REMREV2 Case Doctrines and Digests

REMREV2 Cases AY 2017 - 2018

and Gelario Provisional Remedies R-57: Preliminary Attachment

8. Novecio v Li, 754 SCRA 111

5 5

1. Lim v Lazaro, 700 SCRA (2013)

5

2. Ligon v RTC of Makati Br. 56 717 SCRA (2014)

5

3. Torres v Satsatin, 605 SCRA

5

4. Mangila v CA, 387 SCRA

6

5. Chuidian v Sandiganbayan, 349 SCRA

6

6. Luzon Dev. Bank v Krishman, 755 SCRA (2015)

7

7. Northern Luzon Island Co. v Garcia, 753 SCRA 603

7

8. Excellent Quality Apparel v Visayan Surety, 761 SCRA 464 9. Watercraft Venture Corp v Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179

Atty. Dela Peña Professor

7 7

12

9. Liberty Broadcasting Network v Atlocom, 760 SCRA 625 12 10. Republic v Cortez, 769 SCRA 267 R - 59: Receivership

13

14

1. Larrobis JR v Phil Veterans Bank, 440 SCRA

14

2. Chavez v CA, 610 SCRA

14

3. Tantano v Espina - Caboverde, 702 SCRA 508

15

4. Koruga v Arcenas, 509 SCRA

15

R - 60: Replevin

16

1. Orosa v CA, 329 SCRA 2. Smart Communications v Astorga, 542 SCRA

16 16

10. Phil Airconditioning Center v RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265 8

3. Hao v Andres, 555 SCRA

16

11. Alejandro Ng Wee v Tankiansee, 545 SCRA

4. Navarros v Escobedo, 606 SCRA

17

5. Agner v BPI Family Savings Bank, 697 SCRA (2013)

17

R - 58: Preliminary Injuction

9

9

1. Idolor v CA, 351 SCRA

9

R - 61: Support

17

2. Gustilo v Real, 353 SCRA

10

1. De Asis v CA, 303 SCRA

17

3. Lagrosas v Bristo-Myers, 565 SCRA

10

2. People v Manahan, 315 SCRA

17

4. Jenosa v Delarlarte, 630 SCRA

10

3. Lim v Lim, 604 SCRA

18

5. Solid Builders Inc v China Bank, 695 SCRA (2013)

11

4. Gotardo v Buling, 678 SCRA

18

6. Plaza v Lustiva, 718 SCRA (2014)

11

5. Lim - Lua v Lua, 697 SCRA

19

7. Office of the Ombudsman v De Chavez, 700 SCRA

11

6. Republic v Yahon, 726 SCRA 438

19

Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.

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7. Salas v Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560

19

8. Del Socorro v Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA 516

20

Special Civil Actions R - 62: Interpleader

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v COMELEC, 705 SCRA 340 (2013) 26 R-65: Certiorari, Prohibition, andMandamus 27

20

S-1: Certiorari

20

21

3. Maglalang v PAGCOR, 712 SCRA 472 (2013)

28

4. People v Castañeda, 712 SCRA 800 (2013)

29

5. UP Board of Regents v Ligot-Teylan, 227 SCRA 342 (1993)

21

R - 63: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

27

2. A.L. Ang Netwrok, Inc. v Mondejar, 714 SCRA 514 (2014) 28

3. Pasricha v Don Luis Dizon Realty, 548 SCRA 273, (2008) 21 4. Bank of Commerce v Planters Development Bank, 681 SCRA 521, (2012)

27

1. Ampil v Ombudsman, 703 SCRA 1 (2013)

1. Wack - Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc v Won, 70 SCRA 165, (1976) 20 2. Eternal Gardens v IAC, 165 SCRA 438 (1988)


22

6. Tuazon v RD of Caloocan, 157 SCRA 613 (1988)

30 30

1. Almeda v Bathala Marketing Ind., 542 SCRA 470 (2008) 22

7. Province of Leyte v Energy Development Corp, 760 SCRA 149 (2015) 30

2. Republic v Orbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005)

23

8. Cawad v Abad, 764 SCRA 1 (2015)

3. Malana v Tappa, 600 SCRA 189 (2009)

23

4. Chavez v Judicial Bar Council, 676 SCRA 579 (2012)

24

1. Vivas v Monetary Board of BSP, 703 SCRA 290 (2013) 31

5. Sabitsana v Muertegui, 703 SCRA 145 (2013)

24

2. Corales v Republic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013)

32

3. Tan v CA, 524 SCRA 306 (2007)

32

6. Republic v Roque, 706 SCRA 273 (2013) in relation to Southern Hemisphere Case, 630 SCRA 146 (2010)

24

7. Department of Finance v De la Cruz JR, 768 SCRA 73 (2015)

26

R-64: Review of Judgements and Final Orders of the COMELEC and COA 26 Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.

S-2: Prohibition

S-3: Mandamus

31

31

33

1. Hipos SR v Bay, 581 SCRA 674 (2009)

33

2. Sanchez v Lastimosa, 534 SCRA 84 (2007)

33

3. Social Justice Society v Atienza, 517 SCRA 657 (2007) 34

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4. Funa v Manila Economic and Cultural Office, 715 SCRA 247 (2014) 34 5. Cudia v Superintendent of PMA, 751 SCRA 469 (2015) 35 6. Villanueva v JBC, 755 SCRA 182 (2015) R-66: Quo Warranto

35

36

1. Mendoza v Allas, 302 SCRA 623 (1999)

36

2. Calleja v Panday, 483 SCRA 680 (2006)

37

3. Lokin JR v COMELEC, 621 SCRA 385 (2010)

38

4. Aratea v COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012)

39

5. De Castro v Carlos, 696 SCRA 400 (2013)

39

6. Velasco v Belmonte, 780 SCRA 81 (2016) R -67: Expropriation 40

39

1. City of Manila v Serrano, 359 SCRA 231 , 20 JUNE 2001 40 2. NAPOCOR v CA, GR No. 106804, 12 August 2004

41

3. Republic v Andaya, 524 SCRA 671, 15 JUNE 2007

43

4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon v DOTC, 552 SCRA 59 (2008) 43 5. Abad v Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA 247 (2010)

44

6. NPC v YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, GR No. 193936, 11 December 2013 45 R-68 Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

46

1. Ramirez v Manila Banking Corp., GR No. 198800, 11 December 2013 Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.

