First Day at Gettysburg

Gettysburg Day One:Layout 1

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THE FIRST DAY AT

GETTYSBURG The course of the war hangs in the balance. By Neil Smith FROM BRANDY STATION TO GETTYSBURG The day after the fighting at Brandy Station, Lt. General Richard S. Ewell’s II Army Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia left the Culpeper area to cross the Blue Ridge Mountains into the Shenandoah Valley. His mission was to neutralize the Union presence at Winchester, opening the way for Robert E. Lee’s proposed advance into Pennsylvania. Major General “Fighting Joe” Hooker, commanding the Army of the Potomac, still did not know where his antagonist was, but had surmised that Lee planned a northern offensive. He wrote to President Abraham Lincoln, asking permission to attack a presumably unguarded Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. The President replied that Hooker needed to keep his mind on the job of beating Lee. Nevertheless, it took Hooker another couple of days to realize Lee’s army was in motion, allowing the Confederates to get a head start and capture the strategic initiative. In the meantime, Strategic Situation by Nightfall on June 20 Ewell’s arrival at Winchester shocked the Union commander, Major General Robert H. Millroy, who abandoned the town on 14 June, retreating to the more defendable Harper’s Ferry.

Left: Foundry 28mm Rebel Standard bearer

Hooker was still none the wiser on 16 June as to Lee’s position, even though that day Ewell crossed the Potomac at Williamsport into Maryland with Lt. General James Longstreet’s I Corps and Lt. General Ambrose P. Hill’s III Corps not far behind. Lee himself would follow a few days later. The Union commander ordered his cavalry out to find Lee, but despite their best efforts at Aldie and Middleburg, the Federal cavalry could not penetrate a by now thoroughly alert JEB Stuart’s cavalry screen. Of course, the reverse was also true; if Stuart was protecting Lee’s army from prying eyes, he could not be spying on the Army of the Potomac. Lee surmised correctly, however, that Hooker was tied to the defence of Washington DC and that his Confederate army would be relatively free to operate in Pennsylvania, at least until Hooker took the bait and could be lured into the decisive battle Lee sought. Hooker continued to dither, even though he had intelligence from Confederate deserters confirming Lee’s movements; Hooker chose not to believe them. Instead, he rode to Washington DC for orders convinced that the capital was Lee’s target, but he confessed he had no idea where Lee was or what his objective might be. The following day, Lee released Stuart to raid north and get between the Union army and Washington DC, creating confusion wherever he

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went. Stuart was then to meet up with the main army again at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, that left Lee ‘blind’ to the Army of the Potomac’s movements, and Stuart’s abscence would

lay the groundwork for much of what was to follow. June 27 proved a propitious day in the Gettysburg campaign. Finally

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recognizing that Lee had got the jump on him, Hooker crossed into Maryland but only with some of his army. He also demanded of the President and Generalin-Chief Henry Halleck that Harper’s Ferry be evacuated to add to his strength, and he put his command on the line to show his seriousness. Lincoln called Hooker’s bluff, much to the delight of Halleck who despised Hooker and undermined him at every opportunity, and it was a surprised Major General George G. Meade that was awoken before dawn on the 28th to be told he was now in command of the Army of the Potomac. Meade reacted with his customary modesty, arguing that others were better qualified than he, but to no avail; he now had the arduous task of finding out where all his army was then lead them against the Confederate General who had destroyed every other effort to bring him to heel. That same day, June 27, Lee began to see that the most likely site of any showdown with the Union army was in the vicinity of the sleepy little Pennsylvania town of Gettysburg. He, therefore, ordered his scattered units to abandon their foraging and converge west of the town. Lee’s plan was simple; hit the demoralized Union army as it marched, driving corps after corps onto each other, and smashing it. That would leave the road to the Federal capital open, and surely Lincoln must then sue for peace. Meade knew what was at stake too and his orders were explicit in ensuring he was to cover both Washington DC and nearby Baltimore. After some reorganization of command, Meade ordered the Army of the Potomac to take up positions on the Susquehanna River along a broad front, but to be within mutually supporting distance once he found the enemy. At this junction, neither commander knew where the other was, but they were very close, almost operating in each other’s shadows. Meade too had surmised that Gettysburg might be important and dispatched Major General John Reynolds with I and XI Corps to the town. Meade’s plan was for Reynolds to find Lee’s army then pull back to a previously scouted position along the so-called Pipe Creek Line in Maryland where Meade would make his stand. Only, Meade seems to have omitted any instruction to Reynolds not to engage the enemy. In the meantime, Meade’s cavalry had found Stuart, but General Judson Kilpatrick (nicknamed ‘Kill-cavalry’ for his propensity for recklessness) and General George Armstrong Custer (whose fame was growing, although not yet his notoriety) both came up short against the Confederate horsemen. After seeing off the Federals, however, Stuart continued north

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The Battlefield - Key Roads, Woods and Farms

American Civil War 1861-1865


Notes This map shows the entire battlefield as it was in 1863. Included are some contour lines, woods, orchards, streams And fences/walls with places of importance named.

