Torts and Damages (Partial Reviewer)

dreamer Bar Review Notes

Sources of Philippine Tort Law Chapter on Quasi-Delicts (Arts. 2176-2194);  Chapter on Quasi-Contracts (Arts. 2144-2148,  2150, 2151, 2159); Chapter on Human Relations (Arts. 19-36);  Arts. 1172-1174; 1723; 2003; 309; and, and, 1314 1314 of  the NCC;  Arts. 2195-2235 of the NCC NCC (Title XVIII; XVIII; Damages); Chapter on Nuisance (Arts. 694-707);   Chapter III, Section 4, on Common Carriers (Arts. 1755-1763);  Family Code of the Philippines;  Arts. 100-103 of the RPC;  R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act);  Supreme Court decisions;  American law and jurisprudence; and,  Opinion of legal authors. NOTE: primary statute that governs torts in the Philippines is the New Civil Code. Art. 1157 of the NCC includes Quasi-Delict as a source of obligation (extracontractual obligation). The Supreme Court likewise borrows heavily from decisions of the Courts in other countries especially Spain and the United States. PERTINENT NEW CIVIL CODE PROVISIONS Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n) Article 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict . (n) Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n) Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

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Mainly patterned from Atty. Marianne Elizabeth Beltran- Angeles’ discussions on the subject “Torts and Damages” and from the discussions of Atty. Timoteo Aquino in his book, Torts and Damages (2013 ed.) hereinafter referred to as Aquino (unless otherwise stated, the source is Aquino). Other sources: Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated – Volume Volume V (2013 ed.) by Justice Edgardo

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[Torts and Damages] Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904) Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed. (n) Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. (1905) Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least t wice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable. (n) Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fi xed by the competent public official. (n) Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n) Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (n) Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907) Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of e xplosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908) Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the

Paras, hereinafter referred to as Paras; Comments and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines – Volume Volume V (1992 ed.) by Dr. Arturo Tolentino, Civil Code Book hereinafter referred to as Tolentino; and, Torts and Damages – Civil VIII (2006 ed.) by Usec. Ernesto Pineda, hereinafter referred to as Pineda.

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[Torts and Damages] engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909) Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910) Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Torts; Origin – taken directly from the French; a derivation of the Latin word “torquere” which which means “to 2 twist” . This was not used as a technical term of law until the beginning of the 19 th century (Pineda, pp. 3) Torts; Concept – an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and gives rise to an action for damages (Aquino, pp. 1). 1). It is an act or omission of a person which causes some injury or damage directly or indirectly to another person (Pineda, pp. 2), 2), without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident.3 It is a legal wrong committed upon the person or property independent of contract. It may either be (1) a direct invasion of some legal rig ht of the individual; (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual.4 NOTE: There is no universal formula for tort liability. 5 Tortious acts cannot be listed exhaustively (Pineda, pp. 3) Quasi-Delict ; Concept - Whoever by act or omission

causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties (Art. 2176, NCC).

contracts. However, the case of Barredo v. Garcia6, in effect, followed the English Law on torts which makes no distinction between intentional and negligent injuries (Pineda, pp. 5). Furthermore, in Elcano v. Hill 7, the Court ruled that the Art. 2176 of the NCC no longer uses the phrase “not punishable by law” for according to Justice Bocobo, then Chairman of the Civil Code Commission, that such phrase could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that “killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life.” By deleting such phrase, it was made clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent (Aquino, pp. 8-9). Explanation of Concepts  Damage – the loss, hurt or harm which results from injury. It differs from damages which damages which term refers to the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.  Fault – that condition where a person acts in acts in a way or manner contrary to what normally should have been done. It is a positive act but but the act was done contrary to the normal way of doing it, and causing damage or injury to another.  Negligence – consists in the omission to omission to do acts required under the attendant circumstances resulting in damage or injury to another (Pineda, pp. 7-8). 7-8). Kinds of Tort Liabilities – includes liability for legal wrongs encompassing three types of conduct, namely: intentional torts, negligence and strict liability.

TORTS Reason for the Use of Quasi-Delict instead instead of Tort in NCC – the term quasi-delict was deliberately used to designate obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses. The term tort was not used because it is broader in coverage as it covers, in common law countries, acts which are intentional or malicious, which latter acts in the general plan of the Philippine legal system are governed by the Revised Penal Code (Pineda, pp. 4). 4). However, there is an intent to adopt the expanded concept of tort (Aquino, tort (Aquino, pp. 6). covers both Punishable and NonPunishable Negligence – traditional concept of quasidelict is is one that excludes acts which are intentional or malicious and acts which arise from pre-existing

Quasi-Delict

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Aquino, pp. 1, citing Robles v. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220 and The Law of Torts , 7th Ed. by John G. Fleming. 3 Aquino, pp. 1, citing Robles v. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220. 4 Aquino, pp. 1, and Pineda, pp. 2, citing Black’s Law Dictionary. 5 Aquino, pp. 2 citing Torts (1988 ed.) pp. 92, by Edward Kionka. 6 73 Phil. 607. 7 77 SCRA 98.

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Negligence Intentional Torts Strict Liability

Defendants Damages

Negligence – – involves voluntary acts or omissions that omissions that result in injury of others, without intending to cause the same (Aquino, pp. 2).8 The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Pineda, pp. 8). 8). Intentional Torts – – conduct where the actor desires to cause the consequences of his acts or believe the consequences are substantially certain to result from it (Aquino, pp. 2); 2); actor intended to do what the law has declared wrong (Pineda, pp. 9). 9). It includes assault and battery,

8 Note, however, that Art. 1173 of the Civil Code provides: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. (Pineda, pp. 8). The same author observed further that the said article should be amended for it does not seem to distinguish between fault and negligence.

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[Torts and Damages] engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909) Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. (1910) Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)

Torts; Origin – taken directly from the French; a derivation of the Latin word “torquere” which which means “to 2 twist” . This was not used as a technical term of law until the beginning of the 19 th century (Pineda, pp. 3) Torts; Concept – an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and gives rise to an action for damages (Aquino, pp. 1). 1). It is an act or omission of a person which causes some injury or damage directly or indirectly to another person (Pineda, pp. 2), 2), without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident.3 It is a legal wrong committed upon the person or property independent of contract. It may either be (1) a direct invasion of some legal rig ht of the individual; (2) the infraction of some public duty by which special damage accrues to the individual; (3) the violation of some private obligation by which like damage accrues to the individual.4 NOTE: There is no universal formula for tort liability. 5 Tortious acts cannot be listed exhaustively (Pineda, pp. 3) Quasi-Delict ; Concept - Whoever by act or omission

causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties (Art. 2176, NCC).

contracts. However, the case of Barredo v. Garcia6, in effect, followed the English Law on torts which makes no distinction between intentional and negligent injuries (Pineda, pp. 5). Furthermore, in Elcano v. Hill 7, the Court ruled that the Art. 2176 of the NCC no longer uses the phrase “not punishable by law” for according to Justice Bocobo, then Chairman of the Civil Code Commission, that such phrase could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that “killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life.” By deleting such phrase, it was made clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent (Aquino, pp. 8-9). Explanation of Concepts  Damage – the loss, hurt or harm which results from injury. It differs from damages which damages which term refers to the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.  Fault – that condition where a person acts in acts in a way or manner contrary to what normally should have been done. It is a positive act but but the act was done contrary to the normal way of doing it, and causing damage or injury to another.  Negligence – consists in the omission to omission to do acts required under the attendant circumstances resulting in damage or injury to another (Pineda, pp. 7-8). 7-8). Kinds of Tort Liabilities – includes liability for legal wrongs encompassing three types of conduct, namely: intentional torts, negligence and strict liability.

TORTS Reason for the Use of Quasi-Delict instead instead of Tort in NCC – the term quasi-delict was deliberately used to designate obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or criminal offenses. The term tort was not used because it is broader in coverage as it covers, in common law countries, acts which are intentional or malicious, which latter acts in the general plan of the Philippine legal system are governed by the Revised Penal Code (Pineda, pp. 4). 4). However, there is an intent to adopt the expanded concept of tort (Aquino, tort (Aquino, pp. 6). covers both Punishable and NonPunishable Negligence – traditional concept of quasidelict is is one that excludes acts which are intentional or malicious and acts which arise from pre-existing

Quasi-Delict

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Aquino, pp. 1, citing Robles v. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220 and The Law of Torts , 7th Ed. by John G. Fleming. 3 Aquino, pp. 1, citing Robles v. Castillo, 61 O.G. 1220. 4 Aquino, pp. 1, and Pineda, pp. 2, citing Black’s Law Dictionary. 5 Aquino, pp. 2 citing Torts (1988 ed.) pp. 92, by Edward Kionka. 6 73 Phil. 607. 7 77 SCRA 98.

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Negligence Intentional Torts Strict Liability

Defendants Damages

Negligence – – involves voluntary acts or omissions that omissions that result in injury of others, without intending to cause the same (Aquino, pp. 2).8 The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Pineda, pp. 8). 8). Intentional Torts – – conduct where the actor desires to cause the consequences of his acts or believe the consequences are substantially certain to result from it (Aquino, pp. 2); 2); actor intended to do what the law has declared wrong (Pineda, pp. 9). 9). It includes assault and battery,

8 Note, however, that Art. 1173 of the Civil Code provides: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. (Pineda, pp. 8). The same author observed further that the said article should be amended for it does not seem to distinguish between fault and negligence.


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false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy, and interference of property. Strict Liability – – a person is made liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts. The conduct is generally not wrongful in itself but the wrong consists in causing harm by engaging in certain types of risky activities (Aquino, pp. 2). 2).

Torts vs. Quasi-Delict9 Torts – Torts – common law concept; broader as a term.  Quasi-Delict – civil law concept; narrow  coverage. NOTE: Our laws incorporate the common law concept of torts in quasi-delict. Thus, delict may also give rise to an action for damages under quasi-delict. For the law no longer speaks of “not punishable by law.”

Dul ay v. v. CA 10

FACTS: Torzuela, a security guard of Safeguard Investigation and Security Co. and/or Superguard Security Corp., intentionally killed Atty. Dulay with a revolver belonging to his employers, after an altercation ensued between the two.

Maria Dulay filed an action for damages against Torzuela, Safeguard and Superguard alleging that the incident was due to their concurring negligence. Afterwards, an Information charging Torzuela with Homicide was filed before the RTC. HELD: Although Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide, Maria Dulay still has the right to file an independent civil action to recover damages for the fatal shooting of Atty. Dulay, under Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

Safeguard and Superguard contends that the civil action is founded on a delict (homicide) and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended by negligence. This is misplaced. There is no justification for limiting the scope of Art. 2176 of the Civil Code to acts of omissions resulting from negligence, as held in the case of Elcano v. Hill, wherein the SC held that “fault or negligence,” covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character. Furthermore, in Art. 2180, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the employee or servant, or in the supervision over him. Such liability of the employer under Art. 2180 is direct and immediate. immediate.

[Torts and Damages] Therefore, it is incumbent upon Safeguard and Superguard to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Catch All Provisions – the intent to adopt the expanded common law concept of intentional and unintentional tort is more evident in Arts. 19, 20 and 21. Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Article 21. Any 21. Any person who willfully willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate latter for the damage.

They introduce malice in the commission of torts. Moreover, these articles “were intended to expand the concept of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes.” 11 Under such broad concept, the following ar e included:  Defamation;  Fraud;  Physical injuries;  Violation of Constitutional Rights;  Negligence;  Interference with Contractual Relations;  Violation of Privacy;  Malicious Prosecution;  Product liability;  Strict liability for possession of animals;  Abuse of Right; and,  Acts which violate good morals and customs. Quasi-Delict vs. Contract Contracts – are governed by the Civil Code  provisions on Obligations and Contracts, particularly Arts. 1170-1174; however, by express provision of Art. 2178, Arts. 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to quasi-delict cases (Aquino, pp. 36).

12 Ai r F rance v. Carr Carr ascos ascoso o

FACTS: Carrascoso was with a group of pilgrims leaving for Lourdes. He was issued a first class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome, but was later forced by the Manager of Air France to vacate the seat that he was occupying because there was a white man who allegedly had a “better right” over the seat. HELD: Passengers do not contract merely for transportation as they have a right to be treated by the employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and consideration. What happened

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Atty. Beltran- Angeles’ discussion last November 3, 2014. G.R. No. 108017, 108017, April 3, 1995.

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Aquino, pp. 7 citing PNB v. CA, et. al., 83 SCRA 237. G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966.



[Torts and Damages] was a violation of public duty by the Air France – a case of quasi-delict, so damages are proper. The same act that causes the breach of contract may also be considered as a tort. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees could give ground for an action for damages. The wrongful expulsion is a violation of a public duty – a case of quasi-delict.

13 Vil oria v. Continental A irl ines

FACTS: Viloria agreed to buy airline tickets on board CAI after Mager of Holiday Travel Agency informed him that there were no available seats at Amtrak. Later on, Viloria requested that their flight be rescheduled, but Mager instead suggested an alternative flight via Fro ntier Air. Since Viloria knew such flights will be more costly, Viloria requested for a refund which Mager declined.

Viloria sent a demand letter with CAI which CAI Micronesia denied but advised him that he may take said tickets to any CAI ticketing location for re-issuance of new tickets. HELD: In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them.

Freedom contact Freedom distress Reputation Privacy

Freedom from wrongful actions Real Property

Contracts

Person

Interference contractual rights 1314) Fraud (Art. 33)

with (Art.

Freedom from Deception  Specific Purposes – specific statutes may provide for tort liability such as strict liability for defective products, or malpractice statutes. Fundamental Principles of Tort (Aqui no, pp . 13-16) 

Equity and Justice

Juris Praecepta Sunt Hec, Honeste Vivere, Alterum Non Laedare, Suum Cuique Tribuere – the precepts of law are these, to live honestly, not to injure another, and to give to each one his due; Justicia Est Constans et Perpetua Voluntas Jus Suum – Justice is a steady and unceasing disposition to render every man his due; Social Level – Distributive Justice and Retributive Justice; Individual Level – Corrective Justice (primary concern of Tort Law and the Civil Code provisions on damages) and Commutative Justice; Equity – justice according to natural law and right; often invoked in justifying the rule regarding mitigation of liability if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. Democracy – Article 32 provides for independent civil action for damages against “any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly and indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs the civil rights and liberties of another person.” H u m a n P e r s o n a l i t y – inclusion of Art. 26 and moral damages provisions in the Civil Code so as to exalt human personality properly. 

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Torts and/or Provisions Involved

Nuisance (Arts. 694-770); Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176)

Economic/Pecuniary

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Interests Protected

Defamation (Art. 33) Violation of Privacy (Art. 26) Malicious Prosecution (Arts. 20 and 21)

Property

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from

Physical Injuries (Art. 32); Quasi-Delict (Art. 2176) Moral Damages (Arts. 2217-2220)

Dignity

If the passenger’s cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company’s agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortious conduct committed by the employee of its agent.

Purposes of Tort Law (Aquin o, pp . 10-13) Major Purposes  To provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise take the law into their own hands; To deter wrongful conduct; To encourage socially responsible behavior; and, To restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by compensating them for their injury. Balancing of Conflicting Interest – the interests  protected under the Civil Code and examples of provisions that protect such interests are:

from

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Justification of Tort Liability (Aqu ino, pp . 17-21)  M o r a l P e r s p e c t i v e – because conduct is considered a moral wrong. Arts. 19 and 20 provide adequate legal remedy for moral wrongs.

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G.R. No. 188288, January 16, 2012.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes Consistent with this is the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium or “there is no wrong without remedy.” Natural Law – there is a “higher law” revealed through reason”. These are “the rules governing correct human conduct are logically connected with immanent truths concerning human nature. It is believed to be a rational foundation for moral judgment.” These are infused in the Civil Code because it was the aim of the drafters to remain faithful to natural law since their view is that “every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written in the conscience of man.” In Algarra v. Sandejas, it was held that, the abstract rules for determining negligence and the measure of damages are “rules of natural justice rather than man-made law, and are applicable under any enlightened system of jurisprudence.” Corrective Justice – the obligation to compensate the victim of harm is one that is imposed by corrective justice to recover for his losses. S o c i a l a n d E c o n o m i c P e r s p e c t i v e – liability may be provided for certain tortious conduct because of the good that it will do to the society as a whole and its function of encouraging socially responsible behavior. Economic Perspective – focused on the allocation of the risks of loss due to the destruction of property or injury to persons created by those activities. Tort law may thus be viewed as a system of rules designed to maximize the costs associated with engaging in daily activities.

[Torts and Damages]

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Persons Who Can Sue and be Sued for Tort ( A q u i n o , pp . 22-23) Plaintiffs – the person entitled to damages; can 

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be a natural or artificial person. The knowledge of the defendant as to the plaintiff’s identity is immaterial. An unborn child, however, is not entitled to damages because birth determines personality and for civil purposes, the fetus is only considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. D e f e n d a n t s – persons who may be held liable; can either be natural or artificial beings. Close Corporation and Corporation by Estoppel – stockholders who are personally involved in the operation of the corporation may be personally liable for corporate torts; for corporation by estoppel, all persons who assume to act as a corporation knowing it to 

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See also Art. 167 to 208, Labor Code. Note, however, that Art. 1173 of the Civil Code provides: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the 15

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be without authority to do so shall be liable as general partners for all debts, liabilities and damages incurred or arising as a result thereof. Partnerships – solidarily liable with the partner if the latter commit tortious acts while acting in pursuit of partnership business. State – this is subject to rules regarding waiver of immunity from suits; however, there are statutory provisions which expressly provide for such liability of the State and provinces, cities and municipalities such as Articles 2180 and 2189 of the Civil Code.

Remedies – are either preventive or compensatory. Preventive – every remedy in a certain sense is  preventive because it threatens certain undesirable consequences to those who violate the rights of others (e.g. injunction, writ of preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order);  Compensatory – primary purpose of tort action; an action for damages. Alternative Compensation Schemes  Insurance - Art. 378 of the Insurance Code provides that “any claim not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) for death or injury to any passenger or third party shall be paid without the necessity of proving fault or negligence of any kind.”  Workers’ Compensation – Art. 166 of the Labor Code provides that the State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employee’s compensation program whereby employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate income benefits and medical or related benefits in the event of work connected disability or injury.14

Negligence - involves voluntary acts or omissions that result in injury of others, without intending to cause the same (Aquino, pp. 2).15 The failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury (Pineda, pp. 8). Kinds of Actionable Negligence  Culpa Aquiliana – or quasi-delict or tortious conduct; characterized as substantive and

circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. (Pineda, pp. 8). The same author observed further that the said article should be amended for it does not seem to distinguish between fault and negligence.


[Torts and Damages]

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independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie; Culpa Contractual – or contractual negligence or breach of contract; negligence considered as an incident in the performance of an obligation already existing; Criminal Negligence – primarily governed by Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Requisites for a Quasi-Delict  Act or omission;  Presence of fault or negligence (lack of due care);  Damage to another;  Causal connection between the fault or negligence and the damage (Paras, pp. 11741175; Aquino, pp. 28; and, Pineda, pp. 7). No Pre-existing Contract Between the Parties – if there exist a contractual relation between the parties and the same is violated, the proper action is not anchored on quasi-delict , but breach of contract or culpa contractual (Pineda, pp. 15).  Except – where tort is that which breaches the contract (Aquino, pp. 29 citing American Express International v. Cordero, G.R. No. 138550, Oct. 14, 2005) such as when the violation of the contract was deliberate and malicious (Pineda, pp. 15, citing Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155); or, that the breach was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, or in bad faith, oppressive or obscure (Ibid., citing Go v. CA, 272 SCRA 752). “Duty” Need Not be Alleged and Proved – it is not a pre-requisite to liability that the courts in the Philippines determine, since negligence is in fact a breach of legal duty of care to the whole world, as contemplated by the New Civil Code (Aquino, pp. 30-31).

Can there be a Tort/Quasi-Delict in Breach of Contract – generally, no. However, the existence of a contractual relation does not bar the commission of a tort by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort, the contractual relation of the parties does not bar the recovery of damages (Pineda, pp. 15-16 citing Singson v. BPI, 132 Phil. 597). Culpa Aquiliana Separate source of obligation,

Basis Definition

Culpa Contractual Foundation of liability is contract

dreamer Bar Review Notes independent of contract Substantive and independent There may or may not be a pre-existing contractual relationship Defendant’s negligent act or omission Negligence of the defendant There is no presumption of negligence. The injured party must prove negligence of the defendant.

Characteristic or Nature of Negligence Party relationship

Incident of the performance of an obligation There is preexisting contractual relation

Source obligation

Breach of contractual relation Existence of the contract and its breach There is presumption of negligence as long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract. The defendant must prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract (Pineda, pp. 19). Proof of diligence is not a defense

of

Needs to be Proven Presumption of Negligence

Proof of Availability of required diligence as a diligence is a defense valid, complete and proper defense

Interference with Contractual Relations – constitutes tort as when a person induced to violate the latter’s contract with a third person (Pineda, pp. 16 citing People’s Bank and Trust Co. v. Dahl -can Lumber and Co.). Tort/Quasi-Delict vs. Crime (Pineda, Tort Basis A private wrong or As a concept injury; an infringement of the private or civil rights of another There can be a As to legal quasi-delict as basis of long as there is liability fault or negligence resulting in damage or injury to another. It is broader in scope than crime


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pp. 4; 18)

Crime An offense against the public; a punishable act There can be no crime unless there is a law clearly punishing the act.

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dreamer Bar Review Notes Criminal intent is As to criminal generally not intent necessary for quasi-delict (except for intentional torts) to exist. Fault or negligence without intent will suffice. Private individual As to pursuer Indemnity for As to what it damage or injury seeks sustained without seeking the imprisonment of the tortfeasor Every quasi-delict As to liability gives rise to a for damages liability for damages

Preponderance of As to evidence quantum of evidence New Civil Code As to governing law Liability of the As to the employer is direct employer and primary

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Criminal intent essential criminal liability exist.

[Torts and Damages] is for to

State Curtailment of the liberty or imprisonment of the offender with possible civil liability Some crimes (like contempt, illegal possession of firearm) do not give rise to liability for damages Proof beyond reasonable doubt Revised Penal Code Liability of the employer is subsidiary



[Torts and Damages] Emergency Rule – principal defense in actions based on negligence (Pineda, pp. 73). An actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation; an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.16 Emergency Rule; When Not Applicable – if the person who is invoking it found himself in d anger which he himself created through his own negligence 17 ( Aquino, pp. 59-60 citing Delsan Transport v. C&A Construction ).

18 Valenzuela v. CA and L i

FACTS: Valenzuela, driving from her restaurant at Araneta Avenue at around 2AM, noticed that she had her rear right tire flat. She stopped at a lighted area where there were people, to verify if there was a flat tire and if she could solicit some help if needed, until she was hit by another car, driven by Richard Li (car owned by Alexander Commercial, Inc.), resulting to Valenzuela’s left leg being amputated (she was pulled out from under Li’s car).

Apparently, Li was drunk while driving his company issued car. Hospital expenses were paid by Alexander Commercial, through the car insurance. Valenzuela filed a complaint for damages: P1M moral damages, P100K exemplary damages, P180K for other medical expenses and expected earning lost. Li contended the following: (1) driving at 55kph only; (2) it was raining; (3) he was confronted with a car co ming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80kph with “full bright lights”. He was temporarily blinded and instinctively swerved and hit Valenzuela. Rodriguez: Valenzuela parked very near the sidewalk, parallel, and Li was approaching very fast. RTC: Li’s guilty of gross negligence (Art. 2176) and Alexander Commercial is jointly and severally liable (Art. 2180). CA: Alexander Commercial, not guilty. P1M too much, reduced to P500K.

HELD: Li is guilty of gross negligence; company is jointly and severally liable, and Valenzuela is not guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory Negligence – conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Emergency rule is applied. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. Negligence on the part of Li – conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. Bonus Pater F amili as – Alexander Commercial was not able

to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

Delsan Tr ansport v. C& A Construction 19

FACTS: C & A Construction, Inc. was engaged by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to construct a deflector wall at the Vitas Reclamation Area .

M/V Delsan Express anchored at the Navotas Fish Port for the purpose of installing a cargo pump and clearing the cargo oil tank. At around 12:00 midnight, Capt. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila in about eight (8) hours. At approximately 8:35AM next day, Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor but could not enter the area because it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m., Capt. Jusep decided to drop anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, 4 miles away from a Napocor power barge. At that time, the waves were already reaching 8 to 10 feet high. Capt. Jusep ordered his crew to go full ahead to counter the wind which was dragging the ship towards the Napocor power barge. To avoid collision, Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel. He succeeded in avoiding the power barge, but when the engine

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18

17

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Aquino, pp. 90 citing Gan v. CA (G.R. No. L-44264, Sept. 19, 1988). Aquino, pp. 59-60 citing Delsan Transport v. C&A Construction (G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003).

G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996. G.R. No. 156034. October 1, 2003.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes was re-started and the ship was maneuvered full astern, it hit the deflector wall constructed by respondent. The damage caused by the incident amounted to P456,198.24. The trial court ruled that petitioner was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions to avoid the accident. Applying the “emergency rule”, it absolved petitioner of liability because the latter had no opportunity to adequately weigh the best solution to a threatening situation. It further held that even if the maneuver chosen by petitioner was a wrong move, it cannot be held liable as the cause of the damage sustained by respondent was typhoon “Katring”, which is an act of God. Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was reversed and set aside. HELD: Capt. Jusep was negligent in deciding to transfer the vessel only at 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994. As early as 12:00 midnight of October 20, 1994, he received a report from his radio head operator in Japan that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after 8 hours. This, notwithstanding, he did nothing, until 8:35 in the morning of October 21, 1994, when he decided to seek shelter at the North Harbor, which unfortunately was already congested. The finding of negligence cannot be rebutted upon proof that the ship could not have sought refuge at the North Harbor even if the transfer was done earlier. It is not the speculative success or failure of a decision that determines the existence of negligence in the present case, but the failure to take immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances.

When he ignored the weather report notwithstanding reasonable foresight of harm, Capt. Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same situation. Had he moved the vessel earlier, he could have h ad greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor considering that the Navotas Port where they docked was very near North Harbor. Even if the latter was already congested, he would still have time to seek refuge in other ports. Delsan Transport is vicariously liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code an employer may be held solidarily liable for the n egligent act of his employee.

Violation of Rules, Statutes, Practice and Custom – may be treated either as (1) a circumstance which establishes a presumption of negligence, (2) ne gligence per se, or (3) a circumstance which should be considered together with other circumstances as evidence of negligence (AQUINO, pp. 114-115). Violation of a statutory duty = Negligence p e r s e – because the statute or ordinance becomes the standard of care or conduct to which the reasonably prudent person is held.

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[Torts and Damages] When Not Negligence Per Se – when unusual conditions occur, strict observance may defeat the purpose of the rule and may even lead to adverse results. Violation Gives Rise to Presumption in Motor Vehicle Mishaps – Arts. 2184 to 2185 of the NCC. Violation of Administrative Rules – not negligence per se but may be evidence of n egligence. Violation of Private Rules of Conduct – rules imposed by private individuals such as the employer, the same rule applies. Proximate Cause – proximate cause of his injury is the negligence of the defendant; proof must be presented that there was causal connection between the negligence or violation of statute and the injury. Violation Establishes Proximate Cause – when the damage to the plaintiff is the damage that is sought to be prevented by the statute. So if the damage sought to be prevented is the damage to the plaintiff, no more test. Practice and Custom – what usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.

M artin ez v. Buskir k

FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez severely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of th e delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata. HELD: Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.


[Torts and Damages] It appears from the und isputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the h abit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.

Ti son v. Sps. Pomasin 20

FACTS: A tractor-trailer, driven by Jabon and a jitney, driven by Pomasin, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay.

POMASIN’S STORY – curve going downward, saw a tractor-trailer encroaching their lane. JABON’S STORY - while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still hit the left fender of the tractor-trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged. Multiple deaths occurred on the part of the jitney passengers. Tison, the owner of the truck, extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each immediately after the accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorio’s daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance. Pomasin filed a case against Tison and Jabon. RTC ruled for Tison, but was reversed by CA. The appellate court noted that the restriction in Jabon’s driver’s license was violated, thus, giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident. Tison was likewise held liable for damages for his failure to prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck. HELD: The trial court found that the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision.

The testimony of Pomasin was not consistent (from downhill and curve, to uphill) as opposed to Jabon’s which was consistent.


Clearly, the negligence of Gregorio’s daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident. We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver’s license, i.e.,restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land Transportation Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code 8 which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision. A causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury o r that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license.

