Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

References (1 of 2)

[1]Dailey, K.W., The FMEA Pocket Handbook . 2004: DW Publishing company. [2]McDermott, R.E., R.J. Mikulak, and M.R. Beauregard, The basics of FMEA. 1996: Productivity. [3]SAE J1739: Potential Failure Modes and Effects analysis in Design and Potential Failure Effects in Manufacturing and Assembly Processes Reference Manual Draft - for review. 2005. [4]MIL-STD-1629A: Procedure for performing a failure mode, effects and criticality analysis. 1980.

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References (2of 2)

[5]Tweeddale, M., Managing Risk and Reliability of Process Plants. 2003:Petroleum Gulf Publishing. [6]ISO 14224: and natural gas industries Collection and exchange of reliability and maintenance data for equipment. 1999. [7]IEC 60050-191: International Electrotechnical Vocabulary Dependability and Quality ofofService. 1990. [8] -MIL-STD-721C Definitions terms for reliability and maintainability. 1995. [9] Macaulay, D., The Way things work . 1988: RD Press. [10] What's wrong with your existing FMEAs , 24/7 Quality.com.

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Software/Internet Resources MH1

• FMEA InfoCentre: http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/ •• http://www.weibull.com/basics/fmea.htm On-line paper: B. S. Dhillon, Failure modes and effects analysis-Bibliography, Microelectronics

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Slide6 MH1

Add from Plant Maintenance web site Melinda Hodkiewicz; 2006/07/ 16

Definitions and background

What is FMEA? • MIL-STD-1629A [4]: “The purpose of FMEA is to study the results or effects of item failure systemofoperation and to classify each potential failureon in terms its severity” • SAE J1739 [3]: “A FMEA can be described as a systemised group of activities intended to: (a) recognise and evaluate the potential failure of a product/process and its effect, (b) identify actions which could eliminate or reduce the chance of a potential failure occurring, and (c) document the process. It is complementary to the defining what a design or process must doprocess to satisfyofthe customer”. Hodkiewicz –

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Informal definition • “FMEA is anature non-quantitative analysis aims identify the of the failures that canthat occur in ato system, machine, or piece of equipment by examining the sub-systems or components in turn, considering for each the full range of possible failure types and the effect on the system of each type of failure. is an extension of FMEA that assigns a • FMECA ranking to both the severity of the possible effects and their likelihood, enabling the risks to be ranked” [From 5]

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Philosophy •• FMEA procedure. to assist The aimisisato‘common provide asense’ framework/process the thought process of a competent person engaged in identifying system or design problems. • The process focuses on what we want the equipment to do not what it actually is. By identifying what functions need to be achieved, we can then identify situations when the equipment does not perform the required function, and focus attention on the related causes and effects.

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An example FMEA report

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For what activities is FMEA appropriate? • New designs, new technology, or new process • Modifications to existing design or process environment, location or application • Use Identify of existing monitoring design andor inspection process in practices a new for equipment • Identifying failure codes for the CMMS system • Part of the RCM process Hodkiewicz –

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Design and Process FMEA

Types of FMEA • FMEA entity or can to be a functional applied toentity. a physical • For example, – it can be applied to a particular equipment (design FMEA), or to

– A process function (process FMEA).

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Example ANTI-SURGE (LP)

ANTI-SURGE (HP)

PCV 1(LP)

GAS EXPORT HEADER

LP SUCTION COOLER

m LP

P

P

SUCTION DRUM

T

T

DISCH. COOLER

m

LP DISCH. COOLER

HP SUCTION DRUM

P T

DEHYD. PACK

P T

M P

GEARBOX

ND

2

LP STAGE

HP STAGE

COMPRESSION

COMPRESSION

P TO SUBSEA PIPELINE

GAS EXPORT COMPRESSION TRAIN

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Design FMEA (DFMEA) Identifies functional of a design •• Evaluates the initial requirements design for manufacturing, assembly, service and recycling requirements. • Used by Design Team. The customer for the design team may be the end user, the design engineer of the higher level assemblies or the manufacturing process/assembly team. Hodkiewicz –

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Design FMEA in the AM context • If you are the maintenance engineer in an oil and gas or similar facility, it is unlikely that you will be involved in a design FMEA process. • However, if you are (1) troubleshooting equipment, (2) developing failure codes or (3) engaged in RCM, then information from the design FMEA conducted by the manufacturer may be helpful. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Process FMEA (PFMEA) • Identifies the process functions, process requirements, potential product and process failures and the effects on the customer. • Identifies to focus controls. process/operational variables on which • Traditionally used by Manufacturing/ Assembly/ Process team. The customer can be a downstream team, a service operation, or even • In government the AM arena, regulations. there is some overlap between HAZOP and Process FMEA for operational equipment