46


2. Marquez v Alindog, 714 SCRA 460 (2014)

46

3. LZK Holdings v Planters Development Bank, 714 SCRA 294 (2014) 47 4. Goldenway Merchandising Corp. v Equitable PCI Bank, 693 SCRA 439 (2013) 48 5. Allied Bank v Mateo 588 SCRA 538 (2009)

48

6. Robles v Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75 (2014)

49

7. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v CPR Promotions and Marketing Inc, 760 SCRA 59 (2015) 49 R-69: Partition

50

1. Vda. de Figuración v Figuracion - Gerilla, 690 SCRA 495 (2013)

50

2. Balus v Balus, 610 SCRA 178 (2010)

50

3. Feliciano v Canosa, 629 SCRA 550 (2010)

50

4. Mangahas v Brobio, 634 SCRA 351 (2010)

51

R-70: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

1. Suarez v Emboy JR, 718 SCRA 677 (2014)

51

51

2. Alconera v Pallanan, 714 SCRA 204 (2014)

51

3. Teodoro v Espino, 715 SCRA 435 (2014)

52

4. Ferrer v Rabaca, 632 SCRA 204 (2010)

52

5. CGR Corp., v Treyes, 522 SCRA 765 (2007)

53

6. Abad v Fil-homes Realty, 636 SCRA 247 (2010)

54

7. Zacarias v Anacay, 736 SCRA 508 (2014)

54

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and Gelario 8. Manalang v Bacani, 745 SCRA 27 (2015)

REMREV2 Cases AY 2017 - 2018 55

9. Supapo v De Jesus, 765 SCRA 211 (2015), GR. No. 198356

56

10. De la Cruz v Hermano, 754 SCRA 231 (2015)

56

11. Erorita v Dumlao, 781 SCRA 551 (2016)

57

R-71: Contempt


57

1. Yasay v Recto, 313 SCRA 739 (1999)

57

2. Sison v Caoibes JR 429 SCRA 258 (2004)

58

3. Español v Formoso, 525 SCRA 216 (2007)

58

4. Marantan v Diokno, 716 SCRA 164 (2014)

59

5. Tormis v Paredes, 749 SCRA 505 (2015) 6. Pulumbarit SR v CA, 772 SCRA 244 (2015)

60 60

7. Balindong v CA, 773 SCRA 27 (2015)

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Provisional Remedies R-57: Preliminary Attachment

1. Lim v Lazaro, 700 SCRA (2013)


or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all persons.

While the provisions of Rule 57 are silent on the length of time within which an attachment lien shall continue to subsist after the rendition of a final judgment, jurisprudence dictates that the said lien continues until the debt is paid, or the

3. Torres v Sa tsatin, 605 SCRA

sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law. A writ of attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement between the parties.

since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the respondents. There are two ways of discharging the attachment. First, to file a counter-bond in accordance with Section 12 of Rule 57. Second[,] [t]o quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same rule. Whether the attachment was discharged by either of the two ways indicated in the law, the attachment debtor cannot be deemed to have waived any defect in the issuance of the attachment writ by simply availing himself of one way of discharging the attachment writ, instead of the

2. Ligon v RTC of Makati Br. 56 717 SCRA (2014) Attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. Such a proceeding, in effect, means that the property attached is an indebted thing and a virtual condemnation of it to pay the owner’s debt. The lien continues until the debt is paid, Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.

At the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent

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other. The filing of a counter-bond is merely a speedier way of discharging the attachment writ instead of the other way.

5. Chuidian v S andiganbayan, 349 SCRA

4. Mangila v C A, 387 SCRA

: First.To file Grounds to discharge a writ of attachment a counterbond in accordance with Rule 57, Section 12 or Second. To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued, as provided for in Section 13 of the same Rule. It would appear that petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of the issuance of the writ of attachment. By his own admission, however, he repeatedly acknowledged that his justifications to warrant the lifting of the attachment are facts or events that came to light or took place after the writ of attachment had already been implemented. Supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the purview of this particular rule. In the instant case, there is no showing that the issuance of the writ of attachment was attended by impropriety or irregularity. Apart from seeking a reconsideration of the resolution granting the application for the writ, petitioner no longer questioned the writ itself. For four (4) long years he kept silent and did not exercise any of the remedies available to a defendant whose property or asset has been attached. It is rather too late in the day for petitioner to question the propriety of the issuance of the writ.

The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second,the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant. The alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the circumstances of the case. The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.


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6. Luzon Dev. Bank v K rishman, 755 SCRA (2015)

8. Excellent Quality Apparel v Visayan Surety, 761 SCRA 464

Once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that petitioner’s argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount" is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5 requires the deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of money. Petitioners should not give a special or technical interpretation to a word which is otherwise construed in its ordinary sense by the law and broaden the signification of the term "deposit" to include that of real properties.

Under Section 20, Rule 57, in relation to Section 4 therein, the surety bond shall answer for all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment. In other words, the damages sought to be enforced against the surety bond are unliquidated. Necessarily, a notice and hearing before the finality of judgment must be undertaken to properly determine the amount of damages that was suffered by the defendant due to the improper attachment. These damages to be imposed against the attaching party and his sureties are different from the principal case, and must be included in the judgment. On the other hand, under Section 17, Rule 57, in relation to Section 12 therein, the cash deposit or the counterbond shall secure the payment of any judgment that the attaching party may recover in the action. Stated differently, the damages sought to be charged against the surety bond are liquidated. The final judgment had already determined the amount to be awarded to the winning litigant on the main action. Thus, there is nothing left to do but to execute the judgment against the losing party, or in case of insufficiency, against its sureties.

7. Northern Luzon Island Co. v Garcia, 753 SCRA 603 The consequence is that where the main action is appealed, the attachment which may have been issued as an incident of that action, is also considered appealed and so also removed from the jurisdiction of the court a quo. The attachment itself cannot be the subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such action. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.

9. Watercraft Venture Corp v Wolfe, 770 SCRA 179 The applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's

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mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time, persons, places and specific acts of fraud committed. An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective and the court that ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13 of Rule 57 by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff's application and affidavits on which the writ was based – and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued – the reason being that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the action. In other words, the merits of the action would be ventilated at a mere hearing of a motion, instead of at the regular trial. Be that as it may, the foregoing rule is not applicable in this case because when Wolfe filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, he did not offer to show the falsity of the factual averments in Watercraft's application and affidavit on which the writ was based. Instead, he sought the discharge of the writ on the ground that Watercraft failed to particularly allege any circumstance amounting to fraud. No trial on the merits of the action at a mere hearing of such motion will be had since only the sufficiency of the factual averments in the application and affidavit of merit will be examined in order to find out whether or not Wolfe was guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action is brought, or in the performance thereof. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


10. Phil Airconditioning Center v RCJ Lines, 775 SCRA 265 There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or posting a counterbond under Section 12; (2) by proving that the attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the bond is insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the attachment is excessive under Section 13; and (4) by claiming that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2. The discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counterbond. On the other hand, the discharge under Section 13 takes effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued, or that the bond is insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under Section 13 must be made only after hearing. The dissolution of the preliminary attachment upon security given [Section 12], or a showing of its irregular or improper issuance [Section 13], does not of course operate to discharge the sureties on plaintiffs own attachment bond. The reason is simple. That bond is executed to the adverse party,. . . conditioned that the ... (applicant) will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto." Hence, until that determination is made, as to the applicant's entitlement to the attachment, his bond must stand and cannot be withdrawn.

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11. Alejandro Ng Wee v Tankiansee, 545 SCRA For a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor. The affidavit, being the foundation of the writ, must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. In the application for the writ under the said ground, compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established is the rule that fraud is never presumed. The merits of the main action are not triable in a motion to discharge an attachment otherwise an applicant for the dissolution could force a trial of the merits of the case on his motion. However, the principle finds no application here because petitioner has not yet fulfilled the requirements set by the Rules of Court for the issuance of the writ against the properties of respondent. The evil sought to be prevented by the said ruling will not arise, because the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of the writ in this case can be determined by simply reading the complaint and the affidavit in support of the application.



