Torts Midterms

TORTS AND DAMAGES

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. (n)

The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.

Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103) Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)

Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

Art. 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.

Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.

Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

JD-2 AUF-SOL MIDTERMS

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or falling from the same. Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a government controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official.

Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.

Tort Art. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.

Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.

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In common law, tort is an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages. It is an act or omission producing an injury to another, without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said act or omission may be said to be a natural outgrowth or incident.

N.B. Tort law not concerned with the criminal liability of the offender. Kinds of tort liabilities: 1.

Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.

2.

Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.

Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.

Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.

Art. 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown

3.

Negligence tort – Omission to do acts required under the attendant circumstances resulting in damage or injury to another. It is a voluntary act or omission which results in injury to others without intending to cause the same. Intentional tort - Conduct where the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act to which the law declared wrong or believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. Intentional torts include assault, battery, false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy and interference of property. Strict liability tort - The person is made liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts.

Major purposes of tort law 1.

2. 3. 4.

To provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise take the law into their own hands; Deter wrongful conduct; To encourage socially responsible behaviour; To restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law can do this, by compensating them for their injury.

Tort vs quasi-delict RAMIREZ G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977 PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of AgapitoElcano, deceased,plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees. Facts: o Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of AgapitoElcano(son of Pedro Elcano). o Pedro Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but the latter was acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.”


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Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his father (ATTY. Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

Issue: (1) Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

ART 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. 

Held: NO (In BARREDO VS. GARCIA) o The same given act can result in civil liabilitynot only under the Penal Codebut also underthe Civil Code Dual characterCriminaland Civil,of fault or negligence as a source of obligation 1.

The Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Coderefer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution ofculpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.

Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.  In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases ofcriminal negligencewhich cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, butcan be proved by a preponderance of evidence.  In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil actionunder articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.

In ART 2177, the former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict which has its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence.  Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. o But said article forestalls a double recovery.  In ART 2176, it refers to "fault or negligence which covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. 

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Because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Codeon this subject, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered useless the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.

Ratio: (1) The acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal casehas not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict,hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

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The offended party is not allowed,if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. The extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crimeis not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, in reiteration of Garcia, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

Issue: (2) May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married? Held: YES “ART. 2180 The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company." 

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is also clear that pursuant to Article


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399,emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.  Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. o It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. o He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.

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mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in shooting Atty Napoleon Dulay; OR (B) that the same was done in the performance of his duties. He ruled that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the Mrs Dulay without stating the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law. He also declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable under ARTICLES 100 AND 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those arising from, QUASI-DELICT.

In the instant case, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father REASON BEHIND THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITYunder Article 2180  Obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons.  Such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.  However, as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

DULAY VS COURT OF APPEALS GR No 108017 April 03, 1995 Second Division BIDIN J.: 1st-The Trial Court decided in favor of Safeguard and Superguard Security Corporation. It granted their Motion to Dismiss the complaint of Mrs Dulay 2nd –The Court of Appeals reaffirmed the decision of the lower court 3rd- Supreme Court reversed the CA’s decision and granted the petition of Mrs Dulay. Facts: o On December 7, 1988, an altercation between SECURITY GUARD BENIGNO TORZUELA and ATTY. NAPOLEON DULAY occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa which resulted in the death of Atty Napoleon Dulay who was SHOT AND KILLED by Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival. o

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On February 08, 1989, Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed a Civil Case for an action for damages against BENIGNO TORZUELA and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), who are the alleged employers of defendant Torzuela. On April 13, 1989, JUDGE REGINO issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. He held that the complaint did not (A)state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not

Issue: WON the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of the Security Guard Torzuela and his employer Safeguard/Superguard Security Corporation. Held: Yes. Petition of Mrs Dulay was granted. Ratio: The Court ruled that Safeguard is incorrect in its interpretation that Article 2176 is limited in its scope to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. It stressed that it is wellentrenched doctrine that Article 2176 covers NOT ONLY ACTS COMITTED BY NEGLIGENCE, BUT ALSO ACTS WHICH ARE VOLUNTARY AND INTENTIONAL. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Other discussions: ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS: The dispute in this case is the nature of Mrs Dulay’s CAUSE OF ACTION Mrs Dulay Safeguard Argument The filing of the The filing of the civil action is civil action of Mrs founded on a Dulay is founded quasi-delict on a delict since it is not attended by negligence TAKE NOTE: Republic vs Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 (1988) “The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.” (TAKE NOTE: The issue here is not one of liability but of the cause of action since the Lower court dismiss the complaint of Mrs Dulay. The Supreme Court stated that to prove liability are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. Said must be distinguish from the cause of action alone to avoid confusion) Question: In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CAUSE OF ACTION, it must be borne in mind that the complaint DOES NOT HAVE (A)to establish or (B)allege the facts


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proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset. Citing the case of Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, the Court said that this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. In Rava Dev't. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992], the Court declared that “If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.” Question: What must be shown in sustaining a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action? Answer: The Court cited the case of Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]. The complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. Application in the case at bar: Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them to present evidence of such injury. Question: What are the examples of issues that center on liability? Answer: 1. Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; 2. Whether the employer SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and 3. Whether the defendants are actually liable

Quasi – delict and contract G.R. No. L-21438

September 28, 1966

AIR FRANCE, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. SANCHEZ, J.:

Facts: Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and

pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.3 Decision of the lower Courts: 1. Court of First Instance - sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit. 2. Court of Appeals - slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against petitioner. Contention of Air France - respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.

Issue: WON Carrasco is entitled to damages

Held: Yes

Ratio: That said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42 Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion.


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This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.

Sub-Issue: Whether or not there is an Agency relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel and Mager.

On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Held: 1. No 2. Yes. Ratio: To determine is CAI should be held liable based on a quasidelict,determine first if there is an Agency Relationship.

Second Division Sps. Viloria vs. Continental Airlines, Inc. G.R No. 188288 January 16, 2012 Reyes, J.:

Facts: o

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Spouses Viloria are trying to buy a round tripTrain Ticket departing San Diego going to Newark with Amtrak. However Ms. Mager an agent of Holiday Travel told the spouses that the Amtrak is fully booked and no available seats with that particular route. Instead, Ms. Mager offered Continental Airlines for their particular trip for $400 per person. Fernando Viloria subsequently tried to rebook their flight to have it earlier but Ms. Mager informed them that the same flight is not available on Aug 6, 1997 via Continental Airline, instead Mager offered Frontier Air but with a higher fare and will travel by night. Fernando Viloria did not accept this offer and requested for a refund, but Mager told them that the ticket with Continental Airline is non-refundable instead what they can offer is to convert the value of the ticket to a travel fund which the Spouses can use to buy another ticket valid for 1 year. On the day of their trip, Fernando Viloria tried to inquire with Amtrak and discovered that there are available seats from San Diego bound to Newark. Fernando asked Mager why he was told that there were no available seats with Amtrak, but there were actually available seats with Amtrak if you booked directly with them. Fernando demanded again for a refund however Mager was firmed that the tickets were non-refundable and may only be converted to a travel fund. Fernando upon arriving in the Philippines, went to CAI’s Manila Office to have the subject tickets to be converted for a Manila- Los Angeles flight. However, he was informed that he can only use his ticket because the tickets are non-transferrable hence Fernando cannot use the ticket of his spouse, and needs to pay more. Fernando filed a complaint against CAI for the refund of the money paid for the subject ticket contending that CAI committed breach of contract by charging more compared to other airlines and not allowing him to use his Spouse’s ticket. RTC favored Spouses Fernando and the C.A overturned the RTC’s decision favoring CAI, hence this petition.

Main Issue: Whether or not Continental Airlines, Inc. as a Principal is liable based on quasi-delict.

The court held that there is an Agency Relationship between CAI and Holiday Travel. The following are the elements of agency: 1. There is consent, express or implied of theparties to establish the relationship; 2. The object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; 3. The agent acts as a representative and not for himself, and 4. The agent acts within the scope of his authority. The first and second element are present as CAI does not deny that it concluded an agreement with Holiday Travel, whereby Holiday Travel would enter into contracts of carriage with third persons on CAI’s behalf. The third is present since Holiday Travel merely acted in a representative capacity and it is CAI and not Holiday Travel who is bound by the contracts of carriage. Fourth element: Holiday Travel did not exceed its authority.

Main Issue: In actions based on quais-delict, a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them.

To determine if an airline company should be held liable. A prior determination of the nature of the passenger’s cause of action is necessary. If the passenger’s cause of action against the airline company is premised onculpaaquiliana or quasidelict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company’s agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline company’s agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent’s employees and the principal-agency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principal’s own fault or negligence. Art. 2180 par. 4. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible of damages cause by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Spouses Viloria’s cause of action on the basis of Mager’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasidelict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault.


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However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI’s alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager’s supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI’s agent, Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Mager’s complained act either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation.

1. 2. 3.

Culpa contractual 1170-1174 CC Culpa criminal 365 RPC Culpa aquiliana 2176 CC

N.B. The bases of liability are separate and distinct from each other even if only one act or omission is involved.

Assuming that CAI has control over Mageror has authorized Mager in his acts Spouses Viloria cannot still claim for a refund based on fraud.

A single act or omission may give rise to two or more causes of action.

After meticulously poring over the records, this Court finds that the fraud alleged by Spouses Viloria has not been satisfactorily established as causal in nature to warrant the annulment of the subject contracts. In fact, Spouses Viloria failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mager’s statement was fraudulent. Specifically, Spouses Viloria failed to prove that (a) there were indeed available seats at Amtrak for a trip to New Jersey on August 13, 1997 at the time they spoke with Mager on July 21, 1997; (b) Mager knew about this; and (c) that she purposely informed them otherwise.

Negligence Article 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.

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Kinds of negligence

Other Discussions:

Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. In order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolocausante), not merely the incidental (doloincidente), inducement to the making of the contract.

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or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do

It is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person the degree of care, precaution and vigilance, which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do,

Culpa criminal

Culpa aquiliana Legal basis of liability There can be no As long there is crime unless there fault or negligence is a law punishing resulting in the act. damage or injury to another. Nature of liability Direct, Direct, substantive and substantive and independent. independent.

Culpa contractual The obligation arises from the breach of contract.

Incidental to the performance of an existing obligation based on a contract.

Criminal intent Not necessary. Not necessary. Fault or negligence will suffice. Proof needed Beyond Preponderance of Preponderance of reasonable doubt evidence evidence Existence of pre-existing contractual obligation None None Yes Defence of “Good father of a family” Not available if Complete and Not a complete the employee is proper defence. defence in the insolvent, the selection and employer is supervision of subsidiarily liable. employees but can mitigate liability for damages. Presumption of negligence Innocence of the No presumption There is accused is of negligence. presumption of presumed until negligence as long the contrary is Injured party must as it can be proven. prove the proved that there negligence of the is was a breach of defendant contract. Nature of right violated Public right Private right Private right Essential for criminal liability to exist.

Quasi-delict Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for


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the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter

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Concept under 2176 is broad; it includes injuries to persons and damage to property.

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Requisites (CARD) 1. 2. 3. 4.

No pre-existing Contractual relation between the parties. Act or omission constituting fault or negligence Causal relation between the damage and the act or omission. Damage caused by the said act or omission

N.B. An action for quasi-delict may still be maintained even if there is a pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties, provided, that all the requisites are present and the existence of the contract are merely incidental. Test of negligence 1.

2.

Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against harm.

Circumstances to consider: 1.

2.

3.

Time o The time of the day may affect the diligence required of the actor. More prudence is required when driving at night. Place o The place of the incident is also material. A man who should have occasion to discharge a gun on an open and extensive marsh, or in a forest would be required to use less circumspection and care, than if he were to do the same thing in an inhabited town, village, or city. Emergency o Emergency rule or sudden peril doctrine –

General rule: Adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. Exception: Unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. 4.

Gravity of harm to be avoided o Even if the odds that an injury will result are not high, harm may still be considered foreseeable if the gravity of the harm to be avoided is great.

7.

Alternative course of action o If the alternative presented to the actor is too costly, the harm that may result may still be considered unforeseeable to a reasonable man. More so if there is no alternative thereto. Social value or utility of activity o Any act subjecting an innocent person to unnecessary risk is a negligent act if the risk outweighs the advantage accruing to the actor and even to the innocent person himself. Person exposed to the risk o The character of the person exposed to the risk is also a circumstance which should be considered in determining negligence. Consistent with this rule, a higher degree of diligence is required if the person involved is a child. Even if a trespasser because entry of a child in a vacant lot may be foreseeable.

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910 DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant. Facts: o David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training in mechanics. o One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye. o Taylor with the help of his father, sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the company’s negligence. Issue: WON Manila Electric is liable for damages. Held: No. Ratio: The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused damages to Taylor.


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However, the causal connection between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries. Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he knew well the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself with. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavours brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was doing. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. Let the judgment be entered in favour of the defendant for the costs in first instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.

First Division Jarco Marketing v. CA GR No. 129792 December 21, 1999 Davide, Jr., J: Facts: o

Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvel’s Department Store (owned by JarcoMrktg). The former was signing her credit card slip when a counter fell upon her daughter Zhieneth and pinner the latter to the ground. She was immediately rushed to Makati Medical Center where she was operated. 14 days later, her frail six year old frame was not able to survive the injuries. She died.

o

After the burial of the daughter, Criselda demanded upon Jarco Marketing the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses. Jarco refused to pay and denied any liability for the injuries and death of Zhieneth. They claimed that Criselda was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and appliances. Also, the counter was allegedly made of sturdy wood with a strong support and could not have collapsed if Zhieneth did not climb on it.

RTC ---- Ruled in favor of Jarco Marketing CA ---- Ruled in favor Criselda Issue: Whether or not the death of Zhieneth was attributable to negligence Held: Yes, Zhieneth’s death could only be attributable to negligence Ratio: We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the incident and accompanied CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital: Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the child was being treated? A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the doctor asked the child "what did you do," the child said "nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me." Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN) You want the words in Tagalog to be translated? ATTY. BELTRAN Yes, your Honor. COURT Granted. Intercalate "walapo, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta bumagsak." This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed (and should be admitted as) part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus: Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to


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have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter's base. Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the customer waiting area and its base was not secured.

o

o o

o Additional: An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is "a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens." On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is "the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG vs METROPLOITAN WATER DISTRICT GR. No. L – 7664, August 29, 1958 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J: Facts: o o o o

o o

Metropolitan owns 3 swimming pools at its filters in Balara, Quezon City It charges the public a certain fee if such wanted to use its pools Dominador Ong, 14 years of age, son of petitioners, went to the pools along with his 2 brothers. He stayed in the shallow pool, but then he told his brothers that he would get something to drink. His brothers left him and went to the Deep pool. Around 4pm that day, a bather reported that one person was swimming to long under water. Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ong’s lifeless body. Applying first aid, the lifeguard tried to revive the boy.

Soon after, male nurse Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards, boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Investigation was concluded and the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in water. The parents of Ong bring this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging negligence on the selection and supervision of its employees and if not negligent, they had the last clear chance to revive Ong. It is to be noted that Metropolitan had complete safety measures in place: they had a male nurse, six lifeguards, ring buoys, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also on display in a conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, one of which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although defendant does not maintain a full- time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise

Issues: (1) WON Metropolitan is liable to the Ongs for its negligence, Held: (1) No. Metropolitan is not negligent Ratio: Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons. It has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency. The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. When they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body found him to be already dead.


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Issue: (2) WON the last clear chance doctrine may be invoked in this case

the incident and he is not judged based on his knowledge or experience after the event.

Held: All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death The Last Clear Chance Doctrine is inapplicable in this case.

However, there are matters which a prudent man is conclusively presumed to know based on actual knowledge and experience. For instance, where a particular act is followed from past acts or omissions, one is charged with notice that a similar act or omission, may produce a similar result.

Ratio: it is not known how Dominador came into the big pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of MWD regarding the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called and all efforts at the disposal of MWD had been out into play in order to bring Dominador back to life.

PLDT Company, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (No. 57079, September 29, 1989), the plaintiff was not able to recover from the defendant telephone company even if he was injured because of the excavation of the company in the street. He sustained such injuries when his jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench dug by the telephone company for its underground conduit system. Although there were no warning signs in the area, the plaintiff was not allowed to recover because he had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations, having passed on the same street almost everyday.

LAST CLEAR CHANCE, DEFINED The negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. OR A person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. IN A DECIDED CASE: O’Mally vs Eagan, 77 ALR 582, 43 Wyo, 223, 350, 2 P2d 1063 The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.

a.

Children [Republic Act No. 9344] JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT (a) Definition of child in conflict with the law (Sec. 4, RA 9344 Child in conflict with the law – a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense under Philippine laws Child – a person under 18 years (b) Exemption from criminal liability

Standard of conduct 1)

Good father of a family What should be determined in negligence cases is what is foreseeable to a good father of a family. The standard of conduct used in the Philippines is that of paterfamilias in Roman law or that who is referred to in Article 1173 of the Civil Code (in rel. Art. 2178) as a good father of a family. A good father of a family is likewise referred to as the reasonable man, man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, or ordinary reasonable prudent man. Attributes of a good father of a family o Knowledge and experience of the actor - The prudent man is expected to act according to the circumstances that appear to him at the time of

1. Child 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense = EXEMPT from criminal liability = However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program. Regardless of whether or not he acted with discernment (per Sec. 20 of RA 9344) 2. Child above 15 years but below 18 years of age = EXEMPT from criminal liability and subjected to intervention program = UNLESS the child acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with RA 9344 Exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Sec. 6, RA 9344) (c) Juvenile justice and welfare system


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RA 9344, Sec. 4(m). ―Juvenile Justice and Welfare System‖ refers to a system dealing with children at risk and children in conflict with the law, which provides child-appropriate proceedings, including programs and services for prevention, diversion, rehabilitation, reintegration and aftercare to ensure their normal growth and development.

The action of the child will not necessarily be judged according to the standard of an ordinary adult. Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 [1910] The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. If a minor is mature enough to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions, he will be considered negligent if he fails to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts.

The doctrine in Jarco Marketing Corporation et al. v. Court of Appeals (ibid.) therefore modifies the rule laid down in Taylor v. Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. (supra.). If the child is under nine years, it is no longer necessary to determine his maturity and capacity because he is conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence. If the child is above nine to fifteen, he is disputably presumed to be incapable of negligence but the opposing party can prove that the child is at such stage of maturity and capacity that he can already determine what a reasonable man would do under the same circumstances.

Liability without fault: a child under 15 years can still be subsidiary liable with his property. (RPC, Article. 100) Absence of negligence does not necessarily mean absence of liability. If the child is legally incapable of discernment, the parents or any person exercising parental authority over him may still be liable if proper diligence in supervising the child was not observed. The actor himself is liable up to the extent of his properties. G.R. No. L-35283

November 5, 1932

JULIAN DEL ROSARIO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, defendant-appellee. Vicente Sotto for appellant. Ross, Lawrence & Selph and Antonio T. Carrascoso, Jr. for appellee.

STREET, J.: Facts: o Shortly after 2 o'clock on the afternoon of August 4, 1930, trouble developed in a wire used by the Manila Electric Company on Dimas-Alang Street for the purpose

o

o

o

of conducting electricity used in lighting the City of Manila and its suburbs. A person reported the same to the defendant at 2.25 p.m. and received answer from the station to the effect that they would send an inspector. Alberto del Rosario, age of 9 years, with two other boys, all members of the second grade in the public school were dismissed at 4pm. These other two boys were Jose Salvador and Saturnino Endrina. Subsequently, when the boys saw the parted wire on the street, Alberto, although warned by Jose Salvador, a son of an electrical engineer, touched the wire. He immediately fell face downwards. The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post. Accordingly, he was taken to St. Luke's Hospital but was immediately pronounced dead. Thus, Julian del Rosario instituted this action for the purpose of recovering damages from the Manila Electric Company for the death of his son, Alberto del Rosario.

Issue: WON the Manila Electric Company was negligent and hence can be held liable for damages for the death of Alberto Del Rosario, son of Julian del Rosario Held: Yes. Ratio: The Court is of the opinion that the presumption of negligence on the part of the company from the breakage of this wire has not been overcome, and the defendant is in our opinion responsible for the accident. Furthermore, when notice was received at the Malabon station at 2.25 p. m., somebody should have been dispatched to the scene of the trouble at once, or other measures taken to guard the point of danger; but more than an hour and a half passed before anyone representing the company appeared on the scene. (MAIN TOPIC) Issue 2: WON contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased Held: No. Ratio: It is doubtful whether contributory negligence can properly be imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and the natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact that the deceased ignored the caution of a companion of the age of 8 years does not, in our opinion, alter the case. But even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased, — a proposition upon which the members of the court do not all agree, — yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. NOTE: As provided in this case, even supposing that contributory negligence could in some measure be properly imputed to the deceased yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case, not having been the determining cause of the accident. Accordingly, mere contributory negligence, if not the proximate


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cause(determining cause) of the injury, would not totally exonerate the defendant.

G.R. No. L-33722 July 29, 1988 FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO petitioners, vs. EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents Facts: o Soriano- School principal Aquino and Banez- teachers in the school. Novelito Ylarde- student [decease o

Gabaldon Primary School, an academic school, was littered with several huge concrete blocks [around one ton each] which were remnants of an old school shop which was destroyed in WWII.

o

Banez [teacher] realized that these stones were huge hazards so he started burying them, and he was able to bury 10 blocks by himself.

o

A fellow teacher Aquino decided to help, so he gathered 18 students and ordered them to dig a hole where a 1-ton stone could be buried.

o

The following day, he called 4 of these students, one of which is Ylarde, to continue digging. When the hole was 1m 40cm deep, Aquino alone continued digging while the students remained inside the pit, throwing out loose soil. They got out of the hole when the depth was right.

o

Aquino left the children to level the loose soil around the hole because he went to see Banez (who was 30 meters away) to borrow the key to the school workroom to get a rope. He allegedly told the children not to touch the stone.

o

o

-

After Aquino left, the kids jumped inside the pit, Ylarde included. One of them jumped on top of the block, causing it to slide downwards. Two were able to get out but Ylarde wasn’t able to do so, and so the block pinned him to the wall in a standing position. He sustained injuries and three days later, Ylarde died. His parents filed a suit for damages against Aquino and Soriano, the principal, but the RTC dismissed the complaint for the following reasons: Digging done is in line with Work Education subject Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless imprudence CA affirmed RTC. Petitioners base their action against Aquino [teacher] on NCC 2176 for his alleged negligence that caused Ylarde’s death, while the action against the principal was based on NCC 2180.

Issue: WON Aquino and Soriano should be held liable for negligence

Held: YES. The petition GRANTED. Aquino, the teacher, to pay petitioners the following: (1) Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30, 000.00 (2) Exemplary damages 10,000.00 (3) Moral damages 20,000.00 Soriano, the principal, not held liable. Ratio:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre- existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. TEST OF NEGLIGENCE: DUTY- A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils must make sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company. BREACH- Yes Aquino acted with fault and gross negligence when he: (1) Failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers (2) Required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance may go to the perilous area (3) Ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that the huge stone was at the brink of falling (4) Went to a place where he would not be able to check on the children's safety (5) Left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance. PROXIMATE CAUSE: Negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde; it was but natural for the children to play around. The child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by Aquino. The excavation should not be placed in the category of school gardening, planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that could result in death or physical injuries. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. INJURY: Death of the child, Ylarde.

Art. 2180. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.


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As regards the principal, we hold that he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades.

o

Bonifacio was charged in the trial court with homicide committed with reckless negligence and he was convicted of homicide committed with simple negligence.

Soriano did not give any instruction regarding the digging.

General Rule: Teachers shall be liable for the acts of their students. Exception: Where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable b.

Persons with disability Weaknesses of a person will not be an excuse in negligence cases. General rule: A weak, clumsy or accident prone person must come up to the standard of a reasonable man, otherwise, he will be considered negligent. Exception: If the defect is not a mere weakness but one amounting to real disability. The standard of conduct is that of a reasonable person under like disability. The Constitution recognizes the rights of disabled persons. (Section 13, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution) A person who is suffering from physical disability must, however, refrain from activities which a reasonable person suffering from such disability would not undertake. Obviously, a blind person should refrain from driving altogether.

G.R. No. L-10563

March 2, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO BONIFACIO, defendant-appellant. CARSON, J.: Facts: o Bonifacio was an engineer and was conducting the heavy freight train one morning in Batangas. The train had just rounded a curve when Bonifacio saw a man (EligioCastillo) walking along the railroad track. The former immediately blew his whistle twice; unknown to him, Castillo was a deaf-mute. Noticing that Castillo did not step aside from the track, Bonifacio tried to slow down the engine, but did not succeed in stopping in time to avoid running down the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and attempted to cross the track. o

He was travelling at the rate of 35 kilometers an hour, the maximum speed permitted under the railroad regulations for freight trains.

