTC of Quezon City. Respondent Lexber averred that because petitioner stopped dumping garbage on the dumpsite after May 1992, Lexber's equipment and personnel were idle to its damage and prejudice. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of respondent. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said Judgment was affirmed in toto. ISSUE: WON a contract entered into by the city mayor involving the expenditure of public funds by the local government without prior appropriation by the city council valid and binding. HELD: There is no denying that Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 (Auditing Code of the Philippines) provide that contracts involving expenditure of public funds: 1) can be entered into only when there is an appropriation therefor; and 2) must be certified by the proper accounting official/agency that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose, which certification shall be attached to and become an integral part of the proposed contact. However, the very same Presidential Decree No. 1445, which is the cornerstone of petitioner's arguments, does not provide that the absence of an appropriation law ipso facto makes a contract entered into by a local government unit null and void. Section 84 of the statute specifically provides: Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority. Consequently, public funds may be disbursed not only pursuant to an appropriation law, but also in pursuance of other specific statutory authority, i.e., Section 84 of PD 1445. Thus, when a contract is entered into by a city mayor pursuant to specific statutory authority, the law, i.e., PD 1445 allows the disbursement of funds from any public treasury or depository therefor. It can thus be plainly seen that the law invoked by petitioner Quezon City itself provides that an appropriation law is not the only authority upon which public funds shall be disbursed. Furthermore, then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr. did not enter into the subject contract without legal authority. The Local Government Code of 1983, or B.P. Blg. 337, which was then in force, specifically and exclusively empowered the city mayor to "represent the city in its business transactions, and sign all warrants drawn on the city treasury and all bonds, contracts and obligations of the city." Such power granted to the city mayor by B.P. Blg. 337 was not qualified nor restricted by any prior action or authority of the city council. We note that while the subsequent Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect after the execution of the subject contracts, provides that the mayor's representation must be "upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance," there was no such qualification under the old code. We must differentiate the provisions of the old Local Government Code of 1983, B.P. Blg. 337, which was then in force, from that of the Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. No.7160, which now requires that the mayor's representation of the city in its business transactions must be "upon authority of the sangguniang panlungsod or pursuant to law or ordinance" (Section 455 [vi]). No such prior authority was required under B.P. Blg. 337. This restriction, therefore, cannot be imposed on the city mayor then since the two contracts were entered into before R.A. No.7160 was even enacted. 92. Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Baguio v. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation (G.R. No. 160025, 23 April 2014) FACTS: On 1 March 1999, Jadewell proposed the privatization of the administration of on-street parking in Baguio City using Schlumberger’s DG4S Pay and Display Parking Meter (hereinafter "DG4S P&D”). On 31 May 2000, respondent Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 159, Series of 1999, authorizing the City Mayor of Baguio to negotiate and enter into a Memorandum of Agreement with Jadewell for the installation of its proposed DG4S parking technology. On 27 March 2000, respondent Sanggunian enacted City Ordinance No. 003, Series of 2000 (Ordinance No. 003-2000) amending Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1983, outlining the rules and policy on the privatization of the administration of on-street parking in the city streets of Baguio. An invitation to bid for the proposed regulation of on-street parking and installation of parking meters on Baguio City’s streets was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on 8, 9 and 10 May 2000. Four interested bidders

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) submitted their proposals, but three were disqualified. The bid of Jadewell was the only one not disqualified; hence, it was awarded the project. On 26 June 2000, the MOA was finally executed between Jadewell and the City of Baguio – through its then City Mayor, Mauricio G. Domogan – for the installation, management and operation of the DG4S P&D parking meters. On 17 July 2000, the Sanggunian confirmed the MOA through its Resolution No. 205-2000. On 31 August 2000, the parties executed a supplemental MOA to include the Ganza/Burnham parking space, owned by the Philippine Tourism Authority and managed by the City of Baguio, in the project. This supplemental agreement was neither confirmed nor ratified by the Sanggunian. In September of 2000, Jadewell began to mobilize and take over the parking facilities at the Ganza/Burnham Park area. Around this time, questions arose regarding the compliance by Jadewell with the provisions of the MOA, notably on matters such as obtaining the recommendation from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) for the installation of the parking meters and the legality of the collection of parking fees being done by its parking attendants prior to the installation of the parking meters at Burnham Park. Ultimately, Jadewell was able to install no more than 14 parking meters in three (3) areas of Baguio City: six (6) on Session Road, five (5) on Harrison Road and three (3) on Lake Drive. At the time that these meters were installed, there were already verbal complaints being raised against Jadewell by the Sanggunian for the following alleged violations: a. Failure to install parking meters for each parking space as specified in Section 3-F of Ordinance No. 003-2000; b. Failure to install a convenient and technologically advanced parking device that is solar-powered and can measure the time a vehicle stays in a parking slot; c. Failure to give the City of Baguio the latter's share of the collected parking fee; d. Failure to post a performance bond in the amount of P1 million after its previous bond expired. The Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 395, Series of 2000, directing Jadewell to comply with its obligations under the MOA for the installation of the necessary number of parking meters. On 19 February 2002, the Sanggunian passed Resolution 37, expressing its intent to rescind the MOA with Jadewell. ISSUE: Whether the Sangguniang Panlungsod may rescind the MOA HELD: Yes. The following are clear: (1) that the City of Baguio decided on the privatization of the administration of parking for environmental and peace and safety reasons, both of which are within its powers under Section 458(A)(5)(v) and (vi) of the Local Government Code; and (2) that the terms of agreement between the City of Baguio and Jadewell involve the delegation of governmental functions in terms of regulating the designation and use of parking spaces as well as the collection of fees for such use. These are indicators that any privatization contract pursuant to the above Resolution takes the essential character of a franchise because what is being privatized is a government-monopolized function. Under Resolution No. 003-2000 and the MOA and have additionally reflected on the applicable provision under the Civil Code. We have come to the conclusion that: (a) There is only one provision that allows for unilateral revocation of the MOA, which can be found in Section 9 thereof: 9. Minimum Guaranty – The FIRST PARTY guaranties (sic) a minimum period of five (5) years against rescission; provided that after such period, the parties may agree to increase to a reasonable rate the parking fees and the share of the city from the parking fees collected as provided for in the guidelines, (Annex "B"); (b) This Section 9 requires that five years must have lapsed – presumably from the date of execution of the MOA – before the unilateral right to revoke the MOA can be exercised; (c) Therefore, before the five year period has lapsed, the right to revoke the MOA arises only under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. From the above, it appears that in order to effect a valid revocation of the MOA prior to the lapse of the 5-year period provided for in Section 9, the City of Baguio had to approach the problem from one or both of two perspectives: one, negotiate the termination of the MOA with Jadewell, or two, exercise its option under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the instant case, the assailed act by the Sanggunian Panlungsod in rescinding the MOA was clearly in the exercise of its legislative or administrative functions and was not an exercise of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. The Sanggunian Panlungsod does not possess any judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The preamble of the MOA lends support to this view. Evidently, the foremost reason why the agreement was entered into by the parties was to provide order, given Baguio City’s parking problems in identified areas, as well as to generate income. The objectives of the Sanggunian Panlungsod, as well as its intention to rescind the MOA; because it deems to no longer serve the interest of the City of Baguio, are clearly an exercise of its legislative or administrative function. However, it is another matter as to whether the City of Baguio was able to clearly establish the grounds as basis for the exercise of its right to rescind.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY 93. CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO, GR L-23052 January 29, 1968 FACTS: Genaro N. Teotico was within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid. He was brought to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The City of Manila urged that it cannot be held liable to Teotico for damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been negligent in connection therewith. ISSUE: WON the City of Manila is liable for damages. HELD: YES. Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that " the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions and duties as imposed upon them by law . " Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision . Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. Under Article 2189, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. 94. Jimenez v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 71049, May 29, 1987 Facts: The evidence of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) shows that in the morning of August 15, 1974 he, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the "bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble home. He felt ill and developed fever and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita Mascardo. Despite the medicine administered to him by the latter, his left leg swelled with great pain. He was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days due to high fever and severe pain.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk around with crutches for fifteen (15) days. His injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he is operating. As a result, he had to engage the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his business for an aggregate compensation of nine hundred pesos (P900.00). Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and Operating Contract Issue: Whether the City of Manila is liable for damages. (YES) Holding: This issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of Manila v. Teotico (22 SCRA 269-272 [1968]) where the Supreme Court squarely ruled that Republic Act No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or any other law or ordinance or from negligence" of the City "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides that: "Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision." constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case. In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former. 95. Guilatco v. City of Dagupan G.R. No. 61516, 21 March 1989 Facts: Florentina Guilatco was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a national road) when she accidentally fell into an open manhole. Her right leg was fractured, resulting in her hospitalization and continuing difficulty in locomotion. Because of her accident, Guilatco was unable to go to work, thereby losing her income. She also lost weight, and she is now no longer her former jovial self since she is unable to perform her religious, social, and other activities. She filed an action for damages against the City of Dagupan. The City of Dagupan denied liability on the ground that the manhole was located on a national road, which was not under the control or supervision of the City of Dagupan. Issue: Whether or not the City of Dagupan is liable to Guilatco? Held: Yes, the City of Dagupan is liable. For Article 2189 of the Civil Code to apply, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In this case, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer, whose duties include the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers. The charter of Dagupan provides that the laying out, construction, and improvement of streets, avenues, and alleys and sidewalks and the regulation of the use thereof may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus, the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. 96. E. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS G.R. No. L-11154, March 21, 1916, Trent, J.

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FACTS: When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof, the General Hospital ambulance, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, according to Dr. Saleeby, who examined him on the very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in his eyes and in his mental condition. As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolve the partnership he had formed with the engineer Wilson, because he was incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco building. Meanwhile, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, which was an Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the AttorneyGeneral of said Islands to appear in said suit. ISSUE: Whether or not the Government, in enacting the Act, did not simply waive its immunity from suit but also conceded its liability to the plaintiff RULING: No. The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized. The State is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts. 97. MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION VS. FIRME GR.No. L-52179, April 8, 1991

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña. ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions? HELD: No. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover. In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any liability. 98. PALAFOX vs. PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE (Leonardo Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, The District Engineer and The Provincial Treasurer) G.R. No. L-10659 January 31, 1958 Sometime on September 30, 1948, Sabas Torralba was employed as the driver of Ilocos Norte and detailed to the Office of the District Engineer. While driving his truck along the National Highway in compliance with his duties, Sabas ran over Proceto Palafox, Plaintiffs-appellants’ father, resulting to the latter’s death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against him, the Province, the District Engineer and the Provincial Treasurer. ISSUE: Is the Province of Ilocos Norte liable for the death of Proceto Palafox? RULING: No. The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint for damages held that the province could not be made liable because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the construction and maintenance of roads — and however tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of its employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case" the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a governmental duty. Therefore" the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act. However tragic and deplorable it may be" the death of Palafox imposed on the province no duty to pay monetary consideration. The municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor does the fact that such duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and so on to administer government, whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a local organization. And the state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.

FACTS:

99. Ladislao Palma vs. Honorato Graciano (99 Phil 72) FACTS: This is an action to recover damages for the institution, against Plaintiff-Appellant, Ladislao Palma, of for “frauds against the public treasury,” and for malversation of public funds, in which he was acquitted. It is alleged in the complaint that the information in said criminal cases were through “malicious machination” and in “bad faith”, as well as “without any probable cause” and “with the intention of harassing and embarrassing the Plaintiff” and “to besmirch” his “honor and reputation” — by Defendant Manuel Cuenco, then provincial governor of Cebu who, it is said, acted, “with evident premeditation” and “due to personal hatred and vengeance against Plaintiff,” in connivance with Defendant Honorato Graciano, as assistant fiscal of the City of Cebu, and contrary to law. Said City of Cebu and the province of Cebu were, likewise, included in the complaint as Defendants.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In due course, each one of the aforementioned four Defendants filed separate motions to dismiss, all based upon one and the same ground, namely, “that the complaint states no cause of action”. Hence, this appeal by Plaintiff Ladislao Palma. ISSUE: W/N Plaintiff’s complaint states a cause of action against any of the four Defendants herein HELD: With respect to the province of Cebu and the City of Cebu, it is clear that the order appealed from is welltaken and must be upheld. Indeed, if as Plaintiff avers in his complaint, the acts therein set forth were performed by Defendants Manuel Cuenco and Honorato Graciano, “contrary to law,” it follows that they bore neither the approval nor the authority of said political subdivisions, which, accordingly, cannot be held liable therefor. This exemption from responsibility of the province of Cebu and the City of Cebu becomes more evident when we consider that said acts (prosecution of crimes) are, not corporate, but governmental or political in character, and that, in the discharge of functions of this nature, municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, and only to the extent that, that have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements thereof. In fact, section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 (as amended), which is the Charter of the City of Cebu, provides: “The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the mayor, the municipal board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this charter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said mayor, municipal board, or other officer while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.” The situation varies, fundamentally, as regards Defendants Manuel Cuenco and Honorato Graciano. The order of dismissal complained of is predicated upon the theory that the filing of the informations above referred to, is “presumed” to have been made “in good faith” and that, in fact, the proper court had found the existence of probable cause against Plaintiff herein, contrary to the allegations in the complaint, which specifically charges “bad faith”, lack of “any probable cause”, desire to give vent to “personal hatred and vengeance,” and intent to harass and embarrass the Plaintiff and to besmirch his honor and reputation. 100. Mendoza v De Leon 33 Phil 508 February 11, 1916

