PART I. TORTS I.
QUASI-DELICT (Arts. 2176-2194, NCC)
a. INTRODUCTORY CONCEPTS a.1 Nature, scope and coverage ELCANO V. HILL, 77 SCRA 98 FACTS:
Reginald Hill, son of defendant Marvin Hill, was charged criminally for the killing of Agapito Elcano, son of plaintiffs Elcano spouses. At the time of the killing, Reginald was a minor, married and was living with his father Marvin and receiving subsistence from him. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of lack of intent to kill coupled with mistake. Subsequently the Elcano spouses filed a civil action for damages against Reginald and his father arising from the killing of their son. The case was dismissed by the lower court and plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. One of the questions raised was whether the father of the minor who was already married but living with, and receiving subsistence from said father was liable in damages for the crime committed by the minor. ISSUE:
W/N the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case. RULING:
Criminal negligence is in violation of the criminal law while civil negligence is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by b y law. It results that the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict. Hence, the acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the Article 2176 is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the RPC. But the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Article 2176, where it refers r efers to f ault or negligence negl igence covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Now under Article 2180, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father. “It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the
reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child, while still a minor, does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in our considered view, Article 2170 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become subsidiary to that of his son.” GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH V. CA, GR NO.97336, FEB. 19, 1993 FACTS:
On October 27, 1987, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her
started to change. He maltreated and threatened to kill her. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent damages. ISSUE:
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W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA, GR NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993 FACTS:
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. Some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles. She brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the DOH for examination; subsequently, the DOH informed her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated”. Due to this, her sales of soft drinks
severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses; not long after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless and destitute. ISSUE:
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict , as held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
HELD:
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption." The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict quasi-delict under under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict , the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict , i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict . Thus, in Singson vs . Bank of the Philippine Islands, this Court stated: We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. The liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.Quasi-delict , as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. NAVIDA V. DIZON ET. AL G.R. NO. 125078, MAY 30, 2011 FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,"
which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the
Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that Page 2
W/N Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. HELD:
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in
fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. VS. CA, GR NO. 110295, OCT. 18, 1993 FACTS:
Geronimo, herein private respondent, filed a complaint for damages against petitioner. She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. Some parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles. She brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Office of the DOH for examination; subsequently, the DOH informed her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated”. Due to this, her sales of soft drinks
severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses; not long after that, she had to lose shop and became jobless and destitute. ISSUE:
W/N the subsequent action for damages against the soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict , as held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
HELD:
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption." The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict quasi-delict under under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict , the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict , i.e., the acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict . Thus, in Singson vs . Bank of the Philippine Islands, this Court stated: We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. The liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.Quasi-delict , as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law, which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. NAVIDA V. DIZON ET. AL G.R. NO. 125078, MAY 30, 2011 FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The cases therein that involved plaintiffs from the Philippines were "Jorge Colindres Carcamo, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.,"
which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-94-1359, and "Juan Ramon Valdez, et al. v. Shell Oil Co., et al.," which which was docketed as Civil Action No. H-95-1356. The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the
Federal District Court conditionally granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970's up to the early 1980's when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that Page 2
their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former's health and well-being. The RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the acts of defendants cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides, their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of commerce which occurred abroad. Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged by NAVIDA, et al., in their complaint is a tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws.
CHILD LEARNING V. TAGORIO, GR NO.150920, NOV. 25, 2005 FACTS:
Timothy Tagario entered the boy's comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out. Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times for help. When no help arrived, he decided to open the window to call for help. In the process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories. Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical injuries. An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed by respondents against the Child Learning Center. The trial court found in favor of respondents. The CA affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N DOLE Inc., should be held liable for damages due to exposure of the nematocides.
W/N CLC is guilty under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Amended JointComplaints of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., attribute to defendant companies certain acts and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system. Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence. To be precise, Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Article 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
HELD:
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred. Difference between fault and negligence: FAULT
o
a.2 Requisites Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another
NEGLIGENCE
o
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.
voluntary act or omission which causes damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such damage.
failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. Consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.
The fact that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points that something was wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor . There is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners' part. Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could not get out using the door, negates petitioners' other contention that the proximate cause of the accident was Timothy's own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause that originated from CLC's own negligence. b. QUASI-DELICT DISTINGUISHED FROM:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
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b.1. culpa criminal BARREDO V. GARCIA AND ALMARIO, GR NO. 48006, JULY 8, 1942 FACTS:
A head-on collision between a taxicab owned by Barredo and a carretela occurred. The carretela was overturned and one of its passengers, a son of Garcia and Almario, died as a result of the injuries which he received. The driver of the taxicab, an employee of Barredo, was prosecuted for the crime and was convicted. When the criminal case was instituted, Garcia and Almario reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages. Subsequently, Garcia and Almario instituted a civil action for damages against Barredo. ISSUE:
Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo thus making him primarily and directly responsible under Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. HELD:
The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; or create an action for cuasi- delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are: (1) That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasidelitos are only of private concern. (2)That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage. (3) That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos , include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes. However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, and infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA, GR NO.L-41423, FEB. 23, 1989 FACTS:
Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck for conveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12, 1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela. Petitioner boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, then driven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and Lazaro Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict. Respondents Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a "Motion to Exonerate and Exclude Defs/ Cross defs. Alberto Cardeno, Lazaro Villanueva, Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan on the Instant Case", alleging that respondents Cardeno and Villanueva already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P 1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement. The trial court decided in favor of respondents ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct to dismiss the case for lack of cause of action. HELD:
The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of contract of carriage, is untenable. If only one injury resulted from several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law. The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
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Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL. GR NO.129029, APR. 3, 2000 FACTS:
Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for the San Miguel Corporation (SMC). Among its fleets of vehicles for hire is the white truck trailer driven by Romeo Dunca. At around 4:00 o ’clock in the morning while the truck was descending at a slight downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a damaged portion of the road which was uneven because there were potholes about five to six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. Before approaching the potholes, Dunca and his truck helper saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lane but at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. The Nissan was severely damaged, and its two passengers, Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. Reyes Trucking settled the claim of the heirs of Balcita. The heirs of Dy opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against Reyes Trucking. They also withdrew their reservation to file a separate civil action against Dunca and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. TC consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the same. TC held Dunca guilty of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law and liable to indemnify the heirs of Dy for damages and the dismissal of the complaint in the separate civil case. TC rendered a supplemental decision ordering Reyes Trucking subsidiarily liable for all the damages awarded to the heirs of Francisco Dy, Jr., in the event of insolvency of the Dunca.
Rule Against Double Recovery: In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between: (1) an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code [civil liability ex delicto]; and (2) a separate action for qu as i d el ic t under Article 2176 of the Civil Code [civil liabilit y quasi delicto].
Once the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused (Article 2177 of the Civil Code). In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability." In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against Reyes Trucking as employer of Dunca, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under the law, the vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific provisions of law: Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
ISSUES:
May Reyes Trucking be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the heirs of Dy in the criminal action against Dunca, despite the filing of a separate civil action against Reyes Trucking? HELD:
No. Reyes Trucking, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action based on q u a s i delict against it. However, Reyes Trucking, as defendant in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Preponderance Evidence
of
Liability of employer is Direct and Primary subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. Employer and employee are solidarily liable, thus, it does not require the employer to be insolvent.
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt Liability of employer is subsidiary to the liability of the employee.
Liability attaches when the employee is found to be insolvent.
SPS. SANTOS, EL. AL. V. PIZARDO, ET. AL., GR NO.151452, JUL. 29, 2005 FACTS:
Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of the van's driver and three of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to five of the van's passengers. Sibayan was convicted and sentenced due to the said crime. There was a reservation to file a separate civil action.
Page 5
In the filing of the separate civil action, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground that the cause of action had already prescribed. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which dismissed the same for error in the choice or mode of appeal. ISSUE:
W/N the trial court is correct in dismissing the case on the ground of prescription based on quasi delict and not on ex delicto. HELD:
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant and the similar proscription against double recovery. At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as the latter action had been expressly reserved. MANLICLIC V. CALAUNAN, GR NO.150157, JAN. 25, 2007 FACTS:
Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan.Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI.According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it.Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
ISSUE: What is the effect of Manliclic’s acquittal to the civil
case? HELD: Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclic’s
acquittal does not affect the case. MANLICLIC AND PRBLI ARE STILL LIABLE FOR DAMAGES. A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crim e under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. b.2 CULPA-CONTRACTUAL Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. W hen negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. OCHOA V. G&S TRANSPORT G.R. NO. 170071, MARCH 9, 2011 Page 6
W/N PSBA is liable for civil damages through quasidelictdue to negligence. GUTIERREZ V. GUTIERREZ, 56 PHIL 177 (1913) HELD: FACTS:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while attempting to pass each other on the Talon Bridge on the Manila South Road in Las Pinas, Rizal. As a result of the collision a passenger in the truck, Narciso Gutierrez, suffered a fracture in his right leg. The truck was owned by the defendant Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. & Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez, also defendants in this case. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother together with several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were in the car. The court found that both drivers of the truck and the car were negligent. ISSUE:
Who among the passenger truck and the automobile is liable for damages due to negligence? HELD:
In case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the bus driver on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was an incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages caused by the minor. PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, ET.AL. V. CA, GR NO. 84698, JAN 4, 1992 FACTS:
A stabbing incident which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and denied their motion to dismiss. The respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders. ISSUE:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
No. Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. It had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code. It would not be equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. AIR FRANCE V. CARRASCOSO, 18 SCRA 155 FACTS:
Carrascoso was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958. Air France issued a “first class” round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, passenger Carrascoso traveled in first class but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced him to vacate the first class seat because a white man had a Page 7
better right to it. The purser wrote in his record book “First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist
class against his will, and the captain refused to intervene” which was written in French. Petitioner
contends that damages must be averred that there was fraud and bad faith in order that claim for damages should set in. ISSUE:
W/N passenger Carrascoso was entitled to damages. RULING:
The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose." The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in law.For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
campaign dubbed the “Rave Party and Dance Revolution,” the proceeds of which were to go to the construction of the school’s tennis and volleyball courts.
The project was allegedly implemented by recompensing students who purchased tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final examinations. At the scheduled dates of the final examinations in logic and statistics, respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad allegedly disallowed her from taking the tests. ISSUE:
W/N respondents are liable for tort. HELD:
The acts of respondents supposedly caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and “demoralization of unimaginable proportions” in violation of Articles 19, 21
and 26 of the Civil Code. Art. 26.Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into residence;
the
privacy
of
another’s
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable.
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.”
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public its business is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Thus, "Where a steamship company had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she was not ejected." Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". REGINO V. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, GR NO. 156109, NOV 18, 2004 FACTS:
Petitioner Khristine Rea M. Regino was a first year computer science student at Respondent Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology (PCST). She was enrolled in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Rachelle A. Gamurot and Elissa Baladad, respectively, as teachers. PCST held a fund raising Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort. In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient causes of action against respondents, and that it should not have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of. That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a quo. MANILA RAILROAD CO. V. LA COMPANIATRASATLANTICA, GR NO. 11318, OCT 26, 1918 FACTS:
A steamship belonging to the Compañia Transatlantica de Barcelona, arrived at Manila with two locomotive boilers aboard, the property of The Manila Railroad Company. The equipment of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, and it was therefore necessary for the Steamship Company to procure assistance in the port of Manila. Atlantic Company was accordingly employed by the Steamship Company. Upon the arrival of the steamship, the Atlantic company sent out its crane in charge of one Leyden. The crane Page 8
and the boiler were however damaged when discharging the cargoes. It was found to be so badly damaged that it had to be reshipped to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was returned to Manila. The Railroad Company made expenses for the damage; to recover these damages the present action was instituted by the Railroad Company against the Steamship Company. The latter caused the Atlantic Company to be brought in as a codefendant. The trial court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but the absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint.
passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven by Iglecerio Verena bumped the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. Sunga filed a complaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasi-delict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and found Calalas liable to Sunga for violation of contract of carriage.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N Atlantic Company is liable for damages.
Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
HELD:
HELD:
It is desirable to bring out the distinction between negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence considered as an independent source of obligation between parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana). This distinction is well established in legal jurisprudence and is fully recognized in the provisions of the Civil Code. As illustrative of this, we quote the following passage from the opinion of this Court in the well-known case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co., and in this quotation we reproduce the first paragraph of here presenting a more correct English version of said passage.
Yes.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of preexisting duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give arise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as culpa, substantive and independent ,
which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between two person not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation. If there had been no contract of any sort between the Atlantic company and the Steamship Company, an action could have been maintained by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic Company to recover the damages sustained by the former. Such damages would have been demandable under article 1103 of the Civil Code and the action would not have been subject to the qualification expressed in the last paragraph of article 1903. It is equally obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract, the Railroad Company can have no right of action to recover damages from the Atlantic Company for the wrongful act which constituted the violation of said contract. The rights of the plaintiff can only be made effective through the Compañia Trasatlantica de Barcelona with whom the contract of affreightment was made. CALALAS V. CA, GR NO. 122039, MAY 31, 2000 FACTS:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, Calalas gave Sunga an stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. Along the way, the jeepney stopped to let a Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
The f i r s t , quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual , has as its source the negligence of the tort feasor. The s e c o n d , breach of contract or culpa contractual , is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasidelict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ESTRELLA, ET.AL., GR NO.147791, SEPT. 8, 2006 FACTS:
Respondents Rebecca G. Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However, they never reached their destination because their bus was rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them. They regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in the bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They were brought to the Makati Medical Center. Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for damages against CDCP, BLTB, Espiridion Payunan, Jr. and Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court rendered a decision finding CDCP Page 9
and BLTB and their employees liable for damages. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the amount of damages.
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
ISSUE:
Art. 3, (RPC). Definitions. — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delit os).
Whether BLTB and its driver Wilfredo Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages sustained by respondents.
Felonies are committed not only be means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
HELD:
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts or omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible. Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an employee's act or omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and primary , but is subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Payunan, Jr. It is well-settled that the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same. The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident. In Anuran v. Buño, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate Appellate Court , and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals , the bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the latter's heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v. Court of Appeals, thus: Nor should it make any difference that the l i ab i l i t y o f p e t i t io n e r [ b u s o w n e r ] s p r i n g s f r o m contract while that of respondents [owner and d r i v e r o f o t h e r v e h i c l e] a r i s es f r o m q u a s i - delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in
Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all of them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as compared to that of the others. II.
ACT OR OMISSION
Art. 1173, NCC.The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
GAID vs. PEOPLE, GR No. 171636, Apr. 7, 2009 FACTS:
Petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the Laguindingan National High School is At the time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner's jeepney which was traveling on the right lane of the road. However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point. The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata's feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the ground behind the jeepney. Dayata was then seen lying on the groundand caught in between the rear tires.Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side. Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim. Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepney's left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right."On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the decision of the MCTC. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment with modification in that it found petitioner guilty only of simple negligence resulting in homicide. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is negligent for the accident resulting to the death of Dayata. HELD:
The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left Page 10
side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt. FIRST STAGE: Petitioner cannot be held liable during
the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride. In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe
for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. SECOND PART: The Court of Appeals found petitioner
guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing to stop driving at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring to the second stage of the incident. Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury. The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated in the post-mortem findings. His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal. Mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can never be the basis of a conviction in a criminal case. The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused. The overriding consideration is not whether the Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as to his guilt. Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim's death was petitioner's alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident. DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, GR NO.161803, FEB. 4, 2008 FACTS:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. along the National Highway in Barangay Sumilihon, Butuan City, going to Surigao City. A Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising on the opposite lane towards the van. In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer that suffered a tire blowout, owned by private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. The driver, private respondent Cresilito Limbaga, parked the prime mover askew occupying a substantial portion of the national highway, on the lane of the passenger bus. He parked the prime mover with trailer at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway which was not equipped with triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages against private respondents prime mover owner and driver with the RTC in Butuan City. The Joana Paula passenger bus was not impleaded as defendant in the complaint. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc. The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was improper parking of the prime mover on the national highway and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle. The CA reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of way of the passenger bus. ISSUE:
W/N Limbaga was negligent in parking the vehicle. HELD:
Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime mover on the national highway; he failed to prevent or minimize the risk to oncoming motorists. Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict , the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and Page 11
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The test by which to determine the existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation. We find that Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Limbaga to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it. Private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. was also negligent in failing to supervise Limbaga and in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition.
Daywalt claims that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property and its conversion into a sugar mill. ISSUE:
Whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt for damages. HELD:
No. Defendants believed in good faith that the contract could not be enforced and that Teodorica would be wronged if it should be carried into effect. Any advice or assistance which they may have given was prompted by no mean or improper motive. Teodorica would have surrendered the documents of title and given possession of the land but for the influence and promptings of members of the defendant’s corporation. But the idea that they were in
any degree influenced to the giving of such advice by the desire to secure to themselves the paltry privilege of grazing their cattle upon the land in question to the prejudice of the just rights of the plaintiff can’t be credited.
DAYWALT V. CORPORACION DE PP. AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS, 39 PHIL587
The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermeddles. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there isfirst a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt fromEndencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages which were notwithin the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damagesare too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt,neither can the Recoletos be held liable.
