Annotation Bail

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A N N O T A T I O N BAIL By * ROGEL ROGELIO IO E. SUBONG ______________ § I. Introdu Introduct ction ion,, p. 162 § II. Brief History History an and d Definitions, Definitions, p. 163 a) A Brief Histor History y, p. 163 b) Definitions Definitions,, p. 164 § III. Rationale and Horns of a Dilemma Dilemma,, p. 165 a) Rationale Rationale,, p. 165 b) Horns of a Dilemma, Dilemma, p. 167 § IV. Laws and Related Issuances on Bail, Bail, p. 168 § V. Some of the Cases on Application for Bail Decided by the Supreme Court, Court, p. 169 a) Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan of 1907 to People vs. Follantes, et al. of 1936, 1936, p. 169 b) Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira of 1945 to People vs. Hernandez of 1956, 1956, p. 171 c) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan of 1961 to People vs. San Diego of 1968, 1968, p. 174 d) People vs. Bocar of 1969 to Bernardo vs. Mendoza of 1979,, p. 177 1979 e) People vs. Sola of 1981 to People vs. Calo of 1990, 1990, p. 181

f) Carpio vs. Maglalang of 1991 to Pico vs. Combong of 1992,, p. 185 1992 _____________________ * A.B.

‘62 [UP] & LL.B. ‘66 [UP]. 162

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g) Medina vs. De Guia of 1993 to People vs. Nitcha of 1995,, p. 188 1995 h) Concerned Citizen vs. Elma of 1995 to Gimeno vs. Arcueno of 1995, 1995, p. 191 § VI. The State of the Law and Jurisprudence, Jurisprudence, p. 194 § VII. The Case of Robin C. Padilla vs. CA And Its Significance,, p. 196 Significance § VIII. Steps in the Filing of Petition for Issuance of Bail,, p. 197 Bail § IX. Conclusion Conclusion,, p. 206 _____________

§ I. Introduction Bail may seem to be an innocuous matter but to those who are under criminal prosecution, especially for capital offenses, it is of crucial immediacy, since their liberty, albeit temporary, depends upon it entirely. To the offended parties and their families bail is also of grave concern for they would rather that the offender or accused were not granted bail or incarcerated and remained so during the pendency of the case and after conviction. To those connected with the administration of criminal justice, like the police and the public prosecutors, bail is also of particular concern for any mishandling of their duties in this regard would subject them to possible sanctions. To the trial judges, bail is of paramount importance in their judicial functions because failure to strictly follow the

guidelines set forth by the Constitution, the law and prevailing jurisprudence for its grant or denial has either resulted in stern warnings, hefty fines or even their outright dismissals from the judiciary ( Pico Pico vs. Combong, Jr., Jr., 215 SCRA 421 [1992]; Lebarios vs. Dabalos, Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991]; Mangalindan vs. CA, CA, 246 SCRA 105 [1995]; Concerned Citizen vs. Elma, Elma, 241 SCRA 84 [1995]; and De Los Santos vs. Montesa, Jr., Jr., 247 SCRA 85 [1995]). 163

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Hence, let us inquire once more into the laws and jurisprudence on bail. The case of Robin Cariño Padilla vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, Philippines, G.R. No. 121917 promulgated on July 31, 1996 provides the occasion for inquiry. Many of course know about the fruitless plea for freedom of this action star pending appeal of his case with the appellate court. He was charged with illegal possession of firearms and thereafter convicted. The instant case pertains only to his petition for admission to bail after conviction while pursuing his appeal before the Supreme Court. However, before we discuss this case under annotation, annotation, let us first inquire into pertinent principles, decisions and other related matters on bail. § II. Brief History and Definitions a) A a) A Brief History — The bail system as presently practiced in the United States and which is adopted in our jurisdiction, according to an extensive study on American criminal justice system, was “developed during the first thousand years A.D. in England.” The judges then were few with vast judicial circuits to cover. Given the primitive means of travel during the period, judicial visits to far-off circuits to hold trials were either few and far between, even “several years apart.” In the meantime, while awaiting arrival of these roving judges to conduct trials, the prisoners remained in the custody of the sheriffs of the place. Prison conditions then as now were described as

“atrocious.” Hence, prisoners often escaped. So the practice of entrusting the prisoners to the custody of sureties, who were relatives and friends of the accused was evolved. At first when the prisoners escaped or failed to appear during the trials of their case, the sureties were the ones tried instead. Over time, in the event the prisoner escaped during trial, the sureties were no longer “seized bodily” or made personally answerable. Instead, they were merely ordered to pay money for their failure to produce the accused during trials. Thus “this liability of the surety for the appearance of the defendant, and the 164

