US v. Toribio Facts:
Sometime in 1910, Luis Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for wor. !t appears that in the town of "ar men, in the #rovince of $ohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the provisions of %ct &o. 11'( do not prohibit nor penali)e the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure. Sections *0, *1, *+, and ** of the %ct are as follows S-". *0. &o large cattle shall be slaughtered or illed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse ecept ecept upon permit secured from the municipal municipal treasure. treasure. $efore issuing the permit permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the person appl/ing for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as ma/ satisf/ said treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested. S-". *1. &o permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted b/ the municipal treasurer unless such animals are unfit for agricultural wor or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter for food an/ animal of an/ ind which is not fit for human consumption.
He nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessar/ license. He was eventuall/ sued and was sentenced b/ the trial court. His counsel in one wa/ or the other argued that the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid eercise of police power. ISSUE: 1) hether or not the said law is valid.
+ hether or &ot it is an eercise of eminent domain or of police power. HELD:
The S" ruled against Toribio. The S" eplained that it 2is not a taing of the propert/ for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a 3ust and legitimate eercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the propert/ as would be inconsistent with or in3urious to the rights of the publics. %ll propert/ is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to in3ure the equal rights of others or greatl/ impair the public rights and interests of the communit/.4 !t is not quite clear from the argument of counsel whether his contention is that this provision of the stat statut utee cons consti titu tute tess a tai taing ng of prop proper ert/ t/ for for publ public ic use use in the the eer eerci cise se of the the righ rightt of emin eminen entt domain without providing for the compensation of the owners , or that it is an undue and unauthori)ed
eercise of the police power of the State. $ut whatever ma/ be the basis of his contention, we are of opinion, appropriating, with necessar/ modifications understood, the language of that great 3urist, "hief 5ustice Shaw 6in the case of "om. vs. Tewsbur/, 11 7et., 88, where the question involved was the constitutionalit/ of a statute prohibiting and penali)ing the taing or carr/ing awa/ b/ an/ person, including the owner, of an/ stones, gravel, or sand, from an/ of the beaches in the town of "hesea, that the law in question is not a taing of the propert/ for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a 3ust and legitimate eercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the propert/ as would be inconsistent with or in3urious to the rights of the public. %ll propert/ is acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to in3ure the equal rights of others or greatl/ impair the public rights and interest of the communit/. !t ma/ be conceded that the benificial use and eclusive en3o/ment of the propert/ of all carabao owners in these !slands is to a greater or less degree interfered with b/ the provisions of the statute: and that, without inquiring what quantum of interest thus passes from the owners of such cattle, it is an interest the deprivation of which detracts from their right and authorit/, and in some degree interferes with their eclusive possession and control of their propert/, so that if the regulations in question were enacted for purel/ private purpose, the statute, in so far as these regulations are concerned, would be a violation of the provisions of the #hilippine $ill relied on be appellant: but we are satisfied that it is not such a taing, such an interference with the right and title of the owners, as is involved in the eercise b/ the State of the right of eminent domain, so as to entitle these owners to compensation, and that it is no more than a 3ust restrain of an in3urious private use of the propert/, which the legislature had authorit/ to impose. !n the case of "om. vs. %lger 6( "ush., 8*, ;', wherein the doctrine laid down in "om. vs. Tewsbur/ 6 supra was reviewed and affirmed, the same eminent 3urist who wrote the former opinion, in distinguishing the eercise of the right of eminent domain from the eercise of the sovereign police powers of the State, said e thin it is settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
%ppl/ing these principles, we are opinion that the restrain placed b/ the law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for agricultural wor and draft purpose is not an appropriation of propert/ interests to a public use, and is not, therefore, within the principle of the eercise b/ the State of the right of eminent domain. !t is fact a mere restriction or limitation upon a private use, which the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. %nd we thin that an eamination of the general provisions of the statute in relation to the public interest which it sees to safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides, leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints imposed upon the eercise of rights of ownership b/ the particular provisions of the statute under consideration were imposed not for private purposes but, strictl/, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest in the eercise of the sovereign police power which ever/ State possesses for the general public welfare and which reaches to ever/ species of propert/ within the commonwealth.
