TANADA VS. ANGARA, GR. NO. 118295, MAY 2, 1997 FACTS:
Petitioners Senators Tañada, Tañada , et al. al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of the 1987 -reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Constitution to “develop a self -reliant Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively co ntrolled by Filipinos.” ISSUE: Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in wo rldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? RULING: [The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.] NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. [W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair is unfair . xxx
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[T]he constitutional policy of a “self -reliant and independent national economy” does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy: Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion; seclusion ; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources and public utilities.
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trad e policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire. faire .
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It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,” ther eby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross” arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some o f its members, may even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate Resolution No. 97. But t hat is not a legal reason to reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did did was a valid exercise of its authority. authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a member .
SAMSON VS. DAWAY, GR. NO. 106654, JULY 21, 2004
Facts: The petitioner allegedly sold or offers the sale of garment product using the trademark “Caterpillar” to the prejudice of its previous user, private respondent in this case. The respondent filed the case to the RTC. The petitioner contended that the c ase should be filed with the MTC because violation of unfair competition is penalized with an imprisonment not exceeding 6 y ears under RA 7691. Issue: Where do you file a suit for unfair competition? Held: The SC held that under Sec 163 of the IPC, actions for unfair competition shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws. The law contemplated in Sec 163 of IP C is the Trademark Law. Sec 27 of Trademark Law states that action for unfair competition shall be filed with the CFI (now RTC). Since RA 7691 is a general law and IPC in relation to Trademark law is a special law, the latter shall prevail. Actions for unfair competition therefore should be filed with the RTC.
TWENTIETH CENTURY MUSIC CORP. VS. AIKEN, 422 US 151 Twentieth Century’s copyrighted songs were received on the radio in Aiken’s food shop from a local broadcasting station, which was licensed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers to perform the songs, but Aiken had no such license. Twentieth Century then sued Aiken for copyright infringement. The Supreme Court held that Aiken did not infringe upon Twentieth Century’s exclusive right, under the Copyright Act, “[t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit,” since the radio reception did not constitute a “performance” of the copyrighted songs. ________
Petitioners' copyrighted songs were received on the radio in respondent's food shop from a local broadcasting station, which was licensed by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers to perform the songs, but respondent had no such license. Petitioners then sued respondent for copyright infringement. The District Court granted awards, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Held: Respondent did not infringe upon petitioners' exclusive right, under the Copyright Ac t, "[t]o perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit," since t he radio reception did not constitute a "performance" of the copyrighted songs. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U. S. 390; Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U. S. 394. To hold that respondent "performed" the copyrighted works would obviously result in a wholly unenforceable regime of copyright law, and would also be highly inequitable, since (short of keeping his radio turned off) one in respondent's position would be unable to protect himself from infringement liability. Such a ruling, moreover, would authorize the sale of an untold number of licenses for what is basically a single rendition of a copyrighted work, thus conflicting with the balanced purpose of the Copyright Act of assuring the composer an adequate return for the value o f his composition while, at the same time, protecting the public from oppressive monopolies.
FEIST PUBLICATIONS, INC. V. RURAL TELE. SRVS. CO., 499 US 340, 1991 Brief Fact Summary. A publishing company used information from a telephone directory to publish its own directory. Synopsis of Rule of Law. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author, which means that the work was independently created by the author, and it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. A work may be original even thought it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. Facts. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc. (Plaintiff) provides telephone service to several communities. Due to a state regulation, it must issue an annual telephone directory, so it published a directory consisting of white and yellow pages. The yellow pages have advertisements that generate revenue. Feist Publications, Inc. (Defendant) is a publishing company whose directory covers a larger range than a typical directory. Defendant distributes their te lephone books free of charge, and they also generate revenue through the advertising in the yellow pages. Plaintiff refused to give a license to Defendant for the phone numbers in the area, so Defendant used them without Plaintiff’s consent. Rural sued for copyright infringement. Issue. Are the names, addresses, and phone numbers in a telephone directory able to be copyrighted? Held. No. Facts cannot be copyrighted, however compilations of facts can generally be copyrighted. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author, which means that the wo rk was independently created by the author, and it possesses at least some minimal degree of c reativity. A work may be original even thought it c losely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying. Facts are not original. The first person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact; he has merely discovered its existence. Facts may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person. Factual compilations may possess the requisite originality. The author chooses what facts to include, in what order to place them, and how to arrange the collected date so they may be effectively used by readers. Thus, even a directory t hat contains no written expression that could be protected, o nly facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it feature s an original selection or arrangement. But, even though the format is original, the facts themselves do not become original through association. The copyright on a factual compilation is limited to formatting. The copyright does not extend to the facts themselves. To establish copyright infringement, two elements must be proven: ownership of a valid copyright and copying of constituent elements of the work t hat are original. The first element is met in this case because the directory contains some forward text. As to the second element, the information contains facts, which cannot be copyrighted. They existed be fore being reported and would have continued to exist if a telephone directory had never been published. There is no originality in the formatting, so there is no copyrightable expression. Thus, there is no copyright infringement. Discussion. Facts cannot be subject to copyright laws; otherwise there would be no spreading of information or learning. Subjecting facts to copyright laws would mean that any time a person used a fact found in a book, be it in a school paper, newspaper, or another book, that person would be guilty of piracy.