Burden of Proof – the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defenses by the amount of evidence required by law. Plaintiff has the burden of proving that defendant is negligent, except in cases where there’s a presumption of negligence, example of which is in cases of common carriers. Presumption of Negligence – party invoking a presumption must still establish certain factual preconditions before the presumption can operate. Traffic Rules and Law of the Road – speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior. Driver must slow down before negotiating a curve. Contractual Relationships – in common carriers. Presumption does not apply in Non-Motorized Vehicles – bicycles.

R e s Ip s a L o q u i t u r – the thing speaks for itself.

Requisites:  The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;

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G.R. No. 173180, August 24, 2011.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes  

It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

Read book: pp. 140-154.

[Torts and Damages] block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision.

M alayan I nsurance v. Alberto

FACTS: 4 car collision, Alberto, the driver of Fuzo Cargo Truck, bumped a Mitsubishi Galant, damaging the 2 other vehicles (Isuzu Tanker and Nissan Bus).

In the case at bar, aside from the statement in the police report, none of the parties disputes the fact that the Fuzo Cargo Truck hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant, which, in turn, hit the rear end of the vehicle in front of it. Respondents, however, point to the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver as the proximate cause of the collision, which allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence on record. And assuming that this allegation is, indeed, true, it is astonishing that respondents never even bothered to file a cross-claim against the owner or driver of the Nissan Bus. Res Ipsa Loquitur applies, the 3 requisites are present. In the instant case, the Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents.

HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits fro m the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against peti tioner’s personnel.

Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. Jar cia v. People

FACTS:

HELD:

D.M . Consunji v. CA

FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.

Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain

21

Rule 18.01, Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 18.02, Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.

AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES Negligence of Lawyers Basis of Responsibility – Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall serve his clients with competence and diligence.”  Not to undertake legal service he knows or should know that he is not qualified to render; 21  Not to handle any legal matter without adequate preparation;22  Not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.23

23

Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.

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[Torts and Damages] NOTE: an attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. He is not answerable to every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.24 Loss and Error of Judgment Not Bases of Liability – it would be to place an intolerable burden on a member of the bar if just because a client failed to obtain what is sought by her after due exertion of the required effort on his part, he would be held accountable. 25 Proof of Damage Necessary – where a judgment became final through the fault of the lawyer who did not appeal therefrom, that fact alone is not sufficient ground for the losing party to recover damages from his lawyer since the action for damages rests on the unsubstantiated and arbitrary supposition of the injustice of the decision which became final through the fault and negligence of the lawyer.26

F ranco-Cruz v. CA 27

FACTS: Franco Transit bus collided with the rear portions o f a bus and truck wrecker both owned by Victory Liner. The collision damaged both vehicles of Victory Liner and killed Manuel Fabian, Rodel Ganelo, Caesar Santos, and Michael Figueroa. The driver of the Franco Transit bus likewise died in the accident.

Victory Liner and the surviving spouses of those killed filed a complaint for damages against Franco-Cruz, the registered owner of the buses under Franco Transit. They alleged that Franco-Cruz failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver of the Franco Transit bus. Franco-Cruz failed to appear during the pre-trial scheduled on June 5, 1998 despite due notice thereof, albeit her counsel filed on even date an urgent motion to postpone. The motion was denied, however, and petitioner was declared “as in default” [sic]. Victory Liner, et. al. at once started presenting evidence ex-parte. RTC found that the negligence of the driver of Franco Transit resulted in the accident which Franco-Cruz failed to rebut and that, moreover, Franco-Cruz totally failed to present evidence to overthrow the presumption of negligence against her pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. HELD: The filing of a motion for reconsideration by respondent Ma. Theresa within the reglementary period

prevented, with respect to her, the decision from becoming final, but not with respect to petitioner. The faux pas or negligence of petitioner’s counsel, however, in failing to file a timely motion for reconsideration should not be taken against her. Ordinarily, the negligence of counsel binds the client. However, this Court has recognized the following exceptions to this rule: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright de privation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice require. In the case at bar, the application of the rule would result in Franc-Cruz being held liable for the damages suffered by respondents even without them having established the basis of her liability, thus depriving her of due process of law. Compounding petitioner’s plight is the trial court’s procedural error which precluded petitioner from presenting evidence in her behalf. The trial court denied her motion for reconsideration of its order declaring her “as in default” on the ground that she failed to submit an affidavit of merit respecting her claim that she had meritorious defenses. This ratio is, of course, erroneous, for an affidavit of merit is not required to support a motion for reconsideration of an order allowing the ex-parte presentation of evidence by the plaintiff, the defenses having already been laid down in the answer as in petitioner’s case. Petitioner, early on in the Affirmative Defenses segment of her Answer, already disclaimed the allegation in respondents’ complaint that she is the registered owner of the bus, hence, not a real party-in-interest-ground to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

Jacot v. Dal 28

FACTS: Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of ViceMayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renoun cement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. HELD: Jacot did not effectively renounce his US citizenship. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

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25

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Aquino, pp. 230, citing Adarne v. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734, 739 (1978). Aquino, pp. 230, citing Atienza v. Evangelista, 80 SCRA 338, 341-342 (1977). 26 Aquino, pp. 231, citing Roque v. Guigundo, 89 SCRA 178 (1979).

G.R. No. 172238, September 17, 2008. G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008


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dreamer Bar Review Notes The justification offered by Jacot, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, Jacot’s counsel, and even Jacot himself, could have easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There was no apparent danger for Jacot to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for which he could lose. And even if it were true, Jacot’s excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not change the outcome of Jacot’s case. It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. These exceptions are not attendant in this case. The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel. Also belying petitioner’s claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his former counsel’s theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite the former’s incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent. Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC, instead of waiting until a

[Torts and Damages] decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and, thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsel’s acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.

Negligence of Banks  







The banking business is affected by public interest. The bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. The depositor expects the bank to treat his account with utmost fidelity, whether such account consists of only a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. The bank is also liable if it wrongfully dishonors the check issued by the depositor even if there are sufficient funds in the account and even if there is no other valid justification to do so. The depositor, not the payee, can maintain an action based on breach of contract or on quasi-delict.

Phil . Bank of Commerce v. CA29

FACTS: Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts with PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. The RMC General Manager Lipana entrusted to his secretary, Irene Yabut, RMC funds amounting to P300,000+ for the purpose of depositing the same to RMC’s account with PBC. However, it turned out that Yabut deposited the amounts in her husband’s account instead of RMC. Lipana never checked his monthly statement of accounts regularly furnished by PBC so that Yabut’s modus operandi went on for the span of more than one year. ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of the loss – Lipana’s negligence in not checking his monthly statements or the bank’s negligence through its teller in validating the deposit slips? HELD: The bank teller was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the selfimposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original o r duplicate.

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[Torts and Damages]

The bank teller’s negligence, as well as the negligence of the bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, not the latter’s entrusting cash to a dishonest employee. Xxx Even if Yabut had the fraudulent intention to misappropriate the funds, she would no t have been able to deposit those funds in her husband’s current account, and then make plaintiff believe that it was in the latter’s accounts wherein she had deposited them, had it not been for the b ank teller’s aforesaid gross and reckless negligence. 30 M etropoli tan Bank v. Tobias

FACTS: Rosella A. Santiago, then the OIC-Branch Head of Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company (METROBANK) in Valero Street, Makati City, was introduced to respondent Antonino O. Tobias III (Tobias) by one Jose Eduardo Gonzales, a valued client of METROBANK.

Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. METROBANK next proceeded to appraise the property Tobias offered as collateral by asking him for a ph otocopy of the title and other related documents. The property consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila with a total area of 6,080 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-16751. Based on the financial statements submitted by Tobias, METROBANK approved a credit line for P40,000,000.00. On August 15, 1997, Joselito Bermeo Moreno, Lead Internal Affairs Investigator of METROBANK, proceeded to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon to cause the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on TCT No. M-16751. The annotation was Entry No. 26897. When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Atty. Sarah Principe-Bido, Deputy Register of Deeds of Malabon, went on to verify TCT No. M-16751 and learned that Serial No. 4348590 appearing therein had b een issued for TCT No. M-15363 in the name of one Alberto Cruz; while TCT No. 16751 (now TCT No. 390146) appeared to have been issued in the name of Eugenio S. Cruz and Co. for a parcel of land located in Navotas. Prosecutor found probable cause for estafa through falsification of public documents, however, upon appeal to the DOJ, both Gutierrez and Gonzales dismissed the appeal for lack of probable cause. It was said that h andling the same was a disputable presumption of authorship. HELD: METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty.

dreamer Bar Review Notes Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of investigating who was its real owner . Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest. Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part. Side: Metrobank urges the application of the presumption of authorship against Tobias based on his having offered the duplicate copy of the spurious title to secure the loan, and posits that there is no requirement that the pr esumption shall apply only when there is absence of a valid explanation from the person found to have possessed, used and benefited from the forged document. Metrobank’s theory was not sustained here. First, a presumption affects the burden of proof that is normally lodged in the State. The effect is to create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case that shall prevail in the absence of proof to the contrary. As such, a presumption of law is material during the actual trial of the criminal case where in the establishment thereof the party against whom the inference is made should adduce evidence to rebut the presumption and demolish the prima facie case. This is not so in a preliminary investigation, where the investigating prosecutor only determines the existence of a prima facie case that warrants the prosecution of a criminal case in court. Second, the presumption of authorship, being disputable, may be accepted and acted upon where no evidence upholds the contention for which it stands. It is not correct to say, consequently, that the investigating prosecutor will try to determine the existence of the presumption during preliminary investigation, and then to disregard the evidence offered by the respondent. Moreover, the presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation.

CAUSATION Proximate Cause – that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred; the procuring efficient and predominant cause.  Is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final even in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person,

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dreamer Bar Review Notes having reasonable ground to expect at the moment his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. 31

32 Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina

FACTS: Medina is the owner and operator of a bus. This bus, on Sept. 13, 1952 around 2:00AM somewhere in Imus, Cavite, crashed and fell into a d itch. Apparently, its front tire burst, zig-zagged and turned turtle into the ditch. Bataclan was one of the 18 passengers. Most of the passengers were able to get out, but Bataclan and 3 others were trapped. It appears that the bus drivers and the passengers who already got out did not try to h elp Bataclan et al get out, instead, about 10 of the locals in the area came to their aid, they were carrying a burning torch for illumination, but then a fierce fire started and engulfed the bus and killed Bataclan et al. It appears that there was a gas leak from the bus and it caught fire from the torch the would -be rescuers were using.

The heirs of Bataclan sued Medina. The trial court found that there was a breach of a contract of carriage where Medina undertook to take Bataclan to his destination safely. The trial court also found that there was negligence on the part of Medina since at the time of the blowout, the bus was speeding. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court argued that Medina is only liable for the injuries suffered by B ataclan and not by his death, the proximate cause of which was the fire, which was not caused by Medina. ISSUE: Whether or not it was the negligence of Medina, owner of the bus company, which was the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan. HELD: Yes. In this case, the proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the b us, because of the overturning, it leaked gas which is not unnatural or unexpected. The locals coming to the aid of the trapped passengers was most likely because the driver and the conductor went out looking for help. It is only natural that the would-be rescuers bring with them a torch because it was 2:30AM and the p lace was unlit. The fire could also be attributed to the bus driver and conductor because he should have known, from the circumstances, and because he should have been able to smell gasoline and therefore he should have warned the rescuers not to bring the torch. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions abovereproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763. Proximate Cause – ‘that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result 31

Aquino, pp. 317-318, citing Vda. De Bataclan v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 (1957). G.R. No.

[Torts and Damages] would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.’ 33 M ercury Dru g v. Baking

FACTS: Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about th e collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the defendant which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition. ISSUE: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: YES. Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the d amage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician. Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence in driving his car. Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred Proximate cause is determined from the facts

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[Torts and Damages] of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in collision. Petition DENIED.

Remote Cause – that cause which some independent force merely took advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof. A remote cause cannot be considered the legal cause of the damage.

34 Gabeto v. Araneta

FACTS: In 1918, Basilio Ilano and P roceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. The driver, Julio Pagnaya, replied that h e had not heard or seen the call of Araneta. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out in order to find the bridle. Meanwhile one of the passengers, Ilano, had alighted but the other, Gayetano, h ad unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died. ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the accident was the stopping of the horse by Araneta. RULING: Judgement reversed and defendant absolved from the complaint. RATIO: The stopping of the rig by Araneta was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the h ead of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken. According to the witnesses for the defendant, it was Julio who jerked the rein, thereby causing the bit to come out of the horse's mouth; and that after alighting, led the horse over to the curb, and proceeded to fix the bridle; and that in so doing the bridle was slipped entirely off, when the horse, feeling himself free from control, started to go away as previously stated.

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Nearest Cause – the last link in the chain of events. Not necessarily the proximate cause.  Ex: house burning because of embers negligently emitted by the train. Concurrent Causes – other causes of the injury brought about by acts or omissions of third persons. The actor is not protected from liability even if the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm so long as the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance – not applicable in  this cases. The joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable. If Plaintiff’s Negligence is Concurrent Proximate  Cause – plaintiff cannot recover damages.

Phil ippine National Constructi on Corporation v. CA 35

FACTS: PASUDECO transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang, Pampanga, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through NLEX.

They entered into a MOA that allowed PASUDECO to enter and pass through NLEX: 1. PASUDECO trucks should move in convoy; 2. Said trucks will stay on the right lane; 3. A vehicle with blinking lights should be assigned at the rear end of the convoy with a sign which should read as follows: Caution: CONVOY AHEAD!!!; 4. Tollway safety measures should be properly observed; 5. Accidents or damages to the toll facilities arising out of any activity related to this approval shall be the responsibility of PASUDECO; 6. PASUDECO shall be responsible in towing their stalled trucks immediately to avoid any inconvenience to the other motorists; 7. This request will be in force only while the national bridges along Abacan-Angeles and Sapang Maragul via Magalang remain impassable. One day, the patrols of PNCC saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road and suspected that the same are from PASUDECO. Later on, thinking that the p ile was already cleared on the side of the street, they left, only for Rodrigo S. Arnaiz, who was driving at 65kph, with his sister Regina Latagan, and his friend Ricardo Generalao to have a vehicular mishap and their car turned turtle several times.

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dreamer Bar Review Notes Hence, they filed action for damages. PNCC averred that the mishap was due to the “unreasonable speed” at which Arnaiz’s car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECO’s gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed. RTC rendered its decision in favor of Latagan, dismissing that of Arnaiz and Generalao for insufficiency of evidence. The case as against the PNCC was, likewise, dismissed. CA rendered judgment, affirming the RTC decision with modification. The appellate court ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e., PASUDECO’s failure to properly supervise its men in clearing the affected area. Its supervisor, Mallari, admitted that he was at his house while their men were clearing Km. 72. Thus, the appellate court held both PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and severally, liable to Latagan. HELD: There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. In the case at bar, it is clear that the petitioner failed to exercise the requisite diligence in maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing by at night or in the wee hours of the morning. PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. Anent respondent Arnaiz’s negligence in driving h is car, both the trial court and the CA agreed that it was only contributory,

[Torts and Damages] and considered the same in mitigating the award of damages in his favor as provided under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Even the petitioner itself described Arnaiz’s negligence as contributory. In its Answer to the complaint filed with the trial court, the petitioner asserted that “the direct and proximate cause of the accident was th e gross negligence o f PASUDECO personnel which resulted in the spillage of sugarcane and the apparent failure of the PASUDECO workers to clear and mop up the area completely, coupled with the contributory negligence of Arnaiz in driving his car at an unreasonable speed.” However, the petitioner changed its theory in the present recourse, and now claims that the proximate and immediate cause of the mishap in question was the reckless imprudence or gross negligence of respondent Arnaiz. Such a change of theory cannot be allowed. When a party adopts a certain theory in the trial court, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Loadmasters Customs 36 Corporation

Services v.

Brokerage

FACTS: The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 82822. On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the six (6) trucks route to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. Later on, the said truck, was recovered bu t without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B Insurance paid

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Glodel



[Torts and Damages] Columbia the indemnity.

amount

ofP1,896,789.62

as

insurance

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss." On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’ counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance. Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their liability for the loss of the subject cargo. RULING: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation jointly and severally liable to respondent Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting p assenger o r goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. For as stated and well provided in the case of Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.

the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, th e carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing. For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and n ever against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a party who h as been at fault or negligent.

Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual p rudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility,


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Efficient Intervening Cause – one that destroys the causal connection between the negligent act and injury and thereby negatives liability; sometimes called novus actus interviens. There is no efficient intervening cause if the force created by the negligent act or omission have either:  Remained active itself;  Created another force which remained active until it directly caused the result; or,  Created a new active risk being acted upon by the active force that caused the result; Test of Sufficiency of Intervening Cause – can be found in the manner in which it affects the continuity of operation of the primary cause or connection between it and the injury.

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[Torts and Damages]

Special Torts – are those acts and actions covered by the following nine (9) articles found in the Chapter on Human Relations which are expressly mentioned in paragraph 10 of Article 2219, to wit: Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. xxx xxx xxx Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence; (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. Article 27. Any person suffering m aterial or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. Article 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. Article 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground. Article 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. xxx xxx xxx Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of the laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be a free from involuntary servitude in any form; (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; (18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and (19) Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. xxx xxx xxx Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. Article 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.  The

injured party under the said articles may file a criminal case against the offender if the act constitutes a crime. In addition, he is entitled to recover moral damages (Art. 2219).  The other articles in the Chapter on Human Relations such as Articles 19, 20, 23 and 33 also involve torts or quasi-delicts. Although they are not included in Article 2219 (10), moral damages may still be recovered therefrom in the absence of any prohibition, especially so, when they are analogous to those enumerated (Pineda, pp. 314-318). Concept of Tort or Quasi-Delict Applicable to Both Persons and Property – as a general rule, the concept of tort or quasi-delict applies to persons. Thus, the Chapter on quasi-delict generally speaks of physical

37

For purposes of this Bar Review Notes, Special Torts includes the two other types of Tort Liabilities , namely (1) Intentional Torts; and, (2) Strict Liability Torts.


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[Torts and Damages]

injuries or death caused to persons. This tort is referred to as personal tort. There are, however, articles which speaks of property particularly the following:

interests and to secure a “rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.” 38

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if t hrough the act or event he was benefited. Article 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection. xxx xxx xxx Article 27. Any person suffering m aterial or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. xxx xxx xxx Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. xxx xxx xxx Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which: (1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or (2) Annoys or offends the senses; or (3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or (4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) Hinders or impairs the use of property. xxx xxx xxx Article 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who created it. xxx xxx xxx Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)

Concept of Intent in Torts:  Restatement (Second) of Torts – the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it; 39 Prosser and Keeton – (1) it is a state of mind (2)  about consequences of an act or omission and not about the act itself, and (3) it extends not only to having in the mind a purpose or desire to bring about given consequences but also to having in mind a belief or knowledge that given consequences are substantially certain to result from the act; Professor John Finnis – a deliberate adoption of  a course of action or means which is wrongful in relation to the plaintiff or adoption of a course of action in order to cause a harmful end (Aquino, pp. 384-385).

The above enumerations are referred to as property torts (Ibid., pp. 319-321).

Human Relations, Concept – refers to the rules needed to govern the inter-relationships of human beings in a society for the purpose of maintaining social order. This is to balance opposing or crisscrossing

38

Ibid., pp. 322, citing Report of the Code Commission, pp. 39.

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Intentional Tort vs. Negligence Tort (Ibid., pp. 385) Intentional Tort Negligence Tort Involves CERTAINTY of Involves the harm FORESEEABILITY of the risk There is a KNOWLEDGE There is a KNOWLEDGE which is which is SHORT of SUBSTANTIALLY substantial certainty CERTAIN Manifestations of Intent – in most cases, intent appears by way of malice, bad faith or fraud. Bad faith – involves a dishonest purpose or some  moral obloquy and conscious doing of wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interests or ill will that partakes the nature of fraud; Malice – connotes ill will or spite and speaks not  in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is bad faith or bad motive. Fraud – refers to all kinds of deception that would  lead an ordinarily prudent person into error after taking the circumstances into account. NOTE: There are, however, some tort cases that requires intent as a content specific. For example, in interference with contract, the persuasion is used for the indirect purpose of injuring the plaintiff or benefitting the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff (Aquino, pp. 386-387). It is not just ill-will or spite, like in malicious prosecution, but the fact of benefitting on one end and injuring in the other.

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Substantially the same definition of “intent” provided by Black’s Law Dictionary.


[Torts and Damages] Catch-All Provisions Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate latter for the damage.

Concept of Catch-All Provisions – expands the coverage of torts which “renders it impossible that a person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision, should find himself without relief.”40 The above provisions provide the legal bedrock for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision, or an act which though not constituting a transgression of positive law, nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the party aggrieved.41 ART. 19 – Principle of Abuse of Right Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Abuse of Right – refers to acts performed which are not illegal but nevertheless make the actor liable for damages, if in so acting or in exercising his right, his purpose is to prejudice or injure another. This is a complete departure from the old Spanish doctrine “he who uses a right injures no one” (Pineda, pp. 323). COMMENT: A contradiction in terms because “if a person acts with abuse, his right to act ceases, and his act becomes illicit, giving rise to liability.” 42

dreamer Bar Review Notes underlying an award of damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code is to compensate the injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person.” 44 Good Faith as a Defense  Aquino – defendant may likewise be guilty of tort under Articles 19 and 21 even if the tortfeasor did not act with ill-will. In those cases, liability to pay exemplary damages may not be imposed on the defendant who acted in good faith. ( Evil ends are not necessarily controlling. 45 Pineda – the absence of good faith is essential to  abuse of right. When a person exercises his rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with honesty and good faith, he opens himself to liability. 46 COMMENT: It is submitted that the latter rule is more correct. This answer is based from the elements of abuse of right as stated below. Elements of Abuse of Right – under Art. 19, the elements of abuse of right are:  There is a legal right or duty;  Which is exercised in bad faith;  For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.47 Abuse of Right vs. D a m n u m A b s q u e I n j u r i a  Abuse of Rights – when the conjunction of damage and wrong is wanting, there is no damnum absque injuria.  Damnum Absque Injuria – a person who only exercises his legal rights does no injury (Pineda, pp. 328)

Rationale – the exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social justice. 43

Art. 19, Not a Panacea for All Human Hurts and Social Grievances – the object of the article is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s right but also in the performance of one’s duty (Ibid.).

Damage as an Essential Element of Cause of Action based on Abuse of Right – it can only prosper when the plaintiff suffers damage (material or otherwise). However, it is not necessary that there are actual damages. “Moral damages may be awarded in appropriate cases referred to in the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code (Arts. 19 to 36), without need of proof that the wrongful act complained of had caused any physical injury upon the complainant. It is clear from the report of the Code Commission that the reason

ART. 20 – Indemnification

40

the Court categorically said that there exist a bad faith, although no ill -will or grudge. In the Grand Union Supermarket Case, Atty. Aquino likewise believed that there was no good faith in the case because Espino was paraded to be humiliated. 46 Pineda, pp. 324, citing Sea Commercial Company, Inc., 319 SCRA 211; BPI Express Card Corp. v. CA, 296 SCRA 260; and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532. 47 Pineda, pp. 325; and Aquino, pp. 395, both citing Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532; and Carpio vs. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004, among others.

Aquino, pp. 388, citing Report of the Code Commission, pp. 39. Ibid., citing Carpio vs. Valmonte, G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004. 42 Ibid., citing 3 Camus 550. 43 Ibid., pp. 325, citing Borrel Macia, pp. 87-89. 44 Aquino, pp. 391, citing Patricio v. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989. 45 Aquno, pp. 392-394, citing Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 309; and, Grand Union Supermarket v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979. NOTE: Atty. Aquino, however, seems to contradict himself or it seems he is in disagreement with the decisions of the SC. He said in the Llorente Case that 41

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Coverage of the Article – provides a general sanction (the indemnification for damages) for cases wherein the law does not provide its own sanctions. The article is broad enough to cover even legal wrongs not constitutive of breach of contract, as well as torts based


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dreamer Bar Review Notes on malice (Art. 20) and torts based on negligence (Art. 2176) (Pineda, pp. 330). Right Must be Impaired – it is essential that some right of his is impaired (Ibid.). ART. 21 – Injury Based from Acts Contrary to Morals, Good Customs or Public Policy Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate latter for the damage.

Rationale of the Article – to fill in the gaps in statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury. This is common in business practices, and certain acts of landlords and employers. 48 Requisites for Recovery of Damages – necessary that the act should have been willfully done and more it is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. There should be loss or injury, material or otherwise, which one may suffer as a result of such violation (Ibid.).

Garciano V. CA 49

LESSON: There is no abuse of right if the defendants (teachers allegedly threatening to resign en masse) are legitimately exercising their constitutional rights (in this case, their right to free speech). FACTS: The petitioner was hired to teach during the 198182 school year in the Immaculate Concepcion Institute in the Island of Camotes. On January 13, 1982, or before the school year ended, she applied for an indefinite leave of absence because her daughter was taking her to Austria where her daughter was employed. The application was recommended for approval by the school principal, Emerito O. Labajo, and approved by the President of the school's Board of Directors.On June 1, 1982, Emerito Labajo addressed a letter to the petitioner through her husband, Sotero Garciano(for she was still abroad), informing her of the decision of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, the school's founder, concurred in by the president of the Parent-Teachers Association and the school faculty, to terminate her services as a member of the teaching staff because of: (1) the absence of any written contract of employment between her and the school due to her refusal to sign one; and (2) the difficulty of getting a substitute for heron a temporary basis as no one would accept the position without a written contract. Upon her return from Austria in the later part of June, 1982, she received the letter informing her th at her services at the Immaculate Concepcion Institute had been terminated. She made inquiries from the school about the matter and, on July 7, 1982, the members of the Board of

48

Pineda, pp. 331, citing Report of the Code Commission, pp. 39-40. 212 SCRA 436 (1992). Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo. 49

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[Torts and Damages] Directors of the school, with the exception of Fr. Joseph Wiertz, signed a letter notifying her that she was "reinstated to report and do your usual duties as Classroom Teacher . . . effective July 5, 1982," and that" any letter or notice of termination received by you before this date has no sanction or authority by the Board of Directors of this Institution, therefore it is declared null and void."- On July 9, 1982, the president, vice president, secretary, and three members of the Board of Directors, out of a membership of nine (9), resigned their positions from the Board "for the reason that the ICI Faculty, has reacted acidly to the Board's deliberations for the reinstatement of Mrs. Esteria F. Garciano, thereby questioning the integrity of the Board's decision".- On September 3, 1982, petitioner filed a complaint for damages in the Regional Trial Court, Cebu, Branch XI, against Fr. Wiertz, Emerito Labajo, and some members of the faculty of the school for discrimination and unjust and illegal dismissal. ISSUE: WON the defendants prevented the petitioner from reporting to the school and thus making them liable for damages HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals was correct in finding that petitioner's discontinuance from teaching was her own choice. While the respondents admittedly wanted her service terminated, they actually did nothing to physically prevent her from reassuming her post, as ordered by the school's Board of Directors. That the school principal and Fr. Wiertz disagreed with the Board's decision to retain her, and some teachers allegedly threatened to resign en masse, even if true, did not make them liable to her for damages. They were simply exercising their right of free speech or their right to dissent from the Board's decision. Their acts were n ot contrary to law, morals, good customs or public policy. They d id not "illegally dismiss" her for the Board's decision to retain her prevailed. She was ordered to report for work on July 5, 1982, but she did not comply with that order. Consequently, whatever loss she may have incurred in the form of lost earnings was selfinflicted. Volenti nonfit injuria (Assumption of risk) RATIO: Liability for damages under Articles 19, 20 and21 of the Civil Code arises only from unlawful, willful or negligent acts that are contrary to law, or morals, good customs or public policy.