FACTS:
NEGLIGENCE, defined
In 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P4,000. They agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as
NEGLIGENCE – conduct that creates undue risk of
Endencia’s title to the land was perfected in the Court of
Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property measured 1,248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, the La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corporation, which owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the influence of other people. Father Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire tract. Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
harm to another. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. (Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja, G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002) - want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties, and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably impose. Where the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. (US v. Juanillo, G.R. No. 7255, Oct. 3, 1912) Elements:
Reasonable foresight of harm
Failure to take necessary precaution
PICART V. SMITH, 69 SCRA 809 FACTS:
Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony on the Carlatan Bridge in San Fernando, La Union when the defendant, riding on his car, approached. Defendant Page 12
blew his horn to give warning. Plaintiff moved the horse to the right instead of moving to the left, reasoning that he had no sufficient time to move to the right direction. Defendant continued to approach, and when he had gotten quite near, he quickly turned to the left. The horse was frightened that it turned his body across the bridge. His limb was broken and the rider was thrown off and got injured. The horse died. An action for damages was filed against the defendant. ISSUE:
W/N the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of negligence such as to give rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done. HELD:
As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant. The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tort feasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences. It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. UMALI V. BACANI, 69 SCRA 263 FACTS:
On May 14, 1972 a storm with strong rain hit Alcala, Pangasinan. During the storm banana plants standing on an elevated ground along the barrio road near the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric wire. As a result the live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell on the ground under the fallen banana plants. At about 9:00 o’clock the
following morning the barrio captain who was passing by saw the broken electric wire and he warned the people Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
in the place not to go near the wire for they might get hurt. He also told an employee of the electric plant of the broken line and asked him to fix it. The employee replied that he could not do it but he was going to look for a lineman to fix it. Manuel Saynes, a boy of 3 years and 8 months old whose house was just opposite the road, went to the place where the broken line was and got in contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and subsequently died. Fidel Saynes father of the boy brought an action for damages against Teodoro Umali the owner and manager of the electric plant. One of Umali’s defenses was that as owner and manager of the electric plant he was not liable on a quasidelict or tort because the boy’s death was not due to any negligence
on his part but to a fortuitous event which was the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut the electric line. ISSUE:
W/N Alcala Electric can be liable for TORT. HELD:
Alcala Electric is LIABLE under TORT First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were already aware of the possible damage the storm of May 14, 1972, could have caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut. Third, employee Cipriano Baldomero was negligent on the morning of the incident because even if he was already made aware of the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property. On defendants' argument that the proximate cause of the victim's death could be attributed to the parents' negligence in allowing a child of tender age to go out of the house alone, We could readily see that because of the aforementioned series of negligence on the part of defendants' employees resulting in a live wire lying on the premises without any visible warning of its lethal character, anybody, even a responsible grown up or not necessarily an innocent child, could have met the same fate that befell the victim. It may be true, as the lower Court found out, that the contributory negligence of the victim's parents in not properly taking care of the child, which enabled him to leave the house alone on the morning of the incident and go to a nearby place cut wire was very near the house (where victim was Page 13
living) where the fatal fallen wire electrocuted him, might mitigate respondent's liability, but we cannot agree with petitioner's theory that the parents' negligence constituted the proximate cause of the victim's death because the real proximate cause was the fallen live wire which posed a threat to life and property on that morning due to the series of negligence adverted to above committed by defendants' employees and which could have killed any other person who might by accident get into contact with it. Art. 2179 of the Civil Code provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants' lack of due care, the p laintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which states: The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions.
The negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence of the employer because the employer is supposed to exercise supervision over the work of the employees. This liability of the employer is primary and direct (Standard Vacuum Oil Co. vs. Tan and Court of Appeals, 107 Phil. 109). In fact the proper defense for the employer to raise so that he may escape liability is to prove that he exercised, the diligence of the good father of the family to prevent damage not only in the selection of his employees but also inadequately supervising them over their work. This defense was not adequately proven as found by the trial Court, and We do not find any sufficient reason to deviate from its finding. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION ET.AL., GR NO. L-51806, NOV 8, 1988
V.
CA,
FACTS:
Ernest E. Simke, a naturalized Filipino citizen, was Honorary Consul General of Israel in the Philippines. He went to Manila International Airport to m eet his future son-in-law. As the plane was landing, he and his companions went to the viewing deck to watch the arrival of the plane. While walking, Simke slipped on an elevation 4 inches high and fell on his back, breaking his thigh bone in the process. He underwent a 3hour operation and after recovery he filed a claim for damages against the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA), which was the government entity in charge of the airport. ISSUE:
W/N CAA was negligent HELD:
CAA contended that the elevation in question "had a legitimate purpose for being on the terrace and was never intended to trip down people and injure them. It was there for no other purpose but to drain water on the Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
floor area of the terrace." But upon ocular inspection by the trial court, it was found that the terrace was in poor condition. Under RA 776, the CAA is charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping, expanding, maintenance...etc. of the Manila International Airport. Responsibility of CAA Pursuant to Art. 1173, "the fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, and of the place." Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers using it. As these people come to look to where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement of the viewing deck, the CAA should made sure that no dangerous obstructions or elevations exist on the floor of the deck to prevent any undue harm to the public. Contributory Negligence Under Art. 2179, contributory negligence contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which although not the proximate cause of his injury, CONTRIBUTED to his own damage. The Court found no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, considering the following test formulated in the early case of Picart v. Smith: The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent man would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of the negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot be here of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued' If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist....
The private respondent, who was the plaintiff in the case before the lower court, could not have reasonably Page 14
foreseen the harm that would befall him, considering the attendant factual circumstances. Even if the private respondent had been looking where he was going, the step in question could not easily be noticed because of its construction. RAKES V. AG & P, 7 PHIL 359 FACTS:
Rakes was a laborer employed by Atlantic. While transporting iron rails from a barge to the company’s
yard using a railroad hand car, Rakes broke his leg when the hand car toppled over and the rails fell on him. It appears that the hand car fell due to a sagging portion of the track that gave with the weight of the rails. Atlantic knew of the weak state of the rail but did nothing to repair it. When Rakes filed an action for damages, Atlantic’s defense was that Rakes’ injuries were caused
by his own negligence in walking alongside the car, instead of in front or behind it, as the laborers were told to do. ISSUES:
1. Whether Rakes was negligent. 2. Whether Atlantic is liable to Rakes. HELD:
1. Rakes was negligent. He disobeyed the orders of his superiors when he walked alongside the car instead of in front or behind it. 2. Atlantic is liable to Rakes. The negligence of Rakes will not totally bar him from recovering anything from Atlantic, although the liability of the latter will be mitigated as a result of Rakes’ contributory negligence. This is because although Rakes contributed with his own negligence, the primary cause of the accident was still the weak rails which Atlantic refused to repair. Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemedequivalent for his own imprudence.
We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa, substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already existing obligation. ASSOCIATED BANK v. TAN, GR No. 156940, Dec 14, 2004 FACTS:
check with the said bank in the amount of P101,000.00 which was added to his original deposit. The check was duly entered in his bank record and upon advice and instruction of the bank that it was already cleared and backed up by sufficient funds, Tan, on the same date, withdrew the sum of P240,000.00. A day after, Tan deposited the amount of P50,000.00 making his existing balance in the amount of P107,793.45, because he has issued several checks to his business partners. However, his suppliers and business partners went back to him alleging that the checks he issued bounced for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Tan, thru his lawyer, informed the bank to take positive steps regarding the matter for he has adequate and sufficient funds to pay the amount of the subject checks. Nonetheless, the bank did not bother nor offer any apology regarding the incident. Consequently, Tan filed a Complaint for Damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner. It was shown that respondent was not officially informed about the debiting of the P101,000.00 from his existing balance and that the bank merely allowed the respondent to use the fund prior to clearing merely for accommodation because the bank considered him as one of its valued clients. It ruled that the bank manager was negligent in handling the particular checking account of the respondent stating that such lapses caused all the inconveniences to the respondent. Affirming the trial court, the CA ruled that the bank should not have authorized the withdrawal of the value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. Having done so, contrary to its obligation to treat respondents account with meticulous care, the bank violated its own policy. Without such notice, it is estopped from blaming respondent for failing to fund his account. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner, which is acting as a depository bank and a collecting agent, has properly exercised its right to setoff the account of its client for a check deposit which was dishonored by the drawee bank. HELD:
1. Obligation as a depositor bank The banking business is impressed with public interest. "Consequently, the highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and performance are even required of it. By the nature of its functions, a bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family where the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors is concerned. Indeed, the banking business is vested with the trust and confidence of the public; hence the "appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not the highest, degree of diligence." The standard applies, regardless of whether the account consists of only a few hundred pesos or of millions. The fiduciary nature of banking, previously imposed by case law, is now enshrined in Republic Act No. 8791 or the General Banking Law of 2000. Section 2 of the law specifically says that the State recognizes the "fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance."
Vicente Henry Tan is a regular depositor-creditor of the Associated Bank. He deposited a postdated UCPB Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Page 15
The respondents did not treat the account of the petitioner with highest degree of care. It is undisputed -nay, even admitted -- that purportedly as an act of accommodation to a valued client, petitioner allowed the withdrawal of the face value of the deposited check prior to its clearing. That act certainly disregarded the clearance requirement of the banking system. 2. Obligation as a collecting agent As a general rule, a bank is liable for the wrongful or tortuous acts and declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their employment. Due to the very nature of their business, banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Jurisprudence has established that the lack of diligence of a servant is imputed to the negligence of the employer, when the negligent or wrongful act of the former proximately results in an injury to a third person; in this case, the depositor. The manager of the banks Cabanatuan branch, Consorcia Santiago, categorically admitted that she and the employees under her control had breached bank policies. They admittedly breached those policies when, without clearance from the drawee bank in Baguio, they allowed respondent to withdraw on October 1, 1990, the amount of the check deposited.
PACIS v. MORALES, GR NO. 169467, Feb 25, 2010 FACTS:
Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old, died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome Jovanne Morales. The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair which was left by defendant Morales, who was in Manila that time, in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store. It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of the table to which Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partly due to the negligence of respondent’s employee Aristedes Matibag (Matibag).
Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were employees of respondent even if they were only paid on a commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, unless respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no employer-employee relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that Matibag was not under the control of respondent with respect to the means and methods in the performance of his work. Even if no employer-employee relationship existed, it found that no negligence can be attributed to respondent. ISSUE:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
W/N respondent is negligent for the death of Alfred Dennis Pacis. HELD:
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for readyaccess defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. For failing to ensure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case. S.D. MARTINEZ v. BUSKIRK, GR No. L-5691, Dec 27, 1910 FACTS:
The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant which was attached a pair of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff's carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk and stopped, in order to give defendant's delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by, but that instead of passing by the defendant's wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it. Page 16
The cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage and for the purpose of delivery the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon to unload the forage; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding. ISSUE:
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence. HELD:
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years and the other for five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers. It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not. YLARDE, ET. AL., V. AQUINO, ET.AL., GR NO. L33722, JUL 29, 1988 FACTS:
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School wherein private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein. that time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
burying them. Deciding to help his colleague, private respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered some of his pupils aged ten to eleven after class dismissal to to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. As teacher-in-charge, he called Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, to dug until the excavation was one meter and forty centimeters deep. When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, private respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole. He then left the students to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to see Banez to get some Rope. Three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing position which caused him several injuries and later on died. Petitioners filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint and was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE:
1. W/N both private respondents can be held liable for damages. 2. Were there acts and omissions on the part of private respondent Aquino amounting to fault or negligence which have direct causal relation to the death of his pupil Ylarde? HELD:
1. Soriano cannot be made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of arts and trades. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher and not the head of an academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by their students. This Court went on to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who can be held liable. However, respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. 2. YES, Aquino is liable for damages. The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around. Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging, it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight. Everything that occurred was the natural and probable effect of the negligent acts of private respondent Aquino. Needless to say, the child Ylarde would not have died were it not for the unsafe situation created by private respondent Aquino which exposed the lives of all the Page 17
pupils concerned to real danger. A truly careful and cautious person would have acted in all contrast to the way private respondent Aquino did. Were it not for his gross negligence, the unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the child Ylarde would probably be alive today, a grown- man of thirty-five. Due to his failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid the hazard, Ylarde's parents suffered great anguish all these years. We cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which resulted in the death of the child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence. It should be remembered that he was only ten years old at the time of the incident. As such, he is expected to be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to a boy his age. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence. PHIL. HAWK CORP. V. VIVIAN TAN LEE, GR NO. 166869, FEB. 16, 2010 FACTS:
The accident involved a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus which was owned by petitioner Philippine Hawk Corporation, and was then being driven by Margarito Avila. Respondent testified that she was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who was on the wheel. They were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and their motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital but her husband died due to the vehicular accident. The driver of the passenger jeep involved in the accident testified that his jeep was parked on the left side of the highway. He did not notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he saw the bus dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus bumped his jeep and sped away. The driver of petitioner's bus testified that he was driving his bus at 60 kilometers per hour on the Maharlika Highway. When a motorcycle ran from his left side of the highway, and as the bus came near, the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he turned the bus to the right. From his side mirror, he saw that the motorcycle turned turtle ("bumaliktad"). He did not stop to help out of fear for his life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he bumped the motorcycle. The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner and defendant Margarito Avila which affirmed by the CA. ISSUE:
W/N negligence may be attributed to petitioner's driver, and whether negligence on his part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and causing physical injuries to respondent. HELD:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
There is negligence indeed on the part of petitioner’s driver Margarito Avila. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In this case, the bus driver, who was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep. Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping incidents. REGALA V. CARIN G.R. NO. 188715 APRIL 6, 2011 FRANCISCO V. CHEMICAL BULK CARRIERS G.R. NO. 193577 SEPTEMBER 7, 2011 III. DAMAGE TO ANOTHER (See discussion on Damages, infra.) IV. CAUSAL RELATION OMISSION AND DAMAGE
BETWEEN
ACT
OR
TISON ET AL V. SPS POMASIN, G.R. NO. 173180 AUGUST 24, 2011 FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City. Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter, Andrea Pomasin Pagunsan, sister Narcisa Pomasin Roncales and Abraham Dionisio Perol died on the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the jitney driver, and granddaughter Annie Jane Pomasin Pagunsan expired at the hospital. His wife, Consorcia Pomasin, another granddaughter Dianne Pomasin Pagunsan, Ricky Ponce, Vicente Pomasin, Gina Sesista, Reynaldo Sesista, Antonio Sesista and Sonia Perol sustained injuries. On the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured. Page 18
They alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. ISSUE:
Who is the negligent part or the party at fault? HELD:
This interplay of rules and exceptions is more pronounced in this case of quasi-delict in which, according to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These requisites must be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of action by preponderance of evidence, evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Likewise controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. In said case, Añonuevo, who was driving a car, did not attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these violations in themselves sufficiently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on Añonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him as having failed to discharge his necessary burden of proving the cyclist' s own liability." We took the occasion to state that: The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injur y sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of other. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver's restrictions on his license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license. OCEAN BUILDERS V. SPS CUBACUB G.R. NO. 150898, APRIL 13, 2011 FACTS:
On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company's general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company's "barracks" where he lives free of charge. Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co-worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir's intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital. Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company. The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk to Bladimir's parents, hence, on Silangga's request, their co-workers June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimir's parents from Tarlac. AIcaDC At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the sam e day, April 13, 1995, Bladimir's parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995. The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir's immediate cause of death as cardiorespiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox. ISSUE: W/N Hoa’s negligence is the proximate cause of the
death Bladimir. HELD:
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages based on torts, the employeremployee relationship being merely incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance Page 19
to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed. AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent, apart from adopting the appellate court's findings, finds that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as well. This finding is not, however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the appellate court's or even the trial court's decision is there any such definite finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At best, the only allusion to another employee being afflicted with chicken pox was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it happened. a. Doctrine of Proximate Cause FERNANDO V. CA, 208 SCRA 714 FACTS:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market m aster of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernandoand Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned that the five victim sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners, children of the deceased, file a complaint for damages. TC: Dismissed. CA: In favor of petitioners, based on social justice. CA on MR: Reversed, in favor of Davao City. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
ISSUE:
W/N Davao City is liable. HELD:
No. We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm. While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed. In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. DYTEBAN V. JOSE CHING, supra. ISSUE: W/N prime mover driver Limbaga’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van. HELD:
SC held that the skewed parking of the prime mover (negligence of the driver) was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff Page 20
must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van. The skewed parking is the proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van. BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181 FACTS:
The deceased Juan Bataclan was among the passengers of Medina Transportation, driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. On its way from Cavite to Pasay, the front tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal. Some passengers were able to escape by themselves or with some help, while there were 4, including Bataclan, who could not get out. Their cries were heard in the neighbourhood. Then there came about 10 men, one of them carrying a torch. As they approached the bus, it caught fire and the passengers died. The fire was due to gasoline leak and the torch. Salud Villanueva Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her 5 minor children, sought to claim damages from the bus company. The CFI favored the plaintiff, and the CA forwarded the case to the SC due to the amount involved. ISSUE:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers? HELD:
We agree with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. We also agree that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. At the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers, and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses, including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst up to the canal where the bus overturned after zigzaging, there was a distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle. There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only question is to what degree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows: . . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
In the present case, we do not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 am), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763. MANILA ELECTRIC CO V. REMOQUILLO, 99 PHIL 117 FACTS: Efren Magno went to repair a “media agua” of the house
of his brother-in-law on Rodriguez Lanuza Street, Manila. While making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which he was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to the edge of the “media agua” and 2-1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died as a result thereof. The electric wire was already in the premises at the time the house was built. This distance of 2-1/2 feet of the “media agua” from the electric wire was not in
accordance with city regulations which required a distance of 3 feet but somehow or other the owner of the building was able to have the construction approved. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against the Manila Electric Co. the CA awarded Page 21
damages holding that although the owner of the house in constructing the “media agua” exceeded the limits fixed
in the permit, still after making that finally approved because he was given a final permit to occupy the house and that the company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company did not exercise due diligence nor take other precautionary measures as may be warranted. Said decision was appealed to the SC. HELD:
SC held that the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself. When he was called by his stepbrother to repair the “media agua” just below the third story window, it is to be
presumed that due to his age and experience he was qualified to do so. Perhaps he was a tinsmith or carpenter and had training and experience for the job. So, he could not have been entirely a stranger to electric wires and the danger lurking in them. But unfortunately, in the instant case, his training and experience failed him, and forgetting where he was standing, holding the 6-feet iron sheet with both hands and at arms length, evidently without looking, and throwing all prudence and discretion to the winds, he turned around swinging his arms with the motion of his body, thereby causing his own electrocution. But even assuming for a moment that the defendant electric company could be considered negligent in installing its electric wires so close to the house and ‘mediaagua’ in question, and in failing to properly
insulate those wires (although according to the unrefuted claim of said company it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire), nevertheless to hold the defendant liable in damages for the death of Magno, such supposed negligence of the company must have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident, because if the act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet with his hands was the proximate and principal cause of the electrocution, then his heirs may not recover. To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length
of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If not danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
injury because of prior defection condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. TAYLOR V. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO., 16 PHIL 8 FACTS:
The defendant left some twenty or thirty fulminating caps used for blasting charges of dynamite scattered in the premises behind its power plant. The plaintiff, a boy 15 years of age, in company with another boy 12 years of age, entered the premises of the defendant, saw the fulminating caps and carried them away. Upon reaching home they made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and the plaintiff held the cap while the other boy applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the boys. This action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for the injuries which he suffered. ISSUE:
W/N Manila Electric is liable for damages to the petitioners HELD:
No. The immediate cause of the explosion, the accident which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover." But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew t he explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed Page 22
by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
1. W/N the cimmaron was guilty of contributory negligence due to violation of traffic rules and regulation which added to the proximate cause of the accident or such was based solely on the negligence of the panel truck driver.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such circumstances.
