Family Law

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Case Concerning ‘DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE’

SAVITRI PANDEY (APPELLANT)

V. PREM CHANDRA PANDEY (RESPONDENT)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE APPELLANT

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

AYUSHI DWIVEDI Roll No.-47 Sem-II Section-A


CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................i INDEX OF AUTHORITIES………………………………………………………………...ii LIST OF CASES…………………………………………………………………………….iii STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION…………………………………………………………4 STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………………………………………..5 ISSUES RAISED……………………………………………………………………………6 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS………………………………………………………….....7 WRITTEN SUBMISSION………………………………………………………………...8-17

PRAYER FOR RELIEF……………………………………………………………………18


LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AIR

-

All India Reporter

&

-

And

Anr.

-

Another

Edn

-

Edition

Expl.

-

Explanation

Etc.

-

Ltd.

Et Cetera -

IPC

-

Limited Indian Penal Code

Ors

-

Others

P.

-

Page number

RBI

-

Reserve Bank of India

SC

-

Supreme Court

SCC

-

Supreme Court Cases

v.

-

versus

vol.

-

Volume

i


INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Acts: 

Hindu Marriage Act,1955



The Constitution Of India

Books:

1. Modern Hindu Law, Paras Diwan (22nd ed,2013) 2. D.Tolstoy, The Laws and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes 3. Mayne’s , Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage,Bharat Law house

Dictionaries: Black’s Law Dictionary (West Group Publishers, 2002) The Law Lexicon, Bakshi, P. M., Ashoka Law House, New Delhi.

ii


LIST OF CASES FOREIGN CASES   

Bowron v. Bowron1898 79 L.T. 102 Gollins v. Gollins [1963] 2 All E.R. 966 at 976 Russell v Russell[1887] AC 395

INDIAN CASES 

Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal, (1997) 11 SCC 490



Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri (1997) 4 SCC 226



Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati, AIR 1957 SC 176



Inder Mohan Tiwari v Manju Tiwari (1985 Cur Civ Cas 110 (Del)



Jyotish Chandra v. Meera1970 Cal 266



Laxman v. Meena, 1964 SC 40



Leela v. Suresh1994 Raj 128



Madhuri Mehta v. Meet Verma. (1997) 11 SCC 81



Naval Kishore Somani v Poonam Somani (1999) 1 DMC 415 (DB)



Prakash Kaur v. Harjinderpal Singh AIR 1999 Raj 46 at 47



Shashi Garg v. Arun Garg, (1997) 7 SCC 565



Shobha Rani v Madhukar Reddi AIR 1988 SC 121



Subbarma v. Saraswathi(1996) 2 M.L.J. 263



Sukhama v. Niranjan 1982 Del 409



Surbhi Agrawal v. Sanjay Agrawal AIR 2000 MP 139



Vira Reddy v. Kistamma1969 Mad 235

iii


STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellant, Savitri Pandey, has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, under a Special Leave Petition under the Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

4


STATEMENT OF FACTS

I.

The facts of the case giving rise to the filing of the present appeals are that marriage between the parties was solemnized on 6.5.1987. The appellant-wife lived with the respondent-husband till 21st June, 1987 and according to her the marriage between the parties was never consummated. After 21st June, 1987 the parties started living separately.

II.

Sometime thereafter the wife filed a petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on the grounds of cruelty and desertion; she also sought permanent alimony and also to have her jewellery, given at the time of the marriage, returned to her. She averred inter alia that her father had spent more than Rs. 80,000 on the marriage itself and gave gifts in the form of ornaments, cash and kind as demanded by the respondent.

III.

The respondent and his family members later demanded a color TV, refrigerator, more jewellery and Rs. 10,000 in cash. In the first week of June, the appellant’s father gave the respondent Rs. 10,000 and his, but still the respondent and his family began tormenting the appellant. The appellant also alleged that her husband had illicit relations with another woman. The respondent denied the allegations and submitted that the appellant was taking advantage of her wrongs.

IV.

The Family Judge granted a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion by the husband and awarded Rs. 12,000 towards the price of a scooter gifted at the time of marriage and also Rs. 500 per month as permanent alimony. Both the parties filed appeals. The High Court disposed of the appeals by setting aside the decree and holding that the appellant was the guilty party and that she has been unable to prove the allegations of cruelty and desertion.

V.

To this dispute rises the appeal.

5


ISSUES RAISED

I.

Whether the defendant has treated the petitioner with cruelty or deserted her? If so, its effect?

