10 19 Case Digests

10. Marlow Navigation v. Ganal, June 7, 2017 G.R. No. 220168, June 7, 2017 Peralta, J.: FACTS: Marlow Navigation employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-Standard Employment Contract, which was executed by and between the parties. Around 7 o'clock in the evening of April 15, 2012, a party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was anchored at Chittagong, Bangladesh. After finishing his shift at 12 midnight, Ganal joined the party. Around 3 am, the ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk. He directed him to return to his cabin and take a rest, which Ganal ignored. Thus, some crew members were summoned to escort Ganal to his cabin. They attempted to accompany him back to his cabin but he refused. They then tried to restrain him but he resisted and when he found a chance to escape, he ran towards the ship’s railing and, without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into the sea. The crew members tried to save and search for him but to no avail. Ganal was later found dead and floating in the water. The medico-legal report showed that the cause of his death was asphyxia by drowning. Subsequently, Ganal’s wife Gemma Boragay, , for herself and in behalf of their minor children, filed with Marlow Navigation the recovery of death benefits. Her claim however, was denied by Marlow Navigation. Thus, Boragay filed with the NLRC a complaint for the recovery of death and other benefits,unpaid salaries for the remaining period of Ganal’s contract as well as moral and exemplary damages. LA Ruling: Dismissed complaint for lack of merit. The LA held that the Heirs of -serving and hearsay. On the other hand, Marlow were able to present Ganal’s allegations are self -serving documentary evidence, consisting of af fidavits fidavits of Ganal’s fellow crew members who have direct and actual knowledge of what occurred on board the MV Stadt Hamburg and who attested to the fact that Ganal willfully jumped on board. NLRC Ruling: Affirmed decision of LA. Ganal’s death is not compe nsable as it was the result of the deliberate and willful act of Ganal and thus directly attributable to him .Heirs of Ganal filed a Motion for reconsideration but NLRC denied the same. They then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA Ruling: Reversed decision of NLRC. CA Ruled that Ganal jumped into the sea while he was completely intoxicated and deprived of his consciousness and mental faculties to comprehend the consequence of his own actions and keep in mind his own personal safety. ISSUE:

1

The world’s largest digital library

Try Scribd FREE for 30 days to access over 125 million titles without ads or interruptions! Start Free Trial Cancel Anytime.













WON a seafarer who was heavily intoxicated during a ship sponsored party who later jumped off the ship and drowned is entitled to compensation RULING: Under the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as amended, the death of a seafarer by reason of any work-related injury or illness during the term of his h is employment is compensable. However, Section 20(D) of the same Standard Terms and Conditions states that: D. No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any an y injury, incapacity, inca pacity, disability or death of the sea seafar far er r esult sultii ng fro fr om his wi wi llful llful or or cri minal inal act act or i nte ntenti nti onal nal br br each of his su ch injury, incapacity, disability or duties , provided however, that the employer can prove that such death is directly attributable to the seafarer.

In the present case, it may be conceded that the death of Ganal took place in the course of his employment, in that it happened at the time and at the place where he was working. However, the accident which produced this tragic result did not arise out of such employment. The occasion where Ganal took alcoholic beverages was a grill party organized by the ship officers of MV Stadt Hamburg. It was a social event and Ganal attended not because he was performing his duty as a seaman, but was doing an act for his own personal benefit. Even if the Court were to adopt a liberal view and consider the grill party as incidental to Ganal’s work as a seaman, his death during such occasion may not be considered as having arisen out of his employment as it was the direct consequence of his decision to jump into the water without coercion nor compulsion from any an y of the ship officers or crew members. The hazardous nature of this act was not due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board the MV Stadt Hamburg, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Ganal had. The necessary question that follows then is whether Ganal’s act was willful. Considering his apparent intoxication, may Ganal’s death, which resulted from his act of jumping overboard, be considered as directly attributable to him? The Court agrees with the LA and the NLRC that the pieces of evidence presented by petitioners, consisting of the testimony of the crew members present at the time of the unfortunate incident, as well as the accident report made by the master of the vessel, prove the willfulness of Ganal’s acts which led to his death. The term “willful” means “voluntary and intentional”, bu t not necessarily malicious. In the case of Mabuhay Shipping Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 Phil. 142, 147 (1991), the seaman, in a state of intoxication, ran amuck and committed an















the death of the seaman could be categorized as a deliberate and willful act on his own life directly attributable to him. In the same manner, in the instant case, Ganal’s act of intentionally jumping overboard, while in a state of intoxication, could be considered as a deliberate and willful act on his own life which is directly attributable to him. Hence, not compensable.