R - 58: Preliminary Injuction

1. Idolor v CA, 351 SCRA Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be aright in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.

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2. Gustilo v Real, 353 SCRA



3. Lagrosas v Bristo-Myers, 565 SCRA

Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act The injunction bond is intended as a security for on the application only after all parties have been notified and damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary not to have been granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the hearing may not be dispensed with. enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential injunction, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly. that the following requisites be present: (1)there must be a The appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a NLRC, and that the implementation of the writ of execution violation of such right. The onus probandi is on movant to and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in show that there exists a right to be protected, which is directly effect amounted to a finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further, there must damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and bond is intended to protect Lagrosas against loss or damage by substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas claim, it is for the writ to prevent a serious damage. not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter. In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do not see how the Since injunction is the strong arm of equity, he who complainant's exercise of such rights would cause an must apply for it must come with equity or with clean irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing candidate so hands. This is so because among the maxims of equity are (1) as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order "to he who seeks equity must do equity, and (2) he who comes into maintain the status quo." We see no reason to disagree with the equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently finding of the OCA that the evident purpose of the second TRO stated maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he was to prevent complainant from participating in the election of who has done inequity shall not have equity. It signifies that a the Liga ng mga Barangay. litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.

4. Jenosa v Delarlarte, 630 SCRA


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Here, petitioners, having reneged on their agreement without any justifiable reason, come to court with unclean hands. This Court may deny a litigant relief if his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue. Since petitioners have come to court with inequitable and unfair conduct, we deny them relief.

5. Solid Builders Inc v China Bank, 695 SCRA (2013)


Neither has there been a showing of irreparable injury. An injury is considered irreparable if it is of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law, or where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy, that is, it is not susceptible of mathematical computation. The provisional remedy of preliminary injunction may only be resorted to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. Where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to auction sale. Foreclosure of mortgaged property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are present in the case before it. In this connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injury. The petitioners failed to show clear and unmistakable As no clear right that warrants the extraordinary rights to be protected by the writ; the present action has been protection of an injunctive writ has been shown by SBI and rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of the main MFII to exist in their favor, the first requirement for the grant of action. a preliminary injunction has not been satisfied. In the absence of any requisite, and where facts are shown to be wanting in ! bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ of injunction must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution authorizes the Office of the Ombudsman to promulgate its own rules of

6. Plaza v Lustiva, 718 SCRA (2014)

7. O ce of the Ombudsman v De Chavez, 700 SCRA


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procedure. In this connection, Sections 18 and 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 also provide that the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions and duties" and to amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. For the CA to issue a preliminary injunction that will stay the penalty imposed by the Ombudsman in an administrative case would be to encroach on the rule-making powers of the Office of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and RA 6770 as the injunctive writ will render nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. The CA's issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman.

8. Novecio v Li, 754 SCRA 111 A preliminary injunction is proper when the plaintiff appears to be clearly entitled to the relief sought and has substantial interest in the right sought to be defended. As this Court has previously ruled, "while the existence of the right need not be conclusively established, it must be clear.”



A writ of preliminary injunction is generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided. In a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. The court in granting or dismissing an application for a writ of preliminary injunction based on the pleadings of the parties and their respective evidence must state in its order the findings and conclusions based on the evidence and the law. This is to enable the appellate court to determine whether the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in resolving, one way or the other, the plea for injunctive relief.

9. Liberty Broadcasting N etwork v Atlocom, 760 SCRA 625 A right to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. From the evidence on record, no clear, actual and existing right to the subject frequencies or to the extension of PA had been shown by Atlocom. Accordingly, no grave abuse

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of discretion was committed by the RTC in denying Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 insofar as the use of the reallocated frequencies claimed by Atlocom. The CA thus seriously erred in reversing the RTC and holding that Atlocom was entitled to injunctive relief due to alleged violation of its right by the NTC. A writ of preliminary injunction being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, it must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights. In the absence of the same, and where facts are shown to be wanting in bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down for having been rendered in grave abuse of discretion. CA gravely abused its discretion when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the implementation of MC 06-08-2005 in the absence of a clear legal right on the part of Atlocom, and subsequently denying LBNI's offer to file counter bond despite compliance with the requisites provided in Section 6 of Rule 58. However, with our ruling that the writ of preliminary injunction was improperly issued, hence, null and void, the matter of allowing LBNI to post a counter-bond has been rendered moot.

10. Republic v Cortez, 769 SCRA 267 "The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction."A preliminary injunction does not determine the merits of a case Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


or decide controverted facts. Since it is a mere preventive remedy, it only seeks to prevent threatened wrong, further injury and irreparable harm or injustice until the rights of the parties are settled. "It is usually granted when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case." A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order. For its issuance, the applicant is required to show, at least tentatively, that he has a right which is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. Simply stated, the applicant needs only to show that he has the ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint. On the other hand, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment that embodies a final injunction. A final injunction is one which perpetually restrains the party or person enjoined from the commission or continuance of an act, or in case of mandatory injunctive writ, one which confirms the preliminary mandatory injuction. It is issued when the court, after trial on the merits, is convinced that the applicant is entitled to have the act or acts complained of permanently enjoined. Otherwise stated, it is only after the court has come up with a definite pronouncement respecting an applicant’s right and of the act violative of such right, based on its appreciation of the evidence presented, that a final injunction is issued. To be a basis for a final and permanant injunction, the right and the act violative thereof must be established by the applicant with absolute certainty.

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Rev. Cortez failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction.

R - 59: Receivership

1. Larrobis JR v Ph il Veterans Bank, 440 SCRA When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the financially distressed bank. A receiver, who concurrently represents the bank, then takes control and possession of its assets for the benefit of the bank’s creditors. A liquidator meanwhile assumes the role of the receiver upon the determination by the Monetary Board that the bank can no longer resume business. His task is to dispose of all the assets of the bank and effect partial payments of the bank’s obligations in accordance with legal priority. In both receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by the receiver or liquidator. The receiver or liquidator meanwhile acts not only for the benefit of the bank, but for its creditors as well. Settled is the principle that a bank is bound by the acts, or failure to act of its receiver. However, the bank may go after the receiver who is liable to it for any culpable or negligent



failure to collect the assets of such bank and to safeguard its assets. The period within which respondent bank was placed under receivership and liquidation proceedings does not constitute a fortuitous event which interrupted the prescriptive period in bringing actions.

2. Chavez v CA, 610 SCRA Receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of the suit to help achieve its purpose. Consequently, it cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res judicata on the merits of the other cases. The grant or denial of this provisional remedy will still depend on the need for it in the particular action. A petition for receivership under Section 1(b), Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy is not receivership. Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Because receivership is a harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she has not. Indeed,

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in none of the other cases she filed against Evelina and Aida has that remedy been granted her.

