G.R. No. 170735 (December 17, 2007) Immaculada L. Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legaland Collection & SSS
FACTS: Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation. The corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube containers and operated two factories. One was a "slug" foundry-factory located in Cuyapo, Nue NuevaEci aEcijja, whi while the otherwas an Extrus rusion Plant ant in Cai Cainta, Metro etroMan Manila,whi whichproce rocesssed sed the "sl "slugs" into alu alumin minum colla llapsib sible tubesand and simi imilarcon containe inersfor for toothpaste and other related products. Records show that around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. By 1980, arises a problem with with the employees of the corporation due unremitted SSS contributions issues. ISSUE: Whether or not the only surviving director of the corporation is liable for all the workers whole collected and unremitted SSS contributions, with penalties. HELD HELD:: The The peti petiti tion onis DISM DISMIS ISSE SED D for for lack lackofmeri merit. t. The survivin surv iving g director dire ctor of the Impact Imp act Corporat Corp oration ion is solely sole ly liable liab le for the unremit unre mitted ted SSS premium contributions contributions and penalties penalties therefor. The petitioner petitioner avers that that under the social social security law provision, the liability does not not include liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions. But accordingly, the sections must be understood or interpreted as a whole and not by parts. The liability imposed as contemplated under the the provisions of the social security law law does not preclude preclude the liability for the the unremitted amount. G.R. No. 158253 (March 2, 2007) Republic v. Lacap
FACTS: Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified. Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain barangay, and thereafter undertook the works and purchased materials and labor. On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the D ist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount it 100% completed according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought sought the payment of the DPWH. DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapp roved final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired. Dist. Eng sought the opin ion of DPWH legal. Legal then responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractor’s License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contrac tor after expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract. DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir III Cesar Mejia, issued First Endorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no payment was issued. ISSUE: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects HELD: A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Penalties - Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanour, and shall, upon conviction, conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not m ore than five thousand pesos. The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambigu ity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine fine prescribed therein. therein. Thus, respondent respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, payment, however, is without without prejudice to the the payment of the fine prescribed under under the law.
227 SCRA 444 (1993) Co v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: On December 15, 1981, the Secretary of Justice issued a circu lar holding that “Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for estafa or violation of BP Blg. 22.” In the next preceding period, on September 21, 1987, in the case of Que v. People, the said circular was overruled and held that check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by BP Blg. 22. Prior to this date, Co issued a rubber check to guarantee a performance of an obligation. ISSUE: Whether or not Co is criminally liable under the amended circular dated September 1987. HELD: The amended circular could not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospective principle and the doctrine that actual existence of a statue prior to its nullification is an operative fact negating acceptance of a principle of absolute ret roactive invalidity. It should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co who relied on the official opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated December 1981. 334 SCRA 738 (2000) Lapid v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other government officials with alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. The Ombudsman made the decision that the petitioner were find guilty for misconduct for which a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay, pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), was render. DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Proceeding from the premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not yet been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for prematurely implementing the assailed decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the O mbudsman, finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay, is immediately executory. HELD: NO, it is not immediately executory. In the provisions of Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act states that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of n ot more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, which is suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. It is clear that those that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.