Petrophi l Corporation v. CA50

LESSON: There was abuse of right when Petrophil terminated its hauling contract with Dr. Cruz, without hearing her side of the story, because Dr. Cruz sympathized with the picketing workers of Petrophil. FACTS: Petitioner Petrophil Corporation (Petrophil) entered into contract with private respondent Dr. Amanda TernidaCruz, allowing the latter to haul and transport any and all packages and/or bulk products of Petrophil. 50

G.R. No. 122796, December 10, 2001. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


[Torts and Damages] The contract provided among others, that Petrophil could terminate the contract for breach, negligence, discourtesy, improper and/or inadequate performance or abandonment. Dr. Cruz was also required to reserve the use of at least two (2) units of tank trucks solely for the hauling requirements of Petrophil. It likewise stipulates that the contract shall be for an indefinite period, provided that Petrophil may terminate said contract at any time with 30 days prior written notice In a letter dated May 21, 1987, Petrophil, through its Operations Manager, advised Dr. Cruz that it was terminating her hauling contract. Dr. Cruz appealed to Petrophil for reconsideration but said appeal was denied. On June 5, 1987-On June 23, 1987, Dr. Cruz filed with the RTC a complaint against Petrophil seeking the nullity of the termination of the contract. On March 11, 1988, the other private respondents herein all tank truck drivers of Dr. Cruz, also filed a complaint for damages against Petrophil. RTC ordered Petrophil to pay the plaintiffs as unearned hauling charges. Dr. Cruz alleges in her appeal that the RTC erred in not awarding actual damages and asks the court to award compensatory, exemplary, and moral d amages. CA modified the decision, adding legal interest in the award. The termination of the contract was “for cause”, and that the procedures set forth in petitioner’s policy guidelines should be followed. Hence this petition. ISSUE/HELD: W/N petitioner is guilty of arbitrary termination of contract / YES

W/N defendant is entitled to damages / YES RATIO: On the first issue, we agree with petitioner that the contract clearly provided for two ways of terminating the contract (“for cause” as per Par. 7 and “without cause” as per Par. 11”) and, one mode do es not exclude the other

Although the contract provided for causes for termination, it also stated in paragraph 11 that the contract was for an indefinite term subject to the right of Petrophil to terminate it any time after a written notice of 30days. When the language of a contract is clear, it requires no interpretation Thus, the finding that the termination of the contract was “for cause”, is immaterial. When petitioner terminated the contract “without cause”, it was required only to give Dr. Cruz a 30day prior written notice, which it did in this case. However Recall that before Petrophil terminated the contract on May 25, 1987, there was a strike of its employees at the Pandacan terminal. Dr. Cruz and her husband were seen at the picket line and were repo rted to have instructed their truck drivers not to load petroleum products. At the resumption of the operation in Pandacan terminal, Dr. Cruz’s contract was suspended for one week and eventually terminated. Nowhere in the record do we find that petitioner asked her to explain her actions. Petrophil simply terminated her contract

dreamer Bar Review Notes In terminating the hauling contract of Dr. Cruz without hearing her side on the factual context above described, petitioner opened itself to a charge of bad faith. While Petrophil had the right to terminate the contract, petitioner could not act purposely to injure private respondents. There is an abuse of right under Article 19 if the following elements are present: 1) There is a legal right or duty; 2) It is exercised in bad faith; 3) For the sole purpose of prejudicing or injuring another All these 3 elements are present in the case at bar. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it imposed a tortious liability where the requisites therefor were not established by the evidence, that there is no other evidence that the termination of the contract was done with deliberate intent to harm or for the sole purpose of prejudicing the respondent-drivers. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the damage done. Petitioner might not have deliberately intended to injure the respondent-drivers. But as a consequence of its willful act directed against Dr. Cruz, respondent-drivers lost their jobs and consequently suffered loss of income. Note that under Article 20, there is no requirement that the act must be directed at a specific person, but it suffices that a person suffers damage as a consequence of a wrongful act of another in order that indemnity could be demanded from the wrongdoer. The appellate court did not err, given the circumstances of this case, in awarding damages to respondent-drivers.

Malicious Prosecution - an action for damages brought by one against another whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceedings has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. Elements of Malicious Prosecution (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. Malice as a Requisite - The presence of malice should therefore be established by going over the circumstances of each case. Concept of Malice - “inexcusable intent to injure, oppress, vex, annoy or humiliate;” presence of probable


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dreamer Bar Review Notes cause signifies absence of malice; a mistake in a doubtful and difficult question of law is a ground for good faith. Acquittal – if the case was dismissed and refiled again, that constitutes malicious prosecution.

Gl obe M ckay v. CA 51

LESSON: Prior acquittal, to justify that there exist malicious prosecution, may include dismissal by the prosecutor after p reliminary investigation. FACTS: 10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

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G.R. No. 81262, August 1989. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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[Torts and Damages] HELD: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a h undred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and th e filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human condu ct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Dri lon v. CA 52

LESSON: Prior acquittal and writ of habeas corpus, not the same. Prior acquittal is the dismissal of a case against a person. Habeas corpus cannot justify that there exist malicious prosecution. FACTS: In a letter-complaint to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, General Renato de Villa, who was then the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, requested the Department of Justice to order the investigation of several individuals named therein, including herein private respondent Homobono Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed December 1989 coup d’etat.

The letter-complaint was based on the affidavit of Brigadier General Alejandro Galido, Captain Oscarlito Mapalo, Colonel Juan Mamorno, Colonel Hernani Figueroa and Major Eduardo Sebastian Panel released its findings holding that there is probable cause to hold herein respondents for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED MURDER. This resolution served as the basis for the filing of the corresponding information against them charging them with the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, with no recommendation as to bail. Feeling aggrieved by the institution of these proceedings against him, private respondent Adaza filed a complaint for damages Adaza charged petitioners with engaging in a deliberate, willful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a

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G.R. No. 107019, 1997. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


[Torts and Damages] charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners, according to Adaza, were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Adaza’s complaint on the ground that said complaint states no actionable wrong constituting a valid cause of action against petitioners RTC denied Motion to Dismiss petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in ruling that sufficient cause of action exists to warrant a full-blown hearing of the case filed by Adaza and thus denying petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss Appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and ordered respondent Judge to proceed with the trial of Civil Case ISSUE: WON There was malice in this case. HELD: NO. The complaint likewise does not make any allegation that the prosecution acted without probable cause in filing the criminal information for rebellion with murder and frustrated murder. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. Elsewise stated, a suit for malicious prosecution will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictment miscarried

In the case at bar, the decision of the Special Team of Prosecutors to file the information for rebellion with murder and frustrated murder against respondent Adaza, among others, cannot be dismissed as the mere product of whim or caprice on the part of the prosecutors who conducted the preliminary investigation. Said decision was fully justified in an eighteen (18)-page Resolution. While it is true that the petitioners were fully aware of the prevailing jurisprudence enunciated in P eople v. Hernandez, which proscribes the complexing of murder and other common crimes with rebellion, petitioners were of the honest conviction that the Hernandez Case can be differentiated from the present case. In the Hernandez case, the common crimes of murder, arson, etc. were found by the fiscal to have been committed as a necessary means to commit rebellion, or in furtherance thereof. Thus, the fiscal filed an information for rebellion alleging those common crimes as a necessary means of committing the offense charged under the second part of Article 48, RPC.

dreamer Bar Review Notes The prosecutors, however, find no occasion to apply the Hernandez ruling since as intimated above, the crimes of murder and frustrated murder in this case were absolutely unnecessary to commit rebellion although they were the natural consequences of the unlawful bombing. Hence, the applicable provision is the first part of Article 48 of the RPC. Enrile v Salazar was also cited saying Hernandez ruling is still a good law but part o f it needs clarification. In line with Enrile case, SC held that a doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard, the law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties. Any person who seeks to establish otherwise has the burden of proving bad faith or ill-motive. Here, since the petitioners were of the honest conviction that there was probable cause to hold respondent Adaza for trial for the crime of rebellion with murder and frustrated murder, and since Adaza himself, through counsel, did not allege in his complaint lack of probable cause, we find that the petitioners cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution. Probable cause was not wanting in the institution of Criminal Case against Adaza. As to the requirement that the prosecutor must b e impelled by malice in bringing the unfounded action, suffice it to state that the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence, the absence of malice. At the risk of being repetitious, it is evident in this case that petitioners were not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded belief that respondent Adaza can be held for trial for the crime alleged in the information.

I nhelder Corporati on v. CA 53

LESSON: Malice and purpose to vex as elements of malicious prosecution. Collection cases where check was used to p ay; there exist no malicious prosecution if the check was not yet cashed. FACTS: On December 29, 1972, DOCTOR's CLINIC purchased medicines and drugs from INHELDER in the amount of P1,385.10, payable in installments. The PANGANIBANS were able to pay the amount of P 824.10 for that purchase, leaving a balance of P561.00 which had remained unpaid for approximately two years.

On December 2, 1974, Atty. Fajardo sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS requesting settlement of the said amount of P561.00. In their reply, the PANGANIBANS requested a statement of account which was sent to them on January 17, 1975 with a follow-up letter, again, requesting remittance of the outstanding balance of P561.00. (a) On January 28, 1975, the PANGANIBANS, as stated by them, "sent PNB Check No. 32058 to (INHELDER) in the amount of P561.00, dated January 28, 1975, and said check

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G.R. No. L-52358, May 30, 1983. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes was received by (INHELDER) on or before February 5. 1975". (b) The check must have been sent by mail. If it was personally delivered, the PANGANIBANS would know the specific date when the check was received, which then would not be "on or before February 5, 1975." (c) It can be presumed that the PNB Check was drawn on the PNB Branch in Calapan. On February 8, 1975, Atty. Fajardo prepared the complaint in the COLLECTION CASE, which was filed with the MANDALUYONG COURT on February 12, 1975. (a) On February 19, 1975, INHELDER sent a letter to the PANGANIBANS "acknowledging the receipt of the PNB Check No. 32058 in the amount of P561.00 representing full payment of the ('PANGANIBANS') account with INHELDER". (b) For the payment made by the PANGANIBANS to be effective, the PNB Check must first be cleared with the PNB Branch in Calapan, which could have been completed only on February 19, 1975.

[Torts and Damages] In the present case, there is no evidence on record, clearly establishing these two elements. Although there may be want of probable cause, there is no proof that petitioner d eliberately initiated the COLLECTION CASE knowing that the same was false and groundless. It should also be stressed that the mere filing of a suit does 'not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful. The law could no t have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. Sound principles of justice and public policy demand that persons shall h ave free resort to Courts of law for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights without fear of later on standing trial for damages should their actions lose ground.

Public Humiliation - The Revised Penal Code punishes similar acts known as slander by deed. This crime is committed by any person who performs an act that costs dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party in the presence of other person or persons.

ISSUE: WON the Collection Case is unfounded. HELD: NO, it is not. It is a valid case. It should be difficult to conclude that the COLLECTION CASE was a clearly unfounded civil action. It is not clear that the account of the PANGANIBANS had already been paid as of February 12, 1975. Under Article 1249 of the Civil Code, payment should be held effective only when PNB Check No. 32058 was actually cashed by, or credited to the account of, INHELDER. If that did not eventuate on or before February 12, 1975, and there is no proof that it did, the account would still be unpaid, and the complaint in the COLLECTION CASE, technically, could not be considered as substantially unfounded .

It is true that when the check of the PANGANIBANS was received on February 5, 1975, the better procedure would have been to withhold a complaint pending determination of whether or not the check was good. If d ishonored, that would be the time to file the complaint. That procedure was not followed because of the failure of the corresponding advice which could have been given to Atty. Fajardo by the INHELDER Credit and Collection Manager. But the lack of that advice should not justify qualifying the COLLECTION CASE as clearly unfounded. If the check had bounced, the COLLECTION CASE would have been tried and acted upon by the MANDALUYONG COURT on the merits. Neither may it be said that the COLLECTION CASE was malicious. Malicious prosecution, to be the basis of a suit, requires the elements of malice and want of probable cause. There must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was false and groundless.

54 Carpio v. Valmonte

FACTS: Respondent Valmonte is a wedding coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra engaged her services for their church wedding. On that day, Valmonte went to the Manila Hotel to where the bride and her family were billeted. When she arrived at the Suite, several persons were already there including the petitioner Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was preparing to dress up for the occasion. After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the suite carrying the items needed for the wedding rites and the gifts from the principal sponsors. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant where the reception was to be held. She went back to the suite after, and found several people staring at her when she entered. . It was at this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the following words to Valmonte: “Ikaw lang ang lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mongbag? Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha.”

Petitioner then ordered one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag. It turned out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in a paper bag were lost. A few days after the incident, petitioner received a letter from Valmonte demanding a formal letter of apology which she wanted to be circulated to the newlyweds ’relatives and guests to redeem her smeared reputation as a result of petitioner’s imputations against her. Petitioner did not respond to the

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G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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[Torts and Damages] letter. Thus, on 20February 1997, Valmonte filed a suit for damages against petitioner. ISSUE: W/N respondent Valmonte is entitled to damages RULING: Valmonte is entitled to damages. In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach against respondent was certainly uncalled for considering that by her own account nobody knew that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry inside the paper bag. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain the identity of the malefactor, but to malign respondent without an iota of proof that she was the one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by any standard or principle of law is impermissible. Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in a manner which is contrary to morals and good customs. She did not act with justice and good faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in mind but to pr ejudice respondent. Certainly, petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 for which she should b e held accountable.

Contra Bonus Mores (see Art. 21) Breach of promise to marry - generally not actionable because the right to marry is a personal one and is not subject to judicial compulsion. Exceptions – when breach of promise to marry may give rise to damages:  there was financial damage;  social humiliation was caused to one of the parties; and,  where there was moral seduction. NOTE: In such cases, either moral or actual damages can be recovered, based from the circumstances. Moral Damages, When Applicable – When there is seduction. Seduction may be criminal or mere moral seduction. Moral seduction, although not punishable, connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded. Actual Damages, When Applicable – if suffered by breach of promise to marry; example is when a teacher resigned her position because of the man’s promise to marry.

55 Wassmer v. V elez

LESSON: Actual damages can be recovered for actual wedding expenses; Moral damages can be recovered because there exist fraud in the promise to marry.

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G.R. No. L-20089. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her “nothing changed rest assured returning soon”. Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry. ISSUE: Is breach of p romise to marry an actionable wrong? HELD: The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.

This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code. When a breach to marry is actionable und er Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

Baksh v. CA 56

LESSON: Moral damages can be recovered if there is seduction, thus, the existence of fraud; Pari delicto rule does not apply if accompanied by seduction. FACTS: Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilou’s house to secure approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.

Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed 56

G.R. No. 97336, February 17, 1993. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes marriage or agreed to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marliou’s parents. He claimed that he asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual expenses. ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages. HELD: The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court found that petitioner’s deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and womanhood.

Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of th e country. Therefore, SC affirms RTC and CA.

Seduction and Sexual Assault - Seduction, by itself, without breach of promise to marry is also an act which is contrary to morals, good customs and p ublic policy. When Liable - The defendant is liable if he employed deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence in successfully having sexual intercourse with another. He is liable even if he satisfied his lust without promising to marry the offended party. It may not even matter that the plaintiff and the defendant are of the same gender. The defendant would be liable for all forms of sexual assault. These include the crimes defined under the Revised Penal Code as rape, acts of lasciviousness and seduction. Thus, liability may be imposed under Article 21 of the Civil Code if a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust.

57 Pe v. Pe

LESSON: There exist trickery – fraud; moral damages can be recovered. FACTS: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant 57

G.R. No. L- 17396, May 30, 1962. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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[Torts and Damages] became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts and exchanged love notes The rumors about their love affairs reached Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from their house but her brothers and sisters found a note written by the defendant. ISSUE: Whether the defendant is liable according to Article 21 of the Civil Code HELD: Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying o f rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.

The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary.

Trespass58 NOTE: Remember Dean Navarro’s lengthy discussion about “the circumstances contemplated in Article 448 Discussion from PROPERTY: Real Property A owns a land, and B built a building on A’s land in good faith. A, the land owner, is in good faith and discovered about it when the building was already constructed. His rights are: 1) To appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting + indemnity. 2) To oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. Can they compel each other? NO. a) He LO cannot be compelled to buy the building, as his right is OLDER.  Before the building has been built, the owner already owns the land.

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Notes of Dean Domingo Navarr o in the subject “Property”; Transcription courtesy of Ms. Czarina Bantay.



[Torts and Damages] By his right of accession. That’s why the option to choose is given to him. b) B can be compelled to pay the price of the land.  EXCEPTION: when the value of the land if CONSIDERABLY MORE than that of the building.  

Ex: A (GF) built a building on B’s land. The value of the building is P1.9M and the land is valued P2M (there is a difference of P100K). - Can B be compelled? YES, as it is not considerably more. - When is it considerably more? Example: when the land is valued at P2M and the building was for P300K only. - In this case, B cannot be compelled. A, in GF, built a house on B’s land in 1985. It was only in 2005 when B accosted A and told A that A built on his (B’s) land. After which, B demanded him to VACATE the house. - Can B do that? NO, it is not one of the options given to him by law. - What if B said “I don’t want to buy your house and I don’t want to sell my land to you either?”  Can the LO refuse to exercise those options and simply ask the B to vacate? NO. - What if the option selected by the B is to APPROPRIATE A’s building?  Payment of indemnity.  VALUE OF THE BUILDING → PRESENT VALUE.  Can B demand the payment of rent from 1985 to 2005? NO, since he is in GF, he has the right of retention until fully reimbursed. The builder in good faith cannot be o compelled to pay rents during the period of retention. - What if the op tion selected by B is to SELL HIS LAND to A, since the value of the land is not considerably more than the building? Can B compel A to pay rent from 1985 to 2005? YES, until when? Until A hasn’t fully paid the  value of the land. If A has already paid the land in full, then he  need not have to pay rent. He is the owner of the land already. - What if the option chosen is the BUY A’s BUILDING, from that point on, is A required to pay rent? NO, because of A’s right of retention and it  implies tenancy.  If you are compelled to pay rent, then that would defeat your right of retention. - Supposing that the building produces fruits in the form of rent because you are leasing units in the building to tenants. Who is entitled to those fruits / rents in the meantime? If indemnity is not yet paid when the option chosen is to APPROPRIATE THE BUILDING… TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT according to the decisions of the SC

TECSON and SAN From the moment the builder becomes aware of DIEGO: the builder still the defect / flaw of his title has the rights over the or mode of acquisition, fruits during the period of technically, he ceases to retention. Retention be in good faith. At that implies tenancy, so he is moment, then he has no still entitled to the fruits. rights over the rents. RECONCILE: that fact that A was now aware that he is the rightful owner of the land will NOT DETRACT from the fact that he is in good faith. He is still entitled to the rights of a builder in good faith – he does not cease to be in GF. How do we reconcile that with the doctrine that once good faith ceases, you are no longer entitled to the fruits? When you are in bad faith, one is no longer entitled to the fruits. DEAN: WE HAVE TO MAKE A DISTINCTION → WON those fruits are produced by the LAND itself, or by the BUILDING. TECSON: if it is fruits produced by the BUILDING itself, then the fruits belong to the builder, prior to the payment of indemnity as he is still the owner of the building, making him entitled to receive such fruits. What if before A can pay B for the value of the land, the building was totally lost due to caso fortuito? EFFECT: no right of re tention anymore. Even under the law on possession, the person who recovers possession is not entitled to pay for improvements that had ceased to exist. B does not have to pay A anything. A loses his right of retention. MANOTOK: if the improvements ceased to exist, then there is no right of retention. - Let us assume that the option availed by B is for A to buy the land, but A was unable to pay. What are B’s options? 1) To lease. 2) Removal or demolition. 3) Sale of both land and the building, and the proceeds will go first to the value of the land, then to the value of the building. - Assuming that the owner of the land chose the option to appropriate, but before paying the builder, he already sold the property to C. Who will pay the indemnity to the builder? 1) If C paid the value of the land AND the building to the land owner, then the land owner will pay t he builder. 2) If C only paid the value of the land, then whoever benefits from the building will pay the builder. 

 

Personal Property With respect to personal property, the commission of the crimes of theft or robbery is obviously trespass. In the field of tort, however, trespass extends to all cases where a person is deprived of his personal property even in the absence of criminal liability.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes Disconnection of Service - A usual form of deprivation of access to property is the unjustified disconnection of electricity service. An electric company certainly has the right to disconnect the electricity service of a customer if the latter unreasonably fails to pay his bills. However, the right to disconnect and deprive the customer of electricity should be exercised in accordance with law and rules. For instance, if the company disconnect the electricity service without prior notice as required by the rules promulgated by duly authorized government agency, the company commits a tort under Article 21.

[Torts and Damages] use of electricity. However, any action must be done in strict observance of the rights of the people. “Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board”. During the inspection, no government official or ERB representative was present. Petitioner’s claim for actual damages was not granted for failure to supply proof and was premised only upon Lorna’s testimony. These are compensation for an injury that will put the injure position where it was before it was injured.

59 Qui sumbin g v. Meralco

LESSON: Moral damages are recoverable when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated – as in this case, the disconnection of their electric service.

Public Officer Refuses to Perform his Duty Article 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. xxx xxx xxx Article. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

FACTS: The plaintiff, spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are the owners of a house located at #94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. Around 9AM on March 3, 1995, defendant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house and observed as standard operating procedure to ask permission and was granted by the plaintiff’s secretary. After the inspection, it was found that the meter had been tampered with. The result was relayed to the secretary who conveyed the information to the owners of the house. The inspectors advised that the meter be brought in their laboratory for further verifications. In the event that the meter was indeed tampered, defendant had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the couple. After an hour, inspectors returned and informed the findings of the laboratory and asked the couple that unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential bill their electric supply will be disconnected. The plaintiff filed complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

60 Javellan a v. Tayo

ISSUE: Whether or not MERALCO acted maliciously and malevolent manner done without due process, lack of regard for QUISUMBING’s rights, feelings, social and business reputation and therefore held them accountable and plaintiff be entitled for damages.

On February 8, 1960 the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Iloilo, unanimously approved Resolution No. 5, Series of 1960. On June 1, 1960, at the time and place set for the regular session of the Municipal Council, the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, No. 1 and No. 2 Councilors, and the Secretary were absent

HELD: Supreme Court partly granted the petition and ordered plaintiff to pay respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96 while latter is ordered to pay petitioners moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. Moral damages may be recovered when rights of individuals including right against the deprivation of property without due process of law are violated. Exemplary damages on the other hand are imposed by way of example or correction for public. SC recognized the effort of MERALCO in preventing illegal 59

G.R. No.142943, April 3, 2002. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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FACTS: The petitioners are duly elected and qualified a members of the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo, Philippines; and that the respondent at the time the acts herein below complained of took place, was and still is the duly-elected and qualified Mayor of the Municipality of Buenavista, Province of Iloilo Philippines where he resides and may be served with summons.

The six councilors, who are the petitioners in this case, were present and they proceeded to elect among themselves a temporary presiding officer and Acting Secretary to take notes of the proceedings. Having thus elected a temporary presiding officer and a secretary of the Council, they proceeded to do business.

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G.R. L-18919 December 29, 1962. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


[Torts and Damages] On June 15, 1960 at the time and place designated in Resolution No. 5, series of 1960, dated February 8, 1960 above referred to, the petitioners acting as duly elected and qualified councilors were present and again, in view of the absence of the Mayor, Vice-Mayor said to councilor and the Secretary proceeded to elect a temporary presiding officer and temporary secretary from among them, and did business as a Municipal Council of Buenavista. When the minutes of the proceedings of June 1, June 15. July 6, July 20, August 17, September 7, and September 21, 1960 of the Municipal Council were presented to the respondent for action, the respondent Mayor refused to act upon said minutes, or particularly to approve or disapprove the resolution as approved by the municipal Council, the Mayor declaring the sessions above referred to as null and void and not in accordance with. Petitioners made repeated demands for payment of their per diems for the of June1, June 15, July 6, July 20, August 3, August 17, September 7, 1960, by representing the payrolls; Provincial Forms No. 38(A) to the respondent Mayor for the latter signature, but that the respondent refused to affix his signature to the payrolls thus presented, covering the per diems of the petitioner alleging that the proceedings were illegal due to his absence. The Honorable Provincial Fiscal of the Province of Iloilo in his indorsement, rendered an opinion upholding the validity of the controverted sessions of the Municipal Council, despite the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, the respondent Mayor refused and still refuses to act upon the resolution petitions presented to him and to sign the payrolls covering the per diems of the herein petitioners. ISSUE: Whether petitioners entitled damages? HOLDING & RATIONALE: Yes. Article 27 provides as follows: 'Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that my be taken.' Only petitioner Exequiel Golez was presented as a witness who proved moral damages he suffered as a consequence of the refusal the respondent Susano Tayo to perform his o fficial duty. such, of all the petitioners, only Exequiel Golez is entitled receive moral damages in the sum of P100.00.

Respondent-appellant claims, in this appeal, that the trial court erred in holding that the sessions held by petitionersappellees during his absence and during the absence of his Vice-Mayor and the No. 1 and No. 2 Councilors the Municipal Council of Buenavista, Iloilo were valid an legal. The claim is untenable. In the first place, there is no q uestion that the sessions at issue were held on the days set for regular sessions of the council, as authorized an approved in a previous resolution. Secondly, it is not disputed that a

dreamer Bar Review Notes majority of the members of the council (six out of ten) were present in the sesessions. Appellant asserts that while under Section 2221 of the Revised Administrative Code, the majority of the members of the council constitutes a quorum to do business, the council "shall be presided by the Mayor and no one else", inasmuch as it is one of the duties imposed upon him under Section 2194(d) of the Revised Administrative Code. The argument would be correct if the mayor (herein appellant) were present at the sessions in question and was prevented from presiding therein, but not where, as in the instant case, he absented himself therefrom. We find said award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, considering that according to the trial court, he (Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to perform his official duty, notwithstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Board upholding the validity of the session in question. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs against respondent-appellant. So ordered.

Abortion - The Supreme Court recognized the right to recover damages against a physician who caused an abortion. Damages are available to both spouses if the abortion was caused through the physician’s negligence. Both spouses may also recover damages if the abortion was done intentionally without their consent. NOTE: It should be recalled that a doctor who performs an illegal abortion is criminally liable under Article 259 of the Revised Penal Code. It imposes imprisonment upon any physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific knowledge or skill, shall cause an abortion or assent in causing the same. Even parents may be criminally liable for such offense. (Article 258, Revised Penal Code). In fact, criminal and civil liability will also result even if the abortion is unintentional.

61 Geluz v. Cour t Of Appeals

FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her p arent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic

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G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, P hilippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari. ISSUE: Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child? HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.

“Although we live in a world of noisy self -confession, privacy allows us to keep certain facts to ourselves if we choose. The right to privacy, it seems, is what makes us civilized.“ (Alderman and Kennedy, The Right to Privacy, 1997) “So terrifying are the possibilities of a law such as Admin istrative Order No. 308 in making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtual Big Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without delay, be “slain upon sight” before our society turns totalitarian with each of us, a mindless robot.’’ (Justice Romero, Ople v. Torres)

Right to Privacy (the Right to be Let Alone) Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence: (2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends; (4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

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[Torts and Damages] Right to Privacy, Concept – right to be let alone; right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity; and right to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned. Invasion of Privacy – unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one’s personality, publicizing one’s private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern, or wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities, in such a manner as to cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to person of ordinary sensibilities. Constitutional Right - the right to privacy is protected by: the due process clause of the Constitution.  against unreasonable searches and  right seizures, the right to privacy of one’s communication and  correspondence, and the right against self-incrimination.   Bill of Rights Question: For Celebrities? Facebook? Answer: “The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable. The factual circumstances of the case determine the reasonableness of the expectation. However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.” (The Supreme Court, Morfe v. Mutuc) Tort Actions for Invasion of Privacy Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude  or into his private affairs; Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts  about the plaintiff; Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light  in the public eye; and  Appropriation for the defendant’s advantage, of plaintiff’s likeness or name. NOTE: generally invoked by natural persons (basis of  right is injury to feelings and sensibilities) corporations can invoke right against illegal  search and seizures  personal right (may be waived)  ceases upon death (the law provides for the heirs, however)  The standard to be applied in determining if there was violation of the right is that of a person of ordinary sensibilities. It is relative to the customs of time and place, and is determined by the norm of an ordinary person


[Torts and Damages] Intrusion- involves the following:  prying into the privacy of another’s residence Criminal trespass  The law has long held that it is illegal to peep, snoop, or eavesdrop on people in private places.  Generally, there is no invasion of the right to privacy when a journalist records, photographs or writes about something that occurs in public places. (one does not automatically make public everything he does in public.)  public persons or private persons are protected  right to privacy is superior to freedom of press in most instances (exception: matter of public importance) no intrusion in an administrative investigation  in technological sense, hacking, wiretapping and  the like are violations matters of public record are not intrusion  Publication of private facts - right to be free from unwarranted publicity, from the wrongful publicizing of the private affairs and activities of an individual which are outside the realm o f legitimate public concern. Elements of Publication of Private Facts  publicity is given to any private or purely personal information about a person,  without the latter’s consent,  regardless of whether or not such publicity constitutes a criminal offense, like libel or defamation, the circumstance that the publication was made with intent of gain or for commercial and business purposes invariably serves to aggravate the violation of the right. NOTE:  Newsworthiness of information about a public figure is a defense. (unless with reckless disregard for the truth. The publication of facts derived from the records  of official proceedings, which are not otherwise declared by law as confidential, cannot be considered a tortious conduct There can be no invasion of privacy if what is  sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of the performance of official functions. False Light  Defamatory (The tort of putting another in false light may be distinguished from defamation primarily because in the former the gravamen of the claim is not reputational harm but rather the embarrassment of a person in being made into something he is not)  Libel

dreamer Bar Review Notes Commerical Appropriation of Likenes  The tort of commercial appropriation of likeness has been held to protect various aspects of an individual’s identity from commercial ex ploitation: name, likeness, achievements, identifying characteristics, actual performances and fictitious characters created by a performer.