3. Tantano v Espina - Caboverde, 702 SCRA 508 Dominalda’s alleged need for income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment of a receiver. The approval of an application for receivership merely on this ground is not only unwarranted but also an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need and like reasons are not found in Sec. 1 of Rule 59 which prescribes specific grounds or reasons for granting receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which seems to be a catchall provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under receivership will be lost, wasted or injured. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 is very clear in that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall" denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Sec. 2 of Rule 59 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


4. Koruga v Arcenas, 509 SCRA Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank Act should be followed, viz.: The designation of a conservator under Section 29 of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. Furthermore, the designation of a conservator is not a precondition to the designation of a receiver. It is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for receivership of banks. Crystal clear in Section 30 is the provision that says the "appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board." The term "exclusively" connotes that only the Monetary Board can resolve the issue of whether a bank is to be placed under receivership and, upon an affirmative finding, it also has authority to appoint a receiver. This is further affirmed by the fact that the law allows the Monetary Board to take action "summarily and without need for prior hearing.” And, as a clincher, the law explicitly provides that "actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory, and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on a petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”

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From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership.

R - 60: Replevin

1. Orosa v CA, 329 SCRA We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred when it ordered private respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase price. Verily, to sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen installments actually paid with interest.

2. Smart Communications v Astorga, 542 SCRA SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employee-employer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


personal property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.

3. Hao v Andres, 555 SCRA The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do. The rule is clear that the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff, and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five days. Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification. It must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in replevin is executed by taking possession of the property specified therein, such property is in custodia legis. As legal custodian, it is Andres’ duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, when he passed his duty to safeguard the motor vehicles to Silver, he committed a clear neglect of duty.

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4. Navarros v Escobedo, 606 SCRA Prior demand is not required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed. For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond.

5. Agner v BPI Family Savings Bank, 697 SCRA (2013) The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment30 to speak of.

R - 61: Support

1. De Asis v CA, 303 SCRA The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

2. People v Manahan, 315 SCRA On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.

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3. Lim v Lim, 604 SCRA Petitioners Liable to Provide Support but only to their Grandchildren. Grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void. However, petitioners’ partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners’ grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


The persons entitled to receive support are petitioners’ grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the grandchildren a wellprovided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her husband’s infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryl’s charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.

4. Gotardo v Buling, 678 SCRA "[F]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. A parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the

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recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.

5. Lim - L ua v Lua, 697 SCRA Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child. The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent. Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears. The monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.

6. Republic v Yahon, 726 SCRA 438 Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government. It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement legislation. Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution.

7. Salas v Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under

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Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his illegitimate child.

8. Del So corro v Van W ilsem, 7 44 SCRA 516 It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether. It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the noncompliance therewith. Respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife. To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

Special Civil Actions R - 62: Interpleader

1. Wack - Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc v Won, 70 SCRA 165, (1976) A stakeholder6 should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court.7 He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader.8 He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants.9 Otherwise, he maybe barred by laches10 or undue delay.11 But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. It has been held that a stakeholder’s action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants,13 especially where he had notice of the conflicting

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claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.

2. Eternal Gardens v IAC, 165 SCRA 438 (1988) The essence of interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest of the property in litigation by petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy, with the court. It is a rule founded on justice and equity: “that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.” The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interests of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.



3. Pasricha v Don Luis Dizon Realty, 548 SCRA 273, (2008) Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. When interpleader proper.—Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.

4. Bank of Commerce v Planters Development Bank, 681 SCRA 521, (2012) When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new action arises ,134 where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed outin an action. The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Page 21 of 60

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Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions. 136 Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court137 does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim,138 a form of defense, 139 or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s “counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader” runs counter to general procedures. Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141 allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device of a motion. While captioned “Answer with countercomplaint/cross-claim for interpleader,” the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion, 142 seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that “payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner”143 of the subject CB bills. The rules define a “civil action” as “one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.” Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment. Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern theuniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted “in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


(fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.” In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.

R - 63: Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

1. Almeda v Bathala Marketing Ind., 542 SCRA 470 (2008) Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be

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an actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. We do not agree. A petition for declaratory relief may not be dismissed despite the filing of an action for rescission, ejectment and damages where the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition.

2. Republic v O rbecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005) The petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8 This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

3. Malana v Tappa, 600 SCRA 189 (2009) An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for

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declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.

4. Chavez v J udicial Ba r Co uncil, 676 SCRA 579 (2012) The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the srcinal jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court ( RTC ). Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not among those within the srcinal jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

5. Sabitsana v Muertegui, 703 SCRA 145 (2013) On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action to quiet Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC. It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.

6. Republic v Roque, 706 SCRA 273 (2013) in relation to Southern Hemisphere Case, 630 SCRA 146 (2010) It is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA 9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: a() the remedy of certiorari was improper; ( b) petitioners therein lack locus standi; and (c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy. Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion. The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC’s ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief. Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or

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other written instrument, statute, executive order or danger to sustain some direct injury as a result of the regulation, or ordinance;second, the terms of said enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. Not far documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require removed from the factual milieu in theSouthern Hemisphere judicial construction; third, there must have been no breach cases, private respondents only assert general interests as of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an citizens, and taxpayers and infractions which the government actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the said law between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, must be ripe for judicial determination;sixth and, adequate private respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on relief is not available through other means or other forms of remarks of certain government officials which were addressed action or proceeding. to the general public.40 They, however, failed to show how these Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental observes that while the first, second, and third requirements action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth them. In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent requirements, however, remain wanting. threat to any of them. As held in Southern Hemisphere: As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an Without any justiciable controversy, the actual justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, exists in this case. over which the Court has no srcinal jurisdiction. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an Then again, declaratory actions characterized by existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for “double contingency,” where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipated reaction to it of a public official are anticipatory.38 Corollary thereto, by “ripening seeds” it is merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, lack of ripeness. but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and The possibility of abuse in the violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take describes a state of facts indicating imminent and inevitable the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by and merely imagined. Such possibility is not tranquilizing declaration. peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power A perusal of private respondents’ petition for granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse declaratory relief would show that they have failed to must be anchored on real events before courts may demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate step in to settle actual controversies involving rights Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.

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41 which are legally demandable and enforceable. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted) Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief all the same. Thus, it follows that the fifth and sixth requisites are not met with in this case.

7. Department of Finance v De la Cruz JR, 768 SCRA 73 (2015) Here, the declaratory relief was recognized to be under the jurisdiction of the RTC because of Respondents’ raising the issue of validity and effectivity of EO 140, by virtue of which, Respondents are being transferred to other positions. It did not dwell however to the appropriateness of the declaratory relief in this case. Author submits that the dissenting opinion of Justice Leonen in this case is a better ruling in tackling the issue of the appropriateness of the declaratory relief in this case. [Dissenting opinion] A petition for declaratory relief may prosper only if there is no breach or violation yet of the assailed government regulation, and adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding. The third and sixth requisites are absent. The Complaint before the lower court did not simply ask for a declaration of a hypothetical breach. Adequate relief through the Civil Service Commission was also available. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


R-64: Review of Judgements and Final Orders of the COMELEC and COA

Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v COMELEC, 705 SCRA 340 (2013) The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. “Grave abuse of discretion,” under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross.