11. Seapower Shipping v. Subanal, G.R. No. 198544, June 19, 2017 FACTS: Petitioner Seapower Shipping Enterprises, for and in behalf of its principal Westward Maritime Corporation, hired Warren M. Sabanal as Third Mate onboard MT Montana on July 20, 1995. In September 1995, Sabanal started exhibiting unusual behavior. When the ship captain checked on him on Sept. 22, 1995, he responded incoherently, though it appeared that he had problems with his brother in the Philippines. This prompted the captain to set double guards on Sabanal. The sailors watching over Sabanal reported that he wanted to board a lifeboat, citing danger in the ship’s prow. Because of Sabanal’s condition, the captain relieved him of his shift and allowed him to sleep in the cabin guarded. The following day, the captain wanted to supervise Sabanal better, so he took him on deck and assigned to him simple tasks. The captain observed that Sabanal’s condition was “rather better” and he “did not appear to have any problems.” Later that day, Sabanal requested the sailor -on-guard that he be allowed to return to the deck for some fresh air. Once on deck, Sabanal suddenly ran to the stem and jumped to the sea. His body was never recovered. Though she was informed of her husband’s death, Elvira Sabanal alleged that Seapower told her that she has to wait for a period of seven to ten years before Sabanal can be declared dead. Relying on this representation, she went back to Seapower sometime in late 2004 or early 2005 to claim whatever benefits she was entitled to. On May 16, 2005, she filed a complaint for payment of Sabanal’s death benefits. The LA dismissed Elvira’s case on the grounds of prescription and lack of merit, ruling that Elvira filed to substantiate her claim that Seapower misled her to wait for seven to ten years; thus, her claim was already barred by the statute of limitations. The LA also ruled that Sabanal’s death was due to his taking his own life, thus, not compensable. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s dismissal, though finding that the action had not prescribed. The CA reversed the NLR C, C, concluding that “his actions were borned not by his willful disregard of his safety and of his life, but, on the contrary, he became paranoid that the ship was in grave danger, that he wanted to save himself from the imagined doom that was to befall the ship.” ISSUE: Whether or not Sabanal’s death is compensable HELD: NO. In order for insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant must substantially that the seafarer suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the















Elvira did not present any evidence to support her claim that Sabanal was already insane when he jumped overboard. Similar to the claimant in Agile, she only relied on the strange behavior of Sabanal S abanal as detailed by the ship captain in the ship log and master's report. However, as we already held, while such behavior may be indicative of a possible mental disorder, it is insufficient to prove that Sabanal had lost full control of his faculties. In fact, the ship log shows Sabanal was still able to correct maps and type the declarations of the crew hours before he jumped overboard. The captain observed that Sabanal did not appear to have any problems while performing these simple tasks, while the sailor-onguard reported that Sabanal did not show any signs of unrest immediately before the incident. These circumstances, coupled with the legal presumption of sanity, tend to belie Elvira's claim that Sabanal no longer exercised any control over his own senses and mental faculties.















12. GSIS v. Pauig, January 30, 2017 FACTS: Pauig, respondent herein, was the Municipal Agriculturist of San Pablo, Isabela. He started in the government service as a contractual employee from February 12, 1964. Later on, he became a temporary employee from July 5, 1972 to July 18, 1977. A day after, he became a permanent employee. Finally, on August 1, 1977, he became a GSIS member. When Pauig reached the age of 65 on November 3, 2005, he retired from service. His complaint in this action was that the GSIS-Cauayan erroneously computed his years of service, excluding the 14 years that he has rendered and only including in the computation the years that he became a member of the organization, 27 years to be specific. GSIS reasoned that the exclusion of the 14 years was because no premium payments were remitted to it. Moreover, under the Premium-Based Policy of the GSIS, which took effect on August 1, 2003, only the periods of service where premium payments were duly remitted to the System shall be incluses in the computation co mputation of retirement benefits. Aggrieved, respondent filed the action to the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela. The Court directed GSIS to credit respondent's service from 1964 to 1977. The former filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this present p resent petition. ISSUE: Whether or not Pauig's 14 years of service must be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. HELD: No. Pauig insists that retirement laws must be liberally construed in favor favo r of the retirees because the intention is to t o provide for their sustenance, sustenance , and hopefully even comfort, when they no longer have the stamina to continue earning their livelihood. However, upon checking relevant laws, compulsory coverage under the GSIS had previously and consistently included regular and permanent employees, and expressly excluded casual, substitute or temporary employees from its retirement insurance plan. The Court must deny Pauig' s appeal to liberal construction since the applicable law is clear and unambiguous. The primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions of the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this consideration, the Court finds that the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for construction or interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law. Therefore, Pauig' s casual and temporary service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977.

















13. CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc vs. Castillo GR No. 208215; April 19, 2017 FACTS: On June Jun e 6, 2008, respondent Rhudel Castillo was hired by petitioner C.F. Sharp Crew Management on behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., to serve as Security Guard on board the vessel MV Norwegian Norw egian Sun under the Contract of Employment, for a period for a period of ten (10) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$559.00. While on board the vessel, respondent suffered from difficulty of breathing and had a brief seizure attack causing him to fall from his bed. It was found that respondent was suffering from "right parietal hemorrhage" of o f the brain and was given medications to prevent seizures. On October 7, 2008, respondent was repatriated. He was referred to the companydesignated physicians, p hysicians, Dr. Susannah Ong-Salvador and Dr. Antonio A. Pobre for further treatment, evaluation and management. Dr. Ong-Salvador issued a Medical Progress Report stating that respondent is suffering from "right parietal cavernoma" and the condition is deemed to be idiopathic, thus, it is not work-related. Dr. Pobre issued a Certification indicating that respondent is suffering from Cavernoma and the illness is a congenital disorder and not work-related. Petitioners shouldered all the expenses in connection with respondent’s medical treatment. On December 16, 2009, respondent filed a complaint for permanent and total disability benefits, damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent alleged that he is entitled to a maximum disability compensation co mpensation of US$120,000.00 under un der the Norwegian Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Respondent further alleged that even eve n after all the examinations, he is still suffering from the illnesses and is disabled up to the present.















HELD: The Court ruled that the respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits for his failure to refute the companycompan y-designated physician’s findings that his illness was not work-related. While it is true that medical reports issued by the company-designated physicians do not bind the courts, their declaration should be given credence, considering the amount of time and effort they they gave to monitoring and treating the respondent’s condition. The respondent was evaluated by a specialist, neurosurgeon Dr. Allied Tan. The series of tests and evaluations show that Dr. Ong-Salvador's Ong -Salvador's findings were not arrived at arbitrarily; neither were they biased in petitioner's favor. On the other hand, it is obvious in the report of Dr. Vicaldo, respondent’s physician, that he only saw respondent once and did not perform any sort of diagnostic test or examination ex amination on respondent. From the foregoing, considering that the company-designated physicians closely monitored respondent from fro m his repatriation, and considering further that respondent did not observe the third-doctor referral provision, We adopt the ruling of the NLRC. Bare statement that "His illness is considered work aggravated/related," without any an y explanation as to the same, could cou ld not even begin to prove that complainant's illness is work-related, much less overcome the findings of the company-designated physicians ph ysicians Likewise, the mere fact that complainant's disability exceeded 120 days, da ys, by itself, is not a ground to entitle him to full disability benefits. b enefits. While the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be b e work-related, the seafarer or the claimant must still show a reasonable connection between the nature of work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated. Respondent did not adduce proof to show a reasonable connection between his work as Security Guard and his cavernoma.















14. Dionio v. Transglobal Martime, November November 19, 2018

FACTS: Henry Dionio was engaged by Trans-Global Maritime Agency, Inc. as Bosun on board a vessel. On February 25, 2011, Dionio experienced dizziness, slurred speech, chest pain, difficulty in breathing, repeated vomiting and minor loss of strength in his right hand. He was then diagnosed with a "possible transient Ischaemic Attack/Labyrinthitis." On March 8, 2011, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was referred to the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) for further evaluation and treatment. Dionio's last diagnosis was "Bilateral Cerebellar Infarct" with a disability grading of 10. On November 10, 2011, Dionio filed a complaint against Trans-Global, Goodwood and Michael Estaniel (hereafter "respondents") for permanent disability benefits, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees. On March 14, 2012 Dionio consulted Dr. Pascual of Philippine Heart Center who concluded that he was medically unfit to work as seaman. LA ordered respondents to jointly and severally pay Dionio US$10,075.00 representing disability benefits based on a grade 10 disability rating. The claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees were denied for lack of basis. NLRC reversed the LA and awarded total and permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$89,100.00, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award. CA reversed and set aside NLRC’s resolution and reinstated LA’s decision. Dionio argues the following: 1. It is not mandatory to appoint a third physician to resolve a conflict of findings between the company-designated physician and the doctor chosen by the seafarer. The assessment of a company-designated physician may be disputed by the opinion of a physician chosen by the seafarer. The option of engaging enga ging the opinion of a third doctor is merely directory and not mandatory. 2. Dionio cites the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency's (POEA) Contract which