MIPURI V. CA, GR. NO. 114508, NOV. 19, 1999
Facts: Lolita Escobar applied for the registration of the tr ademark ‘Barbizon’ for her products such as brassieres and ladies undergarments. Respondent Barbizon Corporation, an American corporation, opposed alleging that petitioner’s mark is confusingly similar to its own trademark ‘Barbizon.’ Escobar’s application was given due course and her trademark was registered. Later, Escobar assigned all her rights to petitioner Mirpuri who failed to file an Affidavit of Use resulting in the cancellation of the trademark. Petitioner then applied for registration of the trademark to which respondent Barbizon again opposed, now invoking the protection under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. The Director of Patents declaring respondent’s opposition was already barred, pet itioner’s application was given due course. CA reversed the judgment. Issue: Whether or not respondent may invoke the protection under Article 6bis of the Paris Convention. Ruling: YES. The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property, otherwise known as the Paris Convention, is a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect industrial property consisting of patents, utility models, industrial designs, trademarks, service marks, trade names and indications of source or appellations of origin, and at the same time aims to repress unfair competition. The Convention is essentially a compact among various countries which, as members of the Union, have pledged to accord to citizens of the other member countries trademark and other rights comparable to those accor ded their own citizens by their domestic laws for an effective protection against unfair competition. Art. 6bis is a self-executing provision and does not require legislative enactment to give it effect in the member country. It may be applied directly by the tribunals and officials of each member country by the mere publication or proclamation of the Convention, after its ratification according to the public law of each state and the order for its execution. The Philippines and the United States of Amer ica have acceded to the WTO Agreement. Conformably, the State must reaffirm its commitment to the global community and take part in evolving a new international economic order at the dawn of the new millennium.
KHO VS. CA, GR. NO. 115758, MARCH 19, 2002
Elidad Kho is the owner of KEC Cosmetics Laboratory and she was also the holder of copyrights over Chin Chun Su and its Oval Facial Cream Container/Case. She also bought the patent rights over the Chin Chun Su & Device and Chin Chun Su for medicated cream from one Quintin Cheng, who was the assignee of Shun Yi Factory – a Taiwanese factory actually manufacturing Chin Chun Su products. Kho filed a petition for injunction against Summerville General Merchandising and Company to enjoin the latter from advertising and selling Chin Chun Su products, in similar containers as that of Kho, for this is misleading the public and causing Kho to lose income; the petition is also to enjoin Summerville from infringing upon Kho’s copyrights. Summerville in their defense alleged that they are the exclusive and authorized importer, re-packer and distributor of Chin Chun Su products; that Shun Yi even authorized Summerville to register its trade name Chin Chun Su Medicated Cream with the Philippine Patent Office; that Quintin Cheng, from whom Kho acquired her patent rights, had been terminated (her services) by Shun Yi. ISSUE: Whether or not Kho has the exclusive right to use the trade name and its container. HELD: No. Kho has no right to support her claim for the exclusive use of the subject trade name and its container. The name and container of a beauty cream product are proper subjects of a trademark ( not copyright like what she registered for) inasmuch as the same falls squarely within its definition. In order to be entitled to exclusively use the same in the sale of the beauty cream product, the user must sufficiently prove that she registered or used it before anybody else did. Kho’s copyright and patent registration of the name and container would not guarantee her the right to the exclusive use of the same for the reason that they are not appropriate subjects of the said intellectual rights. Consequently, a preliminary injunction order cannot be issued for the reason that the petitioner has not proven that she has a clear right over the said name and container to the exclusion of others, not having proven that she has registered a trademark thereto or used the same before anyone did.
PEARL AND DEAN INC. V SHOEMART INC., GR. NO. 148222, AUGUST 15, 2003 FACTS: Pearl and Dean is a corporation in the manufacture of advertising display units also known as light boxes, which were manufactured by Metro Industrial Services. A copyright Registration was obtained in 1981. These were marketed in the name of "Poster Ads". They also applied for a registration of trademark with the Bureau of Patents in 1983, but was only approved in 19988. In 1985, petitioner had an agreement with respondent Shoemart Inc (SMI) to install these light boxes in their Makati and Cubao branch, Only the Makati branch was able to sign the agreement. In 1986, the contract was rescinded unilaterally by SMI, and instead contracted with Metro Industrial Services. They installed these lightboxes in different SM city branches, including Cubao and Makati, with association with North Edsa Marketing Inc (NEMI), SMI's sister company. Petitioner requested SMI and NEMI to put down their installations of the light boxes, and payment of compensatory damages worth P20M. Claiming that respondents failed to comply, they filed a case for infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair competition and damages. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner, but CA re versed. ISSUES: (1) Whether there was a copyright infringement (2) Whether there was a patent infringement (3) Whether there was a trademark infringement (4) Whether there was unfair competition RULING: No to all. (1) Copyright is a statutory right, subject to the terms and conditions specified in the statute. Therefore, it can only cover the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description. Since the copyright was classified under class "O" works, which includes "prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags and box wraps," and does not include the light box itself. A lightbox, even admitted by the president of petitioner company, was neither a literary nor an artistic work but an engineering or marketing invention, thus not included under a copyright.