1. It has not been been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during night time certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the fact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuver ability." We are convinced that no maneuvering which the Cimarron driver could have done would have avoided a collision with the panel truck, given the suddenness of the events. Clearly, the overcrowding in the front seat was immaterial.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY V. CA, 300 SCRA 20 FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a truck owned by petitioner and a cimarron which caused the death of three persons and injuries to several others. Petitioner’s
truck crashed the cimarron when the driver stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. RTC found Petitioner’s
driver to be responsible for the accident and awarded damages in favor of Private respondents. Petitioner contends that the driver of the cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence since it was guilty of violation of traffic rules and regulations (overloading, had only one headlight on) at the time of mishap. He also argued that sudden swerving of a vehicle caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se. He further argued that the driver should be exonerated based on the doctrine of last clear chance, which states that the person who has the last clear chance of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. He petitioner claimed that the cimarron had the last opportunity of avoiding an accident. ISSUE:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
2. W/N petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. HELD:
All these point to the fact f act that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioners driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioners panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioners driver was running the vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well. 2. With respect respect to the requirement of passing psychological and physical tests prior to his employment, although no law requires it, such circumstance would certainly be a reliable indicator of the exercise of due diligence. As the trial court said: . . . No tests of skill, physical as well as mental and emotional, were conducted on their would-be employees. No on-the-job training and seminars reminding employees, especially drivers, of road courtesies and road rules and regulations were done. There were no instructions given to defendants drivers as to how to react in cases of emergency nor what to do after an emergency occurs. All these could only mean failure on the part of defendant to exercise the diligence required of it of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Indeed, driving exacts a more than usual toll on the sense. Accordingly, it behooves employers to exert extra care in the selection and supervision of their employees. They must go beyond the minimum requirements fixed by law. But petitioner did not show in what manner drivers were supervised to ensure that they drove their vehicles in a safe way. MERCURY DRUG V. BAKING, GR NO. 156037, MAY 25, 2007 FACTS:
Sebastian M. Baking, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. Respondent was given two medical prescriptions Diamicron for his blood sugar and Page 23
Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. On the third day of taking the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving collided with the car of one Josie Peralta due to falling asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy’s clinic. Dr.
Sy was shocked to find that what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of respondent and this was affirmed by the CA in toto. ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of respondents accident. HELD:
the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Thus, petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter. BPI V. SUAREZ, GR NO. 167750, MAR 15, 2010 FACTS:
Respondent Reynald R. Suarez (Suarez) is a lawyer who used to maintain both savings and current accounts with petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Suarez had a client who planned to purchase several parcels of land in Tagaytay City, but preferred not to deal directly with the land owners. They agreed that the client would deposit the money in Suarez’s BPI account as
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Requisites under Art. 2176: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Petitioners employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. Proximate Cause Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioners employee been careful in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision. Complementing Article 2176 is Article 2180 of the same Code.The employer of a negligent employee is liable for Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
payment for the Tagaytay properties and then, Suarez would issue checks to the sellers. An RCBC check was then deposited to Suarez’s current account in BPI.
Suarez instructed his secretary, Garaygay, to confirm from BPI whether the face value of the RCBC check was already credited to his account that same day it was deposited. It was alleged that BPI confirmed the sameday crediting of the RCBC check. With this, Suarez issued on the same day five checks for the purchase of the Tagaytay properties. Days after while in the U.S. for vacation, he was informed by Garaygay that the checks issued were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds with penalties despite an assurance from RCBC that it has already been debited in his account and fully funded. Claiming that BPI mishandled his account through negligence, Suarez filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages. The TC rendered judgment in favor of respondent which was affirmed by CA. ISSUE:
W/N the erroneous marking of DAIF (drawn against insufficient funds), instead of DAUD (drawn against uncollected deposit)on the checks,is the proximate cause of respondents injury. HELD:
In the present case, Suarez failed to establish that his claimed injury was proximately caused by the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks. Proximate Cause has been defined as any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred. There is nothing in Suarez’s testimony which convincingly shows
that the erroneous marking of DAIF on the checks proximately caused his alleged psychological or social injuries. Suarez merely testified that he suffered humiliation and that the prospective consolidation of the titles to Tagaytay properties did not materialize due to the dishonor of his checks, not due to the erroneous marking of DAIF on his checks. Hence, Suarez had only himself to blame for his hurt feelings and the unsuccessful transaction with his client as these were directly caused by the justified dishonor of the checks. In Page 24
short, Suarez cannot recover compensatory damages for his own negligence. RAMOS V. C.O.L. REALTY, GR NO. 184905, AUG. 28, 2009
assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via
FACTS:
A vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin ("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"). (C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when ( Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right
rear door and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat ("Estela") sustained injuries. Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the
proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection. Petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City. MeTC rendered the decision exculpating Ramos from liability. RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC. The CA affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA). ISSUE:
Whether petitioner could be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty for damages suffered in a vehicular collision. HELD:
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code Co de on quasi-delicts quasi- delicts apply in this case, viz: Article 2179.When 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Article 2185.Unless 2185.Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s action against the third person, Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. It is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the
immediate and proximate cause of the accident. VALLACAR TRANSIT V. CATUBIG G.R. NO. 175512 MAY 30, 2011 FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of transportation and the franchise owner of a Ceres Bulilit bus with Plate No. T-0604-1348. Quirino C. Cabanilla (Cabanilla) is employed as a regular bus driver of petitioner. On January 27, 1994, respondent's husband, Quintin Catubig, Jr. (Catubig), was on his way home from Dumaguete City riding in tandem on a motorcycle with his employee, Teddy Emperado (Emperado). Catubig was the one driving the motorcycle. While approaching a curve at kilometers 59 and 60, Catubig tried to overtake a slow moving ten-wheeler cargo truck by crossing-over to the opposite lane, which was then being traversed by the Ceres Bulilit bus driven by Cabanilla, headed for the opposite direction. When the two vehicles collided, Catubig and Emperado were thrown from the motorcycle. Catubig died on the spot where he was thrown, while Emperado died while being rushed to the hospital. Page 25
ISSUE: W/N the proximate cause of the collision was Catubig’s
reckless and negligent act. HELD:
The petition is meritorious. The issue of negligence is basically factual. There is merit in the argument of the petitioner that Article 2180 of the Civil Code — imputing fault or negligence on the part of the employer for the fault or negligence of its employee — does not apply to petitioner since the fault or negligence of its employee driver, Cabanilla, which would have made the latter liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, has never been established by respondent. To the contrary, the totality of the evidence presented during trial shows that the proximate cause of the collision of the bus and motorcycle is attributable solely to the negligence of the driver of the motorcycle, Catubig. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. The RTC concisely articulated and aptly concluded that Catubig's overtaking of a slow-moving truck ahead of him, while approaching a curve on the highway, was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision which led to his own death. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Cadimas and PO2 Elnas that Cabanilla was driving the bus at a reckless speed when the collision occurred lack probative value. We are unable to establish the actual speed of the bus from Cadimas's testimony for he merely stated that the bus did not stop when he tried to flag it down because it was "running very fast."
Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Art. 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. TISON V. POMASIN G.R. NO. 173180 AUGUST 24, 2011, supra CAEDO V. YU KHE THAI, 26 SCRA 381 FACTS:
Plaintiff Caedo was driving his Mercury car at about 5:30 in the morning of March 24, 1958 along E. de los Santos Ave., in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village bound for the airport. Several members of his family were in the car. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac car of defendant Yu Khe Thai driven by his driver Rafael Bernardo. The two cars were traveling at a moderate speed with their headlights on. Ahead of the Cadillac was a caretela (rig). Defendant’s driver did not notice it until he was about eight (8) meters away. Instead of slowing down behind the caretela defendant’s driver veered to the left with the intention of passing by the caretela but in doing so its rear bumper caught the ream of the caretela’s left wheel wrenching it off. Defendant’s car skidded obliquely to the other end and collided with the on-coming vehicle of the plaintiff. The plaintiff on his part, slackened his speed and tried to avoid the collision by veering to the right but the collision occurred just the same injuring the plaintiff and members of his family. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the driver and owner of the Cadillac car. ISSUE:
W/N Bernardo is liable? If Yes, W/N Yu Khe Thai is solidarily liable with Bernardo? HELD:
The presumption that employers are negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil Code flows from the negligence of their employees. Having adjudged that the immediate and proximate cause of the collision resulting in Catubig's death was his own negligence, and there was no fault or negligence on Cabanilla's part, then such presumption of fault or negligence on the part of petitioner, as Cabanilla's employer, does not even arise. Thus, it is not even necessary to delve into the defense of petitioner that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Cabanilla as its employee driver. b. Doctrine of Imputed Negligence
YES. Bernardo is liable, because facts reveal that the collision was directly traceable to his negligence. BUT, owner, Yu Khe Thai is not solidarily liable with his driver. Art 2184 is indeed the basis of a master’s liability in a vehicular accident.Note however that the 2nd sentence of Art 2184 qualifies before the owner can be made solidarity liable with the negligent driver. This is because the basis of the master’s liability is not
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR but rather the relationship of PATERFAMILIAS. The theory is that, the negligence of the servant, is known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects the master’s
negligence if he fails to correct it order to prevent injury Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Page 26
or damage.Test of imputed negligence in Art 2184 is necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held in a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he can own a motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed. In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the misfortune. KAPALARAN BUS LINE V. CORONADO, GR NO. 85331, AUG 25, 1989 FACTS:
The jeepney driven by Lope Grajera has reached the intersection where there is a traffic sign 'yield,' it stopped and cautiously treated the intersection as a "Thru Stop' street, which it is not. The KBL bus was on its way from Sta. Cruz, Laguna, driven by its regular driver Virgilio Llamoso, on its way towards Manila. The regular itinerary of the KBL bus is through the town proper of Pila, Laguna, but at times it avoids this if a bus is already fully loaded with passengers and can no longer accommodate additional passengers. As the KBL bus Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
neared the intersection, Virgilio Llamoso inquired from his conductor if they could still accommodate passengers and learning that they were already full, he decided to bypass Pila and instead, to proceed along the national highway. Virgilio Llamoso admitted that there was another motor vehicle ahead of him. The general rule is that the vehicle on the national highway has the right-of-way as against a feeder road. Judging from the testimony of Atty. Conrado L. Manicad, the sequence of events shows that the first vehicle to arrive at the intersection was the jeepney. Seeing that the road was clear, the jeepney which had stopped at the intersection began to move forward, and for his part, Atty. Manicad stopped his car at the intersection to give way to the jeepney. At about this time, the KBL bus was approaching the intersection and its driver was engaged in determining from his conductor if they would still pass through the town proper of Pila. Upon learning that they were already full, he turned his attention to the road and found the stopped vehicles at the intersection with the jeepney trying to cross the intersection. The KBL bus had no more room within which to stop without slamming into the rear of the vehicle behind the car of Atty. Manicad. The KBL driver chose to gamble on proceeding on its way, unfortunately, the jeepney driven by Grajera, which had the right-of-way, was about to cross the center of the highway and was directly on the path of the KBL bus. The gamble made by Llamoso did not pay off. The impact indicates that the KBL bus was travelling at a fast rate of speed because, after the collision, it did not stop; it travelled for another 50 meters and stopped only when it hit an electric post. After trial, the trial court rendered a judgment in favor of private respondents which was affirmed by the CA but modified the award of damages. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for the accident. HELD: Kapalaran’s driver had become aware that some
vehicles ahead of the bus and traveling in the same direction had already stopped at the intersection obviously to give way either to pedestrians or to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. The bus driver, who was driving at a speed too high to be safe and proper at or near an intersection on the highway, and in any case too high to be able to slow down and stop behind the cars which had preceded it and which had stopped at the intersection, chose to swerve to the left lane and overtake such preceding vehicles, entered the intersection and directly smashed into the jeepney within the intersection. Immediately before the collision, the bus driver was actually violating the following traffic rules and regulations, among others, in the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as amended. Thus, a legal presumption arose that the bus driver was negligent, a presumption that Kapalaran was unable to overthrow. Application of Article 2180: The patent and gross negligence on the part of the petitioner Kapalaran's driver raised the legal presumption that Kapalaran as employer was guilty of negligence either in the selection or in the supervision of its bus driver. Where the employer is held liable for damages, it has of course a right of recourse against its own negligent employee. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is direct and Page 27
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. So far as the record shows, petitioner Kapalaran was unable to rebut the presumption of negligence on its own part. MENDOZA V. SORIANO, ET.AL, GR NO. 164012, JUNE 8, 2007 FACTS:
Sonny Soriano, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa. He was thrown five meters away, while the vehicle only stopped some 25 meters from the point of impact. One of Soriano’s companions, asked Macasasa to bring Soriano to the hospital, but after checking out the scene of the incident, Macasasa returned to the FX, only to flee. A school bus brought him to the hospital where he later died. After trial, the trial court dismissed the complaint against petitioner. It found Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Avenue by using a small gap in the islands fencing rather than the pedestrian overpass and that petitioner was not negligent in the selection and supervision of Macasasa. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision.
damage suit is for the quasi-delict of petitioner, as owner and employer, and not for the delict of Macasasa, as driver and employee. In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily liable for the damages caused by Macasasa. Respondents could recover directly from petitioner since the latter failed to prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Macasasa. Contributory Negligence We agree that the Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing Commonwealth Avenue. We even note that the respondents now admit this point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced by 20% the amount of damages it awarded. Hence, we affirm the reduction of the amount earlier awarded, based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code which reads: When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable and W/N respondent is guilty of contributory negligence.