Facts: Marcos Mendoza was forcibly ejected under and pursuance of a resolution adopted by Francisco De Leon, et al, who are individual members of the municipal council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, awarding a franchise for an exclusive ferry privilege. Mendoza filed an action for damages against respondents for the revocation of the lease of the ferry privilege previously awarded to him under the provisions of Act no. 1643 of the Philippine Commission. Issue: Whether or not the municipality is liable Held: Yes. It is well-established that the municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor of the municipality which, for convenience the state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and so on to administer government, whether it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a local organization. And the state being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute. Following this, it should be clear that a municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In this case, it is clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect. There is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he had leased. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was dispossessed was the one which he leased that no reasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever upon the question. Hence, the Court cannot say that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of the municipality. 101. Torio vs Fontanilla FACTS: On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed resolutions for management of the town fiesta celebration and for the creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of 2 stages. While the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. A complaint was filed by the heirs of Fontanilla for damages with the CFI of Manila. In its Answer, defendant municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. They maintained that they merely acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all defendants solidarily liable for damages. ISSUE: Whether or not the Municipality is liable over the death of Fontanilla HELD: Yes. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a governmental function. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the defective construction of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability. Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the subcommittee on entertainment and in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

102. [G.R. No. 152833. May 9, 2005] CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. JOCELYN S. GENTALLAN, respondent. [G.R. No. 154961. May 9, 2005] THE MUNICIPALITY OF JASAAN, Represented by the Municipal Mayor HUBERTO C. PAUROM, petitioner, vs. JOCELYN S. GENTALLAN, respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Jocelyn Gentallan was appointed ad local civil registrar of the Municipality of Jasaan, Misamis Oriental by then Mayor Jose Salcedo. Commissioner Thelma Gaminde of the CSC confirmed Gentallan’s work experience was more than enough to meet the minimum requirement of 3 years’ experience. Gentallan’s permanent appointment was eventually deemed approved. Rosalina Asis, a research aide in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar filed a protest, but was dismissed by the CSC, because Asis was not qualified next-in-rank. In the same resolution, the CSC also reviewed the appointment of Gentallan and found out that Gentallan was not qualified as she failed to fulfil the required threeyear experience. Mayor Paurom then ordred Gentallan to vacate the post as Local Civil Registrar, pursuant to the CSC resolution and directed her to assume her former position as Assistant Registration Officer. The CA, since Gentallan submitted an appeal, ruled that she was qualified for the position. However, Mayor Paurom did not reinstate Gentallan to the Local Civil Registrar position. Gentallan wrote the CSC Regional Office to reinstate her and for her backwages. Still, she was not reinstated. Issue W/N the CSC has standing to appeal? Held Yes, the CSC has standing to appeal. it should be noted that the Civil Service Commission, under the Constitution, is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. Thus, the CSC, as an institution whose primary concern is the effectiveness of the civil service system, has the standing to appeal a decision which adversely affects the civil service. We hold, at this juncture, that CSC has the standing to appeal and/or to file its motion for reconsideration. As a permanent appointee to the position, she enjoys security of tenure. She is likewise entitled to all benefits, rights and privileges attached to the position. She cannot be removed or dismissed from the service without just cause and without observing the requirements of due process. An illegally dismissed government employee who is later ordered reinstated is entitled to backwages and other monetary benefits from the time of her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. This is only fair and just because an employee who is reinstated after having been illegally dismissed is considered as not having left her office and should be given the corresponding compensation at the time of her reinstatement. In the instant case, we note that there is no finding that malice or bad faith attended the illegal dismissal and refusal to reinstate Gentallan by her superior officers. Thus, they cannot be held personally accountable for her back salaries. The municipal government, therefore, should disburse funds to answer for her claims resulting from dismissal. 103. City of Angeles v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97882, 28 August 1996 DOCTRINE: A public official may be held liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. FACTS: Private respondent, Timog Silangan Development Corporation, donated to the petitioner, City of Angeles, 51 parcels of land situated in Barrio Pampang, City of Angeles, with an aggregate area of 50,676 square meters, more or less, part of a bigger area also belonging to private respondent. The Deed of Donation provided that the properties donated shall be devoted and utilized solely for the site of the Angeles City Sports Complex and that any substantial breach of the foregoing provisions shall entitle the donor to revoke or rescind the Deed of Donation, and in such eventuality, the done agrees to vacate and return the premises, together with all improvements, to the donor peacefully without necessity of judicial action. On July 19, 1988, petitioners started the construction of a drug rehabilitation center on a portion of the donated land. Upon learning thereof, private respondent protested such action for being violative of the terms and conditions of the amended deed and prejudicial to its interest and to those of its clients and residents. Private respondent also offered another site for the rehabilitation center but petitioners ignored the protest and maintained that the construction was not violative of the terms of the donation. The offer for an alternative site was also rejected citing that the site was too isolated and had no electric and water facilities. Private respondent then filed a complaint before the RTC of Angeles City alleging breach of the conditions imposed in the amended deed of donation and sought the revocation of the same and damages. Petitioner admitted the commencement of the construction but alleged the condition imposed in the amended deed were contrary to Municipal Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1962, otherwise known as the Subdivision Ordinance of the Municipality of Angeles. The

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) petitioner also contended that they have a meritorious defense as private respondents had no right to dictate upon petitioner what to do with the donated land and how to do it so long as the purpose remains for public use. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent which on appeal was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the petitioner can be held liable for the said breach of the terms of the deed of donation HELD: Yes. In ruling this case, the Court first cleared the issue on the donation itself. Upon review and scrutiny of the matters at hand, the Court held that both parties were in violation of P.D. 957 as amended: the respondent, for donating and accepting a donation of open space less than that required by law, and for agreeing to build and operate a sports complex on the non-buildable open space so donated and the petitioner, for constructing a drug rehabilitation center on the same non-buildable area. Since the condition to construct a sports complex on the donated land has previously been shown to be contrary to law, therefore, the stipulations with regard to the breach of the amended deed cannot be implemented because (1) no valid stipulation of the amended deed had been breached, and (2) it is highly improbable that the decree would have allowed the return of the donated land for open space under any circumstance, considering the non-alienable character of such open space, in the light of the second “Whereas” clause of P.D. 1216 which declares that “…such open spaces, roads, alleys, and sidewalks in residential subdivisions are for public use and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men.” In as much as the construction and operation of the drug rehabilitation center has been established to be contrary to law, the said center should be removed and demolished. In theory, the cost of the such demolition, and the reimbursement of the public funds expended in the construction thereof, should be borne by the officials of the City of Angeles who ordered and directed such construction. The Court has time and again ruled that public officials are not immune from damages in their personal capacities arising for acts done in bad faith. In the instant case, the public officials concerned deliberately violated the law and persisted in their violations, going so far as attempting to deceive the courts by their pretended change of purpose and usage for the center, and “making a mockery of the judicial system”. Indisputably, said public officials acted beyond the scope of their authority and jurisdiction and with evident bad faith. However, as noted by the trial court, the petitioners mayor and members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Angeles City were sued only in their ”official” capacities, hence, they could not be held personally liable without first giving them their day in court. Prevailing jurisprudence holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities. 104 Rama v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44484, 16 March 1987 Doctrine: A public officer by virtue of his office alone, is not immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith. A different rule would sanction the use of public office as a tool of oppression. Facts: During the incumbency of Rene Espina as provincial governor of Cebu, Osmundo G. Rama as vice-governor and Pablo P. Garcia, Reynaldo M. Mendiola and Valerians S. Carillo as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, said officials adopted Resolution No. 990 which appropriated funds "for the maintenance and repair of provincial roads and bridges and for the operation and maintenance of the office of the provincial engineer and for other purposes." To implement said policy, the provincial board resolved to abolish around thirty positions thus doing away with the caminero (pick-shovel-wheelbarrow) system. Consequently around 200 employees of the province were eased out of their respective jobs and, to implement the mechanization program in the maintenance of roads and bridges, the provincial government purchased heavy equipment worth P4,000,000.00. Aggrieved by these turn of events, the employees whose positions were abolished filed separate petitions for mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees aimed at the annulment of Resolution No. 990, their reinstatement and the recovery of damages. In Civil Case No. R-10704, the Court of First Instance of Cebu declared Resolution No. 990 null and void and ordered the respondent officials to re-create the positions abolished, to provide funds therefore, to reinstate the 56 petitioners headed by Jose Abala, and to pay them back salaries. For "lack of legal and factual basis," no damages were awarded to petitioners and no pronouncement as to attorney's fees were made as the petitioners had agreed to pay their lawyers 30% of whatever amount they would receive as back salaries. All the parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Eventually, said appellate court, through its First Division, affirmed the lower court's decision with the modification that respondents were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their "individual and personal capacity" P1,000.00 moral damages to each of the petitioners considering that the case involved a quasi-delict

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Issues: Whether or not the public officers who issued the resolution are personally liable for damages for adopting a resolution which abolished positions to the detriment of the occupants Held: Yes. The dismissed employees are entitled to damages because they have suffered a special and peculiar injury from the wrongful act of which they complain. It is an undeniable fact that the dismissed employees who were holding such positions as foremen, watchmen and drivers, suffered the uncertainties of the unemployed when they were plucked out of their positions. That not all of them testified as to the extent of damages they sustained on account of their separation from their government jobs, cannot be used as a defense by the petitioners. Suffice it to state that considering the positions they were holding, the dismissed employees concerned belong to a lowsalaried group, who, if deprived of wages would generally incur considerable economic hardships. Justice demands that they be recompensed for the predicament they were placed in, apart from the back salaries which they are entitled to as a matter of right. Petitioner Rama's protestations that when he eventually became the governor of Cebu, he reinstated most of the dismissed employees through provincial board Resolution No. 392 cannot erase the fact that he had a hand in the adoption of Resolution No. 990. His subsequent benevolent act cannot sufficiently make up for the damage suffered by the dismissed employees during their period of unemployment. Apropos the practice of victorious politicians to remove government employees who did not support them in their campaign for office, this Court has said: "There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective officials, upon assumption to office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges regardless of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts." 105. Correa v. CFI of Bulacan, G.R. No. L-46096, 30 July 1979 Doctrine: A Public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor lie any private individual. This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of non-compliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official authority." Facts: On December 13, 1968, respondent Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 3621-M in favor of therein plaintiffs (private respondents herein) and adversely against therein defendants Eufemio T. Correa (petitioner herein) and Virgilio Sarmiento. The pertinent portions of the decision is as follows: “This Court finds that defendants Eufemio T. Correa and Virgilio Sarmiento, municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Norzagaray, Bulacan respectively, should be ordered personally to pay the salaries which the plaintiffs failed to receive by reason of their illegal removal from office until they are actually reinstated.” Petitioner prays, among others, that judgment be rendered declaring that the payment of back salaries of private respondents should be made by the incumbent mayor and by the municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that petitioner is no longer liable for the payment thereof. Petitioner alleges that the writ of execution is already being enforced against the personal properties of petitioner; that such enforcement during the pendency of the instant petition would probably work injustice to petitioner; and that petitioner stands to suffer great and irreparable injury if enforcement of the writ is not temporarily restrained. Petitioner, therefore, prays that the execution be stayed or a temporary restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant proceedings. RTC and CA: The defendants are personally liable jointly and severally because they acted without justifiable cause Issue: Whether the municipality of Norzagaray is liable for the acts of the Mayor (illegal removal)? Held: NO. In the discharge of govermental functions, "municipal corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when and only to the extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in comformity with the requirements thereof." A Public officer who commits a tort or other wrongful act, done in