(2) Petitioner was not able to secure a patent for its lightboxes, and cannot legally prevent anyone from manufacturing or commercially using the same. Patent has a three-fold purpose: a) to foster and reward invention; b) promotes disclosures of invention and permit public to use the same upon expiration; c) stringent requirements for patent protection to ensure in the public domain remain there for free use of the public. Since petitioner was not able to go through such examination, it cannot exclude others from manufacturing, or selling such lightboxes. No patent, no protection. (3) The certificate of registration issued by the Director of Patents gives exclusive right to use its own symbol only to the description specified in the certificate. It cannot prevent others to use the same trademark with a different description. (4) "Poster Ads" is a general term that cannot be associated specifically to Pearl and Dean, thus it cannot be considered to use such term to be unfair competition against the petitioner.
PEST MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION V. FERTILIZER and PESTICIDE AUTHORITY, GR. 156041
IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC. V SEHWANI, INCORPORATED AND/OR BENITA’S FRITES, INC., GR. NO. 179127
Facts:
Petitioner IN-N-OUT BURGER, INC., is a business entity incorporated under the laws of California. It is a signatory to the Convention of Paris on Protection o f Industrial Property and the TRIPS Agreement. It is engaged mainly in the restaurant business, but it has neve r engaged in business in the Philippines. Respondents Sehwani, Incorporated and Benita Frites, Inc. are corporations organized in the Philippines. Sometime in 1991, Sehwani filed with t he BPTTT an application for the registration of the mark “IN N OUT (the inside of the letter “O” formed like a star). Its application was approved and a certificate of registration was issued in its name on 1993. In 2000, Sehwani, Incorporated and Be nita Frites, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement, wherein the former entitled the latter to use its registered mark, “IN N OUT.” Sometime in 1997, In-N-Out Burger filed trademark and service mark applications with the Bureau o f Trademarks for the “IN-N-OUT” and “IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design. In 2000, In-N-Out Burger found out that Sehwani, Incorporated had already obtained Trademark Registration for t he mark “IN N OUT (the inside of the letter “O” formed like a star).” Also in 2000, In-N-Out Burger sent a demand letter directing Sehwani, Inc. to cease and desist from claiming ownership of the mark “IN-N-OUT” and to voluntarily cancel its trademark registration. Sehwani Inc. did not acce de to In-N-Out Burger’s demand but it expressed its willingness to surrender its registration for a consideration. In 2001 In-N-Out Burger filed before the Bureau of Legal Affairs an administrative complaint against the Sehwani, Inc. and Benita Frites, Inc. for unfair competition and cancellation of trademark re gistration. Issues:
Whether or not the Intellectual Property Office (an administrative body) have jurisdiction of cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition).[1] Whether or not there was unfair competition.
Held: FIRST ISSUE: Yes, the IPO (an administrative body) has jurisdiction in cases involving provisions of the IPC (e.g. unfair competition) due to t he following reasons:
Section 10 of the Intellectual Property Code specifically identifies the functions of the Bureau of Legal Affairs, thus:
Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs .“The Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following functions: 10.1 Hear and decide opposition to the application for registration of marks; cancellation of trademarks ; subject to the provisions of Section 64, cancellation of patents and utility models, and industrial designs; and petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;
10.2 (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in administrative complaints for violations of laws involving intellectual property rights; Provided , That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints where the total damages claimed are not less than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000): Provided , futher , That availment of the provisional remedies may be granted in accordance with the Rules of Court. Xxx Xxx (vi) The cancellation of any permit, license, authority, or registration which may have been granted by the Office, or the suspension of the validity thereof for such period of time as the Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable which shall not exceed one (1) year; Xxx (viii) The assessment of damages ; Unquestionably, petitioner’s complaint, which seeks the cancellation of the disputed mark in the name of respondent Sehwani, Incorporated, and damages for violation of petitioner’s intellectual property rights, falls within the jurisdiction of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.
While Section 163 thereof vests in civil courts jurisdiction over cases of unfair competition, nothing in the said section states that the regular courts have sole jurisdiction over unfair competition cases, to the exclusion of administrative bodies. Sections 160 and 170, which are also found under Part III of the Intellectual Property Code, recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of civil courts and the IPO over unfair competition cases.
