G.R. No. 69260. December 22, 1989.* MUNICIPALITY OF INAN, !e"#"#o$er, %&. 'ON. (O) MAR GARCIA, (+-e o "/e Re-#o$ Tr# Co+r" " #$$, L-+$ RANC' 333I4, Re-#o$ I45, $ RLINDA FRANCI)CO, re&!o$e$"&. m#$e$" Dom#$ T7o &"-e& o Proce+re o.1. T/ere re "7o 25 &"-e& #$ e%er c"#o$ o e:!ro!r#"#o$. T/e ;r&" #& co$cer$e 7#"/ e"erm#$"#o$ o "/e +"/or#" o "/e !#$"#< "o e:erc#&e "/e !o7er o em#$e$" om#$ $ "/e !ro!r#e" o #"& e:erc#&e #$ "/e co$"e:" o "/e c"& #$%o%e #$ "/e &+#". I" e$& 7#"/ $ orer, # $o" o #&m#&& o "/e c"#o$, =o co$em$"#o$ ecr#$- "/" "/e !#$"#< /& 7+ r#-/" "o ">e "/e !ro!er" &o+-/" "o be co$em$e, or "/e !+b#c +&e or !+r!o&e e&cr#be #$ "/e com!#$", +!o$ "/e !me$" o ?+&" com!e$&"#o$ "o be e"erm#$e & o "/e "e o "/e ;#$- o "/e com!#$".@ A$ orer o #&m#&&, # "/#& be or#$e, 7o+ be ;$ o$e, o co+r&e, &#$ce #" ;$ #&!o&e& o "/e c"#o$ $ e%e& $o"/#$- more "o be o$e b "/e Co+r" o$ "/e mer#"&. )o, "oo, 7o+ $ orer o co$em$"#o$ be ;$ o$e, or "/ere"er, & "/e R+e& e:!re&& &""e, #$ "/e !rocee#$-& beore "/e Tr# Co+r", =$o ob?ec"#o$ "o "/e e:erc#&e o "/e r#-/" o co$em$"#o$ or "/e !ro!r#e" "/ereo5 &/ be ;e or /er.@ T/e &eco$ !/&e o "/e em#$e$" om#$ c"#o$ #& co$cer$e 7#"/ "/e e"erm#$"#o$ e"erm#$"#o$ b "/e Co+r" o ="/e ?+&" com!e$&"#o$ or "/e !ro!er" &o+-/" "o be ">e$.@ T/#& #& o$e b "/e Co+r" 7#"/ "/e &&#&"$ce o $o" more "/$ "/ree 5 comm#&&#o$er&. comm#&&#o$er&. T/e orer ;:#$- "/e ?+&" com!e$&"#o$ o$ "/e b&#& o "/e e%#e$ce beore, $ ;$#$- o, "/e comm#&&#o$er& 7o+ be ;$, "oo. I" 7o+ ;$ #&!o&e o "/e &eco$ &"-e o "/e &+#", $ e%e $o"/#$- more "o be o$e b "/e Co+r" re-r#$- "/e #&&+e. Ob%#o+&, o$e or $o"/er o "/e !r"#e& m be#e%e "/e orer "o be erro$eo+& #$ #"& !!rec#"#o$ o "/e e%#e$ce or ;$#$-& o c" or o"/er7#&e. Ob%#o+&, "oo, &+c/ #&&"#&;e !r" m &ee> re%er& o "/e orer b ">#$- $ !!e "/ererom. )me )me )me CoBo7$er&/#! Co Bo7$er&/#! F#r&" F#r&" !/&e o !r"#"#o$ $ or cco+$"#$- &+#" T/e ;r&" !/&e !/&e o !r"#"#o$ !r"#"#o$ $or cco+$"#$cco+$"#$- &+#" #& #& ">e$ +! 7#"/ "/e e"erm#$"#o$ e"erm#$"#o$ o 7/e"/er or $o" coBo7$er&/#! #$ c" e:#&"&, $ !r"#"#o$ #& !ro!er #.e., $o" o"/er7#&e e- !ro&cr#be5 $ m be me b %o+$"r -reeme$" o "/e !r"#e& #$"ere&"e #$ "/e !ro!er". T/#& !/&e m e$ 7#"/ ecr"#o$ "/" !#$"#< #& $o" e$"#"e "o /%e !r"#"#o$ e#"/er bec+&e coB o7$er&/#! oe& $o" e:#&", or !r"#"#o$ #& e- !ro/#b#"e. !ro/#b#"e. I" m e$, o$ "/e o"/er /$, 7#"/ $ ?