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Al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) on Ḥadīth Criticism Ignacio Sánchez University of Warwick, United Kingdom
[email protected]
Abstract
The notable and distinguished adīb adīb a nd theologian of the third/ninth century, al-Jā�i�, is usually not associated with the study of ḥadīth ḥadīth.. On the contrary, he has frequently been considered a vitriolic critic of the experts on traditions and some of his works havee even been interpreted as a demolition of the science of ḥadīth hav ḥadīth.. However, a careful reading of his writings reveals a quite di�ferent picture. In this article, al-Jā�i�’s treatises on the imamate — and especially the most extended one, the Kitāb the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya al-ʿUthmāniyya — will be scrutinised and discussed in the light of the author’s acquaintance with the tradition of legal hermeneutics as described in al-Shā��ʿī’s al- Shā��ʿī’s Risāla Risāla..
Keywords
Ḥadīth – hermeneutics – imamate – Muʿtazila Ḥadīth Muʿtazila – al-Shā��ʿī
Introduction
Most scholars of ʿAbbāsid studies, even those who are familiar with al-Jā�i�’s work, hardly associate the distinguished adīb adīb with with ḥadīth ḥadīth in in scholarship, at least not in a positive way. On the contrary, al-Jā�i� earned fame as a severe critic of the ahl al-ḥadīth. al-ḥadīth. Two main factors seem to have contributed to this reputation: on the one hand, al-Jā�i�’s own vitriolic writings against ignoramuses labelled ḥashwiyya or nābita nābita whom scholars often identify as the ahl al-ḥadīth al-ḥadīth and, on the other, the critiques of Muslim authors such as Ibn
* I would like to thank James Montgomery Montgomery for his insightful comments, and the two anonyanonymous reviewers of the article for o�fering corrections and suggestions.
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Qutayba accusing al-Jā�i� of forging reports and contaminating the science of ḥadīth with Muʿtazilite jargon.� Moreover, his a���liation with the Muʿtazila has ḥadīth strongly conditioned the way in which his writings have been read and the few scholars who have discussed al-Jā�i�’s engagement in ḥadīth ḥadīth have positioned the author within a Muʿtazilite paradigm where ḥadīth ḥadīth h as no place at all as an authoritativee source.� authoritativ A close reading of al-Jā�i�’ al-Jā�i�’ss treatises, howev however er,, reveals a quite di�ferent image, not only of his attitude towards the experts on ḥadīth ḥadīth,, but of his treatment of prophetic reports as well. On several occasions the works of al-Jā�i� praise the role of these experts, for instance, instance, in the Kitāb the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya al-ʿUthmāniyya: Not everyone who wants to be truthful in similar things [i.e. the transmission of ḥad�̄th] th] is in a position to achieve this. It comes only with pre-eminence (al-taqaddum (al-taqaddum)) in the frequent study of traditions (kathrat ( kathrat al-samāʿ ) and the broadening of the meaning of reports (ittisāʿ ( ittisāʿ al-riwāya).� al-riwāya).� No one, not even if he is sound of mind and reasoning, should speak about what can only be acquired as knowledge by means of khabar u ntil he has become an expert in khabar ( �āḥib khabar ) and a seeker of reports (�ālib athar ).). Only if he is of sound mind and has made an extensive extensive study of traditions, the trouble he imposes upon himself and his adversary is lightened.� Another example can be found found in the the Ḥujaj Ḥujaj al-nubuwwa al-nubuwwa,, where al-Jā�i� a���rms: It is surprising that the experts on ��qh on ��qh have abandoned the scrutiny of the reports (āthār (āthār ),), and that the theologians (mutakallimūn ( mutakallimūn)) have abandoned the discussions about the soundness of traditions (akhbār ( akhbār ),), for it is by means of traditions that people know the di�ference between the Prophet and the false prophet, between the truthful (�ādiq ( �ādiq)) and the liar (kādhib (kādhib),), the shar�̄ʿa ʿa and the sunna sunna,, between the religious duty and the supererogatory act (al-far�̄ (al-far�̄�a �a wa-l-nā��la), wa-l-nā��la), the anomalous reports (shudhūdh shudhūdh)) and the widespread and accepted traditions.� traditions.�
� See Ibn Qutayba, Taʾwīl Mukhtalif al-ḥadīth al-ḥadīth,, 59-60. � See, Zahniser, Zahniser, The The ʿ Uthmāniyya of al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Jāḥiẓ, 18-19; Afsaruddin, Excellence Afsaruddin, Excellence and and Precedence Precedence, 226. � The term ittisāʿ refers to the extension or broadening of speech beyond the grammatical boundaries without distorting the intended meaning, see Gleave, Gleave, Islam Islam and Literalism Literalism,, 89. � Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya ʿUthmāniyya,, 135.2-6. � Jā�i�, Ḥujaj Jā�i�, Ḥujaj al-nubuwwa al-nubuwwa,, 224.6-11.
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Also in the Ḥujaj al-nubuwwa, al-Jā�i� states: People do not bene��t from dialectical discussions about traditions (al-kalām f�̄ l-akhbār ) except when [they apply] criteria of authenticity; and there is no authentication without frequent and extensive study of the tradition (kathrat al-samāʿ ) and knowledge of the [primary] principles (u�ūl ).� The respectful tenor of these statements casts doubt, at least, on a direct identi��cation of the ignoramuses vili��ed by al-Jā�i� with ḥadīth-experts in general. One could argue that these assertions exemplify the proverbial contradictory thought al-Jā�i� shows in many of his works and that they only reveal the inconsistency of the author’s ideas. But both this argument and the contention that al-Jā�i�’s thought would be inconsistent require further investigation, especially by paying attention to the way in which the author addresses the treatment of ḥadīth. Al-Jā�i� not only praised ḥadīth-experts in some of his works, he also engaged in the analysis of reports by applying the same hermeneutical tools described and used by contemporary legal scholars. The list of works ascribed to al-Jā�i�, which amounts to 245 items in Pellat’s inventory, does not reveal any particular interest in ḥadīth.� We know that al-Jā�i� wrote a treatise on khabar , which might also have addressed ḥadīth, but those parts of the essay that have come down to us convey a discussion on epistemology and do not seem particularly related to the theoretical study of Prophetic traditions.� The Kitāb al-Futyā is also lost, but in an extant letter al-Jā�i� refers to its composition and states that it is an epistle on legal responsa and rulings dedicated to A�mad b. Abī Duʾād.� A third title relating to ḥadīth stands out as an oddity in the Jā�i�ian corpus: al-Bāqillānī mentions in his Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān a treatise entitled Kitāb fī khabar al-wāḥid t hat is ascribed to al-Jā�i� together with the Kitāb fī Naẓm al-Qurʾān and the Kitāb fī Radd ʿalā l-Na�ārā.�� We do not know whether al-Jā�i� actually wrote such a treatise, but the attribution of al-Bāqillānī is by no means an eccentricity because al-Jā�i� was certainly aware of the problems and discussions concerning the acceptance of � � � � ��
Jā�i�, Ḥujaj al-nubuwwa, 265.12-13. See Pellat, Nouvelle essai d’inventoire. The ��rst part of this work has been edited and translated by Pellat in Kitāb al-akhbār . Some fragments of the second part have been edited in Van Ess, Ein unbekanntes Fragment. Jā�i�, Risāla ilā Aḥmad b. Abī Duʾād . Some of its content about al-Na��ām’s opinions is quoted in later works and has been collected by Van Ess, Das Kitāb an-Nakṯ . Bāqillānī, Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān, 377.14. See also Pellat, Nouvelle essai d’inventoire, 138 note 75.