ANONUEVO V. CA, ET. AL., GR NO. 130003, OCT. 20, 2004 FACTS:
HELD:
Application of Article 2185 Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a motor vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating traffic regulations. The records show that Macasasa violated two traffic rules under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. First, he failed to maintain a safe speed to avoid endangering lives. Both the trial and the appellate courts found Macasasa overspeeding. The records show also that Soriano was thrown five meters away after he was hit. Moreover, the vehicle stopped only some 25 meters from the point of impact.Both circumstances support the conclusion that the FX vehicle driven by Macasasa was overspeeding. Second, Macasasa, the vehicle driver, did not aid Soriano, the accident victim, in violation of Section 55, Article V of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. While Macasasa at first agreed to bring Soriano to the hospital, he fled the scene in a hurry. What remains undisputed is that he did not report the accident to a police officer, nor did he summon a doctor. Application of Article 2180 Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, employers are liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. The liability arises due to the presumed negligence of the employers in supervising their employees unless they prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.While respondents could recover damages from Macasasa in a criminal case and petitioner could become subsidiarily liable, still petitioner, as owner and employer, is directly and separately civilly liable for her failure to exercise due diligence in supervising Macasasa. We must emphasize that this Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Villagracia was traveling along Boni Avenue on his bicycle, while Añonuevo, traversing the opposite lane was driving his Lancer car with owned by Procter and Gamble Inc., the employer of Añonuevo’s brother,
Jonathan. Añonuevo was in the course of making a left turn towards Libertad Street when the collision occurred. Villagracia sustained serious injuries as a result. As testified by eyewitness Alfredo Sorsano, Añonuevo was “umaarangkada,” or speeding as he
made the left turn into Libertad and that Añonuevo failed to exercise the ordinary precaution, care and diligence required of him in order that the accident could have been avoided. Villagracia instituted an action for damages against Procter and Gamble Phils., Inc. and Añonuevo before the RTC. The RTC rendered judgment against Procter and Gamble and Añonuevo while the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. ISSUE:
Whether Article 2185 of the New Civil Code should apply by analogy to non-motorized vehicles and whether Villagracia’s own fault and negligence serves to absolve the Añonuevo of any liability for damages. HELD:
The applicability of Art. 2185 is expressly qualified to motor vehicles only, and there is no ground to presume that the law intended a broader coverage. Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating any traffic regulation. Page 28
As distinguished, motorized vehicle operates by reason of a motor engine unlike a non-motorized vehicle, which runs as a result of a direct exertion by man or beast of burden of direct physical force. A motorized vehicle, unimpeded by the limitations in physical exertion is capable of greater speeds and acceleration than nonmotorized vehicles. At the same time, motorized vehicles are more capable in inflicting greater injury or damage in the event of an accident or collision. Art. 2185 was not formulated to compel or ensure obeisance by all to traffic rules and regulations. If such were indeed the evil sought to be remedied or guarded against, then the framers of the Code would have expanded the provision to include non-motorized vehicles or for that matter, pedestrians. Yet, that was not the case; thus the need arises to ascertain the peculiarities attaching to a motorized vehicle within the dynamics of road travel. The fact that there has long existed a higher degree of diligence and care imposed on motorized vehicles, arising from the special nature of motor vehicle, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the qualification under Article 2185 exists precisely to recognize such higher standard. Simply put, the standards applicable to motor vehicle are not on equal footing with other types of vehicles. Thus, we cannot sustain the contention that Art. 2185 should apply to non-motorized vehicles, even if by analogy. NEGLIGENCE PER SE: The generally accepted view is that the violation of a statutory duty constitutes negligence, negligence as a matter of law, or negligence per se. The mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained. Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct of others. WHEN THERE IS AN ORDINANCE: But the existence of an ordinance changes the situation. If a driver causes an accident by exceeding the speed limit, for example, we do not inquire whether his prohibited conduct was unreasonably dangerous. It is enough that it was prohibited. Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent. S h o u l d t h e d o c t r i n e o f n e g l i g en c e p e r s e a p p l y t o Villagracia, resulting from his violation of an ordinance?
It cannot be denied that the statutory purpose for requiring bicycles to be equipped with headlights or horns is to promote road safety and to minimize the occurrence of road accidents involving bicycles. At face value, Villagracia’s mishap was precisely the danger sought to be guarded against by the ordinance he violated. However, there is the fact which we consider as proven, that Añonuevo was speeding as he made the left turn, and such negligent act was the proximate cause of the accident. This reckless behavior would have imperiled anyone unlucky enough within the path of Añonuevo’s car as it turned into t he intersection, whether
they are fellow motorists, pedestrians, or cyclists. We are hard put to conclude that Villagracia would have avoided injury had his bicycle been up to par with safety regulations, especially considering that Añonuevo was already speeding as he made the turn, or before he had seen Villagracia. Even assuming that Añonuevo had failed to see Villagracia because the bicycle was not equipped with headlights, such lapse on the cyclist’s part
would not have acquitted the driver of his duty to slow down as he proceeded to make the left turn. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it substantially contributed thereto. Añonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latter’s injury. FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER V. DELOS SANTOS G.R. NO. 152033 MARCH 16, 2011 FACTS:
On the night of September 30, 1984, Teresa Elena Legarda-de los Santos (Teresa Elena), the wife of respondent Wilfredo de los Santos (Wilfredo), performed at the Rizal Theater in Makati City, Metro Manila as a member of the cast for the musical play, Woman of the Year. On that same night, at the request of Wilfredo, his brother Armando de los Santos (Armando), husband of respondent Carmina Vda. de los Santos, went to the Rizal Theater to fetch Teresa Elena after the latter's performance. He drove a 1980 Mitsubishi Galant Sigma (Galant Sigma) with Plate No. NSL 559, a company car assigned to Wilfredo. Two other members of the cast of Woman of the Year, namely, Annabel Vilches (Annabel) and Jerome Macuja, joined Teresa Elena in the Galant Sigma. Around 11:30 p.m., while travelling along the Katipunan Road (White Plains), the Galant Sigma collided with the shuttle bus owned by petitioner and driven by Alfredo S. Mejia (Mejia), an employee of petitioner. The Galant Sigma was dragged about 12 meters from the point of impact, across the White Plains Road landing near the perimeter fence of Camp Aguinaldo, where the Galant Page 29
Sigma burst into flames and burned to death beyond recognition all four occupants of the car.
evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
ISSUE:
W/N Mejia was negligent. W/N petitioner exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee. HELD: st
1 Issue: It was well established that Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50 kilometers per hour, while the records show that he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the condition's encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. To suggest that De los Santos was equally negligent based on that sole statement of the RTC is erroneous. The entire evidence presented must be considered as a whole. Incidentally, a close reading of the ruling of the CA would clearly show the negligence of Mejia. nd
2 Issue: Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private respondents (in this case, the petitioner) to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. In Manliclic v. Calaunan, this Court ruled that: In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was explained that: Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption. We emphatically reiterate our holding, as a warning to all employers, that "the formulation of various company policies on safety without showing that they were being complied with is Page 30
not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on efficiency and safety were followed." . . . . d. Res Ipsa Loquitur Translation: “The thing speaks for itself.” Requisites:
1. Event does not ordinarily occur o
NOTE: The test is not based on “rarity”
but that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. 2. Exclusive control of defendant 3. No other cause 4. No fault on party injured MAAO CENTRAL CO. V. CA, GR NO. 83491, AUG. 27, 1990 FACTS:
Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the RTC of Bago City. Judge Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In its own decision, the CA sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent. ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court is at fault for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Art 2176 of the Civil Code. HELD:
Petitioner is guilty of negligence and cannot claim defense under Art 2176. DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF EMPLOYEES; NOT EXERCISED IN THE CASE AT BAR. The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
happened "every hour." Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailments — which reports have not been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments — is not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. RES IPSA LOQUITOR The absence of the fish plates — whatever the cause or reason — is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court. (167 SCRA 376) thus: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. FF CRUZ & CO. V. CA, GR NO. 52732, AUG 29, 1988 FACTS:
The furniture manufacturing shop of F.F. Cruz in Caloocan City was situatedadjacent to the residence of the Mables.Sometime in August 1971, private respondent Gregorio Mable first approached Eric Cruz, petitioner's plant manager, to request that a firewall be constructed between the shop and Mable’s residence. The request was repeated several times but they fell on deaf ears.In the early morning of September 6, 1974, fir e broke out in Cruz’s shop.Cruz’s employees, who slept in the shop premises, tried to put out the fire, buttheir efforts proved futile. The fire spread to the Mables’ house. Both the shopand the house were razed to the ground.The Mables collected P35,000.00 on the insurance on their house and thecontents thereof.The Mables filed an action for damages against the Cruz’s.The TC ruled in favor of the Mables. CA
affirmed but reduced the award ofdamages. ISSUE:
W/N the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. HELD:
Page 31
YES. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable to the case. The CA, therefore, had basis to find Cruz liable for the loss sustained by the Mables’.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, may be stated as follows: Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. [Africa v. Caltex (Phil.),Inc., G.R. No. L-
12986, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 448.] The facts of the case likewise call for the application of the doctrine, considering that in the normal course of operations of a furniture manufacturing shop, combustible material such as wood chips, sawdust, paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants for machinery may be found thereon. It must also be noted that negligence or want of care on the part of petitioneror its employees was not merely presumed.Cruz failed to construct a firewall between its shop and the residenceof the Mables as required by a city ordinance:
-
that the fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a litcigarette
-
that gasoline and alcohol were used and stored in the shop; and
-
that workers sometimes smoked inside the shop
Even without applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, Cruz's failure to construct a firewall in accordance with city ordinances would suffice to support a finding of negligence.Even then the fire possibly would not have spread to the neighboring houses were it not for another negligent omission on the part of defendants, namely, their failure to provide a concrete wall high enough to prevent the flames from leaping over it. Defendant's negligence,therefore, was not only with respect to the cause of the fire but also with respect tothe spread thereof to the neighboring houses. In the instant case, with more reason should petitioner be found guilty of negligence since it had failed to construct a firewall between its property and private respondents' residence which sufficiently complies with the pertinent city ordinances. The failure to comply with an ordinance providing for safety regulations had been ruled by the Court as an act of negligence [Teague v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-29745, June 4, 1973, 51 SCRA 181.] US V. CRAME, 30 PHIL 2
performance of his duties as a soldier. Crame alleges that he was only going at about 10 miles per hour, and that since Coombs suddenly appeared in front of the car, he tried but failed to change the course of the automobile so as to avoid hitting him. The trial court convicted Crame of serious physical injuries by imprudencia temeraria, on the ground that: 1) he did not reduce his speed sufficiently, nor did he attempt to stop to avoid an accident; 2) he did not sound his horn or whistle or use his voice to call the attention of Coombs to notify him that he should stop and avoid being struck by the car; and 3) Crame was driving in the center, or a little to the right of the center of the street instead of on the left side thereof. ISSUE:
W/N Crame is criminally liable for the damages caused to Coombs. HELD:
THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE MORE THAN SUSTAINED. The fact that Crame did not see Coombs until the car was very close to him is strong evidence of inattention to duty, especially since the street was wide and unobstructed, with no buildings on either side from which a person can dart out so suddenly. Moreover, the street was also well-lighted, so there is no reason why Crame did not see Coombs long before he had reached the position in the street where he was struck down. The presence of the carromata was not corroborated by any of the witnesses. Moreover, it would have obscured his vision only for a moment. Besides, it is the duty of automobile drivers in meeting a moving vehicle on public streets and highways to use due care and diligence to see to it that persons who may be crossing behind the moving vehicle are not run down by them. It is clearly established that Crame was driving along the right-hand side of the streetwhen the accident happened. According to the law of the road and the custom ofthe country, he should have been on the lefthand side of the street. According towitnesses there was abundant room for him to drive on such side. There is no evidence which shows negligence on the part of Coombs. At the time he was struck, he had a right to be where the law fully protected him from vehicles traveling in the direction in which the accused was driving at the time of injury. There is no evidence to show that the soldier was drunk at the time of the accident. And even if he were, mere intoxication is not negligence, nor does it establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. If one’s
conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether he is drunk or sober.
FACTS:
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF.
Mariano Crame, chauffeur of a motor vehicle, while driving along Calle Herran in the city of Manila, knocked down, dragged, and ran over the body of George E. Coombs, a private in the US army, who was then crossing the road, causing him injuries, wounds, and bruises. Moreover, such injuries damaged his mental faculties and incapacitated him from further
Where, in a criminal prosecution against the driver of an automobile for running down and injuring a pedestrian crossing a street, it appeared that at the time the injury was produced, the injured person was where he had a right to be, that the automobile was being driven on the wrong side of the street, and no warning was given of its approach, it was properly held that there was a
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
PRESUMPTIONS
AND
Page 32
presumption of negligence on the part of the driver and that the burden of proof was on him to establish that the accident occurred through other causes than his negligence.
LAYUGAN V. IAC, 167 SCRA 363 FACTS:
nothing definite,” and that while the rules do not prohibit its adoption inappropriate cases, “in the case at bar, however, we find no practical use for such doctrine.”
Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck driven recklessly by Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized. Serrano bumped the truck being repaired by Pedro Layugan, while the same was at a stop position. From the evidence presented, it has been established clearly that the injuries sustained by the plaintiff was caused by defendant's driver, Daniel Serrano. The police report confirmed the allegation of the plaintiff and admitted by Daniel Serrano on crossexamination. The collision dislodged the jack from the parked truck and pinned the plaintiff to the ground. As a result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. The left leg of the plaintiff from below the knee was later on amputated when gangrene had set in, thereby rendering him incapacitated for work depriving him of his income. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff, however, the Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N without proof as to the cause and origin of the fire, the doctrine of res ipsaloquitur should apply as to presume negligence on the part of the appellees.
Whether the IAC acted correctly in applying the doctrine or res ipsa loquitur with proper jurisprudential basis and if not, who is negligent?
HELD:
HELD:
DOCTRINE OF RE S IP SA LO QU IT UR APPLIES. CALTEX IS LIABLE.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back of the truck. But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot.
AFRICA V. CALTEX [PHIL], GR NO.L-12986, MAR. 31, 1966 FACTS:
A fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. It started while gasoline was being hosed from a tank truck into the underground storage, right at the opening of the receiving truck where the nozzle of the hose was inserted. The fire then spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including the personal properties and effects inside them.The owners of the houses, among them petitioners here, sued Caltex and Boquiren (agent in charge of operation).Trial court and CA found that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. Both courts refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsaloquitur on the grounds that “as to its applicability xxx in the Philippines, there seemsto be
Res ipsa Loquitur is a rule to the effect that “where the thing which caused the injurycomplained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in absence of explanation of defendant, that the incident happened because of want of care. The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of appellees. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The person who knew or could have known how the fire started were the appellees and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is fair and reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care. The report by the police officer regarding the fire, as well as the statement of the driver of the gasoline tank wagon who was transferring the contents thereof into the underground storage when the fire broke out, strengthen the presumption of negligence. Verily, (1) the station is in a very busy district and pedestrians often pass through or mill around the premises; (2) the area is used as a car barn for around 10taxicabs owned by Boquiren; (3) a store where people hang out and possibly smoke cigarettes is located one meter from the hole of the underground tank; and (4) the concrete walls adjoining the neighborhood are only 2½ meters high at most and cannot prevent the flames from leaping over it in case of fire. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
It is clear from the foregoing disquisition that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that in stamping its imprimatur upon the invocation by respondent Isidro of the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur to escape liability for the negligence of his employee, the respondent court committed reversible error. DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR: Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of any explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. AS DEFINED UNDER BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY:
Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant’s exclusive control, and that the Page 33
accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer. RULE OF EVIDENCE: The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine can only be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence, as in this case. PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. V. SPS.SARANGAYA, GR NO. 147746, OCT. 25, 2005 FACTS:
In 1986, spouses Sarangaya erected a building known as “Super A Building” and was subdivided into three
doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey residence of the Sarangayas was behind the second and third doors of the building.In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc., through its branch manager and co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the “Super A Building.” Perla Compania renovated its
rented space and divided it into two. The left side wasconverted into an office while the right was used by Pascual as a garage for a 1981model 4-door Ford Cortina. On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later, he returned, and decided to “warm up” the
car. When he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an “odd” sound and
did not start. He again stepped on the accelerator and started the car but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
television when they heard two loud explosions. In no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings, furniture and appliances.The city fire marshall c submitted a report to the provincial fire marshall and concluded that th e fire was “accidental.” The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law.Based on the same report, a criminal complaint for “Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Damage in Property” was filed
against petitioner Pascual. On the other hand, Perla Compania was asked to pay the amount of P7,992,350, inclusive of the value of the commercial building. At the prosecutor’s office, petitioner Pascual moved for the
withdrawal of the complaint, which was granted. Respondents (spouses Sarangaya) later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against petitioners for a “sum of money and damages,” alleging that Pascual
acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee. ISSUES:
W/N Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine and W/N Perla Compania liable under tort HELD:
a.) YES, Pascual liable under res ipsa loquitur doctrine Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It
relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima
facie case. The doctrine rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege negligence in general terms. In such instance, the plaintiff relies on proof of the happening of the accident alone to establish negligence. The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of. Thus, it is the defendant’s responsibility to show that there was no
negligence on his part. To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must concur: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence. A flame spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved. Hence, in this case, without any direct evidence as to the cause of the accident, the doctrine Page 34
of res ipsa loquitur comes into play and, from it, we draw the inference that based on the evidence at hand, someone was in fact negligent and responsible for the accident. Under the second requisite , the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls under the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it and ensure its proper functioning. Where the circumstances which caused the accident are shown to have been under the management or control of a certain person and, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have happened had that person used proper care, the inference is that it occurred because of lack of such care. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed. Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident. They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a building they owned.
Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route. During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia's father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six minor children of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 9620219, an independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquilian. Oscar Jr.'s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep. ISSUE:
TEST TO DETERMINE NEGLIGENCE: W/N will apply in this case. The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: did the defendant in committing the alleged negligent act, use reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person in the same situation would have employed? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known thata14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.
b.) YES, COMPANIA LIABLE UNDER TORT In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. While the petitionercorporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire.In the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. To fend off vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them. CARMEN, JR. V. BACOY G.R. NO. 173870 APRIL 25, 2012 FACTS:
At dawn on New Year's Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
HELD:
YES. Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence — in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant — that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care. The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeep's use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on their part. Page 35
V.
DEFENSES
There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases: duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
a. Complete Defenses a.1 Plaintiff’s own negligence PAULAN V. SARABIA, 104 PHIL. 1050 (can’t find, sorry) FE CAYAO-LASAM v. RAMOLETE, G.R. No. 159132, December 18, 2008 FACTS:
On July 28, 1994, three months pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was admitted to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC) due to vaginal bleeding. A pelvic sonogram was then conducted on Editha revealing the fetus’ weak cardiac pulsation. The following day, Editha’s repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from the fetus’ weak c ardiac pulsation, no fetal movement was also appreciated. Due to Editha’s persistent and
profuse vaginal bleeding, petitioner performed a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or "raspa." On September 16, 1994, Editha was once again brought at the LMC, as she was suffering from vomiting and severe abdominal pains. Dr. Mayo allegedly informed Editha that there was a dead fetus in the latter’s womb.