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) excess or beyond the scope of his duty, is not protected by his office and is personally liable therefor lie any private individual. This principle of personal liability has been applied to cases where a public officer removes another officer or discharges an employee wrongfully, the reported cases saying that by reason of noncompliance with the requirements of law in respect to removal from office, the officials were acting outside their official authority." Appellant cannot hide under the mantle of his official capacity and pass the liability to the municipality of which he was mayor. There are altogether too many cases of this nature, wherein local elective officials, upon assumption of office, wield their new-found power indiscriminately by replacing employees with their own proteges, regardless of the laws and regulations governing the civil service. Victory at the polls should not be taken as authority for the commission of such illegal acts. 106. ARSENIO SALCEDO vs. CA GR L-40846 January 31, 1978 DOCTRINE: The mayor, for his persistently defiance of the order of the CSC to reinstate the employee, was held liable for back salaries. FACTS: An administrative complaint for misconduct and serious irregularities in the performance of his duties was filed against the petitioner. On the same day, he was suspended flora office for ten days, extended to 60 days, then indefinitely, until on March 12, 1965, while his administrative case was penalty that respondent mayor terminated his services as Chief of Police. The letter of termination stated that the petitioner was not a civil service eligible because the attention of appointment as permanent was erroneous and illegal petitioner not possessing the appropriate eligibility for the position of Chief of Police. Petitioner was ordered separated from the service by a resolution of the Municipal Council of Candelaria, Quezon, finding him guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed to the CSC but was found guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer. He was ordered reinstated, and was imposed a fine of one month's pay, with a warning against seminar offenses. Respondent mayor moved to reconsider the decision alleging the inappropriate eligibility of petitioner but the reconsideration was denied. Petitioner made repeated requests, for reinstatement but were refused by the respondent mayor. Petitioner wrote the CSC to intervene and the latter, in a series of endorsements, ordered the respondent mayor to immediately reinstate the petitioner. Respondent mayor, nevertheless, ignored these endorsements, and coursed a request to the Office of the President that the issue of the termination of petitioner's services, on the ground of lack of the requisite eligibility, be squarely resolved by the latter office. On January 10, 1967, petitioner then filed mandamus proceedings before the CFI of Quezon. The lower court found cause for mandamus to issue, and ordered the reinstatement of petitioner, with back wages. Respondent mayor appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. On the ground that the Civil Service Commissioner has the final authority to decide on the eligibility of the petitioner, the appellate court ordered the reinstatement of the petitioner, with back wages. Respondent mayor moved to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals. Resolving said motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reversed its earlier decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: May the respondent be held personally liable for the payment of back salaries? HELD: Yes, the respondent mayor persistently ignored the order of reinstatement given by the Commissioner of Civil Service and defied the directive of a superior body with final authority on the matter which is respondent's duty to comply. For acting arbitrarily and without legal justification in terminating the services of petitioner and refusing to reinstate him as Chief of Police, the respondent mayor must be held personally liable for the back salaries of petitioner. 107. ABELLA vs. [ G.R. No. L-3738 November 20, 1951, 90 Phil 385 ]

MUNICIPALITY

OF

NAGA

Doctrine: Sec. 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: “No municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Facts: The Municipality of Naga, by a resolution, closed a road which ran through the public market and Abella’s property and used the closed thoroughfare to expand the market. Constructions were made along the sidewalk of Abella's property and abutting to said property, facing P. Prieto Street, and extending out in the middle of the same street, hence depriving Abella's property of access to said street. Abella sought damages from the CFI of Camarines Sur, which ruled in her favor by ordering the municipality to pay P300 pesos for damages. Aggrieved, the municipality appealed to the SC. It contended it is not liable for damages as it acted and exercised its police power to preserve the peace and good order of the community and promote the general welfare." Issue: Whether the municipality is liable for damages considering that it merely exercised its police power to preserve peace and good order of the community and promote general welfare. Held: Yes. The municipality was not charged with any unlawful act, or with invading Abella’s property rights, it was not found guilty of any such acts. What is in issue in this case is the liability for damages. Sec. 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: “No municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any person.” The stipulation of facts admits that Abella was economically damaged and adversely affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market. Hence, the municipality must be held liable for damages. 108. PROVINCE OF CEBU vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT GR N0. 72841 FACTS:

29 January 1987

The issue in this case is the granting respondent Pablo P. Garcia's claim for compensation for services rendered as counsel in behalf of the respondent Province of Cebu. On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent Governor Rene Espina was on official business in Manila, the ViceGovernor, Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province. owned lots all located in the City of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the province. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmeña, Jr. The document of donation was prepared and notarized by a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio. Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as Legal and immoral the action of his colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial property of the province of Cebu, considering that the latter's income was less than one. fourth (1/4) of that of the City of Cebu. Thereupon, Governor Espina engaged the services of respondent Garcia in filing and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in behalf of the Province of Cebu. Garcia filed the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which application was granted on the same day, August 6, 1965. For services rendered, respondent Pablo P. Garcia filed through counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, dated April 14, 1975, praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon the records thereof, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu filed through counsel, its opposition dated April 23, 1975, stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by the Province. A rejoinder to this opposition was filed by private respondent Garcia. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, then presided over by Judge Alfredo Marigomen, rendered judgment dated May 30, 1979, in favor of private respondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the former is entitled to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount thereof at P30,000.00. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the representation of respondent Garcia as counsel of Governor Espina was valid and legal? 2.

Whether or not Atty. Pablo Garcia was entitled to compensation for the legal services he rendered?

HELD: 1. The general rule is that a private attorney cannot represent a municipal corporation. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: .Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality, or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality, or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality, or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is clear in providing that only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it as when he represents the province against a municipality. However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur; inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque (Where anything is granted generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right). Indeed, equity, as well as the exceptional situation facing us in the case at bar, require a departure from the established rule. A situation obtains, therefore, where the Provincial Governor, in behalf of the Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the very members of the body, that is, the Provincial Board, which, under the law, is to provide it with legal assistance. A strict application of the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on the matter would deprive the plaintiffs in the court below of redress for a valid grievance. The provincial board authorization required by law to secure the services of special counsel becomes an impossibility. The decision of the respondent court is grounded in equity — a correction applied to law, where on account of the general comprehensiveness of the law, particular exceptions not being provided against, something is wanting to render it perfect. 2. The Court applied a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the general law,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same." (38 Am Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193): The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does not connote an enforceable obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the claim. The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the unlawful contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit received by the municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property or services, or the compensation specified in the contract, is not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the true measure of recovery. The petitioner can not set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of denying answerability. The trial court discussed the services of respondent Garcia as follows: ... Thus because of his effort in the filing of this case and in securing the issuance of the injunction preventing the City of Cebu and Sergio Osmeña, Jr., from selling or disposing the lots to third parties, on the part of the members of the Provincial Board from extending the date of the automatic reversion beyond August 15, 1965, on the part of the Register of Deeds — from effecting the transfer of title of any of the donated lots to any vendee or transferee, the disposition of these lots by the City of Cebu to third parties was frustrated and thus: saved these lots for their eventual recovery by the province of Cebu. Actually it was Governor Espina who filed the case against Cebu City and Mayor Osmeña. Garcia just happened to be the lawyer, Still Atty. Garcia is entitled to compensation. To deny private respondent compensation for his professional services would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329).

109. SAN DIEGO vs. MUN. OF NAUJAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO GR L-9920 February 29, 1960 DOCTRINE: POWER TO EXECUTE CONTRACTS; WHEN ESTOPPEL CANNOT APPLY AGAINST A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. — The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make, or which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed his part of the agreement, or has expanded large sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a municipality in such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity on this ground; nor can it be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or government powers. FACTS: When a public bidding was conducted by the municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro for the lease of its municipal waters, the municipal council issued Resolution 46 awarding the concession of the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to the highest bidder petitioner San Diego. With that, a contract was entered petitioner and respondent stipulating that for 5 years,former was to be the lessee of "the exclusive privilege of erecting fish corrals along the Butas River beginning from its junction with the San Agustin River up to the Naujan Lake itself," for P26.3k annually or P131.5kfor 5 years, subsequently reduced by 20% at petitioner’s request. When typhoon Wanda destroyed most of his fish corrals, petitioner asked for another 5-year extension which council through Resolution 222 acceded for another 5 years with the express condition that the plaintiff would waive the privilege to seek for reduction of the amount of rent which was to be based on the original contract. Petitioner accepted,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) filed surety bond, reconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake with bañgus fingerlings. When new SP members came, they adopted Resolution 3, revoking the resolutions that confirmed the extension of the lease period. The lessee requested for reconsideration and recall of Resolution 3, on the ground, among others, that it violated the contract executed between him and the municipality and therefore contrary to Article III, sec 1, clause 10 of the Constitution on impairment of contracts. The request was not granted since respondents believe extension was illegal, it having been granted without competitive public bidding. ISSUE: WON Resolution No. 3revoking Resolution 222of the municipal council of Naujan is valid HELD: YES. The Court REVERSED the ruling sincethe law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code) requires that when the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct a fish-breeding ground is granted to a private party, the same shall be let to the highest bidder belonging to the municipality. The requirement of competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition and to guard against favoritism, fraud and corruption in the letting of fishery privileges. There is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case was awarded to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the extension of the term of the lease appear to have been granted without previous public bidding. The lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellant municipality has been estopped from assailing the validity of the contract into which it entered in 1951, seems to have overlooked the general rule that — ". . . the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make or which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully performed his part of the agreement, or has expended large sums in preparation for performance. A reason frequently assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a municipality in such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality executing it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity on this ground; nor can it be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or government powers." 110. MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL vs. COURT OF APPEALS REGALADO, J.:

DOCTRINE: When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. FACTS: Atty. Felix E. Mendiola served as counsel for the Municipality of Pililia in a collection suit for unpaid business taxes, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee, sanitary inspection fee, and the cost of the suit against private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC). The municipality won in the trial court, and when PPC elevated the case to the Supreme Court, the SC affirmed the aforesaid judgment. The judgment became final and executory and the records were remanded to the trial court for execution.

In connection with the execution of said judgment, Atty. Felix E. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of the municipality for the examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and 1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing business tax. Defendant corporation filed a manifestation that Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it the sum of P11,457,907.00 as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed by said mayor. The RTC denied the municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment on the ground that the judgment had already been satisfied.

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It was when the case was only when the case was brought before to the CA that respondent PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to represent petitioner municipality. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendiola can represent the Municipality of Pilila? HELD: No. The Court of Appeals is correct in holding that Atty. Mendiola has no authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla. Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: Section 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its council. Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

The fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law. The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to apply to situations where the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a legal justification. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court.

It should also be noted that the lack of authority of Atty. Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which was filed by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal in behalf of said municipality.

The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality is untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of the proceedings. Also, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise agreement with PPC. WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

111. RAMOS VS CA

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) G.R. No. 99425, 3 March 1997 Doctrine: Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. FACTS: Petitioners Antonio C. Ramos, Rosalinda M. Perez, Norma C. Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a case for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan. During the hearing on the petitioners' motion for the issuance of preliminary injunction, the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the petition. At the pre-trial conference Atty. Roberto B. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for respondent municipality. Provincial Attorney Oliviano D. Regalado then appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. Petitioners questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel of the respondent municipality. Respondent Judge issued the Order now being assailed which, as already stated, denied petitioners' motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare null and void the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally adopt the entire proceedings including the formal offer of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not a private counsel for a municipality may represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits RULING: No. Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein private counsel is without authority of law." The foregoing provisions of law and jurisprudence show that only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney, and municipal attorney should represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only in exceptional instances may a private attorney be hired by a municipality to represent it in lawsuits. None of the foregoing exceptions is present in his case. It may be said that Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent municipality in this same case. The order of the trial court stated that Atty. Romanillos "entered his appearance as collaborating counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial attorney." This collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not have been recognized as legal. Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality of the appearance of Atty. Romanillos, notwithstanding that they questioned the witnesses of respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the municipality. 112. Mancenido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118605, 12 April 2000