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the khabar al-wāḥid , a tradition going back to one single authority. He himself refers to a work bearing the title fī khabar al-wāḥid in his Fa�l Hāshim ʿalā ʿAbd al-Shams, when commenting on the excellence of ʿAlī b. al-�usayn on the authority of al-Shā��ʿī whom he calls �āḥib al-Risāla fī Ithbāt khabar al-wāḥid .�� This is not the only work in which al-Jā�i� quotes and paraphrases passages from al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla. Among his works that have come down to us one stands out both for its sophistication and its dependence on al-Shā��ʿī’s interpretative paradigms: the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya. The Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya belongs to a cycle of treatises on the imamate that al-Jā�i� wrote for an unidenti��ed patron, most certainly al-Maʾmūn; it is, therefore, an early work probably written in the third decade of the third/ ninth century. The treatise conveys the discussion between the ʿUthmāniyya and the Rā��ḍa about the imamate of ʿAlī. Although it contains a typical discussion of the manāqib of ʿAlī and Abū Bakr, the debate also focuses on the value of the revealed sources adduced by the contenders to sustain their claims. Some Qurʾānic verses are discussed in detail, but the majority of the sources analysed in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya are akhbār , either ḥadīths or historical reports.�� Based on the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya I focus in what follows exclusively on al-Jā�i�’s discussion of theory, namely the categorisation of ḥadīths and the hermeneutical techniques required for their evaluation.
Al-Jāḥiẓ and al-Shā��ʿī
The ascription to al-Jā�i� of the ideas presented in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya as well as the characterisation of the hermeneutical paradigm framing the debate as Shā��ʿite require explanation. Al-Jā�iz is well known for his ventriloquism and the structural complexity of his works, which usually adopt a dialogic form. In the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya he not only words the opinions of the ʿUthmānīs but also takes sides with them against the Rā��ḍa. However, this does not necessarily mean that he shares their critique of ḥadīth. There are other works in which al-Jā�i�, giving voice to varied interlocutors or speaking for himself, uses di�ferent analytic paradigms to discuss ��
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Jā�i�, Fa�l Hāshim, 106.9. The reference to ʿAlī b. al-�usayn can be found in the Bāb fī khabar al-wāḥid of al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla; see Shā��ʿī, Epistle on Legal Theory, 323 (§545). According to some sources, al-Jā�i� praised al-Shā��ʿī — referred to, on this occasion, as al-Muṭallibī — as the best writer of the ahl al-sunna, and stated that his tongue “strings pearls”; see Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh Dimashq, �, 51, 370. For the treatment of the Qurʾān in the ʿUthmāniyya see Sánchez, Shā��ʿite Hermeneutics.
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legal matters. For instance, in the Kitāb al-Shārib wa-l-mashrūb, the discussion about the lawfulness of alcoholic drinks is predicated upon a critique of traditions that focuses on the existence of contradictory reports and the inability of the a�ḥāb al-ḥadīth to deal with them. The question discussed in this epistle is whether wine consumption should be considered lawful; the premise that governs the debate is that only through clear Qurʾānic verses, the sunna agreed upon, sound reasoning, and correct analogies can be determined what is lawful and what is not (innamā yuʿraf al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām bi-l-kitāb al-nā�iq wa-l-sunna al-mujtamaʿ ʿalayhā wa-l-ʿuqūl al-�aḥīḥa wa-l-maqāyīs al-mu�ība).�� But the implied author — who may or may not be identi��ed as al-Jā�i� — explicitly states that he abhors the blind reliance on discordant reports ( wakarahtu ay�an taqlīd al-mukhtalaf min al-āthār ) and asks: “Who are those Muhājirī or Anṣarī from whom they take reports to condemn date-wines and not to declare them lawful?”�� This formulation and the critique of ikhtilāf seem to follow early Muʿtazilite doctrines on ḥadīth, similar to those held by al-Jā�i�’s master al-Na��ām who was extremely critical of using traditions and even denied the possibility of ijmāʿ .�� It would be wrong, therefore, to infer from the entire corpus of al-Jā�i�’s works the existence of a doctrine we could ascribe to the author, let alone to explain di�ferences by appealing to the proverbial Jā�i�ian playfulness or inconsistency.�� The logic governing these texts depends on al-Jā�i�’s rhetorical strategies and objectives which might change according to generic conventions, the nature of the topics discussed, and the identity of the interlocutors addressed. That is why a proper identi��cation of the voices and a contextualisation of the arguments are important to understand this kind of texts. Al-Jā�i�’s writings on the imamate, especially the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya, the Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya and the Risāla fī ta�wīb ʿAlī , di�fer from his other works in a variety of ways. Although these essays have survived in fragmentary form it is possible to a���rm that they are strongly coherent and, although they have a dialogic form and convey the opinions of antagonistic interlocutors, they are all based on similar theoretical premises. As far as I am aware, theoretical discussion of ḥadīth seems to occur only in these treatises and the hermeneutical
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Jā�i�, Risāla fī l-shārib, 277.2-3. Ibid., 273.1-2 and 277.4-5 respectively. See Van Ess, Ein unbekanntes Fragment. On the scholarly use of humour as an analytical category to explain al-Jā�i�’s works, see Montgomery, Beeston and the Singing Girls.
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framework al-Jā�i� employs to deal with traditions on the imamate has no parallel in Muʿtazilite sources.�� Why the dependency on al-Shā��ʿī then? Although we know next to nothing about al-Jā�i�’s possible engagement in legal debates, we do know that he was an active scholar who must have been aware of the discussions that were taking place around him. In this context, it is very likely that al-Jā�i� acquired knowledge through both oral and written sources and that he as such became acquainted with al-Shā��ʿī’s work, more speci��cally his Risāla. It is not my intention to evaluate here al-Shā��ʿī’s role in the process of canonization of Islamic Law and the reception of legal theories in the third/ninth century;�� my aim is to discuss al-Jā�i�’s engagement in ḥadīth criticism. In this respect, al-Jā�i�’s acquaintance with al-Shā��ʿī and, concretely, with his Risāla is beyond doubt central to our understanding of al-Jā�i�’s treatment of ḥadīth and the debates on the imamate and kufr .�� In what follows, I hypothesise that the discussion of reports in al-Jā�i�’s treatises on the imamate, and especially the most extended one, the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya, is based on a classi��cation of ʿilm that was clearly inspired by al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla. This does not mean, however, that al-Jā�i� — or the ʿUthmānīs and other groups of scholars whose opinions are brought to the fore — adhered to Shā��ʿite doctrines in general. On the contrary, the khabar al-wāḥid , for instance, one of the most important sources for al-Shā��ʿī, is systematically rejected. But the discussion of ḥadīth as authoritative source is, at least in the debates on the imamate discussed below, consistently based on a paradigm of source interaction similar to that described by al-Shā��ʿī.