62 Val monte vs. Belmonte

LESSON: Although they are required to disclose public information, they are NOT REQUIRED to give out alphabetically-arranged information. It is the duty of the requester to do that, not the corporation. FACTS: Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June 1986, requesting to b e "furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS, Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion "that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, Ricardo Valmonte, Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bartolome, Leo Obligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy" Alba, Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to furn ish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP -Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. ISSUE: Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang

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G.R. No. 74930, 1989. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP -Laban political parties. HELD: The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of PD 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay th e contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the ob ligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas Clause, PD 1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmonte himself admits, the GSIS "is not suppo sed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these fun ds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS p erformed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds o f the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of pub lic interest and concern. Still, Belmonte maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.

63 Ayer v. Capulon g

LESSON: Public Figures – Generally, public figures’ public lives are NOT SUBJECT to the right to privacy. Their private lives, however, are applicable to the protection.

[Torts and Damages] the movie "The Four Day Revolution," a documentary of the EDSA Revolution in 1986 on the ground that it violated his right to privacy. Petitioners contended that the movie would not involve his private life not that of his family. But the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction and ordered petitioners to desist from making the movie making reference whatsoever to Ponce Enrile. This, this action for certiorari. HELD: Freedom of speech and expression includes freedom to produce motion pictures and to exhibit them. What is involved is a prior restraint by the Judge upon the exercise of speech and of expression by petitioners. Because of the preferred character o f speech and of expression, a weighty presumption of invalidity vitiates measures of prior restraint. The Judge should have stayed his hand considering that the movie was yet uncompleted and therefore there was no "clear and present danger." The subject matter of the movie does not relate to the private life of Ponce Enrile. The intrusion is no more than necessary to keep the film a truthful historical account. He is, after all, a public figure. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy may be marked out in terms of a re quirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of facts. There must be no showing of a reckless disregard of truth. Notes: Ayer sought to produce a movie on the 4-day revolution. Enrile, who had previously been asked for the use of his character in the movie and had refused the offer, sued to enjoin the filming because he did not want any mention of his and his family's name. The SC lifted the injunction issued by the lower court on the ground that it amounted to prior restraint, which is no better if imposed by the courts than if imposed by administrative bodies or by ecclesiatical officials.

In Ayer, the reference to Enrile is unavoidable because his name is part of history and this cannot be changed or altered; thus his name can be used so long as only his public life is dwelled only. But in Lagunzad, although Moises Padilla was also a public figure, the movie dealt with both the pu blic and private lives of Moises Padilla.

St. Loui s Realty Cor p. vs CA 64

LESSON: False Light – Wrongful advertisement. Private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. FACTS: Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a wrong ful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp. misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.

FACTS: Pivate respondent Juan Ponce Enrile filed an action in the RTC of Makati to enjoin the petitioners from producing

St. Louis published an ad on December 15, 1968 with the heading “where the heart is”. This was republished on January 5, 1969. In the advertisement, the house featured was

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G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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G.R. No. L-46061, 1984. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.



[Torts and Damages] Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the company asked permission and the intended house to be published. After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1 week after such receipt. No rectification or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in charge of the advertisement. This prompted Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral and exemplary damages. On March 18, 1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr. Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr Aramil filed a complaint for damages on March 29. During the April 15 ad, the notice of rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr. Aramil. HELD: St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication. Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did n ot belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.

Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar HELD: Yes. On the part of Tenchavez: His marriage with Escaño was a secret on e and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her no nappearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents.

On the part of Escaño’s pa rents: It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. 66 NL RC and Cortez

Tench avez V. Escano 65

LESSON: Interference will only bear fruit if it is proven by substantial evidence. FACTS: In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.

In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their d aughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence he’s asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for

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and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counterclaim by the Escaños.

G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965.

LESSON: The gravamen of sexual harassment is NOT the violation of the victim’s sexuality BUT the abuse of power. Sexual Harassment is a TORTIOUS act. FACTS: Rosalinda Cortez was the company nurse at Philippine Aeolus. As early as her first year of employment, her Plant Manager, William Chua, already manifested a special liking for her, that she was receiving special treatment from him who would oftentimes invite her “for a date,” which she would as often refuse. On many o ccasions, he would make sexual advances – touching her hands, putting his arms around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his flirtations, until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that if she would not give in to his sexual advances he would cause her termination from the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just found out one day that her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal belongings 66

G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument ensued when she confronted Chua resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect. The company then dismissed her for throwing a stapler and throwing invectives, among others, at her Plant Manager, Chua. Rosalinda, thereafter, filed an illegal dismissal case and explained that the incident arose when she had been trying to refuse the sexual advances of Chua. The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in her favor, h olding that the dismissal was illegal and ordering the company to pay her moral damages. The corporation elevated the case on certiorari to the Supreme Court alleging grave abuse of discretion. HELD: The Supreme Court declared Rosalinda’s dismissal illegal and affirmed the award of moral damages. It did not give merit to the company’s argument that it is unbelievable that it took her four (4) years before she reacted violently in defense of her womanhood. The court recognized Mr. Chua’s acts as sexual harassment and explained that there is no time period for reporting such crime saying:

“Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to expose William Chua’s alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more prepared to support her position if her act of throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case, according to public respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely protecting her womanhood, her person and her rights. We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee’s sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry “foul” provided the claim is well substantiated. Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee. Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before finally coming out with her employer’s sexual impositions. Not many women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. If petitioner corporation had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she would keep her silence. Moreover, few persons are privileged indeed to transfer from one employer to another. The dearth of quality employment has become a daily “monster” roaming the streets that one may not be expected to give up one’s employment easily but to hang on to it, so to speak, by all tolerable means. Perhaps, to private respondent’s mind, for as long as she could outwit her employer’s ploys she

[Torts and Damages] would continue on her job and consider them as mere occupational hazards. This uneasiness in her place of work thrived in an atmosphere of tolerance for four (4) years, and one could only imagine the prevailing anxiety and resentment, if not bitterness, that beset her all that time. But William Chua faced reality soon enough. Since he had no place in private respondent’s heart, so must she have no place in his office. So, he provoked her, harassed her, and finally dislodged her; and for finally venting her pent-up anger for years, he “found” the perfect reason to terminate her.” Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced “superiority” which is enough to dampen an employee’s spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment. It changes her life, if for this alone private respondent should be adequately compensated.

Conception vs. CA 67

LESSON: the enumerations in Article 26 and 1219 are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language. FACTS: This case is a result of defamatory remarks made by petitioner Rodrigo Conception against private respondent Nestor Nicolas. Rodrigo angrily accosted Nestor at the latter's apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with Florence, his sister-in-law. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! . . . Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan kayo ni Bing."

Nestor explained that he and Bing are business partners but Rodrigo did not believe and continued to spread rumors that Rodrigo and Bing are lovers. The acts of Rodrigo resulted to the severance of business ties between Bing and Rodrigo. It also affected the business of the spouses Nicolas and Allem [Rodrigo's spouse] began to doubt Rodrigo's affection to her. A case was filed in court. Moral, exemplary damges and attorney's fees were awarded. Petitioner questioned the decision since it has no legal basis, neither Art. 26 nor Art. 1219 is applicable. ISSUE: Whether or not the damages awarded made by the court is proper. HELD: Yes, the award of damages is proper. The Supreme Court ratiocinated: findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in favor of respondents. We reject petitioner's posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident complained of

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G.R. No. 120706, January 31, 2000. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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[Torts and Damages] neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 2 6 of the Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if h uman personality is not exalted — then the laws are indeed defective. Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a person's d ignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Moreover, the enumerations in Article 26 and 1219 are not exclusive but are merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions against a person's dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.

Strict Liability Torts - liability without fault. A case is one of strict liability “when neither care nor negligence, neither good nor bad faith, neither knowledge nor ignorance will save the defendant. Falling Objects Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.

NOTE: Even lesses (even co-lessees); No provision on force majeure – it is not a defense. Employers Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

Animals Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.


68 Vestil v. IAC and Uy

LESSON: Possessor of animal, immediately liable FACTS: On July 29, 1915, Theness Tan Uy was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an antirabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." The following day, on August 15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho pneumonia.

Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE:In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. RULING: Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.

Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself. While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in

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G.R. No. 74431, November 6, 1989.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six kilometers from her own house. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one witness, and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and until 1975, wh en the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita said she knew them only casually. ISSUE: The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a r esult thereof. RULING: On the contrary, the death certificate declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had no thing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously ho spitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo. On the strength of th e testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for th e alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.

According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance o f the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as

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[Torts and Damages] prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.

Nuisance - Under the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:  Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or  Annoys or offends the senses; or  Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of  any public highway or street, or any body of water; or Hinders or impairs the use of property. 

Velasco v. M anil a Electric Co

LESSON: Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. FACTS: Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the last one as his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away from appellant’s house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up only an interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound emanates from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound from different areas in Velaso’s pr operty was measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound exceeded the average intensity levels of residences. ISSUE: Can there be a nuisance caused by no ise or sound? HELD: Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v. Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances. The determining factor, however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However, appellant’s testimony is too plainly biased. Nor are the witnesses’ testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level meters were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of appellant’s physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him, unlike the appellee’s) point to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep,



[Torts and Damages] irritation and tension weakening his constitution. Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the produced sound to around.

(Annotation to follow)

69 Navi da vs. Hon . Dizon

LESSON: According to SC: Article 2176, according to Ma’am Marcy Art. 19, 20, 21 = Broad enough to cover liability involving product FACTS: Several petitioners filed cases for damages against defendant companies for injuries (reproductive system) allegedly because their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill worms while working on farms. NAVIDA, et al., (plaintiffs from General Santos City) claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former’s health and well-being. ISSUE: WON plaintiffs are entitled to the award of damages. HELD: YES. Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute a quasidelict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.

issued by respondent ABB to petitioner, the liability of respondent ABB “does not extend to consequential damages either direct or indirect. ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to the award of d amages HELD: YES. Respondents contend that under Clause 7 of the General Conditions their liability “does not extend to consequential damages either direct or indirect.” This contention, however, is unavailing because respondents failed to show that petitioner was duly furnished with a copy of said General Conditions. Hence, it is not binding on petitioner. Having breached the contract it entered with petitioner, respondent ABB is liable for damages pursuant to Articles 1167, 1170, and 2201 of the Civil Code RULING: Granted. NOTE: Although there is no written contract it can still be actionable because of implied warranty. For implied warranty to have a limit it should be communicated to the other party.


71 Go vs. Cordero

LESSON: 3 elements of Tort interference 1.) Valid contract; 2.) Knowledge of the 3 rd person; 3.) Interference of 3 rd person w/o legal justification FACTS: Cordero was an exclusive distributor of a shipping company is Brisbane. After incurring travel expenses and closing his first deal with Go, he fou nd out that the latter was directly dealing with the shipping company for the second transaction, cutting off his commissions. Worse, his lawyers also connived with the client and the shipping company to take him out of the picture. He sued them all for conspiring in violating his exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights.

Conti nental Cement Corp. vs. Asea Br own Boveri, I nc. 70

ISSUE: WON there is tort interference;

LESSON: For implied warranty to have a limit it should be communicated to the other party

HELD: YES. First two elements are obviously present. As to the third element, to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have b een driven by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff. In the case, herein petitioner Go acted in bad faith and with malice as supported by evidences.

FACTS: Petitioner Continental Cement Corporation (CCC), a corporation engaged in the business of producing cement, obtained the services of respondents Asea Brown Boveri, Inc. (ABB) and BBC Brown Boveri, Corp. to repair its 160 KW Kiln DC Drive Motor but the respondent failed to repair it three times, hence petitioner filed for damages. Respondents, however, claimed that under Clause 7 of the General Conditions, attached to the letter of offer dated July 4, 1990

69

G.R. No. 125598, May 30, 2011. Case digest courtesy of Ms. Janice Tiglao. G.R. No. 171660, October 17, 2011. Case digest courtesy of Ms. Janice Tiglao. 71 G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010. Case d igest courtesy of Ms. Janice Tiglao.

RULING: Denied. Shell Company of the Phi l. L td. vs. I nsular Petroleum Refi ni ng Co. Ltd. 72

72

G.R. No. L-19441, June 30, 1964.. Case digest courtesy of Ms. Janice Tiglao.

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dreamer Bar Review Notes LESSON: The element of “Passing off” must be present to consider it as u nfair competition. FACTS: Petitioner, Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd. is a corporation engaged in the sale of petroleum products, including lubricating oil. The packages and containers of its goods bear its trademark, labeled or stenciled thereon. Defendant Insular Petroleum Refining Co., Ltd. is a registered limited partnership, whose principal business is collecting used lubricating oil which, thru a scientific process, is refined and marketed to the public at a price much lower than that of new lubricating oil. Respondent uses miscellaneous drum for the low grade lubricating oil and one of those miscellaneous containers are the Shell containers but according to respondent “...but before filling the empty drums we obliterate the markings of the drums.” n one transaction, however, the low-grade oil that was sold to said operator was contained in a drum with the petitioner's mark or brand "Shell" still stenciled without having been erased. ISSUE: WON there is unfair competition; HELD: No. Not just because a manufacturer used a container still bearing a competitor's marking in the sale of one's products, irrespective of to whom and how the sale is made, can there be a conclusion that the buying public has been misled or will be misled, and, therefore, unfair competition is born.

It was found by the Court of Appeals that in all transactions of the low-grade Insoil, except the present one, all the marks and brands on the containers used were erased or obliterated. The drum in question did not reach the buying public. It was merely a shell dealer or an operator of a Shell Station who purchased the drum n ot to be resold to the public, but to be sold to the petitioner company, with a view of obtaining evidence against someone who might have been committing unfair business practices, for the dealer had found that his income was dwindling in his gasoline station. RULING: Decision of CA AFFIRMED.

SCHOOLS, TEACHERS and ADMINISTRATORS Vicarious Liability under the Family Code – under Art. 218 of the Family Code, school, its administrators, and teachers or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care ( C o m p l e t e A n n o t a t i o n t o f o l l o w ) Respondeat superior - "let the master answer" is a

legal doctrine which states that, in many circumstances, an employer is responsible for the actions of employees performed within the course of their employment. This rule is also called the "Master-Servant Rule", recognized in both common law and civil law jurisdictions. Employer

[Torts and Damages] CANNOT escape liability by claiming that he exercised due diligence in the selection or supervision of the employee. When Applied: 1. Criminal Acts (Art. 103 RPC) 2. Partnership – both natural & juridical persons may be held liable for quasi-delict B o n u s P a t e r F a m i l i a s - Good father of a family,

whereby the employer ultimately becomes liable on his own negligence. It means that the employer is liable upon a finding that he has been negligent in the selection of his employees (culpa in elgiendo) or in the supervision of his employees (culpa in vigilando).

73 Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai and Bernar do

LESSON: Employer (Yu) NOT LIABLE for driver even if he was inside the vehicle BECAUSE he COULD NOT HAVE FORESEEN the overtaking maneuver from happening. FACTS: Caedo and family were traveling Highway 54 on the way to the airport. Private respondents were traveling on the opposite direction. Bernardo was the personal river of Yu. Both vehicles were running at moderate speeds when a carritela was traveling the same direction as Bernardo’s. The latter overtook the caritella and took the lane Caedos were traveling and caused multiple injuries and damage to the Caedos. Bernardo was held liable. ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the vehicle who was riding with the driver at the time of the accident be held solidarily liable. RULING: The court ruled that if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was pr esent is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the existence of due diligence. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. Version 2:

FACTS: Yu was riding in his Cadillac driven by Bernardo saw a carratela about 8 meters away. Instead of slowing down veered to the left to overtake and in so doing the car hit the carratella’s left wheel and skidded obliquely hitting the on coming car of Caedo who despite slackened speed to avoid the collision was hit resulting to the injuries of Caedo and his passengers. Yu’s driver was negligent. Was Yu liable? HELD: The basis of the master/employer’s liability in civil

73

G.R. No. L-20392, 1968. Case digest courtesy of Mr. Antonio Antonio Santos and Mr. Rommelito Francisco Macarayo.

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[Torts and Damages] law is not respondent superior but rather the relationship of Pater Familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction, reflects the master’s negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent the injury or damage (J. Makalintal) The owner of the car Yu was not liable because he did not see the carretela at a distance, however, he could not have anticipated his driver’s sudden decision to pass the carretela. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu to assess the danger involved and warn the driver accordingly. *Former owner of Motor Vehicle are liable for the tortuous acts of the new owner.

Person Vicariously Liable for Acts of Others (Art 2180) - The basis of vicarious liability is responsibility of a person over other persons under their legal au thority, control or influence. Violation or remission of duty arising from such relationship makes them liable for damages caused by other person under their care or charge. 1.Parent – father, if dead or incapacitated, mother are responsible for damages caused by minor children living in their company (Art 2180 NCC) 2.Guardians – a r e l i a b l e f o r d am a g e s c a u s e d b y t h e m i n o r s o r incapacitated person wh o are under their authority and live in their company . (ibid)

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. FC Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. FC Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases. Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one. Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The Basis of the civil liability which is primary-direct and solidary imposed by law is the necessary consequence of parental authority exercise over their children. This authority imposed a duty upon parents to support them, keep them company, educate and instruct them, and grand the right to correcting punish with moderation. The parents are relieved of this liability only upon proof

dreamer Bar Review Notes that they have exercise the diligence of a good father of a family (Exconde vs Capuno, 101 Phil 843) to prevent damage. RPC Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

Cuadra vs M onfort

LESSON: The father COULD NOT HAVE exercised due diligence inside the school. FACTS: Grade 6 pup il Maria C and Maria M were assigned by teacher to weed the grass in the school premises. M found a plastic headband which she aloud she found an earthworm and tossed it to C hitting the latter right eyes resulting to loss of said eye. HELD: The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Art 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or omission there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby and in Art 2180 p roviding vicarious liability of parent although primarily.

It was not shown that the parent could have prevented the damage as their child was in school and they have the right to expect their child to be under the care and supervision of the teacher. Beside the act was an innocent prank and unusual among children at play and which no parent could have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Parent not held liable. Where the minor or insane person causing damage to others


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dreamer Bar Review Notes has no parent or guardian/ the minor or insane person’s property shall answer the damage caused. (Art 2182) Tamargo vs. CA – there would be NO retroactive effect because of adoption if child was guilty of quasi-delict FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.

Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. ISSUE: WON the natural parents or the adoptive parents are to be held liable. HELD: Bundoc spouses contend that the parental authority of the adoptive parents started upon the filing of the petition for adoption. Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which reads as follows: Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be p romoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective on the date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be known. The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code: Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall: xxx xxx xxx (2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent; xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

and urge that their Parental authority must be d eemed to have been dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed. The Court is not persuaded. Article 58 o f the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this rule: Article 58 Torts —

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[Torts and Damages] Parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the civil Code. Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines has similarly insisted upon the requisite that the child, doer o f the tortious act, shall have beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage: Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no a ctual or physically custody over the adopted child . Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Libi vs. IAC – Parents are liable since they were negligent in the secure placing of the gun. FACTS: Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA. ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages. HELD: The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the parents


[Torts and Damages] for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However, Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. Wendell could not h ave gotten hold of the gun unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to prevent such damage. FC Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution

dreamer Bar Review Notes within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him. In any event, the school may be held to answer for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they had taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of and thus be exonerated from liability imposed by Art 2180. Basis of teacher’s vicarious liability is, as such, they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents). However teachers are not expected to have the same measure of responsibility as that imposed on parent for their influence over the child is not equal in degree. x x x The parent can instill more lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the child than the teacher and so should be held to a greater accountability than the teacher or the head for the tort committed by the child. Phil ippine School of Business Administration vs. CA

Amador a vs CA

LESSON: School DID NOT have custody over the student. Head NOT liable. FACTS: It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was shot to death by his classmate Pablito Daffon. Alfredo went to the school to submit his “Report in Physic”. Held: Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools, academic or nonacademic. Teachers are liable for acts of their student except where the school is technical in nature (arts and trade establishment) in which case the head thereof shall be answerable.

“There is really no substantial difference distinction between the academic and non-academic schools in so far as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the student under their control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching”. “x x x x The distinction no longer obtains at present. x x x “ The student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not ended, or has ended or has not yet begun. The term “custody” signifies that the student is within the control and influence of the school authorities. The teacher in charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils or students in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher is physically present and in a position to prevent it. Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed

LESSON: School is NOT LIABLE for actions of persons NOT ASSOCIATED with the school. However, School is LIABLE for BREACH OF CONTRACT for NOT PROVIDING a safe and secure le arning environment for their students. FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was stabbed while on the second floor premises of the schools by assailants who were not members of the schools academic community. This prompted the parents of the deceased to file a suit in the RTC of Manila for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers.

The defendant schools (now petitioner) sought to have the suit dismissed on the ground of no cause of action and not within the scope of the provision of Art 2180 since it is an academic institution. The trial court overruled the petitioner’s contention and its decision was later affirmed by the appellate court. ISSUE: Whether the decision of the appellate court p rimarily anchored on the law of qu asi-delicts is valid. HELD: Although the Supreme Court agreed to the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny the petition of motion to dismiss by the PSBA, they do not agree to the premises of the appellate court’s ruling.

Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176 of the civil code establishes the rule of in loco parentis, they can not be held liable to the acts of Carlito’s assailants which were not students of the PSBA and because of the contractual relationship. The school and the students, upon registration established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations. The institution of learning must provide their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge, and maintain peace and or der within its premises.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes The SC dismissed the petition and the case was remanded to the trail court to determine if the school neglected its obligation to perform based on the contractual relation of them and the students. St. Joseph's Coll ege v. Mi ran da

LESSON: Higher degree of care by teachers . FACTS: On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s premises, the class to which Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of [Jayson’s] class is Estefania Abdan. Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of [Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the test tube spurted ou t and several particles of which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower court, [Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount o f at least P40,000. On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that [Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC. On November 17, 1994, before the science experiment was conducted, [Jayson] and his classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written pr ocedure for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson], however, a person of sufficient age and discretion and completely capable of understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment and as repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson’s] eyes. Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter cried and apologized to his teacher for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound had cooled off. After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced

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[Torts and Damages] ready for discharge and an eye test showed that his vision had not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid additional hospital charges due to the delay in [Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S. Miranda, [Jayson’s] father, requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing [Jayson’s] hospital bill until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to the request. On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of [Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment. RTC in favor of Jayson. CA affirmed. ISSUE: W/N petitioners are liable. YES RATIO: Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause. The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor the RTC decision, thus: In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of the latter’s injury. We find that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners] could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The court a quo correctly ruled that: "All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual [petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these [petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them. [Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although [Jayson] insisted that said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to establish that [petitioner] Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by [petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that [petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom at the time the accident happened. The Court is also perplexed why none of the other students (who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in Court to corroborate the story of the [p etitioners]. The Court, however, understands that these other students cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no longer enrolled in said school and testifying for [Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities. Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing would go wrong and that the


[Torts and Damages] science experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner] Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual [petitioners] were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the other individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of their assigned tasks. "The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent r igid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. [Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students. The fact that there has never been any accident in the past during the conduct of science experiments is not a justification to be complacent in just preserving the status quo and do away with creative foresight to install safety measures to protect the students. Schools should not simply install safety reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals. More importantly, schools should provide protective gears and and devices to shield students from expected risks and anticipated dangers. "Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend to the school or university itself, although an educational institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDEANT SUPERIOR. It has also been held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous] acts or negligence of its employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the negligent employee." As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers. SAL UDAGA vs. vs. FAR EASTERN UNIV ERSIT ERSIT Y

LESSON: Security LESSON: Security Agency is liable for quasi-delict but school is liable for contractual breach for not providing a safe and secure learning environment for their students. FEU is liable for contractual breach BUT NOT for torts. FACTS: Petitioner Joseph Saludaga was a sophomore law student of respondent Far Eastern University when he was shot by Alejandro Rosete, one of the security guards on duty at the school premises on August 18, 1996. Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.

Respondents, in turn, filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and Management Corporation (Galaxy), the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its premises and Mariano D.

dreamer Bar Review Notes Imperial (Galaxy’s President), to indemnify them for whatever would be adjudged in favor of petitioner. Petitioner is suing respondents for damages based on the alleged breach of student-school contract for a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive to learning. ISSUE: WON FEU was not negligent and such shooting was tantamount to a caso fortuito? NO, it was negligent and such is not a fortuitous case. HELD: When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its p art, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Respondent FEU failed to discharge the burden of proving that they exercised due diligence in providing a safe learning environment for their students. It failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was no t proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency a bout these matters or failure to check the papers stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its students. Respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. FEU cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy. The instructions issued by respondents Security Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete. It had no hand in selecting thesecurity guards. Thus, the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family cannot be demanded from the said client FALLO: “For these acts of negligence and for having supplied respondent FEU with an unqualified security guard, which resulted to the latters breach of o bligation to petitioner, it is proper to hold Galaxy liable to respondent FEU for such damages equivalent to the above-mentioned amounts awarded to petitioner. Unlike respondent De Jesus, we deem Imperial to be solidarily liable with Galaxy for being grossly negligent in directing directing the affairs of the security agency.”


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dreamer Bar Review Notes E m p l o y e r s : M a s t er er

a.

Owner and Manager of establishment or enterprises are liable for damage caused by their employees in the service of employment or on the occasion of their functions.. Employer of household helper though not engaged in any business or industry are liable for damages caused by helper acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.

[Torts and Damages] Issue: Whether or not the term “employer” as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha.

The term “Manager” in Art 2180 is used in the sense of employer, not employee.

Ruling: The Court ruled that even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. At the time of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of h is tortious negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused. Furthermore, the Court cited Section 14, Rule X of Book III of the Labor Code, under the Labor Code, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha’s employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll.

Filamer v. CA

VALENZUELA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days. At the time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning. Funtecha, who only had a student driver’s permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the unconscious victim to the hospital. The trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non -party. Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court’s decision became final as as to Funtecha. For failure failure of the insurance firm firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17, 1985, the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court’s decision in toto. Hence the present recourse by petitioner Filamer.

Facts: At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home. While travelling along Aurora Blvd., she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car’s condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk.

b.

Basis of Liability is not “Respondent Superior (Anglo American doctrine where the negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer) but on the relationship of Pater-Familias, (master-servant) a theory basing the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not that of the servant as manifested in his negligence in the selection of their employee-servant (culpa eligiendo) or in the supervision over their employee-servants (culpa in vigilando). This negligence is prima facie presumption juris tantum- overcome or rebutted by proof that they have observed and exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family (diligantissimi bonus fater familias). The theory is deduced from the last par of Art 2180 NCC providing the responsibility shall cease upon proof of exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

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She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant’s car. Plaintiff’s left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a “traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee).” She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.