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Doctrine: Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the appointment of a legal officer, whose function is: "(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;" Facts: On September 6, 1990 private respondent [herein petitioner] Eduardo Mancenido filed an action for mandamus and damages with the Regional Trial of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, Daet (docketed as Civil Case No. 5864), against the petitioners provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board, provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the teacher's claim for unpaid salary increases. On December 19, 1990, petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. On December 20, 1993, the lower court rendered a decision ordering the Provincial School Board to appropriate and satisfy plaintiffs claim in the amount of P268,800.00, as unpaid salary increases. On February 21, 1994, petitioners [filed a notice of appeal. On February 24, 1994, respondent judge issued an order giving due course to petitioners appeal.On March 1, 1994, private respondents filed a notice of appeal.On the same date, private respondents filed an opposition to petitioners notice of appeal and a motion for partial execution of judgment.On April 8, 1994, respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23, 1994, granting the appeal of petitioners; (2) approving the appeal of private respondents; and (3) granting their motion for partial execution. On April 14, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April 8, 1994.On June 1, 1994, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration." Dissatisfied with the denial, respondents herein filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition, and injunction with the Court of Appeals with the prayer, among others, that their notice of appeal be given due course and the trial court be prohibited from enforcing the partial execution of its judgment. Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its decision of October 17, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for prohibition and mandamus and hereby orders respondent judge: (1) to elevate the original record of Civil Case No. 5864 to the Court of Appeals in due course of appeal; and (2) to desist from the partial execution of the decision in the case. "No costs. "SO ORDERED.".[2] Petitioners then filed a motion to reconsider the appellate court's decision, which motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated December 21, 1994. Issue: Whether or not a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities? Held: Yes. Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the appointment of a legal officer, whose function is: "(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;" The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local government unit by a private attorney. In Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, 93 Phil, 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we held that only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of a special attorney. We reiterated this in De Guia v. Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169 (1972)..[6] In Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez, 107 Phil 932 (1960), we enumerated the instances when the provincial public prosecutor is disqualified from representing a particular municipality, i.e., when the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise. But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), we laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 102 Phil. 211 (1957), we approved the representation by private counsel of a provincial governor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. In Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, we declared that where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, for mandamus and damages. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court granted mandamus, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not award damages. In view of the damages sought which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. No error may thus be attributed to the appellate court when it recognized the right of respondents to be represented by private counsel. 112 Mancenido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118605, 12 April 2000 Doctrine: Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the appointment of a legal officer, whose function is: "(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;" Facts: On September 6, 1990 private respondent [herein petitioner] Eduardo Mancenido filed an action for mandamus and damages with the Regional Trial of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, Daet (docketed as Civil Case No. 5864), against the petitioners provincial board of Camarines Norte, the school board, provincial governor, provincial treasurer, and provincial auditor to pay the teacher's claim for unpaid salary increases. On December 19, 1990, petitioners filed their answer to the complaint. On December 20, 1993, the lower court rendered a decision ordering the Provincial School Board to appropriate and satisfy plaintiffs claim in the amount of P268,800.00, as unpaid salary increases. On February 21, 1994, petitioners [filed a notice of appeal. On February 24, 1994, respondent judge issued an order giving due course to petitioners appeal.On March 1, 1994, private respondents filed a notice of appeal.On the same date, private respondents filed an opposition to petitioners notice of appeal and a motion for partial execution of judgment.On April 8, 1994, respondent judge issued an order (1) recalling the order of February 23, 1994, granting the appeal of petitioners; (2) approving the appeal of private respondents; and (3) granting their motion for partial execution. On April 14, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of April 8, 1994.On June 1, 1994, respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration." Dissatisfied with the denial, respondents herein filed a petition for mandamus, prohibition, and injunction with the Court of Appeals with the prayer, among others, that their notice of appeal be given due course and the trial court be prohibited from enforcing the partial execution of its judgment. Subsequently, the appellate court rendered its decision of October 17, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads: "WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for prohibition and mandamus and hereby orders respondent judge: (1) to elevate the original record of Civil Case No. 5864 to the Court of Appeals in due course of appeal; and (2) to desist from the partial execution of the decision in the case. "No costs. "SO ORDERED.".[2] Petitioners then filed a motion to reconsider the appellate court's decision, which motion was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated December 21, 1994. Issue: Whether or not a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their official capacities? Held: Yes. Section 481, Article 11, Title V of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) provides for the appointment of a legal officer, whose function is: "(I) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party;" The Court has previously ruled on the representation of a local government unit by a private attorney. In Municipality of Bocaue v. Manotok, 93 Phil, 173 (1953), and succeeding cases, we held that only when the provincial fiscal is disqualified may the municipal council be authorized to hire the services of a special attorney. We reiterated this in De Guia v. Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169 (1972)..[6] In Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez, 107 Phil 932 (1960), we enumerated the instances when the provincial public prosecutor is disqualified from representing a particular municipality, i.e., when the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province, and when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise. But do these rulings equally apply to local government officials? In Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), we laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a local government

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 102 Phil. 211 (1957), we approved the representation by private counsel of a provincial governor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint contained other allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. In Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, we declared that where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper. The present case had its origins in Civil Case No. 5864 filed before the RTC of Camarines Norte, Branch 38, for mandamus and damages. Notwithstanding the fact that the trial court granted mandamus, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals since the trial court did not award damages. In view of the damages sought which, if granted, could result in personal liability, respondents could not be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. No error may thus be attributed to the appellate court when it recognized the right of respondents to be represented by private counsel. 113. GONTANG vs. ALAYAN GR 191691 January 16, 2013 DOCTRINE: Where personal liability on the part of local government officials is sought, they may properly secure the services of private counsel. FACTS: Herein respondent was appointed in 2000 as Municipal Government Department Head (Municipal Assessor) on temporary status. In 2001, she applied for change of status from temporary to permanent. It was denoied by CSC-Camarines Sur Field Office for lack of relevant experience. On appeal, the CSC-Regional Office in its order approved her application. Thus, she reported for work and sought recognition of her appointment and the grant of the emoluments of the position from petitioner, then incumbent Mayor Gontang. Her requests having been denied, she filed before the RTC of Naga City a petition for mandamus, against petitioner, in his official capacity as Municipal Mayor of Gainza, Camarines Sur. RTC dismissed the petition for having been prematurely filed as the Order of the CSC-Regional Office had not attained finality due to the pendency of the appeal before the CSC. Respondent appealed to the CA which ruled in her favor holding that the pendency of an appeal is not a justification to prevent her from assuming office. Prior to the CA decision, the CSC set aside the order of the CSC-Regional Office upon a finding that there was no permanent appointment as the concurrence of the local Sanggunian was not obtained. Respondent’s appeal of the CSC decision was denied by the CA. Meanwhile, Alayan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of execution by the RTC for her alleged unsatisfied judgment award representing her unpaid salaries and allowances during the pendency of her appeal in the CSC Resolutions. The RTC issued the alias writ of execution. Dissatisfied, Mayor Gontang, represented by Atty. Fandino and Atty. Saulon, a private attorney, filed a petition for certiorari to the CA. However, the CA denied the petition on the ground that Atty. Saulon, a private attorney, lacks legal authority to represent the Municipality of Gainza, Camarines Sur. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of unauthorized representation of petitioner by private lawyers HELD: YES. The damages sought therein could have resulted in personal liability, hence, petitioner cannot be deemed to have been improperly represented by private counsel. It can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that capacity is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by the people’s money which ordinarily should have been his personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of his own choice.

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We held that where rigid adherence to the law on representation of local officials in court actions could deprive a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of a private counsel would be proper. Consequently Attys. Fandiño and Saulon had the authority to represent petitioner at the initial stages of the litigation and this authority continued even up to his appeal and the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA respecting the execution of the RTC judgment.

LOCAL OFFICIALS PROHIBITIONS

–

QUALIFICATIONS,

DISCIPLINE,

AND

114. Javellana v. v. DILG G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992 Griño-Aquino, J. Doctrine: By appearing as counsel for dismissed employees, City Councilor Javellana violated the prohibition against engaging in private practice if such practice represents interests adverse to the government. The LGC and DILG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors: it applies to all provincial and municipal officials Facts: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5, 1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1) violation of Department of Local Government (DLG) Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the “Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,” and (2) for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority. Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an incumbent member of the City Council or Sanggunian Panglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department; that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for “Illegal Dismissal and Reinstatement with Damages” putting him in public ridicule; that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38. On August 13, 1990, a formal hearing of the complaint was held in Iloilo City in which the complainant, Engineer Divinagracia, and the respondent, Councilor Javellana, presented their respective evidence. Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons stated in his letter-request. On September 21, 1991, Secretary Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective officials. In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana’s motion to dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991. Five months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of which provides: Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. (b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not: (1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) (2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office; (3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedingsinvolving the local government unit of which he is an official; and (4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the Government. (c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom. Issue: Whether or not DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law Held: No. Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it. 115. FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC GR 120295 June 28, 1996 FACTS: Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. Later, Raul Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with Comelec to disqualify Frivaldo on ground that he is not yet a Filipino citizen. Comelec 2nd Division granted the petition and disqualified Frivaldo, prompting a Motion for Reconsideration but it was unacted until after the elections and as a result Frivaldo was voted for and garnered the highest number of votes. Comelec En Banc, consequently affirmed the decision of the 2nd Division. Lee, the 2nd placer, filed a petition praying for his proclamation as duly-elected governor, which was granted. Thus, he was proclaimed as governor. Frivaldo filed with Comelec a new petition for the annulment of Lee’s proclamation alleging that on June 30, 1995 at 2pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under PD 727 which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted. Later, Comelec 1st Division promulgated a Resolution holding that Lee, not garnering the highest number of votes, was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor, and the Frivaldo, having garnered the highest number of votes and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 uner PD 727, is qualified to hold office of governor. ISSUE: WON the repatriation of Frivaldo is valid or is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor HELD: Yes. The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus: "Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twentythree (23) years of age on election day. From the above provision, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day). Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people. 116. Altarejos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163256, 10 November 2004 FACTS: Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997. ISSUE: Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. RULING: Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004 elections. 117. Garvida v. Sales, G.R. No. 124893, 18 April 1997 Facts: The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections nationwide was scheduled to be held on May 6, 1996. Lynette Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. However, the Board of Election Tellers (BET) denied her application because she was allegedly over the maximum age limit. Garvida filed a case with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bangui. The MCTC granted her petition. The BET was unable to appeal to the RTC since the Judge of the RTC inhibited himself. On April 23, 1996, she filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan. However, she was denied again on the grounds of her age. On appeal, however, COMELEC Regional Director Asperin allowed her to run. On April 29, 1996, Private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy" against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. The petition was sent by facsimile and registered mail to the Commission on Elections National Office, Manila.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On May 2, 1996, the COMELEC en banc, issued an order directing the BET to suspend Garvida’s proclamation, in case she wins. On May 6, 1996, Election Day, petitioner garnered 78 votes as against private respondent's votes of 76. However, her proclamation was suspended so she filed this petition for certiorari. On June 6, 1996 she was proclaimed but it was "without prejudice to any further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." Issue/s: 1. W.O.N COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction to act on the petition to deny or cancel her certificate of candidacy 2. W.O.N the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy is valid on the ground that she has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK. Held: 1. No. Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, jurisdiction over a petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy lies with the COMELEC sitting in Division, not en banc. Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Moreover, only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc also erred when it failed to note that the petition itself did not comply with the formal requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. The COMELEC Rules provide that the petition must be printed, mimeographed or typewritten in legal size bond paper and filed in at least ten (10) legible copies. Pleadings must be filed directly with the proper Clerk of Court of the COMELEC personally, or, by registered mail. In this case, the COMELEC en banc did not refer the case to any of its Divisions upon receipt of the petition. Also, the subject petition was not in proper form because only two (2) copies of the petition were filed and it were transmitted via fax instead of registered mail. Therefore, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction. 2. Yes. Under Section 424 of the Local Government Code, a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. The Local Government Code distinguishes between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age at 21 years only. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The elective official, must not be more than 21 years old on the day of election. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio or the courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification. The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. Furthermore, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel the sponsor and principal author of the Local Government Code, declared that the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his 21st birthday." In this case, petitioner Garvida is no longer consider a “youth.” On the day of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Therefore, she is disqualified for being over the maximum age limit.

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118. DELA TORRE vs. COMELEC GR 121792 July 5, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Rolando De La Torre filed a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of COMELEC’s resolutions declaring petitioner disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti, Laguna. The first resolution declared the petitioner disqualified from running for Mayor for having been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, pursuant to Sec. 40 of RA 7160 (Local Government Code). Documentary evidence shows that the petitioner was convicted by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law. The second assailed resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Petitioner contended that Sec. 40 of RA 7160 does not apply to his case because he was granted probation by the MTC, which had the effect of suspending the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 40, RA 7160 can be applied? HELD: Yes. The legal effect of the probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

119. Villaber v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148326, 15 November 2001 FACTS: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas filed his on February 28, 2001. On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, COMELEC, Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latters certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the RTC of Manila for violation of BP 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. ISSUE: Whether the violation of BP 22 involes moral turpitude HELD: YES. As to the meaning of moral turpitude, we have consistently adopted the definition in Blacks Law Dictionary as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. However, not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, and that as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine. The determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can be resolved by analyzing its elements alone. The elements of the offense are: 1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. A conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imports deceit and certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person. The effects of the issuance of a

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus, paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. 120. MARQUEZ vs. COMELEC GR 112889 April 18, 1995 FACTS: Petitioner Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate for Governor of Quezon Province during the 1992 elections filed this petition for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC resolution dismissing his petition against winner respondent Eduardo Rodriguez for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.It is averred that when respondent filed his COC a criminal charge against him for 10 counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial DistrictCalifornia, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from that country.Comelec 2nd div dismissed the petition with En Banc denying the reconsideration for the same thus this petition. Petitioner claims that term needs no further interpretation since Sec 40(e) of RA #7160 is rather clear that it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local office. The Solicitor General, taking the side of petitioner, expresses a like opinion and concludes that the phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. In turn, respondent would have the Court respect the conclusions of the Oversight Committee which, conformably with Section 533 of RA. 7160, was convened by the President to "formulate and issue the appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of the Code to ensure compliance with the principles of Local Autonomy. Said committee finalized that fugitive means somebody who is convicted by final judgment, meaning that if he is simply in jail and because he put up, post bail, but the case is still being reviewed, that is not yet conviction by final judgment. ISSUE: WON respondent who, at the time of the filing of his COC, was facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from justice" contemplated by Sec 40(e) of the LGC and, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office. HELD: The Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the Comelec Resolutions and REMANDED it to the Commission since COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, in fact, respondent is a "fugitive from justice" as such term must be interpreted and applied in light of the Court's opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter. Private respondent reminds us that the construction placed upon a law by the officials in charge of its enforcement deserves great and considerable weight. The Court certainly agrees; however, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to it. The Court believes and thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente that Art. 73 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC, to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. 121. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC

GR 120099 July 24, 1995

FACTS:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were running for governing of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly- elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the LGC so argued Marquez. The COMELEC dismissed the quo warranto petition and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof. Marquez challenged the COMELEC dismissal of the petition before the SC via petition for certiorari (GR. 112889). The crux of said petition is whether Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e) of the LGC based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him. The court in Marquez vs. Comelec declared that: ‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The SC remanded the case to the COMELEC to determine whether Rodriguez is a ‘fugitive from justice’. Rodriguez sought a reconsideration thereof while showing a certification from the Commission on Immigration that Rodriguez left the US on June 25, 1985 — roughly 5 months prior to the institution of the criminal complaint filed against him before the Los Angeles court. The Court however denied a reconsideration of the MARQUEZ Decision. In the May 8, 1995 elections, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." On May 7, 1995, after the promulgation of the Marquez decision, the COMELEC issued a Resolution for the quo warranto case which found Rodriguez to be a ‘fugitive from justice’ keeping in mind its definition in the Marquez decision. COMELEC ordered that he is ineligible from assuming and performing the functions of Governor of Quezon Province. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 elections. Marquez filed a motion to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC granted. The Provincial Board of Canvassers nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez. The COMELEC issued a resolution suspending Rodriguez' proclamation thus gave rise to the filing of the instant petition for certiorari. The Court issued a resolution directing the COMELEC to receive legally admissible evidence of the parties and to issue a report to be submitted to the court. The COMELEC declared that Rodriguez is NOT a "fugitive from justice" as defined in the main opinion of the MARQUEZ Decision, thus making a 180-degree turnaround from its finding in the Resolution. COMELEC opined that intent to evade is a material element of the MARQUEZ Decision definition. Such intent to evade is absent in Rodriguez' case because evidence has established that Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines (June 25, 1985) long before the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court (November 12, 1985). ISSUE: WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice’ HELD: No. To reiterate, in the Marquez decision, the definition of ‘fugitive from justice’ includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction. Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigration preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost 5 months.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. However, Marquez and the COMELEC seem to urge the Court to re-define "fugitive from justice". They espouse the broader concept of the term as culled from foreign cited in the MARQUEZ Decision itself, i.e., that one becomes a "fugitive from justice" by the mere fact that he leaves the jurisdiction where a charge is pending against him, regardless of whether or not the charge has already been filed at the time of his flight. However, the "law of the case" doctrine forbids the Court to craft an expanded re-definition of "fugitive from justice”. Not being a ‘fugitive from justice’ under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

122. SOBEJANA-CONDON vs. COMELEC GR 198742 August 10, 2012 FACTS: On December 13, 1984, Teodora Sobejana-Condon (petitioner), a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Canberra, Australia pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003.” The application was approved and the petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on December 5, 2005. On September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian citizen. After losing in her mayoralty bid in 2007, petitioner again sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time for the position of ViceMayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Soon thereafter, private respondents Robelito V. Picar, Wilma P. Pagaduan and Luis M. Bautista filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning the petitioner’s eligibility before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought the petitioner’s disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath” as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27, 2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225. The RTC decided that the petitioner failed to comply with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 since it clearly mandates that the document containing the renunciation of foreign citizenship must be sworn before any public officer authorized to administer oath. The COMELEC sustained the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: WON petitioner has sufficiently complied with Section 5(2), R.A. No. 9225 HELD: No. Therefore, petitioner was declared disqualified and ineligible to hold the office of Vice-Mayor. The Supreme Court found untenable her contention that a sworn renunciation imposed by Sec. 5(2) was a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement. The oath petitioner made on September 18, 2006 in Canberra, Australia was not under oath, contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2).

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who reacquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. 123. Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013 Facts: Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was issued in his favor. On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado's US citizenship, Balua presented in his Memorandum a computergenerated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700 in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July 2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November 2009. Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name "Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on file as of 21 April 2010, with the pertinent travel records. Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on misrepresentation, the COMELEC First Division considered it as one for disqualification. Balua's contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to present any evidence to support his contention," whereas the First Division still could "not conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year residency requirement under the Local Government Code.” Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an Opposition to Arnado's Amended Motion for Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he claimed that the cancellation of Arnado's candidacy and the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. Issues: 1. Whether or not intervention is allowed in a disqualification case. (YES) 2. Whether the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship affects one's qualifications to run for public office. (YES) 3. Whether the rule on succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to this case. (YES) Holding: 1. Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner. Mercado v. Manzano clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. In that case, the Court said: That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered. Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in Sinsuat v. COMELEC are present and therefore would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before this Court. CIETDc Arnado's claim that the main case has attained finality as the original petitioner and respondents therein have not appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua against Arnado will attain finality. 1. The use of foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one's nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he "absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" and that he "divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political rights and privileges of the United States of America." We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one's foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado's bid for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position. Arnado's category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. Dual citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public office. By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Section 40 (d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified to run for a local elective position. In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his American passport after renouncing his American citizenship. 2. The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, Maquiling is not a second- placer as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic. With Arnado's disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates. We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v. COMELEC and Jalosjos v. COMELEC that a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

124. CAASI vs. COMELEC 191 SCRA 229, 1990 Facts: Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao. Issues: Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988? Held: No. The Supreme Court held that Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988, the Court’s conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void. 125. BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR. G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, Mendoza, J. FACTS: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that. On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros. However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioner’s 7,773 votes and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. ISSUE: Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) RULING: No. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides: SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the constitutional provision in question. A fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle. Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration. Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in that office. Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter’s office and serves for the remainder of the term. The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the VicePresident, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. Also, the Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latter’s death, permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the President. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term. This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of them. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit. 126. ADORMEO VS COMELEC GR No. 147927, Feb. 4, 2002 Doctrine: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Facts: Ramon Talaga, Jr. served as mayor of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms in violation of the three term-limit rule. Comelec found Talaga disqualified to run for mayor. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration which Comelec granted. Talaga was then elected Mayor.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Issue: Whether or not Talaga was disqualified to run as mayor given that he had already served two full terms and he won in the 2000 recall elections. Held: No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. For nearly two years Talaga was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disruptedby his defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus, there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the disqualifications in the LGC. Talaga only served two consecutive full terms. There was a disruption when he was defeated in the 1998 elections. His election during the 2000 recall election is not a continuation of his two previous terms which could constitute his third term thereby barring him for running for a fourth term. Victory in the 2000 recall election is not the “voluntary renunciation” contemplated by the law. 127. SOCRATES vs. COMELEC (Victorino Dennis M. Socrates, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City vs. Commission on Elections, et. al.) G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002 (Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. vs. Commission on Election) G.R. No. 154683 November 12, 2002 (Ma. Flores P. Adovo, Mercy E. Gilo and Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. vs. Commission on Elections, and Edward S. Hagedorn) FACTS:

ISSUE: RULING:

These are consolidated petitions for certiorari 1 seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the COMELEC in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Sometime on July 2, 2002, out of the 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of Puerto Princesa, 312 convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate the recall of then Puerto Princesa Mayor Victorino Dennis Socrates. The PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02, which declared their loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. Thereafter, the COMELEC scheduled the campaign period and the recall election. Mr. Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy. On August 17, 2002, Petitioners in GR No.155083-84, Ma. Flores F. Adovo and Merly E. Gilo filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. Days after, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. filed a petition-in-intervention also seeking to disqualify Hagedorn. Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post." Consequently, the COMELEC issued a resolution declaring Hagedorn to be qualified to run in the recall election. Eventually, he won the recall election. Hence, the instant consolidated petitions. Is Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa? Yes. According to the Court, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. A recall election mid-way in a term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, as well as the three-term limit rule reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections. Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates. Thus, in summary, the Supreme Court concluded that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because: (1) Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001; (2) Hagedorn's continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen; (3) Hagedorn's recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and (4) Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders. 128. Venancio Rivera vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 167591; May 9, 2007) FACTS: The case is a resolution of two consolidated petitions – one filed by Attys. Venancio Q. Rivera III and Atty. Normandick de Guzman against Marino “Boking Morales, and the other one filed by Anthony D. Dee, the candidate who obtained the second highest vote after Morales.

Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 1995-1998 (1st term), then elected again for the term 1998-2001 (2nd term), and then finally from 2001-2004 (3rd term). For the 2004 elections, Morales ran again as a candidate for mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term 2004-2007. After filing his certificate of candidacy, Attys. Rivera and De Guzman filed a petition to cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground that he was already elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of Mabalacat thus his candidacy violates Sec. 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Sec. 43 (b) of R.A. 7160. After being proclaimed as Mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga in the 2004 elections, Anthony Dee, in the second case, filed a petition for quo warranto against Morales asserting that since the latter has already served for three consecutive terms, he is no longer eligible to serve the 2004-2007 term as this is already his 4th term. For both cases, Morales’s argues that he isn’t precluded from running for the 2004-2007 election because he served the 1998-2001 term only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer" since he was not validly elected for that 2nd term by virtue of the decision of the RTC of Angeles City dated April 2, 2001 declaring his proclamation as mayor to be void and he was also preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case from January to July 1999. Since in the petitions of Rivera and Dee, both the COMELEC and the RTC

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) respectively

ISSUE:

ruled

W/N

in

favor

Morales

of

Morales,

violated

they

the

appealed

three-term

to

the

limit

SC.

rule

HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely.”

129. Naval v COMELEC GR207851 July 8 2014 Doctrine: Where the law providing for reapportionment shows that the current electorate is substantially the same as the previous ones which elected a local official for 3 consecutive terms for the same office, the 3-term limit rule has the effect of disqualifying said local official. Facts: Angel Naval was elected and served as member of Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Second District, Camarines Norte from 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010. In 2009, the President approved RA9716 which reapportioned the legislative districts in the province. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third District. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re-elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third District. Nelson Julia was likewise a Sanggunian member candidate in the 2013 elections who filed a petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy of Naval, on the ground that he had already served three terms as member of the Sanggunian from 2004 to 2013. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunian member for the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC, which must be strictly construed. The COMELEC Second Division cancelled Naval’s COC and later the COMELEC en banc denied Naval’s motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not Naval is disqualified due 3-term limit rule Held: Yes. The words of R.A.No. 9716 plainly state that the new Second District is to be created, but the Third District is to be renamed. Verba legis non est recedendum. The terms used in a legal provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers mean what they say. The verb create means to "make or produce something new." On the other hand, the verb rename means to "give a new name to someone or something." A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716 yields no logical conclusion other than that the lawmakers intended the old Second District to be merely renamed as the current Third District. The reapportionment provisions of RA9716 show that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter. This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007. Therefore, he is disqualified to run for the same office due to the three-term limit rule. 130. Victoria v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 109005, 10 January 10, 1994

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) FACTS: Under the LGC, Vice Governor Danilo Azana’s position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post being contested by petitioner and private respondent. For purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district. In answer to private respondent’s petition for his declaration as senior Sanggunian member for the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking, garnering 21.78% out of the total registered voters while petitioner herein as second ranking member with 21.19%. The COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. However the petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein. ISSUE: Whether or not the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein HELD: No. The Local Government Code provides: “SEC. 44.—Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor.—(a) If a permanent vacancy, occurs in the office of the governor, or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vicegovernor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vicemayor, as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. xxx xxx xxx “For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local election” The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything about factoring the number of voters who actually voted. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.