After, Editha underwent laparotomy, she was found to have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a ruptured uterus. Thus, Editha had to undergo a procedure for hysterectomy and as a result, she has no more chance to bear a child. Editha and her husband filed a Complaint for Gross Negligence and Malpractice against petitioner before the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC). The Board of Medicine of the PRC rendered a Decision exonerating petitioner from the charges filed against her. Respondents went to the PRC on appeal. The PRC rendered a Decision reversing the findings of the Board and revoking petitioner’s authority or license to practice her profession as a physician. Petitioner brought the matter to the CA in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner also dubbed her petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition was dismissed by the CA citing that neither Rule 43 nor Rule 65 was a proper remedy. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner was guilty of negligence and malpractice. HELD:
Worthy to mention that the fact that the PRC was not among those enumerated in the list of quasi-judicial agencies in Rule 43 does not by its fact alone, imply its exclusion from the coverage of the said Rule. The Rule expressly provides that it should be applied to appeals from awards, judgments final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi judicial functions.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
A physician-patient relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the petitioner. As Editha’s physician, petitioner was duty -bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of skill and care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. In the present case, respondents did not present any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was a specialist in gynecology and obstetrics. He testified that the D & C procedure was not the proximate cause of the rupture of Editha’s uterus resulting in her hysterectomy. From his
expert testimony, the D&C procedure was conducted in accordance with the standard practice, with the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances, and that there was nothing irregular in the way the petitioner dealt with Editha. Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages, provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are: Art. 2179.When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In the present case, the Court notes the findings of the Board of Medicine that petitioner advised her to return on August 4, 1994 or four (4) days after the D&C. However, complainant failed to do so. This being the case, the chain of continuity as required in order that the doctrine of proximate cause can be validly invoked was interrupted. Had she returned, the respondent could have examined her thoroughly. Editha omitted the diligence required by the circumstances which could have avoided the injury. The omission in not returning for a follow-up evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about Editha’s own injury. Based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission when Page 36
she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner’s orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s
injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury. Petition is GRANTED. Decision of the CA reversed and the decision of the Board of Medicine is affirmed. Exception: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance TAYLOR v. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO., supra. ISSUE:
W/N defendant company is liable to plaintiff for damages for having negligently failed to provide security measures to prevent the general public from entering its premises. HELD:
Counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff. On this score, the doctrine of implied invitation is applicable. In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises things tempting to children, the same implication should arise. But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his part, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury, and, on the other hand, we are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred. The doctrine of implied invitation does not apply where the said youth has not been free from fault when he willfully and deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing that his action would result in an explosion. In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. True, he may not have known and probably did not know the Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
precise nature of the explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. We are satisfied that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury. HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. v. BALANDAN, 91 Phil 488 FACTS:
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. was the owner of an ice-plant factory in the City of San Pablo, Laguna, in whose premises were installed two tanks full of water for cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or top covers. Through the wide gate entrance, motor vehicles hauling ice and persons buying said commodity passed, and any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased. There was no guard assigned on the gate. On April 16, 1948, plaintiff's son, Mario Balandan, an 8 year old boy, while playing with and in company of other boys of his age entered the factory premises through the gate, while bathing in one of the said tanks, sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already a cadaver, having been died of "asphyxia secondary to drowning." The CA and the CFI of Laguna, took the view that the petitioner maintained an attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents to persons entering its premises. ISSUE:
W/N the said tanks constitute an attractive nuisance. HELD:
The doctrine of attractive nuisance may be stated, as: One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without adding any new danger, (he) is not liable because of having created an "attractive nuisance. Page 37
The appealed decision is reversed and the Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. is absolved from liability. a.2. Assumption of Risk Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In the present case, the animal was in custody and under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And being injured by the animal under those circumstances, was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences. ILOCOS NORTE CO., v. CA, GR No. 53401, Nov. 6, 1989 FACTS:
Art. 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself. AFILIADA v. HISOLE and HISOLE, 85 Phil 67 FACTS:
This is an action for damages arising from injury caused by an animal. The complaint alleges that the now deceased, Loreto Afialda, was employed by the defendant spouses as caretaker of their carabaos at a fixed compensation; that while tending the animals he was, on March 21, 1947, gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries; that the mishap was due neither to his own fault nor to force majeure; and that plaintiff is his elder sister and heir depending upon him for support. Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under article 1905 of the Civil Code, which reads: The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have suffered it. ISSUE:
W/N owner of the animal is liable for the injuries caused to the caretaker.
Inn the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967, strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00 A.M. on June 29, 1967, when the floodwaters were beginning to recede, the deceased Isabel Lao Juan, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio Yabes, on No. 19 Guerrero Street, Laoag City, and proceeded towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium to look after her merchandise therein that might have been damaged. The deceased was followed by Aida Bulong and Linda Alonzo Estavillo. Aida and Linda walked side by side at a distance of between 5 and 6 meters behind the deceased. Suddenly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water. Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz tried to go to the deceased, but he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Thereafter, Yabes requested the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut off the electric current. Then the party waded to the house on Guerrero Street. The floodwater was receding and the lights inside the house were out indicating that the electric current had been cut off in Guerrero. Yabes instructed his boys to fish for the body of the deceased. The body was recovered about two meters from an electric post. An action for damages was instituted by the heirs of the deceased against INELCO. INELCO contends that the deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge, caused the installation of a burglar deterrent. Petitioner conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's electrocution when she tried to open her gate that fateful day. After due trial, the CFI found the facts in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. An appeal was filed with the CA which reversed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition. HELD: ISSUE:
NO. For the statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for "any damages it may cause," and this for the obvious reason that the possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
W/N the CA erred in not applying the legal principle of "assumption of risk" in the present case to bar private respondents from collecting damages. HELD:
Page 38
In order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric wire she herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. Petitioner suggests that the switch to said burglar alarm was left on. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with evidence. While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim's death. It was through the intervention of petitioner's negligence that death took place. In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in constant vigilto prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise) policing the area, nor even manning its office. The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous event. "When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission" Likewise, the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof and brave the subsiding typhoon. A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril. Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence, private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by petitioner's negligence.
as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. Petitioner breached the contract of carriage on two scores. First, as found by the CA, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of §32(a) of the same law. The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers. We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN, ET.AL., v. REYES, GR No. 154259, FEB. 28, 2005 FACTS:
Respondent Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that in the evening of 13 October 1994, at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Dr. Violeta Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. At the penthouse, they
first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. When dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who was Hotel Nikko’s Executive Secretary. In a loud voice and within
CALALAS v. CA, s u p r a . ISSUE:
W/N Calalas is liable for damages to private respondent, Sunga. HELD:
The petition has no merit. The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicata does not apply. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, the Civil Code requires extraordinary diligence from common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
the presence and hearing of the other guests, Ruby Lim told him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang "). Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Mr. Reyes claims damages in an action instituted against the hotel, Ms. Lim and Dr. Filart. Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter and claimed that she asked the latter to leave in the most discreet manner. After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim . The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited. On appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of the Page 39
trial court as it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes. ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in not applying the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria considering that Mr. Reyes, by its own account, is a gate crasher. HELD:
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave as he was a "gatecrasher." The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury") refers to selfinflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court’s findings of fact.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right
done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. a.3. Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; Doctrine of Supervening Negligence; Doctrine of Discovered Peril; or the “Humanitarian” Doctrine PICART vs. SMITH, s u p r a . ISSUE:
W/N defendant is guilty of negligence to be liable for damages. HELD:
safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. ALLIED BANK V. BPI G.R. NO. 188363 FEBRUARY 27, 2013 FACTS:
On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to "Mateo Mgt. Group International" (MMGI) was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner's Kawit Branch. The check, postdated "Oct. 9, 2003", was drawn against the account of Mr. Silva with respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt, petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine Clearing House Corporation (PCHC). The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of MMGI with P1,000,000. On October 22, 2002, MMGI's account was closed and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva discovered the debit of P1,000,000 from his account. In response to Silva's complaint, respondent credited his account with the aforesaid sum. On March 21, 2003, respondent returned a photocopy of the check to petitioner for the reason: "Postdated." Petitioner, however, refused to accept and sent back to respondent a photocopy of the check. Thereafter, the check, or more accurately, the Charge Slip, was tossed several times from petitioner to respondent, and back to petitioner, until on May 6, 2003, respondent requested the PCHC to take custody of the check. Acting on the request, PCHC directed the respondent to deliver the original check and informed it of PCHC's authority under Clearing House Operating Memo (CHOM) No. 279 dated 06 September 1996 to split 50/50 the amount of the check subject of a "Ping-Pong" controversy which shall be implemented thru the issuance of Debit Adjustment Tickets against the outward demands of the banks involved. PCHC likewise encouraged respondent to submit the controversy for resolution thru the PCHC Arbitration Mechanism.
Defendant is liable. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
However, it was petitioner who filed a complaint before the Arbitration Committee, asserting that respondent should solely bear the entire face value of the check due to its negligence in failing to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour reglementary period as provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing House Rules and Regulations. Petitioner prayed that respondent be Page 40
ordered to reimburse the sum of P500,000 with 12% interest per annum, and to pay attorney's fees and other arbitration expenses. In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the postdated check in the first place. It contended that petitioner's admitted negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the loss. On December 8, 2004, the Arbitration Committee rendered its Decision 10 in favor of petitioner and against the respondent. First, it ruled that the situation of the parties does not involve a "Ping-Pong" controversy since the subject check was neither returned within the reglementary time or through the PCHC return window, nor coursed through the clearing facilities of the PCHC. As to respondent's direct presentation of a photocopy of the subject check, it was declared to be without legal basis because Section 21.1 11 of the CHRR 2000 does not apply to post-dated checks. The Arbitration Committee further noted that respondent not only failed to return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period, it also failed to institute any formal complaint within the contemplation of Section 20.3 12 and it appears that respondent was already contented with the 50-50 split initially implemented by the PCHC. Finding both parties negligent in the performance of their duties, the Committee applied the doctrine of "Last Clear Chance" and ruled that the loss should be shouldered by respondent alone. ISSUE:
the payee's account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek reimbursement from respondent the amount credited to the payee's account covering the check. PANTRANCO v. BAESA, GR No. 79050, Nov. 14, 1989 FACTS:
In the morning of June 12, 1981, the spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children, together with 10 other persons, were aboard a passenger jeepney on their way to a picnic to celebrate the fifth wedding anniversary of the spouses. Upon reaching the highway, the jeepney turned right and proceeded to Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph. While they were proceeding towards Malalam River, a speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri encroached on the jeepney's lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it. As a result of the accident David Ico, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their children, Harold Jim and Marcelino Baesa, died while the rest of the passengers suffered injuries. Trial Court ruled in favor of respondents. Petitioner appealed but CA dismissed the case. Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for not applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" against the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that under the circumstances of the case, it was the driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and was therefore negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and competence his then existing opportunity to avoid the harm.
Last clear chance. ISSUE: HELD:
Will the doctrine of last clear chance apply in this case? The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant's failure to exercise such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury. In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing facility without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary care in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect upon seeing the date written on the face of the check "Oct. 9, 2003". Respondent could have then promptly returned the check and with the check thus dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
HELD:
The above contention of petitioner is manifestly devoid of merit. The doctrine of the last clear chance simply, means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the peril. In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction. As held by this Court in the case of Vda. De Bonifacio v. Page 41
BLTB, G.R. No. L-26810, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA
618, a motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway is generally entitled to assume that an approaching vehicle coming towards him on the wrong side, will return to his proper lane of traffic. There was nothing to indicate to David Ico that the bus could not return to its own lane or was prevented from returning to the proper lane by anything beyond the control of its driver. Leo Marantan, an alternate driver of the Pantranco bus who was seated beside the driver Ramirez at the time of the accident, testified that Ramirez had no choice but to swerve the steering wheel to the left and encroach on the jeepney's lane because there was a steep precipice on the right [CA Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. However, this is belied by the evidence on record which clearly shows that there was enough space to swerve the bus back to its own lane without any danger [CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 50]. Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that the negligence of petitioner's driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own lane immediately upon seeing the jeepney coming from the opposite direction was the sole and proximate cause of the accident without which the collision would not have occurred. There was no supervening or intervening negligence on the part of the jeepney driver which would have made the prior negligence of petitioner's driver a mere remote cause of the accident. GLAN PEOPLE’S LUMBER v. IAC, GR No. 70493, May 18, 1989
The finding that "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision occurred" is, based on nothing more than the showing that at the time of the accident, the truck driven by Zacarias had edged over the painted center line of the road into the opposite lane by a width of twenty-five (25) centimeters. It ignores the fact that by the uncontradicted evidence, the actual center line of the road was not that indicated by the painted stripe, that although it was not disputed that the truck overrode the painted stripe by twenty-five (25) centimeters, it was still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center line of the road and well inside its own lane when the accident occurred. By this same reckoning, since it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed into the stopped truck, it may also be deduced that the jeep was at the time travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck by at least the same 11-centimeter width of space. Nor was the IAC correct in finding that Zacarias had acted negligently in applying his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane upon spying the approaching jeep. Being well within his own lane, he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way. And even supposing that he was in fact partly inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away cannot be considered an unsafe or imprudent action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was "zigzagging” and hence no way of telling in which direction it would go as it approached the truck. It was rather Engr. Calibo’s negligence which was the
FACTS:
proximate
cause
of
the
accident.
Evidence
and
testimonies show that the jeep had been “zigzagging” or
Engr. Calibo, Roranes, and Patos were on the jeep owned by the Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo at the wheel, as it approached from the South Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao City in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At about that time, the cargo truck, driven by defendant Zacarias and owned by petitioners herein, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City had just crossed said bridge. The cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which Engr Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt. After the impact, the jeep fell and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a few meters to the rear of the truck, while the truck stopped on its wheels on the road. A case for damages was filed by the surviving spouse and children of the late Engr Calibo against the driver and owners of the cargo truck. The Trial Court ruled that plaintiffs were unable to establish the negligence of defendant and thus, dismissed the case. The trial court’s decision was
reversed upon appeal to the IAC. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is answerable for the death of Engr. Calibo owing to the negligence of its employee, Zacarias. HELD: The petition is meritorious. The IAC’s decisi on is
reversed.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
was driven erratically at that time and that its driver had been on a drinking spree on the occasion prior. Even, however, ignoring theof negligence on the part of Calibo, and assuming some antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias in failing to keep within his designated lane, incorrectly demarcated as it was, the physical facts, would still absolve the latter of any actionable responsibility for the accident under the rule of the last clear chance. Both drivers had had a full view of each other's vehicle from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. It is also admitted that the truck was already at a full stop while the jeep was still 30 meters away when thereafter, the latter plowed into the truck. From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path. DE ROY vs. CA, January 29, 1988 FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view Page 42
of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are free of liability since respondents had the last clear chance of avoiding the incident. HELD:
The petition is denied. This Court finds that the CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.”
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case. PLDT vs. CA, GR No. 57079, Sept. 29, 1989 FACTS:
Private respondents spouses Esteban instituted a case against petitioner company for the injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT. The complaint alleged that respondent Antonio Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. The trial court issued a decision in favor of the private respondents. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court. However, after granting a second motion for reconsideration, the CA set aside its original decision and affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner company is liable to private respondents for the injuries sustained by the latter. HELD:
The petition is meritorious. As evidenced by the factual findings of respondent court, private respondents’ jeep were running along the inside
lane of Lacson street when it suddenly swerved (as shown through the tiremarks) from the left and thereafter Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
hit the accident mound. Petitioner company cannot be held liable to the private respondents. The accident had not occurred due to the absence of warning signals but rather the abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside lane. Secondly, the jeep was not running at 25kph when the accident occurred, otherwise it would not have hit the accident mound since at that speed, it could easily apply its brakes on time. From the above findings, the negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory but rather the very cause of the occurrence of the accident and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The only purpose of warning signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger; hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. ONG vs. MCWD, 104 Phil 397 FACTS:
Defendant owns and operates three recreational swimming pools at its Balara filters in Diliman, Quezon City to which people are invited and nominal fees are charged. In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, a 14year old boy, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, arrived at the defendant's swimming pools. This has th th been the 5 or 6 time that the three brothers had gone to said natatorium. After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. Later on, Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed one Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under water for quite a long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Abaño of the same happening and Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom. Manual artificial respiration was applied. Despite medical attention by the nurse and Dr. Ayuyao of UP, the boy died. Plaintiffs instituted a case to recover damages from defendant for the death of their son in the said swimming pool operated by defendant. After trial, the lower court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition. Page 43
ISSUE:
Whether the death of minor Dominador Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle plaintiffs to recover damages. HELD: The trial court’s decision is hereby affirmed.
