MAGELLAN AEROSPACE CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, Respondent. MENDOZA, J.:
In 2008, Philippine Air Force (PAF) contracted Chervin Enterprises, Inc. (Chervin) for the overhaul of two T76 aircraft engines in an agreement denominated as "Contract for the Procurement of Services and Overhaul of Two (2) OV10 Engines. Chervin commissioned MAC to do the work for US$364,577.00. MAC, in turn, outsourced the overhaul service from another subcontractor, National Flight Services, Inc. (NFSI). Eventually, the engines were overhauled and delivered to the PAF. Satisfied with the service, PAF accepted the overhauled engines. On December 15, 2008, MAC demanded from Chervin the payment of US$264,577.00 representing the balance of the contract price. PAF confirmed that it had already released to Chervin the amount of ₱23,760,000.00, on November 7, 2008, as partial payment for the overhaul service, and that it withheld the amount of ₱2,376,000.00 as retention fund. Notwithstanding the release of funds to Chervin, MAC was not paid for the services rendered despite several demands. Unpaid, MAC demanded from PAF the release of the retained amount. In a letter, dated March 3, 2010, however, PAF rejected the demand and informed MAC that the amount could not be released as it was being held in trust for Chervin. On July 6, 2010, MAC filed a complaint10 for sum of money before bef ore the RTC against Chervin together with its Managing Director, Elvi T. Sosing (Sosing), and the PAF. It prayed that Chervin be ordered to pay the amount of US$264,577.00, plus 12% legal interest from January 15, 2009 until full payment; that in the event of failure of Chervin to pay the amount claimed, PAF be ordered to pay the said amount with interest and to release the retained amount of ₱2,376,000.00 plus attorneys attorneys fees and and litigation litigation expenses expenses amounting amounting to ₱500,000.00; ₱500,000.00; and and that the the defendants defendants pay the costs of suit. MAC alleged that Chervin merely acted as an agent of PAF.
PAF moved to dismiss the complaint averring that its contract with Chervin was one for repair and overhaul and not for agency; that it was never privy to any contract between Chervin and MAC; and that it already paid Chervin in full. Chervin also asked the RTC to dismiss the complaint against them asserting that MAC had no capacity to sue because of o f its status as a nonresident doing business in the Philippines without the required license, and that no disclosure was made that it was suing on an a n isolated transaction which would mean that the real party-in-interest was not MAC, but NFSI. RTC granted both motions to dismiss d ismiss and ordered the dismissal of the complaint filed by MAC. MAC appealed before the CA The CA partly granted MAC’s appeal by b y reversing the RTC order of dismissal of the complaint against Chervin and Sosing. It, however, affirmed the dismissal of the complaint against PAF. The CA explained that MAC failed to show that PAF had a correlative duty of paying under the overhauling contract as it was obvious that the contract was executed only between MAC and Chervin. Thus, the CA disposed MAC moved for a partial reconsideration of the decision but its motion was denied by the CA. MAC appealed the Supreme Court Issues:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the complaint against PAF failed to sufficiently state a cause of action 2. Whether or not the CA concluded prematurely that no agency there’s agency relationship existed between PAF and Chervin.
RULING
The Court denies the petition. Cause of action is defined as an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. In pursuing that cause, a plaintiff must first plead in the complaint a "concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the cause of action. In particular, the plaintiff must show on the face of the complaint that there exists a legal right on his or her part, a correlative obligation of the defendant to respect such right, and an act or omission of such defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s rights. Such a complaint may, however, be subjected to an immediate challenge. Under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court (Rules), the defendant may file a motion to dismiss "[w]ithin the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim" anchored on the defense that the pleading asserting the claim stated no cause of action. In making such challenge, the defendant’s issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. It has nothing to do with the merits of the case. "Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion."http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2016/feb2016/gr_216566_2016.html - fnt21 The inquiry is then limited only into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the material allegations. Thus, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be presented by the defendants. Conversely, the dismissal of the complaint is permitted if the allegations stated therein fail to show that plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Accordingly, the survival of the complaint against a Rule 16 challenge depends upon the sufficiency of the averments made. In determining whether an initiatory pleading sufficiently pleads, the test applied is whether the court can render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer if the truth of the facts alleged is admitted. In essence, MAC asserts that the allegations stating that Chervin "acted for and in behalf" of a "principal," PAF, in tapping its services for the overhaul of the aircraft engines, completed with the requirements of sufficiency in stating its cause of action against PAF. MAC claims that its allegation of Chervin being "mere agents" of PAF in the overhaul contract, establishes clearly, under the premise of admitting them as true for purposes of a Rule 16 challenge, its entitlement to recover from PAF, the latter being the "principal" and "beneficiary." The Court is not persuaded. The standard used in determining the sufficiency of the a llegations is not as comprehensive as MAC would want to impress.
The assumption of truth (commonly known as hypothetical admission of truth), accorded under the test, does not cover all the allegations pleaded in the complaint. Only ultimate facts or those facts which the expected evidence will support are considered for purposes of the test. It does not cover legal conclusions or evidentiary facts. What MAC entirely did was to state a mere conclusion of law, if not, an inference based on matters not stated in the pleading. To clarify, a mere allegation that PAF, as a principal of Chervin, can be held liable for nonpayment of the amounts due, does not comply with the ultimate fact rule. Without the constitutive factual predicates, any assertion could never satisfy the threshold of an ultimate fact. Not being an ultimate fact, the assumption of truth does not apply to the aforementioned allegation made by MAC concerning PAF. Consequently, the narrative that PAF can be held liable as a principal in the agreement between Chervin and MAC cannot be considered in the course of applying the sufficiency test used in Section 1(g) Rule 16 . It, therefore, produces no link to the alleged PAF’s correlative duty to pay the amounts being claimed by MAC – a necessary element of a cause of action that must be found in the pleading. Lacking that essential link, and after hypothetically admitting the truth of all the allegations other than those that are ought to be excluded for not being ultimate facts, it is demonstrable that the CA correctly ruled for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of MAC’s failure to state its cause of action against PAF. The foregoing discussion makes plain that the CA did not act prematurely in dismissing the complaint. Perhaps, the CA might have been misunderstood as, indeed, the tenor of its decision apparently gave an untimely conclusion that no agency relationship existed. Be that as it may, this Court affirms the findings of the CA - t hat the order of dismissal of MAC’s complaint against PAF is proper.