Issue: Whether or not Bonifacio is liable for the death of Castillo. Held: NO. Ratio: There is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his engine when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unless there is something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to anticipate the possibility that such person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of an engine driver under such circumstances is that he give warning of his approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is assured that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train. There was nothing in the appearance or conduct of the victim of the accident in the cast at bar which would have warned the accused engine driver that the man walking along the side of the tract was a deaf-mute, and that despite the blowing of the whistle and the noise of the engine he was unconscious of his danger. It was not until the pedestrian attempted to cross the track, just in front of the train, that the accused had any reason to believe that his warning signals had not been heard, and by that time it was too late to avoid the accident. Under all the circumstances, we are satisfied that the accused was without fault; and that the accident must be attributed wholly to the reckless negligence of the deaf-mute, in walking on the track without taking the necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from behind. Bonifacio was without fault; and that the accident must be attributed wholly to the reckless negligence of the deafmute, in walking on the track without taking the necessary precautions to avoid danger from a train approaching him from behind.

c.

Intoxication General rule: Mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. If one’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober. Intoxication is of little consequence in negligence cases if it was not shown that such drunkenness contributed to the accident or that the accident would have been avoided had he been sober. Exception: Driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation of traffic regulations. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.


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d.

Wright v. Meralco G.R. No. L-6670, October 1, 1914 Moreland, J.

Under the Revised Penal Code, an insane person is exempt from criminal liability. But may not be exempted from civil liability.

Facts: o The defendant is a corporation engaged in operating an electric street railway in the city of Manila and its suburbs, including the municipality of Caloocan. The plaintiff's residence in Caloocan fronts on the street along which defendant's tracks run, so that to enter his premises from the street plaintiff is obliged to cross defendant's tracks. o

o

Under the Civil Code. The insanity of a person does not excuse him or his guardian from liability based on quasi-delict. (Articles 2180 and 2182, Civil Code). This means that the act or omission of the person suffering from mental defect will be judged using the standard test of a reasonable man.

One night the plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle with the rails, resulting in a sudden stop, threw plaintiff from the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. Not only the rails were above-ground, but that the ties upon which the rails rested projected from one-third to one-half of their depth out of the ground thus the tracks are above the ground which is 5 to 6 inches above the level of the street. It was admitted by the defendant the it was negligent in maintaining the tracks, but it was alleged that the plaintiff is also negligent because he was intoxicated and that he was unable to take care of himself and thus this was the proximate cause of the accident.

Issue: Whether or not the plaintiff is negligent Held: No. Ratio: Mere intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. It is the general rule that it is immaterial whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required than by a sober one. The testimony of Doctor Kneedler who was the physician who attended him after an hour of the accident as to the negligence of the plaintiff was referred by the Court. “If the defendant or its employees were negligent by reason of having left the rails and a part of the ties uncovered in a street where there is a large amount of travel, the plaintiff was no less negligent, he not having abstained from his custom of taking more wine than he could carry without disturbing his judgment and his selfcontrol, he knowing that he had to drive a horse and wagon and to cross railroad tracks which were to a certain extent dangerous by reason of the rails being elevated above the level of the street. If the plaintiff had been prudent on the night in question and had not attempted to drive his conveyance while in a drunken condition, he would certainly have avoided the damages which he received, although the company, on its part, was negligent in maintaining its tracks in a bad condition for travel” It is clear from the facts that the plaintiff is not negligent. It is impossible to say that a sober man would not have fallen from the vehicle under the conditions described.

Insanity

The bases for holding a permanently insane person liable for his tort: o Where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss it should be borne by the one who occasioned it; o To induce those interested in the estate of the insane person (if he has one) to restrain and control him; o The fear that an insanity defense would lead to false claims of insanity to avoid liability. US V BAGGAY G.R 6706 ; 20 PHIL 142 September 1, 1911 NATURE Appeal by the defendant from the judgment rendered on April 28, 1910, whereby he was declared exempt from criminal liability but was obliged to indemnify the heirs if the murdered woman, Bil-liingan, in the sum of P1,000, to pay the costs in the case and to be confined in an institution for the insane until further order of the court. Facts: o About the 4th of October, 1909, several persons were assembled in the defendant's house in the township of Penarrubia, Abra, Province of Ilocos Sur, for the purpose of holding a song service called "buni" according to the Tinguian custom, when he, the non-Christian Baggay, without provocation suddenly attacked the woman Billiingan with a bolo, inflicting a serious wound on her head from which she expired immediately; and with the same bolo he like wise inflicted various wounds on the women named Calabayan, Agueng, Quisamay, Calapini, and on his own mother, named Dioalan. o

For this reason the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of Ilocos Sur, dated February 15, charging the nonChristian Baggay, jr., with murder, because of the violent death of the woman Bil-liingan. This cause was instituted separately from the other, No. 1109, for lesiones. After trial and proof that the defendant was suffering from mental aberration, the judge on April 28 rendered the judgment cited above, whereupon the defendant's counsel appealed to this court.

Issue: WON an insane person, exempt from criminal liability can still be civilly liable?


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Held: Yes Ratio: Civil liability accompanies criminal liability, because every person liable criminally for a crime or misdemeanor is also liable for reparation of damage and for indemnification of the harm done, but there may be civil liability because of acts ordinarily punishable, although the law has declared their perpetrators exempt from criminal liability. Reasoning/Some provisions mentioned 









Such is the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though they be performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer for the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. Law and society are under obligation to protect him during his illness and so when he is declared to be liable with his property for reparation and indemnification, he is still entitled to the benefit of what is necessary for his decent maintenance, but this protection does not exclude liability for damage caused to those who may have the misfortune to suffer the consequences of his acts. Article 17 of the Penal Code states: Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable. Article 18 of the same code says: The exemption from criminal liability declared in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, and 10 of article 8 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced, subject to the following: In cases 1, 2, and 3, the persons who are civilly liable for acts committed by a lunatic or imbecile, or a person under 9 years of age, or over this age and under 15, who has not acted with the exercise of judgment, are those who have them under their authority, legal guardianship or power, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having them under his authority, legal guardian, or power, if such person be insolvent, the said lunatics, imbeciles, or minors shall answer with their own property, excepting that part which is exempted for their support in accordance with the civil law.

DISPOSITION Therefore, the judgment appealed from being in accordance with law, affirmation thereof is proper, and it is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

2)

Experts or persons with special skill An expert should exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular field that he is in. When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skills, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempted to do.

Those who undertake any work calling for special skills are required not only to exercise reasonable care in what they do but also possess a standard minimum of special knowledge and ability.

G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930 CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., plaintiffvs. PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION, defendant Facts: The plaintiff and defendant are domestic corporations; and at the time of the incident, H.D. Cranston was the representative of the plaintiff in the City of Manila o Plaintiff was the registered owner of the motor schooner Gwendoline (used for fishing) In January 1925, Cranston decided to have the engine on the Gwendoline changed from a gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner o He made known his desire to McLeod & Co. and was told by Mc Kellar to inquire at the Philippine Motors Corporations. Cranston went to the office of the Philippine Motors Corporation and talked to C.E. Quest, its manager who agreed to do the job. o The Philippine Motors Corporation was engaged in business as an automobile agency, but under its charter, it had authority to deal in all sorts of machinery engines and motors, as well as to build, operate, buy and sell the same and the equipment. Quest and Cranston visited the Gwendoline and upon preliminary inspection of the engine, Quest came to the conclusion that the principal thing necessary to accomplish the end in view was to install a new carburetor, and a Zenith carburetor was chosen as the one most adapted to the purpose. o After this appliance had been installed, the engine was tried with gasoline as a fuel. The result of this experiment was satisfactory. o The next problem was to introduce into the carburetor the baser fuel, consisting of a low grade of oil mixed with distillate. In the course of the preliminary work upon the carburetor, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding and that the gasoline, or other fuel, was trickling freely from the lower part to the carburetor to the floor. The boat was taken out into the bay for a trial run. The first part of the course was covered without any untoward development, other than the fact that the engine stopped a few times. 5PM In the course of the trial, Quest remained outside of the engine compartment and occupied himself with making distillate, with a view to ascertaining what proportion of the two elements would give best results in the engine. 7:30PM  the engine stopped, and connection again had to be made with the gasoline line to get a new start. After this had been done the mechanic, or engineer, switched to the tube connecting with the new mixture. A back fire occurred in the cylinder chamber which caused a flame to shoot back into the carburetor, and instantly the carburetor and adjacent parts were covered with a mass of flames, which the members of the crew were unable to subdue.


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The salvage from, the wreck, when sold brought only the sum of P150. The value of the boat before the accident occured, as the court found, was P10,000. MAIN Issue: WON the incident was due to the negligence of Phil. Motors as experts? Held: YES Ruling:  The loss of the boat was chargeable to the negligence and lack of skill of Quest. It must be remembered that when a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.  The proof shows that Quest had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing of similar work on boats.  Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines on boats - Negligence The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest's carelessness or lack of skill.  The test of liability is not whether the injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame. OTHER ISSUE RE: DEFENDANT AS BAILEE  Quest was not in charge of the navigation of the boat on this trial run.  As a rule, workmen who make repairs on a ship in its owner's yard are not bailees, and their rights and liabilities are determined by the general rules of law under their contract.  The true bailee acquires possession and as a consequence, bailee is given a lien for his compensation. o These ideas seem to be incompatible with the situation now under consideration. SIDE ISSUE RE: ACTION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS SALE SINCE IT WAS INSTITUTED 2 YEARS AFTER THE ACCIDENT AND AFTER QUEST CEASED TO BE A MANAGER  The action was brought within the period limited by the statute of limitations and the situation is not one where the defense of laches can be properly invoked.

3)

Expected conduct

VICTORINO CUSI and PILAR POBRE VS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS GR No L-29889 May 31, 1979 First Division GUERRERO J.: FLOW OF THE CASE: 1st-The Trial Court decided in favor of Spouses Victorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre.

2nd –The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court 3rd- Supreme Court reaffirmed the Court of Appelas decision. Facts: o On October 5, 1963, the Spouses Vistorino Cusi and Pilar Pobre attended a birthday party in Paranaque, Rizal. After the party, they proceeded home on board their car (in particular Vauxhall car) driven by Mr Cusi. Upon reaching the railroad tracks, and (A) after finding the the level crossing bar was raised and (B) seeing that there was NO FLASHING RED LIGHT, and (C) hearing NO WHISTLE from any coming train, mr Cusi merely slackened his speed and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train of Philippine National Railways (PNR) bound for Lucena, Quezon Province traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two. The spouses suffered injuries and sued PNR. o

However, PNR argued that the spouses Cusi are not entitled to damages since it is the gross negligence of Mr Cusi which was the proximate cause of the collision. They contend that had he made a full stop before traversing the crossing as required by Section 56 (a) of ACT 3992 OR THE Motor Vehicle Law, then he could have seen and heard the approach of the train, and thus, there would have been no collision.

Issues: 1.

2. 3.

Whether or not the Philippine National Railways gross negligence was the proximate cause of the collision Whether or not Mr Cusi committed acts of contributory negligence. Whether or not PNR is liable for damages.

Held for issue #1: Yes, PNR was grossly negligent. Ratio The Court in laying down its decision cited Judge Cooley’s definition and concept of negligence: Negligence is “the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of(A) care,(B)precaution, and (C0 vigilance which the CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTLY DEMAND, whereby such person suffers injury.” The Court made a pronouncement that by such a test, there is NO HARD and FAST RULE whereby such degree of care and vigilance is measured, IT IS DEPENDENT UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES in which a person finds himself so situated. All that the law requires is that it is always incumbent upon a person to use that (1) care and (2) diligence expected of REASONABLE MEN under similar circumstances. Petition of Mrs Dulay was granted. Further, the Court stated that “where railroad company maintains signallingdevice at a crossing to give warning of approach of the train, failure of device to operate is evidence of negligence. The traveling public has right to rely on warning devices installed in railroad crossings.


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It noted that the act of PNR cannot be tolerated nor condone. Said allowed the train to travel through the UNATTENDED CROSSING with INOPERATIVE SIGNAL DEVICES. It also did not send any of its employees to operate said signal devices so as to warn motorists of the approached of one of its trains. The failure of the warning devices created misunderstanding upon the riding public thinking that it is safe to pass.

Facts:

There is a need for the PNR (A) to use reasonable care to keep such devices in good condition and in working order, or (B) to give notice that they are not operating, since failure to do the same will create misunderstanding which in turn will result in a menace.

o

o

o

Held for issue #2: No. Ratio: The PNR FAILED TO ESTABLISHED that (1) its train driver blew his whistle to warn motorists og his approach to compensate for the absence of the warning signals, and (2) that Mr Cusi instead of stopping or slackening his speed, proceeded with reckless speed and regardless of possible or threatened danger.

o

Held for issue #3: Based from the ruling in issue # 1 and #2 the Spouse Cusi are entitled to damages

4)

Emergency rule - or sudden peril doctrine “Who can be wise, temperate, furious, loyal and neutral in that moment? No man” General rule: Adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution. Exception: Unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. Reason: Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. A person who is confronted with a sudden emergency may be left with no time for thought and must make a speedy decision largely upon impulse or instinct.

G.R. No. 115024

February 7, 1996

MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER COMMERCIAL, INC., respondents. This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.

o

o

Plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street, Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street. She noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, about 1-1/2 feet away, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car insurance. Rogelio Rodriguez the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT heavy rain)

Issue: (1) WON Li was negligent, (2) WON Valenzuela exercised the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances, (3) WON Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable, (4) WON the awarding of damages is proper Held: (1) Yes, (2) Yes, (3) Yes, (4) Yes Ratio: (1) Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened.


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(2)

A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. In the instant case, Valenzuela, upon reaching that portion of Aurora Boulevard close to A. Lake St., noticed that she had a flat tire. To avoid putting herself and other motorists in danger, she did what was best under the situation. As narrated by respondent court: "She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed. Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home she parked along the sidewalk, about 1 1/2 feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car. In fact, respondent court noted, Pfc. Felix Ramos, the investigator on the scene of the accident confirmed that Valenzuela's Valenzuela's car partly straddling the sidewalk, clear and at a convenient distance from motorists passing the right lane of Aurora Boulevard. This fact was itself corroborated by the testimony of witness Rodriguez.

Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. (3)

We agree with the respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees. It is up to this point, however, that our agreement with the respondent court ends. Utilizing the bonus pater familias standard expressed in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, 28 we are of the opinion that Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. is jointly and solidarily liable for the damage caused by the accident of June 24, 1990.

In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car.31 Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,

ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident. (4) As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident. The damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.

Delsan Transport vs. C&A Construction, Inc. G.R No. 156034 October 1, 2003 Ynares-Santiago, J.:

Facts: o

M/V Delsan Express owned operated by Delsan Transport is anchored at Navotos Fish Port

o

The captain of the ship Jusep received a report on October 20 that a typhoon would hit Manila in the next 8 hours

o

October 21 at 8:35 a.m Capt. Jusep tried to seek shelter at the North Harbor however the North Harbor was already congested and just anchored 4 miles away from Napocor power barge

o

At that time, the waves were already reaching 8-10 feet, to counter the waives Capt. Jusep ordered to go full ahead, but to avoid collision with the power barge, he ordered the ship to a full stop

o

However when the engine was re-started, the ship hit the deflector wall constructed by C&A Construction costing a P456,198.24 damage

o

C&A demanded payment from Delsan transport but refused to pay

o

C&A then filed a complaint for damages against Delsan Transport with the RTC, RTC however ruled in favor of Delsan, stating that Delsan was not guilty of negligence because it had taken all the necessary precautions, and applied the “emergency rule”

o

On appeal, CA reversed the RTC’s decision and held that Capt. Jusep is guilty of negligence, hence this case

Issue: WON Delsan Transport and Capt. Jusep is guilty of negligence applying the “Emergency Rule” Held: Yes. Ratio:


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Reason: The statute or ordinance becomes the standard of care or conduct to which the reasonably prudent person is held. Failure to follow the statute involved constitutes a breach of the legal duty imposed and fixed by the statute. Since negligence is a breach of legal duty, the violator of a statute is then negligent as a matter of law.

• Emergency Rule- when an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. • The court held that the “Emergency Rules” is not applicable in this case, because the danger where Capt. Jusep found himseld was caused by his own negligence

Exceptions: o When unusual conditions occur, strict observance may defeat the purpose of the rule and may even lead to adverse results. o Specific cases when the statute expressly provides that violation of statutory duty merely establishes a presumption of negligence.

Reasons: 1. Capt. Jusep was informed of the coming typhoon as early as 12 midnight of Oct 20 but did nothing 2. Capt. Jusep only decided to take shelter the next morning 3. Capt. Jusep only took shelter at 8:35 which is already way past sunrise, and did not transfer as soon as the sun rose

Non-compliance is not sine qua non of negligence. In addition, one cannot avoid a charge of negligence by showing that the act or omission complained of was of itself lawful or not violative of any statute or ordinance. Compliance therewith is not conclusive that there was no negligence. I.E. Driving below the speed limit.

• The court also stated that, had Capt. Jusep moved the vessel earlier he could have had greater chances of finding a space at the North Harbor, and even the North Harbor is congested, Capt. Jusep could still have enough time to seek shelter As to the liability of Delsan Transport: • Art. 2180 of the Civil Code provides: • “an employer may be held solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee”

ii.

Violation of a rule promulgated by administrative agencies, is not negligence per se but it may be evidence of negligence.

• Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees, unless the employer can prove otherwise

However, in Cipriano vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the Supreme Court considered violation of a Ministry (Department) Order which was issued pursuant to and to implement a statute as negligence per se.

• Diligence of a good father of a family does not only pertains to the selection of employees but also to the supervision of its employees iii. 5)

Violation of rules, statutes, practice and custom a. i.

Violations of rules and statutes Statutes and ordinances Violation of statute may be treated either as: o a circumstance which establishes a presumption of negligence o negligence per se o a circumstance which should be considered together with other circumstances as evidence of negligence. It is up to the legislature or the Court to select which competing theory should be applied in a particular jurisdiction.

Administrative rules

Private rules of conduct The same rule applies to rules imposed by private individuals like an employer. The order or prohibition of an employer “couldn’t be of greater obligation than the rule of a Commission or Board” and violation thereof is merely a “possible evidence of negligence.”

N.B. Although violation of statute is negligence per se (or even in case negligence is merely presumed), the plaintiff must still present proof that the proximate cause of his injury is the negligence of the defendant. Proof must be presented that there was causal connection between the negligence or violation of statute and the injury. Absent such proof, the defendant will not be held liable.

General rule: In several cases, the Supreme Court consistently held that violation of statutory duty is negligence per se.


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b.

Practice and custom Compliance with the practice and custom in a community will not automatically result in a finding that the actor is not guilty of negligence. On the other hand, non-compliance with the custom or practice in a community does not necessarily mean that the actor was negligent. Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. (33 Phil. 11, 12-13 [1915]). A practice which is dangerous to human life cannot ripen into custom which will protect anyone who follows it. One who performs an act so inherently dangerous cannot, when an accident occurs, take refuge behind the plea that others have performed the same act safely.

SOFIA M. GUILLANG, represented by SUSAN GUILLANGCABATBAT, REYNALDO, GERARDO, BIENVENIDO, DAWNA, and NELLIE, all surnamed GUILLANG, GENARO GUILLANG, JOSE DIGNADICE, and ALVIN LLANILLO, Petitioners, vs. RODOLFO BEDANIA and RODOLFO DE SILVA, Respondents. G.R. No. 162987 May 21, 2009 CARPIO, J. Facts: o

o

o

On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro) was driving his brand new Toyota Corolla along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite. Genaro, Antero Guillang (Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just left from Golden City, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and were on their way to Manila. At the other side of the highway, respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving a ten-wheeler truck towards Tagaytay City. The truck was owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva). Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a U-turn. When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaro’s car hit the right portion of the truck. The truck dragged Genaro’s car some five meters to the right of the road. As a consequence, all the passengers of the car were rushed to the hospital for treatment. Because of severe injuries, however, on 3 November 1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision.

o

The heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva.

o

On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in

the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. The dispositive portion of the decision provides: Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 3 June 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondents. Issue: Whether or not Bedania and Silva are liable for damages based on quasi delict. The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court According to the trial court, there is a presumption that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In this case, the trial court found that the Traffic Accident Investigation Report (report), corroborated by the testimonies of the witnesses, showed that the truck committed a traffic violation by executing a U-turn without signal lights. The trial court also declared that Bedania violated Sections 45(b),10 48,11 and 5412 of Republic Act No. 413613 when he executed the sudden U-turn. The trial court added that Bedania violated another traffic rule when he abandoned the victims after the collision.14The trial court concluded that Bedania was grossly negligent in his driving and held him liable for damages. Moreover, the trial court found that Bedania did not make the U-turn at an intersection. According to the trial court, vehicles trying to maneuver to change directions must seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver and not recklessly make a U-turn in a highway. The trial court said Bedania should have observed extreme caution in making a U-turn because it was unexpected that a long cargo truck would execute a U-turn along the highway. The trial court also said that Bedania’s gross negligence raised the legal presumption that de Silva, as Bedania’s employer, was negligent in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court said that, under Articles 217615 and 218016 of the Civil Code, de Silva’s liability was based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of his employees, subject to the defense that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. The trial court ruled that de Silva failed to prove this defense and, consequently, held him liable for damages. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals dismissed the testimonies of the witnesses and declared that they were "contrary to human observation, knowledge and experience. The Court of Appeals concluded that the collision was caused by Genaro’s negligence. The Court of Appeals declared that the truck arrived at the intersection way ahead of the car and had already executed the U-turn when the car, traveling at a fast speed, hit the truck’s side. The Court of Appeals added that considering the time and the favorable visibility of the road and the road conditions, Genaro, if he was alert, had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road. The Court of Appeals found no reason for Genaro not to be prudent because he was approaching an intersection and there was a great possibility that vehicles would be traversing the intersection either going to or from Orchard Golf Course.


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The Court of Appeals said Genaro should have slowed down upon reaching the intersection. The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaro’s failure to observe the necessary precautions was the proximate cause of Antero’s death and the injuries of the petitioners. The Court of Appeals also relied on the testimony of Police Traffic Investigator Efren Videna (Videna) that the car was running at a fast speed and overtook another vehicle just before the collision occurred.18 The Court of Appeals concluded that Genaro did not see the truck as the other vehicle temporarily blocked his view of the intersection. The Court of Appeals also gave weight to Videna’s testimony that it was normal for a ten-wheeler truck to make a U-turn on that part of the highway because the entrance to Orchard Golf Course was spacious.19

The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. Again, this is not supported by the evidence on record. The police sketch does not indicate an intersection and only shows that there was a road leading to the Orchard Golf Course near the place of the collision. Furthermore, U-turns are generally not advisable particularly on major streets. Contrary to Videna’s testimony, it is not normal for a truck to make a U-turn on a highway. We agree with the trial court that if Bedania wanted to change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck. Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway was clear of vehicles from the opposite direction before executing the U-turn.

On the Presumption of Negligence and Proximate Cause

The finding of the Court of Appeals that it was not yet dark when the collision occurred is also not supported by the evidence on record. The report stated that the daylight condition at the time of the collision was "darkness."39

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith,25 we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation.

Contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, the sheer size of the truck does not make it improbable for the truck to execute a sudden U-turn. The trial court’s decision did not state that the truck was traveling at a fast speed when it made the U-turn. The trial court said the truck made a "sudden" Uturn, meaning the U-turn was made unexpectedly and with no warning, as shown by the fact that the truck’s signal lights were not turned on.

The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the evidence on record. In ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight and credence to Videna’s testimony. However, we find that Videna’s testimony was inconsistent with the police records and report that he made on the day of the collision. Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should have been skid marks on the road when Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the collision. But the sketch of the accident showed no skid marks made by the car.

Clearly, Bedania’s negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners. Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The truck’s sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. In this case, the report showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a violation of traffic rules. The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his truck. This is another violation of a traffic regulation. Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the time of the mishap.

We agree with the trial court that de Silva, as Bedania’s employer, is also liable for the damages suffered by petitioners. De Silva failed to prove that he exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.

The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred. If the truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear. But the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals even declared, that the car hit the truck’s gas tank, located at the truck’s right middle portion, which disproves the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by the car.

Second Division

Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car was cruising. Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road and the car had the right of way over the truck that was making a U-turn. Clearly, the truck encroached upon the car’s lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.

o

Tison v. Sps. Pomasin GR No. 173180 August 24, 2011 Perez, J: Facts: Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jeepney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Albay. Some passengers of the jeepney including the driver died while the tractor’s driver and passengers were injured. Respondents, those in the jeepney, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the


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TORTS AND DAMAGES

RTC and alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. In their answer, petitioners countered that it was the jeepney driver’s negligence which proximately caused the accident.

aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other. In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision.