131. G.R. No. 90762 May 20, 1991 LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D. MENZON, petitioner, vs. LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR, LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA in his capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte and Head of SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and Leyte Provincial Treasurer FLORENCIO LUNA, respondents. GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Facts Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos was designated Vice-Governor and Leopoldo Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. Aurelio Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by Secretary Santos to act as Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. Menzon took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo on March 29, 1988. Provincial Administrator Tente Quintero from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local Government, Jacinto Rubillar, Jr. as to the legality of the petitioner to act as Vice-Governor of Leyte.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Rubillar stated that since BP 337 has no provision relating to succession in the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of Menzon is not necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor could concurrently assume functions of both offices. Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the appointment of Menzon as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte. Issue 1. W/N there was a vacancy? 2. W/N the secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments? Held 1. Yes, there is a vacancy. It can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor. 2. No, the secretary of Local Government has no authority to make temporary appointments. However, Menzon is a de facto officer entitled to compensation. There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. As revealed by the records, the petitioner was appointed by no less than the alter ego of the President, the Secretary of Local Government, after which he took his oath of office before Senator Alberto Romulo in the Office of Department of Local Government Regional Director Res Salvatierra. Concededly, the appointment has the color of validity. The respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition withdrawn. 132. Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141307, 28 March 2001 FACTS: In the May 11, 1997 local elections, Cesar Calimlim and Baltazar Aquino were elected as Mayo and Vice-Mayor, respectively. Also elected were members of the Sangguniang Bayan composed of 6 officials from the REFORMA-LM political party and 2 from the LAKAS-NUCD-KAMPI. On March 25, 1999, Mayor Cesar Calimlim died. Because of his death, vacancy to the Office of the Mayor was created and by operation of law, the Vice Mayor Baltazar Aquino was elevated to the position of Mayor. The following officials were also elevated due to the vacancies which resulted from the said elevation of Aquino: · Danny Tamayo, having garnered the highest number of votes in the previous election, was elevated to the Office of the Vice Mayor · Petitioner Purto Navarro, having appointed by Gov. Victor Bayani, was appointed as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He belonged to the same political party as that of Tamayo. The appointment of Navarro was then assailed by the respondents via a petition before the RTC of Dagupan City. The petition sought to nullify the appointment arguing that since it was the former vice-mayor’s succession to the position of Mayor who created the permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, the appointee should have come from said former vice-mayor’s political party – in this case, the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi. Petitioner, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of Tamayo, who was the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan, to the office of the Vice Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy in the Sangguninag Bayan. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents reasoning that the vacancy which resulted from the death of the mayor created a series of vacancies and successions by operation of law. By this interpretation, Tamayo’s former position as the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan was filled up by the second highest ranking member and that vacated by the second highest ranking member was succeeded by the third highest ranking member, and so forth. And the last vacancy created was the position of the lowest ranking member of the Sanggunian, that is, the eight position occupied by Rolando Lalas. The CA then concluded that it was the appointment of the eight councilor which created the “last vacancy”, therefore, the person to be appointed to the vacant position should come from the same political party to which Lalas belonged, which was the Lakas-NUCD-Kampi. ISSUE/S: Whether or not the appointment of petitioner Navarro as member of the Sangguniang Bayan be nullified HELD:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) No. Section 44 and 45 of the LGC are the applicable provisions with regard to vacancies and successions in LGUs. Under Sec. 44, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. The Court said that what is crucial is the interpretation of Sec. 45(b), which provides that: “only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner herein above provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who cause the vacancy...” The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election. With the elevation of Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of Vice Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who should belong to the same political party as that of Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA’s representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes already enumerated. The term “last vacancy” is thus used in Sec. 45(b) to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. 133. FARIÑAS vs BARBA G.R. No. 116763 April 19, 1996 FACTS: Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States. Respondent Angelo M. Barba who was the mayor at that time, recommended to the Governor of the province, respondent Rodolfo C. Fariñas, the appointment of respondent Edward Palafox. The Sangguniang Bayan was the one which recommended Edward Palafox to Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Section 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under Section 56 of the LGC, disapproved the resolution "for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor, and therefore, the Resolution should be addressed to the Provincial Governor." Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino, vice Carlito Domingo, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On June 8, 1994, petitioner Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position on June 8, 1994. The next day, June 9, 1994, respondent Palafox took his oath as member of the Sangguniang Bayan. On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition. On July 8, 1994 the trial court upheld the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba. The trial court said that the applicable law in the case is sub-section "C" of Section 45 of the LGC which provides: “In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member who does not belong to any political party, the Local Chief Executive shall upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.” Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the trial court on August 18, 1994. Hence this petition for review on certiorari. They contend that the power to fill a vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan, which is created as a result of the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to a political party, is vested in the provincial governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. ISSUE: In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure? HELD: In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan caused by the cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, the appointment must be made by the Governor upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan as the case may be. However, the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Governor is limited to the appointment of those "recommended" to him by the Sangguniang Bayan. The appointing authority is not bound to appoint anyone recommended to him by the Sanggunian concerned. In the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the correct manner, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.

134. La Carlota City v. Rojo, G.R. No. 181367, 24 April 2012 Facts: On March 18, 2004, then Vice-Mayor Jalandoon of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental appointed Atty. Rojo who had just tendered his resignation as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding such appointment, as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary. The status of the appointment was permanent. The next day, March 19, 2004, the Vice-Mayor submitted Rojos appointment papers to the CSC Negros Occidental Field Office (CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for attestation. The said CSCFO wrote Jalandoon to inform him that the Human Resource Management Officer did not sign the certifications. In view of the failure of the appointing authority to comply with the directive, the said CSCFO considered the appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or withdrawn. Jalandoon brought the matter to the CSC Regional Office No. 6 in Iloilo City, by way of an appeal. He averred that the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City refused to affix his signature on Rojos appointment documents but nonetheless transmitted them to the CSCFO. Such transmittal, according to Jalandoon, should be construed that the appointment was complete and regular and that it complied with the pertinent requirements of a valid appointment. Before the said CSC Regional Office No. 6 could resolve the appeal, the City of La Carlota represented by the newly elected mayor, Hon. Ferrer and the Sangguniang Panlungsod represented by the newly elected Vice-Mayor, Hon. Honrado, collectively, the petitioners herein, intervened. They argued that Jalandoon is not the real party in interest in the appeal but Rojo who, by his inaction, should be considered to have waived his right to appeal from the disapproval of his appointment; that the appointment was made within the period of the election ban prior to the May 14, 2004 national and local elections, and finally, that the resignation of Rojo as member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod is ineffective having not complied with the provision on quorum under Section 82(d) of R.A. No. 7160. The CSC Regional Office No. 6 reversed and set aside the CSCFOs earlier ruling. Mayor Ferrer and Vice-Mayor Honrado appealed the Decision of the CSC Regional Office No. 6 to the CSC. On May 17, 2005, the CSC dismissed said appeal on the ground that the appellants were not the appointing authority and were therefore improper parties to the appeal. MR of petitioners denied. Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals which was also denied. Hence, this petition for review Issues: 1. Whether the appointment of respondent as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary violated the constitutional proscription against eligibility of an elective official for appointment during his tenure? 2. Whether respondent's appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary was issued contrary to existing Civil Service Rules and Regulations? Held: 1.Petitioners maintain that respondents irrevocable resignation as a Sangguniang Panlungsod member was not deemed accepted when it was presented on 17 March 2004 during the scheduled regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental for lack of quorum. Consequently, respondent was still an incumbent regular Sangguniang Panlungsod member when then Vice Mayor Jalandoon appointed him as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary on 18 March 2004, which contravenes Section 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution. RA 7160 clearly states that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of the panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) members. As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a member of the Sanggunian. A quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be computed based on the total composition of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is composed of the presiding officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members. A majority of the 13 members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7) members, is needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7) members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17 March 2004 regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly accepted. 2. The Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission that since the respondents appointment was validly issued on 18 March 2004, then the appointment did not violate the election ban period which was from 26 March to 9 May 2004. Indeed, the Civil Service Commission found that despite the lack of signature and certification of the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City on respondents appointment papers, respondents appointment is deemed effective as of 18 March 2004 considering that there was substantial compliance with the appointment requirements. Clearly, the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 was validly issued considering that: (1) he was considered resigned as Sangguniang Panlungsod member effective 17 March 2004; (2) he was fully qualified for the position of Sanggunian Secretary; and (3) there was substantial compliance with the appointment requirements. 135. REGIDOR vs. CHIONGBIAN GR 85815 May 19, 1989 FACTS: Respondents are duly elected city officials of Tangub City who issued a resolution recommending the suspension of the petitioners who failed to appear at the hearing of a complaint filed by respondent Taclobfor unspecified misconduct filed against them in Office of Governor and SP. Pursuant to the resolution, GovChiongbian issued an order for preventive suspension suspending the petitioners "from their elective positions as City Mayor, City Vice-Mayor and SP members of Tangub City for a period of 60 days” and ordering them to "cease and desist from performing the functions and duties of their respective offices. With that, Chiongbian appointed Taclob, Tangub City SP member,as OIC Mayor in lieu of petitioner Mayor Regidor’s suspension. Belonging to rival factions, petitioners allege that respondents GovChiongbian and the SP acted without authority, and contrary to law, in issuing the Order of Preventive Suspension against the petitioners because under Sec 63 of the preventively suspended by the Minister of Local Government, not by the Provincial Governor. Respondents meanwhile justify the suspension of the petitioners as a valid exercise of Provincial Governor’s power of general supervision over a component city and done “in pursuance to LGC provisions and IRR”. ISSUE: Did respondent Chiongbian and SP members commit grave abuse of discretion or lack of authority in suspending petitioners? HELD: YES. The Court ANNULLED and SET ASIDE the suspensions. Respondent’s contention that it was within the authority granted in Sec 7, Rule 18 of the IRR holds no water. Sec 61 of the LGC provides that complaints against elective provincial or city officials should be verified and should be filed before the Minister (NOW secretary) of Local Government. Sec 63 provides that the Minister of Local Government may impose a preventive suspension against the accused elective provincial or city official. IRRs meanwhile should be read together with the law. Hence, it is the Minister (not the provincial governor) who would know whether or not the charges are serious enough to warrant the suspension of the accused elective provincial or city official.No rule or regulation issued by the Secretary of Local Government may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of the Local

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Government Code. The implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. 136. Salalima vs. Guingona [G.R. Nos. 117589-92. May 22, 1996]

Facts: Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaints against the petitioners, who were elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed with the Office of the President and later docketed as O.P. Cases Nos. 5450, 5469, 5470, and 5471. Acting thereon, the President issued Administrative Order No. 94 creating an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the charges and to thereafter submit its findings and recommendations. The Province of Albay imposed real property tax against the National Power Corporation. The latter, claiming that it is tax exempt, refused to pay the said tax liability. Due to its refusal to pay, the Province of Albay took over the properties of National Power Corporation and sold them in an auction sale. The Province was the sole bidder. Upon the failure of National Power Corporation to redeem the property, the Province sought the issuance of a writ of possession from the Regional Trial Court. The National Power Corporation challenged this in a petition filed with the Supreme Court. The Province, through its legal office Atty. Ricaforte, filed its comment on the said petition on May 17, 1989. On June 2, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued Resolution No. 129-89, authorizing Salalima to engage the services of a Manila-based law firm to handle the case. As such, on August 25, 1989, Atty. Jesus Carnago entered his appearance with the Supreme Court as a collaborating counsel. On November 14, 1989, Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes of Cortes and Reyna Law Firm sent a letter to Salalima, informing him that Atty. Carnago had filed a memorandum in the Supreme Court. He then proposed that his law firm and that of Atty. Carnago enter into a retainer agreement with the Province in connection with the case. He charged 50,000 as acceptance fee and a contingency fee of 18%. In response to this, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90 authorizing Salalima to sign a retainer contract with Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Province. The latter then paid the lawyers amounting to around 7 million. However, on May 31, 1993, the Provincial Auditor informed the Province that COA had disallowed the payments for lack of prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and a written concurrence of COA. An administrative complaint was later on filed against the petitioners with the Office of the President. The Office of the President found that the petitioners incurred administrative liability in hiring private lawyers to defend it in the National Power Corporation case. Issue/s: (1) Whether or not suspension (from twelve months to twenty months or the entire duration of their unexpired term, which was only seven months) constituted to removal from office - No (2) Whether or not the petitioners incurred administrative liabilities in hiring private lawyers to represent the Province - No Held: (1) The penalty of suspension should not exceed six months or the unexpired portion of the term of office of the respondent for every administrative offense. An administrative offense means every act or conduct or omission, which amounts to, or constitutes, any of the grounds for disciplinary action. An elective local official may be removed from office on the following grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang panialawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, and sangguniang barangay; (g) Acquisition for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in each of the subject four administrative cases arc correct, it committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners term of office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six months and there was an express provision that the successive service of the penalty of suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of office of the petitioners. Their term of office expired at noon of 30 June 1995. And this Court is not prepared to rule that the suspension amounted to the petitioners removal from office. (2) Governor Salalima could no longer be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5450 in connection with the negotiated contract entered into on 6 March 1992 with RYU Construction for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market. Nor could the petitioners be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469 for the execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and Aguinaldo vs. Santos. In Pascual, this Court ruled: The legality of disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office. In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American authorities. We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe. Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregard or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. This Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated therein: Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. Thus, any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case No. 5469 and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on 6 March 1992 of a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for the Tabaco Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished by his re-election in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. So are the liabilities, if any, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in the 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant circumstances. As to petitioners Victoria, Marcellana, Reyeg, Osia, and Cabredo who became members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only after their election in 1992, they could not be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469, for they had nothing to do with the said resolution which was adopted in April 1989 yet.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 137. JOSON vs. TORRES GR 131255 May 10, 1998 FACTS: Oscar Tinio, Vice-Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging Eduardo Joson, Governor, with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Tinio alleged that when they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a session with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP), Joson belligerently barged in and kicked the doors and chairs of the in the hall and uttered threatening words at them due to the refusal of the SP to approve a loan proposed by Joson. Tinio prayed for the suspension and removal of Joson. The President instructed the DIL to take investigative actions. The DILG required the parties to submit their position papers. Joson prayed that a formal investigation of this case be conducted pursuant to the LGC and Admin Order No. 23. The DILG denied his request declaring that the submission of position papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings. Joson was thereafter suspended from office. ISSUE: WON Joson as Governor of Nueva Ecija was validly suspended from office HELD: No. Joson’s suspension was made without formal investigation. The rejection of his right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due process. An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due process.The local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross- examine the witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are reiterated in the Rules Implementing the LGC and in A.O. No. 23.Well to note, petitioner formally claimed his right to a formal investigation Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There is nothing in the LGC and in A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on position papers. A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to dispense with a hearing in cases involving allegations of fact which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other. These contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials-are markedly different from appointive officials. The rules on the removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the community that elected him. The official has a definite term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office. When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their imposition. 139. ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR. vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office. Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay: 1) abuse of authority and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits, 2) dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is being

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent's private residence and medical clinic. On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ordered respondent Mayor Naomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay to pay Achilles Costo Berces, and Mayor is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for her blatant abuse of authority coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others similarly inclined from using public office as a tool for personal vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer. Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which provides: Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. The OP stay of execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, and finds that a stay of execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest. Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6). ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18. HELD:

NO.

The

petition

was

dismissed.

“Stay

of

execution”

applied.