+-me$" "/" coBo7$er&/#! coB o7$er&/#! oe& #$ "r+"/ e:#&", !r"#"#o$ #& !ro!er #$ "/e !rem#&e& $ $ cco+$"#$- o re$"& $ !ro;"& rece#%e b "/e ee$$" rom "/e re e&""e #$ +e&"#o$ #& #$ orer. I$ "/e ""er c&e, ="/e !r"#e& m, # "/e re be "o -ree, m>e !r"#"#o$ mo$- "/em&e%e& b !ro!er #$&"r+me$"& o co$%e$ce, $ "/e co+r" &/ co$;rm "/e !r"#"#o$ &o -ree +!o$. I$ e#"/er c&e#.e., e#"/er "/e c"#o$ #& #&m#&&e or !r"#"#o$ $or cco+$"#$- #& ecree"/e orer #& ;$ o$e, $ m be !!ee b $ !r" --r#e%e "/ereb. "/ereb. )me )me )me )eco$ !/&e comme$ce& 7/e$ #" !!er& "/" "/e !r"#e& re +$be "o -ree +!o$ "/e !r"#"#o$ #rec"e b "/e co+r".T/e &eco$ !/&e comme$ce& 7/e$ #" !!er& "/" ="/e !r"#e& re +$be "o -ree +!o$ "/e
!r"#"#o$@ #rec"e b "/e co+r". I$ "/" e%e$" !r"#"#o$ &/ be o$e or "/e !r"#e& b "/e Co+r" 7#"/ "/e &&#&"$ce o $o" more "/$ "/ree 5 comm#&&#o$er&. T/#& &eco$ &"-e m 7e &o e 7#"/ "/e re$#"#o$ o "/e cco+$"#$- #"&e $ #"& !!ro% b "/e Co+r" "er "/e !r"#e& /%e bee$ ccore o!!or"+$#" "o be /er "/ereo$, $ $ 7r or "/e reco%er b "/e !r" or !r"#e& "/ere"o e$"#"e o "/e#r ?+&" &/re #$ "/e re$"& $ !ro;"& o "/e re e&""e #$ +e&"#o$.@ )+c/ $ orer #&, "o be &+re, ;$ $ !!ebe. )me )me )me A!!e& Re-eme$"r !er#o o 0 & "o !!e #$ e:!ro!r#"#o$ !rocee#$-& Re&o$ C&e " br.T/e Co+r" "/ereore /o& "/" #$ c"#o$& o em#$e$" om#$, & #$ c"#o$& or !r"#"#o$, &#$ce $o e&& "/$ "7o 25 !!e& re o7e b 7, "/e !er#o or !!e rom $ orer o co$em$"#o$ #& "/#r" 05 & co+$"e rom $o"#ce o &# orer $ $o" "/e or#$r !er#o o ;"ee$ 1E5 & !re&cr#be or c"#o$& #$ -e$er, co$ormb 7#"/ "/e !ro%#&#o$ o )ec"#o$ 9 o "& Pmb$& #$- 129, #$ re"#o$ "o !r-r!/ 19 b5 o "/e Im!eme$"#$- R+e& "o "/e e
NARVASA, J.:
Three (3) questions are resolved in the action of certiorari at bar. The first is whether the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are allowed 1 as re!ards which the period of appeal shall be thirt# $3%& da#s 2 instead of fifteen (') da#s. 3 The second is whether or not the Trial Court ma# treat the motion to dismiss" filed b# one of the defendants in the action of eminent domain as a "motion to dismiss" under Rule '6 of the Rules of Court reverse the sequence of trial in order and hear and determine said motion to dismiss and thereafter dismiss the epropriation suit as a!ainst the movant. *nd the third is whether or not a "locational clearance issued b# the +uman ,ettlements Re!ulator# Commission relative to use of land is a bar to an epropriation suit involvin! that land.