RTC – Ruled in favor of petitioners (tractor-trailer) CA – Reversed RTC decision. Ruled in favor of respondents (jeepney) 6) o

The CA noted that at the time of the incident, the tractor driver was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver’s license. CA concluded that the said driver was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision and therefore was the negligent party.

Issue:

Held:

Ratio:

The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence. General rule: Plaintiff alleging the damage due to negligent acts in his complaint has the burden of proving such negligence.

Whether or not there is a causal connection between the violation of the traffic regulation and the damages sustained by petitioners.

Exception: When the rules or the laws provide for cases when negligence is presumed.

No, there is no causal connection between the violation of the traffic regulation and the damages sustained by petitioners.

Section 1 Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. — In civil cases, the party having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed on his driver’s license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit,

Proof of negligence/Burden of proof

Disputable presumption of negligence The Civil Code provides for the following cases when the existence of negligence is presumed. (2184, 2185, 2188) a.

Motor vehicle mishaps - a driver is presumed negligent if he: i. Was found guilty of a reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the preceding 2 months. (Article 2184) ii. Violating any traffic regulation at the time of the mishap. (Article 2185)

b.

Possession of dangerous weapons or substances such as firearms and poison that results in death or injury, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. (Article 2188)

N.B. It should be noted, however, that the party invoking such presumption must still establish certain preconditions before the presumption can operate. Thus, Article 2185 requires proof that there was a violation of a traffic regulation while Article 2188


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requires proof of possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison.

no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant’s liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence.

Presumption of negligence may also arise because of certain contractual relationship between the parties. a.

Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or acted negligently in case of death or injuries to passengers, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.

Res ipsa loquitur – “The thing or transaction speaks for itself” MA-AO Sugar Central Co., Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 83491, August 27, 1990: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

G.R. No. 194320 February 1, 2012 MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, vs. RODELIO ALBERTO and ENRICO REYES, Respondents. PONENTE VELASCO, JR., J.:

RTC: Feb 2, 2009 - Decided in favor of Malayan Insurance [1. The amount of P700,000.00 with legal interest from the time of the filing of the complaint; 2. Attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 and; 3. Cost of suit] CA: July 28, 2010 - reversed and set aside RTC’s decision; Oct. 29, 2010 – MR denied. SC: Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 the decisions of CA RULING: Petition GRANTED. The CA’s Decisions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of RTC is REINSTATED. Facts: o At around 5 o’clock in the morning of December 17, 1995, an accident occurred at the corner of EDSA and Ayala Avenue, Makati City, involving four (4) vehicles, (1)Nissan Bus operated by Aladdin Transit; (2) an Isuzu Tanker; (3) Fuzo Cargo Truck; and (4) a Mitsubishi Galant o

Based on the Police Report, the three (3) vehicles were at a halt along EDSA facing the south direction when the Fuzo Cargo Truck simultaneously bumped the rear portion of the Mitsubishi Galant and the rear left portion of the Nissan Bus. Due to the strong impact, these two vehicles were shoved forward causing the Mitsubishi Galant to ram into the Isuzu Tanker.

o

Mitsubishi Galant is insured by Malayan insurance against third party liability, own damage and theft, among others. Having insured the vehicle against such risks, Malayan Insurance claimed in its Complaint dated October 18, 1999 that it paid the damages sustained by owner of Mitsubishi Galant (assured), amounting to PhP 700,000.

o

Maintaining that it has been subrogated to the rights and interests of the assured by operation of law upon its payment to the latter, Malayan Insurance sent several demand letters to Rodelio Alberto (Alberto) and Enrico Alberto Reyes (Reyes), the registered owner and the driver, respectively, of the Fuzo Cargo Truck, requiring them to pay the amount it had paid to the assured.

o

When respondents refused to settle their liability, Malayan Insurance was constrained to file a complaint for damages for gross negligence against respondents.

o

Reyes and Alberto asserted that they cannot be held liable for the vehicular accident, since its proximate cause was the reckless driving of the Nissan Bus driver, they also controverted the results of the Police Report, asserting

Res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. Requisites: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. It must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident

When doctrine is inapplicable: 1.

2.

3.

Where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of Where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant,

ALBERTO


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that it was based solely on the biased narration of the Nissan Bus driver. o

o

The trial court, ruled in favor of Malayan Insurance and declared Reyes and Alberto liable for damages. Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the CA, the CA reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court and denied Motion for Reconsideration filed by Malayan Insurance, thus, this petition.

Issues: 1.

2.

3.

WON THE POLICE REPORT IS ADMISSIBLE IN COURT EVEN WHEN IT WAS NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED BY THE POLICE INVESTIGATOR. WON MALAYAN INSURANCE FAILED TO OVERCOME THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF RESPONDENTS WHETHER THE SUBROGATION OF MALAYAN INSURANCE HAS PASSED COMPLIANCE AND REQUISITES AS PROVIDED UNDER PERTINENT LAWS.

Admissibility of the Police Report: MALAYAN - POLICE REPORT still admissible in evidence even without the presentation of the police investigator for respondents’ failure to make a timely objection to its presentation in evidence RESPONDENTS - POLICE REPORT was never confirmed by police investigator, hence, it cannot be considered part of the evidence on record SUPREME COURT - Respondents failed to make a timely objection to the police report’s presentation in evidence; thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so.25 As a result, the police report is still admissible in evidence. There was a discussion on hearsay rule and its exemption, however, it was not applied, third requisite was lacking for it to apply. Sufficiency of Evidence: MALAYAN - Reyes, the driver of the Fuzo Cargo truck, bumped the rear of the Mitsubishi Galant, he is presumed to be negligent unless proved otherwise. It further contends that respondents failed to present any evidence to overturn the presumption of negligence. RESPONDENTS - Malayan Insurance did not present any witness who shall affirm any negligent act of Reyes in driving the Fuzo Cargo truck before and after the incident, there is no evidence which would show negligence on the part of respondents. SUPREME COURT - The Fuzo Cargo Truck would not have had hit the rear end of the Mitsubishi Galant unless someone is negligent. Also, the Fuzo Cargo Truck was under the exclusive control of its driver, Reyes. Even if respondents avert liability by putting the blame on the Nissan Bus driver, still, this allegation was self-serving and totally unfounded. Finally, no contributory negligence was attributed to the driver of the Mitsubishi Galant. Consequently, all the requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are present, thereby creating a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of respondents. It is worth mentioning that just like any other disputable presumptions or inferences, the presumption of negligence may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence to the

contrary. It is unfortunate, however, that respondents failed to present any evidence before the trial court. Thus, the presumption of negligence remains. Validity of Subrogation: The claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by Malayan Insurance are already part of the evidence on record, and since it is not disputed that the insurance company, indeed, paid PhP 700,000 to the assured, then there is a valid subrogation MALAYAN - there was a valid subrogation in the instant case, as evidenced by the claim check voucher and the Release of Claim and Subrogation Receipt presented by it before the trial court. RESPONDENTS - the documents presented by Malayan Insurance do not indicate certain important details that would show proper subrogation. SUPREME COURT - respondents are deemed to have waived their right to make an objection when they failed to make a timely objection when these documents were presented in the trial court. The rule is that failure to object to the offered evidence renders it admissible, and the court cannot, on its own, disregard such evidence “When a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, it must so state in the form of a timely objection and it cannot raise the objection to the evidence for the first time on appeal. Because of a party’s failure to timely object, the evidence becomes part of the evidence in the case. Thereafter, all the parties are considered bound by any outcome arising from the offer of evidence properly presented.” Consunji Case was discussed at length it could be inferred that the burden of proving that “negligence does not exist” lies on the defendant who is better situated to prove that they were not negligent, and that res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.

G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001

D. M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: Facts: o

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors to the basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein.

o

PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated November 25, 1990, stating that: It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform


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he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock. o

Accordingly, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The trial court held that DMCI is presumed negligent grounded on the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this case.

Issue: WON THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE in this case, and hence, DMCI IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE Held: NO, the appellate court did not err in holding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in this case, and hence, DMCI is presumed negligent under article 2180 of the Civil Code. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent; thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant; thus, the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband; thus,the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use. However, Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify thereon. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements

which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care anymore than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident EXTRAS: Ratio: While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the person who is charged with negligence. Where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. Basis of doctrine- One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or not available. That the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. It proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power. Effect when rule is applicable- As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.27It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.1âwphi1.nêt Notes: Requisites for application of res ipsa loquitur “the thing or transaction speaks for itself”


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(1) That the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. (2) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (3) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; (4) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured

Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. and Dr. Marilou Bastan v. People of the Philippines GR No. 187926, February 15, 2012 Mendoza, J. Facts: o Belinda Santiago (Mrs. Santiago) lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against the petitioners, Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. (Dr. Jarcia) and Dr. Marilou Bastan (Dr. Bastan), for their alleged neglect of professional duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago (Roy Jr.), to suffer serious physical injuries. Upon investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab; that he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an emergency medical treatment; that an Xray of the victim’s ankle was ordered; that the X-ray result showed no fracture as read by Dr. Jarcia; that Dr. Bastan entered the emergency room (ER) and, after conducting her own examination of the victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit, there was no need to examine the upper leg; that eleven (11) days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot; that Mrs. Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and that the X-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline fracture in the shaft of the bone. o

The RTC found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of proof of establishing accused-appellants' negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty and there must be a causal connection of such breach and resulting injury of his patients. The negligence must be proximate cause of the injury. The accused-appellants argued that there is no causal connection between their failure to diagnose the fracture and the injury sustained by Roy. The RTC applied the doctrine of res ipso loquitur and held that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries.

Issue: 1. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipso loquitur is applicable in this case 2. Whether or not the petitioners are liable for criminal negligence Held: 1. No. 2. No.

Ratio: 1. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened provided the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.’s injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be undergone by him to determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and Bastan. As to whether the petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in treating patient Roy, Jr. is generally a matter of expert opinion. 2. The testimony of Dr. Cirilo R. Tacata (Dr. Tacata), a specialist in pediatric orthopedic, although pointing to some medical procedures that could have been done by Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan, as physicians on duty, was not clear as to whether the injuries suffered by patient Roy Jr. were indeed aggravated by the petitioners’ judgment. As residents on duty at the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were expected to know the medical protocol in treating leg fractures and in attending to victims of car accidents. There was, however, no precise evidence and scientific explanation pointing to the fact that the delay in the application of the cast to the patient’s fractured leg because of failure to immediately diagnose the specific injury of the patient, prolonged the pain of the child or aggravated his condition or even caused further complications.

AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES AND MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES. DUTY TO RESCUE Hominis enim ad deos nulla re propius accedut quam salutem hominibus dando — In nothing are men more like gods than in coming to the rescue of their fellow men. Duty to the Rescuer o

o

The defendants are liable for the injuries to persons who rescue people in distress because of the acts or omission of the said defendants. Courts reject the arguments of defendants that they are not liable because the rescuers are not foreseeable. One who was hurt while trying to rescue another who was injured through negligence may recover damages


27

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o

o

from the person who originally caused the injury (not the rescued person) [Santiago vs. De Leon CA-G.R. No. 16180-R, March 21, 1960] Conduct which might otherwise be considered contributory negligence may not be so considered where a person is injured in attempting to save others from imminent danger of personal injury or death even though in attempting such rescue he thereby imperils his own life. In determining whether one making or attempting such rescue exercised ordinary care, all the surrounding circumstances are to be considered including the existing emergency, the alarm, excitement and confusion usually present, the uncertainty as to the means to be employed, the necessity for immediate action, and the liability to err in the choice of the best course of action to pursue.

Requisites to make a tortfeasor liable to the rescuer: 1.

2. 3. 4.

The tortfeasor was negligent to the person rescued and such negligence caused peril or the appearance of peril to the person rescued. The peril or appearance of peril was imminent. A reasonable prudent person who would have concluded such peril or appearance of peril existent. The rescuer acted with reasonable care in effectuating the rescue.

II.

3. 4.

If he reports the accident to the nearest officer of the law; or III. If he has to summon a physician or nurse to aid the victim.” Individuals who are required by law to take care another person. E.g. parents to their children. Defendant in special relationships. E.g. Common carriers to their passengers.

OWNERS, PROPRIETORS and POSSESSORS Article 428 of the New Civil Code provides that the owner has the right to enjoy, dispose of and recover his property. The owner is not liable to any person who might be damaged if he is merely exercising his right as such. Damage to any person resulting from the exercise of any of the rights of ownership is damage without injury - damnum absque injuria. TRESPASSERS General rule: The owner has no duty to take reasonable care towards a trespasser for his protection or even to protect him from concealed danger. The trespasser comes on to the premises at his own risk. [Taylor v. Manila Railroad Company]

Duty to Rescue Exceptions: (VATS) General rule: A person who refuses to render assistance is not liable.

1.

Exceptions: 1.

2.

Cases specified under Article 275 of the RPC. I. Anyone who shall fail to render assistance to any person whom he shall find in an uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying, when he can render such assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall constitute a more serious offense; II. Anyone who shall fail to help or render assistance to another whom he has accidentally wounded or injured; III. Anyone who, having found an abandoned child under seven years of age, shall fail to deliver said child to the authorities or to his family, or shall fail to take him to a safe place. Land Transportation and Traffic Code (Republic Act No. 4136) Sec. 55. Duty of driver in case of accident. — No driver of a motor vehicle concerned in a vehicular accident shall leave the scene of the accident without aiding the victim, except under the following circumstances: I. If he is in imminent danger of being seriously harmed by any person or persons by reason of the accident;

Visitors – Owners of buildings or premises owe a duty of care to visitors. [Cabigao vs. University of the East, CA G.R. No. 33554-R, August 24, 1973, 18 CAR 2s 827]. Common carriers can may be held liable for negligence to third persons who stay in their premises even if they are not passengers.

2.

Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance - One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon land if: I. The place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass; II. the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children;


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TORTS AND DAMAGES

III.

IV.

V.

the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerously by it; the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved; and the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise to protect the children.

N.B. A swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is NOT considered attractive nuisance. In the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than mere water and its location. [Hidalgo Enterprises vs. Baladan 91 Phil 488]

G.R. No. L-3422 June 13, 1952 HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, ANSELMA ANILA and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. Facts: o The Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc – owner of an ice plant factory in Laguna, in whose premises were installed TWO TANKS FULL OF WATER, 9ft deep, for cooling purposes of its engine. o The edges of the tanks were a barely a foot high from the surface of the ground. o Anyone could easily enter the said factory through its wide gate entrance which is continually open for motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity. o There was no guard assigned on the gate. o On about noon of April 16, 1948, plaintiff’s son, Mario, a boy merely 8years old, while playing with and in company of some other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate to take a bath in one of the said tanks. o And while thus bathing, Mario sank at the bottom of the tank only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of “asphyxia secondary to drowning”. Court of first instance and Court of appeals – 1. petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks) 2. petitioner neglected to adopt the necessary precautions Issue: WON a the body of water (the tanks) an attractive nuisance Held: No.

Petitioner’s tanks are NOT CLASSIFIED as attractive nuisance. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, IN THE ABSENCE OF SOME UNUSUAL CONDITION or ARTIFICIAL FEATURE other than the mere water and its location (by great majority of American Decisions) REASON: Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger,. (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance.

3.

Tolerated Possession – The owner is still liable if the plaintiff is inside his property by tolerance or by implied permission.

4.

State Necessity - Owners and possessors of real estate also owe a duty to allow trespassers, who are in a state of necessity, to enter their properties. Article 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him. It is also a recognized justifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code. (Art. 11). In both the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code, the owner may demand from the person benefited, indemnity for damages. For the defence to be availing the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the wilful inaction of the actor.

Use of properties that injures another An owner cannot use his property in such a manner as to injure the rights of others. [Article 431 Civil Code] Thus, the exercise of the right of the owner may give rise to an action based on quasi-delict if the owner negligently exercises such right to the prejudice of another. Liability of Proprietors of buildings Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused:


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TORTS AND DAMAGES

1)

2) 3) 4)

By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place.

N.B. Third persons who suffered damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor if the damage referred to in Articles 2190 and 2191 should be a result of any defect in construction. Nevertheless, actions for damages can still be maintained under Article 2176 for damages resulting from proprietor’s failure to exercise due care in the maintenance of his building and that he used his property in such a way that he injured the property of another. With respect to the second paragraph of Article 2191, the Supreme Court considered the excessive smoke a nuisance that might bring about depreciation in the value of adjoining properties.However, the Court ruled that there is no certain pecuniary standard by which such damage can be measured, and in that sense the threatened injury is irreparable and may appropriately be restrained by injunction [Ollendorf v. Abrahamson, 38 Phil. 585].

which imposes upon the employer certain duties with respect to the proper maintenance of the work place or the provisions of adequate facilities to ensure the safety of the employees. Failure of the employer to comply with said mandatory provisions may be considered negligence per se.

o

N.B. Collateral Source Rule – If the injured person receives compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the damages which he would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor. Employees o

Employees are bound to exercise due care in the performance of their functions for the employers; absence such due care, the employee may be held liable. The liability may be based on negligence committed while in the performance of the duties of the employee. The existence of the contract constitutes no bar to the commission of torts by one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. An employee is liable for a tort when he neglects to perform his duties properly to the damage of the firm of which he was an officer. It is of no moment that he occupied a contractual position as the existence of a contract between the parties is not a bar to the commission of a tort and the consequent recovery of damages.

o

o

GR 185412 THIRD DIVISION GILBERT QUIZORA, Petitioner – versus – DENHOLM CREW MANAGEMENT (PHILIPPINES), INC., Respondent.

DUTY OF EMPLOYERS TO EMPLOYEES Article 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced.

MENDOZA, J.: Facts: o

Article. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. Employers o o

o

Actions for quasi-delict can still be maintained even if employee’s compensation is provided for under the Labor Code. In quasi-delictual actions against the employer, the employee may use the provisions of the Labor Code

In 1992, Denholm Crew Management (Philippines), Inc. (respondent company), a domestic manning agency that supplied manpower to Denklav Maritime Services, Ltd. (Denklav), a foreign maritime corporation, hired the services of Gilbert Quizora (petitioner) to work as a messman on board the international vessels of Denklav. Based on Article 4.2 of the CBA entered into by and between the Association of Marine Officers and Seamen Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) and Denholm Ship Management (Singapore) Ltd., represented by Denklav, his contractual work as messman was considered terminated upon the expiration of each contract. After the end of a contract for a particular vessel, he would be given his next assignment on a different vessel. After the expiration of his contract with "MV Leopard," petitioner was lined up for another assignment to a different vessel, but he was later disqualified for employment and declared unfit for sea duty after he was medically diagnosed to be suffering from varicose veins. Petitioner demanded


30

TORTS AND DAMAGES

o

the payment of disability benefits, separation pay and reimbursement of medical expenses. His demands, however, were denied. He then submitted his claim before the AMOSUP, but it was likewise denied. Thereafter, he filed with same with the LA. The LA, after due hearing, dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA's decision and ordered respondent company to pay petitioner his disability compensation in the amount of US$60,000.00. Upon the denial of its MR in the NLRC, respondent company elevated the case to the CA. On September 8, 2010, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the NLRC Resolution and reinstating the LA Decision. Unsatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner raised before this Court the following

medical diagnosis that his illness was equivalent to a total and permanent disability. Absent any indication, the Court cannot accommodate him.

GR 178901 GSIS, petitioner vs MANUEL P BESITAN, respondent DEL CASTILLO, J.: The primordial purpose of PD No. 626 is to provide meaningful protection to the workers against the hazards of disability or illness; hence, a liberal attitude in favor of the employee and his beneficiaries in deciding claims for compensation should be adopted. Facts:

Issues: (1) WON petitioners illness (varicose veins) is work related, (2) WON petitioner is entitled to disability benefits

o

Held: No

o

Ratio: The Court finds NO merit in the petition. PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT HIS ILLNESS WAS DUE TO HIS EMPLOYMENT. Considering that petitioner executed an overseas employment contract with Denholm in 1999, the 1996 POEA-SEC should govern. Petitioner cannot simply rely on the disputable presumption provision mentioned in Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. As he did so without solid proof of work-relation and workcausation or work-aggravation of his illness, the Court cannot provide him relief. At any rate, granting that the provisions of the 2000 POEA-SEC apply, the disputable presumption provision in Section 20 (B) does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of workrelatedness of the illness. Contrary to his position, he still has to substantiate his claim in order to be entitled to disability compensation. For disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the workrelated injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. In other words, to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. His sea service was not an unbroken service. The fact that he never applied for a job with no other employer is of no moment. He enjoyed month-long signoff vacations when his contract expired. It is possible that he acquired his varicose veins furing those sign-off periods. Besides, it was not expressly stated in his

o

o

o

o

Petitioner GSIS is a social insurance institution charged with the management and administration of the trust fund of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) for government officials and employees. Respondent Besitan was employed by the Central Bank of the Philippines on January 21, 1976 as a Bank Examiner. Subsequently, he was promoted as Bank Officer II and eventually as Bank Officer III. In October 2005, Besitan was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis and thus, had to undergo a kidney transplant for which he incurred medical expenses. Believing that his working condition increased his risk of contracting the disease, Besitan filed with the GSIS a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 626, as amended. The GSIS, however, denied his claim. The GSIS Decision was affirmed by the Employees Compensation Commission but reversed by the Court of Appeals. GSIS contends that Besitan’s ailment is not an occupational disease; hence, it is incumbent upon him to prove that the risk of contracting the said disease was increased by his employment and working condition. And since he failed to show that there is a causal relationship between his employment and his ailment, he cannot claim compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended. On the other hand, Besitan admits that his ailment is not listed as an occupational disease under PD No. 626, as amended. He, however, insists that he was able to prove by substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. He maintains that in claiming compensation benefits, certainty is not required, only probability. He points out that he was in good health when he was employed by the Bangko


31

TORTS AND DAMAGES

Sentral ng Pilipinas in 1976 and that it was only in 2004 that he contracted his kidney ailment.

Nevertheless, the same act which breached the contract gives rise to an action based on quasi-delict. [Air France vs. Carrascoso Gr No L-21438 September, 28, 1966]

Held: Yes. Besitan has sufficiently proved that his working condition increased his risk of contracting Glomerulonephritis. RATIO: In compensation proceedings, the test of proof is probability, not absolute certainty; hence, a claimant only needs to show reasonable work connection and not direct causal relation.  Certainty is not required only probability; Increased risk theory

A contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation because of the relation which an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees is a ground for an action for damages. [Air France vs. Carrascoso Gr No L-21438 September, 28, 1966]

The Medical Certificate presented by the Bank physician is sufficient to prove that the working condition of Besitan increased his risk of contracting Glomerulonephritis. In claims for compensation benefits, a doctor’s certification as to the nature of a claimant’s disability deserves full credence because no medical practitioner would issue certifications indiscriminately. Besitan was able to prove by substantial evidence his entitlement to compensation benefits under PD No. 626.

COMMON CARRIERS Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported by them according to all circumstances of each case. Article 1733

Common carriers shall be responsible for all the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Order or act of competent public authority. (Article 1735, Civil Code).

Issue: WON Besitan is entitled to compensation benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.

When Besitan entered the government service in 1976, he was given a clean bill of health. In 2005, he was diagnosed with End Stage Renal Disease secondary to Chronic Glomerulonephritis. It would appear therefore that the nature of his work could have increased his risk of contracting the disease. His frequent travels to remote areas in the country could have exposed him to certain bacterial, viral, and parasitic infection, which in turn could have caused his disease. Delaying his urination during his long trips to the provinces could have also increased his risk of contracting his disease. As a matter of fact, even the Bank Physician of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Dr. Gregorio Suarez II, agreed that Besitans working condition could have contributed to the weakening of his kidneys, which could have caused his disease.  Compensability proved by substantial evidence

o

5.

Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and

Limitation of liability contract of carriage of goods The parties may stipulate that the degree of diligence be less than extraordinary provided that the contract be: 1. 2. 3.

In writing, signed by the shipper or owner Supported by a valuable consideration other than the service rendered by the common carrier Reasonable, just, and not contrary to public policy (Article 1744 CC)

G.R. No. 111127. July 26, 1996 MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR and PORFIRIO CABIL, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, WWCF, AMYLINE ANTONIO, etc.

Facts: o Petitioners Engracio Fabre, Jr. and his wife were owners of a Mazda minibus. o They use the bus as service for school children which they operated in Manila. o The couple had a driver, Porfirio J. Cabil, whom they hired after trying him out for two weeks. o His job was to take school children to and from the St. Scholastica’s College in Malate, Manila. o Private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with PETs for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry from Manila to La Union and back for the amount of P3,000.00. o The group was scheduled to leave at 5pm. However, since several members of the party were late, the bus did not leave the Tropical Hut until 8pm. o The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. o However, the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area was forced to take a detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. o At 11pm, Cabil came upon a sharp curve on the highway. o The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus (which was running at the speed of 50 km/per hour) to skid to the left road shoulder. o The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side o The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and smashed its front portion.