A the Angle PO the Peach Orchard GH Cemetery Gatehouse CT the Copse of Trees WF the Wheatfield URC unfinished railroad cut PW the Point of Woods DD Devilʼs Den SS Spanglerʼs Spring

to his original rendezvous, not yet knowing the plan had changed: Lee was still blind. Reynolds began his march, pushing Brigadier General John Buford’s First Division of Union cavalry ahead to provide protection and to secure the ground around Gettysburg. On the other side, the Confederate convergence had begun. On the evening of 30 June, Ewell’s Corps camped to the north and northeast of Gettysburg; Hill’s divisions lay eight miles to the west of the town at Cashtown; the rest of Lee’s army remained further west, screened by the mountains. If the fight kicked off at Gettysburg, however, seven of Lee’s nine divisions would have to traverse along one road, ensuring delays in getting to the field. That day, Brigadier General J. Johnston Pettigrew’s brigade of Major General Henry Heth’s 2nd Division of Hill’s III Corps advanced to the outskirts of Gettysburg where he saw Union cavalry approaching from the south up the Taneytown Road. He reported back to Hill that this was the vanguard of the Army of the Potomac, but Heth and Hill did not believe Pettigrew, and Heth

Above Map: Highlighted area shows where the action on day one took place. Maps shown on pages 72 & 73 are from The Gettysburg Companion by Mark Adkin. Used by kind permission of Aurum Press Ltd. www.aurumpress.co.uk

offered to make a reconnaissance with his division the following day. Hill agreed and reported the situation to Lee. The ingredients for the battle to follow were quickly coming together. On his arrival at Gettysburg, Buford established skirmish lines across the Chambersburg Pike about three miles to the west of town, but he did not yet know that Heth’s division was barreling towards his dismounted troopers. The first grey columns emerged from the woods at 7:30am to be confronted with an unknown force of Union troopers. Buford knew that if his troops could hang on until supporting infantry and artillery arrived, the Army of the Potomac could occupy the high ground to the south and west of the town. When Reynolds rode up to him on the field, Buford turned and said, “the devil’s to pay.” The Battle of Gettysburg was on.

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INTRODUCTION THE ACTION ON DAY ONE The Battle of Gettysburg, fought 1-3 July 1863, is replete with potential wargame scenarios and classic vignettes that give great insight into how the American Civil War was fought. It is the first day, however, that I find most intriguing; that was the set-up day, pregnant with possibilities and opportunities for both sides. If the Confederates can smash through Buford’s cavalry screen, or if Ewell can drive his men through the town onto the heights, then everything that followed would change. For the Union, Buford must hold for as long as possible, and the infantry deployment north of the town might prove crucial, not only for the battle, but for the future course of the American Civil War. The scenario for Day 1 is framed for 615mm because of the nature of the battlefield that saw fighting in two main areas north and west of the town (see highlighted area on map pxx), although at some distance from each other. For bigger scale enthusiasts, the two fights can be conducted on separate tables, but “simultaneously”. No rules are specified in the game, but some conditions are applied, which should be playable for any of the major rules sets. The terrain in the map, and some distances, have been abstracted to a small extent to allow for the flow of the game while keeping to the historicity of decision making and combat mechanics. For battlefield conditions, the weather was hot and there was no discernible wind; visibility was excellent apart from the opening stage, from 5:15am to around 7am when the humidity from a recent rain-shower created a ground fog that hampered recognition of friend from foe. The objectives for each side are to occupy Gettysburg at the end of the first day’s battle. Below: The area of action during the first morning at Gettysburg

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OPENING MOVES The sun rose over Gettysburg at 5:15am on the morning of 1 July, but Heth’s Division was already on the move. Twelve-hundred men of BrigadierGeneral James Archer’s Brigade marched in the vanguard down the Chambersburg Turnpike. Brigadier-General Joseph Davis’ 2,200, mostly Mississippians followed; Brigadier-General J. Johnston Pettigrew’s 2,600 North Carolinians came next, and Colonel John Brockenbrough’s 970 Virginians brought up the rear. Heth also took the III Corps reserve artillery with him, four batteries under the command of Major D.G. McIntosh and five batteries under Major William Pegram. Many of the southerners were bare-footed and may have anticipated receiving new shoes rumored to be in a warehouse in town. What few of them would have expected was stiff resistance from any Federal troops between them and Gettysburg; after all, even if the whole Army of the Potomac stood in the way, Lee’s veterans had crushed them the last three times

Above: The view from behind Heth’s division on McPherson’s ridge

they had met and there was no reason today would be any different. Waiting for the Confederates were 1,600 Union cavalry troopers of Colonel William Gamble’s Brigade of Brigadier General John Buford’s First Division of the still relatively new Union Cavalry Corps. They had ridden into town the previous day, along with the rest of Buford’s Division, to be told that the rebels were around, too many of them not to be a serious threat. Buford dismissed talk amongst his commanders of how they would send the Confederates packing if they came: he admonished them that the rebels would come on strong and it would take everything the troopers had to stop them until help arrived from Major General John Reynolds’ I Corps. Reynolds had ordered Brigadier General James Wadsworth’s First Division, including the famed Iron Brigade, to hurry to Gettysburg. That would put a further 3,800 Union men on the field, with another 7,700 to follow once Major General Abner Doubleday got moving. Neither Buford nor Reynolds could know that Doubleday had an attack of the ‘slows’ and would not get the rest of the Corps moving until 8am on 1 July. Buford set his screens north and west of the town; Gamble out to the west, and Colonel Thomas Devlin’s 1,000 Pennsylvanian and New York troopers to the north, accompanied by two companies of West Virginia cavalry, amounting to 59 men perhaps still bemused by the elevation of their region to statehood that had happened only two weeks before. The Union cavalrymen took up their positions behind whatever cover they could find, every fourth man holding the horses of the others. The troopers fiddled with their