The epropriation suit involved in this certiorari proceedin! was commenced b# complaint of the -unicipalit# of i/an 0a!una 4 filed in the Re!ional Trial Court of 0a!una and Cit# of ,an 1ablo presided over b# respondent 2ud!e 2ose -ar arcia. The complaint named as defendants the owners of eleven ('') ad4acent parcels of land in i/an with an a!!re!ate area of about eleven and a half (''5') hectares. The land sou!ht to be epropriated was intended for use as the new site of a modern public mar8et and the acquisition was authori9ed b# a resolution of the ,an!!unian! a#an of i/an approved on *pril '' ':;3.
rancisco. ,he filed a "-otion to ?ismiss" dated *u!ust 6 ':;3 on the followin! !rounds@ (a) the alle!ations of the complaint are va!ue and con4ectural@ (b) the complaint violates the constitutional limitations of law and 4urisprudence on eminent domain@ (c) it is oppressive@ (d) it is barred b# prior decision and disposition on the sub4ect matter@ and (e) it states no cause of action. 5 Aow her motion to dismiss" was filed pursuant to ,ection 3 Rule 67 of the Rules of CourtB
,ec. 3. ?efenses and ob4ections within the time specified in the summons each defendant in lieu of an answer shall present in a sin!le motion to dismiss or for other apppropriate relief all of his ob4ections and defenses to the ri!ht of the plaintiff to ta8e his propert# for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. *ll such ob4ections and defenses not so presented are waived. * cop# of the motion shall be served on the plaintiffs attorne# of record and filed with the court with the proof of service. +er "motion to dismiss" was thus actuall# a pleadin! ta8in! the place of an answer in an ordinar# civil action@ 6 it was not an ordinar# motion !overned b# Rule ' or
a
"motion to dismiss" within the contemplation of Rule '6 of the Rules of Court.
ebruar# 3 ':; =rlinda >rancisco filed a "-otion for ,eparate Trial" invo8in! ,ection Rule 3'. 7 ,he alle!ed that there had alread# been no little dela# in brin!in! all the defendants within the courts 4urisdiction and some of the defendants seemed "nonchalant o r without special interest in the case" if not mere "free riders@" and "while the cause of action and defenses are basicall# the same@" she had amon! other defenses "a constitutional defense of vested ri!ht via a pre5eistin! approved 0ocational Clearance from the +.,.R.C." 8 Dntil this clearance was revo8ed >rancisco contended or the -unicipalit# had submitted and obtained approval of a "re9onin! of the lots in question" it was premature for it to "file a case for epropriation. 9 The Court !ranted the motion. # rancisco re!ardin! her special defenses mentioned in he r .. -otion for ,eparate Trial and in her -otion to ?ismiss distinct from and separate from the defenses commonl# raised b# all the defendants in their respective motions to dismiss."
