CONSOLACION FLORENTINO DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. DR. MANUEL SINGSON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. [ G. R. No. L-13876, February 28, 1962 ]
Facts of the Case: Action for partition commenced by the spouses Consolacion Florentino and Fr ancisco Crisologo against Manuel Singson in connection with a residential lot located at P laridel St., Vigan, Ilocos Sur, with an area of approximately 193 square meters, and t he improvements existing thereon, covered by Tax No. 10765-C. Their complaint alleged that Singson owned one half proindiviso of said property and that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the provisions of the duly probated last will of Dona Leona Singson, the original owner, and the project of partition submitted to, and approved by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur in Special Proceeding No. 453; that plaintiffs had made demands for the partition of said property, but defendant refused to accede thereto, thus compelling them to bring action. Defendant's defense was that Consolacion Florentino was a mere usufructuary of, and not owner of one half proindiviso of the property in question, and that, therefore, she was not entitled to demand partitionthereof. It is admitted that Doña Leona Singson, who died single on January 13, 1948, was the owner ow ner of the property in question at the time of her death. On July 31, 1951 1 951 she executed her last will which was admitted to probate in Special Proceeding No. 453 of the lower court whose dec ision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in G. R. No. 3605-R. At the time of the execution of the will her nearest living relatives were her brothers Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio Singson, and her nieces Rosario, Emilia and Trinidad, and her grandniece Consolacion, all surnamed Florentino.
Issue:
Whether the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for what is called sustitucion vulgar or for a sustitucion fideicomisaria.
Ruling:
The last will of the deceased Dña. Leon a Singson established a mere subtitucion vulgar, the substitution of Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it happens before or after that of the testatrix.
"ART. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance. "A simple substitution, without a statement of the c ases to which it is to apply, shall include the thre e mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, unless t he testator has otherwise provided." "ART. 781. Fidei-comissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of the inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go beyond the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons living at the time of the death of the testator."
It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that upon the death of Consolacion Florentino—whether this occurs before or after that of the testatrix—the property bequeathed to her shall be delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to t he testatrix's three brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary re sult would be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for a sustitucion fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter.
PEREZ vs Garchitonera
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-31703
February 13, 1930
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARIANO GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila, defendants-appellants. L. D. Lockwood and Jose M. Casal for appellants. Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Leoncio B. Monzon for appellee. ROMUALDEZ, J .:
The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana. The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress, and pray for the dissolution of the injunction. The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a final writ of injunction. The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the decision of the trial court, assign the following errors: 1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of Doña Ana Maria Alcantara. 2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the property of the children of the plaintiff as "herederos fideicomisarios." 3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and condemning defendant to pay the costs. The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the institution of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in dispute. The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below: Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew, Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I institute her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate of this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal has been rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix and properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with God's blessing and my own. Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to increase the portions of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible. Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me while her children are still in their minority, I order that my estate be administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but the direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack of confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the duties of
administering my estate, because I recognize that his character is not adapted to management and administration. The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary substitution. This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs, and of the three cases that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause XI provides for the administration of the estate in case the heiress instituted should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are still under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by clause XI in connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where the heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple substitution. The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and since it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the considerations above stated, let us now see whether the instants case is a fideicommissary substitution. In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee on claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit about substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the sole and universal heiress does not prevent her children from receiving, upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the testatrix, the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted) clauses which cannot be disregarded if we are to give a correct interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance. The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it on the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th ed.), says: Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as held in the Resolution of June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, requires three things: 1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate. 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. 3. A second heir. To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another, namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the fiduciary. (Emphasis ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as referred to in articles 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the English "trust." It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it, but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct inherent in fideicommissary substitution. Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null for transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which prescribed that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they do not go beyond the second degree." Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from Manresa inserted above. Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and enjoying the inheritance. The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under consideration, to wit: 1. At first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate, according to clause IX of the will. 2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case she should die after the testatrix. 3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI. Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit, that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir fi rst instituted, but from the testator. By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara. Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the fideicommissary heirs. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant, Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT
Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-3891
December 19, 1907
ELENA MORENTE, petitioner-appellant ,
vs. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, respondent-appellee. Agoncillo and Ilustre, for appellant. Agustin Alvares, for appellee.