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ability to discharge the liability by the payment of a sum of money remain the basis of our present system of bail.” (John Kaplan, Criminal Justice, Justice, 1978 ed., p. 314). b) Definitions b) Definitions — What is the basic concept of bail? “Bail is the law’s pragmatic method of compromise between the principle that a man is innocent until proven guilty and the obvious fact that a large portion of the defendants in criminal proceedings are well on the way to being convicted” (John Kaplan, op. cit., p. 312). Its technical definition is provided in Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: “Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or recognizance.” The word “bail” as used in the prohibition against excessive bail is “inadequately translated by the word fianza’ ‘fianza’ as bail implies a particular kind of bond—that is to say, a bond given to secure the personal liberty of one held in restraint upon a criminal or quasi quasi criminal charge” (Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan, Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546). Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines bail as—“The means of procuring the release from custody of a person charged with a criminal offense or with debt by assuring his future

appearance in court and compelling him to remain within the jurisdiction. (Manning vs. State, 190 Okla. 65, 120 P2d 980). The security given for the defendant’s appearance in court in cash, bond, or undertaking.” (p. 119, 3rd Edition). Black’s Law Dictionary defines bail— —as a verb: “To procure release of one charged with an offense by insuring his future attendance in court and compelling him to remain within jurisdiction of the court. To deliver the defendant to persons who, in the manner prescribed by law, become security for his appearance in court.” 165

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Bail —as a noun: “The surety or sureties who procure the release of a person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance at the time and place designated. Those persons who become sureties for the appearance of the defendant in court.” (p. 73, Abridged 5th Edition)

On the other hand, “a bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be required to perform.” ( People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566). A bail bond has also been defined as “a bond given as security for the purpose of obtaining release of a person in custody” (Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, p. 119, 3rd Edition). Another definition is that a bail bond is “a written undertaking, executed by the defendant to one or more sureties, that the defendant will render himself amenable to orders and processes of the court.” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 73, Abridged 5th Edition). The right to bail has also included the right to recognizance. A recognizance is “an obligation undertaken by a person, generally a defendant in a criminal case, to appear in court on a particular day or to keep the peace” (Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 661, Abridged 5th Edition). Sec. 12, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides. “Whenever allowed pursuant to law or these Rules, the court may release a person on his own recognizance or that of a responsible person.”

People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566, explained that—“A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial.” § III. Rationale and Horns of the Dilemma a) Rationale — The rationale of bail is nothing more but to guarantee the appearance of the accused when so required, especially during 166

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hearings of the case wherein this bail was granted. While there is usually the private individual as the offended party, the legal fiction is that it is the State or the People of the Philippines which is the aggrieved party. Any criminal deed or offense is a disturbance or threat upon the order and integrity of the community so much so that the offender in a sense is waging “war” against the People or the State. The State is entitled to exercise its inherent right to self-defense. So the People or the State has to fight back and exact penalty or retribution against the offender or accused. Hence, the case is filed in the name of the People of the Philippines, as public plaintiff, versus the offender. The private plaintiff appears to be a “secondary party” although the latter suffered the immediate damage or injury. It is settled that once the case is filed, the prosecution is under the full control and supervision of the fiscal or public prosecutor. In other words, it becomes the People’s fight and being so it must insure the appearance of the accused during hearings through the system of bail. Apart from this consideration, the accused is also entitled to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Accordingly, in light of this Constitutional presumption of innocence, he should not be incarcerated unless the charge is for a capital

offense or the penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. When the charge is for a capital offense and evidence of guilt is strong, the presumption of innocence could not take precedence anymore because the presumption has been effectively destroyed by the strong evidence of guilt. And besides, there are practical considerations for the immediate detention of the accused in this situation, e.g., the likelihood of flight considering the gravity of the penalty or the possibility of harassment of the offended party or prosecution witnesses if only to avoid prosecution or gain acquittal, among others. In any case, the basic rationale of bail “is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial” ( Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741). Then in Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et 167

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al., 66 SCRA 38, which was cited in Paderanga vs. CA, supra., the High Court clarified that bail is neither a penalty or a revenue raising measure: “The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government.” Thus when in this case the trial court insisted on a cash bond instead of a surety bond, the High Court rejected this for being “abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.” Finally, Black’s Law Dictionary states that the object of bail in criminal cases “is to secure appearance of principal before the court when his presence is needed” (p. 73, Abridged 5th Edition). b) Horns of the Dilemma — Some legal scholars have raised misgivings about the logic and practicality of the purpose for which bail has been devised. Is bail really an effective guarantee for the appearance of the accused in a criminal case? It is argued that if the charges were for lesser offenses with minor

penalties, perhaps, bail would be generally effective. But if the charge were for capital offenses or for offenses calling for the death penalty, reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or even any stretch of jail term which to the accused would be unbearable, bail may prove to be ineffective as insurer that the accused will not jump-bail, so to speak. Thus, it was observed that— “Although bail has obvious uses in preventing an accused criminal who cannot provide bail from repeating his presumed transgression, in theory the only purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the proceedings against him. The thought is that having posted the amount of cas h or collateral named in the bail bond, he will appear in court, rather than forfeit his money or property. As applied to a defendant, such as Jack Ruby (the televised killer of Lee Harvey Oswald, the accused assassin of Pres. John F. Kennedy) who was threatened with death penalty, there is an obvious fallacy in this reasoning. It is difficult to envision 168