*t the separate trial the >iscal in representation of the -unicipalit# called the Trial Courts attention to the irre!ularit# of allowin! >rancisco to present her evidence ahead of the plaintiff "puttin! the cart before the horse as it were." +e ar!ued that the motion to dismiss was in truth an answer citin! Rural 1ro!ress *dministration v. 2ud!e de u9man and its filin! did "not mean that the order of presentation of evidence will be reversed" but the usual procedure should be followed@ and the evidence adduced should be deemed "evidence onl# for the motion for reconsideration of the writ of possession." 10 Aevertheless at the hearin! of -arch and -arch 6 ':; the Court directed >rancisco to commence the presentation of evidence. >rancisco presented the testimon# of *tt#. 2osue 0. 2orvina 2r. and certain ehibits the 0and Dse -ap of the -unicipalit# of i/an the 0ocational Clearance and ?evelopment 1ermit issued b# the +.,.R.C. in favor of "=rlinda >rancisco co >erlins Realt# E ?evelopment Corporation and =ecutive R*ACF,C<" and amendin! the Grit of 1ossession dated erlins Realt# .. owned b# defendant =rlinda >rancisco to convert .. (her) lot to a commercial comple@" ) accordin! to the testimon# of *tt#. 2orvina of the +.,.R.C. a !rantee of a locational clearance acquires a vested ri!ht over the sub4ect propert# in the sense that .. said propert# ma# not be sub4ect of an application for locational clearance b# another applicant while said locational clearance is subsistin!@" 3) such a clearance should be "considered as a decision and disposition of private propert# co5equal with or in parit# with a disposition of private propert# throu!h eminent domain@
) the clearance was therefore "a le!al bar a!ainst the ri!ht of plaintiff -unicipalit# .. to epropriate the said propert#." The -unicipalit# filed on *u!ust '7 ':; a -otion for Reconsideration. Therein it (a) reiterated its contention respectin! the irre!ularit# of the reversal of the order of trial supra. 11 (b) decried the act of the Court in considerin! the case submitted for decision after the presentation of evidence b# >rancisco without settin! the case for further hearin! for the reception of the plaintiffs own proofs (c) pointed out that as admitted b# *tt#. 2orvina the locational clearance did not "mean that other persons are alread# p revented from filin! locational clearance for the same pro4ect and so could not be considered a bar to epropriation (d) ar!ued that the locational clearance issued on -a# ':;3 became a "worthless sheet of paper" one #ear later on -a# ':; in accordance with the eplicit condition in the clearance that it "shall be considered a utomaticall# revo8ed if not used within a period of one (') #ear from date of issue" the required municipal permits to put up the commercial comple never havin! been obtained b# >rancisco@ and (e) alle!ed that all le!al requirements for the epropriation of the propert# had been dul# complied with b# the -unicipalit#. 12
The -unicipalit# set its motion for reconsideration for hearin! on *u!ust ; ':; after furnishin! >ranciscos counsel with cop# thereof The Court however re5 scheduled the hearin! more than two () months later on Aovember % ':;. 13 Gh# the hearin! was reset to such a remote date is not eplained. rancisco filed an "=51arte -otion for =ecution andor >inalit# of
15
rancisco) was served on plaintiff -unicipalit# on 2ul# 7 ':; but its motion for reconsideration was not presented until *u!ust '7 ':; be#ond the fifteen5da# period for appeal prescribed b# law. *nd on
The -unicipalit# attempted to have the respondent Court reconsider both and
') "multiple appeals are allowed b# law" in actions of eminent domain and hence the period of appeal is thirt# (3%) not fifteen (') da#s@ ) moreover the !rant of a separate trial at >ranciscos instance had !iven rise "ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became available (,ections and Rule 36 .. ,antos v. 1ecson 7: 1hil. 6')@" 3) it was wron! for the Trial Court to have acted eparte on the motion for eecution the motion bein! "liti!able in character@" and ) it (the -unicipalit#) was denied due process when the Court after receivin! >ranciscos evidence and admittin! her ehibits immediatel# resolved the case on the merits as re!ards >rancisco without settin! the case "for further hearin! for reception of evidence for the plaintiff." The motion was denied b#
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination b# the Court of "the 4ust compensation for the propert# sou!ht to be ta8en." This is done b# the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 23 The order fiin! the 4ust compensation on the basis of the evidence before and findin!s of the commissioners would be final too. Ft would finall# dispose of the second sta!e of the suit and leave nothin! more to be done b# the Court re!ardin! the issue.
parties ma# believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation of the evidence or findin!s of fact or otherwise.