These two provisions read: Section 160. Right of Foreign Corporation to Sue in Trademark or Service Mark Enforcement Action. Any foreign national or juridical person who meets the r equirements of Section 3 of this Act and does not engage in business in the P hilippines may bring a civil or administrative action hereunder for opposition, cancellation, infringement, unfair competition, or false designation of origin and false description, whether or not it is licensed to do business in the Philippines under existing laws. Section 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty t housand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), shall be imposed on any person who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Sec tion 155, Section168, and Subsection169.1. Based on the foregoing discussion, the IPO Director of Legal Affairs had jurisdiction to decide the petitioner’s administrative case against respondents and the IPO Director General had exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the judgment of the IPO Director of Legal Affairs.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes. The evidence on record shows that Sehwani Inc. and Benita Frites were not using their registered trademark but that of In-n-Out Burger. Sehwani and Benita Frites are also giving their products the general appearance that would likely influence t he purchasers to believe that their products are that of In-N-Out Burger. The intention to deceive may be i nferred from the similarity of the goods as packed and offered for sale, and, thus, an action will lie to restrain unfair competition. The respondents’ frauduulent intention to deceive purchasers is also apparent in their use o f the In-N-Out Burger in business signages.
The essential elements of an action for unfair competition are (1) confusing similarity in the general appearance of the goods and (2) intent to deceive the public and defraud a competitor. The confusing similarity may or may not result from similarity in the marks, but may result from other external factors in the packaging or presentation of t he goods. The intent to deceive and defraud may be inferred from the similarity of the appearance of the goods as offered for sale to t he public. Actual fraudulent intent need not be shown.
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. & Pfizer (Phil.), Inc. G.R. No. 167715, 17 November 2010
Facts: Pfizer is the registered owner of a patent pertaining to Sulbactam Ampicillin. It is marketed under the brand name “Unasyn.” Sometime in January and February 2003, P fizer discovered that Pharmawealth submitted bids for the supply of Sulbactam Ampicillin to several hospitals without the Pfizer’s consent. Pfizer then demanded that the hospitals cease and desist from accepting such bids. Pfizer also demanded that Pharmawealth immediately withdraw its bids to supply Sulbactam Ampicillin. Pharmawealth and the hospitals ignored the demands. Pfizer then filed a complaint for patent infringement with a prayer for permanent injunction and forfeiture of the infringing products. A preliminary injunction effective for 90 days was granted by the IPO’s Bureau of Legal Affairs (IPO -BLA). Upon expiration, a motion for extension filed by Pfizer was denied. Pfizer filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the denial. While the case was pending in the CA, Pfizer filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) a complaint for infringement and unfair competition, with a prayer for injunction. The RTC issued a temporary restraining order, and then a preliminary injunction. Pharmawealth filed a motion to dismiss the case in the CA, on the ground of forum shopping. Nevertheless, the CA issued a temporary restraining order. Pharmawealth again filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the patent, the main basis of the case, had already lapsed, thus making the case moot, and that the CA had no jurisdiction to review the order of the IPO-BLA because this was granted to the Director General. The CA denied all the motions. Pharmawealth filed a petition for review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issues: a) Can an injunctive relief be issued based on an action of patent infringement when the patent allegedly infringed has already lapsed? b) What tribunal has jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Director of Legal Affairs of t he Intellectual Property Office? c) Is there forum shopping when a party files two actions with two seemingly different causes of action and yet pray for the same relief? Held: a) No. The provision of R.A. 165, from which the P fizer’s patent was based, clearly states that "[the] patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented m achine, article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce, throughout the territory of the Philippines for the term of t he patent; and such making, using, or selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the patent."
Clearly, the patentee’s exclusive rights exist only during the term of the patent. Since the patent was registered on 16 July 1987, it expired, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. 165, after 17 years, or 16 July 2004. Thus, after 16 July 2004, Pfizer no longer possessed the ex clusive right to make, use, and sell the products covered by their patent. The CA was wrong in issuing a temporary restraining order after the cut-off date.
b) According to IP Code, the Director General of the IPO exercises exclusive jurisdiction over decisions of the IPO-BLA. The question in the C A concerns an interlocutory order, and not a decision. Since the IP Code and the Rules and Regulations are ber eft of any remedy regarding interlocutory orders of the IPOBLA, the only remedy available to P fizer is to apply the Rules and Regulations suppletorily. Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari t o the CA is the proper remedy. This is consistent with the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA had jurisdiction. c) Yes. Forum shopping is defined as the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, of see king another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two (2) or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties that represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserte d and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; (c) identity of t he two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to r es judicata in the action under consideration. This instance meets these elements. The parties are clearly identical. In both the complaints in the BLA-IPO and RTC, the rights allegedly violated and the acts allegedly violative of such rights are identical, regardless of whether the patents on which the complaints were based are different. In both cases, the ultimate objective of Pfizer was to ask for damages and to permanently prevent Pharmawealth from selling the contested products. Relevantly, the Supreme Court has decided that the filing of two actions with the same objective, as in this instance, constitutes forum shopping. Owing to the substantial identity of parties, reliefs and issues in the IPO and RTC cases, a decision in one case will necessarily amount to res j udicata in the other action.