[Torts and Damages]

Issues: 1.) Whether or not Li was negligent. 2.) Whether or not Valenzuela was contributory negligent. 3.) Whether or n ot Alexander Commercial, Inc. Li’s employer is liable. Held: 1.) Yes. A witness testified that Li’s car was being driven at a “very fast” speed, racing towards the general direction of Araneta Avenue. He also saw the car hit Valenzuela, hurtling her against the windshield of the defendant’s Mitsubishi Lancer, from where she eventually fell un der the defendant’s car. Moreover the witness declared that he observed Valenzuela’s car parked par allel allel and very near the sidewalk, contrary to Li’s allegation that Valenzuela’s car was close to the center of the right lane. 2.) No. The Court held that Valenzuela was not negligent applying the emergency rule. Under the “emergency rule,” an individual who w ho suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a b etter solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. 3.) Yes. Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to the Court’s satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. Li was an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc. He admitted that his functions as Assistant Manager did not require him to scrupulously keep normal office hours as he was required quite often to perform work outside the office, visiting prospective buyers and contacting and meeting with company clients. These meetings, clearly, were not strictly confined to routine hours b ecause, as a managerial employee tasked with the job of representing his company with its clients, meetings with clients were both social as well as work-related functions. The service car assigned to Li by Alexander Commercial, Inc. therefore enabled both Li – as well as the corporation – to put up the front of a highly successful entity, increasing the latter’s goodwill before its

clientele. It also facilitated meeting between Li and its clients by providing the former with a convenient mode of travel. travel. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL VS VASQUEZ FACTS: On Aug. 28, 1988, around 1:30-2 am, Romeo Vasquez was driving his motorcycle around the Osmeña Rotunda in the normal flow and collided with the company pick-up driven by Benjamin Benjamin Abad who was going against against the flow of the the traffic in the same Rotunda. Vasquez died at the hospital on Sept. 5, 1988. Abad signed an acknowledgement of Responsible party wherein he would pay all the expenses. Vasquez parents commenced an action for damages against Abad and Castilex. TC held that both must pay jointly and solidarily. CA affirmed but held that the liability of Castilex is only vicarious and not solidary. ISSUE: WON an employer may be held vicariously (subsidiarily) liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle HELD: NO RATIO: Art 2180 par 5 says that WON engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to first establish the employeeemployer rel’nship. Then the plaintiff must show, to hold employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer can interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Abad was production manager of Castilex. At the night of the incident, he did some overtime work at petitioner’s office. Thereafter he went to a restaurant at a place known as a “haven for prostitutes, pimps, prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and add icts. ”The Court finds that Abad was engaged in affairs of his own (had a woman in the car with him not young enough to call him Daddy!! ) or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was 2 am and way beyond normal working hours. His overtime had ended. Since there is a paucity (scarcity, insufficiency) of evidence that Abad was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that Castilex be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle. AFRICA vs. CALTEX

LESSON: Agent of the company and not independent contractor FACTS: A fire broke out at the Caltex service station at the corner of Antipolo street and Rizal Avenue, Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving tank where the nozzle of the hose was inserted, when an unknown


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dreamer Bar Review Notes bystander threw a matchstick into the n ozzle after lighting a cigarette. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them. Their owners, among them petitioners here, sued respondents Caltex (Phil.), Inc. and Mateo Boquiren, the first as alleged owner of the station and the second as its agent in charge of operation. Negligence on the part of both of them was attributed as the cause of the fire. Trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seems to be nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption in appropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such docrtrine.” Issue: WON Caltex and Boquiren should be held liable for the damages caused to the appellants. Held: Decision was REVERSED. Caltex and Boqu iren were held solidary liable.

The Supreme Court applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, found that there was negligence on the part o f Boquiren. Also, it affirmed the findings of the Court of Appeals that the operator (Boquiren) was an agent of the company and not an in dependent contr actor . Taking into considerations of the following: (1) Caltex has control over Baquiren and the company could remove him or teminate his services; (2) he only sells the products of the company; (3) equipment in the station belonged to the company and loaned only to him; (4) repairs and maintenance were conducted by Caltex; (5) prices were fixed by Caltex; and (6) the receipt he signed indicated only that he was a mere agent. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS

LESSON: Independent Contractor is liable for his own acts Facts: Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho was the operator of a gasoline station in Naguilian Road, Baguio City, wherein she sells petitioner Shell's petroleum products. Camacho requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-pressure test on the underground storage tanks of the said station in order to determine whether or not the sales losses she was incurring for the past several months were due to leakages therein. Petitioner acceded to the said request and one Jesus "Jessie" Feliciano together with other workers, came to private respondent's station with a Job Order from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure test.

On the same day, Feliciano and his men drained the underground storage tank which was to be tested of its

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[Torts and Damages] remaining gasoline. After which, they filled the tank with water through a water hose from the deposit tank of private respondent. Then, after requesting one of private respondent's gasoline boys to shut off the water when the tank was filled, Feliciano and his men left. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, private respondent saw that the water had reached the lip of the pipe of the underground storage tank and so, she shut off the water faucet. At around 5:30 a.m., private respondent's husband opened the station and started selling gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the customers who had bought gasoline returned to the station complaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the gasoline that they bought. On account of this, private respondent was constrained to replace the gasoline sold to the said customers. However, a certain Eduardo Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint with the police against private respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In addition, he caused the incident to be published in two local newspapers. Feliciano, who arrived later that morning, did not know what caused the water pollution of the gasoline in the adjacent storage tank. So he called up Nick Manalo, Superintendent of Shell's Poro Point Installation at San Fernando, La Union, and referred the matter to the latter. Manalo went up to Baguio in the afternoon to investigate. Thereafter, he and Feliciano again filled with water the underground storage tank undergoing hydro-pressure test whereat they noticed that the water was transferring to the other tanks from whence came the gasoline being sold. Manalo asked permission from Shell's Manila Office to excavate the underground pipes of the station. Upon being granted permission to do so, Feliciano and his men began excavating the driveway of private respondent's station in order to expose the underground pipeline. The task was continued by one Daniel "Danny" Pascua who replaced Feliciano, Pascua removed the corroded pipeline and installed new independent vent pipe for each storage tank. Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal complaint filed by Villanueva. Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance. Thereafter, private respondent demanded from petitioner the payment of damages in the amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner, instead, offered private respondent additional credit line and other beneficial terms, which offer was, ho wever, rejected. Subsequently, or on October 12, 1983, private respondent filed before the trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner due to the latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of the hydro-pressure test in her gasoline station. For its part, petitioner denied liability because, according to it, the hydro pressure test on the underground storage tanks was conducted by an independent contractor. The trial court dismissed the complaint of private respondent for the reason that the hydro-pressure test which brought about the incident was conducted by Jesus Feliciano, who was neither an employee nor agent nor representative of the


[Torts and Damages] defendant. Jesus Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. While the CA reversed the decision of the trial court Issue: WON Pilipinas Shell Petroleum should be held liable for the damage to private respondent due to the hydro pressure test conducted by Feliciano. Held: SC set aside the decision of CA and REINSTATED the decision of the Trial Court.

Pilipinas Shell is not liable because Feliciano was not its employee. It was shown that Phil Shell has no control over Feliciano who do business of his own, used his own tools and worked on his own time charging a fixed lump sum for every piece of work. Feliciano was an independent contractor and not an employee and thus h e alone is liable. Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of how he was to undertake the hydropressure test, he alone must bear the consequences of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.

It is firmly settled that the existence or non-existence of the employer-employee relationship is commonly to be determined by examination of certain factors or aspects of that relationship. These include: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct, although the latter is the most important element . . . As aptly held by the trial court, petitioner did not exercise control and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner in which he conducted the hydro-pressure test. All that petitioner did, through its Field Engineer, Roberto Mitra, was relay to Feliciano the request of private respondent for a hydro-pressure test, to determine any possible leakages in the storage tanks in her gasoline station. The mere hiring of Feliciano by petitioner for that particular task is no t the form of control and supervision contemplated by law which may be the basis for establishing an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Feliciano. The fact that there was n o such control is further amplified by the absence of any shell representative in the job site at the time when the test was conducted. Roberto Mitra was never there. On ly Feliciano and his men were. True, it was petitioner who sent Feliciano to private respondent's gasoline station to conduct the hydro pressure test as per the request of private respondent herself. But this single act did not automatically make Feliciano an employee of petitioner. As discussed earlier, more than mere hiring is required. It must further b e established that petitioner is the one who is paying Feliciano's salary on a regular basis; that it has the power to dismiss said employee, and more importantly, that petitioner has control and supervision over the work of F eliciano. The last requisite was sorely missing in the instant case. There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met:

dreamer Bar Review Notes (1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and (2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly registered business name, "JFS Repair and Maintenance Service," and is duly registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a lump sum consideration for every piece of work he accomplishes. If he is not able to finish his work, he does not get paid, as what happened in this case. Further, Feliciano utilizes his own tools and equipment and has a complement of workers. Neither is he required to work on a regular basis. Instead, he merely awaits calls from clients such as petitioner whenever repairs and maintenance services are requested. Moreover, Feliciano does not exclusively service petitioner because he can accept other business but n ot from other oil companies. All these are the hallmarks of an independent contractor. CEREZO vs. TUAZON

LESSON: Employer’s liability based on a quasi -delict is not only solidary but is primary and direct. Facts: A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for Damages against Foronda, the bus driver, Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus line, and Atty. Cerezo her husband. Summons was never served against Foronda, and thus, the Court never acquired jurisdiction over him.

Tuazon failed to show that the business benefitted the family pursuant to Art. 121(3) of the Family Code, hence Atty. Cerezo was not held liable and Mrs. Cerezo was held to be the only one liable. Instead of an appeal, Mrs. Cerezo filed an action for relief of judgment. When such was denied, the Cerezo spouses filed certiorari before the CA. And subsequently, certiorari before the SC. One of Mrs. Cerezo’s contentions is that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Foronda whose negligence was the main issue and that he was an indispensible party whose presence was compulsory. ISSUE: WON Mrs. Cerezo may be held to be solely liable as the employer with the negligent employee impleaded in the case. HELD: Petition was Denied. Decision of CA was affirmed with Modification with regards to the legal interest rates. Yes, Mrs. Cerezo’s liability is not only solidary but also primary and direct, as an employer


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dreamer Bar Review Notes The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. Tuazon chose to file an action based on quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, “without exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses,” hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s “recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence,” aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s “lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda.” Art. 2180 states that Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. An employer’s liability based on a quasi -delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.

The words "primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employee’s criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer’s liability is solely subsidiary is wrong. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone. PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. vs. PHILAMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.

[Torts and Damages] Facts: An action for damages was brought against Phil Am Forwarded and its Manager Balingit for negligent act of their driver Pineda.

Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit moved to dismiss the action against him for though he was manager, ho wever, he was just an employee of the company. Issue: WON Balingit is liable for the damages. Held: SC AFFIRMED the lower court’s order of dismissal.

Balingit is not liable because he was just a mere employee though designated as “Manager”. The r elationship of employer-employee or master-servant must first be established to exist before the employer/master will be held liable. The Civil Code provides: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The Court is in the op inion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasidelictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. Sps. Mamaril vs The Boy Scout of the Philippines

LESSON: Manager is also an employee Facts: Sps. Mamaril would park every night their 6 passenger jeepneys at BSP Compund. However, one of the vehicle was missing and was never recovered.

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ISSUE: Did BSP’s negligence allow for the loss of the vehicle, such that a valid claim for damages can be made against them? HELD: No. “Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Similarly, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the result would not have occurred. XXX On the other h and, the records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the subject vehicle based on fault or negligence. Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 218017 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employeremployee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi. Sps. Jayme vs Apostol Facts: Mayor Migue;; was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fildel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal- the truck then figured an accident. RTC held Mayor Miguel to be liable with others for being employer of Lozano. Issue: Whether the mayor should be held vicariously liable Held: NO. Employer is the MUNICIPALITY. The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case.

To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times;and

dreamer Bar Review Notes (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. To make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions. The employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to p rove the relationship by preponderant evidence. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, we rely on the four-fold test: (1) the employer‘s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer‘s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer‘s right of suspension o r dismissal. The liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. ―Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its operation‖ The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the driver‟s employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle. Duavit vs CA FACTS: The jeep being driven by defendant Sabiniano collided with another jeep, which had then two (2) p assengers on it. Duavit admitted ownership of the jeep but denied that Sabiniano was his employee. Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit d id not push through as the parents of Sabiniano apologized to Duavit on his behalf. ISSUE: Won the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the CC when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter. HELD: NO. In Duquillo v Bayot (1939), SC ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving a vehicle if the same was driven without h is consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him.

CA’s reliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte and Vargas v Langcay is misplaced and cannot be sustained. In Erezo v Jepte case, defendant Jepte was held liable for the death of Erezo even if he was not really the owner o f the truck that killed the latter because he represented himself as its owner to the Motor Vehicles Office and had it registered under his name; he was thus estopped from later on denying such representation.


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In Vargas, Vargas sold her jeepney to a 3rd person, but she did not surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates. So when the jeepney later on figured in an accident, she was held liable by the court. holding that the operator of record con tinues to be the operator of vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and 3rd persons. The circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of vehicle but denies having employed or authorized the driver Sabiniano. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage. CASE: Equitable Leasing vs Suyom Facts: A Fuso Road Tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into house/store of Tamayo in Tondo. The RTC holds that since the Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had no t been registered with the LTO, the legal owner was still Equitable. Issue: Whether or not Equitable is liable for the negligent acts of Tutor despite the fact that he was not its employee. Held: YES. In n egligence cases, the aggrieved party may sue the negligent party under (1) Article 100 of the RPC, for civil liability ex delicto; or (2) under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, for civil liability ex quasi delicto. Employees may also be held subsidiarily liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of the latter‘s duties under Article 103 of the RPC. This applies when the employee/s convicted of the crime are found to be insolvent. Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180, an action may be instituted against the employer for an employee‘s act or omission, in which case the liability of the employee is direct and primary subject to the defense of due diligence. It does not require that the employee is insolvent in this case. These two causes of action (ex delicto or ex quasi delicto) may be availed o f, subject to the caveat that the offended party cannot ―recover damages twice for the same act or omission‖ or under both causes. Since these two civil liabilities are distinct and independent of each other, the failure to recover in one will not necessarily preclude recovery in the other. Since respondents failed to recover anything in the criminal case, they elected to file a separate civil action for damages based on quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It is clear that the damages caused were due to the fault of the driver of the tractor. Equitable is liable since the deed of sale evidencing the sale of the tractor was not registered with the LTO . The court has held that regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. Since Equitable remained the registered owner of the tractor, it could not escape primary liability for the deaths and the injuries arising from the negligence of the driver . In the instant case, the registered owner is considered under the law to be the employer of the driver while the actual operator is deemed to be its agent. The same goes for purposes

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[Torts and Damages] of the law on quasi-delict. Additionally since respondents have proved the factual bases of the their right to their claim and that the present case falls under Article 2219 (2) which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasidelict, petitioners are thus entitled to the same. Rent-a-car business FGU Insurance Corp v. CA, GR 118889, March 23, 1998 FACTS: Car owned by FILCAR Transport, Inc. driven by lessee Peter Dahl-Jensen, swerved to the right and hit the car of Lydia Soriano. At the time of accident, the Danish tourist did not possess a Philippine driver’s license. FGU, the insurer of Soriano paid over P25K and by way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and FILCAR and Fortune Insurance Corp, the insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict. ISSUE: WON FILCAR or Fortune can be held liable for damages suffered by third persons although the vehicle is leased to another. HELD: NO. Article 2176 states: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . .”

To sustain a claim, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the d amage incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault o r negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the circumstance that DahlJensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein. Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasidelict provides: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the 

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[Torts and Damages] branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 

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The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter. We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: " In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict ; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper. ________ Article 2185 Civil Code Anonuevo v. CA, GR 130003, October 20, 2004 FACTS: Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his car. The car was owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother, Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result, which necessitated his hospitalization several times in 1989, and forced him to undergo four (4) operations.

Añonuevo points out that Villagracia’s bicycle had no safety gadgets such as a horn or bell, or headlights, as invoked by a 1948 municipal ordinance. Nor was it duly registered with the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, as required by the same ordinance. Finally, as admitted by Villagracia, his bicycle did not have foot brakes. Before this Court, Villagracia does not dispute these allegations, which he admitted during the trial, but directs our attention instead to the findings of Añonuevo’s own negligence. Villagracia also contends that, assuming there was contributory negligence on his part, such would not exonerate Añonuevo from payment of damages. The Court of Appeals likewise acknowledged the lack of safety gadgets on Villagracia’s bicycle, but characterized the contention as “off -tangent” and insufficient to obviate the fact that it was Añonuevo’s own negligence that caused the accident. Añonuevo claims that V illagracia violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon. He posits that Article 2185 of the New Civil Code applies by analogy. The provision reads: Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. ISSUE: WON Article 2185 of the New Civil Code, which presumes the driver of a motor vehicle negligent if he was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the mishap, should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles. HELD: NO

At the time Article 2185 was formulated, there existed a whole array of non-motorized vehicles ranging from human powered contraptions on wheels such as bicycles, scooters, and animal-drawn carts such as calesas and carromata. These modes of transport were even more prevalent on the roads of the 1940s and 1950s than they are today, yet the framers of the New Civil Code chose then to exclude these alternative modes from the scope of Article 2185 with the use of the term “motorized vehicles.” If Añonuevo seriously contends that the application of Article 2185 be expanded due to the greater interaction today of all types of vehicles, such argument contradicts historical experience. The ratio of motorized vehicles as to non-motorized vehicles, as it stood in 1950, was significantly lower than as it stands today. This will be certainly affirmed by statistical data, assuming such has been compiled, much less confirmed by persons over sixty. Añonuevo’s characterization of a vibrant intra-road dynamic between motorized and non-motorized vehicles is more apropos to the past than to the present. As admitted by appellant Añonuevo, he first saw appellee Villagracia at a distance of about ten (10) meters before the accident. Corrolarily, therefore, he could have avoided the accident had he [stopped] alongside with an earlier jeep which was already at a full stop giving way to appellee. But according to [eyewitness] Sorsano, he saw appellant Añonuevo “umaarangkada” and hit the leg of Villagracia. This earlier jeep at a full stop gave way to Villagracia to proceed but Añonuevo at an unexpected motion


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dreamer Bar Review Notes (umarangkada) came out hitting Villagracia. Appellant Añonuevo admitted that he did not blow his horn when he crossed Boni Avenue. The fact that Añonuevo was recklessly speeding as he made the turn likewise leads us to b elieve that even if Villagracia’s bicycle had been equipped with the proper brakes, the cyclist would not have had opportunity to brake in time to avoid the speeding car. _______ State Merritt v. Gov’t of the Phil., GR L -11154, 34 Phil 311 (March 21, 1916) FACTS: Merritt, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of said streets, the General Hospital ambulance , upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the p ost place there. ISSUE: WON for a Tort committed by a government employee (in this case the chauffeur of the General Hospital ambulance), the government is legally liable for damages.

[Torts and Damages] In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either tort or contract, the rule is stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus: By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does no t thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in h is favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.

HELD: NO. All admit that the Insular Government ( the defendant) cannot be sued by an individual without its consent. As the consent of the Government to be sued by the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed ord er or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

Merritt was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the respon sibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere for such authority, if it exists.

_________ State City of Manila v. Teotico, GR L-23052, January 29, 1968 FACTS: Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left eyelid.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose and scope of Act No. 2457.

Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint — which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. ISSUE: WON the City of Manila is liable.

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HELD: YES. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of Manila) reading: The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or o rdinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.

Or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines. The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of th e city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condi tion of roads, streets, bridges, publ ic bui ldi ngs, and other- publ ic works under their control or supervision ." In other words,

said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.

_________ State GSIS v. Deang, GR 135644, September 17, 2001 FACTS: Spouses Deang obtained a housing loan from the GSIS. As required by the mortgage deed, the spouses Daeng deposited the owner's duplicate copy of the title with the GSIS. Eleven (11) months before the maturity of the loan, the spouses Deang settled their debt with the GSIS and requested for the release of the owner's du plicate copy of the title since they intended to secure a loan from a private lender and use

the land covered by it as collateral security for the loan which they applied for with one Milagros Runes. They would use the proceeds of the loan applied for the renovation of the spouses' residential house and for business. However, personnel of the GSIS were not able to release the owner's duplicate of the title as it could not be found despite diligent search. On June 26, 1979 (five months later), after the completion of judicial proceedings, GSIS finally secured and released the reconstituted copy of the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14926-R to the spouses Deang. On July 6, 1979, the spouses Deang filed with the Court of First Instance, Angeles City a complaint against GSIS for damages, claiming that as result of the delay in releasing the duplicate copy of the o wner's title, they were unable to secure a loan from Milagros Runes, the proceeds of which could have been used in defraying the estimated cost of the renovation of their residential house and which could have been invested in some profitable business undertaking. ISSUE: WON GSIS, as a GOCC primarily performing governmental functions, is liable for a negligent act of its employee acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. HELD: YES. Under the facts, there was a pre-existing contract between the parties. GSIS and the spouses Deang h ad a loan agreement secured by a real estate mortgage. The duty to return the owner's duplicate copy of title arose as soon as the mortgage was released. GSIS insists that it was under no obligation to return the owner's duplicate copy of the title immediately. This insistence is not warranted. Negligence is obvious as the owners' duplicate copy could not be returned to the owners. Thus, the more applicable provisions of the Civil Code are: "Article 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages." "Article 2201. In contracts and quasicontracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted x x x." 

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Since good faith is presumed and bad faith is a matter of fact which should be proved, we shall treat GSIS as a party who defaulted in its obligation to return the owners' duplicate copy of the title. As an obligor in good faith, GSIS is liable for all the "natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation." The inability of the spouses Deang to secure another loan and the damages they suffered thereby has its roots in the failure of the GSIS to return the owners' duplicate copy of the title.


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“Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.” (Art. 100, RPC) Basis of Liability - underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities, namely: The society in which he lives in or the political  entity called the State whose law he had violated; and, The individual member of that society whose  person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. NOTE: Dual character of crimes is present not only in felonies under the RPC but also in cases governed by special laws. When there is No Liability Even if there is Delict  Contravention of ordinances, violations of game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt, do not produce civil responsibility;  Crimes of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and other similar crimes do not result in civil liability. NOTE: The crime being public or private is immaterial. Persons Liable – principals, accomplices and accessories as defined under Articles 16 to 20 of the RPC. NOTE: If there are 2 or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the amount for which each must respond. (Complete Annotation to follow)

OZOA V. MADULA (GR L-62955, Dec. 22, 1987) Ozoa was the employer of Policarpio Balatayo (a driver of Weapons Carrier truck), who was convicted by CFI of Bukidnon for homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Balatayo was sentenced to 6 month to 3 years in prison and damages of P12,000 for the deceased heir, whom he ran over and died, and another P3,000 to another victim who suffered physical injuried. Upon writ of execution, the writ was returned unsatisfied because Balatayo was insolvent. Ozoa moved for the issuance of the writ against Ozoa, the employer. Ozoa opposed the writ alleging that the widow already executed an “Affidavit of Desistance” acknowledging full satisfaction of civil liability and that a civil case had to be filed in order to establish the presence of employer-employee relationship and that a separate civil action is required for this. It was later adequately proven by evidence that Ozoa promised P6,000 to the spouse of the victim and thus persuaded her to sign an affidavit of desistance when in fact, he only paid her P1,500. ISSUE: WON employer can be held subsidiarily civilly liable.

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[Torts and Damages] HELD: Yes. Ozoa was found liable based on Article 102 and 103 of the RPC declaring the employer subsidiarily responsible for the civil liability of the employee when the latter is insolvent. There is no need to file a separate civil action because a person criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is reserved. The employer is subsidiarily answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex delito of his employee in the event of the latter’s insolvency; and the judgement in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of the liability but also as to its amount. REQUISITES FOR EMPLOYER’S SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY: 1. He is the employer of the convict, 2. He is engaged in some kind o f industry, 3. The crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties, and 4. Execution against the employee is u nsatisfied. The SC ruled that all of the following were satisfied by evidence and directed the Trial Court to cause execution against the properties of Ozoa to satisfy his subsidiary civil liability. Justifying and exempting circumstances TAN V. STANDARD VACUUM OIL CO. (GR. L-4160, July 29, 1952) Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were drivers and helpers of Standard Vacuum Oil Company. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground tank, it caught fire. Sto. Domingo then drove the truck across Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street, he abandoned the truck which continued moving to the opposite side causing the buildings on that side to be burned including the house of Anita Tan, petitioner. Both Sto. Domingo and Rico were acquitted of arson through reckless imprudence as the CFI ruled it was caso fortuito. Tan brought a civil action against Standard, Rural Transit and including the 2 employees, seeking to recover the damage she suffered (repair of P12,000) for the destruction of her house. Defendants alleged res judicata, that they were barred by prior judgement. ISSUE: WON Standard and Rural Transit have civil liability against Tan. HELD: YES. Res judicata does not apply to them because they were not party to the criminal case where Sto. Domingo and Rico were acquitted. Allegation against Standard is failure to observe the degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demanded, thereby causing the gasoline they were unloading to catch fire. As to Rural Transit, its liability is based on Article 101, Rule 2: Article 101 – Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. – The exemption from civil liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11


[Torts and Damages] of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules: Second. In cases falling within subdivision of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in propor tion to the benefit which they have received. The cause of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it appearing that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly because of the desire of the driver to avoid greater evil or harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-truck to the middle of the street. It cannot be denied that Rural Transit is one of those for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes within the purview of said penal provision. Effect of Acquittal PADILLA V. CA (GR L-39999, May 31, 1984) Roy Padilla, an incumbent municipal mayor of Panganiban, Ilocos Norte, together with 3 others were accused of grave coercion for forcibly opening the stall in the pub lic market of Antonio Vergara and his family, destroying the furnitures with axes and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise. Due to reasonable doubt, the CA reversed their conviction for grave coercion but they were ordered to pay jointly and severally the sum of P9,600 for actual damages. Padilla filed an MR contending that the acquittal in the criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. ISSUE: WON civil liability could be imposed once there is acquittal of the criminal charge. HELD: Yes. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages ONLY when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: 1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt because only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; 2) the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as in felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability; and 3) the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. Article 29 of the Civil Code states: “When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to b e malicious. In the criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.” In the case at bar, no separate civil action is required since civil liability in the is proven by preponderance of evidence. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced

dreamer Bar Review Notes or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspect of the case. SC affirmed the decision of CA; pay damages of P9,600 to Vergara. Effect of acquittal BUNAG JR. V. CA (GR 101749, July 10, 1992) A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by Zenaida Cirilo against Conrado Bunag Jr. and his father Conrado Bunag Sr. with the RTC of Bacoor Cavite. The court order Bunag Jr. to pay private respondent P80K as moral damages, P20K as exemplary damages, P20K as temperate damages and P10K for attorney’s fees. Contrado Bunag Sr. was absolved from liability. Cirilo appealed the decision disculpating Conrado Bunag from civil liability while the Bunags appealed the decision in finding Bunag Jr. forcibly abducting and raping Cirilo and awarding damages for breach of promise to marry. CA dismissed both appeals and affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC hence this petition for review. ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the criminal case in Pasay for forcible abduction with rape warrants the award for civil damages. HELD: YES. Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Hence, the extingction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration of final judgement that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgement that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. SC denied the certiorari for lack of merit and assailed that the judgment and resolution of CA are affirmed. Effect of Death PEOPLE V. BAYOTAS (GR. 102007, Sept. 2, 1994) Rogelio Bayotas was charged rape and eventually convicted but he died while his case was pending appeal of his conviction (died of h ipato carcinoma gastric malingering). ISSUE: WON the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his civil liability. HELD: “Article 89 RPC – How a criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability


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dreamer Bar Review Notes thereafter is extinguished only when the death of the of fender occurs before final judgment;” The term final judgment employed in the RPC means judgment beyond recall. Really, as lon g as a judg ment had not become executor, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him. The SC ruled that: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e. civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” 2. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicted on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the CC enumerates these sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delict. 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in number 2, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only b y way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. Based on these rules, the civil case against Bayotas is extinguished for it is based solely on the act complained in the criminal case already extinguished – rape. Case dismissed.

Concept of Independent Civil Action, Two Views  Dr. Tolentino – the civil action, which the Civil Code provisions allow to be filed (particularly Art. 33) is ex-delicto, or civil liability arising from delict.74 The said articles create an exception to the rule that no civil action can commence independent of a criminal action if said right is not reserved. It creates an exception when the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries.

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Aquino, pp. 577, citing Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293 (1983). Aquino, pp. 578. The author submits that this is the better view as it is consistent with the purpose of the independent civil actions explained by the Code Commission.

[Torts and Damages] 

Justice Caguioa – independent civil actions granted under Articles 32, 33 and 34 are not civil liability arising from crime. The basis is said to be tortious actions more of the nature of culpa aquiliana and, therefore, separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from crime. 75

76 Casupanan v. Lar oya

FACTS: Casupanan and Laroya figured a car collision at Capas, Tarlac. Laroya instituted a criminal case against Casupanan and the owner of the other vehicle, while Casupanan filed a civil case for quasi-delict against Laroya, pending the preliminary investigation stage of the criminal case. The civil case was dismissed because of forum shopping by the MCTC of Capas, but Casupanan filed an MR arguing that what they filed was an independent civil action which can proceed independently o f the criminal case. The same was denied. HELD: The independent civil action arising from quasi-delict may prosper.

Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles. Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (“2000 Rules” for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit: “SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.” (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. 76

G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002.