DECISION WILLARD, J.:
The will of Consuelo Morente contains the following clauses: 1. I hereby order that all real estate which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo de la Santa. 2. That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any. 3. After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarinin which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me. Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months of the death of the testatrix. Elena Morente, a sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Tayabas in which she alleged the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy to him above-mentioned be annulled. Objection was made in the court below by the husband to the procedure followed by the petitioner. The court below, however, held that the proceeding was proper and from that holding the husband did not appeal. From the judgment of the court below, the petitioner, Elena Morente, appealed. In its judgment, the court denied the petition. It was said, however, in the decision, as we understand it, that the husband having married, he had the right to the use of all the property during his life and that at his death two-thirds thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother of the testatrix, and one-third thereof could be disposed of by the husband. The construction given to the will by the court below is not accepted by the appellant. She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. But the question in this case is, Did the testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift which is contained in the first clauses of the will? It is to be observed that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. It is nowhere expressly said that if he does leave the testatrix’s sisters, or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he
shall forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss. But it is expressly provided that if one event does happen the disposition of the property contained in the first clause of the will shall be changed. It is said that if he has children by anyone, two-thirds of that property shall pass to Vicente, the brother of the testatrix. We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and with reference to such surrounding circumstances as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we cannot say that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband married again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the second marriage, we cannot say that any condition can be implied from the context of the will. In the case of Chiong JocSoy vs. Jaime Vano (8 Phil. Rep., 119), we held that the legacy contained in the will therein mentioned was not conditional. It is true that case arose under article 797 of the Civil Code, which perhaps is not strictly applicable to this case, but we think that it may be argued from what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in the will. Whether the children mentioned in the second clause of the will are natural children or legitimate children we do not decide, for no such question is before us, the contingency mentioned in that part of the clause not having arisen, and we limit ourselves to saying merely that by the subsequent marriage of the husband he did not forfeit the legacy given to him by the first part of the will. That was the only question before the court below. The judgment of that court, denying the petition, is accordingly AFFIRMED, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. SO ORDERED. Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Bellis vs Bellis, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased, PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY,
executor, MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, VS. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET. AL., heir-appellees G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children. Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate should be divided in trust in the following order and manner: a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen; b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each; c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to probate in the Philippines. The People’s Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid the entire bequest therein. Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its “Executor’s Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition” where it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for the benefit of the testator’s 7 legitimate childre n by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as illegitimate children.
The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis. TESTACY OF MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS. ROSALINA SANTOS (Executrix), petitioner
and appellee, vs. FLORA BLAS DE BUENAVENTURA (Legatee), oppositor and appellant. Vicente J. Francisco for oppositor and appellant. J.T. de los Santos and R.M. Caluag for petitioner and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J .:
This is an appeal from two orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special Proceedings No. 2524 regarding the testacy of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. On October 22, 1956, Rosalina Santos filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the last will allegedly executed on September 22, 1956 by the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas. 1 The nearest of kin of the deceased were her brothers and a sister, nephews and nieces. Rosalinda Santos, petitioner-appellee herein, is one of said nieces. Among the legatees — or more accurately, devisees — mentioned in the will is Flora Blas de Buenaventura. She is not related by blood to the deceased.
Flora Blas de Buenaventura and Justo Garcia filed on November 28, 1956 an opposition to the probate of said will. Among the grounds for the opposition of Flora Blas and Justo Garcia were that the will was not executed in accordance with law; that undue and improper pressure was exerted upon the testatrix Maxima Santos in the execution thereof; that the signature of Maxima was secured through fraud; and that at the time of the execution of the will Maxima was mentally incapable of making a will. 2 After the probate court had received the evidence for both the petitioner and oppositors, but before the latter could close their evidence, Flora Blas on November 6, 1957 filed a manifestation that she is withdrawing her opposition to the probate of the will, quoted as follows: Oppositor FLORA BLAS BUENAVENTURA, assisted by her counsel, unto this Honorable Court respectfully manifests: 1. That she is hereby withdrawing her opposition to the petition for the probate of the will of the deceased Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas; 2. That being a legatee named in the will, to protect and preserve her rights and interests, she hereby makes of record that she is joining the proponent of said will for the legalization of the same. Some circumstances leading to said withdrawal may be noted. Flora had to sell her house for P5,000 to pay for stenographic notes of this case. Rosalina Santos thereafter gave a party at the Manila Hotel, aimed at settling the case amicably. And there Atty. Jose T. de los Santos — appellee's lawyer — took Flora aside and told her that he learned she had sold her house, that it was a foolish thing to have done, and that for her sake and her children's, she should withdraw her opposition and receive her legacy, so that from its rent she could start a business. The proceedings continued however as to the opposition of Justo Garcia. On December 24, 1957, the court below issued an order allowing the probate of the will. After the order had become final and executory, Flora Blas on February 27, 1958, filed a petition praying for the delivery to her of a fishpond as a specific devise in her favor under Item No. 3, Clause No. 6, of the will. To this petition, inspite of apparent understanding, Rosalina Santos filed an opposition predicated on the ground that said specific devise in favor of Flora was forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs, pursuant to a provision of the will that should any of the heirs, devisees or legatees contest or oppose its probate, the latter shall lose his or her right to receive any inheritance or benefit under it, which shall be forfeited in favor of the other heirs, devisees and legatees. The pertinent provisions of the will, translated into English from Tagalog, reads as follows: Fourteenth. —I request all my heirs, devisees and legatees to look after each other, love and help one another and accept with thanks what I have bequeathed to them, and treasure, love and cherish the same. Any one of them who contests or opposes the probate of my will or the carrying out of its provisions shall lose any right to receive any inheritance or benefit under my will, and their inheritance or share shall pertain to the other heirs who have not opposed. 3 This is known in Anglo-American jurisdiction as the "no contest and forfeiture" clause of a will.