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equipment and checked their carbines, many peering into the grey mist created by the soft rain, looking for the advancing Confederates. Buford stood in the cupola of the Lutheran Seminary where he could oversee the field and make adjustments if necessary, depending on when and where the enemy arrived. He glanced south too, searching for the Union reinforcements. Where were they? Out in the field, troopers of the 8th Illinois cavalry could see shadows in the mist, coming on fast; the troopers fired then withdrew quickly, setting the tone for the morning – fire and move, fire and move. Heth’s Confederates of Archer’s Brigade had reached Marsh Creek south of the turnpike around 5:30am where the 5th and 13th Alabama fanned out into skirmishing order and pushed on to probe the opposition. It was they who first received fire from the Illinois troopers, and they fired back, the boom of their muskets contrasting with the crack of the cavalrymen’s breechloading carbines. Heth now had reason to pause: the Federal force might be bigger than he first thought. Heth’s pause became caution and he deployed his infantry and artillery for a full-scale organized assault. Davis’s Brigade moved into line north of the turnpike, while Archer’s Brigade went into line south of the road. The artillery unlimbered and began to pepper the enemy. All this took time, and even though the Confederates advanced steadily, they advanced slowly, fulfilling the wishes of the Union troopers who maintained their fire and move tactics, falling back when they needed to. By 8am, Heth’s Division had reached Herr’s Ridge, still a long way from their objective, although they could now see it

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in the shimmering distance as the July sun burned off the dew. Their more immediate target was the Federal cavalrymen ranged along McPherson Ridge that rose behind a small creek, Willoughby Run. In the meantime, Davis’s Brigade also advanced, taking advantage of an unfinished railway cut to conceal their movements. Heth’s Division had taken too long, however, and in the distance, they could see Union infantry moving into line of battle along Seminary Ridge that lay behind the McPherson Ridge. THE SCENARIO PHASE I: SET-UP The table is set up so that Herr’s Ridge is on the left (west) edge of the Union player’s side. The Hagerstown Road runs along the Union player’s table edge. The town’s layout is about a square foot for this scenario and sits on the Union player’s edge (south) and about 12 inches in from the eastern edge of the table. The Chambersburg Pike exits the town at an angle leading to about 10 o’clock if we consider 12 as due north. The Mummasburg Road runs out towards 11 o’clock, using the same scale. Oak Hill sits almost astride that road and about eight inches from the northern table edge. The Carlisle Road heads due north from the town, and the Harrisburg Road points out towards 1 o’clock. The McPherson Ridge lies about 18 inches in from the western edge and runs around the ‘clock-face’ where it fades just past the Carlisle Road. Two other ridges straddle the ground between McPherson Ridge and the western edges of the town; they should not be considered as steps, however, but folds in the ground. The creek, Willoughby Run, flows just in front

of McPherson Ridge, running south to north. The unfinished railroad cut runs parallel to the Chambersburg Pike almost as far as the town. The battlefield is mostly farmland with appropriate hedges, fences, and low walls lying around to provide soft cover. There are woods, McPherson’s Woods, about one-third of the way between the Chambersburg Turnpike and the Hagerstown Road. The only significant buildings for day 1 are McPherson’s farm next to the Chambersburg Turnpike on the ridge of the same name, and the Lutheran Seminary on the western edge of the town that gives the Union side an advantage in determining enemy positions and directing deployment and fire. Heth’s Division is deployed along the western table edge with Archer south of the road and Davis to the north. Heth’s artillery sits on Herr’s Ridge near the road in support. Buford’s cavalrymen are deployed in a screen to the west and north of the town. At no point in the game can Union cavalry cross the Mummasburg Road from north to west or visa-versa. If the Union player wants to move his cavalry between the two areas, he must move his units through the town to do so. All other forces remain off table at the beginning of the game. The game begins with a salvo of Confederate artillery and Heth’s Division starting its advance off of Herr’s ridge. At this point the CSA player rolls a D6. If the score is anything other than one, he gets a 6'' initial move free of harassment to simulate the effects of the morning mist. If a one is thrown, he is open to attack from his original position.

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behind McPherson’s farm, to the aid of their fellow New Yorkers and an intense melee and firefight erupted. The NY regiments suffered terribly, so Wadsworth ordered them to fall back, but the 147th NY and the 2nd Maine artillery never got their orders and were nearly cut off, taking terrible casualties before streaming to the rear, the Maine battery pulling back by section, limbering and unlimbering, firing and moving.

Heth’s men began moving off Herr’s ridge at about 8am and advanced towards Willoughby Run. They met increasing carbine fire mixed with artillery from Lieutenant John Calef’s horse-artillery battery of four 3'' inch rifles, firing over the troopers’ heads. Calef’s fire was met by Pegram’s artillery and a fierce duel took place between the cannoneers.