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Machinery FMEA (MFMEA) • This is a new category in the draft SAE J1739-2005 aimed at Plant Machinery • In and AM, Tools. machinery FMEA may be applied to important maintenance support tools such as lathes, cranes, milling machines etc. • There areDFMEA, similarities in approach between PFMEA and MFMEA. Hodkiewicz –

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Relationship SYSTEM

DESIGN

PROCESS

MACHINERY

Components, sub-systems, main systems

Components, sub-systems, main systems

Manpower, Machine, Method, Material, Measurement, Environment

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Tools, Work stations, production lines, operator training, processes, gauges

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Approaches to FMEA • A FMEA may be based on a • (a) hardware/physical, or (b) functional approach. • (a) items The and hardware analyses approach their possible lists individual failure modes. hardware • (b) The functional approach recognises that every item is designed to perform a number of functions that can be classified as outputs. The outputs are listed and their failure modes analysed. • For complex systems, a combination of (a) and (b) may be required. Hodkiewicz –

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Maintenance • For Maintenance Personnel, FMEA is a direct approach to the reduction of maintenance costs through the elimination of faults that give rise to the • FMEA identifies the most critical problems first paving maintenance task. the way for improved maintenance techniques • FMEA on installed equipment provides suggestions for redesign and ‘proactive maintenance’ – (From: Hastings, 1998, Reliability and Maintenance Course notes, QUT) Hodkiewicz –

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Terminology

Terms & definitions (1) • Failure: Termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function [7] • Required function: Function, or combination of functions, of an item which is considered necessary to provide a given service [7] • Failure mode: The manner by which a failure is observed. Generally describes the way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment operation [4]. Hodkiewicz –

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Terms & definitions (2) • Failure cause: • (1) Circumstance during design, manufacture or use which have led to failure [7]. • (2) The physical or chemical processes, design defects, quality defects, part misapplication, or other processes which are the basic reason for failure or which initiate the physical process by which deterioration proceeds [4]. • Failure mechanism: Physical, chemical or other process which has ledHodkiewicz to failure [7] – “FMEA”

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Terms & definitions (3) • Failure effect: The consequence a failure mode has on the operation, function, or status of an item [4]. • Critical failure: Failure of an equipment unit which causes an immediate cessation of the ability to perform its required function [6] • Non-critical failure: Failure of an equipment unit which does not cause an immediate cessation of the ability to perform its required function [6] Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Terms & definitions (4) • Criticality: A relative measure of the consequences of a failure mode and its • Severity: frequencyThe of occurrence consequence [4] of a failure mode. Severity considers the worst potential consequence of a failure, determined by degree of injury, property damage, or system damage that could ultimately occur. Hodkiewicz –

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Terms & definitions (5) • Reliability [8]:The probability that an item will perform its intended function(s) for a specified interval under (Hidden) stated conditions. • Undetectable failure: A postulated failure mode in the FMEA for which there is no failure detection method by which the operator is made aware of the failure [4]. Hodkiewicz –

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The FMEA Process

DEFINE SCOPE

DEFINE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS AND FAILURE MODES

IDENTIFY CAUSES OF FAILURE

IDENTIFY EFFECTS OF FAILURE & SEVERITY RATING

ASSIGN OCCURRENCE (FREQUENCY) RATING

IDENTIFY CONTROLS & ASSIGN DETECTION RATING

CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT

FMEA flowsheet


RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION

RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION & ANALYSIS

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Steps in the FMEA process (from [3]) 1. boundary) Define the SCOPE of the study (System 2. sub-system, Decide on the LEVEL of analysis (System, components) 3. For the selected system or sub-systems, IDENTIFY and list functions and the potential failure modes. Failure modes may be assessed at the hardware or functional level, or a combination of both. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Step 3 in the maintenance context • IDENTIFY and list failure modes …

– Information on what failed and when on a specific piece of equipment or in a system should be available in the maintenance management system – (CMMS) Depending on the organization of the system and the data quality processes then there may be a failure code indicating the cause of failure.