II.

Whether the fact that the marriage has become an empty shell is an indication for the breakdown of marriage?

6


SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS I.

The respondent has not only deserted the appellant, but has also treated her with cruelty and tortured her for dowry. In this case, the appellant was deserted by the respondent and was tortured due to the unending demands of dowry from the respondent and his family. They refused to bring her back from her father’s home until and unless their demands are fulfilled and thereafter, the respondent deserted the appellant. They not only inflicted physical pain upon her, but also tormented her with mental agony and suffering.

II.

The marriage between the parties became an empty shell, with no substance left and just the form remaining. The respondent in this case was found to have illicit relations with some other lady. Moreover, he had solemnised this marriage just for the sake of his parents and for extracting money from the appellant’s family. This made the marriage more of a deal than a relation from the respondent’s side. Their marriage was never consummated and initially, both the parties had filed petitions for divorce. The appellant had even entered into a second marriage and had a child out of it. These facts are enough to prove that there is nothing substantial left in this marriage.

III.

The Court should allow the dissolution of the marriage as it is already irretrievably broken down. Since there is nothing left in this marriage which would be beneficial to either of the parties or to the society, there is no point in continuing this marriage. Thus, in order to enhance and protect everyone’s interest, the Hon’ble Court should pass a decree of divorce to dissolve the marriage.

7


WRITTEN SUBMISSION

I.

ISSUE 1. Whether the defendant has treated the petitioner with cruelty or deserted her? If so, its effect?

CONTENTION A: There was no co-habitation between the parties; even if it had been, it was not constructive. "Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In other words it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which in law legalizes the sexual relationship between man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself; it is a continuous course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each case. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, this Court in Bipin Chandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati1 held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. It further held: "For the office of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid.

1

AIR 1957 SC 176

8

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey To prove desertion in matrimonial matter it is not always necessary that one of the spouse should have left the company of the other as desertion could be proved while living under the same roof. Desertion cannot be equated with separate living by the parties to the marriage. Desertion may also be constructive which can be inferred from the attending circumstances. It has always to be kept in mind that the question of desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn from the facts and circumstances of each case. In this case, the respondent has deserted the appellant in both actual and constructive manner. A.1 Actual Desertion:In this case, marriage between the parties was solemnised on 6.5.1987 and after 21.6.1987 the parties started living separately. On 21.6.1987, the appellant returned to her Maika as per custom along with her father only with a suitcase containing few clothes of daily use. Repeated attempts for her Vidai from Maika were made by her parents but her husband and his other members of the family did not agree to keep her as Bahu of their family until and unless further demands are fulfilled. No efforts were made by the husband to take back his wife with honour. He was least interested in doing so. The appellant was deserted for two consecutive years. As per the case the principle laid down in the cases Sukhama v. Niranjan2 and Leela v. Suresh3, when animus deserdendi (intention to desert) and the factum of separation co-exist, it amounts to desertion. In this case, the respondent had no interest in living with his wife, but was interested in her money. He had a clear intention to desert her which was later evident from his act of not making any efforts to bring back his wife, or co-habit with her. Thus, the respondent has deserted the appellant in an actual manner. A.2 Constructive Desertion: Constructive desertion happens when one partner causes the other partner to leave the marital home through misconduct. If one partner is forced to leave the home because the other’s misconduct, he or she has been constructively deserted. In this regime, the conduct of one spouse

2 3

makes

it

impossible

for

the

1982 Del 409 1994 Raj 128

9

other

to

stay

in

the

marriage.

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey Physical or mental cruelty to the spouse can constitute constructive desertion. Moreover, refusing sexual intercourse can often be held to be constructive desertion. In some cases, requiring a spouse to live with intrusive or abusive in-laws was held to be constructive desertion, as was refusing to relocate to a new town or state. In this case, the respondent following conducts make him offensive of Constructive Desertion: (i)

Continuous pressure of dowry demands on the wife followed by torture which made it impossible for the appellant to reside with him.

(ii)

He had got illicit relations with a lady residing in -the District Gaya of the State of Bihar and had married the appellant only for satisfaction of the members of his family and to extract heavy amount and other valuables from her parents.