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o

Several passengers were injured. PR Amyline Antonio was thrown on the floor of the bus and pinned down by a wooden seat which came off after being unscrewed.

PET. CABIL CONTENTION:  He said he was not familiar with the area and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because it was dark and there was no sign on the road.  He said that he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it. He allegedly slowed down to 30 km per hour, but it was too late. RULING: WON the bus driver, Porfirio Cabil, was negligent?  The fact that it was raining and the road was slippery, that it was dark, that he drove his bus at 50 km an hour when the normal speed was only 20 km an hour, and that he was unfamiliar with the terrain, Cabil was grossly negligent and should be held liable for the injuries suffered by PR Amyline Antonio. Pursuant to Arts. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of their employee.  Due diligence in selection of employees is not satisfied by finding that the applicant possessed a professional driver’s license. o The employer should also examine the applicant for his qualifications, experience and record of service  The Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil had been driving for school children only and had hired him only after a two-week apprenticeship. PETs ARGUMENTS: 1. They are not liable because an earlier departure (made impossible by the delayed meeting) could have averted the mishap  RULING: The hour of departure had not been fixed. Even if it had been, the delay did not bear directly on the cause of the accident. 2. Under the contract, the WWCF was directly responsible for the conduct of the trip.  RULING: This case actually involves a contract of carriage. The Fabres did not have to be engaged in the business of public transportation for the provisions of the Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them.

Art. 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Art 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or

both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, as a sideline). As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee. Art 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Art. 1759 Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. Petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi delict, fully justify finding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.

G.R. No. 177116

February 27, 2013

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., vs. SIMON ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondent.

Petitioner,

VILLARAMA, JR., J.: HIGHLIGHT OF THE CASE PRESUMPTION: Common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, and that the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption (***HOWEVER, the plaintiff must still, before the burden is shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage.) Facts: o On December 03, 1996, Simon Enterprises filed a case for an action for damages with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila against the unknown owner of the vessels M/V "Sea Dream" and M/V "Tern," its local agent Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner ASIAN TERMINALS INC (ATI). It alleged that it suffered the losses through the fault or negligence of the said defendants. It sought to claim damages plus attorney’s fees and costs of suit. o Take note: On June 09, 1998, its claim against the unknown owner of the vessel M/V "Sea Dream,"


33

TORTS AND DAMAGES

o

o

o

o

o o

however, was later settled in a Release and Quitclaim. (I will not discuss the story re: M/V “Sea Dream”) Now, only the claims against the unknown owner of the M/V "Tern," Inter-Asia Marine Transport, Inc., and petitioner ATI remained . Simon Enterprises claimed that on November 25, 1995, Contiquincybunge Export Company(company na nakabased sa USA) allegedly loaded on board the vessel M/V “Tern” at the Port of Darrow, Louisiana (PORT OF ORIGIN) 3,300.000 METRIC TONS OF US Soybean Meal in bulk. On January 25, 1996, the said carrier docked at the inner Anchorage, South Harbor, Manila (POINT OF ARRIVAL). The subject shipment was discharged to the receiving barges of petitioner ATI and received by respondent Simon Enterprises (ito yung pinagbagsakan ng mga imported US Soy meal). However, it reported that it received only 3,100.137 metric tons instead of the manifested 3,300.000 metric tons of shipment. As a result, it filed against petitioner ATI and the carrier a claim for the shortage of 199.863 metric tons, estimated to be worth US$79,848.86 or P2,100,025.00. It alleged that it suffered losses through the fault or negligence of the said defendants. However, the petitioner ATI Argued that it exercised the required diligence in handling the subject shipment.

FLOW OF THE CASE: 1st-The Regional Trial Court decided in favor of Simon Enterprises. It held petitioner ATI and its co0defendants SOLIDARILY LIABLE to the respondent SIMON ENTERPRISES for damages arising from the shortage. 2nd –The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court 3rd- Supreme Court REVERSED and SET ASIDE the decision of the CA and decided in favor of Asian Terminals Inc (ATI).

Issue: Whether or not the ASIAN TERMINALS INC is liable for the claimed damages of Simon Enterprises. Issue: No, ATI is not liable. Ratio: The Court in laying down its decision cited the Extraordinary Diligence to be exercised by Common Carriers. It noted that “Though it is true that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, and that the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must still, before the burden is shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage.” Accordingly, This can only be done if the weight of the shipment at the port of origin and its subsequent weight at the port of arrival have been proven by a preponderance of evidence (ito yung quantum of proof na kailangan), and it can be seen that the former weight(weight sa PORT OF ORIGIN) is considerably greater than the latter weight(weight sa PORT OF ARRIVAL), taking into consideration the exceptions provided in Article 1734 of the Civil Code. The Court ruled that ATI is correct in arguing that the respondent failed to prove that the subject shipment suffered

actual shortage, as there was no competent evidence to prove that it actually weighed 3,300 metric tons at the port of origin. In this case, SIMON ENTERPRISES failed to prove that the subject shipment suffered shortage, for it was not able to establish that the subject shipment was weighed at the PORT OF ORIGIN at Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A. and that the actual weight of the said shipment was 3,300 metric tons. The Court made extensive discussion on the possibility of the discrepancies and the lost of weight. In the end it proclaimed that ATI cannot be faulted for the said lost of weight since: #1. Simon Enterpriseswas not able to establish conclusively that the subject shipment weighed 3,300 metric tons at the port of loading/port of origin (Port of Darrow, Louisiana) #2. The subject shipment most likely lost weight in transit due to the inherent nature of Soya Bean Meal. (Ito yung supporting argument dito “Soybeans and soybean meal are hygroscopic materials and will either lose (desorb) or gain (adsorb) moisture from the surrounding air. The moisture level reached by a product at a given constant temperature and equilibrium relative humidity (ERH) is its equilibrium moisture .As indicated in the Proforma Invoice mentioned above, the moisture content of the subject shipment was 12.5%. Taking into consideration the phenomena of desorption, the change in temperature surrounding the Soybean Meal from the time it left wintertime Darrow, Louisiana, U.S.A. and the time it arrived in Manila, and the fact that the voyage of the subject cargo from the point of loading to the point of unloading was 36 days, the shipment could have definitely lost weight, corresponding to the amount of moisture it lost during transit.)

#3. Assuming that the shipment lost weight in transit due to desorption, the shortage of 199.863 metric tons that respondent alleges is a minimal 6.05% of the weight of the entire shipment, which is within the allowable 10% allowance for loss REFERENCES: Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;


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(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers;

practicing the specialty, taking into account the advances in the profession.

(5) Order or act of competent public authority.

The legal duty to the patient is generally considered to be that of an average specialist, not that of an average physian.

Art. 1742. Even if the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods should be caused by the character of the goods, or the faulty nature of the packing or of the containers, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss.

THE CAPTAIN OF THE SHIP DOCTRINE o o

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/DOCTORS o

o

Doctors or physicians are experts, who, because of their training and the very nature of their work, are required to exercise utmost diligence in the performance of their tasks. The action against the doctor is commonly referred to as medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances The doctor must use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. Indeed, the standard contemplated is not what is actually the average merit among all known practitioners from the best to the worst and from the most to the least experienced, but the reasonable average merit among the ordinarily good physicians (Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 341 SCRA 760, 769 [2000]).

RA 8344: AN ACT PENALIZING THE REFUSAL OF HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS TO ADMINISTER APPROPRIATE INITIAL MEDICAL TREATMENT AND SUPPORT IN EMERGENCY OR SERIOUS CASES, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 702, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "AN ACT PROHIBITING THE DEMAND OF DEPOSITS OR ADVANCE PAYMENTS FOR THE CONFINEMENT OR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS IN HOSPITALS AND MEDICAL CLINICS IN CERTAIN CASES (see special law)

STANDARD OF CARE o

o

General practitioner – The standard of care demanded is ordinary care and diligence in the application of his knowledge and skill in his practice profession. Specialist - A physician who holds himself out as a specialist should be held to the standard of care and skill of the average member of the profession

o

o

o

The doctor cannot blame the assisting nurse for his own omission. Under the “captain of the ship” doctrine, the surgeon is likened to a ship captain who must not only be responsible for the safety of the crew but also of the passengers of the vessel. The head surgeon is made liable for everything that goes wrong within the four corners of the operating room. It enunciates the liability of the surgeon not only for the wrongful acts of those under his physical control but also those wherein he has extension of control. The fact that there is a trend in American jurisprudence to do away with the doctrine does not ipso facto follow said trend. The court must still give regard to the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case to justify the application of the doctrine.

NOT WARRANTORS o o

Physicians are not warrantors of cures or insurers against personal injuries or death of the patient. Difficulties and uncertainties in the practice of profession are such that no practitioner can guarantee results. Error of judgment will not necessarily make the physician liable.

PROOF o

o

Expert testimony should be offered to prove that the circumstances are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. Medical malpractice can also be established by relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor; in which case the need of expert testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. (Ramos vs. CA, GR No.124354, December 29, 1999)

Two pronged evidence: I.

II.

Evidence as to the recognized standards of the medical community in the particular kind of case; and A showing that the physician departed from this standard in his treatment.

It is a matter of expert opinion WON a physician or a surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of a patient.


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Elements in medical negligence (D-BrIP) 1.

2. 3. 4.

Duty to use least the same level of care that any reasonably prudent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. Breach of professional duty or improper performance. Injury is caused to the patient constituting actionable malpractice. The doctor’s actions were Proximate cause of the patient’s injury (Li vs Sps. Soliman, Gr No 165279, June 7, 2011)

LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS AND CONSULTANTS o

o

There is no employer-employee relationship between the hospital and a physician admitted in the said hospital’s medical staff as an active or visiting consultant which would hold the hospital liable solidarily liable for the injury suffered by a patient under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. (Ramos vs. CA GR No 124354, April 11, 2002) The contract between the consultant and the patient is separate and distinct the contract between the hospital and the patient. The first has for its object the rendition of medical services by the consultant to the patient, while the second concerns the provision by the hospital of facilities and services by its staff such as nurses and laboratory personnel necessary for the proper treatment of the patient. (Ramos vs. CA GR No 124354, April 11, 2002)

Doctrine of Corporate Responsibility A hospital has the duty to see that it meets the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. Regardless of the hospital’s relationship with doctor, it may held directly liable for its negligence to follow established standard of conduct to which it should conform as a corporation. [G.R. No. 130547. October 3, 2000] LEAH ALESNA REYES, ROSE NAHDJA, JOHNNY, and minors LLOYD and KRISTINE, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, LEAH ALESNA REYES, petitioners, vs. SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL, SISTER ROSE PALACIO, DR. MARVIE BLANES, and DR. MARLYN RICO, respondents. MENDOZA, J.:

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/DOCTORS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; DEFINED This is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are thus four elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation.

Res ipsa loquitur applied o

o o

In medical negligence, the doctrine allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury. Medical malpractice can be established by res ipsa loquitur The doctrine is not available if the showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment is not accomplished.

Facts: o

Liability of hospitals o

o

o

For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, the existence of Ee-Er relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending physicians and visiting physicians. Where employment relationship exists, the hospital may be held vicariously liable under 2176 in relation to 2180 of the Civil Code or the principle of respondeat superior. When no employment relationship exists but it is shown that the hospital holds out to the public that the doctor is its agent, the hospital can be held vicariously liable under 2176 in relation to 1431 and 1869 of the Civil Code or the principle of apparent authority.

o

o

Jorge had been suffering from a recurring fever with chills, he decided to see the doctor. Suspecting that Jorge could be suffering from this disease, Dr. Rico ordered a Widal Test, a standard test for typhoid fever. Jorge was positive for typhoid fever. Dr. Marvie Blanes took Jorges history and gave him a physical examination. Like Dr. Rico, her impression was that Jorge had typhoid fever. Antibiotics being the accepted treatment for typhoid fever, she ordered that a compatibility test with the antibiotic chloromycetin be done on Jorge. As she did not observe any adverse reaction by the patient to chloromycetin, Dr. Blanes ordered the first five hundred milligrams of said antibiotic to be administered on Jorge. Dr. Blanes was called as Jorges temperature rose to 41C. The patient also experienced chills and exhibited respiratory distress, nausea, vomiting, and convulsions. Dr. Blanes put him under oxygen, used a suction machine, and administered hydrocortisone, temporarily easing the patients convulsions.


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o

Dr. Blanes re-applied the emergency measures taken before and, in addition, valium was administered. Jorge, however, did not respond to the treatment and slipped into cyanosis, a bluish or purplish discoloration of the skin or mucous membrane due to deficient oxygenation of the blood. At around 2:00 a.m., Jorge died. PLAINTIFF’S CONTENTION: Their principal contention was that Jorge did not die of typhoid fever. Instead, his death was due to the wrongful administration of chloromycetin. They contended that had respondent doctors exercised due care and diligence, they would not have recommended and rushed the performance of the Widal Test, hastily concluded that Jorge was suffering from typhoid fever, and administered chloromycetin without first conducting sufficient tests on the patients compatibility with said drug.

Issue: Whether the death of Jorge Reyes was due to or caused by the negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and lack of skill or foresight on the part of defendants Held: No. Ratio: Dr. Marlyn Rico did not depart from the reasonable standard recommended by the experts as she in fact observed the due care required under the circumstances. Though the Widal test is not conclusive, it remains a standard diagnostic test for typhoid fever and, in the present case, greater accuracy through repeated testing was rendered unobtainable by the early death of the patient. The results of the Widal test and the patients history of fever with chills for five days, taken with the fact that typhoid fever was then prevalent as indicated by the fact that the clinic had been getting about 15 to 20 typhoid cases a month, were sufficient to give upon any doctor of reasonable skill the impression that Jorge Reyes had typhoid fever. Dr. Rico was also justified in recommending the administration of the drug chloromycetin, the drug of choice for typhoid fever. The burden of proving that Jorge Reyes was suffering from any other illness rested with the petitioners. As they failed to present expert opinion on this, preponderant evidence to support their contention is clearly absent. That chloromycetin was likewise a proper prescription is best established by medical authority. Wilson, et. al., in Harrisons Principle of Internal Medicine, 12th ed. write that chlorampenicol (which is the generic of chloromycetin) is the drug of choice for typhoid fever and that no drug has yet proven better in promoting a favorable clinical response. Chlorampenicol (Chloromycetin) is specifically indicated for bacterial meningitis, typhoid fever, rickettsial infections, bacteriodes infections, etc. What all this means legally is that even if the deceased suffered from an anaphylactic shock, this, of itself, would not yet establish the negligence of the appellee-physicians for all that the law requires of them is that they perform the standard tests and perform standard procedures. The law cannot require them to predict every possible reaction to all drugs administered. The onus probandi was on the appellants to

establish, before the trial court, that the appellee-physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated. GENERAL RULE: Expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure. WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR IS AVAILED BY THE PLAINTIFF: The need for expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. The court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. All that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. It must be conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or a surgeon which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.


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G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997 DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents. FRANCISCO, J.: Facts:  Lydia Umali was examined by Dr. Cruz who found a myoma [benign tumor] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation [removal of uterus] on 23 Mar 1991. Rowena Umali de Ocampo accompanied her mother to the hospital a day before the operation, and they spent the night there.  Rowena noticed that the clinic was untidy, so she tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, Rowena asked Dr. Cruz if the operation could be postponed, but Lydia told her daughter that Dr. Cruz said that the operation must go on as scheduled.  While Lydia's relatives were waiting, Dr. Ercillo (anesthesiologist) told them to buy tagamet ampules, and Rowena's sister went out to buy some. An hour later, Dr. Ercillo asked them to buy blood for Lydia, so they did. A few hours later, the operation was finished, but later, Dr. Cruz asked the family to buy additional blood, but there was no more type A blood available in the blood bank. A person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia. Rowena noticed that her mother was gasping for breath--apparently, the oxygen supply had run out, so the family went out to buy oxygen. Later in the evening, she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped. She was then transferred to another hospital so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. However, this transfer was without the consent of the relatives, who only found out about it when an ambulance came to take Lydia to the other hospital.  In the new hospital, she was re-operated upon by Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo because blood was oozing out from her incision. They summoned Dr. Angeles, Ob-Gyne head of the new hospital, but when he arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead (BP: 0/0). Dr. Angeles told Drs. Cruz and Ercillo that there was nothing he could do. Lydia died while Dr. Cruz was closing her abdominal wall. Immediate cause of death is shock; disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) as antecedent cause.  Dr. Cruz and Dr. Ercillo were charged with reckless imprudence and negligence resulting in homicide of Lydia Umali. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) found Dr. Ercillo not guilty for insufficiency of evidence against her, but held Dr. Cruz responsible for Umali's death. RTC and CA affirmed MTCC. Issue: WON Dr. Cruz can be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide pursuant to Art. 365 of the RPC. Held: NO, BUT SHE WAS HELD CIVILLY LIABLE. Ratio: Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care

observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In the present case, there is absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised. While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. Q: WHAT ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT THE PROSECUTION ADDUCED (inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate) ? DOES THAT NOT AMOUNT TO THE PETITIONER’S ACT OF BEING RECKLESSLY IMPRUDENT EVEN WITHOUT AN EXPERT TESTIMONY? NO, no cogent proof exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. As stated in the case of Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc,: “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury


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must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes." In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, "negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of ." And "the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." IN here, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs. And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be prevented, it will happen to anyone, anytime." This Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability. NOTES ELEMENTS OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Ramos vs. C.A G.R No. 124354 11 April 2002 Kapunan, J.:

Background of the Case:

• This is a case for reconsideration of the Decision of the SC holding Respondents Guiterrez and Hosaka

• Petitioner Erlinda Ramos was comatose for almost a decade •

after an operation conducted by Guiterrez (Anaesthesiologist) and Hosaka (Surgeon) Erlinda Ramos died in 1999

Facts:

• Erlinda Ramos was scheduled for an operation to remove a stone in her gallbladder in DLSMC

• Dr. Hosaka was her Surgeon and he recommended Dra. Gutierrez as the Anaesthesiologist

• On the day of the operation, Ramos was placed in the • •

• • • • •

operating room at around 7:30am and was accompanied by her sister-in-law Cruz (nurse and dean of College of Nursing) The operation was delayed for more than 3 hours since Dr. Hosaka arrived at 12 in the afternoon. When Dra. Gutierrez was trying to intubate Ramos, Cruz heard her saying “ang hirap ma-intubate into, mali data ang pagkakapasok…” (Intubate:To put a tube in, commonly used to refer to the insertion of a breathing tube into the trachea for mechanical ventilation.)*Google search Ramos then experienced cyanosis (a bluish discoloration of the skin resulting from poor circulation or inadequate oxygenation of the blood.) Since the operation was not going well, Dr. Hosaka called another anaesthesiologist, Dr. Calderon who put Ramos in trendelenburg position At 3pm Cruz was being transferred to ICU, comatose. RTC favored Ramos holding Doctors Hosaka and Gutierrez negligent,C.A reversed the decision. SC’s 1st Decision favored Ramos holding that the failure of the intubation was the proximate cause of Ramos’ coma. hence this move for reconsideration

Issue:

1. WON Dra. Gutierrez is negligent and liable for damages 2. WON Dr. Hosaka is negligent and liable for damages 3. WON DSLMC should be held liable HELD:

1. YES, YES 2. YES, YES 3. NO Ratio: Dra. Gutierrez • Her Contentions: • The outcome of her operation was a comatose person and not a dead one • That there was a cardiac arrest • That the patient was revived by that cardiac arrest • Supreme Court • The SC stated that Dra’s claim is belied of the records of the case 1. It was established that Dra. Gutierrez did not follow the SOP of Anaesthesiologist whenever there is an operation


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TORTS AND DAMAGES

2. Every operation anaesthesiologist should

•

•

•

•

•

•

conduct pre-operative medications to prepare the patient of the future operation and to give the doctors of any medical history and condition of the patient to determine what techniques will be use on the administration of the anaesthesia 3. All procedures and steps should be documented The court noted that the conduct of pre-operative evaluation prior to an operation, whether elective or emergency, cannot be dispensed with Dra. Gutierrez did not conduct any Pre-operative procedure, no prior consultations and evaluation was conducted by Dra. Gutierrez The act of Dra. Gutierrez was considered by the court as a clear indicia of her negligence and therefore an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility It was also noted that the synopsis submitted by Dra. Gutierrez did not have all the details, which requires informations on every step of Dra. Gutierrez It was also proven that the absence of oxygen of Ramos for about 5 mins that caused Ramos’ coma, the same time where Dra. Gutierrez failed to log in her synopsis The court applied res ipsa locator: the injury to the patient therein was one which does not ordinarily take place in the absence of negligence in the administration of an anaesthetic, and the use and employment of an endotracheal tube - a layman would be able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequence of professional treatment were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised,

As to Dr. Hosaka Hosaka’s Claims: • That there is a jurisprudence in US that abandons the doctrine of “Captain of the Ship,” which was the basis of his liability in the SC’s 1st decision • That he being a surgeon has no control over Dra. Gutierrez as the anaesthesiologist • That as surgeon, he has different and distinct task in the operation and cannot interrupt other specialist in the operating room

• The court noted with the preceding reasons that they were not certainly not completely independent of each other so as to absolve one from, the negligent acts of the other physician • The court also noted that one of the reasons of Ramos’ coma was his delayed in reporting to office, Ramos experienced anxiety waiting for Dr. Hosaka to arrived, Ramos was still in the operating room, tired without food or drinks, certainly the delay in the operation contributed in the Coma of Pet. Ramos. As to the DLSMC

• it was not established that DLSMC was an employer of the physician

• There is a different contract between the patient and doctor and rel.between patient and the hospital

• The Hospital does not receive any share on every operation conducted in their hospital

G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999 ROGELIO E. RAMOS and ERLINDA RAMOS, in their own behalf and as natural guardians of the minors, ROMMEL RAMOS, ROY RODERICK RAMOS and RON RAYMOND RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER, DR. ORLINO HOSAKA and DRA. PERFECTA GUTIERREZ, respondents. The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the health and welfare of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is made accountable for his acts. A mistake, through gross negligence or incompetence or plain human error, may spell the difference between life and death. In this sense, the doctor plays God on his patient's fate. Facts: 

Supreme Court • The court noted that the abandonment of the US of the Doctrine of “Captain of the Ship” does not necessarily mean that the SC should follow the trend • The court held Dr. Hosaka liable for the following reasons: 2. 3.

4.

It was Dr. Hosaka who referred Dra. Gutierrez to Ramos Dr. Hosaka was the surgeon of Ramos, and it was admitted that he was the one who called the other physician, hence Dr. Hosaka was control over the operation of Dra. Gutierrez The Hosaka and Gutierrez worked as a team





Plaintiff Erlinda Ramos a 47-year old robust woman. Except for occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder, she was as normal as any other woman. Married to Rogelio E. Ramos, an executive of PLDT Company, she has three children whose names are Rommel Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron Raymond Ramos. Because the discomforts somehow interfered with her normal ways, she sought professional advice. She was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder. Through the intercession of a mutual friend, Dr. Buenviaje, she and her husband Rogelio met for the first time Dr. Orlino Hozaka. They agreed that their date at the operating table at the DLSMC (another defendant), would be on June 17, 1985 at 9:00 A.M. Dr. Hosaka decided that she should undergo a "cholecystectomy" operation after examining the documents presented to him. Rogelio E. Ramos, however, asked Dr. Hosaka to look for a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka, in turn,


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TORTS AND DAMAGES











assured Rogelio that he will get a good anesthesiologist. Dr. Hosaka charged a fee of P16,000.00, which was to include the anesthesiologist's fee and which was to be paid after the operation. At around 7:30 A.M. of June 17, 1985 and while still in her room, she was prepared for the operation by the hospital staff. She was accompanied by her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who was the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center. At around 9:30 A.M., Dr. Gutierrez reached a nearby phone to look for Dr. Hosaka who was not yet in. Dr. Gutierrez thereafter informed Herminda Cruz about the prospect of a delay in the arrival of Dr. Hosaka. At about 12:15 P.M., Dr. Osaka arrived, Dr. Gutierrez was intubating the hapless patient. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, "ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan” Dr. Hosaka issued an order for someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist. After Dr. Calderon arrived at the operating room, she saw this anesthesiologist trying to intubate the patient. Immediately thereafter, she went out of the operating room, and she told Rogelio E. Ramos "that something wrong was . . . happening". Dr. Calderon was then able to intubate the patient. About two days thereafter, Rogelio E. Ramos was able to talk to Dr. Hosaka. The latter informed the former that something went wrong during the intubation. Reacting to what was told to him, Rogelio reminded the doctor that the condition of his wife would not have happened, had he (Dr. Hosaka) looked for a good anesthesiologist.