CA correctly ruled that the company doctor is the one who is tasked with the determination of a seafarer's disability or fitness. The report of Dionio's doctor was also based on a one-time one -time examination as opposed to the th e company compan y doctor who treated him for six months. 2. Contrary to petitioner's assertion, a seafarer is not entitled to disability benefits if he did not comply with the procedure on appointment of a third doctor under the employment contract. In the POEA Contract, as well as the CBA of the parties, it is the companydesignated doctor who is mandated to determine the degree of disability or fitness to work of a seafarer. 3. Supposing the CBA is indeed applicable in this case, based on Sec. 20.1.4 thereof, the seafarer must be certified permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the company doctor for the medical unfitness clause to apply. Mere inability to work does not justify total and permanent disability compensation. 1.

ISSUE: Whether the company –designated doctor’s findings shall prevail due to Dionio’s failure to comply with the requirement of referral to a third-party physician. HELD: Petition is GRANTED. The company-designated physician will have the first opportunity to examine the seafarer and, thereafter, issue a certification as to the seafarer's medical status. On the basis of the said certification, seafarers would be initially informed if they are entitled to disability benefits. The seafarers, however, are not precluded from challenging the diagnosis of the company-designated physicians should they disagree with such findings. They have the option to seek another opinion from a physician of their choice and, in case the latter's findings differ from that of the company designated physician, the conflicting findings shall be submitted to a third-party doctor, as mutually agreed upon by the parties.















facto render the conclusions of the company-designated physician conclusive and binding on the courts. While failure to refer the conflicting findings between the company-designated physician and the seafarer's physician of choice gives the former's medical opinion more weight and probative value valu e over ove r the latter, still, it does not mean m ean that the courts are bound b ound by such doctor's do ctor's findings, as the court may set aside the same if it is shown that the findings of the companydesignated doctor have no scientific basis or are not supported by medical records of the seafarer. The rule that the company-designated doctor's findings shall prevail in case of nonreferral of the case to a third doctor is not a hard and-fast rule as labor tribunals and the courts are not bound by the medical findings of the company-doctor. Instead, the inherent merits of the respective medical findings shall be considered. Dionio was treated by the company-designated doctor from March 9, 2011 to September 5, 2011. While the company-designated physician suggested a disability grading of "Grade 10," the company-doctor also opined "that prognosis for return to sea duties is guarded to risk of another cerebrovascular event." Again, while much weight is given to the company-doctor's assessment, in view of the seafarer's failure to initiate the referral to a third doctor, the Court is not bound to accept, in its entirety, the company doctor's findings, where the circumstances surrounding the fit-to-work assessment show otherwise.

















15. Guerrero v. Phil Transmarine Carrier, October 3, 2018 (CAMY) FACTS: Guerrero alleged that on August 15, 2011, he was employed by PTCI as a Casino Dealer on board the vessel GTS Constellation for a period of 6 months with a basic monthly salary of US$255.00. His pre-employment medical examination declared he was "fit to work as a seaman." Accordingly, sometime in January 2012 during a gastro-intestinal outbreak in the ship, he and other crew members were tasked and ordered to bring elderly guests out of the ship through wheelchairs; since the platform was not levelled with the ship's door exit, and the bridge connecting the platform and the door exit was too steep, they decided that the best way to move and transfer the elderly passengers was by pulling the wheelchairs; while he was pulling a wheelchair with a passenger, a sudden motion occurred which caused him to lose his balance but managed to prevent the wheelchair, the passenger and himself from falling; in order to keep the passenger safe, he had to push the wheelchair really hard to gain control over it; after said incident, he started experiencing back pains which he just ignored. When the backpain became unbearable, he consulted the doctor of the vessel who prescribed him pain reliever medication and sleeping pills. In Carribean, he underwent an MRI the attending physician made the following