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Continued … 4. For the selected system or sub-system and for each of the identified failure mode, identify the POTENTIAL EFFECT(s) on the machine, system or process and (SEVERITY) of the the relative effect(s).importance

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Continued … 4. continued. The effects could include: – Injury to people – Damage to the environment – Damage to equipment – Loss of production – Reduced quality of production – Increased cost of operation

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Continued … 5. Assign mode an (OCCURRENCE) ranking to each failure 6. For each failure mode for each element, identify CONTROLS – The means of preventing the failure by design, operating and maintenance practices, and management. – The means of detecting the failure and responding effectively to it – The means (if any) of limiting the impact of the failure, particularly by design changes. Hodkiewicz –

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Continued .. 7. For each of the controls assign a DETECTION ranking 8. Calculate the Risk Priority Number (RPN) for each effect 9. Prioritise the failure modes for action (RANKING) 10. Take ACTION to eliminate or reduce the high risk failure modes 11. Calculate the resulting RPN as the failure modes are reduced or eliminated.

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DEFINE SCOPE

DEFINE LEVEL OF ANALYSIS

IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS AND FAILURE MODES






FMEA flowsheet

CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION


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Selecting the team • • •

Have you got representatives from all the stakeholders? Do you have a facilitator? Are the team members familiar with the subject but from diverse vantage points?

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Setting up the meeting • • • • • •

Provide advance notice Who will record meeting minutes? Who will facilitate? Establish ground rules Evaluate Provide and meetings follow an agenda Who will you report the results to?

• Allow no interruptions Hodkiewicz –

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Brainstorming rules [1] • Participants must be enthusiastic and give their imagination free reign • The recorder must be given time to record ideas • The ideas must be concisely recorded and placed in clear view of participants • Idea evaluation occurs after the session • Set a firm time limit • Clearly define the problem you want solved • The moderator must keep the group on subject and moving • When time is up, the group rank the ideas Hodkiewicz –

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Selecting systems/subsystems and components • It is important to have an agreed taxonomy when breaking systems down into sub-systems and components. • This may be agreed with by the team for a specific FMEA, or they may choose to use a taxonomy described in a Standard, for example: [6].

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Deciding level for analysis [6] Subunit

Power transmission

Pump unit

Control & monitoring

Lubrication

Miscellaneou s

Maintainable item

Gearbox Variable drive Bearings

Support Casing Impeller

Control Actuating device

Reservoir Pump with motor

Purge air Cooling/ heating

Seals Lubrication Coupling to

Shaft Radial bearing

Monitoring Valves Internal

Filter Cooler Valves

system Filter/ Cyclone

drive Coupling to driven unit

Thrust bearing Seals

Power supply

Piping Oil

Pulsation damper Flange joints

Valves Piping Cylinder liner Piston Hodkiewicz – “FMEA” Diaphragm

Others

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Defining functions and failure modes • Required function: Function, or combination of functions, of an item which is considered necessary to provide a given [7]. • Be explicit so it is clear when service a functional failure has occurred. • Failure mode: The manner by which a failure is observed. Generally describes the way the failure occurs and its impact on equipment operation [4]. Hodkiewicz –

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Defining functions and failures •• Equipment: Engine Crankshaft Function: ToDiesel convert reciprocating force from pistons and connecting rods into rotational force through the bearings and crankshaft to the drive coupling at a maximum rate of up to ‘x’ kW per cylinder at up to ‘y’ rpm continuously or ‘z’ kW per cylinder at ‘w’ rpm for up to ‘v’What hours in some 12. possible functional • Question: are failures?

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Functional failure • Function: To convert reciprocating force from pistons and connecting rods into rotational force through the bearings and crankshaft to the drive coupling • Functional Failure: Unable convert and transmit any force from the to pistons

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Failure mode (1 of 2) • Failure Mode (1): Damaged crankshaft axial alignment bearing (ball race) due to lubrication failure • Failure Effect (1): Crankshaft will float axially and foul on crankcase, of gear • Existing controls (1):misalignment Daily fuel dilution test,drives. weekly oil screen, change oil and filters as required. Hodkiewicz –

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Failure mode (2 of 2) • Failure Mode (2): Damaged axial alignment bearing (ball race)crankshaft due to bearing materialEffect failure(2): Same as (1). Crankshaft • Failure will float axially and foul on crankcase, misalignment of gear drives. • Existing controls (2): bearing Routine as vibration monitoring. Replace required. Hodkiewicz –

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Examples of failure modes • For mechanical equipment – Cracked, Loosened, Fractured, Leaking, Oxidised, Loss of structural support, Deformed, Slips, Disengages too fast, to transmit torque. • ForFailure electrical equipment – No signal, Intermittent signal, Inadequate signal, Sticking, Drift, Hodkiewicz –

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Process Failure modes (from [4]) Failure mode