Maine artillery arrived first and took up positions on the north side of the road, but south of the railroad cut, where it attempted to engage Pegram’s battery. The Union artillerymen were shocked, however, when the 42nd Mississippi of Davis’ Division appeared like spirits from the railroad cut and fired into them. But the Maine battery responded in kind, with canister, and sent the Mississippians scurrying back into cover. Reynolds also acted with alacrity, pushing two New York regiments, the 84th Zouaves and the 95th, into the McPherson Farm area to bolster the artillery and relieve the hardpressed troopers.

Seeing the crisis unfold before him, Reynolds galloped back to hasten his infantry along. He found Wadsworth’s First Division marching up and Reynolds ordered them to hurry. The Union soldiers of Meredith’s Iron Brigade took off at the double along with the 2nd Maine Battery of 3-inch rifles. The 2nd

Arriving on the field, Wadsworth sent the 76th NY and 56th Pennsylvania across the turnpike where they crashed into the 55th North Carolina and 2nd Mississippi who charged them in partial enfilade. Lieutenant Colonel Francis Miller ordered his men of the 147th NY, who to this point had no orders and stood ready

Above: Generals Heth’s view across the battlefield towards the town. Below: The action in the railroad cut

THE BATTLE ESCALATES

At the same time that Davis’s Brigade was crashing in from the north, Archer’s Brigade charged into McPherson’s Woods. Reynolds saw the Iron Brigade moving into line in the depression behind McPherson’s Ridge and urged them to attack, following behind as they did so. The two sides clashed with furious volley fire, and a bullet struck and killed Reynolds; Abner Doubleday was now in charge of the Union I Corps. The Iron Brigade hammered the Confederates with musket fire and Archer’s Brigade broke for the rear, leaving behind their commander as a prisoner in their haste to get away from an enemy they now knew was the Army of the Potomac. It was a different story north of the turnpike. Major General Oliver O. Howard, commanding XI Corps, had arrived to take charge of the battle. He could see the Union line north of the Chambersburg Turnpike disintegrating and ordered the 6th Wisconsin, currently held in reserve to the rear of the Iron Brigade, into line to stop the bleeding. The Wisconsin men, all 340 of them, lined up along a fence on the south side of the pike and unloaded a volley into the advancing Confederates and followed up at the charge. The recovered New York regiments pitched in on the Confederate flank, prompting Davis to order his men out of the railroad cut that was rapidly becoming a trap. Most of the rebels got out, but the rejuvenated Federal infantry captured 250 of them and killed many more. With Heth’s Division falling back to regroup and the Union infantry unable to go forward, an eerie lull fell over the battlefield. PHASE II: THE BATTLE ESCALATES When Heth’s Division ends its first move, the Union player throws a D6 to determine when the Iron Brigade will reach the field. A score of 6 means that the Iron Brigade appears at the southern edge of the table at a point no more than 18'' from the Lutheran Seminary. For a lesser score, nothing happens. The Union player throws a D6 at the end of every subsequent turn with a modifier of +1 for each throw.

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Reynolds and Howard arrive on the south edge nearest Gettysburg at the same time the Confederate advance, but you must have a rule that will allow for the death of commanders and the effects that might have on organization, command and control, and morale, depending on what rules you are using to fight the scenario. If Reynolds is not killed, he is in charge throughout the entire scenario. The rules must also allow for the effects of capturing a commander on morale and command and control. Movement along the railroad cut is hidden movement up to 12'' from the McPherson Farm, but if the Confederate forces reveal themselves at that point, it is assumed that the Union player knows they are being attacked in force and Davis’s Brigade must be revealed in its entirety. Therefore, you will need a hidden movement mechanism agreed upon by both players to achieve this surprise. The Confederate player may remain in the railroad cut for as long as he chooses, but will be seen by any Union force with line of sight along the cut to a distance of 18'', or if Union forces come within 6'' of the Confederate force. Forces firing into the cut can do so from within 2'' of the edge and will count their fire as if firing from the flank. The reactions of the Confederate brigades to meeting Union regular infantry must be reflected in their morale, perhaps with a temporary surprise factor that diminishes CSA morale for at least one or two moves when fired upon by Union infantry or canister. The Union player cannot cross Willoughby Run or the railroad cut at any time in the game. If no Confederate forces are inside the Willoughby Run/railroad cut perimeter after the Iron Brigade is fully deployed, a lull in the fighting occurs. Roll a D6 for the number of turns in the lull. Both sides can use this time to bring on extra forces or reorganize, but they cannot move to within close range to do so and no firing may take place during the lull. Heth’s Division must fall back to just in front of Herr’s Ridge and reorganize. The Union cavalry must begin to withdraw through the town and off the table to the south. They take no further part in the fighting unless fired upon by the Confederates at the end of the lull. If no lull occurs, then the battle continues to Phase III and all reinforcements become available to both sides. They will march on the table in column to the positions described in Phase III.