LA: PTCI and CC are solidarity liable for disability compensation to Guerrero. Although Guerrero's injury had resulted from a gym incident, the same would not release respondents PTCI and CC from their liability for disability benefits; that Guerrero has been incapacitated to work for more than 120 days from the date he was repatriated and seen by the companydesignated physician. NLRC: Guerrero is not n ot entitled to disability benefits and payment of his other monetary claims because his injury is not work-related or not an injury sustained while working on-board the vessel no other evidence was adduced to support and corroborate his "wheelchair theory" CA: affirmed NLRC ISSUE: WON he is entitled to disability benefits and award of damages HELD: For disability to be compensable, two elements must concur: (1) Illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. Work-related injury pertains to injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of, and in the course of, employment. Jurisprudence elucidates that the words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of















admission to the effect that the subject injury resulted from his gym workout. Guerrero's strenuous physical activity consisting of frequent bending and improper lifting of heavy objects during his routine workout at the crew gym on January 22, 2012 produced extreme torsional stress on his back which caused his subject injury. There is nothing in the Job Description Manual which states that part of Guerrero's duty as a Casino Dealer is to go to the crew gym and use its facility for his physical workout. Guerrero's contentions that his disability is permanent and total because Dr. Catbagan, the company-designated physician, failed to issue a medical certificate as to his fitness for work resumption or disability within the 240-day maximum period, and because his chosen physician, Dr. Garcia, issued a medical certificate finding him unfit for further service as a seafarer, would not advance his cause against the respondents. The same were not raised before the labor tribunal and, thus, cannot be considered on appeal The declaration of Dr. Garcia in the medical certificate that Guerrero is "UNFIT for further sea service in whatever capacity as a SEAFARER" leaves much to be desired. Said medical certification was not supported by any relevant and necessary diagnostic tests and/or procedures. No medical records or other sufficient proof was adduced to justify the abovementioned pronouncement/diagnosis. It bears stressing that Dr. Garcia issued the medical certificate on the very same day that he was consulted by Guerrero. Dr. Garcia's assessment should not be taken at face value. At best, Dr. Garcia's medical certificate was merely concerned on the examination of Guerrero for purposes of diagnosis and treatment and not for the















16. Phil. Hammonia Ship Agency v. Israel, October 3, 2018 FACTS: PHSA, the local manning agent, on behalf of petitioner DML, the foreign principal, hired respondent Ferdinand Z. Israel as a Bosun. A pre-employment medical examination was conducted to respondent, and declared such him "FIT FOR SEA SERVICE". The next day he signed his Contract of Employment. While performing his duties on board vessel NASR, respondent accidentally fell from a height of 2 to 2.5 meters while he was conducting an inspection of the crew's maintenance work. Respondent's right arm and shoulder hit the deck first, absorbing the impact of his fall. Because of the persistent pain on his right shoulder, respondent was brought to the Orthopedic and was diagnosed with "supraspinatus tendonitis right shoulder," and was recommended his repatriation. Respondent was repatriated back to the Philippines. He then underwent therapy. After some sessions he was declared “fit to resume sea duties” by the company physician. Petitioner PHSA refused to re-employ respondent because of his condition, or to pay him disability benefits. Respondent alleged that he continues to suffer pain on his right shoulder everytime he raises his right arm, making it difficult for him to perform simple tasks such as putting on or taking off his shirt. That despite the physical therapy therap y sessions and improvement in his right shoulder, the pain on his right shoulder was not cured. Respondent asserted that his disability is total and permanent as no manning agency or vessel owner would consider him for















ISSUE: WON Respondent is still entitled to disability benefits after he was declared fit to work by the company designated physician which he himself acknowledged by b y executing a certificate of fitness for work. (YES) HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The award of attorney's fees in favor of respondent is in order. Where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the award. From the forgoing facts, despite the treatment that he received and improvement in his condition, respondent continued to suffer shoulder pain. By the time that company physician certified that respondent is already fit to work on January 31, 2006, 142 days had passed since respondent's repatriation on September 11, 2005. During that period, respondent was incapacitated to perform his work as a bosun, which consequently deprived him of his livelihood. Pursuant to Crystal Shipping, respondent is already deemed to be suffering from permanent total disability. Crystal Shipping: Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120 days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

