Context: The Appointment of ʿAlī as imām
In order to understand the hermeneutic rules that al-Jā�i� applies to the treatment of ḥadīth, it is necessary to take into consideration the overall context of the polemic concerning the imamate of ʿAlī. In the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya, the Rā��ḍa reportedly argue that several revealed sources support their claim ��
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On Muʿtazilite attitudes towards ḥadīth see Van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft , ��, 649-654; a recent and thorough study can be read in El-Omari, Accommodation and Resistance. Regretfully, none of these studies discuss al-Jā�i�’s works. See Yahia, Šā��ʿī et les Deux Source; also El-Shamsy, Canonisation of Islamic Law. Al-Jā�i�’s relationship with al-Shā��ʿī was ��rstly noted by James Montgomery in his study of al-Bayān wa-l-tabyīn; see Montgomery, Al-Jā�i�’s Kitāb al-Bayān; also Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 23-33.
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that the Prophet explicitly appointed ʿAlī imam and that, as a consequence, the Rāshidūn and all the Ṣaḥāba who supported them should be considered unbelievers, since they did not abide by God’s will — whence the term Rā��ḍa, the “rejecters.” For all the possible derogatory connotations that it might have had already in the third/ninth century, the denomination Rā��ḍa is used in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya essentially as a technical term. In this regard, it is the Rā��ḍī contention that the ��rst three caliphs should be condemned as unbelievers and the concept of kufr , rather than the notion of the imamate, that which drives the discussion of the revealed sources. By focusing on kufr , al-Jā�i� frames the entire debate within an epistemological context inspired by al-Shā��ʿī’s conception of knowledge (ʿilm) which al-Jā�i� introduces with an almost verbatim quotation from the Bāb al-ʿilm of al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla. Al-Jā�i� discusses what the common people (ʿāmma) and the elites (khā��a) can and cannot know in the following terms: If someone asks: “What is the di�ference between what they [i.e. the ʿāmma] can understand and what they cannot understand?” The reply should be: “What they can understand is the revelation, plain and simple (al-tanzīl al-mujarrad ), without explanation (taʾwīl ), and the generalities of the revealed law ( jumlat al-sharīʿa) without interpretation (bi-ghayr tafsīr ), and those reports (mā jalla min al-khabar ) that are common and widespread (istafā�a) and have been learned many times and repeated in their minds. As for what they cannot know, it is the exegesis of the revealed [word] (taʾwīl al-munzal ), the interpretation of doubtful passages (mujmal ) and ambiguous sunnas ( ghāmi� al-sunan) that have been transmitted by the elite from the elite (al-khawā�� ʿan al-khawā��) among the transmitters of reports (ḥamalat al-athar ) and the seekers of traditions (�ullāb al-khabar ), the knowledge of which imposes a moral obligation to be followed wherever it may be, [the kind of report] which does not assail its seeker ( lā yahjumu ʿalā �ālibihi ), and does not invade the ears of him who refrains [from seeking it] (lā yaqharu samʿ al-qāʿid ʿanhu).�� Al-Jā�i� applies this very same formulation to the classi��cation of akhbār : The khabar may be of two kinds: A khabar [the knowledge of which does not imply] a privilege ( fa�l ) for the intellectual elite (khā��a) over the masses (ʿāmma), such as the ��
Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 252.15-253.6.
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��ve prayers, the fasting in Ramaḍān, the ritual ablutions to cleanse major impurities ( ghusl al-janāba), and the [ zakāt of] ��ve [dirhams] in every two hundred. And a khabar [the knowledge of which does imply] that the intellectual elite (khā��a) is privileged over the masses (ʿāmma), such as the sunna of the Prophet on the permissible and the prohibited ( al-ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām), the categories of the missed ritual prayers (qa�āʾ ), divorce (�alāq), the rites of the pilgrimage (manāsik ), sales (buyūʿ ), beverages (ashriba) and expiations (ka�fārāt ).�� This typology for understanding the concept of ʿilm is, in fact, a paraphrase of the corresponding categorisation in the Bāb al-ʿilm in al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla.�� Al-Jā�i�’s dealing with Qurʾānic verses and ha�īths is to a great extent based on Shā��ʿite hermeneutics, but the concepts of ʿilm al-ʿāmma and ʿilm al-khā��a are used here to frame the discussion of legal responsibility within a rigid epistemological categorisation. It is worth noting that al-Jā�i� uses the same categorisation of akhbār w hen discussing the transmission of the qa�iyyat Ṣi�fīn in the Risāla fī taswīb ʿAlī fī l-ḥakamayn, an epistle addressed to a certain Ibn �assān who is described as a muʿtazilī naẓẓāmī . One of the arguments al-Jā�i� adduces to reject the probative value of the document when claiming the imamate for ʿAlī or Muʿāwiya is that the matter it addresses belongs to the kind of khabar in which the khā��a has a privilege over the ʿāmma ( wa-laysa l-ʿilm bihi wa-bi-�iḥḥatihi ka-l-khabar alladh�̄ laysat li-l-khā��a f�̄hi fa��̄la ʿalā l-ʿāmma).�� In the Risāla fī ta�wīb ʿAlī , al-Jā�i� resorts to this categorisation of akhbār as well when discussing the accusation of kufr against Muʿāwiya. The reports referred to in this context are not prophetic sayings, but the hermeneutical principles on which he bases his analysis are similar to those used when discussing ḥadīth. According to Ibn �assān, Muʿāwiya became a kā��r when he decided to adopt Ziyād as brother. Ibn �assān invokes the principle of al walad li-l-��rāsh, sanctioned by prophetic ḥadīths, and argues that Muʿāwiya acted against clearly enunciated rulings (al-ḥukm al-man�ū�) and changed the meaning of a self-explanatory expression (badala hādha l-qawl al-mufassar );��
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Ibid., 253.7-11. Although a paraphrase, the text is very close to al-Shā��ʿī’s both in its formulation and terminology, see Shā��ʿī, Epistle on Legal Theory, 259f (§§434-436). Jā�i�, Ta�wīb ʿAlī , 453.10. On early discussions of this principle see Rubin, Al-Walad li-l-Firāsh.