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THE BATTLE RAGES Both sides used the lull in the battle to reorganize and come to grips with the consequences of the morning’s fighting. Howard had two Corps available to him, but he did not yet know the direction of the heaviest concentration of the enemy. He therefore, tasked Doubleday’s I Corps to hold the western flank, and ordered his own XI Corps, under Major General Carl Schurz, to the northern outskirts of Gettysburg to protect against attack from that direction. Doubleday complied with his instructions by placing Brigadier General John Robinson’s Second Division in reserve on Seminary Ridge, southwest of the town. He commanded his Third Division, under the command of Brigadier General Thomas Rowley, to take up positions on McPherson’s Ridge, bolstering the Iron Brigade and extending the Union line tightly across the gap between the Hagerstown Road and the Chambersburg Turnpike. Howard set up his northern defence by sending Schurz’s 3rd Division, under Brigadier General Alexander Schimmelfennig, to the Oak Hill/Oak Ridge area to join onto the right flank of I Corps. Brigadier General Francis Barlow’s 1st Division was to align with Schurz’s Division to their right, and Brigadier General Adolph von Steinwehr’s 2nd Division would remain to the immediate south of Gettysburg on Cemetery Hill. The Confederates too were busy. Heth had pulled his division into line just below Herr’s Ridge. Behind him came Major General William Pender with his division from Hill’s Third Corps and they took up positions on Herr’s Ridge in full battle array. Meanwhile, in the north, two divisions of Ewell’s Corps marched rapidly towards the town. Major General Robert Rodes’ Division with a battery of artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Carter reached Oak Hill before Schurz. Schurz could not now connect with I Corps and deployed to the right of the Mummasburg Road on the plain, so Doubleday ordered Robinson’s Division out of reserve to fill the gap between the railroad cut and the Mummasburg Road. Rodes and Ewell considered the Union movements provocative and a prelude to attack, therefore Rodes deployed his division into two lines and ordered the cannonade to begin. Rodes’ Division stepped off into a maelstrom of volley fire, and the front line was quickly sent packing, but Rodes

MAKING THE RAILROAD CUT By Trevor Crook One of the key features in this part of the battle was The Cutting, an uncompleted railway bed cut through McPherson’s Ridge. To make this only took a about hour, excluding drying time. Stage 1: Start with a suitable baseboard we used pre-cut plastic sheet, but could also be hardboard, mdf etc. The contours were cut out of polystyrene foam, contoured to match the rest of the hex terrain, and glued down with PVA. Stage 2; Cover the whole with filler. Pre-coloured and textured filler like Basetex minimises painting, and also doesn’t show up later knocks and chips. You can make your own from household emulsion and sand/grit/sawdust. Stage 3: When completely dry, drybrush with Vomit Brown and then Bleached Bone to raise the detail. Stage 4: Add flock onto watered down PVA glue. Do this in patches or the glue will dry before you have completed the whole surface. Knock off onto newspaper to re-cycle the excess. Stage 5: Optional. To avoid the constant shedding of grass, the terrain was then sprayed with varnish. Just avoid spraying onto exposed polystyrene or it may melt.

calmly ordered his second line into the fight, and the battle raged. Seeing Rodes’ attack go in, Robert E. Lee, who had now arrived on the field to take command, ordered Heth’s Division to resume its advance against the Iron Brigade and down the Chambersburg Turnpike, combining with Rodes’ assault. The Iron Brigade was staggered by the attack and fell back through the woods, reforming, then falling back and reforming again in front of the Lutheran Seminary. That left Colonel Roy Stone’s Brigade of three Pennsylvanian regiments, occupying the environs of the McPherson Farm, hopelessly exposed to attack from the west and north, while Colonel George Biddle’s 95th NY Regiment, holding the left end of the line on McPherson’s Ridge, found itself swamped by the Confederates. The exposed Union infantry at either end of McPherson’s Ridge fought ferociously, but the casualties became too much to bear and their position increasingly untenable, so the line fell back to reorganize with the Iron Brigade. They received no respite,

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Above: The Union forces are pushed back towards the town

however, as Pender’s Brigade took up Heth’s assault, and a storm of fighting broke in front of the Lutheran Seminary. The withdrawal of I Corps and the poor positioning of XI Corps north of the town, left XI Corps badly isolated with both flanks hanging. Rodes continued to apply pressure on Robinson and Schurz, bringing greater numbers to bear, but the timely arrival of Major General Jubal Early’s Division of Ewell’s Corps down the Harrisburg and Carlisle roads smashed the right flank of the XI Corps. Only desperate fighting held off a complete collapse of the Corps. With the I Corps in terrible trouble, and XI Corps threatening to come apart at the seams, and XII Corps nowhere in sight, Howard had little choice but to order his men to fall back through the town onto the heights beyond. The scene in Gettysburg was chaotic as the Federal soldiers rushed through with only a few regiments organized enough to provide a rearguard defence against the jubilant rebels flowing into the town. It was perhaps fortunate for the Union that most of the Confederates were spent; Hill could not ask his divisions to do any more than they had already achieved, and Ewell only had two reasonably fresh brigades available to conduct an assault through the town and onto the heights beyond. He chose wisely not to do so. The Confederates had won the day, but at