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R-65: Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus S-1: Certiorari

1. Ampil v Ombudsman, 703 SCRA 1 (2013) Plainly, the Ombudsman has “full discretion,” based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the 20 On this score, existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. we have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers.21 The Ombudsman’s finding to proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 22 However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause: (a)! To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b)! When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c)! When there is a prejudicial question which issub judice; (d)! When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


(e)! Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f)!When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g)! Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h)! Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i)! Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.23 (Emphasis supplied). The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685. While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there is no probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowh ere in the Reso lut ion or in the Order deny ing reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019. We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents is a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the Ombudsman made no finding

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at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

3. Maglalang v PAGCOR, 712 SCRA 472 (2013)

2. A.L. Ang Netwrok, Inc. v Mondejar, 714 SCRA 514 (2014)

It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside. Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the

Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an srcinal action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to the controversy. Considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.


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court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

4. People v Castañeda, 712 SCRA 800 (2013) At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the filing under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the 15 May 2013 Resolution was received by the BOC 2 days after its promulgation, or on 17 May 2013. RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on 24 July 2013, when Atty. Campos received the 15 July 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the 15 May 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that the petition be given due course despite its late filing. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. No convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency Even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process. A perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of discretion on its part or denial of due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.

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5. UP Board of Regents v LigotTeylan, 227 SCRA 342 (1993) The Court finds that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.

6. Tuazon v RD o f Ca loocan, 157 SCRA 613 (1988) The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to “any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to “proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person x x exercising functions judicial or ministerial.” But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.

7. Province of Leyte v Energy Development Corp, 760 SCRA 149 (2015)

Thus, in petitions for certiorari filed before the CA, the latter acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or resolution indicating the CA’s initial action on the petition to the respondent; or b() the voluntary submission of the respondent to the CA’s jurisdiction. In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution dated November 4, 2009 indicating its initial action on the Province of Leyte’s certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to the petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its comment dated December 14, 2009 to such petition. Hence, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both parties to the instant case. Admittedly, the Rules require that the petition filed before the CA should include proof of service to the other party. Essentially, the purpose of this rule is to apprise such party of

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the pendency of an action in the CA. Thus, if such party had already been notified of the same and had even participated in the proceedings, such purpose would have already been served. Considering that in this case, the CA had already issued a Resolution dated November 4, 2009 directing EDC to file a comment which the latter had complied with, it cannot be denied that EDC was already aware of the certiorari proceedings before the CA and that jurisdiction had been acquired over its person. The CA, therefore, should have brushed aside the Province of Leyte’s procedural mishap and resolved the case on the merits in the interest of substantial justice.

8. Ca wad v Abad, 764 SCRA 1 (2015) Certiorarias a special civil action is available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. On the other hand, prohibitionis available only if: (1) it is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising funct ions, judicial , quasi -judicia l, or ministerial; (2) the tribunal, corporation, board or person acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Based on the foregoing, Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


this Court has consistently reiterated that petitions for certiorari and prohibition may be invoked only against tribunals, corporations, boards, officers, or persons exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, and not against their exercise of legislative or quasi-legislative functions.

S-2: Prohibition

1. Vivas v Monetary Board of BSP, 703 SCRA 290 (2013) Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances obtaining. Prohibition or a “writ of prohibition” is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which it has cognizance. Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.

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Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.

3. Tan v CA, 524 SCRA 306 (2007)

2. Corales v R epublic, 703 SCRA 623 (2013)

Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction. As long as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a timely appeal. In determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act in contemplation of law.

Prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM aside from an action for prohibition.


Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.

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S-3: Mandamus

1. Hipos SR v Bay, 581 SCRA 674 (2009) Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However,mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly,mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

2. Sanchez v Lastimosa, 534 SCRA 84 (2007) We have repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions that the remedy of mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one. The issuance of the writ is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In Manila International Airport Authority v. Rivera Village Lessee Homeowners Association, Inc., 471 SCRA 358 (2005), we emphasized, through the erudite and eloquent ponencia of Justice Dante O. Tinga, that the writ can be issued only when the applicant’s legal right to the performance of a particular act sought to be compelled is clear and complete, one which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.

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3. Social Justice Society v Atienza, 517 SCRA 657 (2007) Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.Mandamusis an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done. We have ruled in previous cases that when amandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any specific interest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the enforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.

4. Funa v Manila Economic and Cultural O!ce, 715 SCRA 247 (2014) The rules regarding legal standing in bringing public suits, or locus standi, are already well-defined in our case law. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


Again, We cite David, which summarizes jurisprudence on this point: By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (1) the cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators. We rule that the instant petition raises issues of transcendental importance, involved as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly neglected, by the COA. Hence, We hold that the petitioner, as a concerned citizen, has the requisite legal standing to file the instant mandamus petition. The last preliminary issue is concerned with the petition’s nonobservance of the principle of hierarchy of courts. The COA assails the filing of the instantmandamus petition directly with this Court, when such petition could have very well been presented, at the first instance, before the Court of Appeals or any Regional Trial Court. The COA claims that the petitioner was not able to provide compelling reasons to justify a direct resort to the Supreme Court. In view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised in the mandamus petition, as earlier mentioned, this Court waives this last procedural issue in favor of a resolution on the merits.

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5. Cudia v Su perintendent o f PM A, 751 SCRA 469 (2015)

6. Villanueva v JBC, 755 SCRA 182 (2015)

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed “[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide how or when to perform the duty. Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act sought to be mandated.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC’s constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC’s policy. The petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his noninclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy ofmandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually


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exclusive. The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. More so, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitut ional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.” “[T]he purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc ., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. The instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have srcinal jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691. Therefore, by virtue of the Court’s supervisory duty Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed.

R-66: Quo Warranto

1. Mendoza v Allas, 302 SCRA 623 (1999) The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court.Quo warranto is a demand made by the State upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated. The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.

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Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. x x x If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may order: 1. The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; 2. The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; 3. The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable inquo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent’s successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ ofquo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person—to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court’s decision.



2. Calleja v Pa nday, 483 SCRA 680 (2006) It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appealsthat Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is “limited to actions ofquo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated,” while “[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended).” However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows: 5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. x x x Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

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Procedure does not apply toquo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase “or an office in a corporation created by authority of law” which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing IntraCorporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated. The RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association , Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.

3. Lokin JR v C OMELEC, 621 SCRA 385 (2010) An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated. The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is

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not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action forquo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her. Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by CruzGonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has srcinal and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.

4. Aratea v COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012) In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court as to procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the time these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is brought before the Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


elections, while a quo warranto is filed after and may still be filed even if a CoC cancellation case was not filed before elections.

5. De Castro v Carlos, 696 SCRA 400 (2013) “A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the privilege has been forfeited.” Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

6. Velasco v Belmonte, 780 SCRA 81 (2016) A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., ( i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes’s Certificate of Candidacy; and ( iii) the final and executory

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resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto. Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” A petition formandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionaryon the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

R -67: Expropriation

1. City of Manila v Serrano, 359 SCRA 231 , 20 JUNE 2001 Doctrine/s: Upon compliance with the requirements for expropriation, issuance of writ of possession becomes ministerial. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners. Facts: The City of Manila has filed a complaint for expropriation on certain plots of land in the First District of Tondo before the RTC on the premise of using such properties to give lands to the landless, pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. Respondents and alleged landowners of the properties filed for expropriation alleged among others that their land should not be covered by the expropriation proceedings because their plot of land, 1-C if distributed among the co-owners would result to plots of lands that are inhabitable; that their plot of land is exempt by expropriation under RA 7279; and that the trial court should have not ordered the writ of possession and petitioner’s entry into the property. Issue: WON the issuance of the writ of possession and petitioner’s entry into the property after filing the proper complaint and deposits made is not proper when there are still questions on the validity of the complaints. Held: Yes. A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with

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these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the trial court to issue the writ of possession. As to the question of compliance of the other section of RA 7279 it is held that Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements. The determination of this question must await the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.