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Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is “deemed instituted” with the cr iminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer “deemed instituted,” and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action “deemed instituted” in the criminal action. Under Section 1 of the p resent Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is no t deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and (19) Freedom of access to the courts. In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Rationale of the Inclusion – for the effective maintenance of democracy (Aquino, pp. 581). It could be said that the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are some of the implementing laws for the protection of Civil Liberties (Pineda, pp. 380). NOTE: Art. 32 of the Civil Code provides for the imposition of damages upon any public officer or public employee or any private person, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs the 19 listed rights and liberties. The 1987 Constitution enumerated 22 rights under the Bill of Rights, and such additional rights should be governed by the same principle under Art. 32 of the Civil Code (Ibid .).

Petition is GRANTED.

Article 32: Violation of Civil and Political Rights 77 or Constitutional Torts78 Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: (1) Freedom of religion; (2) Freedom of speech; (3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; (4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; (5) Freedom of suffrage; (6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; (8) The right to the equal protection of t he laws; (9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; (10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; (11) The privacy of communication and correspondence; (12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; (13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances; (14) The right to be a free fr om involuntary servitude in any form; (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; (16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; (17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

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Aquino, pp. 580. Pineda, pp. 379.

How Committed – normally involves intentional acts, but can also be committed through negligence. Good faith on the part of the defendant does not necessarily excuse such violation.

79 Li m v. De Leon

FACTS: On April 29, 1961, Jikil Taha sold to a certain Timbangcaya of Palawan a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL". A year later Timbangcaya filed a co mplaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor launch from him.

On May 14, 1962, after conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal de Leon in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Palawan, filed with the CFI of Palawan the corresponding information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil Taha. On June 15, 1962, Fiscal de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac, Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch. But the same was already sold to the third person, herein petitioner Lim.

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G.R. No. L-22554, August 29, 1975.

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dreamer Bar Review Notes On July 15, 1962 Lim pleaded with Provincial Commander Maddela to return the motor launch but the latter refused. Likewise, on September 20, 1962, Jikil Taha through his counsel made representations with Fiscal de Leon to return the seized property to Lim but Fiscal de Leon refused, on the ground that the same was the subject of a criminal offense. Such other efforts to recover the launch were futile. Thus, Lim and Jikil Taha filed with the CFI of Palawan a complaint for damages against Fiscal de Leon and Maddela. HELD: The search and seizure made was illegal for lack of search warrant, further, the seizure made entitles Lim for damages.

Defendants-appellees admitted that when Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim and impounded the motor launch he was not armed with a search warrant; that he effected the seizure of the motor launch in the absence of and without the consent of Delfin Lim. There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. 6 And since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure. Pursuant to Art. 32 and Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. In the instant case, plaintiffappellant Delfin Lim claimed that he purchased the motor launch from Jikil Taha in consideration of P3 ,000.00, having given P2,000.00 as advanced payment; that since or seizure on July 6, 1962 the motor launch had b een moored at Balabac Bay and because of exposure to the elements it has become worthless at the time of the filing of the present action; that because of the illegality of the seizure of the motor launch, he suffered moral damages in the sum of P1,000.00; and that because of the violation of their constitutional rights they were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer whom they have paid P1,500.00 for attorney's fees. We find these claims of Delfin Lim amply supported by the evidence and therefore should be awarded the sum of P3,000.00 as actual damages; P1,000.00 as moral damages and P750.00 for attorney's fees. However, with respect co plaintiff Jikil Taha, he is not entitled to recover any damage which he alleged he had suffered from the unlawful seizure of the motor launch inasmuch as he had already transferred the ownership and possession of th e motor launch to Delfin Lim at the time it was seized and therefore, he has no legal standing to question the validity of the seizure.

[Torts and Damages] order of his superior o fficer. While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing un lawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated o rders from his superior officer. It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, that he impounded the motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province, Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch. Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor launch. 80 Aberca v. V er

FACTS: This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and d eliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.

As to the liability of Maddela

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded the motor launch upon the

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the

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[Torts and Damages] circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983, and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara, Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21, 1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel. Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun, Presiding, issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss stating among others that the action cannot prosper because of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. ISSUES: 1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. 2. If such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well? 3. WON the accused are covered by the mantle of state immunity HELD: 1. We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do, i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the title of their action."

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release

from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No. 1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text: However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year.

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. 2.

Respondents contend that the doctrine of respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates.

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. 3.

We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers. As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the exeercise of this authority.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their


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dreamer Bar Review Notes duty, as they claim, "to prevent or sup press lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times. Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned. M H P Garments v. CA81

FACTS: MHP Garments was awarded the exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official uniforms and supplies of the BSP. It was also given authority to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting uniforms and other scouting supplies. MHP Garments then tasked its employee, Larry De Guzman, to undertake surveillance and PC report to the activities of Villacruz, et. al., who were reported to be selling scout uniforms and paraphernalia without authority. Then they sought the aid of the PC. PC men and De Guzman went to the stalls and seized the goods and caused a commotion, all without a warrant.

Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against Villacruz, et. al. Fiscal dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized articles. Thereafter, Villacruz, et. al, filed a civil case against MHP Garments for sums of money and damages. RTC ordered MHP Garments to pay. CA affirmed.

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[Torts and Damages] HELD: We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of private respondents' goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25, 1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized. The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal. There was no probable cause for the seizure.

Under the above provision and as aforediscussed, petitioners miserably failed to report the unlawful peddling of scouting goods to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines for the proper application of a warrant. Private respondents' rights are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to transient needs. 15 Petitioners did not have the unbridled license to cause the seizure of respondents' goods without any warrant. And thirdly, if petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a third-party complaint against the raiding team for contribution or any other relief, 16 in respect of respondents' claim for Recovery of Sum of Money with Damages. Again, they did not. We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered. 17 Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit ., moral damages can be awarded in the case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings due the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents' avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by their testimonies.

Article 33: Defamation, Fraud and Physical Injuries Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

NOTE: This is similar to the action in tort for liber or slander, deceit, and assault and battery under the American law.82 Defamation – includes libel and slander; means the offense of injuring a person’s character, fame or 82

Aquino, pp. 599.


[Torts and Damages] reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute. It is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which o thers in the community may have, or tend to have, of the offended party. Libel under the Revised Penal Code Article 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

NOTE: defamation in this jurisdiction, includes the crimes of libel and slander. Libel is written defamation while slander is oral defamation. Requisites of Liability The imputation of a discreditable act or condition  to another; Publication of the imputation;  Identity of the person defamed;  Existence of malice. 

83 M anuel v. Cruz-Pano

FACTS: This case goes back to April 21, 1976, when a raid was conducted by the agents of the now defunct AntiSmuggling Action Center on two rooms in the Tokyo Hotel in Binondo, Manila, pursuant to a warrant of seizure and detention issued by the Acting Collector of Customs of Manila on April 20, 1976. The raid resulted in the seizure of several articles allegedly smuggled into the country by their owners, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong. These articles subsequently became the subject of seizure proceedings in the Bureau of Customs but most of them were ordered released upon proof that the customs duties and other charges thereon had been duly paid as evidenced by the corresponding official receipts. Only a few items "of no commercial value" were ordered confiscated.

While the seizure proceedings were pending, the petitioner, as counsel for the owners of the seized articles, sent a letter dated April 19,1976, to the Chairman of the ASAC in which he complained about the conduct of the raid and demanded that the persons responsible therefore b e investigated. The Chairman of the ASAC ordered the investigation as demanded, but the agents charged were all exonerated in a decision dated August 25, 1976. Not satisfied with what he later described as a "home town decision," the petitioner, on behalf of his clients, filed a complaint for robbery against the same agents with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. This

dreamer Bar Review Notes was later withdrawn, however, on advice of the inquest fiscal who said that the case might come under the jurisdiction of the military tribunal. The petitioner says he then went to Camp Aguinaldo but was discouraged from filing the complaint there when lie was told that it would take about a year to complete the preliminary investigation alone. The owners of the seized articles then instituted a civil complaint for damages which the petitioner filed for them in the Court of First Instance of Manila on June 7, 1976. Three days later, there appeared in the June 1 0, 1976 issue of the Bulletin Today the following report: TOURISTS SUE AGENTS, OFFICIAL Four Chinese, three of whom were tourists from Hongkong, have filed a case for damages against a customs official and 11 agents of the government's anti-smuggling action center ASAC in connection with a raid conducted in their hotel rooms, more than a month ago. The case was docketed in Manila's court of first instance (CFI) as Civil Case No. 102694. The complaints also alleged they lost assorted mat erials amounting to P46,003.40. Named respondents in the case were acting customs collector Ramon Z. Aguirre, Rolando Gatmaitan, Antonio Baranda, Amado M. Tirol, Francisco C. Santos, Edsel Labayen, Jose Robles, Nestor Eusebio, Freddie Ocnila, Renato Quiroz, Pedro Cunanan, Jr., and Enrique Perez, all of ASAC The acting customs collector was impleaded in the case in his official capacity for having issued the warrant that led to the criminal offenses complained of. Aquirre, ASAC vice-chairman, was named as defendant for soliciting the issuance of a warrant of seizure and detention reportedly on the basis of charges contained in an affidavit executed by Gatmaitan, another ASAC agent. Esteban Manuel filed the ca se in behalf of the plaintiffs composed of Manila resident Ng Tee, and Hong Kong visitors Ng Woo Hay, Cheng Pik Ying and Lee Kee Ming who came to the Philippines t o visit their relatives and friends. The agents allegedly subjected Ng Woo Hay to indignities and took her necklace, bracelet and wrist watch. They allegedly seized many articles valued at P27,000 which have remained unaccounted for in the list submitted by the defendants as the inventory of the items confiscated.

On the basis of these antecedent facts, an information for libel was filed against the petitioner, Lee Kee Ming and Ng Woo Hay in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 9 A reading of the information does not show why the two Chinese were included in the charge; all it said was that they were the clients of the petitioner. As for the petitioner himself, it was alleged that he had committed the crime of libel by writing the letter of April 29, 1976 (which was quoted in full) and by causing the publication of the news item in the Bulletin Today. HELD: From the viewpoint of substantive law, the charge is even more defective, if not ridiculous. Any one with an elementary I knowledge of constitutional law and criminal law would have known that neither the letter nor the news account was libelous.

The applicable provision in the Revised Penal Code reads as follows:

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G.R. No. L-46079, April 17, 1989.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes Article 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. The letter comes under Item 1 as it was addressed by the petitioner to the ASAC Chairman to complain against the conduct of his men when they raided the Chinese tourists' rooms in the Tokyo Hotel. It was sent by the petitioner mainly in his capacity as a lawyer in the discharge of his legal duty to protect his clients. While his principal purpose was to vindicate his clients' interests against the abuses committed by the ASAC agents, he could also invoke his civic duty as a private individual to expose anomalies in the public service. The complaint was addressed to the official who had authority over them and could impose the proper disciplinary sanctions. Significantly, as an index of good faith, the letter was sent privately directly to the addressee, without any fanfare or publicity. As for the news report, it is difficult to believe that the petitioner, an ordinary citizen without any known ties to the newspapers, could have by h imself caused the publication of such an explosive item. There is no prima facie showing that, by some kind of influence he had over the periodical, he succeeded in having it published to defame the ASAC agents. It does not appear either that the report was paid for like an advertisement. This looks instead to be the result of the resourcefulness of the newspaper in discovering matters of public interest for dutiful disclosure to its readers. It should be presumed that the report was included in the issue as part of the newspaper's coverage of important current events as selected by its editorial staff. At any rate, the news item comes under Item 2 of the abovequoted article as it is a true and fair report of a judicial proceeding, made in good faith and without comments or remarks. This is also privileged. Moreover, it is n ot correct to say, as the Solicitor General does, that Article 354 is not applicable because the complaint reported as filed would not by itself alone constitute a judicial proceeding even before the issues are joined and trial is begun. It is true that the matters mentioned in Article 354 as exceptions to the general rule are not absolutely privileged and are still actionable. However, since what is presumed is not malice but in fact lack of malice, it is for the prosecution

[Torts and Damages] to overcome that presumption by proof that the accused was actually motivated by malice. Absent such proof, the charge must fail. The respondents contend that the letter was written by the petitioner to influence the seizure proceedings which were then pending. Even assuming that to be true, such purpo se did not necessarily make the letter malicious, especially if it is considered that the complaint against the ASAC agents could not be raised in the said proceedings. The ASAC Chairman, not the Collector of Customs, had jurisdiction to discipline the agents. It should also be noted, as further evidence of lack of malice, that even after the seizure proceedings had been concluded in favor of the petitioner's clients, he pursued their complaint against the ASAC agents in the fiscal's office in Manila and then with the military authorities in Camp Aguinaldo, ending with the filing of the civil case for damages in the court of first instance of Manila. Borj al v. CA 84

FACTS: Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI), now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star , a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was filed, Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial Board. Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker.

Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant and journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy. During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House SubCommittee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or participants. On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous solicitation

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G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999.

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[Torts and Damages] letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his column Jaywalker . The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner together with the dates they were published Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the “organizer” alluded to in p etitioner Borjal’s columns. Private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The dismissal was sustained by the Department of Justice and later by the Office of the President.

dreamer Bar Review Notes Spokesman and not as a conference organizer. The printout and tentative program of the conference were devoid of any indication of Wenceslao as organizer. The printout which contained an article entitled "Who Organized the NCLT?" did not even mention private respondent's name, while the tentative program only denominated private respondent as "Vice Chairman and Executive Director," and not as organizer. No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had several organizers and that he was only a part of the organization, thus – “I would like to clarify for the record that I was only a part of the organization. I was invited then because I was the head of the technical panel of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy that took care of congressional hearings.” Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to in the subject articles. Is Wenceslao a public figure?

On 31 October 1990 private respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. In their answer, petitioners interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney’s fees and costs. After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify private respondent P1,000,000.00 for actual and compensatory damages, in addition to P200,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary damages, P200,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit. HELD: In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar.

The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of the Jaywalker articles which appeared in the 31 May 1989 issue of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was the person referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of fact, in his 9 June 1989 column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on Land Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified " (italics supplied). Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the identity of the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and

In the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the New York Times ruling. At any rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong as x x x x a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a ‘public personage.’ He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously, to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other entertainer. The list is, however, broader than this. It includes public officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, infant prodigy, and no less a personage than the Great Exalted Ruler of the lodge. It includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where the public attention is focused upon him as a person.

The FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the government and the private sector, and organized by top government officials and prominent businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media mileage and drew public attention not only to the conference itself but to the personalities behind as well. As its Executive Director and spokesman, private respondent consequently assumed the status of a public figure. But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the FNCLT, would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved o r because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the


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dreamer Bar Review Notes public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety MVRS Publications v. Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Phils.85

FACTS: ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70) Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar , a daily tabloid. The article reads: "ALAM BA NINYO? Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim? Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang ‘Ramadan’."

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published o ut of sheer ignorance but with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries. MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, con tended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. RTC dismissed the case. CA reversed. HELD: It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

[Torts and Damages] In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action; hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper. An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each Muslim, as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view -some may be conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person. Together, the Muslims do not have a single common reputation that will give them a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy. In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose construction is not so well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification. he foregoing are in essence the same view scholarly expressed by Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in the course of the deliberations in this case. We extensively reproduce hereunder his comprehensive and penetrating discussion on group libel Defamation is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander – the one being, in general, written, while the other in general is oral. In either form, defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name. This is a “relational interest” since it involves the opinion others in the community may have, or tend to have of the plaintiff. The law of defamation protects the int erest in reputation – the interest in a cquiring, retaining and enjoying one’s reputation as good as one’s character and conduct warrant. Rule on Group Libel: The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory charge has been made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for damages suffered by reason of defamation of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom. For recovery in defamation cases, it is necessary that the publication be “of and concerning the plaintiff.” Even when a publication may be clearly

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G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003.

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[Torts and Damages] defamatory as to somebody, if the words have no personal application to the plaintiff, they are not actionable by him. If no one is identified, there can be no libel because no one’s reputation has been injured x x x x In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that the plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in cases where a group or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an individual member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed. If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member of t he group, and an individual member could maintain an acti on for defamation. When the defamatory language was used toward a small group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language referred to each member so that each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury, persons engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a society, a football team, a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a particular company. In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there i s nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal application and was so general t hat no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no private action could be maintained. This rule has been applied to defamatory publications concerning groups or classes of persons engaged in a particular business, profession or employment, direct ed at associations or groups of association officials, and to those directed at miscellaneous groups or classes of persons. Distinguishing a small group-which if defamed entitles all its members to sue from a large group – which if defamed entitles no one to sue – is not always so simple. Some authorities have noted that in cases permitting recovery, the group generally has twenty five (25) or fewer members. However, there is usually no articulated limit on size. Suits have been permitted by members of fairly large groups when some distinguishing characteristic of the individual or group increases the likelihood that the statement could be interpreted to apply individually. For example, a single player on the 60 to 70 man Oklahoma University football team was permitted to sue when a writer accused the entire team of taking amphetamines to “hop up” its performance; the individual was a fullback, i.e., a significant position on the team and had played in all but two of the team’s games. A prime consideration, therefore, is the public perception of the size of the group and whether a statement will be interpreted to refer to every member. The more organized and cohesive a group, the easier it is to tar all its members with the same brush and the more likely a court will permit a suit from an individual even if the group includes more than twenty five (25) members. At some point, however, increasing size may be seen to dilute the harm to individuals and any resulting injury will fall beneath the threshold for a viable lawsuit. x x x x There are many other groupings of men than those that are contained within the foregoing group classifications. There are all the religions of the world, there are all the political and ideological beliefs; there are the many colors of the human race. Group defamation has been a fertile and dangerous weapon of attack on various racial, religious and political minorities. Some states, therefore, have passed statutes to prevent concerted efforts to harass minority groups in the United States by making it a crime

to circulate insidious rumors against racial and religious groups. Thus far, any civil remedy for such broadside defamation has been lacking. There have been numerous attempts by individual members to seek redress in the courts for libel on these groups, but very few have succeeded because it felt that the groups are too large and poorly defined to support a finding that the plaintiff was singled out for personal attack x x x x (citations omitted).

Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in damages. Justice Carpio pushes the opinion that the case is imbued by an “emotional distress tort”. The Court did not agree and said, Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar . Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm - which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs. 86 Phil ippine Journal ist Inc. v. Theonen

FACTS: On 30 September 1990, the following news item appeared in the People’s Journal, a tabloid of general circulation: Swiss Shoots Neighbors’ Pets RESIDENTS of a subdivision in Parañaque have asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds in his domain. The BF Homes residents through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara complained that the deportation of Francis Thoenen, of 10 Calcutta BF Homes Phase III, could help “prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future.” Angara explained that house owners could not control their dogs and cats when they slip out of their dwellings unnoticed. An alleged confrontation between Thoenen and the owner of a pet he shot recently threatens to exacerbate the problem, Angara said.

Cristina Lee

The subject of this article, Francis Thoenen, is a retired engineer permanently residing in this country with his Filipina

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G.R. No. 143372, December 13, 2005.


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dreamer Bar Review Notes wife and their children. Claiming that the report was false and defamatory, and that the petitioners acted irresponsibly in failing to verify the truth of the same prior to publication, he filed a civil case for damages against herein petitioners Philippine Journalists, Inc., Zacarias Nuguid, Jr., its publisher, and reporter Cristina Lee. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community, and that since it had been published, he and h is wife received several queries and angry calls from friends, neighbors and relatives. For the impairment of his reputation and standing in the community, and his mental anguish, Thoenen sough tP200,000.00 in moral damages, P100,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P50,000.00 in attorney’s fees. The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a “social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public ( sic) of the people,” and that the story was published in good faith and without malice. It was proven at trial that the news article contained several inaccuracies. The headline, which categorically stated that the subject of the article engaged in the practice of shooting pets, was untrue. Moreover, it is immediately apparent from a comparison between the above letter and the news item in question that while the letter is a mere request for verification of Thoenen’s status, Lee wrote that residents of BF Homes had “asked the Bureau of Immigration to deport a Swiss who allegedly shoots neighbors’ pets.” No complaints had in fact been lodged against him b y any of the BF Homeowners, nor had any pending deportation proceedings been initiated against him in the Bureau of Immigration. RTC ruled in favor of P eople’s Journal. CA reversed. HELD: The petitioners argue that this case is one for damages arising from libel, and not one for abuse of rights under the New Civil Code. They further claim the constitutional protections extended by the freedom of speech and of the press clause of the 1987 Constitution against liability for libel, claiming that the article was published in fulfillment of its social and moral duty to inform the public “on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral [fabric] of the people.” They insist that the news article was based on a letter released by the Bureau of Immigration, and is thus a qualifiedly privileged communication. To recover damages, the respondent must prove its publication was attended by actual malice - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

For the reasons stated below, we hold that the constitutional privilege granted under the freedom of speech and the press against liability for damages does not extend to the petitioners in this case. In this case, there is no controversy as to the existence of the three elements. The respondent’s name and address were

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[Torts and Damages] clearly indicated in the article ascribing to him the questionable practice of shooting the wayward pets of his neighbors. The backlash caused by the publication of the article was in fact such that stones had been thrown at their house, breaking several flower pots, and daily and nightly calls compelled him to request a change of their telephone number. These facts are not contested by the petitioners. What the petitioners claim is the absence of proof of the fourth element - malice. As a general rule, malice is presumed. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states: ART. 354. Requirement of Publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Neither is the news item a fair and true report without any comments or remarks of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings; there is in fact no proceeding to speak of. Nor is the article related to any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions, for it concerns only false imputations against Thoenen, a private individual seeking a quiet life. The petitioners also claim to have made the report out of a “social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest.” In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that “the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means “that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is d eemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the d iscreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.” Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., that a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest .


[Torts and Damages] 87 Li m v. Kou Co Ping

FACTS: In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its d ate of issuance, unless revoked by FRCC Marketing Department.

Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja), sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15 million or P63.00 per bag. On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim allegedly at the p rice of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering 10,000 bags, to Co. Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant or for the return of her money had failed. Lim filed a complaint against Co for estafa. The RTC rendered a decision acquitting Co. After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the Pasig City RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim in its December 1, 2004 Order . Lim sought a reconsideration of the above Order, arguing that she has presented preponderant evidence that Co committed estafa against her. RTC denied. On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch 21 of the RTC of Manila. The defendants in the civil case were Co and all other parties to the withdrawal authorities, Tigerbilt, Fil-Cement Center, FRCC, Southeast Asia Cement, and La Farge Corporation. Lim prayed for Co to honor his contractual commitments either by delivering the 37,200 bags of cement, making arrangements with FRCC to allow Lim to withdraw the cement, or to pay for their value. She likewise asked that the defendants be held solidarily liable to her for the damages she incurred in her failed attempts to withdraw the cement and for the damages they inflicted on her as a result of their abuse of their rights.

dreamer Bar Review Notes Co maintains that Lim is guilty of forum shopping because she is asserting only one cause of action in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 (the appeal from the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 116377) and in Civil Case No. 05-112396, which is for Co’s violation of her right to receive 37,200 bags of cement. Likewise, the reliefs sought in both cases are the same, that is, for Co to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement or its value to Lim. That Lim utilized different methods of presenting her case – a criminal action for estafa and a civil complaint for specific performance and damages – should not detract from the fact that she is attempting to litigate the same cause of action twice. HELD: A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender (1) civil liability ex delicto , that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the criminal proceedings.

The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries”). Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative. The first action is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action, judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from a contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights).

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DAMAGES – DAMAGES – DAMNUM DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA SPS. CUSTODIO V. CA (GR 116100, 1996) Facts: The plaintiff (Pacifico Mabasa) owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. Said property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to respondents herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of d efendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos Street from respondent’s resp ondent’s property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses of the petitioners. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed. When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises premises and who who were acknowledged by Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one o f said tenants vacated the apartment and when Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there there had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by Petitioners Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. And it was then that the remaining tenants of said apartment vacated the area. Petitioner Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because of some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Trial court rendered a decision ordering the Petitioners Custodios and Santoses to give Respondent Mabasa permanent access access ingress and egress, to the public street and Mabasa to pay the Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway. passageway. Respondent Mabasa went to the CA raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. 

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The CA rendered its decision affirming the judgment o f the trial court with modification only insofar as the grant of damages by Mabasa. The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to p laintiffs-appellants. laintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffsappellants Mabasa the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects. Issues: 1) WON the grant of right of way to Mabasa is proper. 2) WON the award of damages is in order. Held: 1) Yes. Herein petitioners (Custodios and Santoses) are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting Mabasa the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest. 2) No. A reading of the decision of the CA will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the plaintiff, Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff plaintiff suffered some pain pain and suffering. In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. injuria. If, as may happen in 

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[Torts and Damages] many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria. injuria. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence no t contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon." To repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria. injuria. WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly correspondingly REINSTATED. 

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DIAZ V. DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO. (GR 160959, APRIL 3, 2007) FACTS: Diaz was the pres of Diaz and Co., Inc. and the vice pres of Diaz Realty Inc, which in turn, owned the Doña Segunda Hotel formerly known as Davao Imperial Hotel Davao Light and Power Co. (DLPC) is is a public utility duly franchised to provide light, heat, and power to its customers in Davao and other municipalities DLPC supplied Doña Segunda Bldg with electricity DLPC sent a Notice of Disconnection to Diaz and Co., Inc. informing it of its unpaid electric consumption bill amounting to P190,111.02 It also warned that if the amount would not b e paid, DLPC would be obliged to discontinue service Diaz ignored the letter  its meter was disconnected DLPC filed a complaint for collection before the RTC Meanwhile, NFA established its KADIWA store in Davao It leased a portion of the ground floor of Imperial Hotel in Davao

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KADIWA also applied for elec service with DLPC and a contract was later executed between the parties meter installed KADIWA subsequently closed and vacated the Doña Segunda Bldg KADIWA informed DLPC that the light and power connection would be left behind and its right to the connection would be transferred to Diaz; also informed DLPC that the deposit for power connection had been refunded to it by Diaz Diaz informed Manuel Orig that he had leased the untenanted portions of the Doña Segunda Bldg from Diaz and Co and requested that a new elec connection be installed, separate from the one assigned to him by NFA Diaz and Co. sent a letter to DLPC declaring that it had assumed the electrical bills of NFA/KADIWA and requested that bills be sent to it DLPC rejected the request and declared that it was not aware that Diaz and Co. had refunded to NFA/KADIWA its deposit Diaz filed a petition for mandamus alleging that as a hoder of a certificate of public convenience, DLPC is mandated by law to provide him with electric service; the grounds relied by Orig in denying its application are anchored on bias and prejudice since since he is one of the stockholders of Diaz and Co., the owner of Davao Imperial Hotel; and the civil case is against Diaz and Co and not personally against him. him. Meanwhile, the portion of the bldg formerly leased by NFA/KADIWA was leased to Mendiola  needed more electricity than what could be provided by the existing elec wirings, Mendiola opted to change the elec installation from one-phase meter to a three-phase meter connection  approved by DLPC  service contract executed Diaz filed an application for prelim injunction to enjoin DLPC from disconnecting the elec connections Also, an inter-office memo signed by officer in charge was issued to all guards of Doña Segunda who were ordered to prevent anyone from disturbing meter DLPC failed to substitute its single-phase meter with a three-phase meter  DLPC’s linemen thus installed the three-phase meter without removing the single-phase meter RTC denied motion for prelim investigation  MFR also denied DLPC then removed its single-phase meter which rendered almost half of the bldg without power  Diaz went to DLPC  threw stones at it, breaking four glass windows in the process Diaz bought his own elec meter and unilaterally replaced meter  electricity in the bldg was then restored Diaz filed a Complaint for Damages with Prayer for Prelim Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and Restraining Order before the RTC


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Diaz claimed that DLPC arbitrarily and illegally removed meter in violation of their business franchise and Art 19 of the Civil Code. DLPC filed counterclaim for prelim injunction to compel the removal of the meter which Diaz installed without DLPC’s consent and authority  granted by RTC  ordered Diaz to remove meter MFR denied  Diaz filed petition for certiorari before the CA CA rendered a decision granting Diaz’s petition  DLPC filed petition for certiorari before the SC Meanwhile, the parties in Civil Case for collection of sum of money and damages for the unpaid elec consumption executed a Compromise Agreement stipulating that DLPC reduces its total claims and waives any claim in excess as well as its counterclaims; that DLPC, upon receipt of payment, shall install electric service in favor of Diaz; and that parties agree to the dismissal of the Civil Case  compromise approved by RTC Parties also filed in Sp. Civil Case a Joint Motion to Dismiss based on the Compromise Agreement and RTC thereafter ordered the dismissal of the case SC issued resolution dismissing petition for certiorari of CA’s decision for being moot and academic it appearing that petitioner is now providing electrical service to private respondent’s entire building Court makes the admonition, however, that connections of electrical service and installations of electric meters should always be upon mutual contract of the parties, and that payments for electrical consumption should also be made promptly whenever due. RTC rendered a Decision60 in Civil Case dismissing the case filed by Diaz. Diaz appealed the decision with the which appeal is still pending before the app ellate court Based on the aforestated facts, on July 11, 1988, DLPC filed a complaint for theft of electricity against Diaz with the City Prosecutor’s Office submitted an Affidavit to support the charge. In defense, Diaz alleged the following: (1) that the complaint was intended to harass him; (2) he was entitled to electric service by virtue of his subrogation to the right of NFA/KADIWA; (3) the installation of Meter was made with the knowledge and consent of DLPC; (4) there is a pending case between the parties regarding regarding 2 Meter Nos. and (5) the filing of the action is premature. Asst. City Prosecutor, City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal of the charge. He opined that the correspondence to DLPC Manager Orig negated DLPC’s claim of o f lack of consent and knowledge, and since the issue is still pending litigation in court, the determination of whether there is theft of electricity is premature (Sp. Civil Case and Civil Case).