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an awful cost, and their victory was not complete with 9,000 enemy troops and 40 cannon dug in on the high ground of Cemetery Hill. Lee would have the choice of renewing the battle on 2 July, but he would do so against a reinforced and seemingly reinvigorated Union army now occupying an excellent defensive position on high ground. The opening day of Gettysburg was, therefore, a Pyrrhic victory for Lee that had great potential for the decisive victory he sought, but also created the conditions for the disaster that would follow. PHASE III: THE BATTLE RAGES In the third phase of the scenario, either after the lull or in continuity with Phase II, all the forces available can become engaged at the players’ discretion. The phase begins with Heth deployed directly in front of Herr’s Ridge and Pender’s Division deployed along Herr’s Ridge. The Union I Corps is deployed along McPherson Ridge between the Chambersburg Turnpike and the Hagerstown Road. Robinson’s Division is in reserve at or around the Lutheran Seminary. The XI Corps begins behind the town. Rodes’ Division is deployed in two lines of brigades along the northwestern corner of the table. Early’s Division begins the phase off-table to the north, but can be brought on at the Confederate player’s discretion. The morale of various units at the start of

the fighting is a factor: Rodes’ Division came onto the field tired after a forced march down the Mummasburg Road, and the Union XI Corps morale could be described as brittle, or at least lacking in confidence - they came into the battle much maligned for their performance at Chancellorsville earlier in 1863. The Union I Corps, except for Robinson’s Division, cannot move north of the Chambersburg Turnpike, and the XI Corps cannot deploy within six inches of the Harrisburg Road unless Early’s Division has appeared on the table. The phase opens with Heth’s advance from in front of Herr’s Ridge. If the situation arises, and the Union forces attempt to retreat through Gettysburg, the Union player throws a D6 for each regiment attempting to do so, with a score of six allowing that regiment to stand and fight. Any other throw results in the regiment becoming disorganized until it reaches the heights behind the town. Victory goes to the Union if they hold any of field to the west and north of Gettysburg. The Confederates win if they destroy either of the Union Corps and prevent them from retreating through the town or onto the heights behind the town. The battle is drawn if the Confederates hold all the ground north and west of the town but the Union Corps have retreated in good order to fight another day.


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ORDER OF BATTLE Confederate 2nd Army Corps: Lieutenant-General Richard S. Ewell Early’s Division: Major-General Jubal Early Hay’s Brigade: Brigadier-General Harry Hays: 5th La (196); 6th La (218); 7th La (235); 8th La (296); 9th La (347) Smith’s Brigade: Brigadier-General William Smith: 31st Va (267); 49th Va (281); 52nd Va (254) Hoke’s Brigade: Colonel Isaac Avery: 6th NC (509); 21st NC (436); 57th NC (297) Gordon’s Brigade: Brigadier-General J.B. Gordon: 13th Ga (312); 26th Ga (315); 31st Ga (252); 38th Ga (341); 60th Ga (299);61st Ga (288) Artillery Brigade: Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Jones Charlottesville Btty (4x12pdr Naps); Richmond Btty (4x3'' Rifles); Louisiana Guard Btty (2x3''Rifles, 2x10pdr Parrotts); Staunton Artillery (4x12pdr Naps) Johnson’s Division: Major-General Edward Johnson Steuart’s Brigade: Brigadier-General George Steuart: 1st Md Bttn Inf (400); 1st Nc (377); 3rd NC (548); 10th Va (276); 23rd Va (251); 37th Va (264) Stonewall Brigade: Brigadier-General James Walker: 2nd Va (333); 4th Va (257); 5th Va (345); 27th Va (148); 33rd Va (236) Nicholl’s Brigade ‘’Louisiana Tigers”: Colonel J. Williams: 1st La (172); 2nd La (236); 10th La (226); 14th La (281); 15th La (186) Jones’s Brigade: Brigadier-General John Jones: 21st Va (236); 25th Va (280); 42nd Va (265); 44th Va (227); 48th Va (265); 50th Va (240) Artillery Brigade: Major J. Latimer 1st Md Btty (4x12pdr Naps); Alleghany Artillery (2x12pdr Naps, 2x3'' Rifles); Chesapeake Btty (4x10pdr Parrotts); Lynchburg Btty (1x3'' Rifle, 1x10pdr Parrott, 2x20pdr Parrotts) Rodes’s Division: Major - General R.E. Rodes Daniel’s Brigade: Brigadier-General Junius Daniels: 32nd NC (454); 43rd NC (572); 45th NC (570); 53rd NC (322); 2nd NC Bttn (240) Doles’s Brigade: Brigadier-General George Doles: 4th Ga (341); 12th Ga (327); 21st Ga (287); 44th Ga (364) Iverson’s Brigade: Brigadier-General Alfred Iverson: 5th Nc (473); 12th NC (219); 20th NC (372); 23rd NC (316) Ramseur’s Brigade: Brigadier-General S. Ramseur: 2nd NC (243); 4th NC (196); 14th NC (306); 30th NC (278) O’Neal’s Brigade: Colonel E. O’Neal: 3rd Al (350); 5th Al (317); 6th Al (382); 12th Al (317); 26th Al (319) Artillery Brigade: Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Carter Jeff Davis Artillery (4x3'' Rifles); King William Artillery (2x12pdr Naps, 2x10pdr Parrotts); Morris Artillery (4x12pdr Naps); Richmond Orange Artillery (2x10pdr Parrotts) Artillery Reserve: Colonel J. Brown 1st Va Artillery; Capt Willis Dance: 2nd Richmond Howitzer Btty (4x10pdr Parrotts) ; 3rd Richmond Howitzer Btty (4x3'' Rifles ); Powhatan Btty (4x3” Rifles); 1st Rockbridge Btty (4x20pdr Parrotts); Salem “flying” Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 2x3'' Rifles) Nelson’s Battalion: Lieutenant-Colonel William Nelson Amherst Btty (3x12pdr Naps); Fluvanna “consolidated” Artillery (3x12pdr Naps, 1x3'' Rifle); Milledge Btty (2x3'' Rifles, 1x10pdr Parrott)