Although the proprietor of a natatorium is liable for injuries to a patron, resulting from lack of ordinary care in providing for his safety, without the fault of the patron, he is not in any sense deemed to be the insurer of the safety of patrons. And the death of a patron within his premises does not cast upon him the burden of excusing himself from any presumption of negligence. Thus in Bertalot vs. Kinnare, supra, it was held that there could be no recovery for the death by drowning of a fifteenyear boy in defendant's natatorium, where it appeared merely that he was lastly seen alive in water at the shallow end of the pool, and some ten or fifteen minutes later was discovered unconscious, and perhaps lifeless, at the bottom of the pool, all efforts to resuscitate him being without avail. Appellee has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death. Appellant posits that even if it be assumed that the deceased is partly to be blamed for the unfortunate incident, still appellee may be held liable under the doctrine of "last clear chance" for the reason that, having the last opportunity to save the victim, it failed to do so. We do not see how this doctrine may apply considering that the record does not show how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool. The doctrine of last clear chance simply means that the negligence of a claimant does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to claimant notwithstanding his negligence. Or, "As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third person which is imputed to his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident." Since it is not known how minor Ong came into the big swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in violation of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability to appellee..
against petitioners Cresencia Achevara, Alfredo Achevara and Benigno Valdez for the death of Arnulfo Ramos, husband of Elvira Ramos and father of her two children, in a vehicular accident that happened on April 22, 1995 at the national highway along Barangay Tablac, Candon, Ilocos Sur. Crescencia Achevara was sued as the operator of the passenger jeep which was involved in the vehicular accident. Alfredo Achevara was impleaded as the husband of the operator. Respondents alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving a passenger jeep in a reckless, careless, and negligent manner. He tried to overtake a motorcycle, causing the passenger jeep to encroach on the opposite lane and bump the oncoming vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. The injuries sustained by Arnulfo Ramos caused his death. Respondents alleged that Crescencia Achevara failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of Benigno Valdez as driver of the passenger jeep. Petitioners denied Benigno Valdez overtook a motorcycle and bumped the vehicle driven by Arnulfo Ramos. They alleged that Benigno Valdez was driving southward at a moderate speed when he saw an ownertype jeep coming from the south and heading north, running in a zigzag manner, and encroaching on the west lane of the road. To avoid a collision, Valdez drove the passenger jeep towards the shoulder of the road, west of his lane, but the owner-type jeep continued to move toward the western lane and bumped the left side of the passenger jeep. Petitioners alleged that it was Arnulfo Ramos who was careless and negligent in driving a motor vehicle, which he very well knew had a mechanical defect. Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE:
W/N petitioners are liable to respondents for the damages incurred as a result of the vehicular accident. HELD:
The petition is meritorious. The testimony of respondents’ witness, Gamera, that the
vehicular accident occurred because the passenger jeep driven by Valdez tried to overtake the motorcycle driven by PO3 de Peralta and encroached on the lane of the owner-type jeep, which resulted in the collision, was refuted by PO3 de Peralta, who testified that the passenger jeep did not overtake his motorcycle since he was the one following behind the passenger jeep.
ECHEVARA vs. RAMOS, GR No. 175172, Sept. 29, 2009
Gamera also testified that the collision took place on the lane of the owner-type jeep, and one of its wheels was detached and stayed immobile at the place of collision. However, SPO2 Marvin Valdez, who investigated the incident, found that the collision took place on the western lane of the national highway or the lane of the passenger jeep driven by Benigno Valdez. It was the owner-type jeep driven by Arnulfo Ramos that encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep.
FACTS:
Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To
Respondents Elvira Ramos and her two minor children filed with the RTC of Ilocos Sur a Complaint for damages
be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Page 44
persons were unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks.
vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code.
Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding southward; hence, the collision occurred. The CA correctly held that Benigno Valdez was guilty of inexcusable negligence by neglecting to take such precaution, which a reasonable and prudent man would ordinarily have done under the circumstances and which proximately caused injury to another.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS V. VIZCARA G.R. NO. 190022 FEBRUARY 15, 2012
On the other hand, the Court also finds Arnulfo Ramos guilty of gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. The acts of negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez were contemporaneous when Ramos continued to drive a wiggling vehicle on the highway despite knowledge of its mechanical defect, while Valdez did not immediately veer to the rightmost side of the road upon seeing the wiggling vehicle of Ramos. However, when the owner-type jeep encroached on the lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez realized the peril at hand and steered the passenger jeep toward the western shoulder of the road to avoid a collision. It was at this point that it was perceivable that Ramos must have lost control of his vehicle, and that it was Valdez who had the last opportunity to avoid the collision by swerving the passenger jeep towards the right shoulder of the road. The doctrine of last clear chance applies to a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence, but the defendant − who had the last fair
chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so − is made liable for all the consequences of the accident,
notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff. However, the doctrine does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously, and the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.
a.4. Emergency Rule VALENZUELA vs. CA, 253 SCRA 303 FACTS:
At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue Mitsubishi lancer from her restaurant to her home. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to solicit help if needed since rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, put on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear to open the trunk. She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the windshield of the car of the defendant and then fell to the ground. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent and alleged that when he was driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, with a car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked. Both the trial court and the CA found for petitioner. However, the latter modified the former’s decision in
reducing the amount of damages. Hence, this petition.
The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply to this case, because even if it can be said that it was
ISSUE:
Valdez who had the last chance to avoid the mishap when the owner-type jeep encroached on the western lane of the passenger jeep, Valdez no longer had the opportunity to avoid the collision.
W/N petitioner Valenzuela is guilty of contributory negligence to preclude her from claiming damages. HELD:
Article 2179 of the Civil Code provides: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In this case, both Ramos and Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution. Since the gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the proximate cause of the
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
We agree with the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Based on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone. We cannot agree.
Page 45
Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation.
Elordi was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence. The information was subsequently amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims.
Under the "emergency rule", an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
The appearance and intervention of Prosecutor Atty. Navarro for presentation of evidence for damages was disallowed. No appeal was taken from the order.
A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the emergency because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists. Under the circumstances described, Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. The circumstances established by the evidence adduced in the court below plainly demonstrate that Li was grossly negligent in driving his Mitsubishi Lancer. It bears emphasis that he was driving at a fast speed at about 2:00 A.M. after a heavy downpour had settled into a drizzle rendering the street slippery. There is ample testimonial evidence on record to show that he was under the influence of liquor. Under these conditions, his chances of effectively dealing with changing conditions on the road were significantly lessened. ORIX METRO LEASING V. MANGALINAO G.R. NO. 174089 JANUARY 25, 2012 a.5. Prescription Art. 1150. “The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought.” CAPUNO vs. PEPSI, GR No. L-19331, Apr. 30, 1965 FACTS:
A vehicular collision occurred on January 3, 1953 in Apalit, Pampanga which involved a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Judgment on the criminal case was rendered on April 15, 1959, acquitting the accused Elordi. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi Company and Elordi. Appellee moved to dismiss the said action relying on the ground of prescription among others. The motion was dismissed by the Court a quo. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:
W/N the action for damages has prescribed. HELD:
The action has prescribed. The present action is one for recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict , which action must be instituted within four (4) years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellants' intervention in the original action was disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order. And when they commenced the present civil action on September 26, 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code In filing the civil action, appellants considered it as entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code. In other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Capuno and the same would not have been stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958, or after the lapse of more than five years. The contention that the four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of the criminal action against Jon Elordi is incorrect notwithstanding that appellants had neither waived the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such reservation was not necessary; as without having made it they could still file — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of the criminal case; and consequently, the institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on a quasi-delict. b. Incomplete/Partial Defense b.1. Doctrine of Contributory Negligence Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff Page 46
may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. PHIL. NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. TUPANG, GR No. 55347, Oct. 4, 1985 FACTS:
On September 10, 1972, Winifredo Tupang, husband of plaintiff Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train No. 516 of appellant at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in his death. Both the CFI and the CA held PNR liable for damages for breaching the contract of carriage. ISSUE:
On the evening of April 10, 1925, a procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte attended by Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal. After the procession was over, the woman and her daughter, passed along a public street. The little girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her mother’s
friends. When in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared from the opposite direction which frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter coming from the Electric Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. She was taken to the provincial hospital but thereafter died. Dr. Benitez, who attended the child, certified that the cause of death was "Burns, 3rd Degree, whole Body.”
The trial court found that the company was negligent but dismissed the case having ruled that plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence.
W/N deceased Tupang was guilty of contributory negligence.
ISSUE:
HELD:
W/N Enverso was guilty of contributory negligence.
The appellate court found that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train did not even stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
HELD:
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage. But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside. RAKES vs. ATLANTIC GULF, s u p r a .(See under ACT
OR OMISSION) TAYLOR vs. MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD & LIGHT CO..s u p r a .(See under DOCTRINE OF ATTRACTIVE
NUISANCE) BANAL & ENVERSO vs. TACLOBAN ELECTRIC & HOUSE PLANT, 54 Phil 327 FACTS:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
We are shown no good reason for the departing from the conclusion of the trial judge to the effect that the sudden death of the child Purification Bernal was due principally to the nervous shock and organic calefaction produced by the extensive burns from the hot water. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. JARCO MARKETING CORP. vs. CA, 321 SCRA 377 FACTS:
On 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH AGUILAR were at the 2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store owned by herein petitioner. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw her daughter’s body on
the floor pinned by the store's gift-wrapping counter. ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center but died a few days later. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. Petitioners denied any liability claiming that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store Page 47
filled with glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse.
Private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive presumption that a child below nine years is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at six years old, was already capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. Also, the testimony of one of the store's former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied petitioners' theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, "Nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on me."
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's hand. CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. It was reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of herein petitioners finding
A trail existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used
that the proximate cause of ZHIENETH’s injuries was
by members of the community. Sometime in the 1970’s,
the negligence of the latter and that of her mother. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
W/N petitioners should be absolved from liability because of private respondent’s negligence. HELD:
We deny the petition.Under the circumstances, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the matter. Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to keep and maintain the structurally unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence. Petitioner was informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, it neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have done. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
NAPOCOR vs. CASIONAN, GR No. 165969, Nov. 27, 2008 FACTS:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed his life. He worked as a pocket miner.
petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical transmission lines traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two bamboo poles for their pocket mining. Noble carried the shorter pole while Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place. As Noble was going uphill, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Thereafter, Melchor saw Noble fall to the ground. He rushed to Noble and shook him but the latter was already dead. Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of respondents. ISSUE:
W/N Noble Casionan is guilty of contributory negligence so as to mitigate NAPOCOR’s liability. HELD:
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted. Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Noble’s part.
Page 48
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed
lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a mitigation of its liability. CADIENTE vs. MACAS, GR No. 161846, Nov. 14, 2008 FACTS:
Rosalinda Palero testified that on July 19, 1994, , at the intersection of Buhangin and San Vicente Streets in Davao City, 15-year old high school student Bithuel Macas was standing on the shoulder of the road. Rosalinda was about two and a half meters away from the respondent when the latter was bumped and run over by a Ford Fiera, driven by Cimafranca. Respondent was rushed to the hospital where both his legs were amputated in order to save his life. Cimafranca had since absconded and disappeared. Records showed that the Ford Fiera was registered in the name of herein petitioner, Atty. Cadiente. However, Cadiente claimed that when the accident happened, he was no longer the owner of the Ford Fiera. He alleged that he sold the vehicle to Engr. Jalipa with the understanding that the latter would be the one to cause the transfer of the registration. The victim's father filed a complaint for torts and damages against Cimafranca and Cadiente before the RTC. Cadiente later filed a third-party complaint against Jalipa. The RTC held Cadiente and Jalipa jointly and severally liable to respondent. Such decision was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE:
which was the uncemented portion of the highway. As noted by the trial court, the shoulder was intended for pedestrian use alone. Only stationary vehicles, such as those loading or unloading passengers may use the shoulder. Running vehicles are not supposed to pass through the said uncemented portion of the highway. However, the Ford Fiera in this case, without so much as slowing down, took off from the cemented part of the highway, inexplicably swerved to the shoulder, and recklessly bumped and ran over an innocent victim. The respondent cannot be expected to have foreseen that the Ford Fiera, erstwhile speeding along the cemented part of the highway would suddenly swerve to the shoulder, then bump and run him over. Thus, we are unable to accept the petitioner's contention that the respondent was negligent. Coming now to the second issue, this Court has recently reiterated in PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. ,that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if he had already sold it to someone else, is primarily responsible to the public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause. VI. LIABILITY FOR ACT OR OMISSION a. By tortfeasor LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES V. GLODEL BROKERAGE G.R. NO. 179446 JANUARY 10, 2011 FACTS:
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel "Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbia's warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City. Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with Plate No. NSD117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount of P1,903,335.39.
W/N victim is guilty of contributory negligence. ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is absolved from liability by the fact that he was no longer the owner of said vehicle.
W/N Loadmasters be legally considered as an Agent of respondent Glodel.
HELD: HELD:
The petition is without merit. In this case, records show that when the accident happened, the victim was standing on the shoulder, Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. Page 49
It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. The distinction is significant in the sense that "the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers." In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel was private in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to Glodel.
the total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. As stated in the case of Far Eastern Shipping v. Court of Appeals, . . . . Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier. With respect to the time frame of this extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive them. Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, "the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary." Loadmasters' claim that it was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts which expressly provide: ART. 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In connection therewith, Article 2180 provides: ART. 2180.The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury . Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. b. Vicarious Liability b.1. By parents LIBI vs. IAC, GR No. 70880, Sept. 18, 1992 FACTS:
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978. Page 50
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets of the same city.
either crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children, is primary or subsidiary.
ISSUE:
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School. On July 9, 1962 they were assigned to weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten Cuadra, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye became swollen and had to undergo surgical operation twice. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
W/N Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability. HELD:
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasidelicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that "(t) he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages." Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that "(i)f the minor causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. The civil liability of parents for felonies committed by their minor children contemplated in the aforesaid rule in Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code has, aside from the aforecited case of Fuellas, been the subject of a number of cases adjudicated by this Court, viz.: Exconde vs. Capuno, et al., Araneta vs. Arreglado, Salen, et al. vs. Balce, Paleyan, etc., et al. vs. Bangkili, et al., and Elcano, et al, vs. Hill, et al . Parenthetically, the aforesaid
cases were basically on the issue of the civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted with discernment, and also of minors 15 years of age or over, since these situations are not covered by Article 101, Revised Penal Code. In both instances, this Court held that the issue of parental civil liability should be resolved in accordance with the provisions of Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the reasons well expressed in Salen and adopted in the cases hereinbefore enumerated that to hold that the civil liability under Article 2180 would apply only to quasi-delicts and not to criminal offenses would result in the absurdity that in an act involving mere negligence the parents would be liable but not where the damage is caused with criminal intent. In said cases, however, there are unfortunate variances resulting in a regrettable inconsistency in the Court's determination of whether the liability of the parents, in cases involving Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
CUADRA vs. MONFORT, GR No. L-24101, Sept. 30, 1970 FACTS:
The parents instituted a suit in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father. The RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff to which the defendant appealed to SC on pure questions of law. ISSUE:
W/N Alfonso Monfort can be held liable for the acts of his child which caused damage to the Cuadra daughter. HELD:
The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180 under the principle of vicarious liability. The presumption of liability is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted by proving that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. TAMARGO vs. CA, GR No. 85044, June 3, 1992 Page 51
FACTS:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a complaint for damages was filed against respondent spouses Victor and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc. This petition for adoption was granted on, 18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer. Respondent spouses Bundoc, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, the spouses Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed. Petitioners contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption. The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action. The CA dismissed the appeal having been filed out of time. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
Whether the natural parents of Adelberto are liable for the damages sustained by Jennifer Tamargo. HELD:
This principle of parental liability is a specie of vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed negligence where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority — which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. The parental dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
the natural parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages. We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. To hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented would be unfair and unconscionable. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. b.2. By Guardians ART. 217 (FC) - In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a) b.3. By Owners and Managers of Establishments SPS. VILORIA V. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES G.R. NO. 188288 JANUARY 16, 2012 FACTS:
On or about July 21, 1997 and while in the United States, Fernando purchased for himself and his wife, Lourdes, two (2) round trip airline tickets from San Diego, California to Newark, New Jersey on board Continental Airlines. Fernando purchased the tickets at US$400.00 each from a travel agency called "Holiday Travel" and was attended to by a certain Margaret Mager (Mager). According to Spouses Viloria, Fernando agreed to buy the said tickets after Mager informed them that there were no available seats at Amtrak, an intercity passenger train service provider in the United States. Per the tickets, Spouses Viloria were scheduled to leave for Newark on August 13, 1997 and return to San Diego on August 21, 1997. Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to Newark to an earlier date or August 6, 1997. Mager informed him that flights to Newark via Continental Airlines were already fully booked and offered the alternative of a round trip flight via Frontier Air. Since flying with Frontier Air called for a higher fare of US$526.00 per passenger and would mean traveling by night, Fernando opted to request for a refund. Mager, Page 52
however, denied his request as the subject tickets are non-refundable and the only option that Continental Airlines can offer is the re-issuance of new tickets within one (1) year from the date the subject tickets were issued. Fernando decided to reserve two (2) seats with Frontier Air. As he was having second thoughts on traveling via Frontier Air, Fernando went to the Greyhound Station where he saw an Amtrak station nearby. Fernando made inquiries and was told that there are seats available and he can travel on Amtrak anytime and any day he pleased. Fernando then purchased two (2) tickets for Washington, D.C. From Amtrak, Fernando went to Holiday Travel and confronted Mager with the Amtrak tickets, telling her that she had misled them into buying the Continental Airlines tickets by misrepresenting that Amtrak was already fully booked. Fernando reiterated his demand for a refund but Mager was firm in her position that the subject tickets are non-refundable. Upon returning to the Philippines, Fernando sent a letter to CAI on February 11, 1998, demanding a refund and alleging that Mager had deluded them into purchasing the subject tickets. In a letter dated February 24, 1998, Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that his complaint had been referred to the Customer Refund Services of Continental Airlines at Houston, Texas. In a letter dated March 24, 1998, Continental Micronesia denied Fernando's request for a refund and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to any Continental ticketing location for the re-issuance of new tickets within two (2) years from the date they were issued. Continental Micronesia informed Fernando that the subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental ticket, albeit with a reissuance fee. On June 17, 1999, Fernando went to Continental's ticketing office at Ayala Avenue, Makati City to have the subject tickets replaced by a single round trip ticket to Los Angeles, California under his name. Therein, Fernando was informed that Lourdes' ticket was nontransferable, thus, cannot be used for the purchase of a ticket in his favor. He was also informed that a round trip ticket to Los Angeles was US$1,867.40 so he would have to pay what will not be covered by the value of his San Diego to Newark round trip ticket. aTSEcA In a letter dated June 21, 1999, Fernando demanded for the refund of the subject tickets as he no longer wished to have them replaced. In addition to the dubious circumstances under which the subject tickets were issued, Fernando claimed that CAI's act of charging him with US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles, which other airlines priced at US$856.00, and refusal to allow him to use Lourdes' ticket, breached its undertaking under its March 24, 1998 letter. ISSUE: Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Is CAI bound by the acts of Holiday Travel’s agents and
employees such as Mager? HELD: In actions based on quasi-delict, a principal can only be held liable for the tort committed by its agent's employees if it has been established by preponderance of evidence that the principal was also at fault or negligent or that the principal exercise control and supervision over them.
