PEOPLE vs. TRANQUILINO LAGMAN & PRIMITIVO DE SOSA Facts: 1. Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of Section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936 refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year. 2. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board, in spite of these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information. 3. Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed. WON the National Defense Law is valid Ruling: Yes. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except through an army. This is so because the right of the Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. ROBERT ROBERTSON vs. BARRY BALDWIN Facts: 1. This was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Northern District of California, rendered August 5, 1895, dismissing a writ of habeas corpus issued upon the petition of Robert Robertson, H. H. Olsen, John Bradley, and Morris Hanson. 2. The petition set forth in substance that the petitioners were unlawfully restrained of their liberty by Barry Baldwin, Marshal for the Northern District of California, in the county jail of Alameda County, by virtue of an order of commitment, made by a United States commissioner, committing them for trial upon a charge of disobedience of the lawful orders of the master of the American barkentine Arago. 3. Section 4598, which was taken from § 7 of the Act of July 20, 1790, reads as follows: ▬
SEC. 4598. If any seaman who shall have signed a contract to perform a voyage shall at any port or place desert, or shall absent himself from such vessel without leave of the master or officer commanding in the absence of the master, it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace within the United States, upon the complaint of the master, to issue his warrant to apprehend such deserter x x x
4. Petitioners had shipped on board the Arago at San Francisco for a voyage to Knappton; that they had each signed shipping articles to perform the duties of seamen during the course of the voyage, but, becoming dissatisfied with their employment, they left the vessel at Astoria, in the State of Oregon, and were subsequently arrested, under the provisions of Revised Statutes Sections 4596 to 4599 5. Section 4599, which was taken for § 53 of the Shipping Commissioners' Act of June 7, 1872, authorizes the apprehension of deserting seamen, with or without the assistance of the local public officers or constables and without a warrant, and their conveyance before any court of justice or magistrate of the state, to be dealt with according to law. It also provides for punishment by imprisonment for desertion, refusal to join the vessel, or absence without leave. WON the Section 4596-4599 of the Shipping Commissioners’ Act is valid Ruling: Section 4598 and 4599, insofar as they require seamen to carry out the contracts contained in their shipping articles, are not in conflict with the Thirteenth Amendment forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, and it cannot be open to doubt that the
provision against involuntary servitude was never intended to apply to such contracts. The Court is also of opinion that even if the contract of a seaman could be considered within the letter of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is not, within its spirit, a case of involuntary servitude. From the earliest historical period, the contract of the sailor has been treated as an exceptional one, and involving, to a certain extent, the surrender of his personal liberty during the life of the contract; that the sailor will not desert the ship at a critical moment or leave her at some place. Such desertion might involve a long delay of the vessel while the master is seeking another crew, an abandonment of the voyage, and, in some cases, the safety of the ship itself. Hence, the laws of nearly all maritime nations have made provision for securing the personal attendance of the crew on board, and for their criminal punishment for desertion, or absence without leave, during the life of the shipping articles. UNITED STATES vs. SILVESTRE POMPEYA Facts: 1. On or about March 20 of, 1914, in the jurisdiction of the municipality of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Silvestre Pompeya, did willfully, illegally, and criminally and without justifiable motive fail to render service on patrol duty; an act performed in violation of the law. For this violation the said accused was sentenced to pay a fine of P2 2. Pompeya maintained that the complaint filed in this case and charged therein do not constitute a crime; and that it is unconstitutional because it is repugnant to the Organic Act of the Philippines which guarantees the liberty of the citizens. CFI dismissed the case in favor of Pompeya. 3. Prosecutor appealed stating that section 40 (m) of the Municipal Code (which was adopted in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 1309): ▬ authorizing the municipal president to require ablebodied male residents of the municipality, between the ages of 18 to 50, to assist, for a period not exceeding five days in any one month, in apprehending robbers, and other lawbreakers and suspicious characters, and to act as patrols for the protection of the municipality 4. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same. WON said Act No. 1309 section 40 (m) of the Municipal Code is violative of constitutional rights Ruling: Do not individuals whose rights are protected by the Government, owe some duty to such, in protecting it against lawbreakers, and the disturbers of the quiet and peace? If tradition may be relied upon, the primitive man, living in his tribal relations before the days of constitutions and states, enjoyed the security and assurance of assistance from his fellows when his quiet and peace were violated by malhechores. This ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community is still recognized in all well-organized governments in the "posse comitatus" (power of the county). This was a right well recognized at common law. Act No. 1309 is a statutory recognition of such common-law right. Said Act attempts simply to designate the cases and the method when and by which the people of the town (pueblo) may be called upon to render assistance for the protection of the public and the preservation of peace and order. It is an exercise of the police power of the state. The Court is of the opinion, and so hold, that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of said Act are constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby. KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS vs. GOTAMCO SAW MILL Facts: 1. The Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas declared a strike on September 10, 1946, against Gotamco Sawmill, which suspended all the work in the respondent company, for salary increase.
2. After a series of conferences held on September 23, 1946, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement of the wage problem as proposed by management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to all striking laborers; and that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union, stated that they were going to accede to this proposition, provided that the management would permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood 3. Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable and advantageous to both, the court approves the same and orders the striking laborers of the respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent company to resume its operation and admit the striking laborers 4. It appears that on January 7, 1947, the respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) an urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court for having staged a strike during the pendency of the case. Petitioner said that the respondent ordered the stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and there stop working. 5. In the counter-petition said petitioner asked the respondent be held for contempt for having employed four new Chinese laborers during the pendency of the hearing of the main case, without express authority of the court and in violation of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 WON the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, upon which order of September 23, 1946, is constitutional Ruling: We agree with the CIR that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a contract of employment said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in said section 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration, pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled ..." The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment — he has a free choice between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.