Petitioner - Incurred hospital bills amounting to P93,542.25 which is the subject of a promissory note and affidavit of undertaking executed by Rogelio E. Ramos in favor of DLSMC. She has been in a comatose condition. She cannot do anything. She cannot move any part of her body. She cannot see or hear. She is living on mechanical means. She suffered brain damage as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes. After being discharged from the hospital, she has been staying in their residence, still needing constant medical attention, with her husband Rogelio incurring a monthly expense ranging from P8,000.00 to P10,000.00. She was also diagnosed to be suffering from "diffuse cerebral parenchymal damage" 

Petitioners filed a civil case 6 for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against herein private respondents alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos.

RTC - ruled in favor of the petitioners, holding the defendants guilty of, at the very least, negligence in the performance of their duty. CA – on appeal the said decision was reversed – dismissing the complaint against the defendants. Hence this petition. Issue: WON a surgeon, an anesthesiologist and a hospital should be made liable for the unfortunate comatose condition of a patient scheduled for cholecystectomy. Held: Yes

Ratio: RES IPSA LOQUITUR: is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. 13 Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. 14 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. 15 It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. 16 Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. 17 Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. 18 It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural of convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. 19 In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. 20 Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony


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is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him. We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious. We disagree with the findings of the Court of Appeals. We hold that private respondents were unable to disprove the presumption of negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her piteous condition. Dr. Gutierrez (anesthesiologist) is held liable for failure to perform the necessary pre-operative evaluation which includes taking the patient's medical history, review of current drug therapy, physical examination and interpretation of laboratory data. This physical examination performed by the anesthesiologist is directed primarily toward the central nervous system, cardiovascular system, lungs and upper airway. A thorough analysis of the patient's airway normally involves investigating the following: cervical spine mobility,

temporomandibular mobility, prominent central incisors, diseased or artificial teeth, ability to visualize uvula and the thyromental distance. In the case at bar, respondent Dra. Gutierrez admitted that she saw Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation itself, on 17 June 1985. Before this date, no prior consultations with, or pre-operative evaluation of Erlinda was done by her. Until the day of the operation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez was unaware of the physiological make-up and needs of Erlinda. She was likewise not properly informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration of anesthesia to Erlinda. Respondent Dra. Gutierrez' act of seeing her patient for the first time only an hour before the scheduled operative procedure was, therefore, an act of exceptional negligence and professional irresponsibility. The measures cautioning prudence and vigilance in dealing with human lives lie at the core of the physician's centuries-old Hippocratic Oath. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is, therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence. Having failed to observe common medical standards in preoperative management and intubation, respondent Dra. Gutierrez' negligence resulted in cerebral anoxia and eventual coma of Erlinda. Dr. Hosaka, being the head of the surgical team (“captain of the ship”), it was his responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their task in the proper manner. Respondent Dr. Hosaka's negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper authority (as the "captain" of the operative team) in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia protocols. In fact, no evidence on record exists to show that respondent Dr. Hosaka verified if respondent Dra. Gutierrez properly intubated the patient. Furthermore, it does not escape us that respondent Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda's cholecystectomy, and was in fact over three hours late for the latter's operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda's condition. Notwithstanding the general denial made by respondent hospital to the effect that the respondent doctors (referred to as “consultants”) in this case are not their employees, there is a showing that the hospital exercises significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the burden shifts to the respondents


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(parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. o In the instant case, respondent hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over respondent physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of supervision which it exercised over its physicians. In neglecting to offer such proof, or proof of a similar nature, respondent hospital thereby failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180. Having failed to do this, respondent hospital is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for Erlinda's condition.

G.R. No. 126297

January 31, 2007

o

o

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Petitioner, vs. NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: o Facts: o

o

o

o

On April 4, 1984, Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. After a series of medical examinations, Dr. Miguel Ampil, petitioner in G.R. No. 127590, diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid." On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil, assisted by the medical staff4 of the Medical City Hospital, performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad. He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary, necessitating the removal of certain portions of it. Thus, Dr. Ampil obtained the consent of Natividad’s husband, Enrique Agana, to permit Dr. Juan Fuentes, respondent in G.R. No. 126467, to perform hysterectomy on her. After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks: "sponge count lacking 2 "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for closure."

o

After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.

o

o

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o

Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation. On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United States to seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised to return to the Philippines. On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width. He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish. Dr. Ampil’s assurance did not come true. Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital. While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984, Natividad underwent another surgery. On November 12, 1984, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Branch 96, Quezon City a complaint for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322. They alleged that the latter are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died and was duly substituted by her above-named children (the Aganas). On March 17, 1993, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice. Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 42062. Meanwhile, on January 23, 1995, the PRC Board of Medicine rendered its Decision6 in Administrative Case No. 1690 dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes. The Board held that the prosecution failed to show that Dr. Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body; and that he concealed such fact from Natividad. On September 6, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision: WHEREFORE, except for the modification that the case against defendant-appellant Dr. Juan Fuentes is hereby DISMISSED, and with the pronouncement that defendantappellant Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to reimburse defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees,


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the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and the instant appeal DISMISSED. Issues: I. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice (Main Issue) II. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any liability. III. Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil. Ratio: I. Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Holding Dr. Ampil liable for Negligence and Malpractice. (Main Issue) The glaring truth is that all the major circumstances, taken together, as specified by the Court of Appeals, directly point to Dr. Ampil as the negligent party, thus: First, it is not disputed that the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient during the surgical operation. Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses who assisted in the surgery noted in their report that the ‘sponge count (was) lacking 2’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a ‘search was done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue for closure’ x x x. Third, after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was performed.

operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence. To successfully pursue this kind of case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family. II. Whether the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving Dr. Fuentes of any Liability The Aganas assailed the dismissal by the trial court of the case against Dr. Fuentes on the ground that it is contrary to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. According to them, the fact that the two pieces of gauze were left inside Natividad’s body is a prima facie evidence of Dr. Fuentes’ negligence. We are not convinced.

An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se. Even if it has been shown that a surgeon was required by the urgent necessities of the case to leave a sponge in his patient’s abdomen, because of the dangers attendant upon delay, still, it is his legal duty to so inform his patient within a reasonable time thereafter by advising her of what he had been compelled to do. This is in order that she might seek relief from the effects of the foreign object left in her body as her condition might permit.

Literally, res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." Where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. From the foregoing statements of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing

Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her


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requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which caused the injury." We find the element of "control and management of the thing which caused the injury" to be wanting. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not lie. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. In this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.17 In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr. Fuentes. III. Whether PSI Is Liable for the Negligence of Dr. Ampil In this jurisdiction, the statute governing liability for negligent acts is Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which reads:

those of persons for whom one is responsible. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such It is worthy to note that Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. Thus, PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages, let it be emphasized that PSI, apart from a general denial of its responsibility, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of the latter. In neglecting to offer such proof, PSI failed to discharge its burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited earlier, and, therefore, must be adjudged solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil. Moreover, as we have discussed, PSI is also directly liable to the Aganas. Costs against petitioners PSI and Dr. Miguel Ampil.

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. A derivative of this provision is Article 2180, the rule governing vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, thus: ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for

SO ORDERED.

Rubi Li v. Sps. Reynaldo and Lina Soliman GR No. 165279 June 7, 2011 Villarama, Jr., J: Facts: o Angelica Soliman, daughter of respondents, suffered osteosarcoma (a high-grade cancer of the bone which usually afflicts teenage children. Her right leg was amputated. Dr. Rubi Li then suggested that Angelica undergo chemotherapy to eliminate any remaining cancer cells. She told the respondents that the side effects of chemotherapy would only be slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Just 11 days after the chemotherapy, Angelica died. Respondents filed a case against Dr. Li for negligence and disregard of Angelica’s


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health, safety and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemotherapy. According to respondents, had Dr. Li revealed to them all the side effects of chemotherapy, they would not have consented to it.

1. 2. 3.

4. o

Both the trial court and Court of Appeals found that there was no negligence in the administration of drugs during the chemotherapy. However, the CA found that Dr. Li failed to fully explain to the respondents ALL* the known side effects of chemotherapy.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner Dr. Rubi Li can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side effects to the parents of the Angelica who died while undergoing chemotherapy, despite the absence of finding that petitioner was negligent in administering said treatment.

Held:

No, Dr. Rubi Li cannot be held liable.

Ratio:

Cobbs v. Grant further reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v. Spence that for liability of the physician for failure to inform patient, there must be causal relationship between physicians failure to inform and the injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established that, had revelation been made, consent to treatment would not have been given. Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents. Respondents could not have been unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelica’s lower extremity, that her immune system was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure. In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed. Four essential elements in medical malpractice based upon the doctrine of informed consent:

The physician had the duty to disclose material risks; He failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; As a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to the treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and Plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.

LAWYERS Cannon 18.03 provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. However, it was explained by the Supreme Court that “an attorney is not bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human being, he is not answerable to every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.” (Adarne vs. Aldaba, 83 SCRA 734, 739 [1978]). Atienza vs. Evangelista (80 SCRA 338, 341-342 [1977]) “It would be to place an intolerable burden on a member of the bar if just because a client failed to obtain what is sought by her after due exertion of the required effort on his part, he would be held accountable. Success in a litigation is certainly not the test of whether or not a lawyer had lived up to his duties to a client. It is enough that with the thorough preparation of the case handled by him, he had taken all the steps to prosecute his suit. If thereafter the result would be the frustration of his client’s hopes, that is, a cause for his disappointment, no doubt for him no less than for his client, but not for displeasing action. He is more to be sympathized with than condemned — on the assumption of course that he did what was expected of him.”

MA. LIZA FRANCO-CRUZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORY LINER, INC., MARITES M. GANELO, CATHERINE C. SANTOS, and MA. THERESA Q. FABIAN, G.R. No. 172238

PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.: SHORT VERSION: It was alleged that Franco Cruz was the registered owner of Franco Transit whose bus was involved in an accident resulting in the death of five individuals, damages were filed against her while she was contending that she was not the party in interest, she and her counsel failed to appear during the pre- trial and was declared to be in default, TC ruled against Franco – Cruz on her MR she sought the court to allow her to present evidence to prove that she was not the owner and operator of FRANCO TRANSIT, this was denied. Decision of the Court was received by her counsel on April 29, 1998, she


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filed the MR 18 days after such receipt. MR was denied due to the fact that it was filed out of time. Issue is whether or not negligence of her counsel binds Franco Cruz. (See Ratio below) LONG VERSION: o

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A Franco Transit bus collided with the rear portions of a bus and truck wrecker both owned by Victory Liner, Inc. The collision damaged both vehicles of Victory Liner and killed Manuel Fabian, Rodel Ganelo, Caesar Santos, and Michael Figueroa. The driver of the Franco Transit bus likewise died in the accident. Subsequently, Victory Liner and the surviving spouses of Rodel Ganelo, Caesar Santos, and Manuel Fabian, filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against Maria Liza Franco-Cruz, herein petitioner, who was alleged to be the registered owner and operator of Franco Transit in the police report. Respondents claimed that petitioner failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver of the Franco Transit bus. In her Answer, Franco - Cruz, alleged that she is not the real party-in-interest and moved for dismissal of the case. Further stating that the owner and the management of the bus involved in the case have always exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees; and that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and recklessness of a third party, the driver of a Philippine Rabbit bus. Franco - Cruz and her counsel failed to appear during the pre-trial, hence, was declared in default and respondents at once started presenting evidence ex-parte. Franco – Cruz filed for Motion For Reconsideration, stating that she is not the real party-in-interest as she is not the registered owner of the Franco Transit bus but Felicisima R. Franco, in support of which she attached a Certificate of Registration issued on October 28, 1988 in the name of Felicisima R. Franco. RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Franco – Cruz filed for Motion for Reconsideration, but the trial court denied the same for having been filed beyond the 15day reglementary period, it having been filed only on the 18th day following the receipt by Franco – Cruz’s counsel of a copy of the decision. She appealed the same to the CA and the appellate court held that the decision of the court has become final and executory due to it being filed out of time. Thus, this case

Issue: WON the negligence of Franco – Cruz’s lawyer binds her. Held: NO. Ratio: In the case at bar, the records show that petitioners counsel indeed received notice of the trial court’s decision on April 29, 1999. Following Rule 37, Section 1 vis--vis Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, petitioner had 15 days or until May 14, 1999 to file a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal. She filed a motion for reconsideration on May 17, 1999, thus rendering the trial courts decision as to her final and executory. The faux pas or negligence of petitioners counsel, in failing to file a timely motion for reconsideration should not be taken against her. Ordinarily, the negligence of counsel binds the client. However, this Court has recognized the following exceptions to

this rule: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice require. In the case at bar, the application of the rule would result in petitioner being held liable for the damages suffered by respondents even without them having established the basis of her liability, thus depriving her of due process of law. As a general rule, the requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in law must be strictly followed, appeal not being a constitutional right but a mere statutory privilege. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is thus not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008 NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Facts: o Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. On 27 September 2006, petitioner reacquired his Filipino citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of ViceMayor. o Thereafter, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification before the COMELEC. In the meantime, National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. Accordingly, o The COMELEC Second Division issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. Said decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in this case. o The petitioner, however, presents before this Court for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship which he supposedly executed even before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. o The justification offered by petitioner is that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of evidence. Issue: WON the aforementioned advised of his counsel is a valid excuse; hence, the Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States can be admitted in this case. Held: NO.


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Ratio: It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. The only exceptions to the general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality. These exceptions are not attendant in this case. The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case –UNLESS they prejudice the client and (2nd element)prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.33 Also belying petitioner’s claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his former counsel’s theory of the case. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite the former’s incongruous allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent. Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsel’s acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,35 where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar. Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioner’s behalf.(1st execption not applicable). Moreover, petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel. (2nd exception not applicable) NOTES: GEN RULE: a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.

EXCEPTION TO GEN. RULE  when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process(hearing/opportunity to be heard) of law, 2 elements for the exception to apply o Reckless or gross negligence o Deprivation of due process Example case De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense 

when the application of the rule results in the 1)outright deprivation of one’s property through a 2)technicality.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION When client himself is negligent. Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC RATIONALE FOR THE GEN. RULE Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of his former counsel’s acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.

BANKS The business of banks is one affected with public interest. Because of the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. (Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695 [1997]).

Instances when depositor may file an action for damages under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code: o

o

If through the fault of the bank’s employee, the secretary of the depositor was able to fraudulently divert his funds from his account to the account of the secretary’s husband. (Phil. Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695 [1997]). If it wrongfully dishonors the check issued by the depositor even if there are sufficient funds in the account and even if there is no other valid justification to do so.


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Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals GR No. 97626, March 14, 1997 Hermosisima, J. Facts: o A complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 5301734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. o Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. She made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. o RTC decided in favor of respondent RMC Issue: (1) Whether or not the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the respondent is the negligence of the petitioners (2) Discussion about "last clear chance" (3) Discussion about diligence required in banks

to RMC; neither was the bank forewarned by RMC that Yabut will be depositing cash to its account. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff It appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. (2) Under the doctrine of "last clear chance", petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. (3) Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

Held: (1) Yes

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a)

Ratio: (1) Petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent RMC and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee in the person of Ms. Irene Yabut. According to them, it was impossible for the bank to know that the money deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut belong

In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of


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the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.

Metrobank vs. Tobias G.R No. 177780 Jan 25, 2012 Bersamin,J.: Facts: o Antonio Tobias herein respondent is a businessman engaged in merchandising of frozen meats. Tobias open an account with Metrobank, herein petitioners under his business name Adam Merchandising. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from Metrobank and presented his property in Malabon as collateral. o Metrobank conducted a verification of the title thereafter approved a loan amount of 40M. Metrobank instituted the annotation of the deed of real estate mortgage on the Certificate of Title on the subject property. Tobias initially availed only 20M, paid the interest for a year before he defaulted. o The loan was restructred but again Tobias defaulted. Metrobank proceeded to foreclosed the subject propperty, and was sold to Metrobank as sole bidder. o Metrobank then discovered that there was no original copy of the subject property, and that the serial number in the subject property has been issued to Alberto Cruz and Eugenio Cruz. o Metrobank requested an investigation to PAOCTF, and PAOCTF found that the title was fictitious and recommended the filing of criminal complaint against Tobias. The City Prosecutor of Malabon charged Tobias with estafa through falsification of public documents. o Tobias in his defense, to show that he has no intention to defraud the bank, averred that the subject property was sold to him by Leonardo Fajardo and R.E.B Munsayac and Pilapil. That Natalio Bartolome convinced Tobias to buy the property as an ideal site for his meat processing business. That Metrobank did the verification and actual inspection of the subject property and approved the loan applied by Tobias. That he was instructed to transfer the title first, and his R.E Brokers processed the account, and that the property was inspected and verified by personnel of Metrobank. o City Prosecutor continued with the filing of the Criminal Complaint, DOJ however decided that Tobias was in good faith. C.A dismissed the appeal of Metrobank hence this petition. Issue: 1. WON Tobias is in Bad faith 2. WON Metrobank is negligent in the verification and inspection of the subject peroperty. Held. 1. No 2. Yes Ratio:

malicious and oppressive prosecution. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed, and (b) whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. It is a means of discovering the person or persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime. We are not unaware of the established presumption and rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same the presumption or inference is that such person is the forger. Yet, the Supreme Court declared that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used it is presumed to be the forger. Very clearly then, a satisfactory explanation could render ineffective the presumption which, after all, is merely a disputable one. The court considered that Tobias presented a satisfactory explanation that rebutted the presumption. Issue 2: Test of Negligence of Banks We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching its competent and experience representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition, and of investigating who was its real owner.Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part.

Causation 1.

Proximate cause The cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.

Bataclan vs. Medina Gr No. L-10126 The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.”

Issue 1: Presumption of Bad faith The presumption that whoever possesses or uses a spurious document is its forger applies only in the absence of a satisfactory explanation. A preliminary investigation is designed to secure the respondent involved against hasty,


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Tests of proximate cause 1.

In other words, if the accident would not have occurred had there been no negligence of the part of the defendant, the defendants conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the damage or injury.

Cause-in-fact tests In determining the proximate cause of the injury, it is first necessary to determine if defendant’s negligence was the cause-in-fact of the damage to the plaintiff. If defendant’s negligence was not a cause-in-fact, the inquiry stops; but if it is a cause-in-fact, the inquiry shifts to the question of limit of liability of the defendant. i.e. In an ordinary vehicular accident, for example, the defendant will not be made liable for the injury if he can establish that the plaintiff had that injury prior to the accident. The defendant did not cause (in fact) any harm which occurred before his wrongful conduct; nor is the defendant liable for any harm that was caused by some independent event. (ibid.). It is necessary that there is proof that defendant’s conduct is a factor in causing plaintiff’s damage. i.

“But for” test or the sine qua non test Where if the first object had not been, the second never had existed. Defendant’s conduct is the cause in fact of the injury under the but for test if the damage would not have resulted had there been no negligence on the part of the defendant. Conversely, defendant’s negligent conduct is not the cause in fact of the plaintiff’s damage if the accident could not have been avoided in the absence thereof. i.e. Plaintiff was injured because he was hit by a portion of a negligently constructed wall which collapsed, the negligence in the construction of the wall is the cause in fact of the injury because the injury to the plaintiff would not have resulted had there been no negligence on the part of the defendant.

ii.

Substantial factor test The substantial factor test, on other hand, makes the negligent conduct the cause in fact of the damage if it was a substantial factor in producing the injuries. In order to be a substantial factor in producing the harm, the causes set in motion by the defendant must continue until the moment of the damage or at least down the setting in motion of the final active injurious force which immediately produced or preceded the damage. In order to be a substantial factor in producing the harm, the causes set in motion by the defendant must continue until the moment of the damage or at least down the setting in motion of the final active injurious force which immediately produced or preceded the damage.

N.B. Applicable to both cause in fact test and policy test. The substantial factor test is important in cases where there are concurrent causes. iii.

Necessary and sufficient (NESS) test Whether a particular condition qualifies as a casually relevant factor will depend on whether it was necessary to complete a set of conditions jointly sufficient to account for the given occurrence. In such cases, it holds that our candidate condition may still be termed ‘a cause’ where it is shown to be a necessary element in just one of several co-present causal sets each independently sufficient for the effect. Two ways that such co-presence can manifest itself a.

Duplicative Occurs when two (or more) such sets operate simultaneously to produce the effect; in other words, the effect is over-determined. i.e. Conflagration began in two places at once, through the carelessly discarded cigarette and the short-circuit, respectively. It is apparent that, in contrast to the ‘but for’ test (whose counter intuitive result is that neither was a cause), the NESS test allows us to regard both the cigarette and short-circuit as causative of the damage.

b.

Pre-emptive Occurs when, through coming about first in time, one causal set ‘trumps’ another, potential set lurking in the background. The causal potency of the latter is frustrated for, a necessary condition for the sufficiency of any set of actual antecedent conditions is that the injury not have occurred already as a result of other actual conditions outside the set i.e. D shoots and kills P as he is about to drink from a cup poisoned by C. Here, the NESS test makes it clear that it is D’s act, on the other hand, does not satisfy the NESS test: poison does not feature in the list of necessary elements in any operative set of conditions sufficient for P’s death; instead it is a necessary part of a potential but, as things turn out, inoperative, causal set.


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2.

Policy tests of negligence

2.

If the damage or injury to the plaintiff is beyond the limit of the liability fixed by law, the defendant’s conduct cannot be considered the proximate cause of the damage. Such limit of liability is determined by applying what are known as policy tests. i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi.

Policy tests of negligence i.

Rule under the New Civil Code Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

Foreseeability test Natural and probable consequence test Natural and ordinary or direct consequences test Hindsight test Orbit of risk test Substantial factor test.

The definition of proximate cause which includes the element of foresight is not consistent with the express provision of the New Civil Code. A person may be held liable whether the damage to the plaintiff may be unforeseen.

Policy tests may be divided into two groups a.

Foresight perspective – Includes the element of foreseeability.

The defendant is liable for the injuries sustained by those who may be considered unforeseeable plaintiffs. The defendant is liable not only to the person to whom the negligent act was directed but to persons who may be directed but even to third persons.

The defendant is not liable for unforeseeable consequences of his acts. The liability is limited within the risk created by the defendant’s negligent act. b.

Directness perspective – Does not require that the injury is within the foreseeable risk created by the defendant.

i.e. Defendant may be held liable for damages to third persons otherwise called indirect damages.

Makes the defendant liable for damages which are beyond the risk. Direct consequences are those which follow in the sequence from the effect of the defendant’s act upon conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time, without the intervention of any external forces, which come into active operation later.

Third persons who are dependent for support upon the injured party may recover damages. These third persons cannot be considered foreseeable plaintiffs at the time of the occurrence of the negligent act or omission.

Tests applied in the Philippines 1.

Cause-in-fact tests i. But for – The cause should be that without which the damages would not have resulted. ii. Substantial factor - The issue of proximate causation asks whether the defendant’s conduct could be regarded as a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about plaintiff’s harm, and that inquiry often is translated into one that asks whether any of the human actions or natural events that occur after defendant’s conduct but before the plaintiff’s harm severs the causal connection between them. iii. NESS test – Applied in multiple causation cases. There is no statutory provision that fixes the applicable test hence the NESS test is an acceptable test and it might even be superior in multiple causation cases.

Cause and Condition o

The Supreme Court adopted the view that it is no longer practicable to distinguish between cause and condition. i.e. The defendant who spills gasoline about the premises creates a “condition,” but the act may be culpable because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the “condition” remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to another who falls into it a month afterward. G.R. No. L-10126 October 22, 1957 SALUD VILLANUEVA VDA. DE BATACLAN and the minors vs. MARIANO MEDINA,

Facts:


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o

Shortly after midnight, on September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the driver and conductor. At about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus, others had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo, evidently fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to leak, spreading over, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who answered the call for help set it on fire.

o

o

Issue: WON the overturning of bus is the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan Held: YES. The Proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of bus. There is also negligence on the part of the defendant. The case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hir

Ratio: Our new Civil Code amply provides for the responsibility of common carrier to its passengers and their goods. For purposes of reference, we are reproducing the pertinent codal provisions: ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755 ART. 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or

injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the order of the common carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees. ART. 1763. A common carrier responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree with the trial court that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blowout, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still alive. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the


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proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.

was

o

o

CA

hence

this

petition.

Ratio: Art. 2176 provide the requisites of negligence: 1. damage suffered by the plaintiff, 2. fault or negligence of the defendant, 3. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public interest. Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling the wrong prescription. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by the physician. *** Petitioner contends that the proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s negligence in driving his car.  Proximate cause is that cause, which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner’s employee been careful in reading the prescription. Without the potent effect of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in collision.