In Bowron v. Bowron4, Pollock, M.R. said that the party who intends bringing cohabitation to an end and whose conduct in reality causes its termination, commits the act of desertion. A.3 Effect of Desertion: Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act states that: Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party(i) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary, sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse; or (ia) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty; or (ib) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. Thus , the appellant should be granted divorce under this ground. CONTENTION B: The appellant was treated with cruelty and was tortured for dowry. 4

1898 79 L.T. 102

10

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey According to Black’s Law Dictionary, cruelty is the intentional and malicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on a living creature especially; a human.5 It is the human conduct or behaviour in relation to the matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1) (ia) maybe defined as wilful and unjustifiable conduct of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. 6It should be understood as a behaviour by which pain is caused to another. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. Mental cruelty is defined as one spouse’s course of conduct that creates such anguish that it endangers the life, physical health, or mental health of the other spouse. 7 In Shobha Rani v Madhukar Reddi8, it was said that the word "cruelty" in Section 13(1)(ia) has not been defined. It has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. Even in the absence of any particular serious incident causing the breakdown of matrimonial life, a continuous insolent, insulting and degenerative treatment to the other spouse stretching over substantive span of matrimonial life can result in cruelty.9 Small twigs of abnormal behaviour when piled, one upon another, may become a heavy burden of cruelty. Conduct or behaviour of the other spouse making it impossible to cohabit constitutes cruelty.10 Earlier cruelty only included physical violence. In Russell v Russell11 Lopes, LJ ,defining “cruelty” observed: “ There must be danger to life, limbs or health, bodily or mental or a reasonable apprehension of it to constitute cruelty”. Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955 is comprehensive enough to include cases of physical as also of mental cruelty.

5

Black’s Law Dictionary, seventh edition, Bryan A. Garner,1999 D.Tolstoy, The Laws and Practice of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, 6 th edition, pg-61 7 Supra note1 8 AIR 1988 SC 121 9 Inder Mohan Tiwari v Manju Tiwari (1985 Cur Civ Cas 110 (Del) 10 Naval Kishore Somani v Poonam Somani (1999) 1 DMC 415 (DB) 11 [1887] AC 395 6

11

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey The courts have to interpret and analyse and define what would constitute cruelty in a given case depending upon many factors such as social status, background, customs, traditions, caste and community, upbringing, public opinion prevailing in the locality etc. 12 B.1 The respondent has committed the offence of cruel treatment towards the wife. In this case, marriage was solemnized according to Hindu Vedic rites on 6.5.1987 at Allahabad. The Vidai took place on 7.5,1987 and the appellant went to reside at the residence of her husband where she lived upto 21.6.1987. She found her husband and his other family members greedy who made a further demand of colour T. V., Refrigerator and some other ornaments besides a cash of Rs. 10.000. Her father anyhow managed and gave Rs. 10,000 in the first week of June, 1987 but could not fulfil other demands ; when her parents could not fulfil the said further demand, her husband and his other family members started torturing her on one pretext or the other, treated her with physical and mental cruelty including mercilessly beating and did not agree for her Vidai from their residence but on the repeated requests of her father they anyhow agreed and on 21.6.1987 she returned to her Maika along with her father only with a suitcase containing few clothes of daily use. Her husband has kept all the articles, ornaments and valuables (cash and kind described in Schedules A, B and C) which were given at or about the time of marriage as its consideration. Repeated attempts for her Vidai from Maika were made by her parents but her husband and his other members of the family did not agree to keep her as Bahu of their family until and unless further demands are fulfilled. This treatment of the husband has caused a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be not fit and proper for her to live with her husband, who has also deserted her for a continuous period of more than two years It is also not proper to discredit the wife as hypersensitive or prone to exaggeration. Anyone who will face demand for money constantly will be apprehended to some wrong that could be meted out to her if the demand is not fulfilled. It is important to note that even before the marriage on demand by the respondent’s father a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was given and also a scooter thereafter. This proves that there has always been greed on part of the respondent and his parents. It may be pointed out that the respondent’s main philosophy is that since the appellant’s parents are financially sound there is no wrong in his parents to ask for a few more thousands. It may be pointed out that it appears that the sole object of marriage was to get the money standing in the name of appellant transferred to the respondent’s name. It is 12

Mayne’s , Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage,Bharat Law house,2003,pg-259