Definition

Failure mode

Definition

FTS

Fail to start on demand

BRD

Breakdown

STP

Fail to stop on demand

HIO

High output

SPS FTC

Spurious stop Fail to close on demand

LOO ERO

Low output Erratic output

FTO

Fail to open on demand

VIB

Vibration

FTR DOP

Fail to regulate Delayed operation

NOI ELU

Noise External leakage lubricant, hydraulic fluid

FTF

Fail to function on demand

ELP

External leakage process medium

AOL AOH

Abnormal output – low Abnormal output - high

INL LCP

Internal leakage Leakage in closed position

OWD

Operation without demand

PLU

Plugged/choked

OHE PDE

Overheating Parameter deviation

SER OTH

Minor in-service problems Other

AIR

Abnormal instrument reading

UNK

Unknown

STD

Structural deficiency

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Examples of design failure causes • • • •

Improper tolerances Incorrect (stress or other) calculations Wrong assumptions Wrong material Lower grade components

• • • •

Lack of design standards Incorrect algorithm Insufficient lubrication capability Excessive heat Hodkiewicz –

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Examples of failure causes in manufacturing & process 1.

Skipped steps

11 Poor control procedures

2.

Processing errors

12 Improper maintenance

3.

Set up errors

13 Bad ‘recipe’

4.

Missing parts

14 Fatigue

5.

Wrong parts

15 Lack of safety

6.

Processing incorrect work piece

16 Hardware failure

7.

Mis-operation

17 Failure to enforce controls

8.

Adjustment error

18 Environment

9.

Equipment improperly set-up

19 Stress connections

10 Tools improperly prepared

equipment

20 Poor FMEAS Hodkiewicz –

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Example of design failure mechanisms •• Yield Fatigue • Material instability • Creep • Wear •• Corrosion Chemical oxidation Hodkiewicz –

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Examples of design controls • Prototype testing • Design reviews • Worst case stress analysis • FEA • Fault tree analysis

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ACTIVITY • Workshop and failure activity modes to identify functions • The aim of this activity is to see how the functions are broken down and assessed at the different levels. Hodkiewicz –

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Bicycle for (Male) Commuter

[from 3]

• List some design objectives regular commuter bicycle (functions) of a • For twomodes? of the functions identify potential failure

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Bicycle example continued • Identify bicycle some of the sub-systems of the • For one subsystem: Identify at least two functions and failure modes.

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DEFINE SCOPE



IDENTIFY CAUSES OF FAILURE IDENTIFY EFFECTS OF FAILURE & SEVERITY RATING




FMEA flowsheet


RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION


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Recording the FMEA process

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Severity (S) • A relative ranking, individual FMEA. within the scope of the • A reduction in Severity can be achieved by design change to system, sub-system or component, or a redesign of the process. • The rank depends on the evaluation criteria. Examples of suitable tables are available in the literature. Some companies may have standard tables. Hodkiewicz – “FMEA”

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Severity Tables

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Occurrence (O) • This is the likelihood that a specific cause/mechanism (listed in the previous column) will occur. Occurrence is usually based on ranking charts and is a relative rating within the– scope of the Hodkiewicz “FMEA”

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Occurrence Tables (from [1])

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Controls • (mode 1) prevent to the possible the failure or cause fromextent occurring or reduce the rate of occurrence, or • (2) detect the cause/ mechanism and lead to corrective action, or • (3) detect the failure mode or cause should it occur. Hodkiewicz –

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Detection ranking (D) • A rank associated with the best type of control listed in the previous column. Detection is a relative ranking within the scope of the FMEA.

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Detection Tables (from [1])

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Risk Priority number • RPN = (S) x (O) X (D) • Within the scope of the individual FMEA, the resulting value (between 1 and 1000) can be used to rank order the concerns identified by the process. This allows the highest Hodkiewicz ranking items to be – “FMEA”

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Action plans •• Recommended Corrective action action(s) should be addressed at high severity, high RPN issues. The intent of the action is to reduce rankings in the order of preference: severity, occurrence and detection. • Actions taken and resulting revised ratings • After a preventative/corrective action has been identified, estimate and record the resulting S, O and D rankings. All revised rankings should be reviewed to see if further action is necessary. Hodkiewicz –

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Design FMEA actions • An increase in design validation/ verification actions will result in reduction of ‘detection’ ranking onlyranking can be effected by • Occurrence removing or controlling the causes or mechanisms through design revision • Design ranking revision can also affect severity Hodkiewicz –

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DEFINE SCOPE








FMEA flowsheet

CALCULATE RISK PRIORITY NUMBER FOR EACH EFFECT RANK FAILURE MODES FOR ACTION


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Discussion

Drawbacks (1 of 2) •• 1. and RPN subjective 2. The The ratings categorisation intonumber failure are mode and cause does not allow for thinking in terms of causal chains, the’ 5 WHYS’ or other processes. For each mode you must have a failure cause. This cause may have a deeper cause. Sometimes the cause and the mode are the same. • 3. It can be difficult to control brainstorming sessions