Facts:

o

the

Held: YES. The negligence of the petitioner is the proximate cause of the accident. Petition DENIED.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Sebastian M. Baking went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. After undergoing an ECG, and several examininations, Dr. Sy found the respondent’s blood sugar and triglyceride were above normal. The doctor then prescribed two medical prescriptions- Diamicron for the blood sugar and Benalize for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug Alabang to buy the prescribed medicines. The sales lady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum. Thus what was sold was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware of the wrong medicine, he took one pill on three consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, he met an accident while driving his car. He fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting the tablet he took, respondent went back to Dr. Sy who was shocked after finding that what was sold was Dormicum instead of Diamicron. He filed the present complaint for damages against petitioner. The trial court favored the defendant which

by

Issue: Is petitioner negligent, and if so, is the negligence was the proximate cause of the accident?

MERCURY DRUG CORP. v. BAKING GR. No. 156037, May 28, 2007

o

affirmed

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CASE:  Requisites of negligence provided in Art. 2176 were met. Mercury Drug employee is grossly negligent in selling Dormicum instead of Diamicron.  Mercury Drug also liable under Art. 2180. It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the employee  Proximate Cause of the accident is the negligence of the employee of the Mercury Drug.

2.

Remote cause The cause which some independent force merely took advantage of to accomplish something not the natural effect thereof.

G.R. No. L-15674

October 17, 1921


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CONSOLACION GABETO v AGATON ARANETA Facts: o

o

o

o

Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata with a view to going to a cockpit. When the driver of the carromata had turned his horse and started in the direction indicated, the defendant, Agaton Araneta, stepped out into the street, and laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, at the same time protesting to the driver that he himself had called this carromata first. Pagnaya pulled on the reins of the bridle to free the horse from the control of Agaton Araneta, in order that the vehicle might pass on. Owing, however, to the looseness of the bridle on the horse's head or to the rottenness of the material of which it was made, the bit came out of the horse's mouth; and it became necessary for the driver to get out, which he did, in order to find the bridle. While he was thus engaged, the horse, being free from the control of the bit, became disturbed and moved forward, in doing which he pulled one of the wheels of the carromata up on the sidewalk and pushed Julio Pagnaya over. After going a few years further the side of the carromata struck a police telephone box which was fixed to a post on the sidewalk, upon which the box came down with a crash and frightened the horse to such an extent that he set out at full speed up the street. Meanwhile one of the passengers, to wit. Basilio Ilano, had alighted while the carromata was as yet alongside the sidewalk; but the other, Proceso Gayetano, had unfortunately retained his seat, and after the runaway horse had proceeded up the street to a point in front of the Mission Hospital, the said Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, and in so doing received injuries from which he soon died.

o Issue: Whether or not Araneta’s acts were the cause of Gayetano’s death Held: No. Ratio: The mere fact that the defendant interfered with the carromata by stopping the horse in the manner stated would not make him liable for the death of Proceso Gayetano; because it is admitted by Julio Pagnaya that he afterwards got out of the carromata and went to the horse's head to fix the bridle. It is therefore evident that the stopping of the rig by Agaton Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the horse thereafter. The evidence indicates that the bridle was old, and the leather of which it was made was probably so weak as to be easily broken.

Upon the whole we are constrained to hold that the defendant is not legally responsible for the death of Proceso Gayetano; and though reluctant to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial court when there is a conflict of testimony, the evidence in this case so clearly preponderates in favor of the defendant, that we have no recourse but to reverse the judgment.

3.

Concurrent causes The proximate cause is not necessarily the sole cause of the accident. The defendant is still liable in case there is concurrent causes brought about by acts or omissions of third persons. The actor is not protected from liability even if the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm so long as the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another. (Africa vs. Caltex, supra at 157). It is also the effect of the rule on concurrent causes that the doctrine of the last clear chance hereinbelow discussed, cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. (Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 603 [1991]). N.B. In cases where there is concurrent causes or negligence, the joint tortfeasors are solidarily liable. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them to the injured person was not the same. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. N.B. It was ruled, however, that the plaintiff cannot recover if the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant can be considered the concurrent proximate causes of the injury.


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PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODRIGO ARNAIZ, REGINA LATAGAN, RICARDO GENERALAO and PAMPANGA SUGAR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, INC., CORPORATION, Respondent.

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G.R. No. 159270. August 22, 2005 CALLEJO, SR., J.: Facts: o

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Pampanga Sugar Development Company, Inc. (PASUDECO) transports sugarcane from Mabalacat and Magalang, Pampanga. When the Mount Pinatubo eruption of 1991 heavily damaged the national bridges, it requested permission from the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) for its trucks to enter and pass through the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) via Dau-Sta. Ines. At around 2:30 a.m. on January 23, 1993, Sendin, the PNCC security supervisor, and his co-employees Ducusin and Pascual were patrolling Km. 72 going north of the NLEX. They saw a pile of sugarcane in the middle portion of the north and southbound lanes of the road. They placed lit cans with diesel oil in the north and southbound lanes, including lane dividers with reflectorized markings, to warn motorists of the obstruction. Sendin, Ducusin and Pascual proceeded to the PASUDECO office, believing that the pile of sugarcane belonged to it since it was the only milling company in the area. PASUDECO Engineer Mallari told them that he would send someone to clear the affected area. At around 4:00 a.m., five (5) PASUDECO men arrived, and started clearing the highway of the sugarcane. They stacked the sugarcane at the side of the road. The men left the area at around 5:40 a.m., leaving a few flattened sugarcanes scattered on the road. As the bulk of the sugarcanes had been piled and transferred along the roadside, Sendin thought there was no longer a need to man the traffic. As dawn was already approaching, Sendin and company removed the lighted cans and lane dividers. At about 6:30 a.m., Arnaiz, was driving his two-door Toyota Corolla along the NLEX at about 65 km per hour. He was with his sister Latagan, and his friend Generalao; they were on their way to Baguio. As the vehicle ran over the scattered sugarcane, it flew out of control and turned turtle several times. The accident threw the car about fifteen paces away from the scattered sugarcane. Police Investigator Arcilla investigated the matter and saw black and white sugarcanes on the road, on both lanes, which appeared to be flattened. On March 4, 1993, Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao filed a complaint for damages against PASUDECO and PNCC.They alleged that through its negligence, PNCC failed to keep and maintain the NLEX safe for motorists when it allowed PASUDECO trucks with uncovered and unsecured sugarcane to pass through it; that PASUDECO negligently spilled sugarcanes on the NLEX, and PNCC failed to put up emergency devices to sufficiently warn approaching motorists of the existence of such spillage; and that the combined gross negligence of PASUDECO and PNCC was the direct and proximate cause of the

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injuries sustained by Latagan and the damage to Arnaiz’s car. In its Answer, PNCC admitted that it was under contract to manage the North Luzon Expressway, to keep it safe for motorists. It averred that the mishap was due to the "unreasonable speed" at which Arnaiz’s car was running, causing it to turn turtle when it passed over some pieces of flattened sugarcane. It claimed that the proximate cause of the mishap was PASUDECO’s gross negligence in spilling the sugarcane, and its failure to clear and mop up the area completely. It also alleged that Arnaiz was guilty of contributory negligence in driving his car at such speed. PASUDECO adduced evidence that aside from it, there were other sugarcane mills in the area, like the ARCAM Sugar Central (formerly known as Pampanga Sugar Mills) and the Central Azucarrera de Tarlac;20 it was only through the expressway that a vehicle could access these three (3) sugar centrals;21 and PASUDECO was obligated to clear spillages whether the planters’ truck which caused the spillage was bound for PASUDECO, ARCAM or Central Azucarera.22 On rebuttal, PNCC adduced evidence that only planters’ trucks with "PSD" markings were allowed to use the tollway;23 that all such trucks would surely enter the PASUDECO compound. Thus, the truck which spilled sugarcane in January 1993 in Km. 72 was on its way to the PASUDECO compound.24 On November 11, 1994, the RTC rendered its decision in favor of Latagan, Both the plaintiffs Arnaiz, Latagan and Generalao and defendant PASUDECO appealed the decision to the CA. Since the plaintiffs failed to file their brief, the CA dismissed their appeal.27 The CA rendered judgment on April 29, 2003, affirming the RTC decision with modification. The appellate court ruled that Arnaiz was negligent in driving his car, but that such negligence was merely contributory to the cause of the mishap, i.e., PASUDECO’s failure to properly supervise its men in clearing the affected area. And judgment is was rendered declaring PASUDECO and PNCC, jointly and solidarily, liable.

Issue: Whether or not PNCC should be solidarily liable with PASUDECO. Held: Yes. Ratio: There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.31 Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,


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is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. The petitioner cannot escape liability under the MOA between PASUDECO and TRB, since respondent Latagan was not a party thereto. We agree with the following ruling of the CA: Both defendants, appellant PASUDECO and appellee PNCC, should be held liable. PNCC, in charge of the maintenance of the expressway, has been negligent in the performance of its duties. The obligation of PNCC should not be relegated to, by virtue of a private agreement, to other parties. PNCC declared the area free from obstruction since there were no piles of sugarcane, but evidence shows there were still pieces of sugarcane stalks left flattened by motorists. There must be an observance of that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the situation demands. There should have been sufficient warning devices considering that there were scattered sugarcane stalks still left along the tollway. Moreover, the MOA refers to accidents or damages to the toll facilities. It does not cover damages to property or injuries caused to motorists on the NLEX who are not privies to the MOA. PASUDECO’s negligence in transporting sugarcanes without proper harness/straps, and that of PNCC in removing the emergency warning devices, were two successive negligent acts which were the direct and proximate cause of Latagan’s injuries. As such, PASUDECO and PNCC are jointly and severally liable. As the Court held in the vintage case of Sabido v. Custodio. According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor. In Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court declared that the liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary, to wit: It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an

injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasors. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination with the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Thus, with PASUDECO’s and the petitioner’s successive negligent acts, they are joint tortfeasors who are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code.41

Second Division Loadmasters Customs Services v. Glodel Brokerage GR No. 179446 January 10, 2011 Mendoza, J:


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Facts: o

Columbia insured its shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against all risks to R&B Insurance. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouse/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes. The goods were loaded on 12 trucks and were to be delivered to Bulacan and Valenzuela City (6 trucks each).

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However, one truck never reached its destination and the copper cathodes loaded on the truck were lost. Because of this, Columbia filed a claim for insurance indemnity. R&B paid the claim. Being subrogated to the rights of Columbia, it went after Glodel and Loadmasters to recover the amount paid to Columbia. In the Court of Appeals, both Glodel and Loadmasters were found to be liable for the amount paid by R&B.

Issues: Whether or not Loadmasters is liable for damages despite the absence of contractual relation with Columbia Held:

Ratio:

Yes, Loadmasters is liable for damages. It is liable not for the breach of contract but from the alleged negligent manner by which it handled the cargoes of Columbia. Loadmasters’ claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Pertinent is the ruling enunciated in the case of Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New York,/McGee & Co., Inc.19 where this Court held that a tort may arise despite the absence of a contractual relationship, to wit: We agree with the Court of Appeals that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only

been subrogated in the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may have a cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In the present case, Phoenix and McGee are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which Mindanao Terminal handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.

Additional [still (super) related to the topic]: Extent of the respective liabilities of Glodel and Loadmasters What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, X x x. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.


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There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

4.

Efficient intervening cause One who destroys the causal connection between the negligent act and the injury and thereby negatives liability (novus actus interviens) An intervening cause will be regarded as the proximate cause and the first cause as too remote, where the chain of events is so broken that they become independent and the result cannot be said to be the consequence of the primary cause. There is no efficient intervening cause if the force created by the negligent act or omission have either: i. ii. iii.

Remained active itself Created another force which remained active until it directly caused the result Created a new active risk of being acted upon by the active force that caused the result.

secluded place where it would not have cause injury and B had taken it up anew on its errand of mischief, there would have been a new cause, not dependent upon the first. Consequently, there is an efficient intervening cause in this last example. N.B. A cause is not an intervening cause if it is already in operation at the time the negligent act is committed. Rodrigueza vs. Manila Electric Railroad The house of the plaintiff was razed by fire because of the sparks emitted by one of the trains of defendant railroad company. The fire started in one house and wind caused fire to transfer to another house until it reached plaintiff’s property. The wind was not an intervening cause because it was already in operation at the time the negligent act of the defendant was performed. However, even if the wind was not yet operating, the same cannot be considered an efficient intervening cause because the wind did not break the chain of causation between the negligence of the defendant and the resulting damage to the plaintiff.

Foreseeable intervening cause The rule in this jurisdiction is to the effect that foreseeable intervening causes cannot be considered sufficient intervening causes. Because there is an opportunity to guard against it. In the above-discussed Rodrigueza case, even if the wind was not yet operating at the time the negligent act was committed, the same cannot be considered an efficient intervening cause because it was a foreseeable intervening cause. The wind may be considered a “common recurrent feature of the environment.” If the intervening cause is a recurrent feature of the environment, they cannot be considered efficient because they are foreseeable. i.

A tortfeasor is liable for the consequence of negligence, mistake, or lack of skill of a physician or surgeon whose treatment aggravated the original injury. The same is considered a normal and foreseeable risk. The rule is based on the reasoning that the additional harm is either: (1) a part of the original injury, (2) the natural and probable consequences of the tortfeasor’s original negligence or (3) the normal incidence of medical care necessitated by the tortfeasor’s original negligence.

Test of the sufficiency of an intervening cause to defeat recovery for negligence: i.

ii.

iii.

It must be new and independent, not under the control of the original wrongdoer, or one which by the exercise of reasonable foresight and diligence, he should have anticipated and guarded against it. It must break the continuity of causal connection between the original negligent act or omission. The injury so that the former cannot be said to have been the efficient cause of the latter.

i.e. If A throws a hot object to B who in turn threw it to C, there is an intervening cause in the absence of which the C would not have been injured. Nevertheless, A is liable because he had wrongfully set in motion a force which continued to operate until it cause the injury. If A had thrown the object in a

Medical treatment as intervening cause

There will only be an efficient intervening cause where the original tortfeasor is not liable if the injured failed to exercise reasonable care in securing the services of a competent physician or surgeon. ii.

Unforeseen and unexpected act or cause Africa vs. Caltex The defendant argued that the fire in the gasoline station which occurred while gasoline was being unloaded was caused through the acts of a


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stranger who, without authority, or permission of answering defendant, passed through the gasoline station and negligently threw a lighted match in the premises. The Supreme Court ruled that no evidence on this point was adduced, but assuming the allegation to be true it does not extenuate defendant’s negligence. The Supreme Court adopted the view that “if the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious or criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, does not protect the actor from liability. Stated in another way, the intervention of an unforeseen and unexpected cause, is not sufficient to relieve a wrongdoer from consequences of negligence, if such negligence directly and proximately cooperates with the independent cause in the resulting injury.’’

An unforseen and unexpected act of a third person may not therefore be considered efficient intervening cause if it is duplicative in nature or if it merely aggravated the injury that resulted because of a priorcause.

TEAGUE V. FERNANDEZ Gr. No. L-29745 (1973) Facts: o

The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila was owned and operated by Teague. The second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of said fireexits was indicated on the wall.

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October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located about ten meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. No part of the GilArmi Building caught fire. But, after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the stampede. The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for

damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. o

CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of the ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the GilArmi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway under construction.

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The petitioner avers that the violation of the ordinance was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. According to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the ordinance.”

Issue: WON failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. Held: Yes Ratio: As a general rule, the violation of an ordinance was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in 38 American Jurisprudence, page 841: "The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent." Here, overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one. Hence, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation. Q:THE ORDINANCE WHICH HAS BEEN VIOLATED WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT. WILL THAT NOT EXONERATETEAGUE FROM HIS LIABILITY? NO. The violation, as an act of negligence which gave rise to liability, was sufficiently comprehended within paragraph 7 of the complaint, which reads: .


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Par. 7. That the death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross negligence of the defendant who failed to exercise due care and diligence for the safety of its students in not providing the building with adequate fire exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to avoid the stampede, aside from the fact that the defendant did not have a permit to use the building as a school-house.

G.R. No. 186412 September 7, 2011 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ORLITO VILLACORTA, Accused-Appellant. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Facts: o

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On January 23, 2002, accused Villacorta stabbed Danilo Cruz on the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz’s body. When Mendeja returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s body.5 Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center where the latter was treated as an out-patient. Nevertheless, On February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus infection, where he died the following day, on February 15, 2002. While admitting that he did not personally treat Cruz, Dr. Belandres, Head of the Tetanus Department, was able to determine that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound. A case was filed against Vilacorta accusing him of murder. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. It is now contented by Villacorta that in the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection, and not the stab wound.

Issue: WON an efficient intervening cause is present in this case between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death; rendering the tetanus infection the proximate cause of Cruz’s death, and not the stab wound. Held: YES Ratio: We look into the nature of tetanus"The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80 percent of patients become

symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred." We explained in Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court that: The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause." In this case. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death.


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However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.

A person who, knowing that he is exposed to a dangerous condition and voluntarily assumes it may not recover from the defendant who maintained such dangerous conditions. Kinds of dangerous conditions: i.

Those that inherently dangerous - they retain their potential energy in full, even if they are stored or handled with utmost care.

NOTES: WHAT IS AN EFFICIENCT INTERVENING CAUSE OR WHEN IS THERE SUCH?

i.e. One buries radioactive waste or hazardous chemicals in his backyard. A small change in temperature or humidity result to injuries to other people.

An independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

ii.

Those where a person places a thing which is not dangerous in itself, in a dangerous position - cases where objects are placed in such a way that other people’s right of way is not recognized.

Note: ELEMENTS/CHARACTERISTICS of an efficient intervening cause is that it is 1) INDEPENDENT from the prior negligent act Must have occured 2) SUBSEQUENTLY 3) RESULTS IN INJURY Effect: the intervening cause would now be considered as the proximate cause When event considered remote cause If no danger existed in the condition EXCEPT BECAUSE OF THE INDEPENDENT CAUSE(efficient intervening cause), such condition was not the proximate cause.

i.e. a dangerous condition was created because a truck was parked askew in such a way that it partly blocks ongoing traffic. Cases where objects are placed in an unstable position where the application of small force will permit the release of some greater force.

NOTES: RULES WHEN THERE IS EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred."

i.e. If a person leaves a rock in an unstable position on top of a steep hill, there is a great possibility that somebody will be injured because it is bound to be pulled on the ground by the force of gravity. iii.

Those involving products and other things which are dangerous because they are defective - Includes defective construction of a building. The thing itself is not supposed to be dangerous but it was negligently or erroneously produced or constructed.

Accordingly, an act/event cannot be considered as the proximate cause of an injury if there is an efficient intervening cause between the time of event to the time of injury EN BANC If efficient intervening cause is present, the said act/event then will be merely considered as a prior and remote cause RULES WITH RESPECT TO Prior and remote cause A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action When such remote cause merely, furnishes the condition or gives rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible  if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury Even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.

REMIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., vs THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY G.R. No. L-15688 PONENTE: STREET, J.: Facts: o

5.

Dangerous conditions Even if the defendant had only created a condition, he may be held liable for damages if such condition resulted in harm to either person or property.

November 19, 1921

o

This action was instituted jointly by Remigio Rodriguez and three others in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay to recover a sum of money of the Manila Railroad Company as damages resulting from a fire kindled by sparks from a locomotive engine. The defendant Railroad Company operates a line, that on January 29, 1918, as one of its trains passed over said line, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, fire occurred immediately


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o

o

after the passage of the train with a strong wind blowing at the time it consumed four houses. It is stated in the Railroad Company’s brief that the fire was first communicated to the house of Remigio Rodriguez, from whence it spread to the others. All of these houses were of light construction with the exception of the house of Remigio Rodrigueza, which was of strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon. It is alleged that the defendant Railroad Company was conspicuously negligent in relation to the origin of said fire, in the following respects, namely, first, in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in charge of the locomotive; secondly, in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without having the smokestack protected by some device for arresting sparks; thirdly, in using in its locomotive upon this occasion Bataan coal, a fuel of known inferior quality which, upon combustion, produces sparks in great quantity. The sole ground upon which the defense is rested is that the house of Remigio Rodrigueza stood partly within the limits of the land owned by the defendant company, the company notified Rodriguez to get his house off the land of the company and to remove it from its exposed position. Rodriguez did not comply with this suggestion, though he promised to put an iron roof on his house, which he never did. it is contended for the defense that there was contributory negligence on the part of Remigio Rodrigueza in having his house partly on the premises of the Railroad Company, and that for this reason the company is not liable.

destructive of his right of action, because, first, that condition was not created by himself; secondly, because his house remained on this ground by the toleration, and therefore with the consent of the Railroad Company; and thirdly, because even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it. (Grand Trunk Railway of Canada vs. Richardson, 91 U. S., 454; 23 L. ed., 356; Norfolk etc. Ry. Co. vs. Perrow, 101 Va., 345, 350.)lawphil.net

G.R. No. L-47851 October 3, 1986 JUAN F. NAKPIL & SONS, and JUAN F. NAKPIL, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, UNITED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., JUAN J. CARLOS, and the PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, respondents. G.R. No. L-47863 October 3, 1986 THE UNITED CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. G.R. No. L-47896 October 3, 1986 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, ET AL., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents. Facts:  

 Issue: 1. WON Rodriguez bears the risk of loss due to the dangerous conditions whence he built his house (MAIN) 2. WON Railroad Company is not liable for the other 3 house owners because the fire would not have reached the other 3 houses where it not through the fire which was caught by Rodriguez house which in turn communicated the fire to the other houses. (EXTRA) Held: No on both issues.







Ratio: Answer must be qualified. So long as his house remained in this exposed position, he undoubtedly assumed the risk of any loss that might have resulted from fires occasioned by the defendant's locomotives if operated and managed with ordinary care. But he cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent man In the situation now under consideration the proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of the defendant in causing this fire. The circumstance that Remigio Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence





The plaintiff, Philippine Bar Association, a civic-nonprofit association decided to construct an office building The construction was undertaken by the United Construction, Inc. on an "administration" basis, on the suggestion of Juan J. Carlos, the president and general manager of said corporation. The proposal was approved by plaintiff's board of directors and signed by its president Roman Ozaeta, a third-party defendant in this case. The plans and specifications for the building were prepared by the other third-party defendants Juan F. Nakpil & Sons. The building was completed in June, 1966 In the early morning of August 2, 1968 an unusually strong earthquake hit Manila and the building in question sustained major damage. o The tenants vacated the building in view of its precarious condition. The plaintiff commenced this action for the recovery of damages arising from the partial collapse of the building against United Construction, Inc. and its President and General Manager Juan J. Carlos as defendants. o Plaintiff alleges that the collapse of the building was due to the defects in the construction, the failure of the contractors to follow plans and specifications and violations by the defendants of the terms of the contract. Defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint against the architects who prepared the plans and specifications, alleging in essence that the collapse of the building was due to the defects in the said plans and specifications. Meanwhile, plaintiff moved twice for the demolition of the building on the ground that it may topple down in case of a strong earthquake. o The building was authorized to be demolished at the expense of the plaintiff, but another earthquake of high intensity followed by other strong earthquakes on caused further damage to the property.

Issue: WON an act of God-an unusually strong earthquakewhich caused the failure of the building, exempts from


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o

liability, parties who are otherwise liable because of their negligence? Ruling: The applicable law governing the rights and liabilities of the parties herein is Article 1723 of the New Civil Code. Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damage if the edifice fags within the same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the causes of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. GR: ART 1174 No person shall be responsible for events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable

While the third-party defendants were found to have inadequacies or defects in the plans and specifications prepared by them. The defects in the construction and in the plans and specifications were the proximate causes that rendered the PBA building unable to withstand the earthquake of August 2, 1968.



One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible, intervenes to precipitate the loss.

DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES Kinds of defences: I.

II.

1.

Complete – Completely bars recovery o Assumption of risks o Caso Fortuito Partial – Mitigates liability o Contributory negligence Due Diligence

G.R. No. 165413 ACT OF GOD -- an accident, due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains or care, reasonably to have been expected, could have been prevented.  The earthquake of August 2, 1968 is a fortuitous event or an act of God. To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 for a breach of an obligation due to an "act of God," the following must concur: a. the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; b. the event must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; c. the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and d. the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. 

When the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. o To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned.