COLUMBIA PICTURES V. CA, 261 SCRA 144 (1996)
In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco), owner of Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies produced and owned by Columbia Pictures and other motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC judge granted the motion. The judge ruled that based on the ruling in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs CA, before a search warrant could be issued in copyright cases, the master copy of the films alleged to be pirated must be attached in the application for warrant. ISSUE: Whether or not the 20th Century Fox ruling may be applied retroactively in this case. HELD: No. In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated. The lower court could not possibly have expected more evidence from the VRB and Columbia Pictures in their application for a search warrant other than what the law and jurisprudence, then existing and judicially accepted , required with respect to the finding of probable cause.
The Supreme Court also revisited and clarified the ruling in the 20th Century Fox Case. It is evidently incorrect to suggest, as the ruling in 20th Century Fox may appear to do, that in copyright infringement cases, the presentation of master tapes of the copyright films is always necessary to meet t he requirement of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. It is true that such master tapes are object evidence, with the merit that in this class of evidence the ascertainment of the controverted fact is made through demonstration involving the direct use of the senses of the presiding magistrate. Such auxiliary procedure, however, does not rule out the use of testimonial or documentary evidence, depositions, admissions or other classes of evidence tending to prove the factum probandum, especially where the production in court of object evidence would result in delay, inconvenience or expenses out of proportion to is evidentiary value. In fine, the supposed pronouncement in said case regarding the necessity for the presentation of the master tapes of the copy-righted films for the validity of search warrants should at most be understood to merely serve as a guidepost in determining the existence of probable cause in copy-right infringement cases where there is doubt as to the true nexus between the master tape and the pirated copies . An objective and careful reading of the decision in said case could lead to no other c onclusion than that said directive was hardly intended to be a sweeping and inflexible requirement in all or similar copyright infringement cases.
SISON OLANO V LIM ENG CO,
CHING V. SALINAS, GR. NO. 161295, JUNE 29, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Ching is a maker and manufacturer of a utility model, Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile, for which he holds certificates of copyright registration. Petitioner’s request to the NBI to apprehend and prosecute illegal manufacturers of his work led to the issuance of search warrants against respondent Salinas, alleged to be reproducing and distributing said models in violation of the IP Code. Respondent moved to quash the warrants on the ground that petitioner’s work is not artistic in nature and is a proper subject of a patent, not copyright. Petitioner insists that the IP Code protects a work from the moment of its creation regardless of its nature or purpose. The trial court quashed the warrants. Petitioner argues that the copyright certificates over t he model are prima facie evidence of its validity. CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner’s model is an artistic work subject to copyright protection. (2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to copyright protection on the basis of the certificates of registration issued to it. Ruling: (1) NO. As gleaned from the specifications appended to the application for a copyright certificate filed by the petitioner, the said Leaf Spring Eye Bushing for Automobile and Vehicle Bearing Cushion are merely utility models. As gleaned from the description of the models and their objectives, these articles are useful articles which are defined as one having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. Plainly, these are not literary or artistic works. They are not intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain, or works of applied art. They are certainly not ornamental designs or one having decorative quality or value. Indeed, while works of applied art, original intellectual, literary and artistic works are copyrightable, useful articles and works of industrial design are not. A useful article may be copyrightable only if and only to the extent that such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article. In this case, the bushing and cushion are not works of art. They are, as the petitioner himself admitted, utility models which may be the subject of a patent. (2) NO. No copyright granted by law can be said to arise in favor of the petitioner despite the issuance of the certificates of copyright registration and the deposit of the Leaf Spring Eye Bushing and Vehicle Bearing Cushion. Indeed, in Joaquin, Jr. v.Drilon and Pearl & Dean (Phil.), Incorporated v. Shoemart, Incorporated , the Court ruled that: Copyright, in the strict sense of the term, is purely a statutory right. It is a new or independent right granted by the statute, and not simply a pre-existing right regulated by it. Being a statutory grant, the rights are only such as the statute confers, and may be obtained and enjoyed only with respect to the subjects and by the persons, and on terms and conditions specified in the statute. Accordingly, it can cover only the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description. Ownership of copyrighted material is shown by proof of originality and copyrightability. To discharge his burden, the applicant may present the certificate of registration covering the work or, in its absence, other evidence. A copyright certificate provides prima facie evidence of originality which is one element of copyright validity. It constitutes prima facie evidence of both validity and ownership and the validity of the facts stated in the certificate.