COMMANDERS ON GETTYSBURG DAY 1 It is less important to consider the two army commanders for the first day of Gettysburg than it is to understand their subordinates who took part in the action - Lee and Meade would reveal their characters over the following two days of fighting. Indeed, much of what happened on the first day and why would be as a result of the nature of the commanders on the scene as much as the terrain they fought over and the troops at their disposal. The list that follows is a very brief summary of how those commanders were disposed on the day and their potential wargame rating: UNION Buford, John (1st Cavalry Division): Outstanding cavalry commander, redoubtable and pugnacious. [wargame rating: outstanding] Doubleday, Abner (I Corps): Indecisive, but fought ferociously at Gettysburg. [wargame rating: above average]

3rd Army Corps: Lieutenant-General A.P. Hill Anderson’s Division: Major-General R.H. Anderson Wilcox’s Brigade: Brigadier-General Cadmus Wilcox: 9th Al (366); 8th Al (477); 10th Al (311); 11th Al (311); 14th Al (316) Wright’s Brigade: Brigadier-General A.R. Wright: 3rd Ga (441); 22nd Ga (400); 48th Ga (395); 2nd Ga Bttn (173) Mahone’s Brigade: Brigadier-General William Mahone: 6th Va (288); 12th Va (348); 16th Va (270); 41st Va (276); 61st Va (356) Perry’s Florida Brigade: Colonel David Lang: 2nd Fla (242); 5th Fla (321); 8th Fla (176) Posey’s Brigade: Brigadier-General Carnot Posey: 12th Miss (305); 16th Miss(385); 19th Miss (372); 48th Miss (256) Artillery Brigade - 11th Ga Artillery Battalion: Major John Lane Co A (1x12pdr Howitzer, 1x12pdr Nap, 1x3'' Rifle, 1x10pdr Parrott); Co B (4x12pdr Howitzer, 2x12pdr Nap); Co C (3x3'' Navy Rifles, 2x10pdr Parrotts) Heth’s Division: Major-General Henry Heth 1st Brigade: Brigadier-General J.J. Pettigrew: 11th NC (617); 26th NC (843); 47th NC (567); 52nd NC (553) 2nd Brigade: Colonel J. Brockenbrough: 40th Va (253); 47th Va (209); 55th Va (268); 22nd Va Bttn (237) 3rd Brigade: Brigadier-General James Archer: 13th Al (308); 5th Al Bttn (135); 1st Tn (281); 7th Tn (249); 14th Tn (220) 4th Brigade: Brigadier-General Joseph Davis: 2nd Miss (492); 11th Miss (592); 42nd Miss (575); 55th Nc (640) Artillery Brigade: Lieutenant-Colonel John Garnett Donaldsonville Btty (2x3'' Rifles, 1x10pdr Parrott); Huger’s Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 1x3'' Rifle, 1x10pdr Parrott); Pittsylvania Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 2x3'' Rifles); Norfolk “Light Artillery Blues” Btty (2x3'' Rifles, 2x12pdr Howitzers) Pender’s Division: Major-General William Pender 1st Brigade: Colonel Abner Perrin: 1st SC (328); 1st SC Rifles (366); 12th SC (366); 13th SC (390); 14th SC (428) 2nd Brigade: Brigadier-General James Lane: 7th NC (291); 18th NC (346); 28th NC (346); 33rd NC (368); 37th NC (379) 3rd Brigade: Brigadier-General Edward Thomas: 14th Ga (331); 35th Ga (331); 45th Ga (331); 49th Ga (329) 4th Brigade: Brigadier-General A. Scales: 13th NC (232); 16th NC (321); 22nd NC (321); 34th NC (311); 38th NC (216) Artillery Brigade: Major William Poague Apdremarle Artillery (2x3'' Rifles, 1x10pdr Parrott, 1x12pdr Howitzer); Charlotte Artillery (2x12pdr Naps, 2x12pdr Howitzers); Madison Lt Artillery (3x12pdr Naps, 1x12pdr Naps); Warrenton Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 2x12pdr Howitzers) Artillery Reserve: Colonel R. Lindsay Walker McIntosh’s Bttn: Major D.G. McIntosh: Danville Artillery (4x12pdr Naps); Hardaway Artillery (2x3'' Rifles, 2x12pdr Whitworth’s); 2nd Rockbridge Artillery (2x12pdr Naps, 2x3'' Rifles); Johnson’s Richmond Btty (4x3'' Rifles) Pegram’s Battn: Major W. J. Pegram: Crenshaw Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 2x12pdr Howitzers); Fredericksburg Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 2x3'' Rifles); Letcher Btty (2x12pdr Naps, 2x10pdr Parrotts); PeeDee Btty (4x3” Rifles); Purcell Btty (4x12pdr Naps)

Howard, Oliver Otis (XI Corps): Headstrong commander, prone to ignoring orders. [wargame rating: below average] Reynolds, John F. (I Corps [kia]): Inspiring leader, born in Lancaster PA, therefore very motivated at Gettysburg. [wargame rating: outstanding] CONFEDERATE Ewell, Richard S. (II Corps): Brave but eccentric, beloved by his men as “Old Bald Head”. [wargame rating: average] Early, Jubal (1st Division, II Corps): [wargame rating: average] Heth, Henry (2nd Division, III Corps): By the book commander. [wargame rating: average] Hill, Ambrose P. (III Corps): Impetuous Corps commander. [wargame rating: average] Rodes, R.E. (3rd Division, II Corps) [wargame rating: average]