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DLPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the City Prosecutor denied on the ground that DLPC failed to establish the elements of unlawful taking and intent to gain. DLPC appealed the dismissal to the Secretary of Justice, who, however, dismissed the appeal in a letter. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by D LPC was likewise denied Undaunted, DLPC filed a criminal complaint against Diaz for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 87672 with the City Prosecutor’s Office In his counter-affidavit dated September 19, 1992, Diaz alleged that a similar complaint had been filed by DLPC against him. him. In a Resolution 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor, dismissed the case. The Public Prosecutor likewise denied the motion for reconsideration of DLPC Meanwhile Diaz, Ramos, and Arguellas, as complainants, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Pro vincial Fiscal charging the officers of DLPC with estafa through falsification of public documents. They also alleged that the officers of DLPC exacted additional and illegal profits from its consumers by devising a deceptive Varying Discount Formula; based on the alleged misrepresentation of said officers, the Board of Energy (BOE) granted DLPC provisional authority to apply the formula, thereby resulting in losses of more or less P300,000.00 to Diaz, Ramos, and Arguelles. As regards the charge of falsification, the complainants alleged that DLPC had its properties appraised by the Technical Management Services, Philippines, Inc. (TAMSPHIL), and included nonexistent properties that did not belong to it; it also recorded the TAMSPHIL appraisal in its books of account even before it had been approved by the BOE; and submitted financial statements containing the appraisal to the Securities and Exchange Commission and the BOE The Investigating Prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents. An Information was filed before the then Court of First First Instance (CFI) Respondents appealed the resolution of the public prosecutor finding probable cause against them. The appeal was granted. On motion of the Prosecutor, the RTC dismissed the case officers of DLPC, Eduardo J. Aboitiz, Luis Aboitiz, Jr., Roberto E. Aboitiz, Jon R. Aboitiz, and Edson H. Canova, as plaintiffs, filed a Complaint against Diaz, Isagani T. Fuentes (Provincial Fiscal of Davao del Norte), Petronilo D. Ramos (Municipal Mayor of Carmen, Davao del Norte), Gabriel Arguelles (Municipal Attorney of Panabo, Davao del Norte) before the RTC, Cebu City, for damages and attorney’s fees against the defendants for malicious prosecution



[Torts and Damages] RTC dismissed complaint  CA affirmed  SC also dismissed case for lack of merit DLPC instituted a civil action for Damages, before the RTCagainst Diaz for defamatory and libelous remarks and for abuse of rights. The plaintiff alleged that Diaz, motivated by malice and ill-will, had taken it upon himself to find fault in DLPC’s acts and oppose all its application with the BOE, using the media to assault its good name by circulating or publishing libelous and false statements in the newspapers  DLPC suffered besmirched reputation and public humiliation, and damage to its business standing. RTC 11843 rendered a Decision in favor of DLPC and against Diaz, awarding more than P1,500,000.00 in damages to DLPC and dismissing the counterclaim of Diaz. Diaz, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for Damages, Injunction with Writ of P reliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, Plus Attorney’s Fee against DLPC before the RTC. Diaz alleged that DLPC’s filing of criminal cases, for theft of electricity and for violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876), were intended to harass and humiliate him before the public and government authorities and ruin his image; he was seriously prejudiced by the filing of an P11.6 Million damage suit in Civil Case and a P10.8 Million damage suit in Civil Case; defendants, by their common and joint acts, were motivated by evident bad faith and intentionally caused injustice to his person in violation of Article 19 of the New Civil Code RTC issued a TRO in favor of Diaz, directing DLPC or any person acting for and in its behalf, to desist and refrain from committing any unlawful, tortuous and inequitable conduct which may affect the former for a period of twenty (20) days. ISSUES: (1) WON the compromise agreement entered into between DLPC and Diaz barred the former from instituting further actions involving the subject electric Meter  NO (2) WON DLPC acted in bad faith in instituting the criminal cases against Diaz;  NO (3) WON Diaz is entitled to damages.  NO

grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinction of criminal liability.

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As can be inferred from the compromise agreement, Diaz and DLPC merely agreed to (1) reduce the latter’s total claims to only P385,000.00; (2) for DLPC to waive its counterclaims against Diaz; and (3) upon receipt of the amount, for DLPC to immediately install the necessary electric service to the building. The p arties likewise agreed to the dismissal of S p. Civil Case for being moot and academic. Nowhere in said agreement did the parties agree that DLPC was barred from instituting any further action involving the subject electric Meter.

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HELD: Petition is without merit. 1. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public o ffense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense. Moreover, a compromise is not one of the

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The evidence presented by respondents negates malice or bad faith. Based on these established facts, petitioner has not shown that the acts of respondent were done with the sole intent of prejudicing and injuring him.

Petitioner may have suffered damages as a result of the filing of the complaints. However, there is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. Whatever damages Diaz may have suffered would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of the complaints against him. On the other hand, malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by or against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. It is an established rule that in order for malicious prosecution to prosper, the following requisites must be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that the defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. The foregoing are necessary to preserve a person’s right to litigate which may be emasculated by the undue filing of malicious prosecution cases. From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice and want of probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on malicious prosecution. While the institution of separate criminal actions under the provisions of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, and under the provisions of th e Revised Penal Code on theft may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses; and


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dreamer Bar Review Notes where there is variance or difference between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, as in the case at bar, there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, no fault could be attributed to respondent DLPC when it instituted the two separate actions. 3.

SC finds that petitioner is not entitled to damages under Articles 19,20 and 21, and Articles 2217 and 2219(8) of the New Civil Code.

The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or d uty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Thus, malice or bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. Good faith refers to the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. A claim for damages based on malicious prosecution will prosper only if the three elements aforecited are shown to exist. We find that none of the requisites are attendant here. First. Although respondent DLPC initiated before the prosecutor’s office Inv. Sheet No. 593 July/1988 for theft o f electricity, and I.S. No. 92 -4590 for Violation of P.D. 401, as amended by B.P. Blg. 876, no information was ever filed in court. The cases were eventually dropped or dismissed before they could be filed in court. Ultimately, both actions could not end in an acquittal. Second. It cannot be concluded that respondent DLPC acted without probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events which led to the filing of the complaints are undisputed, and respondent DLPC cannot be faulted for filing them. Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The general ru le is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. And 88

Aquino, pp. 948 citing Gatchalian v. Delim, 203 SCRA 126; Spouses Renato Ong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117103 January 21, 1999. 89 G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999 cited in Aquino, pp. 949. 90 G.R. No. 172122, June 22, 2007 cited in Aquino, pp. 949.

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[Torts and Damages] the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried. Thus, the element of malice and the absence o f probable cause must be proved. In the instant case, it is evident that respondent DLPC was not motivated by malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in availing of the remedies provided for by law.

Personal Injury – damages in the form of personal injury can be asked for actual medical and other expenses, or in proper cases, it may likewise include the amount spent for the plastic surgery of the plaintiff. Courts may also award monthly payments to the person who was injured to answer for his future medical expenses.88 Alternative Approaches of Providing Compensation to Disabled Victims for Future Medical Expenses – it could be given in periodic payments (monthly payments) as provided for in Ramos v. CA 89 or could be g iven as a lump-sum payment as provided for in Mercury Drug v. Huang 90 . Aquino believes that the “ lump-sum rule” is the better rule as the enforcement of periodic payments is administratively problematic. Furthermore, in reality, the case will not be closed and terminated unless the victim dies. However, there were arguments that support periodic payments such as that “lump -sum awards often are dissipated by improvident expenditures or investments before the injured person actually incurs the future medical expenses.”91 Damages in Case of Death – when due to a negligent act or a crime, the following damages may be recovered:  Civil indemnity ex delicto for death of the victim;  Actual and compensatory damages;  Moral damages;  Exemplary damages;  Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation;  Interests, in proper cases Actual Expenses – includes medical expenses, wake and funeral expenses, but does not include expenses incurred relating to the 9 th day, 40th day and 1 st year death anniversaries.92 Fixed Damages or Civil Indemnity – Php. 3,000.00 minimum payment to the heirs of the deceased as a fixed amount in addition to any damage that may have resulted because of the act or omission of the 91

Aquino, pp. 949, citing American Bank & Trust Co., v. Superior Court 36 Cal. 3d 1984. 92 Aquino, pp. 951 citing Victory Liner v. Heirs of Malecdan, G.R. No. 154278, December 27, 2002; and, People v. Mangahas, 311 SCRA 384 (1999).



[Torts and Damages] defendant. The current amount of fixed damages as increased by the Court reflecting the current value of currency and prevailing inflation is Php. 50,000.00 Loss of Earning Capacity – when the defendant’s act or omission resulted in plaintiff ’s permanent incapacity (Aquino, pp. 950 ) or death (Ibid., pp. 952). Formula for the Computation of the Awarded Damages for Loss of Earning Capacity – the important variables taken into account in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are:  The number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived (life expenctancy); and, The rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the  deceased (net income). Thus, the formula: Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Necessary Living Expenses)

MARIKINA AUTO LINE TRANSPORT CORP. V. PEOPLE (GR 152040, March 31, 2006) FACTS: Erlinda V. Valdellon is the owner of a two-door commercial apartment located at No. 31 Kamias Road, Quezon City. TheMarikina Auto Line Transport Corporation (MALTC) is the owner-operator of a passenger bus, its employee, was assigned as the regular driver of the bus.2. At around 2:00 p.m. on October 3, 1992, Suelto was driving the passenger bus along Kamias Road, Kamuning, Quezon City, going towards EDSA. The bus suddenly swerved to the right and struck the terrace of the commercial apartment owned by Valdellon. Upon Valdellon’s request, the court ordered Sergio Pontiveros, the Senior Building Inspection Officer of the City Engineer’s Office, to inspect the damaged terrace. He recommended that since the structural members made of concrete had been displaced, the terrace would have to be demolished "to keep its monolithicness, and to insure the safety and stability of the building." In a letter addressed to the bus company and Suelto, Valdellon demanded payment of P148,440.00, within 10 days from receipt thereof, to cover the cost of the damage to the terrace. he bus company and Suelto offered a P30,000.00 settlement which Valdellon refused. Valdellon filed a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property against Suelto. After therequisite preliminary investigation, an Information was filed with the RTC of Quezon City. Valdellon also filed a separate civil complaint against Suelto and the bus company for damages. She prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor. 

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ISSUE: WON Suelto is guilty of reckless imprudence which resulted in the damage of Valdellon’s property

HELD: YES. Respondent People of the Philippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Suelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private respondent’s apartment. Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner Suelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint and when he testified in the civil case. Suelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of private respondent. Petitioners were burd ened to prove that the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the fault of petitioner Suelto. We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger jeepney into the lane of the bus he was driving. It was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner Suelto’s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger jeep coming from EDSA that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. EMERGENCY RULE: One who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own n egligence. In relation thereto, Article 2185 of the New Civil Code provides that “unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.” By his own admission, petitioner Suelto violated the Land Transportation and Traffic Code when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent. It is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution that the commercial apartment of Dr. Valdellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by Suelto. "It seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is quite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when Suelto tried to avoid the passenger jeepney." The damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. Had the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the jeep. If he were more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe. The severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. The accused was not d iligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a 

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dreamer Bar Review Notes full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street. AS TO DAMAGES: Under Article 2199 of the New Civil Code, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente) and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). As expostulated by the Court in PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals: Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of what a person already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. The burden is to establish one’s case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not presumed. The claimant must prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. Specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or conjectures. The Court further declared that “where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would h ave to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before replacement. In the present case, the only damage caused by petitioner Suelto’s act was to the terrace of private respondent’s apartment, costing P55,000.00. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that the CA erred in awarding P100,000.00 by way of actual damages to private respondent is correct. We agree that private respondent is entitled to exemplary damages, and find that the award given by the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, is reasonable. Considering the attendant circumstances, we rule that private respondent Valdellon is entitled to only P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The joint decision of the 

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[Torts and Damages] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is AFFIRMED WITH THE MODIFICATION that petitioner Suelto is sentenced to pay a fine of P55,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay to Erlinda V. Valdellon, jointly and severally, the total amount of P55,000.00 by way of actual damages, and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages. VILLA REY V. CA (GR L-25499, February 18, 1970) FACTS: At about 1:30 in the morning of March 17, 1960, an Izuzu First Class passenger bus owned and operated by the defendant, bearing Plate No. TPU-14871-Bulacan and driven by Laureano Casim, left Lingayen, Pangasinan, for Manila. Among its paying passengers was the deceased, Policronio Quintos, Jr. who sat on the first seat, second row, right side of the bus. At about 4:55 o'clock a.m. when the vehicle was nearing the northern approach of the Sadsaran Bridge on the national highway in barrio Sto. Domingo, municipality of Minalin, Pampanga, it frontally hit the rear side of a bu llcart filled with hay. As a result the end of a bamboo p ole placed on top of the hayload and tied to the cart to hold it in place, hit the right side of the windshield of the bus. The protruding end of the bamboo pole, about 8 feet long from the rear of the bullcart, penetrated through the glass windshield and landed on the face of Policronio Quintos, Jr. who, because of the impact, fell from his seat and was sprawled on the floor. The pole landed on his left eye and the bone of the left side of his face was fractured. He suffered other multiple wounds and was rendered unconscious due, among other causes to severe cerebral concussion. A La Mallorca passenger bus going in the opposite direction towards San Fernando, Pampanga, reached the scene of the mishap and it was stopped by Patrolman Felino Bacani of the municipal police force of Minalin who, in the meantime, had gone to the scene to investigate. Patrolman Bacani placed Policronio Quintos, Jr. and three other injured men who rode on the bullcart aboard the La Mallorca bus and brought them to the provincial hospital of Pampanga at San Fernando for medical assistance. Notwithstanding such assistance, Policronio Quintos, Jr. died at 3:15 p.m. on the same day, March 17, 1960, due to traumatic shock due to cerebral injuries. Policronio Quintos Jr. was single and the case for damages was filed by his 3 surviving sisters. The trial court awarded damages in the amount of P63,750, which the CA affirmed. ISSUE: WON the award for damages is correct. HELD: NO. At this juncture, it should be noted, also, that We are mainly concerned with the determination of the losses or damages sustained by the private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of his earnings, but of the support, they received or would h ave received from him had he not died in consequence of the negligence of petitioner's agent. In fixing the amount of 

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[Torts and Damages] that support, We must reckon with the "necessary expenses of his own living", which should be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has b een consistently held that earning capacity, as an element of damages to one's estate for his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or his capacity to acquire money, "less the necessary expense for his own living .3Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not loss of the entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only net earnings, not gross earning, are to be considered5 that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income6 and less living and other incidental expenses. All things considered, We are of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the deductible living and other expenses of the deceased at the sum of P1,184.00 a year, or about P100.00 a month, and that, consequently, the loss sustained by his sisters may be roughly estimated at P1,000.00 a year or P33,333.33 for the 33 -1/3 years of his life expectancy. To this sum of P33,333.33, the following should be added: (a) P12,000.00, pursuant to Arts. 104 and 107 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 2206 of our Civil Code, as construed and applied by this Court; (b) P1,727.95, actually spent by private respondents for medical and burial expenses; and (c) attorney's fee, which was fixed by the trial court, at P500.00, but which, in view of the appeal taken by petitioner herein, first to the Court of Appeals and later to this Supreme Court, should be increased to P2,500.00. In other words, the amount adjudged in the decision appealed from should be reduced to the aggregate sum of P49,561.28, with interest thereon, at the legal rate, from December 29, 1961, date of the promulgation of the decision of the trial court. M ercur y Dru g Corporati on v. Spouses H uang and Stephen 93 Huang

FACTS: There was a collision of two vehicles, a car driven by Stephen Huang and a truck driven by Del Rosario (owned by Mercury Drug). Both were traversing the C-5 Highway, north bound, coming from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the left innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right, when the truck suddenly swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.

Stephen Huang sustained massive injuries to his spinal cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations, Stephen Huang is paralyzed for life from his chest down and requires continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Sps. Huang fault Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless imprudence while driving, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in

the selection and supervision of its driver. On the other hand, Del Rosario faults Stephen Huang as the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. The RTC rendered a decision in Huang’s favor, and ordered Mercury Drug and Del Rosario as solidarily liable to pay: 1. P2,973,000.00 as actual damages; 2. As compensatory damages: a. P23,461,062.00 for life care cost of Stephen; b. P10,000,000.00 as and for lost or impaired earning capacity of Stephen; 3. P4,000,000.00 as moral damages; 4. P2,000,000.00 as exemplary damages; and 5. P1,000,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expense. The CA affirmed the decision but modified the award of moral damages to P1,000,000.00. HELD: Aside from being held negligent based from a research conducted by a physics expert and from the solidary liability of Mercury Drug for failure to exercise due diligence in the hiring and supervision of its employee pursuant to Art. 2180 because (1) the test conducted with Del Rosario was that for a Delivery Man and not for Truck Man; (2) when tested, instead of using a truck, Del Rosario was made to drive a Gallant (sedan); (3) his driving seminars were at least 12 years ago before the incident; and (4) he was driving without license because the same was confiscated for reckless driving. Thus, the Court upheld all the award for damages. As to the award of damages, the Court h eld as follows:  Actual Damages: Current Expenses - pursuant to Art. 2199, the Court upheld the award for actual damages because the claim by Sps. Huang were supported by receipts. The amount of P2,973,000.00 represented cost of hosp ital expenses, medicines, medical services and supplies, and nursing care services provided Stephen from December 20, 1996, the day of the accident, until December 1998; Future Medical Expenses and Life Care Costs The doctors who attended to Stephen are one in their prognosis that his chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he will need continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and o ther spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care and support of his family. The Court thus affirm the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of Stephen Huang, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he is expected to live; Lost or Impaired Earning Capacity - and the conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, for the loss or impairment of his earning 

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dreamer Bar Review Notes capacity, considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident. He was only seventeen years old, nearly six feet tall and weighed 175 pounds. He was in 4th year high school, and a member of the school varsity basketball team. He was also class president and editor-in-chief of the school annual. He had shown very good leadership qualities. He was looking forward to his college life, having just passed the entrance examinations of the UP, DLSU and the UA&P. The UST even offered him a chance to obtain an athletic scholarship, but the accident prevented him from attending the basketball try-outs. Without doubt, he was an exceptional student. He excelled both in his academics and extracurricular undertakings. Had the accident not happened, he had a rosy future ahead of him. He wanted to embark on a banking career, get married and raise children. NOTE: Other kinds of damages were also upheld by the Court, however, they’re deemed no longer relevant for the topic specific to this case.

[Torts and Damages]

As a consequence of the losses sustained, Eastern Shipping was compelled to pay the consignee P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants.

award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by way of clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for future guidance. I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages. II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be i mposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

The RTC and CA rendered a decision ordering Eastern Shipping to pay the amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of 12% per annum from October 1, 1982, the date of filing of this complaints, until fully paid.

For an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the court’s discretion with 6% per annum.

HELD: The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have called for different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the

With the court judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 12% per annum for such finality until its satisfaction, this interim

Interests; How Computed: pp. 970 to 973 of Aquino book.

Eastern Shippi ng L in es v. CA94

FACTS: Two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan for delivery vessel "SS EASTERN COMET" owned by Eastern Shipping Lines. The shipment was insured under Mercantile Insurance Company - Marine Insurance Policy. The shipment arrived in Metro Port Service, Inc., with one drum, said to be in bad order.

Eastern Shipping contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the consignee suffered losses totaling P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of defendants.

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[Torts and Damages] period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to forbearance of credit. 3.

BSP Circular 799 (July 2013) – dissolves the distinction – 6% per annum for loan or forbearance of money in the absence of an express contract as to such rate interest.

interim period being deemed to be by then an

COMMENT: BSP Circular 799 is ultra vires and should be declared void ab initio. It cannot repeal laws such as the Civil Code and the pronouncement of the Court (Sta. Maria). NOTE: It is submitted that unless otherwise stated by the Court, the BSP Circular stands as a lawful action by the BSP. Furthermore, the Court, speaking through Justice Peralta, declared in the case of Nacar v. Gallery F r a m e s 95 that: “To recapitulate and for future guidance, the guidelines laid down in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines are accordingly modified to embody BSP-MB Circular No. 799, as follows: I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on “Damages” of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages. II.With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate o f interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of th e Civil Code. 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment o f the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for 95

G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013. A Court En Banc decision which was unanimously concurred in by all of the justices.

the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this equivalent to a forbearance of credit. And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein.

Prevailing Indemnity for Death

96 People v. Ami nol a

FACTS: This case involves a robbery with homicide through the use of unlicensed firearm made by Aminola. The Information alleged as follows: “On or about August 31, 1999 in Taguig, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with an unlicensed gun, with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest one Nestor Aranas Gabuya cash amounting to P150,000.00, placed inside the bag of the said victim which was forcibly taken by the respondents, necklace worth P35,000.00, Timex watch worth P4,000.00 and a licensed 9 mm. Bernardelli gun with serial number 302617-50 worth P45,000.00; that by reason or on the occasion of the crime of robbery, accused, Datu Ban Ampatuan y Panaguilan, Abdul Aminola y Omar, a.k.a. “Roy,” Alimudin Laminda y Macacua, a.k.a. “Modin,” Abdulan Sandaton y Sangcopan, a.k.a. “Kulem” and Mike Batimbang y Abubakar, a.k.a. “Nuke” with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shot Nestor Aranas Gabuya with the gun into the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds which directly caused his death.”

Consequently, he was likewise charged of Illegal Possession of Firearms. Prosecution’s Version – At around 5pm of August 31, 1999, Nestor Gabuya closed shop at his motorcycle and bicycle spare parts store. He then headed home on his bike. Unbeknownst to him, Aminola and co-accused Alimudin Laminda were observing him from a nearby basketball court. Aminola proceeded to follow Gabuya. Upon catching up with Gabuya, Aminola put his arms around Gabuya and wrestled for the bag Gabuya was carrying. Gabuya refused to let go of his bag, whereupon Aminola pulled out a gun and shot 96

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him. Gabuya fell to the ground but still resisted, prompting Aminola to take another shot. In the evening of September 1, 1999, Major Migano’s team went to the hideout, where Abdul (informant) identified four of Gabuya’s assailants. One of them, Aminola, was found in possession of an unlicensed .45 caliber gun with one (1) magazine and two (2) ammunitions. Defense’s Version - Maitimbang testified that he was arrested on September 2, 1999 after arriving home from work due to a grenade found in his possession. At the police precinct, he was not informed that his arrest was made in connection with the death of Gabuya. It was only during the inquest, according to him, that he saw his fellow accused for the first time. He further averred that Gabuya’s widow pinpointed him as one of the suspects when she learned he was a Muslim. He claimed his name was only included and superimposed on the list of suspects.

RTC ruled that Aminola is GUILTY of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and were sentenced to suffer Death Penalty. They were ordered to indemnify the heirs of Gabuya as follows: The accused Abdul Aminola y Omar and Mike Maitimbang y Abubakar are likewise sentenced, separately: a) To indemnify the heirs of NESTOR ARANAS GABUYA in the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity. b) The amount of P50,000.00 each as moral damages. c) The amount of P30,000.00 each as exemplary damages. HELD: As to the issue of amount of damages, the Court held:

We modify the damages awarded by the lower court. Civil indemnity of PhP 50,000 is given without need of proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused’s responsibility for it. If, however, the commission of robbery with homicide is attended by a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as here, that requires the imposition of the death penalty (such as the use of an unlicensed firearm), the civil indemnity for the victim shall be PhP 75,000. Moral damages awarded in the amount of PhP 50,000 must also be increased to PhP 75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence. The exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 was correctly awarded, since under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, as in the instant case.

(Annotation to follow) 97 Buenaventur a v. CA and Buenaventur a

FACTS: This case involves two consolidated cases for petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based from psychological incapacity of Noel Buenaventura.

The RTC ruled, among others, as follows: xxx xxx xxx 2) Ordering Noel to pay Isabel moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision plus attorney’s fees of P100,000.00; 3) Ordering Noel to pay the Isabel expenses of litigation of P50,000.00, plus costs; xxx xxx xxx 5) Ordering him to give a regular support in favor of his son Javy Singh Buenaventura in the amount of P15,000.00 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises; xxx xxx xxx The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto, while another Resolution of CA increased the amount of monthly support to Javy from P15,000.00 to P20,000.00. HELD: The award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are without merit.

As to mor al damages , the Court held : The CA and the TC considered the acts of Noel after the marriage as proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Nevertheless, said courts considered these acts as willful and hence as grounds for granting moral damages. It is contradictory to characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. No such evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. For the same reason, since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that one must assume and discharge as a consequence of marriage, it removes the basis for the contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was deceived, it was not due to a willful act on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, the award of moral damages

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[Torts and Damages] was without basis in law and in fact. NOTE: Psychological incapacity is something beyond the control of the party; Moral damages is something that is willful. They contradict each other. As to exemplar y damages : Since the grant of moral damages was not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages are imposed in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. As to attorney’s fees: The acts or omissions of petitioner which led the lower court to deduce his psychological incapacity, and his act in filing the complaint for the annulment of his marriage cannot be considered as unduly compelling the private respondent to litigate, since both are grounded on petitioner’s psychological incapacity, which as explained above is a mental incapacity causing an utter inability to comply with the obligations of marriage. Hence, neither can be a ground for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Furthermore, since the award of moral and exemplary damages is no longer justified, the award of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation is left without basis. As to the issue of support: Moot and academic, Javy has already attained the age of majority during the issuance of this case (he’s already 25 years old). NOTE: I no longer delved with the partition issue as that is no longer a part of the topic at hand. ABS-CBN v. CA 98

FACTS: In this case, there was an exchange of offers and counter-offers between ABS-CBN, through Ms. SantosConcio, and VIVA, through Mr. Del Rosario in televising VIVA’s films. ABS-CBN has the right of first refusal. During this period, when ABS-CBN rejected VIVA’s offer of a film package of 104 films (52 films and 52 re-runs) in the amount of P60M and instead presented another counter-offer of having 14 films in the amount of P36M, VIVA h ad a deal with RBS (now GMA), which agreed to the film package.

Thus, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a complaint for specific performance with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against RBS, VIVA, and Del Rosario, wherein the RTC issued the said TRO, starting with the film Maging Sino Ka Man, which was scheduled to be shown on RBS’ channel 7 at 7PM of May 28, 1992. However, the case was resolved by the RTC in RBS and VIVA’s favor, and ruled as follows: (1) The complaint is hereby dismissed; (2) ABS-CBN is ordered to pay RBS the following: a) P107,727.00 the amount of premium paid by RBS to the surety which issued defendants RBS’s bond to lift the injunction; b) P191,843.00 for the amount of print advertisement for “Maging Sino Ka Man” in various newspapers; c) Attorney’s fees in the amount of P1 million; d) P5 million as and by way of moral damages;

dreamer Bar Review Notes e) P5 million as and by way of exemplary damages; (3) For VIVA, ABS-CBN is ordered to pay P212,000.00 by way of reasonable attorney’s fees. (4) The cross-claim of RBS against VIVA is dismissed. (5) ABS-CBN to pay the costs. HELD: Though there was no perfected contract between ABS-CBN and VIVA in this case, the Court held that the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages to RBS are not correct.