1awphîl.nèt
In its order of April 30, 1958, the court a quo sustained the theory that the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will was valid and had the effect of depriving Flora of her devise in view of her previous opposition to its probate, which it held not justified under the circumstances. Accordingly, it denied the motion for delivery of the specific devise, declaring the same forfeited in favor of the other residuary heirs. Flora's motion for reconsideration, superseded by a subsequent amended motion to the same effect, was denied by the probate court in its order dated March 7, 1959. From the foregoing two orders of the trial court, Flora Blas interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Said Court, in its resolution of March 25, 1964, certified the appeal to Us as calling for determination of questions purely of law. This appeal raises two issues: (1) Did Flora's actuations, under the facts and circumstances herein, amount to a violation of the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will; and (2) Is the "no-contest and forfeiture" provision of the will valid? Anent the second issue, the parties herein, relying mostly upon Spanish and Anglo-American authorities, advance conflicting theories. Petitioner-appellee argues that the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause is a valid, legal and efficacious testamentary condition. Against this position, however, the devisee-appellant maintains that such provision in a will is null and void because it is contrary to public policy. It is, however, the first issue that We will now discuss. For this purpose, the point to determine initially is whether or not appellant's filing of her opposition was justified under the particular circumstances of the case; and then, whether or not a timely withdrawal of said opposition had precluded violation of the "no contest and forfeiture clause" The court a quo's conclusion is that "there is no justification for her to oppose or contest the probate of said will" because "from the evidence given by her and by her witnesses during the pendency of the probate of the will ..., it appears that Flora Blas was aware of the true facts surrounding the execution of the will and of the mental state of mind of the said testatrix at the time of the execution of the will in question, and yet she has charge her benefactor, the late Maxima Santos, as not enjoying sound mind when the latter executed her will on September 22, 1956", and that "there is no proof to show that the said Flora Blas was in any manner related by blood to Maxima Santos Vda. de Blas so that her contest of the said will cannot benefit her." 4 We disagree with the above conclusion of the lower court, which is not the inference borne out by the facts and the evidence — both testimonial and documentary — adduced in the case. Appellant knew about the existence of another will executed earlier in 1953 in which she stood to receive more — much more — than what is devised to her in the 1956 will. 5 Since 1953 up to the death of the testatrix, appellant did not fall out of the good graces of the deceased. Their relationship stayed as close as ever. She did not give any cause to alienate the deceased's affections. Why, then, the supposed change of heart? She was addressed as Flora Buendia in the will, 6 yet she has been using the name Flora Blas as far as she could remember, apparently with the knowledge and consent of the deceased. This is supported by her school records from grade school up to first year pharmacy. Admittedly, it was the deceased who reared and spent for the education of the appellant, and therefore she must have known that the latter was using the family name Blas. If, indeed, the testatrix was not agreeable to such an arrangement why did she not take steps to correct the same? We can only conclude that appellant's use of the family name Blas was with the acquiescence of the testatrix. Why should she
change her mind after all the years and speak of appellant in her will as Flora Buendia instead of Flora Blas? There was also the coincidence that the three attesting witnesses to the will, all brothers, are likewise the lawyers of the executrix (who will receive the biggest single share under the will) and compadres of the assistant executrix, while the notary public is also a compadre of one of the attesting brothers-lawyers. Furthermore, the nurse who attended to the deceased on September 22, 1956 — the date when the will was supposedly typed and signed by that testatrix in her room at the Manila Doctors Hospital — told the appellant that there was no one inside the testatrix's room when she went to administer medications to the old woman at the precise time when the attesting witnesses and the notary public testified they were inside the said room. The nurse admitted this likewise under oath (Tsn., June 10, 1957, p. 23). But the most