LAKTAW V. PAGLINAWAN, 44 PHIL 855 (1918)
JOAQUIN V DRILON, 302 SCRA 225 (1999)
BJ Productions Inc. (BJPI) was the holder of copyright over the show Rhoda and Me. It holds rights over the show’s format and style of presentation. In 1991, BJPI’s president Francisco Joaquin saw on TV – RPN 9’s show It’s a Date, a show which is basically the same as Rhoda and Me. He eventually sued Gabriel Zosa, the manager of the show It’s a Date. The investigating prosecutor found probable cause against Z osa. Zosa later sought a review of the prosecutor’s resolution before the S ecretary of Justice (Franklin Drilon). Drilon reversed the findings of the fiscal and directed him to dismiss the case against Zosa. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of Drilon finding no probable cause is valid. HELD: Yes. The essence of copyright infringement is the copying, in whole or in part, of copyrightable materials as defined and enumerated in Section 2 of PD. No. 49 (Copyright Law). Apart from the manner in which it is actually expressed, however, the idea of a dating game show is a non-copyrightable material. Ideas, concepts, formats, or schemes in their abstract form clearly do not fall within the class of works or materials susceptible of copyright registration as provided in PD. No. 49. What is covered by BJPI’s copyright is the specific episodes of t he show Rhoda and Me.
Further, BJPI should have presented the master videotape of the show in order to show the linkage between the copyright show (Rhoda and Me) and the infringing show ( It’s a Date ). This is based on the ruling in 20th Century Fox vs CA (though this has been qualified by Columbia Pictures vs CA, this is still g ood law). Though BJPI did provide a lot of written evidence and description to show the linkage between the shows, the same were not enough. A television show includes more than mere words can describe because it involves a whole spectrum of visuals and effects, video and audio, such that no similarity or dissimilarity may be found by merely describing the general copyright/format of both dating game shows.
FILIPINO SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS V TAN, 148 SCRA 461 (1987)
Facts: Filipino society is the owner of certain musical compositions among which are the songs entitled: Dahil Sa’yo, Sapagkat Ikaw Ay Akin, Sapagkat Kami Ay Tao Lamang and the Nearness Of You. Tan is the operator of a restaurant where a combo with professional singers, hired to play and sing musical compositions to entertain and amuse customers therein, were playing and singing the above mentioned compositions without any license or permission from the appellant to play or sing t he same. FS demanded payment of necessary license fee but the demand was ignored, hence, they filed a complaint for infringement of copyright against tan.
Issue: Whether tan is liable for infringement of copyright.
Ruling: No. The composers of the contested musical compositions waived their rights in favor of the general public when they allowed their intellectual creations to become property of the public domain before applying or the corresponding copyrights for the same.
MALANG SANTOS VS. MCCULLOUGH PRINTING, 12 SCRA 321 (1964)
Facts: This is an action for damages based on the provisions of articles 721 and 722 of the civil code of the Philippines, allegedly on the unauthorized use, adoption and appropriation by the defe ndant company of plaintiff's intellectual creation or artistic design for a Christmas card. The design depicts "a Philippine rural Christmas time scene consisting of a woman and a child in a nipa hut adorned with a star-shaped lantern and a man astride a carabao, beside a tree, underneath which appears the plaintiff's pen name, Malang." The complaint alleges that plaintiff Mauro Malang Santos designed for former ambassador Felino Neri, for his personal Christmas card greetings for the year 1959, the artistic motif in question. The following year the defendant McCullough printing company, without the knowledge and authority of plaintiff, displayed the very design in its album of Christmas cards and offered it for sale, for a price. For such unauthorized act of defendant, plaintiff suffered moral damages to the tune of P16,000.00, because it has placed plaintiff's professional integrity and ethics under serious question and caused him grave embarrassment before Ambassador Neri. He further prayed for the additional sum of P3,000.00 by way of attorney's fee. Issue: Whether santos is entitled for protection, notwithstanding the fact that he has not copyrighted his design. Ruling: No. The lower court dismisses the complaint which the Supreme Court affirmed. Santos did not choose to protect his intellectual creation by a copyright. The fact that the design was used in the Christmas card of Ambassador Neri who distributed 800 copies thereo f among his friends during the Christmas season of 1959, shows the same was published. Unless satisfactory explained a delay in applying for a copyright, of more than 30 days from the date of its publication, converts the property to one of public domain. Since the name of the author appears in each of the alleged infringing copies of intellectual creation, the defendant may not be said to have pirated the work nor guilty of plagiarism. Consequently, the complaint does not state a cause of action against the defendant. The supreme court held that Santos is not entitled to a protection. Rules of practice in the Philippine patent office relating to the registration of copyright claims. “An intellectual creation should be copyrighted 30 days after its publication, if made in Manila, or within 60 days if made elsewhere, failure of which r enders such creation public property.” When the purpose is limited publication, but the effect is general publication, irrevocable rights thereupon become vested in the public, in consequence of which enforcement of the restriction becomes impossible.