12

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey not out of place to mention that respondent’s behaviour and treatment with appellant could only be said to be a pointer for seeking money alone and marriage was a device. The cumulative effect of the all the circumstances and the evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that demand of dowry went on with the support of the husband and the proof of element of harassment was not necessary. Explanation to s. 498A of the Indian Penal Code provides that any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or likely to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical of the woman), and harassment of the woman with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security would constitute cruelty. Cruelty is a ground for divorce under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act. However, the word `cruelty' has not been defined. Indeed, it could not have been defined. It has been used in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. It is a course of conduct of one which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. From the context and the set up in which the word `cruelty' has been used in s. 13(1) (i-a), intention is not a necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained or, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs; the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty. The relief to the party cannot be denied on the ground that there has been no deliberate or wilful ill-treatment. The same is also the line of reasoning adopted by the House of Lords in Gollins v. Gollins, 13where Lord Evershed said: "I am unable to accept the premise that "cruelty" in matrimonial proceedings requires or involves of necessity the element of malignity- though I do not of course doubt that if malignity be in fact established it would be highly relevant to a charge of cruelty. In my opinion, however, the question whether one party to a marriage has been guilty of cruelty to the other or has treated the other with cruelty does not, according to the ordinary sense of the language used by Parliament, involve the presence of malignity (or its equivalent); and if this view be right it follows, as I venture to think, that the presence of intention to injure on the part of the spouse charged or (which is, as I think, the same thing) proof that the conduct of 13

[1963] 2 All E.R. 966 at 976

13

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey the party charged was "aimed at" the other spouse is not an essential requisite for cruelty. The question in all such cases is, to my mind, whether the acts or conduct of the party charged were "cruel" according to the ordinary sense of that word, rather than whether the party charged was himself or herself a cruel man or woman............. It was also held in the case Surbhi Agrawal v. Sanjay Agrawal14, that intention to harm the other spouse is not essential ingredient of cruelty. “If bitter waters are flowing, it is not necessary to enquire from which source they spring”, the court remarked. Clearly in this case the constant demand for dowry by the in-laws and husband is of such nature so as to cause mental harassment to the appellant which is enough to establish cruelty. It is immaterial if there was intention of cruelty or not. The intention to harm, harass, or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained or, cruelty could be easily established here. As Lord Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins,

15

"In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing

with objective standards; it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the reasonable woman). We are dealing with this man or this woman." Cruelty can thus be subjective in each case and with each individual. Thus it cannot be said that demand of dowry did not amount to cruelty as it caused reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant. Also the demand of dowry itself is very disheartening and shows the intention of the respondent to marry the respondent. The very purpose of the marriage was to get money from the appellant. This attitude of the respondent itself is against the basic principle and essence of marriage which is love and mutual trust. According to the Rajasthan High Court in Prakash Kaur v. Harjinderpal Singh16, “the demand for dowry is an act of cruelty because it is the negation of the matrimonial obligation which one spouse has against the other”. Bearing in mind the proper approach to matrimonial offence, it can be inferred by the facts and circumstances that there was demand for dowry. The demand for dowry is prohibited under law. That by itself is bad enough. That, amounts to cruelty entitling the wife to get a decree for dissolution of marriage. Thus according to S.13(1) (ia) the appellant has the right to get a decree of divorce based on the cruelty that was meted out to her in the form of constant demands for dowry. 14

AIR 2000 MP 139. Ibid. 16 AIR 1999 Raj 46 at 47. 15

14

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey II.

ISSUE 2. Whether the fact that the marriage has become an empty shell is an indication for the breakdown of marriage?

CONTENTION A: The Respondent had illicit relations with another lady. Adultery may be defined as consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of the opposite sex, not the other spouse, during the subsistence of marriage.17 In this case, the respondent had got illicit relations with a lady residing in the District Gaya of the State of Bihar with whom he was stated to have solemnised a second marriage and was expected to have children from her. Moreover, he had married the appellant only for satisfaction of the members of his family and to extract heavy amount and other valuables from her parents. The Respondent’s relation with another lady clearly shows his lack of love and affection towards his wife, the appellant. In such circumstance, the appellant cannot be expected to have faith, trust and love towards her husband, without which the marriage is of no use. As per the cases Vira Reddy v. Kistamma18 and Subbarma v. Saraswathi19, “One single act of adultery is enough for divorce or judicial separation.” Section 13(1)(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act has also considered Adultery as a ground for divorce. Thus, the appellant is entitled to get divorce under this ground. CONTENTION B: The continuous demands of dowry make the marriage more of a monetary deal from the husband’s side. As earlier stated, the respondent had married the appellant only for satisfaction of the members of his family and to extract heavy amount and other valuables from her parents. He and his family members continuously threatened the appellant with their unending demands. They were even not ready to bring back the appellant from her father’s home until and unless their demands are fulfilled.