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a bail so large as to guarantee a man’s returning for a trial which he has reason to believe will result in his death or lengthy imprisonment. The horns of the dilemma are that (a) if a man has enough money to put up bail, the chances are that his bond will not guarantee his appearance at trial; and (b) if he does not have the money, the setting of bail will be irrelevant to his appearance since he will not be able to make bail at all.” (John Kaplan, op. cit., p. 312)

§ IV. Laws and Related Issuances on Bail The paramount legal basis for the granting or withholding of bail is naturally the fundamental law of the land. The basic provision is reproduced hereunder: “Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be

released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.” (Art. III—Bill of Rights, The Constitution of 1987)

Then there are the provisions on bail in the Rules of Court specifically the entire Rule 114. This Rule in the Rules of Court provides a comprehensive coverage of all possible principles that should govern the granting and denial of applications for bail. Then too, some of the provisions embodied therein important decisions of the Supreme Court that were found to be useful for our criminal justice system, e.g., the guidelines in the fixing of bail under Section 6 (see Villaseñor vs. Abaño, 21 SCRA 312 [1967]), the provision that hearing on bail application may be deemed automatically reproduced in the trial, the court must give reasonable notice to the prosecutor of the bail hearing, or require him to submit his recommendation, etc. There are also the circulars of the Department of Justice particularly Dept. Circular No. 36 and its addenda and of the Supreme Court particularly, Administrative Circular No. 2-92. 169

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§ V. Some of the Cases on Applications for Bail Decided by the Supreme Court a) Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546 of 1907 to People vs. Follantes, et al. of 1936 — About the first case on bail bond in our jurisdiction appears to be Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546 (1907). This case pertains to an action upon a bond of P2000 executed by the defendants in favor of the government to secure the safekeeping of some 20 rifles which were thereafter stolen by a band of brigands. Condemned to pay on the bond, one of the errors the defendants raised on appeal was that the bond violated Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 against excessive bonds. The High Court ruled that this provision prohibiting excessive bonds does not apply to this

kind of bonds. “The word ‘bail’ as used in that portion of Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which provides that ‘excessive bail shall not be re-quired’ is inadequately translated by the word ‘fianza’ as bail implies a particular kind of bond—that is to say, a bond given to secure the personal liberty of one held in restraint upon a criminal or quasi criminal charge.” Then there was Montalbo vs. Santamaria, 54 Phil. 595 (1930) wherein a petition for mandamus was filed against a trial judge to compel him to decide whether or not evidence of guilt of the accused charged with murder is strong with a view to determine whether the offense charged was bailable. The High Court issued the writ of mandamus. The first question of law raised was whether Section 3 of Jones Law (“That all persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses.”) was repealed by Section 63 of General Orders No. 58 (“All prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those charged with the commission of capital offense when proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong”). The Court held that there was no repeal. It declared that: “As is well known, General Orders No. 58 was promulgated by the United States Military Government in the Philippine Islands on 170

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April 23, 1900, and Section 63 thereof conferred jurisdiction upon judges to admit persons accused of capital offenses to bail, except when the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption of guilt strong. And the Jones Law far from revoking this power, expressly recognized it in Section 26. This is in effect the ruling of this Court in United States vs. Babasa (19 Phil. 198) where it was held that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction and authority to admit defendants to bail in a criminal case before conviction although charged with a capital offense x x x.” As to whether mandamus would lie as set forth above, the Court ruled in the affirmative. The High Court cited a US case which held that “although the exercise of discretion will not be controlled by mandamus, yet writ will lie to compel the person or the body in whom the discretion is lodged to proceed to its exercise.”

In Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210 (1936) the accused sought also the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the judge to decide on the strength of the proof of guilt against her with a view to determining whether the offense charged is bailable. It appears that in this case, the accused was charged with murder with the information filed before the justice of the peace court who provisionally released her upon filing a bond therein. Before the Court of First Instance, the bond was canceled and accused recommitted to jail. The petition for mandamus as mentioned above was then filed with the High Court which denied the same. The petitioner relied upon Montalbo vs. Santamaria, supra, to support her view that a judicial investigation should have been conducted by the judge to assess the evidence of guilt of the accused. The High Court ruled that there was already a showing by the provincial fiscal of the results of the preliminary investigation and what was shown was a strong evidence of guilt. The High Court further declared that: “Article III, Section 1, paragraph 16, of the Constitution of the Philippines provides: “All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.” 171

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Section 63, General Orders No. 58, also provides as follows: ‘All prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those charged with the commission of capital offenses when proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong.’