The Court further ratiocinated: As to actual damages: The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasidelict. It arose from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN’s alleged knowledge of lack of cause of action. Thus paragraph 12 of RBS’s Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-claim under the heading COUNTERCLAIM specifically alleges: 12. ABS-CBN filed the complaint knowing fully well that it has no cause of action against RBS. As a result thereof, RBS suffered actual damages in the amount of P6,621,195.32. Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be comprehended under the above law on actual damages. RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows: ART. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of hid rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. ART. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the damages which the defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable from the injunctive bond. In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter. Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the counterbond. Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print advertisements for “Maging Sino Ka Man” for lack of sufficient legal basis. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order and later, a writ of preliminary injunction on the basis of its determination that there existed sufficient ground for the issuance thereof. Notably, the RTC did not dissolve the injunction on the ground of lack of legal and factual basis, but because of the plea of RBS that it be allowed to put up a counterbond.

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dreamer Bar Review Notes As to mor al damages: Moral damages are in the category of

an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured p arty to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption or the part of the trial court. The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which can be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it “has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation” is an obiter dictum . On this score alone the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation. As to exemplary damages: These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one o r more aggravating circumstances; in quasi-delicts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasidelict. Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 2 1 of the Civil Code. The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2) which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction; while Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: (1) there is an act which is legal, (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy, and (3) and it is done with intent to injure. Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishon est purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.

[Torts and Damages] There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and sub ject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If damages result from a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria. 99 Quezon Ci ty Govern ment v. Dacara

FACTS: Fulgencio Dacara, Jr., a minor, while driving a sedan, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacara, Jr. (for easy navigation, I’ll call him “Jun”) allegedly sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.

Dacara, Sr. (hereinafter referred to as “Fulgencio”) sought indemnification which yielded negative results. Fulgencio, in behalf of his son, filed a complaint against QC Gov’t and Engr. Tiamzon. Fulgencio prayed that the amount of not less than P20,000.00 actual or compensatory damages, P150,000.00 moral damages, P30,000.00 exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 attorney’s fees and costs of the suit be awarded to him. In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses, QC Gov’t admitted the occurrence of the incident but claimed that they exercised due care by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid accident. Hence, the reason why Jun fell into the diggings was precisely because of the latter’s negligence and failure to exercise due care. RTC and CA ruled in Fulgencio’s favor, and awarded them the following: the sum of P20,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages, P10,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and other costs of suit. HELD: To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury - whether physical, mental, or psychological - clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.

Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in physical injury. In the present case, the Complaint alleged that Fulgencio’s son sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he

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[Torts and Damages] suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the open without any warning device whatsoever, however, no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Jun’s bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article 2219(2) of the Civil Code.

family events especially wedding celebrations and for which they were entitled to be paid actual, moral and exemplary damages including attorney’s fees. In its Answer, PVE claimed that it had diligently supervised its VTR crew in the video recording of petitioners’ wedding and reception and that its crew acted in good faith and with due care and proper diligence of a good father of a family. PVE, a division of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc., disclaimed any liability for the damaged videotape by invoking forcemajeure or fortuitous event and asserted that a defective transistor caused the breakdown in its video tape recorder. However, said respondent failed to substantiate its bare allegation by presenting in evidence the alleged defective transistor before the trial court. Instead, it presented another component [ of the same kind. ISSUE: WON spouses Herbosa are entitled to award of damages for breach of contract. HELD: YES. At any rate, in order that fortuitous event may exempt PVE or respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. from liability, it is necessary that it be free from negligence. The record shows, however, that the alleged malfunctioning of the video tape recorder occurred at the beginning of the video coverage at the residence of the bride. The PVE crew miserably failed to detect the defect in the video tape recorder and that they discovered the same rather too late after the wedding reception at the Manila Hotel. There appeared to be no valid reason why the alleged defect in the video tape recorder had gone undetected. There was more than sufficient time for the PVE crew to check the video tape recorder for the reason that they arrived at the bride’s residence at 6:30 o’clock in the morning while they departed for the wedding ceremonies at the Malate Church at 9:00 o’clock in the morning. Besides, PVE was admittedly furnished earlier by the petitioners with a copy of the script of the scenes to be recorded so that it could prepare and organize its contracted task. PVE studio manager Ben Zarate even testified that ordinarily, the standard playback test to monitor the functioning of the video tape recorder was required at every opportunity. In the instant case, a playback test on three (3) occasions, preferably at the beginning, middle and towards the end portions of the video coverage would have been sufficient. Based on the investigation allegedly conducted by its officers, PVE or respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. claimed that its crew, whom it never presented to testify during the trial of the case, allegedly conducted a playback test at the residence of the b ride and that the next playback test was conducted after the wedding reception at the Manila Hotel where the defect in the video tape recorder was allegedly discovered for the first time. A review of the records however, raised doubts as to whether the crew actually conducted a playback test at the residence of the bride. A very minimal portion, lasting only for two and one half (2 ½) minutes, of the pre-departure activities at the residence of the bride had been recorded while the rest of the video tape was damaged. This strongly suggests that any alleged defect 

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Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the claim of Fulgencio that his moral sufferings were due to the negligence of QC Gov’t. The Decision of the trial court, which summarizes the testimony of Fulgencio’s four witnesses, makes no mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation and the like. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the p hysical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and substantial proof o f the suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation are definite findings as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered. Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded -- whether in a civil or a criminal case -in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The award of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. SPOUSES HERBOSA V. PVE (GR 119086, Jan. 25, 2002) FACTS: The facts show that on January 25, 1982 petitioner spouses sued Professional Video Equipment (PVE for brevity), a division of private respondent Solid Distributors, Inc., for breach of contract with damages. The case stemmed from the failure of PVE to record on video the petitioners’ wedding celebration allegedly due to the gross negligence of its crew as well as the lack of supervision on the part of the general manager of the PVE. Petitioners also alleged that said failure on the part of PVE to perform its obligation caused deep disappointment, anxiety and an irreparable break in the continuity of an established family tradition of recording by film or slide historical and momentous 

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dreamer Bar Review Notes in the video tape recorder could have easily been detected by the PVE crew at the residence of the bride had a sufficient playback test been conducted therein prior to their departure for the wedding ceremonies at the Malate Church. The failure to record on videotape the wedding celebration of the petitioners constitutes malicious breach of contract as well as gross negligence on the part of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. PVE or respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. cannot seek refuge under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code by claiming that it exercised due care in the selection and supervision of its employees and that its employees are experienced in their respective trade. That defense, as provided in the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, may be availed of only where the liability arises from culpa aquilana and not from culpa contractual such as in the case at bar. However, the award of damages to the petitioners cannot be lumped together as was done by the trial court. It is basic that the claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees must each be independently identified and justified. In this connection, Article 1170 of the New Civil Code provides that “those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.” For failure of PVE, a division of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc., to comply with its obligation under the video tape coverage contract, petitioners are entitled to actual damages at least in the amount of One Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Three Pesos (P1,423.00) representing their downpayment in that contract. Ordinarily, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract because such an action is not among those expressly mentioned in Article 2219 of the New Civil Code. However, moral damages are recoverable for breach of contract w here the breach was wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. The wanton and reckless failure and neglect to timely check and remedy the video tape recorder by the PVE crew who are all employees of respondent Solid Distributors, Inc. indicates a malicious breach of contract and gross negligence on the part of said respondent in the discharge of its contractual obligations. Consequently, the petitioners who suffered mental anguish and tortured feelings thereby, are entitled to an award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages which is hereby fixed in the amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) is justified, under the premises, to serve as a warning to all entities engaged in the same business to observe good faith and due diligence in the fulfillment of their contractual obligations. Additionally, the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is also proper in accordance with Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 

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[Torts and Damages] IMMACULATE CONCEPTION ACADEMY V. AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE, INC. (GR. 173575, Feb. 2, 2011) FACTS: This case is about the rescission of a lease contract on the ground that the building turned out to be structurally unsafe even as the lessee had previously inspected the same. Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA) owned a threestorey building in Dasmariñas, Cavite. The property caught the eye of AMA Computer College, Inc. (AMA) and it sought to buy the same but did not succeed. Subsequently, after inspecting the building, AMA settled on leasing it. The parties signed a contract of lease for 10 years from September 22, 1997 to September 21, 2007. The agreed rent was P561,000.00 plus VAT per month. In accordance with the contract, AMA paid ICA P500,000.00 in earnest money, three months advance rentals, and security deposit. After the signing of the contract, officials of AMA reinspected the building and began renovating it for the upcoming school year. But during an inspection, AMA’s Chief Operating Officer for its Cavite Campus noted several cracks on the floor and walls of the building’s second storey. This prompted more inspections. Eventually, AMA applied with the municipal engineer’s office for an occupancy permit. After inspection, Municipal Engineer Gregorio C. Bermejo wrote AMA a letter dated September 29, 1997, detailing his findings and conclusion “that the building is unsafe for human occupancy.” On the same date, September 29, 1997, AMA wrote ICA demanding the return of all that it paid within 24 hours from notice. AMA cited the building’s structural deficiency, which it regarded as a violation of ICA’s implied warranty against hidden d efects. AMA did not pursue the lease contract and instead leased another property from a different party. When its request for reimbursement remained unheeded, AMA filed an action for breach of contract and d amages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against ICA before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite. In its complaint, AMA alleged that ICA (represented by the late Dr. Paulo C. Campos) fraudulently entered into the lease agreement, fraudulently breached the same, and violated its implied warranty against hidden defects; that despite knowledge of the instability of the building, ICA insisted on offering it to AMA; and that ICA had been unable to produce the building’s certificate of occupancy. AMA prayed for restitution of the amounts it paid to ICA with interest and award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. RTC ruled in favor of AMA and awarded the return of 5 months deposit with interest of 6% per annum and exemplary damage of P300K and P200K for attorney’s fees. CA affirmed the decision of RTC but removed the award for exemplary damage and attor ney’s fees. ICA and Dr. Campos filed a certiorari praying for dismissal of the case and moral and exemplary damage 

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[Torts and Damages] in the amount of P90M and P10M and attorney’s fees on the basis of besmirched reputation. ISSUE: (1) WON AMA was justified in rescinding the contract of lease. (2) WON ICA is entitled to damages. HELD: (1) NO; (2) NO, because he Dr. Campos died . 1. Per SC, AMA was not justified in immediately rescinding the lease contract because the lease provides that “major repairs or those affecting the st ructural condition of the building and those due to fortuitous event shall be for the account of the LESSOR.” Instead of demanding the return of its deposit within 24 hours and accusing ICA of fraudulent representation as to the condition of the building, AMA should have gone to ICA to enforce the lease as for ICA to make the necessary repairs. AMA belatedly invoke Article 1660, even it may be deemed to have initially waived its rights. Art. 1660. If a dwelling place or any other building intended for human habitation is in such a condition that its use brings imminent and serious danger to life or health, the lessee may terminate the lease at once by notifying the lessor, even if at the time the contract was perfected the former knew of the dangerous condition or waived the right to rescind the lease on account of this condition. To be entitled to moral damages, ICA needed to pro ve that it had a good reputation and that AMA’s action besmirched the same. Such proof is wanting in this case. As for Dr. Campos, he has amply proved that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, and social humiliation following AMA’s unfounded accusation that he fraudulently misled AMA regarding the structural condition of ICA’s building. However, due to his untimely demise before the finality of this case, his claim for moral damages does not survive and is not transmissible to his substitutes, for being extremely personal to him. FILIPINAS BROADCASTING NETWORK V. AGO MEDICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CENTER-BICOL CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE (GR. 141994, Jan. 17, 2005) FACTS: Exposé” is a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo ‘Mel’ Rima (“Rima”) and Hermogenes ‘Jun’ Alegre (“Alegre”). Exposé is aired every morning over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (“FBNI”). “Exposé” is heard over Legazpi City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. In the morning of 14 and 15 December 1989, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of Medicine (“AMEC”) and its administrators. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago (“Ago”), as Dean of AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre on 27 February 1990. Among the allegations were: if you fail one subject in medicine, you need to repeat the entire semester; that the school was charging tuition fee (example in Anatomy), even though there was no teacher to teach it; that the school is a dumping ground for morally unfit teachers. 

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ISSUE: WON Alegre, Rima and FBNI (their employer) are liable for damages. HELD: YES. The SC affirmed the CA decision that Alegre, Rima nd FBNI are solidary liable for damages but reduced the award from P300K to P150K and removed the attorney’s fees. This is a civil action for damages as a result of the allegedly defamatory remarks of Rima and Alegre against AMEC. While AMEC did not point out clearly the legal basis for its complaint, a reading of the complaint reveals that AMEC’s cau se of action is based on Articles 30 and 33 of the Civil Code. Article 30 authorizes a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a criminal offense. On the other hand, Article 33 particularly provides that the injured party may bring a separate civil action for damages in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries. AMEC also invokes Article 19[ of the Civil Code to justify its claim for damages. AMEC cites Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code to hold FBNI solidarily liable with Rima and Alegre. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead. There is no question that the broadcasts were made public and imputed to AMEC defects or circumstances tending to cause it dishonor, discredit and contempt. Rima and Alegre’s remarks such as “greed for money on the part of AMEC’s administrators”; “AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage of xxx moral and physical misfits”; and AMEC students who graduate “will be liabilities rather than assets” of the society are libelous per se. Taken as a whole, the broadcasts suggest that AMEC is a money-making institution where physically and morally unfit teachers abound. Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious. Rima and Alegre failed to show adequately their good intention and justifiable motive in airing the supposed gripes of the students. As hosts of a documentary or public affairs program, Rima and Alegre should have presented the public issues “free from inaccurate and misleading information.” Hearing the students’ alleged complaints a month before the exposé, they had sufficient time to verify their sources and information. However, Rima and Alegre hardly made a thorough investigation of the students’ alleged gripes. Neither did they inquire about nor confirm the purported irregularities in AMEC from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Alegre testified that he merely went to AMEC to verify his report from an alleged AMEC official who refused to disclose any information. Alegre simply relied on the words of the students “because they were many and not because there is proof that what they are saying is true.” This plainly shows Rima and Alegre’s reckless disregard of whether their report was true or not. 

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dreamer Bar Review Notes FBNI argues vigorously that malice in law does not apply to this case. Citing Borj al v. Cour t of Appeals , FBNI contends that the broadcasts “fall within the coverage of qualifiedly privileged communications” for being commentaries on matters of public interest. Such being the case, AMEC sho uld prove malice in fact or actual malice. Since AMEC allegedly failed to prove actual malice, there is no libel. The SC dismissed this contention because unlike the Borjal case, the broadcast were not based on established facts. AS TO MORAL DAMAGES: FBNI contends that AMEC is not entitled to moral damages because it is a corporation. A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock. The Court of Appeals cites Mambulao L umber Co. v. PNB, et al to justify the award of moral damages. However, the Court’s statement in Mambulao that “a corporation may have a good reputation which, if besmirched, may also be a ground for the award of moral damages” is an obiter dictum. Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219[43] of the Civil Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages. On FBNI’s CLAIM THAT IT EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELETION OF ITS EMPLOYEES: The SC states that basis of the present action is a tort. Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. Joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. Thus, AMEC correctly anchored its cause of action against FBNI on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. An employer and employee are solidarily liable for a defamatory statement by the employee within the course and scope of his or her employment, at least when the employer authorizes or ratifies the defamation. In this case, Rima and Alegre were clearly performing their official duties as hosts of FBNI’s radio program Exposé when they aired the broadcasts. FBNI neither alleged nor proved that Rima and Alegre went beyond the scope of their work at that time. There was likewise no showing that FBNI did not authorize and ratify the defamatory broadcasts. FBNI claims that it “has taken all the precaution in the selection of Rima and Alegre as broadcasters, bearing in mind their qualifications.” However, no clear and convincing 

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[Torts and Damages] evidence shows that Rima and Alegre underwent FBNI’s “regimented process” of application. Furthermore, FBNI admits that Rima and Alegre had deficiencies in their KBP accreditation, which is one of FBNI’s requirements before it hires a broadcaster. Significantly, membership in the KBP, while voluntary, indicates the broadcaster’s strong commitment to observe the broadcast industry’s rules and regulations. Clearly, these circumstances show FBNI’s lack of diligence in selecting and supervising Rima and Alegre. Hence, FBNI is solidarily liable to pay damages together with Rima and Alegre.

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Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Article 2222. The court may award nominal damages in every obligation arising from any source enumerated in article 1157, or in every case where any property right has been invaded. Article 2223. The adjudication of nominal damages shall preclude further contest upon the right involved and all accessory questions, as between the parties to the suit, or their respective heirs and assigns.

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100

Pineda, pp. 283, citing Ventanilla v. Centeno, 1 SCRA 215. Art. 2216; Ibid. pp. 284.

Basis, Nature and Purpose – not for indemnification of loss but for vindication of a right violated.100 Every injury from its very nature legally imports damages, or that the injury complained of would in the future be evidence in favor of the wrongdoer, especially where, if continued for a sufficient length of time, the invasion of the plaintiff’s rights would ripen into a prescriptive right in favor of the defendant. The Code Commission further justified this stating that, there are instances when vindication or recognition of the plaintiff’s right is of the utmost importance to him. Assessment of Nominal Damages – left to the sound discretion of the court in accordance with the circumstances of each case. 101 Cannot Co-exist with Compensatory Damages – where the court has already awarded compensatory and exemplary damages that is already a juridical recognition that plaintiff’s right was violated. Hence, the award of nominal damages is unnecessary and improper.102 Can Co-exist with Attorney’s Fees – as attorney’s fees are not compensatory damages. D e m i n i m i s n o n c u r a t e l ex – “the law does not cure or

bother with trifles” All Sources of Obligation May Give Rise to Nominal Damages – the court may award nominal damages in any obligation arising from any of the five (5) sources. In addition, nominal damages may be awarded where any

102

Pineda, pp. 284, citing Vda. De Medina v. Cresencia, 99 Phil. 506.

101

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[Torts and Damages] property right has been invaded such as in trespass upon property (Art. 2222, last clause). (Complete Annotation to follow)

F ontana Resort v. Sps. Tan

FACTS: Sometime in March 1997, Sps. Tan bought from RNDC two class “D” shares of stock in Fontana Resort and Country Club, Inc., enticed by the promises of RNDC’s sales agents that Fontana would construct a park with first-class leisure facilities in Clark Field, Pampanga, to be called Fontana Leisure Park; that FLP would be fully developed and operational by the first quarter of 1998; and that FRCCI class “D” shareholders would be admitted to one membership in the country club, which entitled them to use park facilities and stay at a two- bedroom villa for “five (5) o rdinary weekdays and two (2) weekends every year for free.”

Two years later, Sps. Tan filed before the SEC a Complaint for refund of the P387,300.00 they spent to purchase Fontana shares of stock from RNDC. Sps. Tan alleged that they had been deceived into buying Fontana shares because of RNDC’s fraudulent misrepresentations. Sps. Tan narrated that they were able to book and avail themselves of free accommodations at an FLP villa on September 5, 1998, a Saturday. They requested that an FLP villa again be reserved for their free use on October 17, 1998, another Saturday, for the celebration of their daughter’s 18th birthday, but were refused because according to Fon tana, the Sps. Tan were only entitled to free accommodations at Fontana for “one week annually consisting of five (5) ordinary days, one (1) Saturday and one (1) Sunday[,]” and that Sps. Tan had already exhausted their free Saturday pass for the year. According to Sps. Tan, they weren’t inf ormed of such rule. The next year, Sps. Tan attempted once more to book and reserve a Fontana villa for their free use on April 1, 1999, a Thursday. Their reservation was confirmed by a certain Murphy Magtoto. However, on March 3, 1999, another country club employee named Shaye called Sps. Tan to say that their reservation for April 1 , 1999 was cancelled because the FLP was already fully booked. Thus, Sps. Tan filed a Complaint with the SEC sometime in March 1997 for a refund of the amount they paid for the said shares. SEC-SICD

Almeda v. Carino Carino-Seller Almeda- Buyer 8 titled land, 3 untitled, Nominal Damages- Almeda claims he did not act malevolently or otherwise Court says he didn’t need to: Its award is thus not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right,

dreamer Bar Review Notes also, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply a recognition of the existence of a technical injury Attorney’s Fees- attorney's fees and litigation expenses can berecovered in cases where the court deems it just and equitable. See number 11 on attorney’s fees, they were forced to litigate after 2 demands and 2 lawyers for A DECADE. (Almeda had 16, but only to delay the trial) Interest Rate- they stipulated on 12%, actually. And when the judgment of the court awarding the sum of money becomes final and executory, a 12% legal interest per annum shall also be imposed from such finality until satisfaction thereof, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Agabon V. Riviera Inc Illegal dismissal – their dismissal was for just cause but had a procedural infirmity: they were not notified. The dismissal should be upheld but the employer is liable. Nominal Damages- the violation of petitioner’s right to statutory due process. (30k in this case) Temperate Damages Araneta V. Bank of America Araneta’s checks for 500 and 150 dollars were wrongfully dishonored. It happened before when a check for 500 was also dishonored. After the last checks, he filed a case against the Bank of America. He asked for Actual, moral, temperate, exemplay and attorney’s fees as damages, all given by the RTC. When on appeal, the CA removed actual and temperate, and lessened the others, he appealed to the SC where the temperate was returned (but not the actual, because it was not of appellate jurisdiction and was evidence for the lower courts.) For instance, injury to one's commercial credit or to the goodwill of a business firm is often hard to show with certainty in terms of money-temperate damages Yes, besmirched rep is moral damages, but BOA did its best to repair the damages. Considering the fact that it went all the way to the SC, attorney’s fees. DeGuzman V. Tumolva Deguzman had an orphanage with a perimeter fence made. Contractor Tumolva made it with deviations. When milenyo struck, the fence was destroyed, tumolva claimed act of God and wanted negotiations, elder lady Degz didnt want to talk. As to actual damages, SC: heck noooo. Engineer should take the stand and swear as witness. Not just calculations and affidavits. As to temperate damages: Undoubtedly, De Guzman suffered pecuniary loss brought about by the collapse of the perimeter fence by reason of the Contractor's negligence and failure to comply with the specifications. As she


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dreamer Bar Review Notes failed to prove the exact amount of damage with certainty as required by law, the CA was correct in awarding temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages. As to moral damages: Her testimony, however, did not provide specific details of the suffering she allegedly went through after the fence collapsed while she was miles away in the United States As to exemplary: there is negligence on the part of Contractor, but it is neither wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, nor malevolent. The Court regards the deviations as excusable due to the unavailability of the approved construction materials. Besides, these were made known to De Guzman's project manager who was present all the time during the construction. Indeed, no deliberate intent on the part of the Contractor to defraud the orphanage's benefactors was ever shown, much less proved. Liquidated Damages Radio Wealth Finance Sps. Del Rosario borrowed money and failed to pay it. THERE WAS NO DATE OF PAYMENT ON PN. A late payment penalty charge of two and a half (2.5%) percent per month shall be added to each unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully paid. “On the contrary, the Note expressly stipulated that the debt should be amortized monthly in installments of P11,579 for twelve consecutive months. While the specific date on which each installment would be due was left blank, the Note clearly provided that each installment should be payable each month. Furthermore, it also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment penalty, both of which showed the intention of the parties that the installments should be paid at a definite date. Had they intended that the debtors could pay as and when they could, there would have been no need for these two clauses.” 25% liquidated damages was inuquitous and unconscionable. Exemplary Damages Cathay Pacific v. Vasquez LESSON: Excessive awards of Damages Facts: Respondents-spouses Dr. Daniel Earnshaw Vazquez and Maria Luisa Madrigal Vazquez are frequent flyers of Cathay and are Gold Card members of its Marco Polo Club. The Vazquezes, together with their maid and 2 friends Pacita Cruz and Josefina Vergel de Dios, went to Hongkong for pleasure and business. For their return

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[Torts and Damages] flight to Manila, the Vazquezes were given Business Class boarding passes but when boarding time was announced, the ground stewardess approached Dr. Vazquez and told him that their accommodations were upgraded to First Class. Dr. Vazquez refused the upgrade, reasoning that it would not look nice for them as hosts to travel in First Class and their guests, in the Business Class; and moreover, they were going to discuss business matters during the flight. He also told the stewardess that she could have other passengers instead transferred to the First Class Section. The stewardess informed them that the Business Class was fully booked, and that since they were Marco Polo Club members they had the priority to be upgraded to the First Class. Dr. Vazquez continued to refuse, so the stewardess told them that if they would not avail themselves of the privilege, they would not be allowed to take the flight. Eventually, after talking to his two friends, Dr. Vazquez gave in. Upon their return to Manila, the Vazquezes, demanded that they be indemnified in the amount of 1M for the "humiliation and embarrassment" caused by its employees. They also demanded "a written apology from the management of Cathay, preferably a responsible person with a rank of no less than the Country Manager, as well as the apology from the stewardess. After Cathay’s failure to give them any feedback, the Vazquezes instituted before the RTC an action for damages against Cathay, praying for the payment to each of them the amounts of P250,000 as temperate damages; P500,000 as moral damages; P500,000 as exemplary or corrective damages; and P250,000 as attorney’s fees. The Trail Court rendered decision in favor of the Vazquezes and decreed a s follows: a) Nominal damages in the amount of P100,000.00 for each plaintiff; b) Moral damages in the amount of P2,000,000.00 for each plaintiff; c) Exemplary damages in the amount of P5,000,000.00 for each plaintiff; d) Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation in the amount of P1,000,000.00 for each plaintiff; and e) Costs of suit. On appeal by the petitioners, the CA deleted the award for exemplary damages; and it reduced the awards for moral and nominal damages and the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. The Vazquezes and Cathay separately filed motions for a reconsideration of the decision, both of which were denied by the Court of Appeals. Cathay seasonably filed with us this petition in this case. Issue: Whether or not respondent spouses are entitled to Exemplary damages? Held: NO


[Torts and Damages] Moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or where the mishap resulted in the death of a passenger. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does not include moral and exemplary damages. In this case, we have ruled that the breach of contract of carriage, which consisted in the involuntary upgrading of the Vazquezes’ seat accommodation, was not attended by fraud or bad faith. The Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages has, therefore, no leg to stand on. The deletion of the award for exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is correct. It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender must be accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner . Such requisite is absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. Since the Vazquezes are not entitled to any of these damages, the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. And where the awards for moral and exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorney’s fees. The most that can be adjudged in favor of the Vazquezes for Cathay’s breach of contract i s an award for nominal damages under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: Article 2221 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Nonetheless, considering that the breach was intended to give more benefit and advantage to the Vazquezes by upgrading their Business Class accommodation to First Class because of their valued status as Marco Polo members, we reduce the award for nominal damages to P5,000. Final Ruling: the instant petition is hereby partly GRANTED. The awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees are set aside and deleted, and the award for nominal damages is reduced to P5,000. - K, Macasieb (sermon ni SC sa TC! For info lang..)

dreamer Bar Review Notes Before writing finis to this decision, we find it well-worth to quote the apt observation of the Court of Appeals regarding the awards adjudged by the trial court: We are not amused but alarmed at the lower court’s unbelievable alacrity, bordering on the scandalous, to award excessive amounts as damages. In their complaint, appellees asked for P1 million as moral damages but the lower court awarded P4 million; they asked for P500,000.00 as exemplary damages but the lower court cavalierly awarded a whooping P10 million; they asked for P250,000.00 as attorney’s fees but were awarded P2 million; they did not ask for nominal damages but were awarded P200,000.00. It is as if the lower court went on a rampage, and why it acted that way is beyond all tests of reason. In fact the excessiveness of the total award invites the suspicion that it was the result of "prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court." The presiding judge of the lower court is enjoined to hearken to the Supreme Court’s admonition in Singson vs. CA (282 SCRA 149 [1997]), where it said: The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited by the principle that t h e am o u n t awarded should no t be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court… .

and in Alitalia Airways vs. CA (187 SCRA 763 [1990], where it was held: Nonetheless, we agree with the injunction expressed by the Court of Appeals that passengers must not prey on international airlines for damage awards, like "trophies in a safari." After all neither the social standing nor prestige of the passenger should determine the extent to which he would suffer because of a wrong done, since the dignity affronted in the individual is a quality inherent in him and not conferred by these social indicators. Bright Maritime Corporation v. Fantonial Attorney’s Fees Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered, except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded; (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest; (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff; (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff; (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid, just and demandable claim;


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[Torts and Damages]

(6) In actions for legal support; (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers; (8) In a ctions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws; (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime; (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded; (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. In all cases, the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.’’ Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani v. Manila Water Company

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Torts and Damages (Partial Reviewer)

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