HABANA VS. ROBLES, GR. NO. 131522, JULY 19, 1999
Pacita Habana and two others were the authors of College English for Today Series 1 and 2 (CET). While they were researching for books to assist them in updating their own book, they chanced upon the book of Felicidad Robles entitled Developing English Proficiency Books 1 and 2 (DEP). They discovered further that the book of Robles was strikingly similar to the contents, scheme of presentation, illustrations and illustrative examples of CET. They then sued Robles and her publisher (Goodwill Trading Co.) for infringement and/or unfair competition with damages. Robles, in her defense, alleged that her sources were from foreign books; that in their field, similarity in styles cannot be avoided since they come from the same background and orientation. The trial court as well as the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Robles. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct. HELD: No. A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if not identical with the text of CET. In several other pages the treatment and manner of presentation of the topics of DEP are similar if not a rehash of that contained in CET. The similarities in examples and material contents are so obviously present in this case. How can similar/identical examples not be considered as a mark of copying? Robles’ act of lifting from the book of Habana et al substantial portions of discussions and examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is an infringement of Habana et al’s copyrights.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that in determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy.
ABS-CBN V. PHILIPPINE MULTI-MEDIA SYSTEM (G.R. NO. 175769-70)
Facts: Petitioner ABS-CBN, a broadcasting corporation, filed a complaint against respondent PMSI alleging that the latter’s unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed on its broadcasting rights and copyright. PMSI posits that it was granted a franchise to operate a digital direct-to-home satellite service and that the rebroadcasting was in accordance with the NTC memo to carry television signals of authorized television broadcast stations, which includes petitioner’s programs. The IPO Bureau of Legal Affairs found PMSI to have infringed petitioner’s broadcasting rights and ordered it to permanently desist from rebroadcasting. On appeal, the IPO Director General found for PMSI. CA affirmed. Issue: Whether or not petitioner’s broadcasting rights and copyright are infringed. Ruling: NO. The Director-General of the IPO correctly found that PMSI is not engaged in rebroadcasting and thus cannot be considered to have infringed ABS-CBN’s broadcasting rights and copyright. Section 202.7 of the IP Code defines broadcasting as “the transmission by wireless means for the public reception of sounds or of images or of representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also ‘broadcasting’ where the means for decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent.” On the other hand, rebroadcasting as defined in Article 3(g) of the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, otherwise known as the 1961 Rome Convention, of which the Republic of the Philippines is a signatory, is “the simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting organization of the broadcast of another broadcasting organization.” The Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat of the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights defines broadcasting organizations as “entities that take the financial and editorial responsibility for the selection and arrangement of, and investment in, the transmitted content.” Evidently, PMSI would not qualify as a broadcasting organization because it does not have the aforementioned responsibilities imposed upon broadcasting organizations, such as ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN creates and transmits its own signals; PMSI merely carries such signals which the viewer s receive in its unaltered form. PMSI does not produce, select, or determine the programs to be shown in Channels 2 and 23. Likewise, it does not pass itself off as t he origin or author of such programs. Insofar as Channels 2 and 23 are concerned, PMSI merely retransmits the same in accordance with Memorandum Circular 0408-88. With regard to its premium channels, it buys the channels from content providers and transmits on an as-is basis to its viewers. Clearly, PMSI does not perform the functions of a broadcasting organization; thus, it cannot be said that it is engaged in rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
Microsoft v. Hwang, GR. 147043, June 21, 2005
In May 1993, Microsoft Corporation and Beltron Computer Philippines, Inc. entered into a Licensing Agreement. Under Section 2(a) of the Agreement, Microsoft authorized Beltron, for a fee, to: 1. Reproduce and install no more than o ne copy of Windows on each Customer System hard disk; 2. Distribute directly or indirectly and license copies of Windows (reproduced as per Section 2 of the Agreement and/or acquired from an Authorized Replicator or Authorized Distributor. Their agreement allowed either party to term inate if one fails to comply with their respective obligations. Microsoft terminated the Agreement in June 1995 by reason of Beltron’s non-payment of royalties. Later, Microsoft learned that Beltron was illegally copying and selling copies o f Windows. Microsoft then sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation. NBI agents made some purchase from Beltron where they acquired a computer unit pre-installed with Windows, 12 windows installer CDs packed as Microsoft products. The agents were not given the end-user license agreements, user manuals, and certificates of authenticity for the products purchased. They were given a receipt which has a header of “T.M.T.C. (Phils) Inc. BELTRON COMPUTER”. TMTC stands for Taiwan Machinery Display and Trade Center. A search warrant was subsequently issued where 2,831 CDs of Windows installers, among others, were seized. Based on the items seized from Beltron, Microsoft filed a case of copyright infringement against Beltron and TMTC as well as their officers (Judy Hwang et al) before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Beltron, in its counter-affidavit, argued the following: 1. That Microsoft’s issue with Beltron was really j ust to have leverage in forcing Beltron to pay the unpaid royalties; and that Microsoft should have filed a collection suit.
