Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law) Caunca v Salazar GR. No. L-2690 January I, 1949
psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
Liberty of abode and travel
Ratio:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode a nd of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be provided by law.
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really indebted, such is not a valid reason for respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be multiplied by thousands or millions but would not in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that power to control said freedom may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental human right. The fortunes of business cannot be controlled by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the province of commerce or any other business enterprise.
Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave? Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it+-- may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house o f the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movem ent, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly o beyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
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Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are imposed "upon any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household servant or farm laborer." Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from leaving her employ because of the influence of the person detaining her.
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same ti me, to put the accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935). ... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. state.14 The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the courtrequires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, Feb. 13, 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. The S.C. held however that said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. Unlike the Shepherd case, petition er has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof , as well as the consent of his surety t o the proposed travel. e. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. He must however convince the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, and that his sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel.
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security,
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
public safety or public health.
urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel,
Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
Article II is the m ost loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle everything
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beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized. This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the th e right to travelfrom tra velfrom the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the rightto travel would normally connote. Essentially, Essent ially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to
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be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining tothe liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return tothe Philippines, the instant petition petit ion is hereby here by DISMISSED
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: Article 13. (1) Ever yone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides: Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor G eneral: As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without reference to attendant circumstances. Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.
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It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it. There are thus gradations to the question, to wit: Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide. Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide. Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit: Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE LAND. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President’s RESIDUAL POWER to protect the general welfare of the people people.. The court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel connote. Essentially, the right to return to one’s country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from, though related to the right to travel. Thus, even the Universal declaration of Human Rights
besieged by the insurgency, separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, etc. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically. Lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution, judicial power now includes the duty to “determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.” NOTE:
and the International Covenant on Civil a nd Political Rights treat the right to f reedom of
The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices
movement and abode within the territory of
(CJ Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
the state, the right to leave a country and the
Gancayco, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and
right to enter one’s country as separate and
Regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in
distinct rights.
favor of DISMISSING the petition. Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez,
THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE’S COUNTRY IS ONE’S COUNTRY
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and
NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY S PECIFICALLY
Sarmiento).
GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELLCONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY
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PASEI v. Drilon G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decisionmaking processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers. ISSUE: Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power. RULING: “[Police power] power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its allcomprehensive embrace. “The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No.
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1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germ ane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The Court is satisfied that the classification madethe preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.
Silverio v. CA
"Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
Justice Douglas, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, said: “Free movement by the citizen is, of course, as dangerous to a tyrant as free expression of ideas or the right of assembly, and it is therefore controlled in most countries in the interest of security . . . . That is why the ticketing of people and the use of
identification papers are routine matters under totalitarian totalitarian regimes.” Freedom of movement in Philippine law has evolved through the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions. The “watch list order” issued by the justice secretary must be measured against the present status of the current constitutional provision. The 1935 provision simply said: “The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.” impaired.” The teaching then was that no one could be compelled to change his or her home except in accordance with law. Thus, when the mayor of Manila sought to cleanse the city of prostitutes by sending them to Davao, the Supreme Court stopped him. The Court then said: “If [the City Mayor and Chief of Police] can take to themselves such power, then any official can do the same . . . And if a prostitute could be sent sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.” ADVERTISEMENT The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text to read: “The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.” The liberty could thus be impaired either “upon lawful order of the the court” or even without such order provided that the restriction was “necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.” The phrase “within the limits prescribed by law” in the 1935 provision disappeared. Thus, the net effect was that an executive officer could impair liberty of abode and of travel even without a prior court order provided only that in the executive officer’s judgment impairment was “necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health.” Drastic attempts by the government to control the travel of citizens during the period of martial law did reach the Court. The curtailment took the form of denial of exit permits. The Court had occasion to warn the Travel Processing Center not to treat the constitutional guarantee of the right to travel as an empty phrase in a pauper’s will. The 1987 Constitution has strengthened t he guarantee by splitting freedom of movement into two disti nct sentences and treating them differently. The liberty of abode is treated in a separate sentence. It may be impaired only “upon lawful order of the court,” and the court is to be guided by “the limits prescribed by law” on the liberty itself. The clear intent was to proscribe practices like “hamletting.”