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therefore, he should be considered kā��r .�� Al-Jā�i�’s defence is based on the critique of the reports on Muʿāwiya: if Muʿāwiya had acted against clearly enunciated rulings (radda l-man�ū�), then the knowledgeable people of his time, let alone his enemies, would have denounced this, but we do not have any notice of such act. Moreover, the accusation should be based on an authorised khabar on Muʿāwiya belonging to the category of widespread reports (la-kāna l-khabar bihi mashhūr wa-la-kāna maʿrūf mustafī� ), but for this there is no proof.�� Such khabar would be required to sustain the accusation because Muʿāwiya’s alleged contravention of clear legal principles that do not need interpretation (al-man�ū� wa-mā lā yaḥtamilu l-taʾwīl ) would have been a case of kufr .�� These references are relevant not only for its wording which is similar in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya and al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla, but also because al-Jā�i� seems to speak for himself on this occasion and holds an argument with a Muʿtazilite. Similarly, al-Jā�i�’s aim in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya and that of the ʿUthmānīs whose opinions he conveys is to demonstrate that the notion of imamate defended by the Rā��ḍīs can only be based on a source belonging to the category of ʿilm al-ʿāmma, that is, the kind of knowledge that everybody can understand. They do so by scrutinising one by one the revealed sources that the Rā��ḍa allege as proof. Consequently, the dichotomy ʿilm al-ʿāmma/ʿilm al-khā��a should be interpreted in terms of legal obligations and responsibilities. If the Rā��ḍa claim that Mu�ammad appointed ʿAlī with clear and unambiguous statements ( na��) and that, by disobeying this decision, those who did not follow ʿAlī should be considered unbelievers, the ʿUthmāniyya — and al-Jā�i� with them — argue that upon doubtful or unclear statements ignorance is always an excuse ( ʿudhr ).�� Therefore, no one can be condemned as unbeliever on this basis, as they claim: We have never seen anyone become a heretic (alḥada) or an apostate (tazandaqa) as a result of the errors in debating the imamate (min qibal al-ghala� f�̄ kalām al-imāma) and divergences in this regard (al-ikhtilāf f�̄hā).��
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Jā�i�, Ta�wīb ʿAlī , 448.10f. Ibid., 449.3-7. Ibid., 449.4-5. Jā�i�, Uthmāniyya, 149.5-8. Ibid., 270.20-271.1.
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This is the overall context that we need to bear in mind in order to understand the discussion of ḥadīths in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya. The ḥadīths adduced by the Rā��ḍa are scrutinised to see whether they can be considered ʿilm al-ʿāmma and therefore convey the universal obligation of recognising ʿAlī as imam. None of these ḥadīths ful��l the criteria of acceptance, but this does not imply that the ʿUthmānīs or al-Jā�i� for that matter reject prophetic traditions as a whole, let alone the science of ḥadīth. Classi��cation of ḥadīths
The Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya is not a theoretical work, but al-Jā�i� explicitly engages in the discussion of legal and hermeneutic principles on several occasions. He classi��es ḥadīths according to various typologies in di�ferent sections of the treatise. The criteria change according to the context of the discussion, but it is possible to divide them into the following two main groups: 1
Classi��cation in Terms of Epistemic and Legal Implications
The division of akhbār into those belonging to the ʿilm al-ʿāmma and those to the ʿilm al-khā��a discussed above is undoubtedly the most important typology to understand the discussion on ḥadīth in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya. For al-Jā�i�, this division is predicated upon human nature — not all human beings have the same cognitive abilities —,�� but in the context of legal theory the most important characteristic of this typology lies in its implications in terms of obligation and legal responsibility, especially as to whether the obscure formulation of a revealed source prevents any contravention of the message it conveys from being considered an act of kufr . 2
Classi��cation in Terms of ḥadīth Criticism
a According to Their Transmission (isnād ) The typology of ḥadīths which is focused on the chain of transmission ( isnād ) combines qualitative and quantitative criteria and can be also related to the division of ʿilm. Ḥadīths may be of two kinds according to the quality of their chains of transmission: authentic (�aḥīḥ) and weak (�aʿīf ) . Those ḥadīths considered weak can also be classi��ed quantitatively, according to the number of its transmitters: the term shādhdh, which can be translated as anomalous, refers to a ḥadīth that has been transmitted by a single individual from another single individual like him (ḥadīth qad yaḥtamilu l-rajul al-wāḥid al-thiqa ʿan ��
Ibid., 256.11f.
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mithlihi ).�� Since it has not been transmitted in the way of widespread ḥadīths (mustafī� ), it is considered weak (�aʿīf ) even if the transmitter is trustworthy.�� The term shādhdh is a synonym for khabar al-wāḥid and both terms are used interchangeably by al-Jā�i�. If, however, two or three individuals have been involved in the transmission of a report and the ḥadīth has been rejected because its transmitters were not trustworthy, the ḥadīth is no longer called anomalous (shādhdh), but only weak (�aʿīf ) .�� Additionally, al-Jā�i� refers to a qualitative criterion when he di�ferentiates between, on the one hand, disputed and obscure reports that belong to the ʿilm al-khā��a and are transmitted by experts on traditions ( ghāmi� al-sunan allātī ḥamalathā l-khawā�� ʿan al-khawā�� min ḥamalat al-athar wa-�ullāb al-khabar ),�� and, on the other hand, widespread traditions (mā jalla min alkhabar wa-stafā�a)�� that can be understood and transmitted by experts and non-experts alike, and thus belong to the ʿilm al-ʿāmma. In practice, however, this epistemological categorisation is only used in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya when the content of a ḥadīth is discussed, not its transmission.�� b According to Their Original Formulation (a�l ) The term a�l as it is used in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya refers to the original formulation of the ḥadīth, which can be understood literally or subjected to interpretation (taʾwīl ). In terms of their a�l , the ḥadīths are classi��ed into those upon which there is agreement (mujtamaʿ ʿalā a�lihi ) and those upon which there is disagreement (mukhtalaf ʿalā a�lihi ; a more detailed discussion of this category will be taken up below). The agreement ( ijmāʿ ) invoked by al-Jā�i� is not the consensus of the whole community, but that of the specialists on traditions. The statement quoted above in which al-Jā�i� vindicates the role of the expert in this particular discipline (�āḥib khabar, �ālib athar ) is exactly found in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya where the di�ferent types of ḥadīth are discussed.��
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Ibid., 115.15. Ibid., 115.15-18. See the complete discussion in ibid., 115.13-116.1. Ibid., 252.4-5. Ibid., 252.2. These considerations are applied to the critique of transmission in another treatise when al-Jā�i� discusses the qa�iyyat Ṣi�fīn; see Jā�i�, Ta�wīb ʿAlī , 453.10. Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 135.2-6.