We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together. The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases. The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order. 140. Office of the Ombudsman vs Rolson Rodriguez GR no 172700, July 23, 2010 FACTS: The Ombudsman in Visayas received a complaint for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty against Rolson Rodriguez, punong barangay in Brgy. Sto. Rosario, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental. The sangguniang bayan of Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, through vice-mayor Jose G. Yulo, received a similar complaint against Rodriguez for abuse of authority, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, and neglect of duty. Rodriguez alleged complainants violated the rule against forum shopping. Rodriguez filed a motion to dismiss the case filed in the sangguniang bayan on the ground that the allegations in the complaint were without factual basis and did not constitute any violation of law.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Rodriguez also alleged that the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction since there is a pending administrative case in the Sangguniang Bayan. ISSUE: Which between the Ombudsman and Sangguniang Bayan has jurisdiction? RULING: The SC ruled that both have concurrent jurisdiction. It is where the case first filed. In the case at bar, since it is filed to the Office of the Ombudsman, then it will have the jurisdiction. The Court held therein that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases. Thus, even if complainants filed in the Ombudsman and the sangguniang bayan identical complaints against private respondent, they did not violate the rule against forum shopping because their complaint was in the nature of an administrative case. As a final note, under Section 60 of the Local Government Code, the sangguniang bayan has no power to remove an elective barangay official. Apart from the Ombudsman, only a proper court may do so. Unlike the sangguniang bayan, the powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. The Ombudsman is clothed with authority to directly remove an erring public official other than members of Congress and the Judiciary who may be removed only by impeachment.

142. YABUT, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN GR 111304 June 17, 1994 FACTS: Petitioner Vice Mayor Yabut was directing traffic at the intersection of Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue and Makati Avenue, he being concurrently the commander of the Traffic Management Division of Makati. On that day, traffic was unusually heavy because of the re-routing of the vehicular flow from the Edsa-Pioneer-Boni area. Private respondent Doran, an American national and a permanent resident in the Philippines, was on board his car in the innermost lane of Makati Avenue, apparently intending to make a left turn to Gil Puyat Avenue towards Pasay City. Since priority was given to vehicles coming from Mandaluyong, Doran and the others in his lane had been made to wait for several turns. When the "go" signal was finally given, Doran stopped where Yabut was asked "why (it took) so long to make a left turn?" Petitioner Yabut answered "Sorry, sir, its Traffic." This did not satisfy Doran and angry words soon turned into an exchange of punches. Both Yabut and Doran suffered injuries as a result of the scuffle. Doran made a formal complaint against Yabut before NBI who in turn indorsed the case to respondent Office of the Ombudsman, which promptly imposed a 90-day preventive suspension on Yabut. Eventually, Office of the Ombudsman found petitioners guilty of simple misconduct and oppression in the performance of official duties and recommended the penalty of a 2-month suspension from office, without pay. Yabut moved for the reconsideration of the suspension order but was denied. ISSUE: Was there grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman to order the suspension of petitioners? HELD: NO. The Court DISMISSED the case since while an appeal by certiorari to this Court would be the correct remedy, it found no error of law nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman. "A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline in expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of extreme provocation. Always he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Petitioner Yabut urges that his preventive suspension of 82 days should be credited to the penalty of 2-month suspension imposed on him. A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of RA 6770, in relation to Sec 9 of Administrative Order No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation. Preventive suspension may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an investigation through the use of influence and authority.

143. Rios v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 129913, 26 September 1997 Facts: On March 6, 1996, an information was filed against petitioner who is the incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of San Fernando, Romblon for alleged unauthorized disposition of confiscated lumber, in violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleged: That on or about May 16, 1994, in San Fernando, Romblon, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, a public officer, x x x while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and with evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause the disposition of confiscated, assorted and sawn tanguile lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper authority therefor, thus, causing undue injury to the Government. Before his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information and Recall Warrant of Arrest, on the ground that the information was invalid as there was no probable cause to hold him liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. On September 16, 1996, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend Accused (herein petitioner) Pendente Lite, to which petitioner filed an Opposition, reiterating the same ground stated in his motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan overruled the argument in its resolution of October 14, 1996. Thereupon, petitioner filed a verified petition, among the issues raised was the alleged invalidity of the information. The Court resolved to deny this petition on December 4, 1996 on the ground that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment. When petitioner was arraigned on January 20, 1997, he entered a plea of not guilty no longer questioning the validity of the information against him. On March 24, 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted the OSPs motion to suspend petitioner. Issue: Is he liable? Ruling: Yes. The act of disposing of confiscated lumber without prior authority from DENR and the Sangguniang Bayan constituted a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Therefore, there is probable cause to hold petitioner liable for such act, for which the information was validly filed. Although any further discussion of this issue would be unnecessary, the Sandiganbayans ruling is herein reiterated as a reminder to public officials of their crucial role in society and the trust lodged upon them by the people.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The act complained of in this case is the disposition (by petitioner) of confiscated, assorted and sawn lumber consisting of 1,319 pieces without proper authority therefor, thus causing undue injury to the Government. First, any act or omission that is not in consonance with the prescribed norms of conduct inflicts injury to the Government, for the reason that it is a disturbance of law and order. This is more so when, as in this case, the alleged offender is the highest officer in the Municipal Government, because he sets a reprehensible example to his constituents. Second, the assertion that no undue injury was caused because the proceeds of the disposition of confiscated lumber went to the Municipal Government gratuitously assumes that the price at which the lumber was disposed of was the reasonable market value thereof and that all the proceeds were paid to the local government. The assertion is further based on the wrong assumption that the lumber belonged to the municipality of which the accused was mayor. It was the National Government, as distinguished to (sic) local governments, that owned it, (Sec. 2(a), RA 3019) there being no evidence that the National Government had disposed of the lumber in any manner. This Court would like to stress adherence to the doctrine that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Public servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all times to guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government service. The good of the service and the degree of morality which every official and employee in the public service must observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part, affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while holding office should be left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances taken into account.

144. PABLICO vs. VILLAPANDO GR 147870 July 31, 2002 FACTS: Solomon Maagad and Renato Fernandez, both members of Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan an administrative complaint against respondent Alejandro Villapando (then mayor of San Vicente) for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the Constitution. Complainants alleged that respondent entered into a consultancy agreement with defeated candidate Tiape which amounted to an appointment to a government position, in violation of the one-year period prohibition provided in Art. IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent contended that he hired Tiape pursuant to Opinion No. 106 of the DOJ, stating that appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and ordered for his dismissal from service, which the Office of the President affirmed on appeal. Pending motion for reconsideration, petitioner Tiape was appointed and took his oath as Municipal Mayor. Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code provides that: “x x x (b) An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other.” The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and obtained a favorable decision. The CA ordered petitioner to vacate the office and later denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and/or the Office of the President have the jurisdiction to order his dismissal on the above-mentioned ground

HELD:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) No. It is clear from the last paragraph of the Sec. 60, RA 7160 that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a court of law. The afore-cited provision of the LGC Implementing Rules and Regulations, insofar as it vests power to the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the Local Government Code. 145. Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, 3 March 2008 Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Punong Barangay Martinez Facts: 1. Martinez, the incumbent Punong Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayambang, Nueva Vizcaya, was administratively charged with Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by the petitioner through the filing of a complaint before the Sangguniang Bayan. Petitioner then filed with the Sangguniang Bayan an Amended Administrative Complaint against Martinez for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 2. The SB placed Martinez under preventive suspension for 60 days. It then rendered its Decision which imposed upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. 3. The Decision was conveyed to Municipal Mayor Bagasao for its implementation. He issued a Memorandum, stating that the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to order Martinez’s removal from service. However, the Decision remains valid until reversed and must be executed by him. For the meantime, he ordered the indefinite suspension of Martinez since the period of appeal had not yet lapsed. 4. Martinez filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction before the trial court against petitioner, questioning the validity of the Decision. 5. Petitioner claims that the courts are merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayanfinds that a penalty of removal is warranted. Issue: Whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. Decision: No, the Sanggunaing Bayan is not empowered to do so. Ratio: 1. Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the courts the power to remove elective local officials from office. 2. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local Government Code, the intent to confine to the courts jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of elective local officials was evident. 3. In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc nullified Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 which granted to the “disciplining authority” the power to remove elective officials, a power which the law itself granted only to the proper courts. 4. The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to remove an elective local official from office is intended as a check against partisan activity. Vesting the local legislative body with the power to remove from office a local chief executive, and only relegating to the courts a mandatory duty to implement the decision, would still not free the resolution of the case from partisanship. 5. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the RTC. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the elective official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

146. Mendoza v. Laxina, G.R. No. 146875, 14 July 2003

The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected. Facts:

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) On May 27, 1997, Respondent Manuel Laxina, Sr. took his oath and assumed office as duly elected Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City. His rival, Roque Fermo filed an election protest with the MeTC. On January 1998, Fermo was declared the winner of the Barangay Elections and was granted a motion for execution. Laxina vacated his office but filed a case with the COMELEC. The COMELEC ruled in favor of Laxina and ordered Fermo to relinquish the position in favor of Laxina. However, On October 27, 1999, Fermo refused to vacate the premises of the Barangay Hall. On the same date, Laxina held office and appointed Godofredo Ramos as Barangay Secretary and Rodel Liquido as Barangay Treasurer. On November, 17 1999, Laxina took his oath of office before Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr. and Forme, vacated his office. On November 20, 1999, the Barangay Council of Batasan Hills issued two Resolutions ratifying the appointment of Ramos and Liquido, appointees of Laxina. In January 2000, petitioner barangay councilors filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint for violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents against Laxina and several other barangay officials. They allege that Laxina and other barangay officials made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they commenced to serve only on November 17, 1999 after respondent took his oath and assumed the office of barangay chairman. In addition, Ramos and Liquido were earning from Nov. 1, 1999 when they were only approved on Novermber 17, 1999. Laxina and co. claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as barangay chairman was a mere formality and was not a requirement before respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office. They contended that respondent's appointees are entitled to the remuneration for the period stated in the payroll as they commenced to serve as early as October 28, 1999. On October 2, 2000, the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases of the City ruled that respondent had no power to make appointments prior to his oath taking on November 16, 1999. Issue/s: 1. W.O.N petitioners exhausted administrative remedies. 2. W.O.N the taking anew of oath of office as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City is a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption in office and to the exercise of the functions thereof. Held: 1. No. Section 67 of the Local Government Code, which allows an appeal to the Office of the President, is not applicable because the decision of the City Council is final and executory. It simply means that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is when the issue involved is purely legal. In this case, although the respondent failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, the case falls within the exception because the questions involved are purely questions of law. 2. No. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office. It is a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been elected. In this case, Laxina is entitled to receive salary from October 28, 1999 because the COMELEC ordered Fermo to cease and desist but the latter refused to comply therewith. If Laxima is not entitled to receive the salary from Oct 28 then it would reward Fermo for defying the COMELEC’s order.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Therefore, all lawful acts of the Laxima arising from his re-assumption in office on October 28, 1999 are valid. Hence, no grave misconduct was committed by him in appointing Godofredo L. Ramos and Rodel G. Liquido as Barangay Secretary and Barangay Treasurer, respectively, and in granting them emoluments and renumerations for the period served. 147. AGUINALDO vs. HON. LUIS SANTOS GR 94115 August 21, 1992 FACTS: Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of Local Governmentdismissing him as Governor of Cagayan on the ground that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss local government official under BatasPambansaBlg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of four (4) years therefrom.Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended or remove from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process was respondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the Vice-Governor of Cagayan. ISSUE: WON petitioner should be dismissed as Governor of Cagayan HELD: No. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administration case pending before Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province.When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

148. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, 10 November 2015 FACTS: On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases). As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati. On his first term (2010 to 2013), he issued the Notice of Award for Phase III to Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation, and consequently,

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) executed the corresponding contract without the required publication and the lack of architectural design. During his second term (2013 to 2016), he approved the release of funds for the remaining balance. On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel). Upon its recommendation, the Ombudsman issued preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. On March 11, 2015, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking the nullification of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to enjoin its implementation. Primarily, Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable since: Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any. On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., DILG Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the DILG NCR-Regional Director. At around 9:47 a.m., Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña, Jr. assumed office as Acting Mayor. At noon, the CA issued a Resolution granting Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO. It was mainly grounded on the condonation doctrine. The Ombudsman filed the present petition. The Supreme Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments, required the parties to file their respective memoranda, and later comment on each other’s memoranda. In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CAG.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine HELD: NO. The CA did not gravely abuse its discretion since it was merely following settled precedents on the condonation doctrine. HOWEVER, the Supreme Court agreed to re-examine the said doctrine. Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as “[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by treating the offender as if there had been no offense.” The condonation doctrine — which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability — is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, which was decided under the 1935 Constitution. The Supreme Court in 1959 considered the controversy in Pascual as a novel issue. It resorted to American authorities and eventually ruled that “the weight of authorities seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term.” The Supreme Court now saw the conclusion as problematic since it uncovered that there was really no established weight of authority in the United States. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this case, at least seventeen (17) states in the U.S. have abandoned the condonation doctrine. In fact, the doctrine is not uniformly applied across all U.S. state jurisdictions. On the one hand, the doctrine was observed in a Texas statute, SC of Ohio, and in the Common Please of Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. On the other hand, the doctrine was not observed in the SCs of Oklahoma, of Louisiana, of Minnesota, and of Kansas. A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. would show that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. Hence, the Court undertook an examination of the current laws in order to determine if there was legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation. The Constitution upholds that public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code states that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation was actually bereft of legal bases. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted. This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation doctrine.