important single factor that should engender reasonable doubt as to the physical and mental capacity of a person to execute a will, was the condition of Maxima Blas as gleaned from the records of the case. She was an old woman more than 86 years old who suffered from various ailments like rheumatoid arthritis, catarrh of the eyes, jaundice, cirrhosis of the li ver, anemia, edema of the lower legs and fracture in the vertebrae. From August 1, 1956 to September 23, 1956 she received seven blood transfusions, as follows: one on August 1; two on September 22 (the alleged date of the execution of the will), with barely three hours intervening; one each on September 24, 25, 26 and 29, 1956. She was also given dextrose vinoclysis on September 22, because she could not take food through the mouth; and on September 23, 1956 she started to bleed by mouth, compelling her doctor to cancel her trip to the United States scheduled for September 25, 1956. Several documents executed by her before the alleged date of execution of the will, were no longer signed but merely thumbmarked by her, 7 whereas the will appealed to have been signed. It is difficult for Us to imagine that one situated and equally faced with the above enumerated facts and circumstances as the appellant was, should keep her peace. She had her doubts, and to resolve them she had to conduct inquiries and investigations. Her findings all the more strengthened her belief that there was something untoward about the execution of the will. Thus, in her desire to know the truth and to protect her rights, she opposed the probate of the will. After all, had the contest been continued and the will held invalid on any of the grounds provided by law for the disallowance of a will, 8 she would have contributed in no small measure to the cause of the truth which the courts have been in a position to apply the proper legal provisions which are for the greater interests of the testatrix — since all of them are ordained to the idea that the truth of her last thoughts may be duly assured and guaranteed. Above all, the factor that preponderates in favor of appellant is that, after realizing her mistake in contesting the will — a mistake committed in good faith because grounded on strong doubts — she withdrew her opposition and joined the appellee in the latter's petition for the probate of the will. She must not now be penalized for rectifying her error. After all, the intentions of the testatrix had been fulfilled, her will had been admitted and allowed probate within a reasonably short period, and the disposition of her property can now be effected. It should be pointed out that, contrary to the translation accorded to Paragraph Fourteen of the will, the testatrix enjoins not a mere contest or opposition to its probate, but a contest or opposition to the probate of the will and the carrying out of its provisions. This is so because the questioned clause speaks of "pagpapatibay at pag-bibigay-bisa" instead of "pagpapatibay o pag-bibigay-bisa."9 This furnishes a significant index into the intention of the testatrix, namely, that she was more concerned
in insuring the carrying out of her testamentary provisions than in precluding any contest or opposition to it. By the withdrawal of the contest which appellant brought in good faith, no prejudice has been done into the intention of the testatrix. The dispositions of her will can now be safely carried out. The most that can be said, if at all, is that Flora Blas' actuations were also impelled by some desire to gain. But who among the heirs can assume a posture of innocence and cast the first stone? None of them can safely claim that he is not thus similarly motivated. From the foregoing premises it cannot be said that Flora's actuations impaired the true intention of the testatrix in regard to the "no-contest and forfeiture" clause of the will. Flora's act of withdrawing her opposition before she had rested her case contributed to the speedy probation of the will. Since the withdrawal came before Flora had rested her case, it precluded the defeat of the probate upon the strength of Flora's evidence. Through said withdrawal, Flora conformed to the testatrix's wish that her dispositions of her properties under the will be carried out. It follows that, taken as a whole, Flora's actuations subserved rather than violated the testatrix's intention. There is, therefore, no further need to discuss the second issue on the validity of a "no contest and forfeiture" clause in this jurisdiction, since, at any rate, said clause was not violated in this case. Wherefore, the appealed orders dated April 30, 1958 and March 7, 1959 are hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to the court a quo with the instruction that appellant's devise under the will be forthwith delivered to her. No costs. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur. Regala J., took no part.