2. That the computer unit allegedly purchased by the NBI agents from them cannot be decisively traced as coming from Beltron because the receipt issued to the agents did not list the computer unit as one of the items bought. 3. That the 12 installers purchased by the agents which are actually listed in the receipt were not manufactured by Beltron but rather they were genuine copies purchased by TMTC from an authorized Microsoft seller in Singapore. 4. That the 2,831 installers seized from them were not a property of Beltron but rather they were left to them by someone for safekeeping. The DOJ secretary agreed with Beltron and dismissed the case. The Secretary ruled that the issue of the authority of Beltron to copy and sell Microsoft products should first be resolved in a civil suit. Microsoft appealed the decision of the DOJ secretary before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, Beltron filed a motion to quash the search warrant before the RTC that issued the same. The RTC partially granted the quashal. The Court of Appeals reversed t he RTC. Hwang et al did not appeal the CA decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ Secretary is correct. HELD: No. Section 5 of Presidential Decree 49 enumerates the rights vested exclusively on the copyright owner. Contrary to the DOJ’s ruling, the gravamen of copyright infringement is not merely the unauthorized “manufacturing” of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owner’s prior consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement.
Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a
synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. Being the copyright and trademark owner of Microsoft software, Microsoft acted well within its rights in filing the complaint before DOJ on the incriminating evidence obtained from Beltron. Hence, it was highly irregular for the DOJ to hold that Microsoft sought the issuance of the search warrants and the filing of the complaint merely to pressure Beltron to pay its overdue royalties to Microsoft. There is no basis for the DOJ to rule that Microsoft must await a prior “ resolution from the proper court of whether or not the Agreement is still binding between the parties.” Beltron has not filed any suit to question Microsoft’s termination of the Agreement. Microsoft can neither be expected nor compelled to wait until Beltron decides to sue before Microsoft can seek remedies for violation of its intellectual property rights.
Furthermore, the articles seized from Beltron are counterfeit per se because Microsoft does not (and could not have authorized anyone to) produce such CD installers The copying of the genuine Microsoft software to produce these fake CDs and their distribution are illegal even if the copier or distributor is a Microsoft licensee. As far as these installer CD-ROMs are concerned, the Agreement (and the alleged question on the validity of its termination) is immaterial to the determination of Beltron’s liability for copyright infringement and unfair competition. Beltron’s defense that the box of CD installers found in their possession was only left to them for safekeeping is not tenable.
Microsoft v. Maxicorp, Inc., 438 SCRA 224
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows. For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a certain “Joel Diaz”. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC. He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as e vidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct. HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to t he prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there. The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in Sacriz’ name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of conditions obtaining in a given situation. Thus, it was improper for the Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
IMPORTANT RULE: Copyright infringement and unfair competition are not limited to the act of selling counterfeit goods. They cover a whole range of acts, from copying to assembling, packaging to marketing, including the mere offering for sale of the counterfeit goods.
BAYANIHAN v. BMG RECORDS, GR. NO. 166337, MARCH 7, 2005
Facts: Jose Mari Chan entered into a contract with petitioner Bayanihan, whereunder Chan assigned Bayanihan all his rights. Interests and participation over his musical composition “Can We Just Stop and Talk a While” and other musical composition “Afraid for Love to Fade”. Bayanihan applied for and was granted a certificate of Copyright Registration. Without knowledge and consent of Bayanihan, Chan authorized his co -respondent BMG records to record and distribute the aforementioned musical compositions in a then recently released album of singer Lea Salonga. Bayanihan filed with RTC QC complaint against Chan and BMG for violation of 216 RA 8293. Issue: Whether Chan and BMG liable. Ruling: No. Chan, the composer and author of the lyrics of the two songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof. IP CODE. 172. 2. Works are protected by the sole fact of their creation, irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as their content, quality and purpose. Respondent Chan, being undeniably the composer and author of the lyrics of the two (2) songs, is protected by the mere fact alone that he is the creator thereof. An examination of petitioner's verified complaint in light of the two (2) contracts sued upon and the evidence it adduced during the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction, yields not the existe nce of the requisite right protec table by the provisional relief but rather a lingering doubt on whether there is or there is no such right. xxx It would thus appear that the two (2) contracts expired on October 1, 1975 and March 11, 1 978, respectively, there being neither an allegation, much less proof, that petitioner Bayanihan ever made use of the compositions within the two-year period agreed upon by the parties. Anent the copyrights obtained by petitioner on the basis of the selfsame two (2) contracts, suffice it to say 'that such purported copyrights are not presumed to subsist in accordance with Section 218[a] and [b], of the Intellectual Property Code, because respondent Chan had put in issue the existence thereof. (Raised the question of ownership) It is noted that Chan revoked and terminated said contracts, along with others, on July 30, 1997, or almost two years before petitioner Bayanihan wrote its sort of complaint/demand letter dated December 7, 1999 regarding the recent "use/recording of the songs 'Can We Just Stop and Talk A While' and 'Afraid for Love to Fade,'" or almost three (3) years before petitioner filed its complaint on August 8, 2000, therein praying, inter alia, for injunctive relief.