The High Court made the conclusion that has been unchanged up to the present: “It is evident from the foregoing that the accused in a criminal case is entitled to bail as a matter of right before conviction except in capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.”

The next case of People vs. Follantes & Jacinto, 63 Phil. 474 (1936) is about similar to the Robin Padilla case. There

was an attempt by the accused to secure bail after conviction of the crime of murder with the sentence of reclusion perpetua. The High Court denied the Petition. It ruled that: “Persons convicted of the crime punishable by death, as murder, are not bailable, as the law recognizes such right in a person accused of said crime, before conviction, only when t he evidence of his guilt is not strong (Art. III, Sec. 1, No. 16, of the Constitution of the Philippines).” “Under the law, persons convicted of non-capital crimes, who appeal from a judgment sentencing them to penalties other than death have no absolute right to bail except when said penalties are imposed upon them by the justice of the peace courts, as the right to bail after conviction is not authorized by the Constitution and is, as a general rule, not recognized. x x x.”

b) Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira of 1945 to People vs. Hernandez of 1956 — After the war, we have the case of Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945) which dealt with offenses committed during the war years. The High Court held that the basic rule on bail under the Constitution also applies in treason cases. Here a person accused of treason before the People’s Court asked to be admitted to bail. The High Court held that 172

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Art. III, Sec. 1(16) of the Constitution applies in this case. “The Constitutional mandate refers to all persons xxx xxx xxx the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision.” It further ruled that upon the filing of an application for bail, “a hearing, summary or otherwise, should be held with due notice to the prosecution and the accused.”

The case that followed, Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946) pertained to a petition for certiorari filed by the defendant accused of treason before the People’s Court to set aside the Order denying his application for bail. The most serious charge was his having reported to the Japanese a fellow Filipino as guerilla for which the latter was shot to death. During the bail hearing the prosecutor merely read the contents of an affidavit which did not touch on his alleged role in the death of that fellow Filipino and only manifested that he had 27 more affidavits. The defendant testified denying this charge and also claimed that “mere recital is not evidence and that evidence cannot be considered strong which has not been subjected to the test of cross-examination.” Held: The High Court ruled that there was abuse of discretion in denying bail because “no proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the evidence of guilt is strong.” Another legacy of the war years was De la Rama vs. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461 (1946) a decision cited in this case under annotation. The accused petitioned the People’s Court for the second time for the grant of bail alleging therein that as per Medical Report of Quezon Institute, he was suffering from tuberculosis. Said Report recommended his stay in the sanitarium for regular treatment. The People’s Court issued an order granting confinement to the Quezon Institute but this was assailed by the accused as abuse of discretion since he insisted on bail so that he could be treated at home as he could not afford staying in the hospital. The High Court sus173

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tained the plea of the accused and ordered the People’s Court to grant bail. The ruling of the People’s Court which ordered confinement of the accused in the hospital “does not in any way modify or qualify the denial so as to meet or accomplish the humanitarian purpose or reason underlying the doctrine adopted by modern trend of court decisions which permit bail to prisoners, irrespective of the nature and merits of the charge against them, if their continuous confinement during the pendency of their case would be injurious to their health or endanger their life.”

Thereafter the decision in People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566 (1950) was promulgated by the High Court. This was an appeal of the Order canceling the bond of the accused for the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape for failure to appear during hearings of his case. Appellants also assailed the bond as being void for not having been signed by Abner as principal. The High Court disregarded this pretense and affirmed the order by arguing that the bond secured was a recognizance which need not be signed by the accused. It also clarified that under the Rules, there are two (2) modes of taking bail: “(1) by bail bond and by recognizance. A bail bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to be void upon the performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it with the condition to do some particular act, the most usual in criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for trial.” Then we have the famous case of People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956), involving noted poet and labor leader Amado V. Hernandez who was charged and convicted with the crime of Rebellion Complex With Murder, Arson, etc. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he also filed a Motion for issuance of bail. It ruled that murder, arson, and other related crimes are mere ingredients of the charge and that the actual crime charged should be simple rebellion which carries the maximum imposable penalty of not exceeding 12 years of Prision Mayor and a fine of P20,000. Not being a capital offense any174