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Hermeneutical Tools
In the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya, al-Jā�i� explicitly discusses the application of several hermeneutical tools related to source interaction and ḥadīth criticism. Although this treatise is the most important source for understanding al-Jā�i�’s dealing with legal theory, this is by no means the only work in which the author engages in ��qh.�� The theoretical context in which al-Jā�i� frames his argumentation is de��ned by a notion of source interaction with clear Shā��ʿite overtones. Although not explicitly discussed in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya, al-Jā�i� makes sporadic references to the principle of source interaction and it is evident that he takes ��ve kinds of sources into consideration: 1) self-explanatory Qurʾānic verses; 2) Qurʾānic verses that need to be interpreted with a supplementary source; 3) self-explanatory ḥadīths; 4) ḥadīths that need to be interpreted with a supplementary source; and 5) ijmāʿ , which al-Jā�i� de��nes as a form of khabar , a repository of common knowledge that comprises historical knowledge as well as previously and unanimously accepted interpretations of the revelation.�� Both this categorisation and the de��nition of khabar broadly correspond to al-Shā��ʿī’s treatment of the revealed sources and his concept of bayān.�� Al-Jā�i�’s discussion of ḥadīth can be classi��ed, therefore, according to the rubrics jumla/na��, ʿāmm/khā��, nāsikh/mansūkh (not discussed in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya but in the extant fragments of the Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya), and, additionally, also according to categories proper to ḥadīth criticism such as isnād and ikhtilāf .�� 1
Jumla/Naṣṣ
The de��nition of khā��a and ʿāmma found in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya is, to some extent, the social translation of the hermeneutical di�ferences between two kinds of sources: on the one hand, ambiguous or complicated texts that need further elucidation and can only be grasped by the khā��a; and, on the ��
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See, e.g., the discussion of abrogation in the Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya discussed below. Another example of al-Jā�i�’s use of legal theory can be found in the Risāla fī l-qiyān; see Sánchez, Reading Adab as Fiqh. The Kitāb al-Ḥayawān also engages the discussion of law, see Miller, More than the Sum of its Parts, 317-336. Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 116.1-2. See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 23-33 (on bayān); 321-357 (on ijmāʿ ). On al-Jā�i�’s engagement with al-Shā��ʿī’s de��nition of bayān, see Montgomery, Al-Jā�i�’s Kitāb al-Bayān. My discussion of these categories is mainly based on Lowry’s analysis of al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla; see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 61-117.
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other, self-explanatory texts that can be understood by the khā��a and the ʿāmma alike. The de��nition of these terms in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya is similar to the one found in the Risāla, where al-Shā��ʿī discusses and applies the categories of jumla (non self-explanatory) and na�� (self-explanatory). The terminology used in Jā�i�’s treatise, however, is slightly di�ferent. In his de��nition of khā��a and ʿāmma, the author uses the same terms that are found in the Risāla: jumla and mujmal are opposed to the term man�ū�, which in this case clearly refers to self-explanatory texts.�� In the rest of the treatise, however, the verb na��a is almost exclusively used to refer to the Prophet’s designation of ʿAlī as imam. The usual expression for reference to Qurʾānic verses or hadīths that need or do not need interpretation is a periphrasis including the verb iḥtamala: either yaḥtamilu l-taʾwīl or lā yaḥtamilu l-taʾwīl . Other terms and expressions con veying the meaning of the category of self-explanatory texts include the verb na�aqa (to speak clearly) and the participle nā�iq.�� The participle ẓāhir also refers to Qurʾānic verses of which the meaning is evident and should be understood literally.�� The treatment of the category of self-explanatory vs. non self-explanatory texts in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya always overlaps with a discussion of other textual characteristics, but the exposition of the “ḥadīth of Hārūn and Mūsā,” also called the manzila ḥadīth, aptly illustrate the application of this rubric.�� The Prophet reportedly had uttered the manzila ḥadīth just before leaving Medina to ��ght the Battle of Tabuk. According to the tradition, the Prophet left ʿAlī as his deputy stating: anta minn�̄ bi-manzilat Hārūn min Mūsā, your status with regard to mine is like that of Aaron with regard to Moses. For the Rā��ḍa, this is a clear reference to the succession of ʿAlī that should be admitted as proof,�� but the ʿUthmāniyya impugn the ḥadīth because it is a khabar al-wāḥid .�� Nevertheless, they proceed to discuss the report as if it were admissible in order to prove, ��rst, the incoherence of the Rā��ḍī interpretation of its literal meaning; second, that a ��gurative meaning cannot be proof of ʿAlī’s imamate. The ʿUthmāniyya argue that the meaning of this ḥadīth is by no means uni vocal. First, if Mu�ammad had designated someone to substitute him while �� �� �� �� �� ��
Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 253.1 ( jumlat al-sharīʿa); 253.3 (tafsīr al-mujmal ); 258.6 ( jumal alsunan . . . jumal al-sharīʿa); 258.7 (kull al-man�ū�). Ibid., 44.2 and 239.3 (na�aqa bihi l-qurʾān); and 14.8 (kitāb nā�iq). Ibid., 118.3 (ammā ẓāhir al-kalām); 119.7 (maʿnā l-kalām ʿan ẓāhir lafẓihi ). On this ḥadīth see Miskinzoda, Signi��cance of the �adīth of the position of Aaron. Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 153.8f. Ibid., 158.17-159.3.
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being on a military campaign, it would have been known. But there are no references whatsoever to ʿAlī, Abū Bakr, or ʿUmar in this regard,�� so the Rā��ḍī contention that Mu�ammad appointed ʿAlī as deputy is not supported by historical evidence.�� Second, if the reference to the relationship between Hārūn and Mūsā was intended to designate a successor after the death of Mu�ammad, then the wording of the ḥadīth is absurd, because Hārūn died before Mūsā.�� The ʿUthmāniyya conclude that the ḥadīth is not self-explanatory and would need a supplementary source, in this case ijmāʿ , for its interpretation. However, the experts agree about the silence of the sources concerning the designation of a successor during the life of the Prophet (khalīfa) and also exclude the possibility that ʿAlī might have been designated as wazīr .�� Al-Jā�i� completes the discussion as follows: A ḥadīth with such a wrong interpretation as yours and such a defective value as proof cannot be but of two kinds: either a false report (bā�il ) that was not uttered by the Prophet, peace be upon him; or a valid report (ḥaqq) the meaning of which is not what you say and the interpretation of which not what you claim.�� The mere disagreement concerning the meaning of the hadīth is reason enough to discard it as proof of ʿAlī’s imamate, since the notion of imamate postulated by the Rā��ḍa should necessarily be based on a revealed source with univocal meaning that can be universally understood. 2
ʿĀmm/Khāṣṣ
Al-Shā��ʿī uses the terms ʿāmm and khā�� to describe the application of a rule that seems to be general, but can be restricted in scope. According to this classi��cation, a rule can be applied to the entirety of a class (ʿāmm, unrestricted) or only to a subset (khā��, restricted), even though its wording may seem to refer to the entire class.�� This rubric is applied to both Qurʾān and ḥadīth and scholars need to know the particular sabab al-nuzūl o r the context of the tradition in order to be able to clarify its meaning in terms of ʿāmm or khā��. �� �� �� �� �� ��
Ibid., 154. 8-12. The ʿUthmāniyya discuss in this regard Mu�ammad’s appointment of Usāma b. Zayd as commander of the army; cf. Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 165.10f. Ibid., 154.18f. Ibid., 157.12f. Ibid., 155.15-17. Lowry, Islamic Legal Theory, 69.