* similar two5phase feature is found in the special civil action of partition and accountin! under Rule 6: of the Rules of Court. 24 The first phase of a partition andor accountin! suit is ta8en up with the determination of whether or not a co5ownership in fact eists and a partition is proper (i.e. not otherwise le!all# prescribed) and ma# be made b# voluntar# a!reement of all the parties interested in the propert#. 25 This phase ma# end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co5ownership does not e ist or partition is le!all# prohibited. 26 Ft ma# end on the other hand with an ad4ud!ment that a co5ownership does in truth eist partition is proper in the premises and an accountin! of rents and profits received b# the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. 27 Fn the latter case "the parties ma# ff the# are able to a!ree ma8e partition amon! themselves b# proper instruments of conve#ance and the court shall confirm the partition so a!reed upon. 28 Fn either case i.e. either the action is dismissed or partition andor accountin! is decreed the order is a final one and ma# be appealed b# an# part# a!!rieved thereb#. 29
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to a!ree upon the partition" directed b# the court. Fn that event partition shall be done for the parties b# the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. 30 This second sta!e ma# well a lso deal with the rendition of the accountin! itself and its approval b# the Court after the parties have been accorded opportunit# to be heard thereon and an award for the recover# b# the part# or parties thereto entitled of their 4ust share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question." 31 ,uch an order is to be sure final and appealable.
Aow this Court has settled the question of the finalit# and appealabilit# of a decision or order decreein! partition or recover# of propert# andor accountin!. Fn -iranda v. Court of *ppeals decided on 2une '; ':;63 the Court resolved the question affirmativel# and epressl# revo8ed the rulin! in Haldarria!a v. =nrique9 33 5that a decision or order of partition is not final because it leaves somethin! more to be done in the trial court for the complete disposition of the case i.e the appointment of commissioners the proceedin!s for the determination b# said commissioners of 4ust compensation the submission of their reports and hearin! thereon and the approval of the partition5and in >uentebella vs. Carrascoso 34 5that a 4ud!ement for recover# of propert# with account is not final but merel# interlocutor# and hence not appealable until the accountin! is made and passed upon. *s pointed out in -iranda imperative considerations of public polic# of sound practice and adherence to the constitutional mandate of simplified 4ust speed# and inepensive determination of ever# action require that 4ud!ments for recover# (or partition) of propert# with accountin! be considered as final 4ud!ments dul# appealable. This notwithstandin! that further proceedin!s will still have to be rendered b# the part# required to do so it will be ventilated and discussed b# the parties and will eventuall# be passed upon b# the Court. Ft is of course entirel# possible that the Court disposition ma# not sit well with either the part# in whose favor the accountin! is made or the part# renderin! it. Fn either case the Courts ad4udication on the accountin! is without doubt a final one for it would finall# terminate the proceedin!s thereon and leave nothin! more to be done b# the Court on the merits of the issue. *nd it !oes without sa#in! that an# part# feelin!
a!!rieved b# that ultimate action of the Court on the accountin! ma# see8 reversal or modification thereof b# the Court of *ppeals or the ,upreme Court. 35
The -iranda doctrine was reiterated in de Guzman v. C.A.5 36 Valdez v. Bagaso@ 37 Lagunzad v. Gonzales@ 38 Cease v. C.A. 39 Macadangdang v. C.A. v. C.A. 41 Gabor v. C.A. 42 Fabrica v. C.A . 43
40
and Hernandez
Ao reason presents itself for different disposition as re!ards cases of eminent domain.
The municipalit#s motion for reconsideration filed on *u!ust '7 ':; was therefore timel# presented well within the thirt#5da# period laid down b# law therefor@ and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled otherwise and to have declared that the order sou!ht to be considered had become final and eecutor#. . *s alread# observed the -unicipalit#s complaint for epropriation impleaded eleven ('') defendants. * separate trial was held on motion of one of them =rlinda >rancisco 46 it appearin! that she had asserted a defense personal and peculiar to her and inapplicable to the other defendants supra. ,ubsequentl# and on the basis of the evidence presented b# her the Trial Court promul!ated a separate
,ec. . ,everal 4ud!ments in an action a!ainst several defendants the court ma# when a several 4ud!ment is proper render 4ud!ment a!ainst one or more of them leavin! the action to proceed a!ainst the others. Ft is now claimed b# the -unicipalit# that the issuance of such a separate final order or 4ud!ment had !iven rise "ipso facto to a situation where multiple appeals became available." The -unicipalit# is ri!ht.