2. NAPOCOR v CA, GR No. 106804, 12 August 2004 Doctine/s:The Court pointed out that a government agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, and then just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. It cannot avail of the automatic dismissal right given to plaintiffs in ordinary civil actions because expropriation as a manifestation of the State’s power of Eminent Domain are still subject to limitations. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. Facts:Antonio Pobre has a 141,300 square meter land in Albay which he turned into a resort-subdivision and were given the necessary permits and titles to said land. A 68,969 square meter plot of land remained with Pobre when the NPC decided to lease 11 plot of lands with Pobre for a geothermal power plant. Later, 2 expropriation proceedings were commenced by the NPC against the plots of lands of Pobre. The first, in 1977, Pobre did not opposed but asked that NPC to stop or limit the waste being dumped on the property outside the leased or expropriated lands. This request was to no avail. The 2nd expropriation in 1 September 1979, and the NPC was given the writ of possession after complying with the proper deposits. This was later on opposed by Pobre and prayed for damages for the permanent damages done to his land, on 10 December 1984. On 2 January 1985, the NPC filed for the dismissal of its 2nd expropriation complaint against the land of Pobre and was granted but the trial for the damages prayed for by Pobre still continued. This is then opposed by NPC on the ground that should have been dismissed together with their expropriation complaint. Issue: WON the complaint for damages filed for by an aggrieved land owner against the initiator of the expropriation

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proceedings be also automa tically dismissed when the expropriation proceedings were withdrawn by the complainant. WON the aggrieved landowner may be still given just compensation when the land being expropriated has been restored to him. Held: No. In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions.The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right. The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law. If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action. However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendants right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action. Yes. Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner. However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation. In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 squaremeter Property. We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements. NPCs taking of Pobres property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobres entire 68,969 squaremeter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobres repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property.

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NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second expropriation case five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobres property rights. Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for Pobres 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC.

3. Republic v Andaya, 524 SCRA 671, 15 JUNE 2007

Taking, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.

Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land.

4. Asia’s Emerging Dragon v DOTC, 552 SCRA 59 (2008) Only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


and that the writ will not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. The rights or privileges of an srcinal proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project are never meant to be absolute; An unsolicited proposal is subject to evaluation, after which, the government agency or local government unit (LGU) concerned may accept or reject the proposal outright. Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) does not possess any legal personality to interfere with or restrain the activities of the Government as regards Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for prohibition and mandamus, such as in the instant case, can only be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the party in the ordinary course of law. As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. Reasonable time for filing a petition for mandamus should likewise be for the same period. The filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and negates any claim that the said petition for the extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. Thus, for expropriation to be valid, the following requirements must be met: (1) the taking

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must be for public use and (2) just compensation must be paid to the owner of the private property. To be valid, the taking must be for public use. The meaning of the term “public use” has evolved over time in response to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally understood as strictly limited to actual “use by the public” has already been abandoned. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public interest,” “public benefit,” “public welfare” and “public convenience.” It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. The State, through expropriation proceedings, may take private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this property again to another private party as long as there is a public purpose to the taking. In 2005, the United States Supreme Court held in Kelo v. New London that promotion of economic development qualifies as a public use even if private parties are benefited. As we stated in Agan (which we likewise recognized in Gingoyon), compensation must conform not only with law but equity as well. This means that the expropriation court is not confined to strictly following the formula spelled out in the law and instead is given latitude in its determination of the compensation due to PIATCO. After all, the determination of just compensation is a judicial function.



5. Abad v F il-homes Realty, 636 SCRA 247 (2010) In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the State expropriates private property for public use upon payment of just compensation. A socialized housing project falls within the ambit of public use as it is in furtherance of the constitutional provisions on social justice. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. The exercise of expropriation by a local government unit is covered by Section 19 of the Local Government Code (LGC).—A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just com pens ati on, purs uant to the provision s of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local

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government unit may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of the property. Expropriation of lands consists of two stages: The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners x x x. It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to pay the property owners the final just compensation. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary to Section 19 of the LGC.

6. NPC v YCLA Sugar Development Corporation, GR No. 193936, 11 December 2013 In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the

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property, the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint. The Court has consistently ruled that just compensation cannot be arrived at arbitrarily; several factors must be considered such as, but not limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by documentary evidence.16 The amount of just compensation could only be attained by using reliable and actual data as bases for fixing the value of the condemned property. A commissioners’ report of land prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be disregarded by the court.

R-68 Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage

1. Ramirez v Manila Banking Corp., GR No. 198800, 11 December 2 013 We have consistently held that unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. The CA erred in ruling that absence of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez as required by Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


paragraph N of the real estate mortgage will not invalidate the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. We rule that when respondent failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez, it committed a contractual breach of said paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on September 8, 1994 null and void. Thus, we reverse the assailed CA Decision and Resolution.

2. Marquez v Alindog, 714 SCRA 460 (2014) It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration (without bond) of the redemption period therefor. To this end, the Court, in China Banking Corp. v. Sps. Lozada( China Banking Corp.), 557 SCRA 177 (2008), citing several cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the part of the court. In the case of Spouses Espiridion v. Court of Appeals , 490 SCRA 273 (2006), the Court expounded on the ministerial nature of the foregoing issuance as follows: The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a ministerial function. The trial court has no discretion on this

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matter. Hence, any talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced. The ministerial issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, however, admits of an exception. Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s Court (Rules) pertinently provides that the possession of the right to a writ of possession over the subject property because mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in an the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding of such particular issue. Moreover, the authority relied upon by the property by adverse title or right. In the recent case of Rural LZK Holdings defeats rather than support its position. The Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo), Inc. v. Centeno, 693 SCRA 110 ruling in PNB echoes the very same rationale of the judgment (2013), citing the case of China Banking Corp., the Court in G.R. No. 167998 that is — the purchaser in foreclosure sale illumined that “the phrase ‘a third party who is actually holding may take possession of the property even before the expiration the property adversely to the judgment obligor’ contemplates a of the redemption period by filing anex parte motion for such situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. purpose and upon posting of the necessary bond. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of The co-owner, agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the possession. This is clear from the following disquisitions in property in their own right, and they are not merely the Espinoza v. United Overseas Bank Phils., 616 SCRA 353 successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co(2010), which reiterates the settled rules on writs of possession, owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property to wit: The proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is should not only be possessed by a third party, but also held by ex parte and summary in nature. It is a judicial proceeding the third party adversely to the judgment obligor.” In other brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice by words, as mentioned in Villanueva v. Cherdan Lending the court to any person adverse of interest. It is a proceeding Investors Corporation, 633 SCRA 173 (2010), h t e third wherein relief is granted without giving the person against person must therefore claim a right superior to that of the whom the relief is sought an opportunity to be heard. By its srcinal mortgagor. very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding. It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a

3. LZK Ho ldings v Planters Development Bank, 714 SCRA 294 (2014)


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wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

4. Goldenway Merchandising Corp. v Equitable PCI Bank, 693 SCRA 439 (2013) The law governing cases of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In this case, the parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan obligation becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended. The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the prescribed time limit, to make it effective.