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more, bail should be granted. Citing Montano vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 6352 dated January 29, 1953, the Court further ruled that in denying bail it is not enough that evidence of guilt is strong but also that upon conviction the liability of accused would probably call for capital punishment. As to the claim of threat to public safety if accused were granted bail, the High Court dismissed such fears. “Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital to a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon

mere general principles and abstract consideration of public safety.” It concluded that “the preservation of liberty is such a major preoccupation of our political system” so much so that the bill of rights has numerous provisions guaranteeing its enjoyment. c) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan of 1961 to People vs. San Diego of 1968 — In the sixties, the High Tribunal promulgated Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961) which ruled on the question of whether a person not under detention can be admitted to bail. Here, the accused was one of those charged with kidnapping and a warrant of arrest was issued against him. Without surrendering himself he asked for bail. This was not acted upon so he filed a Petition for mandamus to compel the judge to rule on his Motion for bail. The High Court denied the Petition for being premature since the law requires that for bail to issue the subject should be under detention. It declared that “the person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of liberty.” The High Court also declared that: “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.” The case of Ong See Hang vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 (1962) addressed the issue of whether bail could be granted to aliens under detention pending deportation. In this case, certain Chinese nationals from Amoy, China who were held in our Immigration Bureau pending deportation proceedings were released on bail by the court. This order was questioned before the Supreme Court in a Petition for 175

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Certiorari. The High Court held that “the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in favor of petitioners-appellees, considering the deportation proceedings do not constitute a criminal action x x x x and the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime x x x x it is merely for the return to his country of an alien who has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to reside within our borders.”

In Bernardez vs. Valera, 4 SCRA 911 (1962) the accused was charged with murder and frustrated murder. During pendency of the case before the trial court, accused filed a motion for bail to which the prosecution objected. Hearings were held on this incident and the prosecution presented evidence in opposition thereto. The judge thereafter denied the motion and on a petition for certiorari, the High Court ruled to reverse. It held that the affidavits presented were of persons who did not see the actual shooting and there was no sufficient proof of premeditation or alevosia as for the offense to amount to murder. It declared that: “It must be observed in this connection that a person charged with a criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even before conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong.” Then in Pareja vs. Gomez, 5 SCRA 830 (1962) the petitioner was one of those accused in the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis, a lawyer and civic crusader in Cebu. Upon being arrested and detained, he filed a Motion for Bail claiming among others that the evidence against him was merely circumstantial. After the trial court denied the motion, accused filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order but the High Court sustained the court a quo. It ruled that “to forfeit the constitutional right to bail in capital offense, it is enough that the evidence of guilt be ‘strong.’” It found there was sufficient basis for the judge to deny the motion, e.g., the murder weapon having been found in one of the safes in his office as City Treasurer of Cebu City, and accordingly declared that he did not “abuse his discretion, much less gravely, in issuing the orders complained of.” 176

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Magno vs. Abbas, 13 SCRA 232 (1965) is another case involving plea for bail before the trial court of accused charged with Kidnapping with Rape. After due hearing on the incident, the trial court denied the motion stating in the order that “the proof of the guilt of the accused is presumptively strong.” The accused questioned this finding since the law specifically requires that the “evidence of guilt is strong.” The High Court rejected this pretense since the evidence presented during the bail hearing showed

evidence of strong evidence of guilt as the accused “participated in the commission of the offense.” In the following case entitled, Villaseñor vs. Abaño, 21 SCRA 312 (1967), the accused who was charged with the murder of a police sergeant (Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in authority with murder) filed a motion for bail which was granted but in the amount of P60,000 which he found to be excessive. He questioned this order of the trial judge before the Supreme Court which saw “no abuse of discretion given the facts and the law.” It further declared that in the fixing of bail, “the principal factor considered, to which most other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.” It also set the guidelines in bail fixing: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was fugitive from justice when arrested; and, (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases” (Now, Sec. 6, Rule 114). In the oft-cited case of People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968) the accused were charged with the murder of action star Jess Lapid inside the then Lanai Restaurant along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. The prosecution and defense agreed that the motions for bail for the defendants would be considered during the course of the trial instead of the court holding a summary proceeding for the purpose. After the presentation of 8 witnesses the trial court issued orders granting bail de177

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spite the objection of the prosecution which was still presenting witnesses. On certiorari, the Supreme Court set aside the bail orders by ruling that the prosecution was denied procedural due process. It held that: “the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.” The High Court further ruled that: “The

court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.” It then set aside the orders since they were defective in form and substance for not containing a summary of the evidence of the prosecution, but only conclusion that guilt was not strong. d) People vs. Bocar of 1969 to Bernardo vs. Mendoza of 1979 — People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 (1969) is an interesting case of a student charged with murder in conspiracy with others. He moved for the issuance of bail before the trial court for his provisional release. During the bail hearing, he presented his examination paper accomplished by him during the time of the crime. His professor and his assistant testified that it is not possible to have this examination paper without having taken the said examination. This naturally controverted the ante mortem statement of the deceased that accused was present during the attack. Then there was the claim of prosecution witnesses that accused was not the triggerman. The trial judge granted bail and this order was challenged by the fiscal before the Supreme Court. It held that “under our regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused is entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the only exception being when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong.” The High Court sustained the trial judge’s finding that evi178