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Drawbacks (2 of 2) • 4. Legal ramifications: if you have identified a failure mode but you have not eliminated it, are you culpable • 5. of Approach negligence? makes it difficult to allow for the interaction of two benign failure models. • 6. FMEA often assumes that the part is ‘in tolerance’. To assume otherwise expands the scope of FMEA considerably. However in real life, out of spec parts are common. Hodkiewicz –

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Common problems with FMEA (from [10]) • Engineers often do not follow a recognised standard and company format • Multiple descriptions of the exact same failure mode, cause or effect • No recommendations or corrective action for high RPM items • Inconsistent documents between parts of the study • No document control or revision control • Engineers them a paindon’t to perform see a value and labour in a FMEA, intensive they find • Companies perform a FMEA study when it is too late. Hodkiewicz –

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Benefits of design FMEA (1 of 2) • Aids in objective evaluation of design, including functional requirements and design • Evaluating alternativesthe initial design for manufacturing, assembly, service and recycling requirements • Increasing the probability that potential failure modes and their effects on the system have been considered in the design/development process. Hodkiewicz –

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Benefits of design FMEA (2 of 2)

• Developing a ranked list of potential failure modes according to their effect on the customer (can be the assembly team), thus establishing a priority system for design improvements, development and validation • Providing an open-issue format for recommending testing/analysis. and tracking risk reduction actions • Providing future reference eg lessons learned, to aid in analysing field concerns, evaluating design changes and developing advanced designs Hodkiewicz –

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Benefits of Process FMEA • Identifies the process functions and requirements • Identifies potential product and process related failure modes • Assesses failures the potential customer effects of the • Identifies process variables on which to focus process controls • Develops a ranked list of potential failure modes thus establishing a priority system for preventative/corrective action considerations • Documents the results of the analysis of the manufacturing, assembly or production process Hodkiewicz –

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Future developments

FMEA and Failure Analysis: Closing the Loop Between Theory and Practice

Dr Joanna Sikorska, Imes Group Ltd Dr Melinda Hodkiewicz, UWA Presented Conference, to Engineers May 2006 Australia

Before and after events • FMEA failurethey modes, causes and effects identifies based before occur. • The Computerized Maintenance Management system (CMMS) records events/failures as/after theyinoccur. • QUESTION: Is there benefit a feedback loop from the CMMS to update the FMEA failure records and O, D, and S values? Hodkiewicz –

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What happens now? • FMEA process: – Proactive but subjective analysis of hypothetical – Integrated into other methodologies – Large upfront costs – Results or benefits rarely substantiated – Static process – Non-inclusive – Completed reports collect dust – Data & process owned by engineering Hodkiewicz –

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What happens now? • Failure analysis process & storage in CMMS: – Retrospective & selective view of reality – Hampered by bad/missing data – Evolved functionality – Dictated by accountants – Interfaces ruled by codes & structure – Poor integration with non-financial systems – Widely distributed, used & disliked – Data & process owned by ops/maintenance Hodkiewicz –

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What happens now? • FMEA & CMMS data rarely linked &/or integrated • Why? – Different process owners – Non-uniform coding between FMEA & CMMS systems – Reporting may be at different hierarchy levels – Hierarchies may be different – Tradition Hodkiewicz –

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Issues to overcome • Structural issues – Consistency of coding & reporting – Adapt systems to users not administrators

• Data quality issues – Ensure data is fit for purpose – Real-time data verification – Up-skill data collectors

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Issues to overcome • Organizational issues change – Implement cultural – Include the disenfranchised – Increase frequency & quality of feedback – Improve status of data collectors • Technical challenges are trivial by comparison

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What is our vision? •• Living FMEA Live links between theoretical (FMEA) & actual (CMMS) • Inclusive process, shared ownership for both datasets • Managed, audited & utilized data processes • Live feeds into various business improvement systems Hodkiewicz –

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How can we get there? • Living FMEA model • See Handout

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Benefits • Aids prioritization & guides business response • Improves reliability analysis from: – More Reduced reliancefailure on free text – consistent classification • Facilitates maintenance optimization • Uncovers disparity between theory & reality • Creates knowledge workers

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• Ensures a recorded, managed & auditable process

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More benefits • Reviews process & measures success of FMEA • Maximizes return on FMEA investment • Supplies future FMEAs with objective data • Future studies become easier Hodkiewicz –

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End

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

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