5. Allied Bank v Mateo 588 SCRA 538 (2009) Considering that petitioner is a banking institution, the determination of the redemption price for the foreclosed property should be governed by Section 78 of the General Banking Act. Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 359 SCRA 480 (2001), is instructive: x " x" x Petitioner’s contention that Section 78 of the General Banking Act governs the determination of the redemption price of the Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


subject property is meritorious. In Ponce de Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 146 SCRA 862 (1970), this Court had occasion to rule that Section 78 of the General Banking Act had the effect of amending Section 6 of Act No. 3135 insofar as the redemption price is concerned when the mortgagee is a bank, as in this case, or a banking or credit institution. The apparent conflict between the provisions of Act No. 3135 and the General Banking Act was, therefore, resolved in favor of the latter, being a special and subsequent legislation. This pronouncement was reiterated in the case ofSy v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 (1989), where we held that the amount at which the foreclosed property is redeemable is the amount due under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding obligation of the mortgagor plus interest and expenses in accordance with Section 78 of the General Banking Act. It was, therefore, manifest error on the part of the Court of Appeals to apply in the case at bar the provisions of Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in fixing the redemption price of the subject foreclosed property. In BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Veloso, 436 SCRA 1 (2004), the Court had occasion to state the requirements for the redemption of the foreclosed property. The Court held: The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes the exercise of the right to repurchase. In several cases decided by the Court where the right to repurchase was held to have been properly exercised, there was an unequivocal tender of payment for the full amount of the repurchase price. Otherwise, the offer to redeem is ineffectual. Bona fide redemption necessarily implies

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a reasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price, otherwise the rule on the redemption period fixed by law can easily be circumvented. It is not difficult to understand why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the auction winner be assured that the offer to redeem is being made in good faith. Thus, the Court finds that respondent’s action for legal redemption was not filed in good faith. It was not filed for the purpose of determining the correct redemption price, but to stretch the redemption period indefinitely.

6. Robles v Yapcinco, 739 SCRA 75 (2014)

The registration of the sale is required only in extrajudicial foreclosure sale because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption. In contrast, the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to the mortgagor, except in mortgages with banking institutions. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation of the sale.



7. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v CPR Promotions and Marketing Inc, 760 SCRA 59 (2015) We have already ruled in several cases that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. In ascertaining the deficit amount, Sec. 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is elucidating, to wit: Section 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.— The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and when there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to the person entitled to it. (emphasis added) Verily, there can only be a deficit when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to cover (1) the costs of foreclosure proceedings; and (2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of interests and penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure.

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R-69: Partition

1. Vda. de Figuración v Figuracion - Gerilla, 690 SCRA 495 (2013) The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely resolved.

2. Balus v Balus, 610 SCRA 178 (2010) Petitioner’s contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the purpose of



partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates petitioner’s claims in the present case.

3. Feliciano v Canosa, 629 SCRA 550 (2010) We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the said deed was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. The applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964). However, the records show that petitioners’ complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979. As petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within the allowable period. The same result obtains even if

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their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners’ cause of action accrued. The CA committed no error in dismissing their complaint.

4. Mangahas v Brobio, 634 SCRA 351 (2010) The foregoing discussion renders the final issue insignificant. Be that as it may, we would like to state that the remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person.

R-70: Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

1. Suarez v Emboy JR, 718 SCRA 677 (2014) In a complaint for unlawful detainer, the following key jurisdictional facts must be alleged and sufficiently established: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. This Court stresses that to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

2. Alconera v Pallanan, 714 SCRA 204 (2014) It must be borne in mind that the case at bar traces its roots to an unlawful detainer case wherein the MTCC ruled against Rafols, complainant’s client. In ejectment cases, the rulings of the courts are immediately executory and can only be stayed via compliance with Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay

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execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. Clearly then under said Sec. 19, Rule 70, a judgment on a forcible entry and detainer action is made immediately executory to avoid further injustice to a lawful possessor. The defendant in such a case may have such judgment stayed only by (a) perfecting an appeal; (b) filing a supersedeas bond; and (c) making a periodic deposit of the rental or reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of the property during the pendency of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being ministerial and imperative. Hence, if the defendantappellant has perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

3. Teodoro v Espino, 715 SCRA 435 (2014) The ground rules in forcible entry cases: (1) One employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of real property. (2) Plaintiff (Teodoro Teodoro) must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant (herein respondents). This requirement implies that the possession of the disputed land by the latter was unlawful from the beginning. (3) The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can, at the outset, preclude the court from taking cognizance of the case. (4) Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.

4. Ferrer v Rabaca, 632 SCRA 204 (2010) Indeed, respondent Judge should have granted the plaintiff’s motion for immediate executionconsidering that the defendant did not file the sufficient supersedeas bond despite having appealed. Granting the plaintiff’smotion for immediate execution became his ministerial duty upon the defendant’s

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failure to file the sufficient supersedeas bond. Section 19, Rule stay the execution. Secondly, he could not also credibly justify 70, of the Rules of Court clearly imposes such duty, viz.: his omission to act according to the provision by claiming good Section# 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay faith or honest belief, or by asserting lack of malice or bad same.—If judgment is rendered against the defendant, faith. A rule as clear and explicit as Section 19 could not be execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless anmisread or misapplied, but should be implemented without appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay evasion or hesitation. To us, good faith, or honest belief, or lack execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved byof malice, or lack of bad faith justifies a non-compliance only the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of thewhen there is an as-yet unsettled doubt on the meaning or plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down applicability of a rule or legal provision. It was not so herein. to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,And, thirdly, given that his court, being vested with srcinal during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with theexclusive jurisdiction over cases similar to Civil Case No. appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time176394-CV, had been assigned many such cases, he was not a under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of trial judge bereft of the pertinent prior experience to act on the the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he issue of immediate execution, a fact that further exposed the shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value abject inanity of his excuses. of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas, 480 SCRA 56 the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. x x x (2006), reiterates the long-established rule that the only form of Respondent Judge’s excuse, that he had lost jurisdiction damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is over the case by virtue of the defendant’s appeal, was the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use unacceptable in light of the clear and explicit text of the and occupation of the property: Lastly, we agree with the CA aforequoted rule. To begin with, the perfection of the appeal by and the RTC that there isno basis for the MTC to award actual, the defendant did not forbid the favorable action on the moral, and exemplary damagesin view of the settled rule that plaintiff’s motion for immediate execution. The execution of the in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the decision could not be stayed by the mere taking of the appeal. fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and Only the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue deposit with the appellate court of the amount of rent due from raised in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages time to time, coupled with the perfection of the appeal, could which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could

5. CGR Corp., v Treyes, 522 SCRA 765 (2007)


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have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations omitted) Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action. Surely, one of the elements oflitis pendentia—that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration—is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees. Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of action.