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dence of the prosecution did not meet the standard of “strong evidence” to warrant the denial of the motion for bail. Besides, the judge “did not rule on the admissibility and probative value of the evidence. It merely held that with the issue of the whereabouts of the accused when the

crime was committed having thus become contentious, the evidence of guilt of the accused (so far presented) can not be considered strong.” In De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971) the High Court resolved the issue of excessive bail imposed by the trial court. In this case, a municipal mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was charged with multiple murder and frustrated murder. Prior to presentation of his evidence, he filed a Motion for admission to bail. The trial court allowed bail but fixed the same at P1,195,200.00 in his Order of August 20, 1970. When challenged before the Supreme Court, it opted not to rule on the plea to nullify the order because the accused escaped in the meantime. However, speaking through then Justice Enrique Fernando, the High Tribunal declared that: “What respondent judge did, however, does call for repudiation from the Court.” It then reaffirmed a settled jurisprudence: “2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there is no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.” This holding was reiterated in another decision regarding bail claimed by the accused also as excessive which was also penned by then Justice Enrique Fernando in Vituoso, Jr. vs. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191 (1978). The High Court then in Siozon vs. Presiding Judge of CCC , 42 SCRA 184 (1971) which is a prosecution for murder, addressed the issue, among others, of whether the proceedings for issuance of bail is summary in nature. In this case the prosecution already took 3 months to present 27 witnesses. When directed by the trial court to present a particular witness otherwise the court would declare the evidence already presented closed, the prosecution questioned this order before the High Court. It however sustained the trial court because application for bail is summary in nature and to allow a “full179

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dress trial on the merits would defeat the purpose of the proceedings.” It also reiterated the settled doctrine as to when an accused is bailable as well as the proper area of

inquiry for bail hearings: “the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. (8 C.J.S. 93, 94).” Then in the case of Mendoza vs. CFI , 51 SCRA 369 (1973), the bail granted to the accused by the municipal court was revoked by the Court of First Instance for which he brought certiorari action before the High Court. But this was unavailing. It found out that when bail was granted by the municipal court, the accused was not even under custody and “what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence.” The Supreme Court also reiterated the settled jurisprudence on bail, e.g., that writ of habeas corpus will not issue if detention is based on valid warrant of arrest; right to bail presupposes accused is under legal custody; and accused is entitled to bail except in capital offenses wherein the evidence of guilt is strong; and that citing People vs. San Diego, supra, the prosecution should be given a chance to be heard on the motion for issuance of bail, otherwise, there would be violation of procedural due process. Hadhirl Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378 (1975) is an administrative case against a judge who admitted in the course thereof that he granted bail in a murder case to an “accused upon the request of a congressman, despite his belief that the evidence of guilt against the accused was strong.” The High Court reiterated the usual principle that the accused is entitled to bail before conviction except when charged with capital offenses and the evidence of guilt is strong. In this case, he was specifically charged in this regard, the High Court also declared that the actuation of the judge in granting bail, “is indeed reprehensible.” In Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975) the High Court addressed the question of whether the court can impose strictly cash bond instead of surety bond for the provisional 180

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release of an accused charged with a non-capital offense.

The High Court ruled that the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist on a cash bond. After defining bail under the Rules of Court it affirmed that—“The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance for trial.” It then observed that to require cash bond would entail hardship on the part of the accused in securing the transfer of these assets in the possession of the court “as to have the effect of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.” Then it reiterated settled jurisprudence: “In this jurisdiction, the accused as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is guaranteed by the Constitution and may not be denied even where the accused has previously escaped detention or by reason of his prior absconding. “In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that ‘excessive bail shall not be required.’ This is logical because the imposition of an excessive bail may negate the very right itself.”

In the subsequent case of Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA 214 (1979) the orders of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza, a CFI judge in Zamboanga del Norte were assailed in a certiorari petition for among others, refusing to dismiss a criminal information which emanated from a purely civil obligation and for refusal to fix and accept the bail bonds being offered in said case. The High Court declared as error the actuation of the judge of giving due course to the aforesaid information. “But his graver error is in issuing a warrant of arrest without a recommendation for bail” by the fiscal when the charge is clearly bailable. It finally held: “The right to bail is a constitutional right. Its denial to an accused is allowed only in rare cases. Respondent judge would do well to examine more carefully the laws and jurisprudence on the right to bail before denying the same.” 181