The negligence of the defendant and the third-party defendants was established beyond dispute o Defendant United Construction Co., Inc. was found to have made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and have failed to observe the requisite workmanship in the construction as well as to exercise the requisite degree of supervision;

February 22, 2012

PHILAM INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO., Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and D.M. CONSUNJI INC., Respondents. SERENO, J.: Facts: o Four gensets from the United States of America were ordered by Citibank, N.A. (Citibank). Petitioner AHIC insured these gensets under Certificate No. 60221 for USD 851,500 covering various risk. The insurance policy provided that the claim may be paid in the Philippines by Philam Insurance Co., Inc, AHICs local settling agent. o Citibanks broker-forwarder, Melicia International Services (MIS), transported the gensets in separate container vans. It was instructed by Citibank to deliver and haul one genset to Makati City,where the latters office was being constructed by the building contractor, DMCI. o MIS was further instructed to place the 13-ton genset ] at the top of Citibanks building. The broker-forwarder declined, since it had no power cranes.] Thus, Citibank assigned the job to private respondent DMCI, which accepted the task. o On 16 October 1993, DMCI lifted the genset with a crane (Unic-K-2000) that had a hydraulic telescopic boom and a loading capacity of 20 tons.] During the lifting process, both the cranes boom and the genset fell and got damaged.


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o

o

o

o

o

After two days, DMCIs surveyor, Manila Adjusters & Surveyors Co. (MASC) assessed the condition of the crane and the genset.[12] According to its Survey Certificate, the genset was already deformed.[13] Citibank demanded from DMCI the full value of the damaged genset, including the cost, insurance and freight amounting to USD 212,850.[14] Private respondent refused to pay, asserting that the damage was caused by an accident.[15] Thereafter, Citibank filed an insurance claim with Philam, AHICs local settling agent, for the value of the genset. Philam paid the claim for PhP 5,866,146.[16] Claiming the right of subrogation, Philam demanded the reimbursement of the gensets value from DMCI, which denied liability.[17] Thus, on 19 April 1994, Philam filed a Complaint with the RTC to recover the value of the insured genset.[18] At the trial court, petitioner Philam did not invoke res ipsa loquitur. Rather, during the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on this sole issue: Whether or not the damage was the fault of the defendant or within their area of supervision at the time the cause of damage occurred.

1. A whole team was involved in transferring the genset. Petitioners did not even the question the acts of the other team members involved in the crane operations.

2. Del Pilar exercised reasonable care and caution when he tested the crane four times right before actual operations to make sure that it could lift the genset.

3. Del Pilar stopped turning the controls, and it was only when the swinging stopped that he performed the next maneuver. All of these acts, as proven by the evidence, showed due diligence in operating the crane.

Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.[26] It is a conduct that involves an

The RTC ruled in favor of Philam - that the loss or damage to the genset was due to the negligent operation of the crane.

CA – REVERSED; that the falling of the genset was a clear case of accident and, hence, DMCI could not be held responsible.

Issue: WON petitioners have sufficiently established the negligence of DMCI for the former to recover the value of the damaged genset

Held: NO, Philam failed to establish DMCIs negligence.

Ratio: DMCI exercised due diligence. The event is an accident; and that consequently Philam cannot claim damages for the damaged genset.

unreasonably great risk of causing damage; or, more fully, a conduct that falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonably great risk of harm.

DISCUSSION

Philam blames the conduct of DMCIs crane operator for the gensets fall. Essentially, it points out the following errors in operating the crane:

1. Del Pilar did not give any reason for his act of raising the boom from 75 to 78 degrees at the stage when the genset was already set for lowering to the ground -> (JUSTIFICATION) it had to be raised three (3) degrees in order to put it exactly in the proper designation.

For DMCI to be liable for damages, negligence on its part must be established.] Additionally, that finding must be the

2. Del Pilars revving of the motor of the boom triggered the

proximate cause of the damage to the genset.

chain of events starting with the jerk, then followed by the swinging of the genset which was obviously violent as it caused

DMCI exercised the necessary care and precaution in lifting the

the body of the crane to tilt upward, and ultimately, caused the

genset.

boom with the genset to fall.


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->(JUSTIFICATION) Philam emphasized the apparent

Applying the test, the circumstances would show

inconsistencies in Del Pilars narration. In his signed statement,

that the acts of the crane operator were rational and justified.

executed 15 days after the incident, Del Pilar stated that when he raised the boom from 75 to 78 degrees, he revved the

Logically, in order to raise the cranes boom, the

motor, upon which he felt the sudden upward movement (jerk)

operator must step on the pedal; else, the 13-ton genset would

of the boom followed by the swinging of the genset.[32]

not be brought down. Philam did not even present expert evidence to challenge the need of increasing the power supply

But in his affidavit, executed already during the trial,

to move the boom.

Del Pilar mentioned that he moved the boom slowly when he raised it to 78 degrees. Del Pilars statements concentrated on

The speculative assertion of Philam should be

the manner of lifting of the genset.

supported by specific evidence of the cranes defects. Instead, Examining the signed statement and the affidavit of

Philam utterly failed to contradict the findings of MASC which

Del Pilar, petitioner Philam inaccurately portrayed his

made an actual site inspection to observe the crane used in

narration.

lifting the genset. The affidavit pertained exactly to how the cranes

Additional: Res ipsa loquitor – not applicable, since there is direct evidence[49] on the issue of diligence or lack thereof pertaining to the lifting of the genset. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience.

boom had been raised. It is only when a witness makes two sworn statements, and these two statements incur the gravest contradictions, that the court cannot accept both statements as proof.

2.

Plaintiff’s own negligence

Even if Del Pilar failed to mention the slow manner

is not necessarily established. Persons are easily liable to

The victim of negligence is likewise required to exercise due care in avoiding injury to himself. He ought to conform to the standard of a reasonable man for his own protection.

commit errors in the recollection of minute details of an

o

of raising the boom in his earlier signed statement, the reverse

important occurrence.

[Art. 2179] When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Not all omissions can be considered as negligent. The test of negligence is as follows: Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.[30]

Plaintiff’s own negligence as the proximate cause

The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance should be against himself and not against another. o

Contributory negligence

Conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard


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to which he is required to conform for his own protection. (Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals). [Article 2214] In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.

Doctrine of comparative negligence - any rule under which the relative degree of negligence of the parties is considered in determining whether, and to what degree, either should be responsible for his negligence. The rules involve apportionment of damages. Under the “pure” type of comparative negligence, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence does not operate to bar his recovery altogether but does serve to reduce his damage in proportion to his fault. At the time the Civil Code was enacted, the prevailing rule in the United States was the doctrine of contributory negligence. (Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., supra). However, as of 1991, the prevailing rule was already the doctrine of comparative negligence. The court is free to determine the extent of the mitigation of the defendant’s liability depending on the circumstances. Contributory negligence (Common law) Negligence of the defendant which contributes to his injury completely bars recovery.

Doctrine of comparative negligence Does not completely bar recovery but merely mitigates the same.

[G.R. No. 57079. September 29, 1989.] PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., INC. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN, respondents. Facts: o This case had its inception in an action for damages instituted in the former Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental by private respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Gloria Esteban allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face, leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. o PLDT, in its answer, denies liability on the contention that the injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result of their own negligence and that the entity which should be held responsible, if at all, is L.R. Barte and

Company (Barte, for short), an independent contractor which undertook the construction of the manhole and the conduit system. Accordingly, PLDT filed a third-party complaint against Barte alleging that, under the terms of their agreement, PLDT should in no manner be answerable for any accident or injuries arising from the negligence or carelessness of Barte or any of its employees. In answer thereto, Barte claimed that it was not aware nor was it notified of the accident involving respondent spouses and that it had complied with the terms of its contract with PLDT by installing the necessary and appropriate standard signs in the vicinity of the work site, with barricades at both ends of the excavation and with red lights at night along the excavated area to warn the traveling public of the presence of excavations. TC: Rendered a decision in favor of the spouses Esteban. CA: Reversed TC’s decision. An MR was filed, but was denied. CA: A second MR was filed; a reso was issued, reversing the original decision. Issue: WON the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Held: YES. Ratio: The Court found no error in the findings of the respondent court in its original decision that the accident which befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT. Such findings were reached after an exhaustive assessment and evaluation of the evidence on record, as evidenced by the CA's resolution of January 24, 1980, which the Court quoted with approval: "First. Plaintiff's jeep was running along the inside lane of Lacson Street. If it had remained on that inside lane, it would not have hit the ACCIDENT MOUND. "Exhibit B shows, through the tiremarks, that the ACCIDENT MOUND was hit by the jeep swerving from the left that is, swerving from the inside lane. What caused the swerving is not disclosed; but, as the cause of the accident, defendant cannot be made liable for the damages suffered by plaintiffs. The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. That may explain plaintiff-husband's insistence that he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it. "Second. That plaintiff's Jeep was on the inside lane before it swerved to hit the ACCIDENT MOUND could have been corroborated by a picture showing Lacson Street to the south of the ACCIDENT MOUND. "It has been stated that the ditches along Lacson Street had already been covered except the 3 or 4 meters where the ACCIDENT MOUND was located. Exhibit B-1 shows that the ditches on Lacson Street north of the ACCIDENT MOUND had already been covered, but not in such a way as to allow the outer lane to be freely and conveniently passable to vehicles. The situation could have been worse to the south of the


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ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason no picture of the ACCIDENT MOUND facing south was taken. Third. Plaintiff's jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour as plaintiff-husband claimed. At that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated by the tiremarks in Exhibit B. The jeep must have been running quite fast. If the jeep had been braked at 25 kilometers an hour, plaintiffs would not have been thrown against the windshield and they would not have suffered their injuries. "Fourth. If the accident did not happen because the jeep was running quite fast on the inside lane and for some reason or other it had to swerve suddenly to the right and had to climb over the ACCIDENT MOUND, then plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the accident. With the drizzle, he should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25 kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he should have driven his jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT MOUND." The above findings clearly show that the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner. The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost every day and

had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. Moreover, the Court also sustained the findings of respondent Court of Appeals in its original decision that there was insufficient evidence to prove any negligence on the part of PLDT. It had for consideration only the self-serving testimony of respondent Antonio Esteban and the unverified photograph of merely a portion of the scene of the accident. The absence of a police report of the incident and the non-submission of a medical report from the hospital where private respondents were allegedly treated has not even been satisfactorily explained. As aptly observed by the CA in its aforecited extended resolution of January 24, 1980: "(a) There was no third party eyewitness of the accident. As to how the accident occurred, the Court can only rely on the testimonial evidence of plaintiffs themselves, and such evidence should be very carefully evaluated, with defendant, as the party being charged, being given the benefit of any doubt. Definitely without ascribing the same motivation to plaintiffs, another person could have deliberately engineered a similar accident in the hope and expectation that the Court can grant him substantial moral and exemplary damages from the big corporation that defendant is. The statement is made only to stress the disadvantageous position of defendant which would have extreme difficulty in contesting such person's claim. If there were no witness or record available from the police department of Bacolod, defendant would not be able to determine for itself which of the conflicting testimonies of plaintiffs is correct as to the report or non-report of the accident to the police department." A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail. WHEREFORE, the resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals, dated March 11, 1980 and September 3, 1980, are hereby SET ASIDE. Its original decision, promulgated on September 25, 1979, is hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139130. November 27, 2002] RAMON K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA BANKING CORPORATION, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: Facts: o Petitioner entrusted to his secretary his credit cards and his checkbook with blank checks. His secretary, thru falsification, encashed and deposited to her personal


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account seventeen checks drawn against the account of the petitioner at respondent bank. Petitioner then requested the respondent bank to credit back and restore to his account the value of the checks which were wrongfully encashed, but respondent bank refused. Hence, petitioner filed the instant case. Manila Bank sought the expertise of the NBI in determining the genuineness of the signatures appearing on the checks. However, petitioner failed to submit his specimen signatures for purposes of comparison with those on the questioned checks. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's own negligence was the proximate cause of his loss.

o

o o

o o

occur. That which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury. Elements: I. II. III.

Exceptions: The plaintiff is free from liability if: I. II.

I.

Held: No

Assumption of risks

The doctrine of assumption of risk is consistent with the Latin maxim volenti non fit injuria. Volenti non fit injuria - One is not legally injured if he has consented to the act complained of or was willing that it should

Express waiver of the right to recover There is assumption of risk if the plaintiff, in advance, has expressly waived his right to recover damages for the negligent act of the defendant. He has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.

Issue: WON Manila Bank is liable for damages for its negligence in failing to detect the discrepant checks?

3.

If an emergency is found to exist If the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.

Kinds:

Hence, this petition.

Ratio: To be entitled to damages, petitioner has the burden of proving negligence on the part of the bank for failure to detect the discrepancy in the signatures on the checks. It is incumbent upon petitioner to establish the fact of forgery, i.e., by submitting his specimen signatures and comparing them with those on the questioned checks. Curiously though, petitioner failed to submit additional specimen signatures as requested by the NBI from which to draw a conclusive finding regarding forgery. Further, the bank's employees in the present case did not have a hint as to the secretary’s modus operandi because she was a regular customer of the bank, having been designated by petitioner himself to transact in his behalf. It was petitioner, not the bank, who was negligent. In the present case, it appears that petitioner accorded his secretary unusual degree of trust and unrestricted access to his credit cards, passbooks, check books, bank statements, including custody and possession of cancelled checks and reconciliation of accounts. Petitioner's failure to examine his bank statements appears as the proximate cause of his own damage. True, it is a rule that when a signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the check is wholly inoperative. However, the rule does provide for an exception, namely: "unless the party against whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority." In the instant case, it is the exception that applies. Petitioner is precluded from setting up the forgery, assuming there is forgery, due to his own negligence in entrusting to his secretary his credit cards and checkbook including the verification of his statements of account.

The plaintiff must know that the risk is present; He must further understand its nature; His choice to incur it is free and voluntary.

Effect of a waiver to recover before/after negligent act: A. B. II.

Before – Invalid as it is prohibited. After – Valid; Condonation of obligation. Implied Assumption.

G.R. No. 154259

February 28, 2005

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Facts: o

o

o

o

Plaintiff Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached him. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter’s present for the celebrant. After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped


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o

o

o

by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang"). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Like a common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. Respondent (Ruby Lim) Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. Doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."

Dr. Filart She never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49. When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly dressed and was not invited.

Amay Bisaya Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees.

Trial Court: Gave more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. CA: Reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests. The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Issue (Main): WON the doctrine of VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA applies in the case at bar considering Amay Bisaya was a gate-crasher Held: No Ratio: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria refers to selfinflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. Issue (Sub 1): WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Amay Bisaya,to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Held: No Ratio: In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to


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be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.

o

o o

Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Issue (Sub 2): WON Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her. Held: No Ratio: Kasi hindi liable si Ruby Lim kaya hindi din liable employer niya.

o

All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. [Article 19] Principle of abuse of rights.

o

Standards: o 1. 2. 3.

act with justice give everyone his due observe honesty and good faith

Elements: 1. 2. 3.

There is a legal right or duty Exercised in bad faith; Sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.

[Article 20] Damages arising from a violation of law. [Article 21] Acts contra bonus mores Elements: 1. 2. 3.

There is an act which is legal Contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy It is done with intent to injure.

The Ilocos Norte Electric Company(INELCO) vs CA GR No L-53401 Novemer 06, 1989 SECOND DIVISION PARAS J.: Facts:

From the evening of June 28 until the arly morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon named "Gening" struck the province of Ilocos Norte which resulted in flooding. The deceased Isabel Lao Juan a.k.a. NANA BELEN was an owner and proprietress of the Five Sisters Emporium. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased went out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded northward towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium TO LOOK AFTER THE MERCHANDISE THEREIN THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. Wading in waist-deep flood on Guerrero, the deceased was followed by Aida Bulong, a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to the deceased, but at four meters away from her HE TURNED BACK SHOUTING THAT THE WATER WAS GROUNDED. Different sorts of help were exhausted and it was only when the electric current had been cut off when the body of the deceased was recovered about two (2) meters from the electric post. An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased in the Cout of First Instance of Ilocos Norte (now RTC). However, the Ilocos Norte Electric Company (INELCO) argued that it is not liable for the damages resulting from the death of the deceased since it exercisedthe required degree of diligence as an electric company. It further assailed the subsequent ruling of the Court of Appeals that it did not apply the legal principle of “ASSUMPTION OF RISK” in the said situation.

Issue: WON INELCO is not liable for damages based on the legal principle of “ASSUMPTION OF RISK” Held: No, the Court ruled that the legal principle “ASSUMPTION OF RISK” has no application in the present case. Ratio: The Court in deciding this case noted the surrounding circumstances which impelled/caused the deceased NANA BELEN to leave the comforts her home and brave the subsiding typhoon. She was on her way "to see to it that the goods were not flooded." INELCO was found to be negligent in not observing the EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE required of it as it venture in electricity. As a supplier of electricity it was warned days before that a typhoon was coming, and yet it was only upon the request of Engr Antonio Juan when the electric current was cut off. Moreover, it was found out that there where no electrical personnel deployed during the typhoon who could have fixed the fallen electrical lines. THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK has three requirements;


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#1. The plaintiff must know that the risk is present; #2. He must further understand its nature; #3. His choice to incur it is free and voluntary. Courts Ruling: Applying the above requirements, it has been held that in relation to the last requisite, there are certain EXCEPTIONS #1. If EMERGENCY is found to exist or #2. If the LIFE or PROPERTY of another is in peril OR #3 when he seek to rescue his endangered property. The Court said that it is crystal clear that ”an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise.

• Breach of Contract: • premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation

• the action can be prosecuted merely by proving • The existence of the contract • That the obligor (common carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination

• Quasi Delict: • has its source the negligence of the tortfeasor • the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action

• The action instituted by Sunga was based on Breach of Calalas vs. C.A G.R No. 122039 May 31, 2000 Mendoza, Background of the Case: This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA reversing the decision of RTC (holding Salva liable and absolved Calalas) instead awarded damages to Sunga herein private respondent against Calalas. Facts: o

Sunga a student major in Physical Education took a passenger jeep owned and operated by Calalas. The capacity of the jeep was 24, however Sunga was still accommodated to ride the jeep and was provided a stool and placed her the rear part of the vehicle. While the jeep unloads some of its passenger, the jeep was hit by an Isuzu Truck driven Verena and owned by Salva, as a result Sunga was injured. Sunga obtained fracture and was confined in the hospital. Sunga stopped her studies because of the injuries. Sunga then filed a complaint against Calala for breach of contract of carriage against Calalas. Calalas then filed a third party complaint against Salva the driver of the Isuzu Truck. RTC absolved Calalas and Salva liable to Calalas. CA reversed RTC’s decision and awarded damages to Sunga including moral damages. Hence this petition.

Issue: WON Calalas is liable based on Breach of Contract of Carriage. WON the taking of Extension Seat by Sunga amounted to Assumption of Risk Held: 1. YES. 2. NO. Petitioners Contention:

• The negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident hence his liability is negated. • That the taking of Sunga of the Extension Seat amounted to an implied assumption of risk

• The award of moral is not supported by evidence.

Contract of carriage hence, Sunga needs only to prove the existence of the two elements provided above. • Furthermore, Art. 1756 provides that, in case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence. • The burden of proof then shifts to the common carrier. • Thus the contention of Calalas that the proximate cause of the accident was Salva is immaterial, since its only applicable in actions based on quasi-delict Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.

• Given

the above provision, in the case at bar, the presumption of negligence arose upon the happening of the accident.

• To

negate Calalas liability, Calalas has to prove that he exercised utmost diligence of a very cautious persons in performing his obligation

• The court held that he failed to do so: • First:

The Jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway. A violation of R.A 4136, which prohibits vehicles to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle

• Second: The driver of the jeep took more passenger than its capacity. Which is also prohibited in the same law.

• Assumption of Risk: • We

find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an


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"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry.

o

The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.

• This is also true of petitioner's contention that the

o

In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person’s own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery.

jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito.

• A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable.

Elements: 1.

• This

requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor.

• Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.

2.

3. 4.

Cases when doctrine applied: o

As to Moral Damages: As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.

In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.

o

Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger.

4.

o

o

o o

Reason:

Last clear chance

The doctrine of the last clear chance – A person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Examination of the cases where the Supreme Court applied the doctrine of last clear chance reveals that the doctrine is being applied for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the accident.

Cases when the doctrine was held inapplicable:

Exception: As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.

Plaintiff was in a position of danger and by his own negligence was unable to escape from such position by the use of ordinary care. Defendant has the last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise such last clear chance. Defendant knew that the plaintiff was in a position of danger. The accident occurred as a proximate result of such failure.

It does not apply if the plaintiff was not negligent, that is, only the defendant was negligent. It cannot also apply where the party charged (defendant) is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury. It cannot be applied in the field of joint tortfeasors and it cannot be invoked as between defendants who are concurrently negligent. It does not arise where the plaintiff, a passenger, filed an action against a carrier based on contract. It is not applicable if the actor, though negligent, was not aware of the danger or risk brought about by a prior fraud or negligent act. Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals GR No. 97626, March 14, 1997 Hermosisima, J. Facts: o A complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC for brevity), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank but which were not credited to


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o

o

its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas, allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank. RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74 to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were instead deposited to Account No. 5301734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains an account with the same bank. Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number, i.e., C.A. No. 53-01980-3. She made her company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. RTC decided in favor of respondent RMC

Issue: (1) Whether or not the proximate cause of the injury suffered by the respondent is the negligence of the petitioners (2) Discussion about "last clear chance" (3) Discussion about diligence required in banks Held: (1) Yes Ratio: (1) Petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent RMC and Romeo Lipana in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee in the person of Ms. Irene Yabut. According to them, it was impossible for the bank to know that the money deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut belong to RMC; neither was the bank forewarned by RMC that Yabut will be depositing cash to its account. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not completely accomplished. There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must

respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff It appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent. (2) Under the doctrine of "last clear chance", petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure. (3) Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.

[G.R. No. 138060. September 1, 2004] WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of D Rough Riders, and VIRGILIO TE LAS


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PIAS petitioners, vs. PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO and PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC., respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.: o Facts: o

o

o

o

o

o

o o

At about 10:00 p.m., the cargo truck marked Condor Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise loaded with firewood. Upon reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized. Pedrano left his helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It was about 12:00 a.m. At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus driven by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies. Among its passengers were the Spouses Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus, about 3 or 4 places from the front seat. As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck, which was then about 25 meters away. He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles. His wife, Felisa, was brought to the hospital and she died shortly thereafter. Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage against D rough riders operator Tiu and his driver Te Laspias. The petitioners, filed a Third-Party Complaint against the following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII), petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They alleged that petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of the highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspias promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on, but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear. The respondent PPSII, for its part, admitted that it had an existing contract with petitioner Tiu, but averred that it had already attended to and settled the claims of those who were injured during the incident. It could not accede to the claim of respondent Arriesgado, as such claim was way beyond the scheduled indemnity as contained in the contract of insurance. After the parties presented their respective evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent Arriesgado. According to the trial court, there was no dispute that William Tiu was engaged in business as a common carrier.

o

o

The trial court ruled that if Laspias had not been driving at a fast pace, he could have easily swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck, thus, averting the unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner Laspias was negligent. The trial court also ruled that the absence of an early warning device near the place where the truck was parked was not sufficient to impute negligence on the part of Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were fully on, and the vicinity was well lighted by street lamps. It also found that the testimony of petitioner Tiu, that he based the selection of his driver Laspias on efficiency and in-service training, and that the latter had been so far an efficient and good driver for the past six years of his employment, was insufficient to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. After the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the trial courts decision. According to the appellate court, the action of respondent Arriesgado was based not on quasi-delict but on breach of contract of carriage. As a common carrier, it was incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that extraordinary diligence was observed in ensuring the safety of passengers during transportation. Since the latter failed to do so, he should be held liable for respondent Arriesgados claim.The CA also ruled that no evidence was presented against the respondent PPSII, and as such, it could not be held liable for respondent Arriesgados claim.

Issue: (under the syllabus): WON the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable (other issues in connection of other topics in torts): 1. WON Laspias as the driver of the bus is negligent 2. WON Tiu as the operator of the bus is negligent 3. WON the driver of the truck and the owner were also negligent 4. WON PPSII as the insurer of Tiu is also liable Ratio: The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Is Inapplicable in the Case at Bar NOT APPLICABLE. Contrary to the petitioners contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has


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itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code. Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent Arriesgados wife due to the negligence of petitioner Laspias, his employee, on this score.

Petitioner Laspias Was negligent in driving The Ill-fated bus YES. Since he saw the stalled truck at a distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspias had more than enough time to swerve to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. Although the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour violating Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136 or Restriction as to speed xxxxxxxxx and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. As shown by preponderance of evidence that defendant Virgilio Te Laspias failed to observe extraordinary diligence as a driver of the common carrier in this case.

Petitioner Tiu failed to Overcome the presumption Of negligence against him as One engaged in the business Of common carriage YES. Arriesgado and his deceased wife contracted with petitioner Tiu, as owner and operator of D Rough Riders bus service, for transportation from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu, to Cebu City for the price of P18.00. It is undisputed that the respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In actions for breach of contract, and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be proved. This is because under the said contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with due regard for all circumstances. As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common carrier.