149. DE RAMA vs. CA GR 131136 February 28, 2001 FACTS: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were “midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said appointments. ISSUE: WON the recall made by petitioner is valid. HELD: No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the Commission.” Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b)Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c)Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner to justify the recall was that these were "midnight appointments." The CSC correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called "midnight appointments," specifically those made within two (2) months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. 150. NICART vs. TITONG

GR 207682 November 10, 2014

FACTS: Governor Ben P. Evardone (Evardone) of Eastern Samar days before the end of his term issued ninety-three (93) appointments including that of Ma. Josefina Titong (Titong) and Joselito Abrugar, Sr. (Abrugar). The Sangguniang Panlalawigan confirmed these appointments. The appointees then immediately assumed their respective positions.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) The Civil Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office, however, disapproved all 93 appointments for having been made in violation of Section 2.1 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 16, series of 2007. The CSC Central Office, however, reversed the decision of the CSC Regional Office. The new Governor Evardone sought for reconsideration, but it was denied. Before the CA, petitioner citing the case of Nazareno v. City of Dumaguete maintained that the appointments were not valid because: (a) there was no need to fill up the vacancies immediately; and (b) the appointments were made en masse. Meanwhile, the CSC proper issued a writ of execution ordering Gov Evardone and the provincial government to pay the salaries and emoluments of Titong and Abrugar. Because of Gov Evardone's refusal to do so, they filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC even while the case before the CA was still pending. The RTC ruled that the appointments were valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments made were valid HELD: Yes. When the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, it was well aware of the case pending in the CA. The subject of the said case was the reversal and setting aside of the CSC’s affirmation of respondents’ appointments, embodied in the very Resolution which respondents seek to be enforced in the petition for mandamus. Nevertheless, the trial court, implying that the petition for review pending before the CA will not, in any way, affect or be affected by the petition for mandamus, held that "such review of the [CA] deals primarily with the validity or invalidity of the alleged midnight appointments, as opposed to the petition before it which only seeks the enforcement of the CSC’s Resolution. It then went on to state that the ground relied upon by petitioner was the mere fact that respondents’ appointments were allegedly ‘midnight appointments’ which the [CSC], however, ruled out to be devoid of merit. The prohibition under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution, it must be noted, applies only to presidential appointments, but not to local appointments, like in this case. This is true even if the grounds relied upon by petitioner are with respect to CSC Circulars and/or Memorandum, Resolutions, Laws, Rules, and Regulations relative to the civil service.

151. PLAZA vs. CA, GR 138464 January 18, 2008

FACTS: A few months after his assumption as Governor of Agusan del Sur in 1992, petitioner Democrito O. Plaza received separate administrative complaints: 1. For having drawn cash advance out of the Local Government Funds (General Funds) of the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur amounting to P117,935.00 PESOS ONLY for allege OPERATIONAL EXPENSES of the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur barely three (3) days before the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections, without passing the same to pre-audit as one of the requirements under Commission on Auditwhich states among others ALL CASH ADVANCES, except those granted for the payment of salaries and wages of officers or employees, shall be pre-audited. 2. For making again a cash advance in an increasing amount to liquidate his previous cash advance, which is a clear violation again of COA Circular No. 86-257 which states among others A cash advance for miscellaneous expenses shall be reported on and liquidated as soon as, but not later than thirty (30) days after, the purpose of which it was served and No cash advance shall be allowed to any official or employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a proper accounting thereof is made for the full amount of the cash advance and No cash advance shall be granted for the purpose of liquidating a previous cash advance. 3. For making cash advances beyond his approved cash bond, again, a violation to COA Memorandum Circular No. 86-257 which states that No Officer and employee shall be granted a cash advance unless he is properly bonded in accordance with law or regulations. The amount of cash advance which may be granted shall not exceed the maximum amount covered by his bond. 4. For inappropriate disbursements of the 20% Development Funds thereby constituting technical malversation and other violations based on existing guidelines;[4] and 5. For neglect in the performance of duty.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Pending the cases, Petitioners was suspended. ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner-Appellants are entitled to backwages during the entire period of their suspension; HELD: The Court rules that private respondents claim for back salaries is untenable because their suspension was authorized by law and they have not been absolved of the administrative charges filed against them. Stated otherwise, the preventive suspension of the private respondents is authorized by R.A. No. 7160. Section 85 (a) of the LGC of 1991 states: SEC. 85. Preventive Suspension of Appointive Local Officials and Employees. (a) The local chief executives may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding sixty (60) days any subordinate official or employee under his authority pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service. Clearly, the law provides for the preventive suspension of appointive local officials and employees pending investigation of the charges against them. The suspension given to private respondents cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified for it is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. To be entitled to back salaries, private respondents must not only be found innocent of the charges, but their suspension must likewise be unjustified. 152. Garcia v. Pajaro, G.R. No. 141149, July 5, 2002 Facts: Sebastian Garcia is at present the Local Treasury Officer III but way back in 1990 he was Senior Revenue Collector whose immediate superior was the late Mr. Viray, the Chief of the Local Taxes, then the Assistant City Treasurer, and the City Treasurer himself. Garcia has been rating Unsatisfactory in his performance for several semesters which is the reason a Formal Charge was filed against petitioner. Then an investigation was scheduled and a subpoena was issued to Mr. Garcia to appear and testify on August 15, 1990. Again Mr. Garcia did not Answer and refused to honor the subpoena to submit himself for investigation. A Decision was promulgated by the Department of Finance on August 1, 1991. The matter of preventive suspension of Mr. Garcia was submitted to the Regional Director, Bureau of Local Government Finance which was 'favorably approved' by the Regional Director. This case stemmed from the application of the Garcia for the position of supervising revenue collector and he was duly appointed. The same appointment was opposed by Mrs. Evangeline Estrada and by a resolution of the Civil Service Commission, the appointment of Mrs. Evangeline Estrada was duly confirmed. Mrs. Estrada was recommended first and she was issued an appointment by the City Mayor and was submitted to the CSC. It was contested by Mr. Gracie. The first ruling of the CSC was adverse to Mrs. Estrada and she requested for reconsideration. In the meantime, Mr. Garcia was able to get an appointment from the same City Mayor but it was not approved. The CSC reconsidered the request of Mrs. Estrada favorably. Issue: Whether the city treasurer of Dagupan can discipline petitioner. (YES) Holding: At the outset, it should be pointed out that under the old and the present Local Government Codes, appointive officers and employees of local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws. The Administrative Code of 1987, — specifically Book V on the civil service — is the primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the government. This Code enumerates the grounds for disciplining them. They may be removed or dismissed summarily "(1) [w]hen the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a recidivist . . . ; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously undesirable." Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense. The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to commence

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint. Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu proprio, disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85, which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers or employees subordinate to them. In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term "agency" refers to any of the various units of the government including a department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order against him.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 153. Municipality of Sta. Fe vs Municipality of Aritao GR No. 140474; 21 September 2007 Doctrine: The Sanggunian Panlalwigan has an expanded role in resolving cases of municipal boundary dispute. Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with Original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its IRR. The trial court now has no power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper court decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sanggunian panlalawigan elevate the same. Facts: In October 16, 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta Fe, in nueva vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the determination of boundary dispute involving the barangays of bantinan and Canabuan. The Trial was almost over when the court realized its oversight under existing law. On December 9, 1988 the court suspended the proceedings and referred the case to the Sanggunian Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. In turn, the Sanggunian concerned passed on the matter to its Committee on Legal Affairs, Ordinance and Resolution which adopted the former Provincial Boards Resolution No. 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondent’s territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committee recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings and preservation of the status quo pending finality of the case. In the RTC, respondent moved to consider resolution 64, as final and executor. The RTC denied the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a decision favouring a party. The court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the provincial board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) Subsequently, respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian Panlalawigan and no longer with the trial court. the rtc granted the motion, the CA then affirmed, according to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it curative in nature. Thus, the Local government code vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect. Since the Local government code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed through congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that regional trial courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes. Issue: Whether or not the RTC has no more jurisdictions over boundary disputes? Ruling: Yes. The Sanggunian Panlalwigan has an expanded role in resolving cases of municipal boundary dispute. Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with Original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its IRR. The trial court now has no power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper court decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sanggunian panlalawigan elevate the same.

154. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs., HON. VICENTE T. BAZ, JR. G.R. No. 105746, December 2, 1996

DOCTRINE: The power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities. It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality.

FACTS: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by Executive Order No. 258 of then President Elpidio Quirino, pursuant to 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.

By virtue of Municipal Council Resolution No. 171, dated November 22, 1988, Sinacaban laid claim to a portion of Barrio Tabo-o and to Barrios Macabayao, Adorable, Sinara Baja, and Sinara Alto, based on the technical description in E.O. No. 258. The claim was filed with the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez.

In its answer, the Municipality of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban, nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality of Sinacaban. This agreement was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental, in its Resolution No. 77, dated February 18, 1950, which fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez.

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In its decision dated October 11, 1989, the Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the previous resolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void because the Board had no power to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in E.O. No. 258, that power being vested in Congress pursuant to the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1983 (B.P. Blg. 337), 134. The Provincial Board denied in its Resolution No. 13-90 dated January 30, 1990 the motion of Jimenez seeking reconsideration.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Sinacaban has legal personality to file a claim. 2. Whether or not R.A. No. 7160, 442(d) is invalid, since it does not conform to the constitutional and statutory requirements for the holding of plebiscites in the creation of new municipalities. 3. Whether the provincial board had the power to declare certain barrios part of the one or the other municipality.

RULING: 1. Yes. The factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban’s corporate existence. Under Administrative order no. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.

Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover following the ruling in Municipality of san Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.

2. No. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, it is not subject to the plebiscite requirement. This requirement applies only to new municipalities created for the first time under the Constitution. Actually, the requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI, 3 of the previous Constitution which took effect on January 17, 1973. It cannot, therefore, be applied to municipal corporations created before, such as the municipality of Sinacaban in the case at bar.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) 3. We hold it did not if effect would be to amend the area as described in E.O no. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban. The power of provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature involving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities. It is thus limited to implementing the law creating a municipality. It is obvious that any alteration of boundaries that is not in accordance with the law creating a municipality is not the carrying into effect of that law but its amendment. If, therefore, Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental is contrary to the technical description of the territory of Sinacaban, it cannot be used by Jimenez as basis for opposing the claim of Sinacaban

155. NHA VS COMMISSION OF SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS GR No. 142601, October 23, 2006 DOCTRINE: Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In acting on a land dispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency having appropriate jurisdiction. FACTS: Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (one of herein respondents) and the City of Caloocan. In order to resolve the long-challenged conflict, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-94 on February 10, 1994. This resolution recognizes the official boundary of respondent municipality and the City of Caloocan. On August 8, 1995, another Resolution was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del Monte recognizing the geographic position and plane coordinates of Tala Estate, Caloocan City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the lot lines delineating the boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. This prompted the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region III to conduct a relocation survey. On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a Comprehensive Report. The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del Monte Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions contradict the delineation embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala Estate, a 598-hectare property allotted by the government mainly for housing and resettlement site under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA), pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on April 26, 1971. Unsatisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), against petitioner NHA. Several residents of San Jose del Monte joined the municipality as complainants in the said case. They alleged that their properties are within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte; that Presidential Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and that the NHA’s Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their landholdings. They prayed that the NHA be ordered to award them damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a party in their complaint. On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling that the correct boundary between respondents San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City is that specified in the twin Resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The COSLAP likewise held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) mere incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land covered by the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, encroaches upon respondents properties. On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (Bureau), attended a meeting held on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of respondent municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundary between the two local government units. During the meeting, petitioner NHA posed strong opposition to the COSLAP Resolution, contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary dispute. Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 30 days. ISSUE: Whether or not the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the boundary dispute between respondent municipality and Caloocan City RULING: No. At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become final and executory, hence, an appeal is out of the question. COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Commission is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems to avoid social unrest. Its objective is to settle land conflicts among small settlers, landowners and members of cultural minorities. The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 561. Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In acting on a land dispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency having appropriate jurisdiction. There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that COSLAP has jurisdiction over boundary dispute between two local government units. Under Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the respective legislative councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their boundary disputes.

156. MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA vs. MADRONA G.R. No. 141375 April 30, 2003 DOCTRINE: Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city, it follows that regional trial courts have the power and the authority to hear and determine such controversy.

FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc, the City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same. In denying the Municipality of Kananga's Motion to Dismiss, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction over the

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS, ELECTION LAW, LAW ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CASE DIGESTS (2C & 2K ’16-’17) action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section 118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Not satisfied with the denial of its Motion, the Municipality of Kananga filed this Petition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent regional trial court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative and denied the petition. As stated, "jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties." It must exist as a matter of law and cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue The SC held that while Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, thus, Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) have exclusive, original jurisdiction to adjudicate such controversy pursuant to Section 19 (6) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.

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