6. Abad v F il-homes R ealty, 63 6 SCRA 247 (2010) When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


purchase of the lands, in which latter case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year. To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted. It has been held that a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.

7. Za rias v Anacay, 736 SCRA 508ca(2014) In Cabrera v. Gataruela, 586 SCRA 129 (2009), the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, 489 SCRA 369 (2006), the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful

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detainer, the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of theRules case. Thus: To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant have been present right from the start of the possessionunlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if theexpiration or termination of his right to hold such possession possession was unlawful from the start, an action forunder any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior possession The judgment or final order shall be appealable to de facto. The MTC dismissed the action because it did not have the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedingsjurisdiction over the case. The dismissal was correct. It is had in the court of srcin and such memoranda and/or fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over the Regional Trial Court. (7a) Hence, the RTC violated the action. To be clear, unlawful detainer is an action filed by a foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the verification survey “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction” and by possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after hearing the testimony of the surveyor, for its doing so was the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was virtue of any contract, express or implied. To vest in the MTC accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal the jurisdiction to effect the ejectment from the land of the based on the survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of the respondents as the occupants in unlawful detainer, therefore, record of the proceedings had in the court of srcin. the complaint should embody such a statement of facts clearly The case should be dismissed without prejudice to the showing the attributes of unlawful detainer. filing of a non-summary action likeaccion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary

8. Manalang v Bacani, 745 SCRA 27 (2015)


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9. Supapo v De Jesus, 765 SCRA 211 (2015), GR. No. 198356 Accion publicianais an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suitfiled after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publicianais to recover possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.

10. De la Cruz v Hermano, 754 SCRA 231 (2015) Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, requires that in actions for forcible entry, it must be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed anytime within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. This requirement implies that in those cases, possession of the land Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


by the defendant has been unlawful from the beginning, as the possession was obtained by unlawful means. Further, the complainant must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until he or she was deprived thereof by the defendant. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry into the land, except when entry was made through stealth; if so, the one-year period would be counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. It is settled that where forcible entry occurred clandestinely, the one-year prescriptive period should be counted from the time the person who was deprived of posses sio n dem anded tha t the def orc ian t desist fro m dispossession when the former learned about it. The owners or possessors of the land cannot be expected to enforce their right to its possession against the illegal occupant and sue the latter before learning of the clandestine intrusion. And to deprive lawful possessors of the benefit of the summary action under Rule 70 of the Revised Rules, simply because the stealthy intruder managed to conceal the trespass for more than a year, would be to reward clandestine usurpations even if they are unlawful. Ownership certainly carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated is not exactly the same as that which is in issue in a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession, and not one flowing out of ownership. These are different legal concepts under which the law provides different remedies for recovery of possession. Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can prove prior possession can recover the possession even against the owner. Whatever may

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be the character of the possession, the present occupant of the property has the security to remain on that property if the occupant has the advantage of precedence in time and until a person with a better right lawfully causes eviction.

R-71: Contempt

11. Erorita v Dumla o, 781 SCRA 551 (2016)

We agree with respondents that the charge of contempt partakes of the nature of a criminal offense. The exoneration of the contemner from the charge amounts to an acquittal from which an appeal would not lie. “A distinction is made between a civil and criminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the court. x x x “Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required.” “In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected.” If the contempt is initiated by the court or tribunal exercising the power to punish a given contempt, it is criminal in nature, and the proceedings are to be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases. The State is the real prosecutor. “The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.” While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for

To make a case for unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint foraccion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted. Although the complaint bears the caption “recovery of possession,” its allegations contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s assessed value.


1. Yasay v Recto, 313 SCRA 739 (1999)

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contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they exercise.

2. Sison v Caoibes JR 429 SCRA 258 (2004) At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant for contempt, due to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same was refused by some staff member in the latter’ssala. We agree with the Investigating Justice when he opined that the respondent judge should have refrained from ordering the arrest and detention of the complainant, since the incident involved his own son, and the matter was very personal to him. The fact that the respondent judge insisted that the complainant personally file his comment in court gives rise to doubts as to the motive behind it; as the Investigating Justice puts it, the requirement of personal filing was deliberately inserted so that the respondent could confront and harass the complainant. Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


The act of a judge in citing a person in contempt of court in a manner which smacks of retaliation, as in the case at bar, is appalling and violative of Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that “a judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.” The very delicate function of administering justice demands that a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner which would reasonably merit the respect and confidence of the people, for he is the visible representation of the law. The irresponsible or improper conduct of judges erodes public confidence in the judiciary; as such, a judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. We do not agree, however, that the respondent judge should be merely reprimanded for his actuations. The Court has not been blind to the improper use by judges of the erstwhile inherent power of contempt which, in fine, amounts to grave abuse of authority. The penalty imposed by the Court in such cases ranges from a fine of P2,500; one month’s salary; suspension from the service without pay for a period of three months; and even the ultimate penalty of dismissal from the service.

3. Español v Formoso, 525 SCRA 216 (2007) Contempt of court has been defined as “some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which in some ways tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the

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court and thus lessens the general efficiency of the same”— simply put, it is despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court. The offense of contempt traces its srcin to that time in England when all courts in the realm were but divisions of the Curia Regia, the supreme court of the monarch, and to scandalize a court was an affront to the sovereign, a concept which was adopted by the Americans and brought to our shores with modifications. Direct contempt is a contumacious act done facie curiae and may be punished summarily without hearing—one may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt at the very moment or at the very instance of the commission of the act of contumely. Indirect or constructive contempt is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court; The use of falsified and forged documents is a contumacious act but constitutes indirect contempt not direct contempt. A contempt proceeding is not a civil action, but a separate proceeding of a criminal nature in which the court exercises limited jurisdiction—thus, the modes of procedure and the rules of evidence in contempt proceedings are assimilated as far as practicable to those adapted to criminal prosecutions.

4. Marantan v Diokno, 716 SCRA 164 (2014) The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render Disclaimer: Do not solely rely on this. We cannot guarantee 100% accuracy.


one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it. For a comment to be considered as contempt of court “it must really appear” that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies. The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publi cati ons and comme nts which tend to impa ir the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. The “clear and present danger” rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be “extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high” before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the exercise

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of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat. The power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.

5. Tormis v Paredes, 749 SCRA 505 (2015) The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice


7. Balindong v CA, 773 SCRA 27 (2015) Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation. Verily, the power of the courts to punish for contempt is to be exercised cautiously, sparingly, and judiciously. Selfrestraint in wielding contempt powers should be the rule unless the act complained of is clearly contumacious. An act, to be contumacious, must manifest willfulness, bad faith, or deliberate intent to cause injustice.

6. Pulumbarit SR v CA, 772 SCRA 244 (2015) In In the Matter of Contempt Proceedings Against Ventura O. Ducat and Teng Mariano and Cruz Law Offices , 269 SCRA 615 (1997), we resolved to grant a petition to cite respondents Ducat, et al. in contempt for delaying the satisfaction of a final judgment against them “by refiling motions and attempting to reopen finally settled issues through the expediency of hiring a new counsel.”


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REMREV2 Case Doctrines and Digests

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