DOMINADOR R. AYTONA, petitioner, vs. vs. ANDRES V. CASTILLO, ET AL., respondents.
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Facts: •
On December 29, 1961, then President Carlos P. Garcia appointed Dominador R. Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. On the same day, the latter took the corresponding oath.
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On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on December 31, 1961, he issued Administrative Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, (date when he, Macapagal, had been proclaimed elected by the Congress). On January 1, 1962, 1962, President Macapagal appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank, and the latter qualified immediately.
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On January 2, 1962, 1962, both appointed exercised the powers of their office, although Castillo informed Aytona of his title thereto; the next day and thereafter, Aytona was definitely prevented from holding office in the Central Bank.
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Aytona filed a quo warranto, warranto, challenging Castillo's right to exercise the powers of Governor of the Central Bank. o Aytona claims he was validly appointed, had qualified for the post, and therefore, the subsequent appointment and qualification of Castillo of Castillo was void, because the position was then occupied by him. o Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona of Aytona had been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 of Macapagal; and so, the real issue is whether the new President had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already qualified.
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The record shows that President Garcia sent to the Commission on Appointments — which was not then in session — several communications dated December 29, 1961, submitting for confirmation names of appointees, one of which is herein petitioner. There were other appointments thus submitted by President Garcia on that date, December 29, 1961. All in all, about three hundred fifty (350) "midnight" or "last minute" appointments. In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is said to have acted for these and other reasons: 1. the outgoin outgoing g President President should should have have refrained refrained from from filling vacancies to give the new President opportunity to consider names in the light of his new policies, which were approved by the electorate in the last elections; 2. these scandalously hurried appointments in mass do not fall
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the appointm appointments ents were were irregular, irregular, immoral immoral and unjust unjust,, because because they were issued only upon the condition that the appointee would immediately qualify obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming President, with the result that those deserving of promotion or appointment who preferred to be named by the new President declined and were by-passed; and the abnormal conditions surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a desire on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the policies of the incoming administration.
Issue: The question is whether the appointment of a person to a public office by a President whose term of office was about to expire or cease is lawful or does not contravene the Constitution; or, if lawful after the appointee has taken his oath, until when would such appointment be valid and effective. Held: WHEREFORE, the Court exercising its judgment and discretion in the matter, hereby dismiss the action, without costs. •
The "midnight appointments" made by President Garcia were extended by him under Section 10, Paragraph 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides: "The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress." It is clear that these appointments can only be made during the recess of Congress because they are ad interim appointments.
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The term "recess" has a definite legal meaning. It means the interval between a session of Congress that has adjourned and another of the same Congress. It does not refer to the i nterval between the session of one Congress and that of another. In that case the interval is not referred to as a "recess" but an adjournment sine die. die.
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If the ad interim appointments made by the President during the recess of the Congress are effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress — a limitation on the power of the President — there is a cogent and strong reason for holding to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution that such appointments made by him ceased to be valid and effective after the term of the Congress existing at the time of the making of such appointments had ended or expired. The end or expiration of the of the Congress existing at the time of the making of the ad interim appointments by the President is a stronger cause or reason for the lapse or ineffectuality of such appointments than "the next adjournment of
Bank ceased, lapsed and expired on thirtieth of December 1961. He is no longer entitled hold the office to which he had been appointed.