17

Reydon on Divorce, (10th Ed.), 172. 1969 Mad 235 18 (1996) 2 M.L.J. 263 18

15

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey In light of the above facts, it seems that the respondent was just interested in the appellant’s money rather than her. This appears to be a blot on a pious and solemn relationship of marriage. Greed and thirst for money being the only considerations from the respondent’s side to marry make the marriage nothing but an empty shell. Thus, divorce should be given to the appellant. CONTENTION C: The marriage was never consummated. As per the facts, both the parties lived with each other for a period of one and a half month. During this period, there was no kind of conjugal relationship between the parties and their marriage was not consummated. This becomes a case of Wilful Neglect where both the parties to the marriage, though living under the same roof, are ignorant towards each other and behave like strangers20. Sexual relationship between parties to the marriage is one of the important factors which brings them closer and strengthens their bond. In this case, even this factor is missing in addition to the absence of any kind of emotions or sentiments. This again supports the fact that the respondent had just married the appellant for money and nothing else. As per the case Jyotish Chandra v. Meera21, “indifference, neglect and sexual ignorance from one party to another can lead to frustration, agony and suffering to the latter and hence can be considered as a ground for divorce.” Thus, the Counsel on behalf of the appellant pleads for divorce under this ground. CONTENTION D: Both the parties wanted to have a Divorce. From the material on the record, it is clear that both sides wanted divorce from the very beginning though for separate grounds. Even the respondent had filed a petition for divorce but which was later withdrawn by him. This shows the level of dissatisfaction that both the parties had from the marriage due to their own reasons. Moreover, no effort was made by the husband to take her back with honour. There is no such pleading either to this effect.

20 21

Laxman v. Meena, 1964 SC 40 1970 Cal 266

16

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey An advertisement was also published during this period in regard to marriage of the husband. The advertisement is dated 2.7.1992, after the wife left the in-laws house on 21.6.87. this even confirms that the respondent and his family were happy that the appellant had left the house and were planning for his remarriage. Thus, divorce should be granted when it’s found essential from the side of both the parties. CONTENTION E: The Appellant solemnized a second marriage after the decree of divorce passed by the Family Court. After the passing of the order dated 8.7.1996 passed by Sri Surendra Pratap Mishra, Family Judge, Allahabad in Matrimonial Petition No. 361 of 1991 allowing the petition of the wife filed under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground of desertion by the husband, the appellant had remarried with one Sudhakar Pandey and a child has also been born to her out of the second marriage. Thus, it would be in interest of justice and parties that the marriage between them is dissolved by a decree of divorce 22, in reference to the cases Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri23 and Madhuri Mehta v. Meet Verma24. Moreover, the second marriage solemnised by the appellant is a indication that the previous marriage had no substance in it. If a decree of divorce is not passed now, it would lead to nothing but chaos and tension in the lives of four people, including the life of a innocent child. CONTENTION F: Marriage has been irretrievably broken down. The essence of marriage is a sharing of common life, a sharing of all the happiness that life has to offer and all the misery that has to be faced in life, an experience of the joy that comes from enjoying, in common, things of the matter and of the spirit and from showering love and affection n one's offspring. In this case, there is no substance in the marriage, just a form is left. Hence, there is no use in continuing the marriage and Divorce should be seen as a solution and an escape route out of a difficult situation. Thus, the Counsel on behalf of the appellant pleads for a decree of divorce due to the above reasons.

22

Anita Sabharwal v. Anil Sabharwal, (1997) 11 SCC 490 Shashi Garg v. Arun Garg, (1997) 7 SCC 565 23 (1997) 4 SCC 226 24 (1997) 11 SCC 81

17


PRAYER FOR RELIEF

In the light of facts stated, arguments advanced, issues raised and authorities cited, it is humbly prayed on the behalf of the appellants , that is to honourable Supreme Court of India, may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. Mr. Prem Chandra Pandey treated his wife, Mrs. Savitri Pandey with cruelty and had deserted her. 2. The marriage between the parties was an empty shell and was irretrievably broken down. 3. The appellant is granted to get a decree of divorce with return of all things given at the time of marriage and proper maintenance. The honourable court may also be pleased to pass any of the order which it may feel deemed in the light of justice, equity and good conscience. All of which is most humbly prayed

DATE OF FILING: 5th April, 2014

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

PLACE: DELHI

AYUSHI DWIVEDI

18

Family Law

Recommend Documents