Respondents Pedrano and Condor were likewise

Negligent YES. In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts failed to consider that respondent Pedrano was also negligent in leaving the truck parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles, and that such failure created the presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, respondent Condor, in supervising his employees properly and adequately. The petitioners were correct in invoking respondent Pedranos failure to observe Article IV, Section 34(g) of the Rep. Act No. 4136, which provides: (g) Lights when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic. The Liability of Respondent PPSII as Insurer YES. The insurer could be held liable only up to the extent of what was provided for by the contract of insurance, in accordance with the CMVLI law. At the time of the incident, the schedule of indemnities for death and bodily injuries, professional fees and other charges payable under a CMVLI coverage. A perusal of the records will show that when the petitioners filed the Third-Party Complaint against respondent PPSII, they failed to attach a copy of the terms of the insurance contract itself. Only Certificate of Cover No. 054940 issued in favor of Mr. William Tiu, Lahug, Cebu City signed by Cosme H. Boniel was appended to the third-party complaint. In fact, respondent PPSII did not dispute the existence of such contract, and admitted that it was liable thereon. It claimed, however, that it had attended to and settled the claims of those injured during the incident, and set up the following as special affirmative defenses: Considering the admissions made by respondent PPSII, the existence of the insurance contract and the salient terms thereof cannot be dispatched. It must be noted that after filing its answer, respondent PPSII no longer objected to the presentation of evidence by respondent Arriesgado and the insured petitioner Tiu. Even in its Memorandum56 before the Court, respondent PPSII admitted the existence of the contract, but averred as follows: As can be gleaned from the Certificate of Cover, such insurance contract was issued pursuant to the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law. It was expressly provided therein that the limit of the insurers liability for each person was P12,000, while the limit per accident was pegged at P50,000.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:


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(1) Respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. and petitioner William Tiu are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado the total amount ofP13,113.80; (2) The petitioners and the respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado P50,000.00 as indemnity; P26,441.50 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees. SO ORDERED.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION V VIZCARA GR NO. 190022, February 15, 2012 Reyes, J: BACKGROUND: CA affirmed the RTCs finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners. It concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure to install sufficient safety devices in the area, such as flagbars or safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause of the accident. Facts: o

o

o

On May 14, 2004, at about three oclock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his five companions. While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR) train, then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, and three of his companions. On the other hand, two sustained serious physical injuries. At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally, the Stop, Look and Listen signage was poorly maintained. The Stop signage was already faded while the Listen signage was partly blocked by another signboard. On September 15, 2004, the two survivors of the mishap, together with the heirs of the deceased victims, filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the alternate driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City.

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENT: The respondents alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained by the victims of the accident was the petitioner’s gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to persons and properties. They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence of the track and of the approaching train. PETITIONER’S ARGUMENT: The petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its roadworthiness. They asseverate that right before the collision, Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. Four hundred (400) meters away from the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching

train. When the train was only fifty (50) meters away from the intersection, respondent Estranas noticed that all vehicles on both sides of the track were already at a full stop.Thus, he carefully proceeded at a speed of twenty-five (25) kilometers per hour, still blowing the trains horn. However, when the train was already ten (10) meters away from the intersection, the passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly crossed the tracks. Estranas immediately stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney but due to the sheer weight of the train, it did not instantly come to a complete stop until the jeepney was dragged 20 to 30 meters away from the point of collision. Also, the petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and recklessness of the driver of the jeepney. They argue that as a professional driver, Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic rules and regulations, including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary measures to observe in traversing the same. However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by PNR trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and thoughtlessly followed the tenwheeler truck ahead of them. His failure to maintain a safe distance between the jeepney he was driving and the truck ahead of the same prevented him from seeing the PNR signage displayed along the crossing Issue: W/N the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance is applicable in the present case. Held: No. The Doctrine of last Clear Chance is not applicable. Ratio: o

The doctrine of last clear chance provides that 1) where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or 2) where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. To reiterate the CA and the RTC’s ruling, the proximate cause of the collision was the petitioner’s negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them. Likewise, they did not exhibit any overt act manifesting disregard for their own safety. Thus, absent preceding negligence on the part of the respondents, the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CASE:


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o

o

o

5.

Petitioner’s (PNRC) negligence was the proximate cause of the accident based on Art. 2176. Negligence was defined as the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The petitioner’s failure to install adequate safety devices at the railroad crossing which proximately caused the collision. There was no contributory negligence on the part of the respondents. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. The respondents could not have contributed to their injury when they were not even aware of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents was following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to traverse the railroad track safely, Reynaldo, the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe to proceed. It bears noting that the prevailing circumstances immediately before the collision did not manifest even the slightest indication of an imminent harm. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable

Fortuitous event [Art. 1174]. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Inevitable accident or casualty; an accident produced by any physical cause which is irresistible; such as lightning, tempest, perils of the sea, inundation, or earthquake; the sudden illness or death of a person. Acts of God – Events totally independent of the will of man. Acts of man - Events independent of the will of the obligor but not of other human wills. General rule: It is a complete defence and a person is not liable if the cause of the damage was a caso fortuito.

Exception: If the caso fortuito is not the sole cause of the injury and the courts may mitigate the damage if the loss would have resulted in any event. [Article. 2215] Essential characteristics: 1.

2.

3.

4.

The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the ‘caso fortuito,’ or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfil his obligation in a normal manner; The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission. The whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. [National Power Corporation vs. The Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 415 [1993]] N.B. Fire not considered as act of God, except when caused by lightning. NAPOCOR vs CA et al Gr No. 103442-45 May 21, 1993 DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Facts: o The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents, sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the destruction to property caused by the inundation of the town of Norzagaray, Bulacan. The flooding was purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). o In said complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 1) defendant NPC operated and maintained a multipurpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question; 3) despite the defendants’ knowledge, of the impending entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level at the dam; 4) when the said water level went beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the dam’s spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which inundated the banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, drowned, and their properties were washed away. o In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3)


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o o o

written notices were sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of typhoon "Kading" and advising them to take the necessary precautions; 4) the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property; 5) in spite of the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not contain or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By way of a special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function. The lower court rendered its decision dismissing the complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence." In its joint decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed. The CA’s conclusion that the petitioners were guilty of: ". . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence . . . in the management and operation of Angat Dam. The resulting flash flood and inundation of even areas 1 kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have been avoided had defendants-appellees prepared the Angat Dam by maintaining in the first place, a water elevation which would allow room for the expected torrential rains."

o

This conclusion, in turn, is anchored on its findings of fact, to wit: "Defendants-appellees knew of the impending onslaught of and imminent danger posed by typhoon ‘Kading.’ Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees maintained a reservoir water elevation even beyond its maximum and safe level, thereby giving no sufficient allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water that will inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon.

o

The appellate court rejected the petitioners’ defense that they had sent "early warning written notices" to the towns of Bulacan.

o

Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate for purposes of the opening of the spillway gates. It did not prepare or warn the persons so served, for the volume of water to be released, which turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents near or along the Angat River, even those one (1) kilometer away, should have been advised to evacuate.

o

CA rejected the petitioners’ plea that the incident in question was caused by force majeure and that they are, therefore, not liable to the private respondents for any kind of damage — such damage being in the nature of damnum absque injuria.

Issue: WON the damage suffered by private respondents was damnum absque injuria (injury without loss). Or due to

fortuitous event. Held: NO. Not due to fortuitous event. Because a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. NAPOCOR is guilty of NEGLIGENCE. The flash flood, was caused not by rain waters, but by stored waters suddenly and simultaneously released from the Angat Dam. Ratio: CA found as conclusively established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of defendants-appellees’ headlessness, slovenliness, and carelessness." Its findings and conclusions are binding upon Us. In any event, We reiterate here Our pronouncement in the case that Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals is still good law as far as the concurrent liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. In the Nakpil case, We held: "To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to an ‘act of God,’ the following must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor. Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage, the obligor cannot escape liability. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate cause of the damage was the act of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of an act of God, he must be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by which that loss or damage may have been occasioned. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by the private respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in question


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may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

building, which remained intact after the storm. Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging of the roofing structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2' diameter steel bars embedded on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not anchored at all to the roof beams.

CA decision affirmed. SO ORDERED.

SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. V CA GR 126389, JULY 10, 1998 BACKGROUND: RTC: Giving credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect that subject school building had a "defective roofing structure," found that, while typhoon "Saling" was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to private respondents' houses "could have been avoided if the construction of the roof of [petitioner's] building was not faulty."

o

It then recommended that "to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in the vicinity," the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a "structural hazard." Issue: WON the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the falling portions of the school building's roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon "Saling", was, within legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event?

CA: Affirmed with modification the RTC’s disposition by reducing the award of moral damages from P1M to P200K. SC: Reversed CA’s decision. Found no clear and convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. Held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon "Saling" was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents' house.

Held: Yes. The damage on the roof of the building of private respondents is due to the typhoon which is a fortuitous event within legal contemplation. Petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault considering the evidences presented.

Facts: o

Ratio: Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, a powerful typhoon "Saling" hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner's building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents' house. After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed building was conducted by a team of engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna. Pertinent aspects of the latter's Report dated October 18, 1989 stated, as follows: One of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the building in the area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general formation of the building becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those located on both ends of the

FORTUITOUS EVENT/ CASO FORTUITO, Defined: Partidas: "an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen." Escriche: "an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted." Tolentino: "[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc." 

In the present case, there is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is


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

unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.

EVIDENCE/S PRESENTED: PRIVATE RESPONDENT: merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner's school building after the typhoon. SC: As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown. In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner's school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial deviation from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. PETITIONER: 1.

Obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy from city building official. SC: prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of subject school building.

2.

When part of its roof needed repairs of the damage inflicted by typhoon "Saling", the same city official gave the go-signal for such repairs — without any deviation from the original design — and subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth floor of the same building. SC: These only prove that subject building suffers from no structural defect, contrary to the report that its "U-shaped" form was "structurally defective."

3.

Presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school

4.

building were regularly undertaken. Petitioner was even willing to present its maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of such regular inspection but private respondents agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice president's narration. The city building official, who has been in the city government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench.

SC: It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school building's roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long years and several typhoons even stronger than "Saling."

6.

Prescription [Article 1146.] The following actions must be instituted within four years. 1. Upon inquiry to the right of the plaintiff. 2. Upon a quasi delict.

The Supreme Court explained in Kramer, Jr. that the right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely: 1.

A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; An obligation on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff.

2. 3.

The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element of commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. Relations back doctrine – That principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by fiction of law to have been done at some antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well-recognized application to proceedings at law; a legal fiction invented to promote the ends of justice or prevent injustice and occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy. KRAMER v CA, G.R. No. L-83524, October 13, 1989 Facts: o

April 8, 1976- F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by the petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a


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o

o

o

consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch. After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed their respective marine protests with the Board of Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of determining the proximate cause of the maritime collision. The Board concluded that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was attributable to the negligence of the employees of the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines during the collision. May 30, 1985 (9 years after the incident) - The petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the private respondent the Regional Trial Court RESPOPNDENTS: He argued that under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict like a maritime collision is four years. He maintained that the petitioners should have filed their Complaint within four years from the date when their cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976 when the maritime collision took place, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985 was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive period.

PETITIONERS: Contended that maritime collisions have peculiarities and characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. The petitioners argued that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest and that their cause of action accrued only on April 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had become final, and that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil Code should be computed from the said date.

The trial court went on to say that the four-year prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. Held: The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. Ratio: In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Administration, 17 this Court held as follows-

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause of action has arisen ... From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages.

7. Issue: WON the prescriptive period for filing the complaint has been prescribed RTC: The trial court observed that in ascertaining negligence relating to a maritime collision, there is a need to rely on highly technical aspects attendant to such collision, and that the Board of Marine Inquiry was constituted pursuant to the Philippine Merchant Marine Rules and Regulations

CA: Private respondents should have immediately instituted a complaint for damages based on a quasi-delict within four years from the said marine incident because its cause of action had already definitely ripened at the onset of the collision.

Veterans

Double recovery [Art. 2177] Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

8.

Involuntariness It is a complete defence in quasi-delict cases and the defendant is therefore not liable if force was exerted on him.

Law on Contracts Force and intimidation result in vitiated consent and the

Revised Penal Code The person acting because of the force or intimidation employed upon him is


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resulting contract is considered voidable.

subsidiarily liable to the offended party. Persons using violence or causing fear are primarily liable for acts committed by third persons acting under irresistible force or uncontrollable fear. If there be no such persons, those doing the acts shall be liable secondarily.

G.R. No. 149275 September 27, 2004 VICKY C. TY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES TINGA, J.: Facts: o

o

This case stemmed from the filing of seven (7) Informations for violation of B.P. 22 against Ty before the RTC of Manila. The facts show that Ty’s mother Chua Lao So Un was confined at the Manila Doctors’ Hospital (hospital) from 30 October 1990 until 4 June 1992. Being the patient’s daughter, Ty signed the "Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment" in the Contract of Admission dated 30 October 1990.6 As of 4 June 1992, the Statement of Account7 shows the total liability of the mother in the amount of P657,182.40. Ty’s sister, Judy Chua, was also confined at the hospital from 13 May 1991 until 2 May 1992, incurring hospital bills in the amount of P418,410.55.8 The total hospital bills of the two patients amounted to P1,075,592.95. On 5 June 1992, Ty executed a promissory note wherein she assumed payment of the obligation in installments.9 To assure payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks against Metrobank payable to the hospital. The seven (7) checks, each covering the amount of P30,000.00, were all deposited on their due dates. But they were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the "Account Closed" advice. Soon thereafter, the complainant hospital sent demand letters to Ty by registered mail. As the demand letters were not heeded, complainant filed the seven (7) Informations subject of the instant case.1 For her defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of "an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury." She averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. She alleged that her mother was deprived of room facilities, such as the aircondition unit, refrigerator and television set, and subject to inconveniences such as the cutting off of the telephone line, late delivery of her mother’s food and refusal to change the latter’s gown and bedsheets. She also bewailed the hospital’s suspending medical treatment of her mother. The "debasing treatment," she pointed out, so affected her mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that the latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged from the hospital. Fearing the worst for her mother, and

o

o

o

to comply with the demands of the hospital, Ty was compelled to sign a promissory note, open an account with Metrobank and issue the checks to effect her mother’s immediate discharge. The trial court rendered a Decision finding Ty guilty of seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. 22 and sentencing her to a prison term of 42 months (7 checks x 6 months ea = 42 months). In its Decision dated 31 July 2001, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification. It set aside the penalty of imprisonment and instead sentenced Ty "to pay a fine of sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00) equivalent to double the amount of the check, in each case." In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals rejected Ty’s defenses of involuntariness in the issuance of the checks and the hospital’s knowledge of her checking account’s lack of funds. It held that B.P. 22 makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check punishable as a special offense, it being a malum prohibitum. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its issuance.16

Issue: WON Ty’s issuance of the checks was under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury (Involuntariness). Held: No. Ratio: Whether the defense of uncontrollable fear is tenable to warrant her exemption from criminal liability--has to be resolved in the negative. For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the following requisites must concur: (1) existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed. It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb.26 A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote.27 A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well.28 It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks--a condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged--for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law. To begin with, there was no showing that the mother’s illness was so life-threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death. Secondly,


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risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.

it is not the law’s intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioner’s flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by the hospital’s threats or demands.

i.e. For instance, if the plaintiff was warned that it is still dangerous to take the vehicle from the repair shop because the repairs are still untested, there would be an express assumption of risk if he nevertheless took the vehicle from the shop with the express waiver of liability in favor of the proprietor.

Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.

Pleasantville Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (253 SCRA 10, 19 [1996]) Case involved a buyer of a subdivision lot who erroneously built on another’s lot because he was told to do so by the petitioner corporation. One of the defenses invoked by the petitioner corporation was that there was a waiver in the Contract of Sale of the right to recover damages based on negligence.

Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks "because the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem."

However, the Supreme Court ruled that a person cannot contract away his right to recover damages resulting from negligence. Even if such waiver was made, the same is contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. Rights can be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Sub Issue: Can the justifying circumstance of State Necessity be applied to the case. Held: No. Ratio: We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor from liability under the doctrine if state necessity: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.32 In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her obligation. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s hospital bills.

9.

Waiver

Express waiver of the right to recover There is assumption of risk if the plaintiff, in advance, has expressly waived his right to recover damages for the negligent act of the defendant. He has given his express consent to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances of injury from a known

Effect of a waiver to recover before/after negligent act: a. b.

Before – Invalid as it is prohibited. After – Valid; Condonation of obligation.

Third Division Gatchalian v. Delim GR No. L-56487 October 21, 1991 Feliciano, J: Facts: o Petitioner Gatchalian was riding a “Thames” mini-bus when it met a vehicular accident. A snapping sound was heard and a few moments later, the mini-bus went off the road and turned turtle. Gatchalian and other passengers were badly injured and they were all taken to Bethany Hospital, La union for medical treatment. o

3 days later, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent Delim went to Bethany Hospital. She visited the injured passengers, paid their hospital bills and medical expenses, and had them signed an already prepared joint Affidavit which stated: That we were passengers of Thames with Plate No. 52-222 PUJ Phil. 73 and victims after the said Thames met an accident at Barrio Payocpoc Norte, Bauang, La Union while passing through the National Highway No. 3; That after a thorough investigation the said Thames met the accident due to mechanical defect


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and went off the road and turned turtle to the east canal of the road into a creek causing physical injuries to us; xxx xxx xxx That we are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames, because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping us to be treated upon our injuries. o

Notwithstanding the document, Gatchalian still filed an action to recover compensatory and moral damages. Respondent contended that petitioner no longer had a cause of action since she already signed a waiver along with other passengers.

Issue: Whether or not the signed joint affidavit constituted a waiver. Held: No, the joint affidavit signed by Gatchalian and other passengers did not constitute a waiver. Ratio: A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent. Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.

PLEASANTVILLE V. CA GR. NO 79688 (1996)

Facts: o Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9 in Pleasantville Subdivision. o In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. o Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. o It was then that he discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof. o It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner. o After the preparation of the lot plan and a copy thereof given to Kee, CTTEI through its employee, Zenaida Octaviano, accompanied Kee's wife, Donabelle Kee, to inspect Lot 8. o Unfortunately, the parcel of land pointed by Octaviano was Lot 9. Thereafter, Kee proceeded to construct his residence, a store, an auto repair shop and other improvements on the lot. o Jardinico’s lawyer wrote to Kee to remove all the improvements he constructed and vacate Lot 9. o Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI. o MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI, and that the petitioner cannot use as a defense o On appeal, RTC ruled that petitioner and CTTEI were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee. o CA reversed the RTC’s decision and ruled that the erroneous delivery was due to the negligence of CTTEI, and that such wrong delivery was likewise imputable to its principal, petitioner herein Issues: 1. 2.

Ratio: 1.

WON Kee can be considered builder in good faith (main argument) WON the provision of the Contract of Sale constitutes as a waiver for petitioner’s liability (this is the waiver-related topic)

YES. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith.

Q: PLEASANTVILLE POINTED OUT KEE’S VIOLATION OF THE CONTRACT OF INSTALLMENT. DOES THIS AMOUNT TO BAD FAITH? IF SO, DOES THIS AFFECT KEE’S GOOD FAITH?


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NO TO BOTH. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith. 2.

NO. Paragraph 13 states: 13. The Vendee hereby declares that prior to the execution of his contract he/she has personally examined or inspected the property made subjectmatter hereof, as to its location, contours, as well as the natural condition of the lots and from the date hereof whatever consequential change therein made due to erosion, the said Vendee shall bear the expenses of the necessary fillings, when the same is so desired by him/her.11

The subject matter of this provision of the contract is the change of the location, contour and condition of the lot due to erosion. It merely provides that the vendee, having examined the property prior to the execution of the contract, agrees to shoulder the expenses resulting from such change. It cannot be interpreted that Kee contracted away his right to recover damages resulting from petitioner's negligence. Such waiver would be contrary to public policy and cannot be allowed. "Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law."

10. Immunity from personal liability by public officials When a public officer goes beyond the scope of his duty particularly when acting tortuously, he is not entitled to protection on account of his office but is liable for his acts like any private individual. A public officer who is the defendant in a case for damages under Article 32 cannot escape liability under the doctrine of state immunity. The doctrine of state immunity applies only if the acts involved are acts done by officers in the performance of official duties within the ambit of their powers. Obviously, officers do not act within the ambit of their powers if they would violate the constitutional rights of other persons. 11. Contributory negligence Conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence

was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

a.

Plaintiff’s own negligence is the proximate cause o He cannot recover damages

b.

Plaintiff’s negligence is not merely contributory because it is a concurring proximate cause o It is sufficient to bring about the effect but plaintiff’s negligence occurs simultaneously with that of the defendant. It is submitted that in these cases, no recovery can be had.

c.

Plaintiff’s negligence, together with defendant’s negligence, is part of the same causal set. o Plaintiff’s negligence is not sufficient to cause the injury while defendant’s negligence is also not equally sufficient. The effect would not have resulted without the concurrence of all of them. Considered merely contributory. The courts are therefore given the discretion to determine the percentage of mitigation that will be imposed against the plaintiff.

d.

Merely contributory negligence o Mitigates liability. May result in the reduction of the liability of the defendant to more than half. It is believed, however, that the reduction cannot be more than fifty percent (50%) in this jurisdiction because reduction by more fifty percent (50%) is no longer consistent with a finding that the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of the damage or injury.

Doctrine of comparative negligence – The relative degree of negligence of the parties is considered in determining whether, and to what degree, either should be responsible for his negligence. (Apportionment of damages) N.B. The defence of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. The fact that a “practical joke” is the cause of an injury does not excuse the perpetrator from liability. Imputed contributory negligence – Negligence is imputed if the actor is different from the person who is being made liable.


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Since a master may be held liable for his servant’s wrongful act, the law imputes to the master the act of the servant, and if the act is negligent or wrongful, and proximately results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable. Effect: The defendant is subject to mitigated liability even if the plaintiff was not himself personally negligent because the negligence of another is imputed to the plaintiff.

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents. FELICIANO, J: Facts: o

o

o

o

o

o

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had just crossed an intersection which was not far from his home , when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the right hand side of the Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck was parked by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, a regular driver phoenix, with the permission of his employer Phoenix. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Both the trial

court and the appellate court drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON Leonardo Dionisio is negligent. Held: YES. Ratio: In this case, Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a validcurfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. Such fact tends to show that he was speeding home and might had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass. There are also sufficient testimonies that Dionisio was speeding Although there is no sufficient evidence to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence, the court rules that Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident based on the aforementioned facts. NONETHELESS, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited "Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9 We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump


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truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines). The relative location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society. AWARD Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court. Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No. 65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following extent: 1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the appellate court found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him; 2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was reduced to P100,000.00,basically because Dionisio had voluntarily resigned his job

such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his loss of income "was not solely attributable to the accident in question;" and 3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and hence reduced to P50,000.00.

The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs remained untouched

G.R. No. L-40452 October 12, 1989 GREGORIO GENOBIAGON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES PONENTE: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.: BACKGROUND:  Prayer to SC: Petition for review, October 10, 1974  Petitioner tried for the crime of homicide thru reckless imprudence  CFI/RTC: Convicted Genobiagon: indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Rita Banzon Cabrera the sum of P6,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed 1/3 of the principal penalty and to pay the costs  CA: Convicted Genobiagon with damages raised to P12,000.00 but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency  SC: Affirmed conviction, increased civil liability to Php. 30,000 in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. Facts: o

On December 31,1959, at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening, a rig driven by Genobiagon’s an old woman, Rita Cabrera, 81 years old was crossing the right side of the street of a Market. Genobiagon's rig was following another at a distance of two meters. Rita started to cross when the first rig was approaching her, but as Genobiagon's vehicle was going so fast not only because of the steep road, but also because he was trying to overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig hit Rita, who as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road. Genobiagon continued to drive on, but a by-stander, ran after Genobiagonwhen stopped, he was asked why he hit the old woman,his answer was, “it was the old woman that bumped him.”. The victim was brought to the hospital where she died three hours later.

Issue: WON the CA erred in not finding that the reckless negligence of the victim was the proximate cause of the accident which led to her death. Held: NO. Ratio:


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1.

The issue is factual ----- Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon the SC

2.

The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. "The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence (People vs. Orbeta, CA-G.R. No. 321, March 29,1947)." (People vs. Quinones, 44 O.G. 1520).


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