Considering that Holiday Travel is CAI's agent, does it necessarily follow that CAI is liable for the fault or negligence of Holiday Travel's employees? Citing China Air Lines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, et al. , CAI argues that it cannot be held liable for the actions of the employee of its ticketing agent in the absence of an employeremployee relationship. An examination of this Court's pronouncements in China Air Lines will reveal that an airline company is not completely exonerated from any liability for the tort committed by its agent's employees. A prior determination of the nature of the passenger's cause of action is necessary. If the passenger's cause of action against the airline company is premised on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict for a tort committed by the employee of the airline company's agent, there must be an independent showing that the airline company was at fault or negligent or has contributed to the negligence or tortuous conduct committed by the employee of its agent. The mere fact that the employee of the airline company's agent has committed a tort is not sufficient to hold the airline company liable. There is no vinculum juris between the airline company and its agent's employees and the contractual relationship between the airline company and its agent does not operate to create a juridical tie between the airline company and its agent's employees. Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not make the principal vicariously liable for the tort committed by its agent's employees and the principalagency relationship per se does not make the principal a party to such tort; hence, the need to prove the principal's own fault or negligence. On the other hand, if the passenger's cause of action for damages against the airline company is based on contractual breach or culpa contractual , it is not necessary that there be evidence of the airline company's fault or negligence. As this Court previously stated in China Air Lines and reiterated in Air France vs. Gillego, "in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that he has to prove is the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-performance by the carrier." Spouses Viloria's cause of action on the basis of Mager's alleged fraudulent misrepresentation is clearly one of tort or quasi-delict, there being no pre-existing contractual relationship between them. Therefore, it was incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI was equally at fault. However, the records are devoid of any evidence by which CAI's alleged liability can be substantiated. Apart from their claim that CAI must be held liable for Mager's supposed fraud because Holiday Travel is CAI's agent, Spouses Viloria did not present evidence that CAI was a party or had contributed to Mager's complained act Page 53
either by instructing or authorizing Holiday Travel and Mager to issue the said misrepresentation.
to prove the negative averment. This Court said:
It may seem unjust at first glance that CAI would consider Spouses Viloria bound by the terms and conditions of the subject contracts, which Mager entered into with them on CAI's behalf, in order to deny Spouses Viloria's request for a refund or Fernando's use of Lourdes' ticket for the re-issuance of a new one, and simultaneously claim that they are not bound by Mager's supposed misrepresentation for purposes of avoiding Spouses Viloria's claim for damages and maintaining the validity of the subject contracts. It may likewise be argued that CAI cannot deny liability as it benefited from Mager's acts, which were performed in compliance with Holiday Travel's obligations as CAI's agent.
"It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving the action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exceptions. This [rule] is in harmony with the provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc." (citations omitted)
However, a person's vicarious liability is anchored on his possession of control, whether absolute or limited, on the tortfeasor. Without such control, there is nothing which could justify extending the liability to a person other than the one who committed the tort. As this Court explained in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co.: With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extracontractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. (emphasis supplied) It is incumbent upon Spouses Viloria to prove that CAI exercised control or supervision over Mager by preponderant evidence. The existence of control or supervision cannot be presumed and CAI is under no obligation to prove its denial or nugatory assertion. Citing Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled in Jayme v. Apostol , that: In Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to deny an alleged employment relationship. The defendant is under no obligation Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that CAI exercised control over Holiday Travel's employees or that CAI was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed on CAI for Mager's supposed misrepresentation. PHIL. RABBIT LINES, INC. vs. PHIL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC. G.R. No. L-25142 March 25, 1975 FACTS:
On November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. As a result of the incident, a complaint for damages was filed against Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., Balingit and Pineda. The CFI dismissed the case as to Balingit citing that the latter was not the manager of an establishment contemplated in article 2180 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: What is the meaning of “manager” as used in Art.2180 of
the NCC? HELD:
The Civil Code provides: ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
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Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. xxx xxx xxx The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) We are of the opinion that the term manager does not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of "employer". Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular accident already mentioned because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of his employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VASQUEZ G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999 FACTS:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad was manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pickup of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctor's hospital where he died a few days after. An action for damages was commenced by the parents of the deceased against Abad and Castilex. The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former. ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle. HELD: Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a manager of a companyissued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances. We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, Cebu City where he had snacks with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred. A witness then testified that at the time of the incident, ABAD was with a woman inside his car. To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident which was about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle. b.4. By Employers MAMARIL V. BOY SCOUT OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 179382 JANUARY 14, 2013 FACTS:
Spouses Benjamin C. Mamaril and Sonia P. Mamaril (Sps. Mamaril) are jeepney operators since 1971. They would park their six (6) passenger jeepneys every night at the Boy Scout of the Philippines' (BSP) compound Page 55
located at 181 Concepcion Street, Malate, Manila for a fee of P300.00 per month for each unit. On May 26, 1995 at 8 o'clock in the evening, all these vehicles were parked inside the BSP compound. The following morning, however, one of the vehicles with Plate No. DCG 392 was missing and was never recovered. According to the security guards Cesario Peña (Peña) and Vicente Gaddi (Gaddi) of AIB Security Agency, Inc. (AIB) with whom BSP had contracted for its security and protection, a male person who looked familiar to them took the subject vehicle out of the compound. ISSUE:
W/N Boy Scout of the Philippines can be held liable as an employer. HELD:
The petition lacks merit. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that every person, who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Similarly, Article 2176 of the Civil Code states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. In this case, it is undisputed that the proximate cause of the loss of Sps. Mamaril's vehicle was the negligent act of security guards Peña and Gaddi in allowing an unidentified person to drive out the subject vehicle. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury or loss, and without which the result would not have occurred. Moreover, Peña and Gaddi failed to refute Sps. Mamaril's contention that they readily admitted being at fault during the investigation that ensued. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any finding of negligence on the part of BSP. Hence, no reversible error was committed by the CA in absolving it from any liability for the loss of the subject vehicle based on fault or negligence. Neither will the vicarious liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code apply in this case. It is uncontested that Peña and Gaddi were assigned as security guards by AIB to BSP pursuant to the Guard Service Contract. Clearly, therefore, no employeremployee relationship existed between BSP and the security guards assigned in its premises. Consequently, the latter's negligence cannot be imputed against BSP but should be attributed to AIB, the true employer of Peña and Gaddi. In the case of Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, the Court enunciated thus: Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards and watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. BALIWAG TRANSIT INC. vs. CA G.R. No. 116624 September 20, 1996 FACTS:
On 2 November 1990, petitioner's Baliwag Transit Bus No. 117 was driven by Juanito Fidel to its terminal for repair of its brake system. Fidel told mechanic Mario Dionisio to inform the headman about the matters so that proper order to the mechanics could be made. Fidel then alighted from the bus and told the gasman to fill up the gas tank. Shortly after, Fidel returned to the bus and sat on the driver's seat. Suddenly the bus moved; he felt something was hit. When he went down to investigate he saw Mario Dionisio lying on the ground bleeding and convulsive, sandwiched between Bus No. 117 and another bus parked thereat. Mario Dionisio was rushed to the hospital but died a few days after. Thereafter a complaint for damages was lodged by private respondents Divina Vda. de Dionisio, for herself and in behalf of her minor children. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
W/N Baliwag Transit is liable solidarily with Fidel for the death of Dionisio. HELD:
The petition must fail. The circumstances clearly show that the proximate cause of the death of Dionisio was the negligence of driver Fidel when he failed to take the necessary precaution to prevent the accident. Driver Fidel should have parked the bus properly and safely. After alighting from the bus to tell the gasman to fill the tank, he should have placed a stopper or any hard object Page 56
against a tire or two of the bus. But without taking the necessary precaution he boarded Bus No. 117 causing it to move and roll, pinning down the deceased which resulted in his eventual death. The reckless imprudence of Fidel makes him liable to the heirs of offended party for damages together with his employer. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the selection of his employee or in the selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The presumption however may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that it had exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Hence, to escape solidary liability for quasi-delict committed by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of care. Petitioner's failure to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver Juanito Fidel will make it solidarily liable with the latter for damages caused by him. ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. CA, G.R. No. 82465 February 25, 1991 FACTS:
Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School, joined a school picnic undertaken by Class I-B and Class I-C at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. During the picnic and while the students were in the water, one of the female teachers was apparently drowning. Some of the students, including Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. His body was recovered but efforts to resuscitate him ashore failed. Thereupon, respondent spouses filed a complaint for damages against the St. Francis High School and the teachers, contending that the death of their son was due to the failure of the petitioners to exercise the proper diligence of a good father of the family in preventing their son's drowning. The trial court found in favor of the respondents but absolved the school from liability. The CA, upon appeal, ruled in favor of respondents and held the school liable under the doctrine in Art. 2180 of the NCC. ISSUE:
W/N St. Francis High School is liable for the death of Ferdinand Castillo by applying Art. 2180 of the NCC.
Hence, it cannot be said that they are guilty at all of any negligence. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind. Article 2180, par. 4 states that: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. xxx xxx xxx Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
Under this paragraph, it is clear that before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned tasks. In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal because this picnic is not a school sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. As earlier pointed out by the trial court, mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic by the students and their teachers does not in any way or in any manner show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same. The application therefore of Article 2180 has no basis in law and neither is it supported by any jurisprudence. Finally, no negligence could be attributable to the petitioners-teachers to warrant the award of damages to the respondents-spouses. Petitioners Connie Arquio the class adviser of I-C, the section where Ferdinand belonged, did her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic. In fact, Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to save the child. FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. CA, G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990
HELD: FACTS:
The petition is impressed with merit. In the instant case, petitioners are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those under them.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an 82-year old retired schoolteacher, was struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged Page 57
employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized. Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages. The trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party to the case. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. ISSUE:
W/N the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner Filamer with reference to Funtecha. HELD:
It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. We agree. In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, 7 specifically Section 14, Rule X of Book III which reads: Sec. 14.Working scholars . — There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the latter in exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under such arrangement.
It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll. But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the jeep from the authorized driver and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence. YAMBAO vs. ZUIGA, G.R. No. 146173. December 11, 2003 FACTS:
Petitioner Yambao is the registered owner of Lady Cecil and Rome Trans passenger bus. On May 6, 1992, the bus owned by the petitioner was being driven by Venturina along EDSA. Suddenly, the bus bumped Zuiga, a pedestrian. Zuiga thereafter died despite being given medical attention. Private respondents, as legal heirs of Zuiga, filed a Complaint against petitioner and her driver, Venturina, for damages. Both the trial court and the CA ruled in favor of private respondents. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
Whether petitioner exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employees, thus absolving her from any liability. HELD: Petitioner’s claim that she exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of her driver deserves but scant consideration. Her allegation that before she hired Venturina she required him to submit his drivers license and clearances is worthless, in view of her failure to offer in evidence certified true copies of said license and clearances. Moreover, as the court a quo aptly observed, petitioner contradicts herself. She declared that Venturina applied with her sometime in January 1992 and she then required him to submit his license and clearances. However, the record likewise shows that she did admit that Venturina submitted the said requirements only on May 6, 1992, or on the very day of the fatal accident itself . In other words, petitioners own admissions clearly and categorically show that she did not exercise due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. In any case, assuming arguendo that Venturina did submit his license and clearances when he applied with petitioner, the latter still fails the test of due diligence in the selection of her bus driver. Petitioner failed to present convincing proof that she went to the extent of verifying Venturinas qualifications, safety record, and driving history. The presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of her bus driver, thus, remains unrebutted. Nor did petitioner show that she exercised due supervision over Venturina after his selection. Petitioner did not present any proof that she drafted and implemented training programs and guidelines on road safety for her employees. In fact, the record is bare of any showing that petitioner required Venturina to attend periodic seminars on road safety and traffic efficiency. Hence, petitioner cannot claim exemption from any liability arising from the recklessness or negligence of Venturina.
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In sum, petitioner’s liability to private respondents for the
negligent and imprudent acts of her driver, Venturina, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear. SYKI vs. BEGASA, G.R. No. 149149 2003
October 23,
FACTS:
On June 22, 1992, respondent Salvador Begasa and his three companions flagged down a passenger jeepney driven by Espina and owned by Pisuena. While respondent was boarding the passenger jeepney (his right foot already inside while his left foot still on the boarding step of the passenger jeepney), a truck driven by Sablayan and owned by petitioner Syki bumped the rear end of the passenger jeepney. Respondent fell and fractured his left thigh bone. Respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of common carrier’s contractual obligations and quasi -delict against Pisuena, the owner of the passenger jeepney;, herein petitioner Syki, the owner of the truck;, and Sablayan, the driver of the truck. The trial court dismissed the complaint against Pisuena but ordered petitioner Syki and Sablayan, to pay respondent Begasa, jointly and severally, actual and moral damages plus attorney’s fees. The CA affirmed
the decision in toto.
without doubt, insufficient to overcome the legal presumption that petitioner was negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is liable for the injuries suffered by respondent. AGUILA vs. BALDOVISO, G.R. No. 163186 February 28, 2007 FACTS:
On April 19, 1993, Lisbos was driving, along EDSA in Caloocan City, a van, registered under the name of petitioner Reyes. The van sideswiped Fausto who was walking along the pedestrian lane and crossing EDSA. Fausto fell on the pavement and suffered injuries, and was brought to the hospital but subsequently died. Fausto’s wife, Carmen R. Baldovizo, and children filed
before the RTC a complaint for damages against Lisbos, Reyes, Emerlito F. Aguila, the actual operator and possessor of the van, and Times Surety and Insurance Company, the insurer of the van under a third-party liability insurance contract. The trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The CA denied the appeal ruling that Reyes and Aguila has lost their right to appeal. ISSUE:
ISSUE:
Do the petitioners have the right to appeal the amended decision after the original decision had become final and executory?
W/N petitioner exercised due diligence of a good father in the selection and supervision of his employees as to absolve him from liability.
HELD: We find petitioners’ contentions devoid of merit.