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e) People vs. Sola of 1981 to People vs. Calo of 1990 — In People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981) the accused in the murders of several persons were immediately issued bail by the trial judge without giving the prosecution an opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The High Court faulted the trial court for this and set aside the order granting bail. It explained that the failure to accord the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence against the plea for bail is “to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People vs. San Diego (26 SCRA 522).” And “there would be a violation of procedural due process and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground.” On the other hand, in Rodil vs. Garcia, 104 SCRA 362 (1981), it was the defense that was denied the right to procedural due process. In this case, the accused moved for the recall of a witness during the preliminary investigation proper so that the defense could cross-examine him on “clarifi-catory and amplificatory matters” which was denied. The motion for bail was also denied. When the issue was brought to the High Court, it set aside the order of denial of bail and directed the lower court to conduct hearing on the bail application in accordance “with the requirements of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and this opinion.” It also directed that the hearing on bail application “while summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or pretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused should not be denied his day in court.” In Bolaños vs. Dela Cruz, 116 SCRA 78 (1992) the High Court resolved a Petition challenging the validity of the order of the trial court denying bail to some accused who were charged with murder. It sustained the ruling of the trial court by reiterating the settled rule that an accused is bailable unless the charge is for capital offense and evidence of guilt is strong. It further conceded that: “It is the trial court which is tasked to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong and it has determined the affirmative in this case after consideration of the evidence already presented by the prose182

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cution. In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, We are not prepared to substitute Our judgment for that of the trial court.” In Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983) the High Court ruled that the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus carried with it the suspension of the right to bail. This holding was later abandoned under the Constitution of 1987 (Sec. 13, Art. III—Bill of Rights). In this case, the accused were arrested and detained pursuant to a PCO (Presidential Commitment Order) when they were raided while having a conference in the house of Dra. Aurora Parong at Bayongbong, Nueva Ecija. They filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and prayed therein admission to bail during pendency of the case. After the hearing before the Supreme Court, and the parties had submitted their memoranda, it resolved to sustain the validity of the arrests of the detainees. As to their plea for admission to bail, the High Court ruled: “The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective.” It added that if bail is granted to detainees, they might only rejoin their comrades and thus jeopardize the efforts of the government against the rebels. It reiterated the holding in Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273 (1981) which also “held that the constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is suspended with respect to certain crimes.” This holding was also reiterated in the subsequent habeas corpus case of Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 (1983) which further held that “to hold otherwise, would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses (national security cases) he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.” However this holding was later abandoned in People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991), as will be discussed later in this inquiry. In Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134 SCRA 466 (1985) the defendant who was accused of murder was 16 years old at the time of 183

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commission of the offense. He then moved for grant of bail alleging that the evidence of his guilt not being strong and that as minor he would be entitled to at most only life imprisonment. The Judge refused bail. On a Petition for Certiorari before the High Court it ruled to grant bail in view of the unrebutted evidence (Certified true copy of the birth certificate of the accused) as to the minority of the accused. The Court ruled that even if he would be sentenced to death, he would be entitled to one degree lower penalty “which effectively rules out the death penalty.” This decision was prior to ratification of the Constitution of 1987. It also held that the birth certificate attached to the motion and unrebutted by the fiscal was sufficient to prove the age of the accused. However, it rejected his contention to the effect that the test of determining whether the charge is capital offense is the actual penalty imposed upon the accused. It held that “the capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law.” To base issuance of bail on the actual penalty imposed would require already a full hearing and would naturally defeat the purpose of bail. In Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840 (1988) the High Court ruled again on the right of the Commissioner on Immigration to grant bail although the basic petition was for habeas corpus. In this case, 3 foreigners who were detained prior to deportation filed a Petition for bail which was denied by the Commissioner. Even as one was allowed provisional release for 15 days, they brought a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the Supreme Court. The High Tribunal sustained the Commissioner on Immigration for the foreigners who were pedophiles were validly arrested and were facing deportation proceedings as undesirable aliens. It held that: “Writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the confinement is or has become legal.” It also sustained the Commissioner in her denial of the petition to bail by these foreigners “because in deportation proceedings the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation.” As earlier ruled, deportation proceedings are not in the nature of criminal pro-

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ceedings hence the constitutional guarantee to bail cannot be availed of. There is also the case of People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 (1989) which pertains to the issuance of bail without giving the prosecution a chance to be heard or its right to procedural due process. As will appear in this case, the accused who was charged with murder filed a Motion for issuance of bail. The judge without any hearing immediately issued an order granting bail and on motion for reconsideration, it held in abeyance resolution pending presentation of prosecution of its evidence. On certiorari without resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the High Court set aside the challenged order because—“The Respondent Court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it tuned out later, over its strong objection.” If further held: “To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled to due process.” The defense contended that “murder is no longer a capital offense being no longer punishable with death.” The High Court reasoned: “This is erroneous because although the constitution states that the death penalty may not be imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19 [1]), it does not follow that all persons have an absolute right to bail. In Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “capital offenses” is replaced by the phrase “offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua.”