Fn the case at bar where a sin!le complaint was filed a!ainst several defendants havin! individual separate interests and a separate trial was held relative to one of said defendants after which a final order or 4ud!ment was rendered on the merits of the plaintiff s claim a!ainst that particular defendant it is obvious that in the event of an appeal from that separate 4ud!ment the ori!inal record cannot and should not be sent up to the appellate tribunal. The record will have to sta# with the trial court because it will still tr# the case as re!ards the other defendants. *s the rule above quoted settles "Fn an action a!ainst several defendants the court ma# when a several 4ud!ment is proper render 4ud!ment a!ainst one or more of them leavin! the action to proceed a!ainst the others. " 47 Fn lieu of the ori!inal record a record on appeal will perforce have to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate court. -ore than one appeal bein! permitted in this case therefore "the period of appeal shall be thirt# (3%) da#s a record of appeal bein! required as provided b# the Fmplementin! Rules in relation to ,ection 3: of .1. l!. ': supra. 48
3. =rlinda >rancisco filed a "motion to dismiss" intraverse of the averments of the -unicipalit#s complaint for epropriation. That "motion to dismiss" was in fact the indicated responsive pleadin! to the complaint "in lieu of an answer." 49 Aow the Trial Court conducted a separate trial to determine whether or not as alle!ed b# >rancisco in her "motion to dismiss" she had a "vested ri!ht via a pre5 eistin! approved 0ocational Clearance from the +R,C." ma8in! the epropriation suit premature. 50 Ghile such a separate trial was not improper in the premises 51 and was not put at issue b# the -unicipalit# the latter did protest a!ainst the Trial Courts (a) reversin! the order of trial and receivin! first the evidence of defendant >rancisco and (b) subsequentl# renderin! its order sustainin! >ranciscos defense and dismissin! the action as to her solel# on the basis of said >ranciscos evidence and without !ivin! the plaintiff an opportunit# to present its own evidence on the issue. The Trial Court was clearl# wron! on both counts. The Court will have to sustain the -unicipalit# on these points.
Aothin! in the record reveals an# valid cause to reverse the order of trial. Ghat the Trial Court mi!ht have had in mind was the provision of ,ection Rule '6 of the Rules of Court allowin! "an# of the !rounds for dismissal" in Rule '6 to "be pleaded as an affirmative defense and authori9in! the holdin! of a "preliminar# hearin! .. thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed." *ssumin! this to be the fact the reception of >ranciscos evidence first was wron! because obviousl# her asserted ob4ection or defense that the locational clearance issued in her favor b# the +,RC was a le!al bar to the epropriation suit was not a !round for dismissal under Rule '6. ,he evidentl# meant to prove the -unicipalit#s lac8 of cause of action@ but lac8 of cause of action is not a !round for dismissal of an action under Rule '6@ the !round is the failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action which is obviousl# not the same as plaintiffs not havin! a cause of action. Aothin! in the record moreover discloses an# circumstances from which a waiver b# the -unicipalit# of the ri!ht to present contrar# proofs ma# be inferred. ,o in decidin! the issue without accordin! the -unicipalit# that ri!ht to present contrar# evidence the Trial Court had effectivel# denied the -unicipalit# due process and thus incurred in another reversible error. . Turnin! now to the locational clearance issued b# the +,RC in >ranciscos favor on -a# ':;3 it seems evident that said clearance did become a "worthless sheet of paper" as averred b# the -unicipalit# upon the lapse of one (') #ear from said date in li!ht of the eplicit condition in the clearance that it shall be considered automaticall# revo8ed if not used within a period of one (') #ear from date of issue" and the unrebutted fact that >rancisco had not reall# made use of it within that period. The failure of the Court to consider these facts despite its attention havin! been drawn to them is #et another error which must be corrected. G+=R=>rancisco and for subsequent proceedin!s and 4ud!ment in accordance with the Rules of Court and the law. Costs a!ainst private respondent. ,<