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As to liberty of travel, under the 1987 law, it may be impaired even without a court order, but the appropriate executive officer is not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. He can impose limits only on the basis of “national security, public safety, safety, or public health” and “as may be provided by law,” a limitive phrase which had disappeared from the less libertarian 1973 text. My questions, therefore, are two. First, in what way will the travel of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo be a threat to “national security, public safety, or public health”? Second, by what statutory authority is the justice secretary preventing the exit of GMA? In issuing “watch list orders” the Department of Justice has relied on its prosecutorial powers as found in Section 3[1], [2] & [6], Chapter I, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code. Of these, the only part specifically related to travel is Section 3(6) which deals with the admission and stay of aliens! In effect, the policy being followed now claims even a broader executive discretion than that given under the 1973 Constitution which at least was limited by the needs of “national security, public safety, or public health.” The limitation on the right to travel must be based on law and not on a mere executive circular. The limitation may also be by legitimate court order under the Rules of Court. As the Court has said in reference to persons out on bail, (and who are therefore under the jurisdiction of a court), the right to travel should not be “construed as delimiting the inherent power of the courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.” The executive department is claiming similar discretionary power and without relation to national security, public safety, and public health. Incidentally, the celebrated case on the right to travel was the ban of President Cory Aquino on former President Ferdinand Marcos’ return to the Philippines. Since the authority to impair the right to travel must be based on law, there was need to point to a law giving her such authority. The Court found it in the “faithful execution clause” of Article VII, Section 17. The Court accepted the argument that the return of Marcos then could be a threat to public safety and the stability of the government at that time. Is the justice secretary making such claim even if President Aquino himself has been quoted as saying that he has no objection to the foreign travel of GMA?
Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80 (1991) "military members exempted from the right to bail”
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of Facts: This the AFP who were charged with violation ofArticles of W ar (AW) ( AW) 67 (Mutiny), (Mutin y), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder). The petitioners were questioning the conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted where a motion to bail was filed but was denied. Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and preliminary injunction before the court which was granted. However De Villa refused to release petitioner for provisional liberty pending the resolution of the appeal they have taken before the court invoking that military officers are an exemption from the right to bail guara nteed by the Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating the release for provisional liberty of petitioners with the court stating that there is a mistake in the presumption of respondents that bail does not apply among military men facing court martial proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the higher court.
Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked by petitioners is not availabl e in the military as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist. Justification to this rule involves the unique structure of the military and national security considerations which may result to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers will be released on provisional liberty giving them the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing the government. Therefore the decision of the lower court granting bail to the petitioners was reversed.
ANICETO SABBUN MAGUDDATU and LAUREANA SABBUN MAGUDDATU, petitioners, vs . Honorable COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN,
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines The Constitution of Philippines explained
the
Republic
J
of
the
.: For a human being who has been inside a prison cell, a bail bond represents his only ticket to liberty,
Issue: Whether or not militar y men are exempted from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to bail.
albeit provisional. But the right to bail is not always a demandable right. In certain instances, it is a matter of discretion. This discretion, however, is not full and unfettered because the law and the rules set the parameters for its proper exercise. Discretion is, of
Cases on constitutional (Philippine casebook series)
law
A historical and juridical study of the Philippine Bill of rights
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course, a delicate thing and its abuse of such grave nature would warrant intervention of this Court by way of the special civil action for certiorari
Sections 4, 5 and 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
The appellate court may review the resolution of the
provide:
Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to
SEC. 4. Bail, 4. Bail, a matter of right.right.- All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities an d Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.
the adverse party. xxx SEC. 7. Capital 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.- No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.- Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
WHAT IS BAIL?
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, 1.
It is the security given
2.
For the release of a person in custody of the law
3.
Furnished by him or a bondsman
bond during the period to appeal subject to the
4.
To guarantee his appearance before before any court as
consent of the bondsman.
required
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment
.
the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail
exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or o ther similar circumstances: (a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is undue risk th at during the pendency of the appeal, the accused ma y commit another crime.
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