17. CF Sharp v. Santos, August 1, 2018 FACTS: Petitioner CF Sharp, acting as the agent of petitioner Norwegian Cruise Line, Ltd., hired respondent Santos an environmental operator on board the vessel "M/S Norwegian Gem" for a period of nine (9) months. He was deployed on September 9, 2011, however, only after three months (December 2011), he experienced dizziness, over fatigue, frequent urination and blurring of the eyesight thus he was brought to the ship's clinic and was found to have elevated blood sugar and blood pressure. When he was referred to a hospital, he was found to have a history of diabetes and has been smoking a pack of cigarettes daily for ten (10) years. Then, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and he was immediately referred to CF Sharp's company designated physicians. They confirmed that he had Diabetes Mellitus II and















the period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a sufficient justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required or when the seafarer is Uncooperative Verily, the company-designated physicians suitably gave their medical assessment of respondent's disability before the lapse of the 120-day period. It was even unnecessary to extend the period of medical assessment to 240 days. After rigorous medical diagnosis and treatments, the company-designated physicians found that respondent only had a partial disability and gave a Grade 12 disability rating. As the medical assessment of the company-designated physicians was meticulously and timely provided, it must be given weight and credibility by the Court. Likewise, the medical assessment of the company-designated physician was not validly challenged. Glaringly, respondent only presented a lone medical certificate from Dr. DonatoTan, which was in contrast with the extensive and numerous medical assessment of the















18. Magsaysay MOL Marine Inc. v. Atraje, July 23, 2018 DIGESTED BY: Rosario, Lex DOCTRINE: (1) RULES REGARDING THE DUTY OF THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIAN IN ISSUING A FINAL MEDICAL ASSESSMENT (2) THE THIRD DOCTOR RULE DOES NOT APP LY WHEN THERE IS NO FINAL AND DEFINITIVE ASSESSMENT BY THE COMPANY-DESIGNATED PHYSICIANS. (3) THIRD DOCTOR RULE COVERS ONLY CONFLICTING MEDICAL FINDINGS ON THE FITNESS TO WORK OR DEGREE OF DISABILITY. D ISABILITY. IT DOES NOT COVER THE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE DISABILITY IS WORK-RELATED OR NOT.















5. Atraje was examined by an Orthopedic Spine Surgeon wherein the assessment was Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament. He was advised to continue with the physical therapy. 6. Shiphealth issued a medical report stating that the Neurologist service's reassessment was single seizure episode. There was no indication for Atraje to undergo further diagnostic or treatment intervention neurology-wise. Hence, Atraje was discharged from Neurology service, although, referral to Orthopedic Spine Surgery was recommended. 7. Atraje completed his 12 sessions of physical therapy. However, persistence of gait instability and weakness on his left side were still noted. 8. Shiphealth opined that "the current symptoms of weakness could be secondary to the [Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament]." The company-designated physicians further stated that the cervical Ossified Posterior Longitudinal Ligament may be pre-existing.















18. Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship's MFR (Motion for Reconsideration) was denied in the Panel of Voluntary Arbiters of the NCMB. 19. Atraje filed a Motion for Execution, which was granted by the the Panel of Voluntary Voluntary Arbitrators of NCMB. 20. Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship paid Atraje the amount of US$95,949.00 plus 10% of this amount as attorney's fees, without prejudice to the outcome of their appeal before the Court of Appeals. 21. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NCMB’s NCMB’s decision and denied petitioner Magsaysay Mol and Mol Ship's subsequent motion for reconsideration. 22. Hence, this petition. 23. Petitioners maintain: a. that respondent is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits because his

















SC held that as found by NCMB and affirmed by the CA that there was substantial evidence that showing that respondent indeed suffered a fall while on board the ship, which caused injury to his neck area and his wrist, as testified by the respondent Atraje’s witnesses that he indeed fell while performing his duties.















In Talar Talar oc v. v. Ar A r paphil hi l Shi ppi ng C or p., this Court summarized the rules regarding the duty of the company-designated physician in issuing a final medical assessment, as follows: 1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the















Evidently, his illnesses disabled him to continue his job on board the vessel. Despite medication and physical therapy, he was not restored to his pre-injury health status. Moreover, there was no declaration from the company-designated doctors about his fitness to return to work, while his own physician advised him h im to refrain from undergoing strenuous activities.















Hence, at the case at bar, given the company-designated physicians' inaction or failure to disclose respondent's medical progress, the extent of his illnesses, and their effect on his fitness or disability, respondent was justified in seeking the medical expertise of the physician of his choice.















19. Dionio v. ND Shipping Agency and Allied Services, August 15, 2018

(Camy) FACTS:













































































10 19 Case Digests

Recommend Documents