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ORDER OF BATTLE Union I Army Corps: Major-General John F. Reynolds 1st Division: Brigadier-General James Wadsworth 1st Brigade “Iron Brigade”: Brigadier-General Solomon Meredith: 19th Indiana (308); 24th Michigan (496); 2nd Wisconsin (302); 6th Wisconsin (344); 7th Wisconsin (364) 2nd Brigade: Brigadier-General Lysander Cutler: 7th Indiana (434); 76th NY (375); 84th NY (318); 95th NY (241); 147th NY (380); 56th Pennsylvania (252) 2nd Division: Brigadier-General John C. Robinson 1st Brigade: Brigadier-General Gabriel Paul: 16th Maine (298); 13th Massachusetts (284); 94th Massachusetts (411); 104th NY (286); 107th NY (255) 2nd Brigade: Brigadier-General Henry Baxter: 12th Massachusetts (261); 83rd NY (199); 97th NY (236); 11th Pennsylvania (270); 88th Pennsylvania (274); 90th Pennsylvania (208) 3rd Division: Brigadier-General Thomas Rowley 1st Brigade: Colonel Chapman Biddle: 80th NY (287); 121st Pennsylvania (363); 142nd Pennsylvania (336); 151st Pennsylvania (467) 2nd Brigade “Bucktails”: Colonel Roy Stone: 143rd Pennsylvania (465); 149th Pennsylvania (450); 150th Pennsylvania (400) 3rd Brigade: Brigadier-General George Stannard: 13th Vermont (636); 14th Vermont (647); 16th Vermont (661) Artillery Brigade: Colonel Charles Wainwright: Maine Lt 2nd Btty (6x3'' Rifles); Maine Lt 5th Btty (6x12pdr Naps); 1st NY Lt, Btty L (6x3'' Rifles); 1st Pennsylvania Lt, Btty B (4x3'' Rifles); 4th US, Btty B (6x12pdr Naps)

XI Army Corps; Major General Oliver O. Howard 1st Division: Brigadier Francis Barlow 1st Brigade: Colonel Leopold von Gilsa: 41st NY (218); 54th NY (183); 68th NY (226); 153rd Pennsylvania (487) 2nd Brigade: Brigadier General Adepdrert Ames: 17th Connecticut (386); 25th Ohio (220); 75th Ohio (269); 107th Ohio (458) 2nd Division: Brigadier-General Adolph von Steinwehr 1st Brigade: Colonel Charles Coster: 134th NY (400); 154th NY (190); 27th Pennsylvania (277); 73rd Pennsylvania (284) 2nd Brigade: Colonel Orland Smith: 33rd Massachusetts (481); 136th NY (473); 55th Ohio (321); 73rd Ohio (338) 3rd Division: Major-General Carl Schurz 1st Brigade: Brigadier-General Alex Schimmelfennig: 83rd Illinois (310); 45th NY (375); 157th NY (409); 61st Pennsylvania (326) 2nd Brigade: Colonel W. Krzyzanowski: 58th NY (193); 119th NY (257); 82nd Ohio (312); 75th Pennsylvania (208); 26th Wisconsin (435) Artillery Brigade: Major Thomas Osborn: 1st NY Lt, Btty I (6x3'' Rifles); NY Lt, 13th Btty (4x3'' Rifles); 1st Ohio Lt, Btty I (6x12pdr Naps); 1st Ohio Lt, Btty K (2x12pdr Naps); 4th US, Btty G (6x12pdr Naps) Cavalry Corps: Major-General Alfred Pleasonton 1st Division: Brigadier-General John Buford 1st Brigade: Colonel William Gamble: 8th Illinois (470); 12th Illinois (233); 3rd Indiana (313); 8th NY (580) 2nd Brigade: Colonel Thomas Devin: 6th NY (218); 9th NY (367); 17th Pennsylvania (464); 3rd West Virginia (59) Reserve Brigade: Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt: 6th Pennsylvania (242); 1st US (362); 2nd US (407); 5th US (306) 2nd US Btty A (4x3'' Rifles);* *Attached to Buford’s 1st Cavalry Division.

Carl Smith, Gettysburg 1863 (Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1998) Mark Adkin, The Gettysburg Companion (Aurum Publishing, 2008) Chester G. Hearn, Rick Sapp, Steven Smith, Civil War Commanders (Metro Books, 2008) Harry W. Pfanz, The Battle of Gettysburg (National Park Civil War Series, 1994) Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (Mariner Books, 2004) Emory M. Thomas, Robert E. Lee: A Biography (W.W. Norton & Co., 1995) Jeffrey Wert, The Sword of Lincoln (Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks to Trevor Crook and the Maidenhead and District Gamers (MAD Gamers) for providing their figures, terrain and time for the photoshoot. www.madgamers.org All figures are Baccus 6mm. The author wishes to thank Paul Leach for playtesting this scenario and for helping to iron out many of the difficulties in presenting this complicated battle.

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Illustration taken from Osprey Publishing Vicksburg 1863 - Campaign 26 www.ospreypublishing.com

REFERENCES

First Day at Gettysburg

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