HELD:
The petition has no merit. Petitioner’s attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris
familias" in the selection and supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony. Petitioner testified that before he hired Sablayan, he required him to submit a police clearance in order to determine if he was ever involved in any vehicular accident. He also required Sablayan to undergo a driving test with conducted by his mechanic, Esteban Jaca. Petitioner’s mechanic, Esteban Jaca, on the other hand,
testified that Sablayan passed the driving test and had never figured in any vehicular accident except the one in question. Petitioner, however, never presented the alleged police clearance given to him by Sablayan, nor the results of Sablayan’s driving test. P etitioner also did not present records of the regular inspections that his mechanic allegedly conducted. The unsubstantiated and selfserving testimonies of petitioner and his mechanic are, Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
While the Resolution dated August 13, 2001, correcting the March 7, 2000 Decision, stated that the name of Lisbos was inadvertently included in the dispositive portion, hence, said name was ordered stricken off, the ensuing Amended Decision rendered on August 13, 2001 is null and void because any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void. Besides, it is not necessary to amend the original decision holding the petitioners, Lisbos, and the insurance company solidarily liable. In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of the employer is direct and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. Thus, even if the driver was included albeit not served with summons, petitioners are directly and primarily liable. Thus, petitioners Aguila and Reyes as employer and registered owner or possessor-operator of the van, respectively, are solidarily liable in accordance with Article 2180 in relation to Articles 2184 and 2194 of the Civil Code. SPS. JAYME vs. APOSTOL, G.R. No. 163609 November 27, 2008 FACTS: Page 59
On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality. The pickup truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. Marvin sustained severe head injuries. Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident. Petitioners spouses Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages against respondents. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. However, the CA absolved Miguel from liability upon appeal, citing that the latter was not the employer of Lozano. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:
May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian? HELD:
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by preponderant evidence In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employer's power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employer's right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer's right of suspension or dismissal. Applying the foregoing test, it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. Mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer. Compare: Subsidiary Liability under Art. 103 of the RPC SPS. FRANCO vs. IAC, G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989 FACTS:
On October 18, 1974, Macario Yuro swerved the northbound Franco Bus he was driving to the left to avoid hitting a truck parked along the cemented pavement of the MacArthur Highway at Barrio Talaga, Capas Tarlac, thereby taking the lane of an incoming Isuzu Mini Bus driven by one Magdaleno Lugue and making a collision between the two vehicles an unavoidable and disastrous eventuality. The collision resulted in the deaths of the two drivers and two passengers of the mini bus, Romeo Bue and Fernando Chuay. Consequently, Antonio Reyes, the registered owner of the Isuzu Mini Bus, Mrs. Susan Chuay, the wife of victim Fernando Chuay, and Mrs. Lolita Lugue, the wife of driver-victim Magdaleno Lugue, filed an action for damages. The trial court in its decision said that the act of the Franco Bus driver was a negligent act punishable by law resulting in a civil obligation arising from Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Said decision was affirmed by the IAC. ISSUE:
Whether the action for recovery of damages instituted by herein private respondents was predicated upon crime or quasi-delict. HELD:
We find merit in this contention. Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer under the RPC and the employer's primary liability under the NCC which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code which provide as follows: Art. 103. Subsidiar y civil liabilit y of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by the servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties; While the second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, liability originates from a delict committed by the employee who is primarily liable therefor and upon whose primary liability his employer's subsidiary liability is to be based. Page 60
Before the employer's subsidiary liability may be proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action whereby the employee's criminal negligence or delict and corresponding liability therefor are proved. If no criminal action was instituted, the employer's liability would not be predicated under Article 103. In the case at bar, no criminal action was instituted. Thus, petitioners' subsidiary liability has no leg to stand on considering that their liability is merely secondary to their employee's primary liability. Logically therefore, recourse under this remedy is not possible. To hold the employer liable under Article 103 of the RPC sans prior conviction is erroneous. It is erroneous because the conviction of the employee primarily liable is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability and, at the same time, absurd because we will be faced with a situation where the employer is held subsidiarily liable even without a primary liability being previously established. Thus the present case must be decided on the basis of civil liability of the employer as a result of the tortious act of its employee and not subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the RPC. BERMUDEZ vs. HON. MELENCIO-HERRERA, G.R. No. L-32055 February 26, 1988 FACTS:
A cargo truck, driven by Pontino and owned by Cordova Ng Sun Kwan, bumped a jeep on which Rogelio, a sixyear old son of plaintiffs-appellants, was riding. The boy sustained injuries which caused his death. As a result, a criminal case filed against Pontino. Plaintiffs-appellants filed in the said criminal case "A Reservation to File Separate Civil Action." On July 28,1969, the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil case for damages. Finding that the plaintiffs instituted the action "on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence constituted a quasi-delict," the trial court stated that plaintiffs had already elected to treat the accident as a "crime" by reserving in the criminal case their right to file a separate civil action. That being so, the trial court decided to order the dismissal of the complaint against defendant Cordova Ng Sun Kwan and to suspend the hearing of the case against Pontino until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:
Whether the civil action filed by the plaintiffs-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict. HELD:
We find the appeal meritorious. To begin with, obligations arise from law, contract, quasicontract, crime and quasi-delict. According to appellant, her action is one to enforce the civil liability arising from Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
crime. It is now settled that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable, the following requisites must be present: (1) that an employee has committed a crime in the discharge of his duties; (2) that said employee is insolvent and has not satisfied his civil liability; (3) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry. Without the conviction of the employee, the employer cannot be subsidiarily liable. In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi- delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family. In the case at bar, the action filed b appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict. ALVAREZ vs. CA, G.R. No. L-59621 February 23, 1988 FACTS:
Renato Ramos was charged with Double Homicide in the CFI of Quezon Province. After trial, the court rendered judgment against the accused. The accused appealed to the CA which affirmed the trial court's decision but deleted that part thereof making herein petitioner, as employer of Renato Ramos, subsidiarily liable for payment of the adjudged indemnities to the offended parties, ruling that -Maximiliano Alvarez is not a party in this action. It is true that the judgment of conviction in the criminal case binds the person subsidiarily liable with the accused, and it is therefore the duty of the employer to participate in the defense. The law, however, does not authorize that the subsidiary liability of the employer be adjudged in the criminal action. This is because, in the criminal proceeding, the employer, not being a party, is denied the opportunity to present his defense against such subsidiary liability. Due regard to due process and observance of procedural requirements demand that a separate action should be filed against the supposed employer to enforce the subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the RPC. The CA’s decision was not appealed. Meanwhile, on 14
December 1978, Pajarito v. Seneris was decided by this Court, holding inter alia that-Page 61
Considering that the judgment of conviction, sentencing a defendant employee to pay an indemnity under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, is conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the latter's civil liability but also with regard to its amount, . . . in the action to enforce the employer's subsidiary liability, the court has no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the decision. In view of the foregoing principles, it would serve no important purpose to require petitioner to file a separate and independent action against the employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary civil liability. At any rate, the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment.
After finality of the CA judgment, the case was remanded to the RTC for execution on the strength of the Pajarito decision. ISSUE:
W/N a separate civil action is necessary to enforce the employer’s subsidiary liability.
The petition is not impressed with merit. The subsidiary liability of an employer automatically arises upon his employee's conviction, and subsequent proof of inability to pay. In this light, the application of Pajarito is merely the enforcement of a procedural remedy designed to ease the burden of litigation for recovery of indemnity by the victims of a judiciallydeclared criminally negligent act. A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. G.R. No. 141538
there was no service of summons on him. The trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s
employee, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Mrs. Cerezo resorted to petition for relief from judgment, petition for certiorari and annulment of judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insisted that trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable party. All of the actions were denied for lack of merit. ISSUE:
W/N Foronda was an indispensable party to the action so as to enforce Mrs. Cerezo’s liability. HELD:
The petition has no merit. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of
view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict under the Revised Penal Code. The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Article 103 of the RPC, or may give rise to an action for a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the NCC. An aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies.
HELD:
CEREZO vs. TUAZON, 23, 2004
The trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because
March
Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi -delict is primary and direct, while the employer’s liability based
on a delict is merely subsidiary. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Article 103 of the RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee ’s delict and corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court’s jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary. However,
FACTS:
On 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger collided with a tricycle. On 1 October 1993, tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line and bus driver Foronda.
the present action is clearly for the quasi-delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda. L.G. FOODS CORPORATION vs. HON. PAGAPONGAGRAVIADOR, G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006 FACTS:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Page 62
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Yeneza. Charles died as a result of the accident. A criminal case was filed against the driver. Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide. On account thereof, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case. Thereafter, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. The defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. The CA denied the petition for certiorari and upheld the trial court. ISSUE:
Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article 103 of the RPC or derived from Article 2180 of the NCC. HELD:
The complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to the death of their 7-year old son. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. b.5 Owner of Vehicle In the vehicle Not in the vehicle Art. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable. (n) Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. (n) Art. 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the proper government office a bond executed by a government-controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be fixed by the competent public official. (n) DUAVIT vs. CA, G.R. No. 82318 May 18, 1989 FACTS:
On July 28, 1971 plaintiffs Sarmiento and Catuar were aboard a jeep. Catuar was driving the said jeep and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Catuar slowed down. Suddenly, another jeep driven by defendant Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep. Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist was broken and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff Sarmiento was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured. The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Sabiniano as driver, and against Duavit as owner of the jeep. Defendant Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep, denied that the other defendant (Sabiniano) was his employee. Defendant Sabiniano categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter The trial court found Sabiniano negligent but absolved Duavit from liability. Upon appeal, the CA rendered the decision holding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano. ISSUE:
W/N the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article 2180 of the NCC when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter. HELD:
As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him. Herein petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely denies having employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like Page 63
holding liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. JUANIZA vs. JOSE, 30, 1979
G.R. No. L-50127-28
March
FACTS:
Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted in the death to 7 and physical injuries to 5 of its passengers. At the time of the accident, Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with defendant-appellant, Arroyo, for 16 years in a relationship akin to that of husband and wife. The CFI rendered a decision against Jose and Arroyo. The lower court based her liability on the provision of Article 144 of the Civil Code which reads: When a man and woman living together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. ISSUE:
W/N Arroyo who is not a registered owner of the jeepney can be held jointly and severally liable for damages with the registered owner of the same. HELD:
As a consequence, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, in view of its insurance contract with Soriano, paid the latter. By way of subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR for quasi-delict. Unfortunately, summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address. Both the RTC and CA dismissed the complaint for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. ISSUE:
May an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car company for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle? HELD:
We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or negligence of FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established. It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other vehicle his personal liability. FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
The co-ownership contemplated in Article 144 of the NCC requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Arroyo. Under the aforecited provision of the Civil Code, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney. It is settled in our jurisprudence that only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.
Art. 2180 is not applicable in this case. FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
ANONUEVO vs. CA, s u p r a .
REPUBLIC vs. HON. PALACIO, G.R. No. L-20322 May 29, 1968
FGU INSURANCE CORP. vs. CA, G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998 FACTS:
On 21 April 1987, 2 vehicles, cruising along EDSA, figured in a traffic accident. The car owned by Soriano was being driven by Jacildone, while the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR, was driven by DahlJensen as lessee. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
CADIENTE vs. MACAS, s u p r a . b.6. By State
FACTS:
Ildefonso Ortiz instituted a case against the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc. to recover possession, with damages, of a lot located in Camarines Sur, which the Irrigation Association allegedly entered and occupied. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic, filed an urgent motion to lift the order of garnishment against the deposits and/or pump irrigation trust fund in the account of the Irrigation Service Unit at the PNB, Manila, for the Page 64
reason that the funds subject matter thereof are public funds and exempt from attachment or execution. Upon denial of this motion, the Solicitor General commenced the present certiorari and prohibition proceeding in the CA. The appellate court sustained the propriety of the said order. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUE:
W/N the pump irrigation trust fund may be garnished to satisfy a money-judgment against the Handog Irrigation Asso. HELD:
An infirmity of the decision under appeal originates from its ignoring the fact that the initial complaint against the Irrigation Service Unit was that it had induced the Handong Irrigation Association, Inc., to invade and occupy the land of the plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz. The ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract; and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor. MERITT vs. GOV’T OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS, G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916 FACTS:
Plaintiff was riding a motorcycle along Taft Avenue when the General Hospital ambulance turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn and in violation of the Motor Vehicle Act, by which movement it struck the plaintiff. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, as a consequence, plaintiff suffered in the efficiency of his work as a contractor. ISSUE:
W/N the gov’t can be held liable for the damages resulting from the negligence of the chauffeur. HELD:
The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government by virtue of Act No. 2457 “in order to fix
the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers, and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do, more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
plaintiff's controversies with the estate. It did not pass upon the question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the absence of the state's immunity from suit. Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations." It is, therefore, evidence that the is only liable for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent. b.7.. By Teachers EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO, 29, 1957
G.R. No. L-10134
June
FACTS:
Dante Capuno was a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School and on March 31, 1949 he attended a parade upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school, Dante, with other students, boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his teacher. Delfin Capuno contends that he is not liable for damages since at the time of the incident, he was not in supervision, custody and control of his son. The RTC sustained the defense and the case was certified by the CA to the SC on the ground of pure questions of law. ISSUE:
Page 65
W/N Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña. HELD:
Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5, provide: ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them. x x x
xxx
The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio Daffon were classmates in Manila Technical Institute. On March 10, 1966, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory room. Desiderio Cruz and Virgilio Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall face downward. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so he was immediately taken to a hospital where he eventually died.
xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in question because at the time the Dante committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father is obvious. This is necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. This, defendants failed to prove. SPS.PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES, G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971 FACTS:
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
Plaintiff-appellants, as parents of the deceased, filed a case against Daffon, Brillantes as member of the Board of Directors of the Institute, Valenton as president and Quibulue as instructor thereof. The trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute, ruling that teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be only liable for damages caused by their pupils and students and apprentices where the latter are under their custody. ISSUE:
W/N defendants-school officials are liable as tortfeasors with defendant Daffon for damages resulting from Palisoc’s death. HELD:
The Court holds that under the Art. 2180 of the NCC, defendants head and teacher of the Manila Technical Institute are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well Page 66
as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. . The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. .
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
AMADORA vs. CA, G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988 FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora was a graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. On April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo. The herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Damon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. The trial court held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved. ISSUE:
W/N Art. 2180 was applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. W/N the students were in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended. HELD:
The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercises a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. By contrast, the head of the academic school is not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons directly dealing with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed. It is conceded that the custody requirement signify that that the student should be within the control of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. However, this does not necessarily mean that such, custody be co-terminous with the semester. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-incharge who must answer for his students' torts. It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the Page 67
student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
which the former took from the armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF. As a result, Napoleon Castro died and Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide.
The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. The evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-incharge of the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Abon, Ungos (ROTC Commandant), school officials and the BCF as party defendants. The Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of Castro. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with modification the decision of the Trial Court.
At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Damon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-in-charge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Finally, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody. SALVOSA vs. IAC, G.R. No. 70458 October 5, 1988 FACTS:
Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic institution. However, it is also an institution of arts and trade. The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Abon received his appointment from the AFP and received his salary from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF. On 3 March 1977, Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of Baguio with an unlicensed firearm Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
ISSUE:
W/N petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. HELD:
Upon the foregoing considerations, we hold that Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Abon for damages resulting from his acts. Besides, the record shows that before the shooting incident, Ungos, ROTC Unit Commandant, had instructed Abon "not to leave the office and to keep the armory well guarded." Apart from negating a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon Castro. ART. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) ART. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or Page 68
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n) ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS, G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002 FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin C arpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the accident. Thereafter, his parents filed a case for damages against James Daniel II and his parents, Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy. The RTC found the St. Mary’s Academy liable while Daniel’s parents were subsidiarily
liable. Villanueva was absolved from liability. Said decision was affirmed by the CA.
Evidence shows, and this the respondents did not dispute, that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was o nly a remote cause
of the accident. Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.”
Hence,
with
the
overwhelming
evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. b.8. Family
Defense: Diligence of a Good Father of
c. Provinces, Cities and Municipalities Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. (n) JIMENEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
ISSUE:
W/N petitioner is liable for the death of Carpitanos.
FACTS:
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
Petitioner alleged that on August 15, 1974 he, together with his neighbors, went to Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. On his way home, he stepped on an uncovered opening obscured by the dirty rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of petitioner. After administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his companions helped him hobble home. Petitioner became ill and his leg swelled with great pain and was thereafter hospitalized. After discharge, he had to walk around in crutches. His injury prevented him from attending to the school buses he is operating.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the victim.
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana Public Market had been placed. The trial court dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the IAC held the Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages but absolved respondent City of Manila.
HELD:
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care.
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
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ISSUE:
W/N the IAC erred in not ruling that respondent City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
been covered, petitioner could not have fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the proximate cause of the injury suffered. The City is therefore liable for the injury suffered by the petitioner.
HELD:
CITY OF MANILA vs. TEOTICO, January 29, 1968
The petition is impressed with merit.
FACTS:
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third persons for any cause attributable to it.
Genaro Teotico fell inside an uncovered and unlighted manhole on P. Burgos Avenue as he stepped down from the curb of the street to board a jeepney. Teotico suffered serious injuries due to the fall.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable under the Revised Charter of Manila which provides: The City shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
G.R. No. L-23052
As a consequence thereof, Teotico filed a complaint for damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The complaint was dismissed by the CFI. The decision was affirmed by the CA except insofar as the City of Manila was concerned which was ordered to indemnify Teotico. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE:
W/N the City of Manila is liable for the damages incurred by Teotico. HELD:
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any person by reason of defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works under their control or supervision. Thus, it is clear that the Revised Charter of Manila refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore decisive on this specific case. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the control of the former. There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately covered. Had the opening Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
The CA applied the Civil Code instead of Act. No. 409 (Charter of Manila), and, we think, correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision. Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila. GUILATCO vs. CITY OF DAGUPAN, G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989 FACTS:
Guilatco was about to board a motorized tricycle at a sidewalk located at Perez Blvd. (a National Road, under the control and supervision of the City of Dagupan) when she accidentally fell into a manhole. As a result thereof, she had to be hospitalized and operated on. From the Page 70
time of the mishap on July 25, 1978 up to the present, plaintiff has not yet reported for duty as court interpreter, as she has difficulty of locomotion. The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioner. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the lower court findings on the ground that no evidence was presented by the plaintiff- appellee to prove that the City of Dagupan had "control or supervision" over Perez Boulevard.
partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. (1907)
Art. 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place;
ISSUE:
W/N control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists, in effect binding the city to answer for damages in accordance with article 2189 of the Civil Code.
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. (1908)
HELD:
We grant the petition. Under Art. 2189, it is not necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. In the case at bar, this control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer who has the following duties:
Art. 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed. (1909) DE ROY V. CA, SUPRA
Sec. 22.The City Engineer--His powers, duties and compensation-There shall be a city engineer, who shall be in charge of the department of Engineering and Public Works. He shall receive a salary of not exceeding three thousand pesos per annum. He shall have the following duties: x x x (j) He shall have the care and custody of the public system of waterworks and sewers, and all sources of water supply, and shall control, maintain and regulate the use of the same, in accordance with the ordinance relating thereto; shall inspect and regulate the use of all private systems for supplying water to the city and its inhabitants, and all private sewers, and their connection with the public sewer system. x x x The same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located. d. Proprietors contractor
of
building,
engineer,
architect,
Art. 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or
Torts Digest Midterms (Rm. 404)
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