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Several hadīths are quoted in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya to explain this rubric, the most illustrative of which is a saying of the Prophet a���rming that Abū Dharr, one of the earliest Companions, was “the most truthful (a�daq):” mā aqallat al-ghabrāʾ wa-lā aẓallat al-kha�rāʾ ʿalā dhī lahja a�daq min Abī Dharr — The earth does not carry nor the heavens cover a man more truthful than Abū Dharr.�� The formulation of this report is unrestricted and seems to encompass the entire class of Muslims, but al-Jā�i� argues that it has a restricted meaning despite its unrestricted formulation (kāna makhrajuhu makhraj al-ʿāmm waannahu khā�� wa-in lam takun khu�ū�iyyatuhu mawjūda fī lafẓ al-ḥadīth).�� In such cases, a supplementary authority such as consensus (ijmāʿ ) is needed to know that the meaning of the hadīth is restricted. In this particular example, both the Rā��ḍa and the ʿUthmāniyya would agree that Abū Dharr is not the most sincere of the Muslims and, therefore, the hadīth is unrestricted in its formulation but restricted in its meaning, since it must refer to a sub-class. In other words, Abū Dharr was the most sincere of a limited group of individuals, but not of all humankind.�� This rubric often overlaps with the rubric jumla/nā��, but in some cases its use is very speci��c, as when dealing with the problem of interpreting plurals. In a discussion about abrogation, for instance — a topic that is not discussed in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya but is central in the extant fragments of the Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya — Abū Bakr is said to have quoted the ḥadīth: innā maʿāshir al-anbiyāʾ lā nūrithu mā taraknāhu fa-huwa �adaqa — We the Prophets do not leave inheritance; what we leave behind is given in alms.�� Although the saying contains the plural form nūrithu, the caliph and his supporters interpret this as a restricted formulation (khā��ū l-khabar al-ʿāmm), thus rendering the ḥadīth doubtful (mujmal) and therefore incapable of being an agent of abrogation.�� 3
Nāsikh/Mansūkh
Abū Bakr reportedly quoted the above mentioned hadīth to underscore his rejection of Fāṭima’s claim to her father’s inheritance. Al-Jā�i� deals with this subject together with the topic of ʿUmar’s prohibition of temporary marriage (mutʿa) within the context of a discussion about abrogation in his Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya. The discussion on mutʿa is not extant, but the comments on
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Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 138.14-15. Ibid., 138.18-19. Ibid., 139.6. Jā�i�, ʿAbbāsiyya, 301.18-19. Ibid., 303.15.
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abrogation, for all their brevity, are relevant enough to shed some light on the debates on this topic during the third/ninth century.�� Qurʾānic rules of inheritance stipulate that Fāṭima was like any other woman the lawful heir of her father. The problem under discussion here is whether the general rules from the Qurʾān should be applied to the particular case of the Prophet’s inheritance — the subject of a debate between ʿAlī and Abū Bakr. Al-Jā�i�’s report of this debate is only partial, but it can be completed with information from other sources. They tell that ʿAlī in his defence of Fāṭima’s claim referred to two Qurʾānic verses to demonstrate that prophets do leave inheritances: wa-waritha Sulaymān Dāwud — Solomon became David’s heir (Q 27:16); and walī yarithunī — Grant me a successor [said the prophet Zachariah] to be my heir (Q 19:5-6).�� Al-Jā�i� does not mention any speci��c Qurʾānic verses, but he points to the claim of Fāṭima’s defenders that the sharīʿa is quite clear about inheritance ( al-ẓāhir min al-sharīʿa)�� and that Abū Bakr’s objection is based on one single hadīth that reads: innā maʿāshir al-anbiyāʾ lā nūrithu — We prophets do not leave inheritance.�� Fāṭima’s defenders argue that the ḥadīth quoted by Abū Bakr is invalid as abrogating source both in terms of its transmission and its meaning. Concerning isnād , they argue that the Prophet’s utterance of the hadīth is not impossible, but its transmission depends on the authority of an individual related to the interested party — Abū Bakr — and this undermines its probative value. From the point of view of its content, the caliph interpreted the ḥadīth as being restricted to the prophet Mu�ammad despite its unrestricted formulation with a plural. However, a ḥadīth with such characteristics does not ful��l the required conditions to abrogate Qurʾānic verses and, consequently, Fāṭima’s defenders claim that the abrogation of the Qurʾānic verse as argued for by Abū Bakr and his partisans was mistaken because of a forced interpretation of the ḥadīth as a restricted report ( nasakhū l-kitāb wa-kha��ū l-khabar al-ʿāmm). It is most likely that al-Jā�i�’s discussion of these passages was in the context of a polemic between the partisans and detractors of al-Maʾmūn who had restored the ��ef of Fadak to the ʿAlids and legalised mutʿa marriage. Despite the fact that the defenders of Abū Bakr are accused of using invalid ḥadīths, it is interesting to see how a discussion of the possibility of using a ḥadīthto �� �� �� ��
On this topic see Melchert, Qurʾanic Abrogation, 75-98. Melchert does not deal with the thesis reported by al-Jā�i� in this article. See the report of the discussion between ʿAlī and Abū Bakr in Ibn Saʿd, �abaqāt , ��, 2, 86. Jā�i�, ʿAbbāsiyya, 302.17. Ibid., 301.18-19.