RESOLUTION AMENDING DECISION November 29, 1966 BENGZON, J.P., J .:
Flora Blas de Buenaventura, oppositor-appellant, moved for reconsideration of this Court's decision herein rendered on September 22, 1966 . Against this motion the petitioner-appellee and executrix, Rosalina Santos, filed an opposition. And appellant filed a reply thereto. Appellant-movant contends, first, that she is entitled to and should be awarded, not only the devised fishpond, but all the fruits or rents of said property from the death of the testatrix on October 5, 1956 up to the time said property will be delivered to her. Appellant, it be noted, did not expressly seek recovery of fruits or rents in her petition for delivery of specific legacy (devise) filed below. She started to mention also the fruits or rents in her amended motion for reconsideration of the court a quo's denial of said petition. And, thereafter she has raised the point in her third assignment of error in the present appeal. This notwithstanding, We believe that appellant should receive the fruits of the property given to her in devise. The provisions of law regarding devised proper are emphatic in stating that a devise of a specific things includes its fruits and income accruing after the testator's death, ordering that these shall be delivered with the thing devised:
ART. 948. If the legacy or devise is of a specific and determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the income which was due and unpaid before the latter's death. From the moment of the testator's death, the thing bequeathed shall be at the risk of the legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or deterioration, and shall be benefited by its increase or improvement, without prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or administrator. ART. 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with all its accessions and accessories and in the condition in which it may be upon the death of the testator. (Civil Code) Furthermore, since fruits or rents are accessions (Arts. 441, 442, Civil Code), strictly speaking, there was really no need to mention them in the petition or the decision. Article 1166 of the Civil Code applies: "The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of delivering all its accessions and accessories, even though they may not have been mentioned ." To remove doubts on the matter, however, We here expressly state that appellant is also entitled to, and appellee should deliver to her, the fruits or rents of the devised fishpond accruing after the testatrix's death. The precise determination of the same, however, should be threshed out in the court below, before which appellee must render an accounting. Appellee, in this regard, would bring up in this proceedings and at this very late stage, some new matters: that allegedly the testatrix owned only 65.38-2/3% of the property devised, so that the fruits or rents pertaining to appellant should likewise be only 65.38-2/3%. And in support of this, appellee refers to final decisions of this Court in two other cases, L-14070, "Maria Gervacio Blas, et al. v. Rosalina Santos" promulgated March 29, 1961, and L-19270, "Manuel Gervacio Blas, et al. v. Hon. Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, et al.," promulgated March 31, 1962. In said decisions, it is contended that the rulings are to the effect that the properties therein litigated belonged to Maxima Santos, the testatrix herein, only to the extent of 65.38-2/3%, the rest being owned by her husband Simeon Blas, represented by the plaintiffs therein. The property involved here is allegedly one of the properties litigated therein. The foregoing cannot avail appellee herein. She is not the proper party to raise it, since she represents the testatrix and not Simeon Blas or his heirs. For her to do so would in effect be to assert an interest adverse to that of the testatrix, even when those to whom said alleged interest pertains — Simeon Blas and his heirs — do not advance it. As to appellee's reiterated contention that appellant had violated the no contest and forfeiture clause of the will, the same has already been sufficiently discussed and resolved in our decision. As therein stated, due to appellant's timely withdrawal of her opposition to the probate of the will, it was as if there had been no opposition by her at all, as far as the purpose underlying the aforestated clause is concerned. The next argument is on appellant's claim to interest upon the fruits or rents. The rule is that interest does not run, unless stipulated, where there is yet no delay (Arts. 1169, 2209, Civil Code). And in settlement proceedings, there is no delay on the part of the administratrix until after the court orders her to make delivery of the legacy or devise (Ongpin v. Rivera, 44 Phil. 808). In this case, the court a quo not having issued such an order, appellee has not incurred in delay and is thus not liable for interest. Appellant-movant also prays for moral and exemplary damages and would rest this claim upon fraud allegedly committed on two different occasions: First, in the preparation of the will; and, second,
during the supposed negotiation for the withdrawal of her opposition preparatory to the delivery of her devise. As to the first, appellant would hereby be assailing the very basis of the right she is asserting as devisee, for if the will was not a voluntary act of the testatrix as she would contend, the devise in question would suffer the same defect. It should be remembered also that the will has already been admitted to probate, so that its due execution and authenticity, are already deemed established for purposes of this proceeding. As to the second alleged occasion of fraud, We have on record only the parties' allegations and denials, and the affidavit of the devisee-claimant. Fraud being a serious charge, it is difficult to see how the same can be sustained on so insufficient an evidence. And moreover, this being a factual issue, We cannot consider the same, for this appeal is confined to questions purely of law. Appellant-movant's prayer for moral and exemplary damages, therefore, is hereby denied. As to attorney's fees, however, this Court, considering all the circumstances; believes it reasonable and equitable to award under Article 2208, par. 11, of the Civil Code, P5,000 in appellant's favor. In view of the foregoing, the dispositive portion of the decision herein promulgated on September 22, 1966 is hereby amended to read as follows: "WHEREFORE, the appealed orders April 30, 1958 and March 7, 1959 are hereby reversed and this case is remanded to the court a quo, with the instruction that appellant's specific devise under the will be forthwith delivered to her by appellee executrix, with all the fruits or rents thereof acquired from the death of the testatrix on October 5, 1956 until its delivery, and for this purpose said appellee executrix shall render an accounting to the court a quo. Lastly, attorney's fee of P5,000 is hereby awarded in appellant's favor against appellee. No costs. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J. Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