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abrogate the Qurʾān is formulated in the same hermeneutical terms as those commented on above. In this case, however, and unlike in the Shā��ʿite tradition, inter-source abrogation seems to be allowed. The contenders in the debate on Fāṭima’s inheritance do not reject the possibility of abrogating the Qurʾān with a prophetic report, but the abrogating value of the particular ḥadīth adduced by Abū Bakr is questioned. Due to its formulation and in virtue of the rubric ʿāmm/khā��, the ḥadīth is proved to be one of those reports that need interpretation and are not hermeneutically autonomous. 4
Categories Speci��c to ḥadīth: isnād and ikhtilāf
In classifying reports in terms of their transmission, al-Jā�i� discusses the different kinds of isnād . Ikhtilāf is not discussed explicitly as a technique in the same way as the application of the rubric ʿāmm/khā��, but al-Jā�i� refers to the implications of disagreement on several occasions. The best example to illustrate the discussion of ikhtilāf is the ḥadīth of Ghadīr Khumm. This ḥadīth was uttered by the Prophet as part of a sermon pronounced at Ghadīr Khumm in the course of the so-called farewell pilgrimage. The version quoted by al-Jā�i� runs as follows: man kuntu mawlāhu fa-ʿAlī mawlāhu — Let he who considers me to be his mawlā, take ʿAlī to be his mawlā.�� The Rā��ḍa adduce a variant that a�fects the terms of the report reading: man kuntu wali yuhu fa-ʿAlī waliyuhu allāhuma wāli man walāhu wa-ʿādi man ʿadāhu — Let he who considers me to be his wālī , take ʿAlī to be his wālī . O God, love the one who loves him [i.e. ʿAlī] and be the enemy of whomever is his enemy.�� The discussion of the ḥadīth focuses on the term mawlā/ wālī , which is understood by the Rā��ḍa as a reference to the wālaya of Mu�ammad in favour of ʿAlī. The ḥadīth is rejected by the ʿUthmāniyya as proof of ʿAlī’s right to the imamate for two reasons. First, they adduce a defect in the chain of transmission, since the ḥadīth was reported by al-Aʿmash who was Rā��ḍī and therefore non partial; he was additionally known to be an untrustworthy reporter (mu�aʿʿaf ) .�� Second, they argue that there is disagreement ( ikhtilāf ) concerning the a�l o f the ḥadīth, that is, the same ḥadīth was transmitted with a variant concerning the terms wālī and mawlā. There is no agreement about the exact formulation of the ḥadīth and the variant has notable implications. Moreover, the ʿUthmānīs reject the second part of the ḥadīth as reported by their Shīʿite adversaries (allāhuma wāli man walāhu wa-ʿādi man ʿadāhu), since it has been transmitted uniquely among the Shīʿa. �� �� ��
Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 144.6. Ibid., 144.14; and 144.6 for the additional sentence (man walāhu wa-ʿādi man ʿadāhu). Ibid., 144.15.
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The Rā��ḍī strategy to corroborate that the ḥadīth of Ghadīr Khumm was addressed to ʿAlī using the term wālī — as in the version of the ḥadīth they themselves transmitted — consists of providing a supplementary report (sa-naʾtīkum bi-mithl al-lafẓ alladhī ataytumūnā bihi ḥattā lā yakūna lafẓ adalla ʿalā l-ghāya bihi ),�� the so-called “ḥadīth of the bird” ( ḥadīth al-�āʾir ). This saying (allāhumma ātinī bi-aḥabb ʿibādika ilayka yaʾkulu maʿī hādhā l-�āʾir) was uttered by the Prophet when he invited ʿAlī to join him in eating a bird and then he greeted him exclaiming allāhumma wālī .�� The supplementary source not only ��xes the exact wording of the report, but also clari��es the meaning of the term wālī . It is therefore intended to prove that Mu�ammad’s words at Ghadīr Khumm should be understood as a literal reference to ʿAlī and not to any other person addressed as wālī . In this case, however, the ʿUthmānīs have no need for a discussion of this tradition as supplementary source because they directly dismiss the “ḥadīth of the bird” as a khabar al-wāḥid ,�� thus holding the ḥadīth of Ghadīr Khumm to be invalid as a proof.
Criteria of Acceptance Particularly Applied in the Kitāb
al-ʿUthmāniyya
The discussion of the ḥadīth of Ghadīr Khumm in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya leads to a general debate on the conditions of acceptance of revealed sources as proof of ʿAlī’s imamate. A prophetic report that ful��ls all the requirements to be accepted as authority is called mustafī� . This term refers in principle to the chain of transmission, but al-Jā�i� uses the expression khabar mustafī� g enerically to refer to a report that belongs to the ʿilm al-ʿamma. Since these reports are necessarily self-explanatory, this notion refers to the quality of both transmission and content. The term mutawātir , broadly corresponding to the notion of mustafī� as a widespread tradition, does not appear in al-Jā�i�’s essay, but at least on one occasion in the Ta�wīb ʿAlī he employs the terms mashhūr and mustafī� a s synonyms.�� In general, al-Jā�i� assesses ḥadīths in terms of transmission and content according to the following criteria. As far as transmission is concerned, the soundness of a mustafī� report cannot be contested, for it is the kind of ḥadīth that has been transmitted through di�ferent routes and is widespread (istafā�a), thus excluding an alleged �� �� �� ��
Ibid., 149.18. Ibid., 150.2-6. Ibid., 158.17-18. See the discussion on khabar al-wāḥid below. Jā�i�, Ta�wīb ʿAlī , 449.3-7.
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fabrication. Ḥadīths that have several lines of transmission but not enough circulation to be considered mustafī� , i.e., reports transmitted by and for the khā��a, are valid if they are sound. Their application, however, is restricted to the ʿilm al-khā��a. Apart from references to the trustworthiness of particular transmitters, there is no theoretical discussion of isnād ’s in the Jā�i�ian corpus. The khabar al-wāḥid , however, is always rejected irrespective of its reporter’s authority. The aforementioned “ḥadīth of the bird” is rejected, although it is transmitted by Anas b. Mālik whose trustworthiness is beyond any doubt ( Anas waḥdahu laysa bi-ḥujja).�� The same holds for the ḥadīth al-manzila because it is only transmitted by ʿĀmir b. Saʿd and therefore cannot be accepted as proof (mā kāna li-yakūna waḥdahu ḥujja).�� In terms of its content, the hadīth mustafī� i s hermeneutically autonomous and its meaning can be understood by all people alike, both khā��a and ʿāmma. Ḥadīths that are obscure or disputed may be interpreted with the aid of a supplementary source such as ijmāʽ or another ḥadīth. It is necessary that such a ḥadīth is mustafī� , i.e., hermeneutically autonomous and transmitted through di�ferent routes. When particularly focused on the traditions adduced in favour of ʿAlī’s imamate, the claims of the ʿUthmāniyya about the soundness of ḥadīths are based on ijmāʿ , here understood as the consensus of the experts both upon transmission (isnād, makhraj ) and original formulation (a�l ). This is explicitly discussed when dealing with the ḥadīth of Ghadīr Khumm, and the possibility that the term wālī refers to ʿAlī. The ʿUthmāniyya scrutinise this tradition by applying a criterion that accounts for both the soundness of its original formulation (a�l ) and its transmission (makhraj ) according to four possible categories: a Ḥadīth mukhtalaf fī a�lihi wa-fī �iḥḥat makhrajihi If there is no agreement on the original formulation of the ḥadīth ( a�l ) nor on the soundness of its transmission (makhraj ) and, consequently, there is disagreement about its interpretation and implications ( wa-mukhtalaf fī taʾwīlihi wa-farʿihi ), the ḥadīth should be rejected and cannot be adduced as proof (ḥujja).��
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Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 150.8-9. Ibid., 159.2-3. Ibid., 148.13-14.
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b
Ḥadīth mujtamaʿ ʿalā a�lihi wa-fī �iḥḥat makhrajihi [. . .] kāna lafẓuhu muḥtamil li-�urūb al-taʾwīl If there is agreement on the original formulation of the ḥadīth and the soundness of its source, but the report might support various interpretations, it cannot be accepted as a proof.�� c
Ḥadīth mujtamaʿ ʿalā a�lihi wa-fī �iḥḥat makhrajihi [. . .] kāna lā yaḥtamilu min al-taʾwīl illā maʿnā wāḥid mā khtalafat fī taʾwīlihi al-ʿulamāʾ If there is agreement on the original formulation of the ḥadīth and the soundness of its source, its meaning is univocal (maʿnā wāḥid ), there is no disagreement among the scholars, and it is obvious to all of sound mind, it should be accepted as a proof.�� d
Ḥadīth mujtamaʿ ʿalā a�lihi [. . .] ghāmi� al-taʾwīl, ʿawī� al-maʿnā lā yakādu yudrikuhu illā l-rāsikh fī l-ʽilm, al-bāriʿ fī ḥusn al-istikhrāj If there is agreement on the content of the ḥadīth but its interpretation is so arduous that only the most expert scholars can grasp its meaning, it should be rejected because the majority of Muslims cannot understand it�� and they would be excused — in this context for not recognising ʿAlī’s imamate. This typology of ḥadīths is obviously based on a solid hierarchy that is speci��cally adduced to contest the Rā��ḍī contention that the origin of the imamate was Mu�ammad’s designation of ʿAlī (na��a ʿalā imamātihi ).�� All ḥadīths with a sound chain of transmission are initially accepted (b), (c), (d) and those with a disputed isnād a re rejected (a). In light of the opposition jumla/na��, a ḥadīth with a sound chain of transmission may be of two kinds in terms of its content: it is either hermeneutically autonomous (kāna lā yaḥtamilu l-taʾwīl ) and unanimously accepted as proof (c); or ambiguous and in need of further elucidation (muḥtamil al-taʾwīl ) (b), (d). Ambiguous ḥadīths may have divergent interpretations (b) or be complicated in such a way that only the best experts are able to interpret them. In that case, they are not compelling for those who are unable to understand their meaning (d). In the particular debate about the legitimacy of ʿAlī’s imamate, these two last types of ḥadīths cannot be accepted as proof according to the ʿUthmāniyya. �� �� �� ��
Ibid., 148.16. Ibid., 148.19-149.4. Ibid., 149.5-8. Ibid., 149.10.
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������� Conclusions
The typology of ḥadīths and the conditions for their acceptance as formulated in al-Jā�i�’s work are extremely restrictive. For some scholars, like Zahniser, this has been reason to argue that it is a typology that is entirely based on Muʿtazilite rational criteria and constitutes a “demolition” of the principles of the science of ḥadīth.�� However, if we contextualise al-Jā�i�’s classi��cation within the overall discussion of the concept of imamate defended by the Rā��ḍa — implying the condemnation of the opponents of the imamate as unbelievers — the conditions are entirely consistent with the categorisation of ʿilm and its implications for legal responsibility and moral obligation. This is explicitly stated in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya when the ʿUthmānīs claim: If the reason for the imamate (al-sabab f�̄ l-imāma) would be what they claim [i.e., a na�� from the Prophet to ʿAl�̄ ], they should have provided a ḥadīth that would not have needed interpretation ( lā yaḥtamilu l-taʾw�̄l) , and could have been accepted merely by the soundness of its content (�iḥḥat a�lihi ) and the trustworthiness of its source (�idq makhrajihi ).�� Moreover, ḥadīths are accepted as a supplementary source when dealing with problems of source interaction. For instance, when discussing Q 5:55: “Your true allies are God, his Messenger and those who believe (alladhīna āmanū),”�� the Rā��ḍa claim that the expression alladhīna āmanū refers to ʿAlī and should not be taken literally ( ẓāhir al-kalām). The ʿUthmānīs reply to this: We know that the literal interpretation of this expression (taʾwīl ẓāhir hādhā l-kalām) di�fers from what they say, but we cannot accept it unless we have a khabar from the Prophet — peace be upon him — or a consensus of the experts on its interpretation (ijmāʿ min a�ḥāb al-taʾwīl ʿalā tafsīrihi ).�� When the arguments discussed by al-Jā�ī� are properly contextualised — as is the case with the rejection of the ḥadīths adduced by the Rā��ḍa in defence of ʿAlī’s imamate in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya or by Abū Bakr to contest the claims of Fāṭima in the Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya — they reveal themselves as the �� �� �� ��
Zahniser, The ʿUthmāniyya of al-Jāḥiẓ, 89. Jā�i�, ʿUthmāniyya, 201.16-17. Quoted in ibid., 118.14-15. Ibid., 119.2-3.
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sophisticated application of clear hermeneutical rules integrated in a coherent epistemological framework, and not a Muʿtazilite rejection of ḥa�īth based on the critique of ikhtilāf . Al-Jā�i�’s use of hermeneutical tools is extremely precise and shows that he was obviously well acquainted with ��qh theory, especially with al-Shā��ʿī’s Risāla and the Shā��ʿite model of source interaction, despite the overall rejection of the khabar al-wāḥid a nd the admission of intersource abrogation in the Kitāb al-ʿAbbāsiyya. The question as to whether the hermeneutic paradigms employed in these treatises represent the opinion of al-Jā�i� and not that of groups to whom he gives voice cannot be answered conclusively. I am inclined to think it was the case, at least with regard to the model of inter-source interaction and the classi��cation of ʿilm as adduced in works where al-Jā�i� reports the opinions of varied interlocutors as well as when he seems to speak for himself. The Risāla fī ta�wīb ʿAlī is especially relevant in this context, because it conveys a debate with a Muʿtazilite and the discussion of reports is based on the same premises that we ��nd in the Kitāb al-ʿUthmāniyya. It is important to note that the discussion of legal hermeneutics is perfectly integrated in the debates that al-Jā�i� reports in his works. He might be digressive, but at least in the treatises on the imamate he is extremely logical and consistent. Moreover, accurate references and discussions to legal hermeneutics may be found in many other of his works besides those quoted in the current study — al-ʿUthmāniyya, al-ʿAbbāsiyya, and al-Risāla fī ta�wīb ʿAlī . Major works such as the Kitāb al-Ḥayawān and even epistles considered pure examples of adab such as the Risāla fī l-qiyān,�� include discussions of ��qh that provide a structure to the entire work. In this respect, al-Jā�ī�’s works show that ��qh permeated the ʿAbbāsid cultural sphere to an extent that cannot be determined by merely paying attention to works that we consider to be proper to the disciplines of law and legal theory.
References
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��
See Sánchez, Reading Adab as Fiqh.
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