Then as to the claim of lack of motion for reconsideration so that the trial court could possibly correct its error, the High Court argued that “this rule does not apply when special circumstance warrant immediate or more direct action.” This is the same ruling in the case of People vs. Calo, Jr., 186 SCRA 620 (1990) wherein the trial court was adjudged precipitate in granting bail even as it held

hearings therefor. This arose from the shooting of a person inside a courtroom in 185

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Butuan City which resulted also in shooting of the fiscal investigating the case. Atty. Tranquilino Calo, Jr., who was charged along with others for the courtroom killing was granted bail after a speedy hearing on his bail application. When brought to the Court of Appeals, the said court sustained the issuance of bail. However, the High Court set aside the order granting bail by declaring that “The mere fact that formal hearings were conducted does not preclude a finding of arbitrariness and denial of due process” for the prosecution. And in this case, it was shown during the hearing that accused “Tranquilino Calo, Jr. slipped the fatal gun to the alleged assailant.” Furthermore, there was undue haste to resolve the incident because the judge terminated the hearings on the bail application even as the prosecution was still presenting witnesses. f) Carpio vs. Maglalang of 1991 to Pico vs. Combong of 1992 — Carpio vs. Maglalang , 196 SCRA 41 (1991) is a challenge of the order granting bail to an accused in the murder of Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan, Bataan. The accused who was in the custody of the NBI was granted bail by a Bataan trial judge after a hearing wherein the number of witnesses for the prosecution were merely mentioned in the order granting bail and thereafter there was a conclusion that evidence of guilt was not strong. This plea for bail was strongly opposed by the NBI since the accused was charged with a capital offense. On appeal by certiorari by the NBI Director and the People, the High Court nullified the order granting bail. The Court faulted the trial judge in not following the teaching of People vs. San Diego which directs the court to summarize the factual basis of its order and to discuss the respective testimonies of the witnesses. The High Court observed that the position of the judge is “that since death penalty has been constitutionally abolished and reclusion perpetua has replaced it, bail may be granted to Escano (the accused) inasmuch as at that particular point,

no legislative enactment had as yet been made restoring the death penalty.” Consistent with the hold186

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ing on this point in People vs. Dacudao, supra, it declared this premise to be “invalid and reflects the lower court’s reckless application of the provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.” It then ruled that: “Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that “(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.” As the phrase “capital offenses” has been replaced by the phrase “offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua,” crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to bail should be made available to all accused.”

Then in People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991) the High Court addressed the following issues whether bail may be denied to a person even as the offense charged is bailable and whether the right to bail may be waived. These were the issues in the case involving the rebellion charges filed against Rafael Salas and company who were arrested in 1986. When the informations for rebellion were filed against Salas and company, the penalty for said offense was reclusion perpetua to death. But during pendency of his motion for bail, the penalty was restored as originally set forth under Art. 135 of the R.P.C. pursuant to Executive Order No. 187. Thus Salas was granted bail. The People appealed the ruling and was sustained by the High Court. It ruled that rebellion is a bailable offense since the penalty is now lower than reclusion perpetua and also under the 1987 Constitution it is provided that the right to bail subsists even with the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. The High Court concluded that this provision “overturns the court’s ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra” which held that when the writ of habeas corpus is suspended the right to bail is also suspended. However,

the grant of bail was set aside since in the course of the proceedings, Salas had made a categorical waiver of his right to bail “which is a right personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, mor187

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als, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded: “The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private respondent.” Lebarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991) is an off-shoot of the Tranquilino Calo, Jr. case ( People vs. Calo, supra.). This controversy also arose from the tragic shooting of the litigant (Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr.) inside a courtroom in the Butuan City Regional Trial Court and the subsequent shooting also of the fiscal investigating the case. For his unsatisfactory handling of his judicial function, an administrative complaint was filed against the judge for gross ignorance of law for immediately granting bail to Tranquilino Calo, Jr. and company who were charged with murder. The Court found the judge guilty of ignorance of the law for which he was accordingly fined by the Court. It clarified again that when an accused is charged with a capital offense, the “trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct hearing before fixing bail in the instant case amounted to a violation of due process.” In Aswat vs. Galido, 204 SCRA 205 (1991) the issue to be resolved was whether a member of the military who shot to death a fellow soldier can file a Petition for Habeas Corpus from the military court martial. He further alleged that he is entitled to bail under Section 13, Art. III of the Constitution. The High Court ruled that the right to bail “is not without exception.” It cited Comendador vs. De Villa (200 SCRA 80) which ruled that the right to bail has not

traditionally been recognized and “is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.” People vs. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 (1992) is another case questioning an Order granting bail to an accused charged with a capital offense (Kidnapping with Murder) wherein the trial 188

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court issued bail without hearing. On a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to annul the bail order before the Supreme Court, it accordingly set aside the same. It warned that “Nothing is more settled than that where the People is deprived of due process, an order granting bail to the accused charged with offense without affording the prosecution the opportunity to adduce proof of guilt is a patent nullity and must be struck down for being null and void.” This ruling was reiterated in Pico vs. Combong, Jr., 215 SCRA 421 (1992) an administrative case against a judge for serious misconduct and abuse of discretion for granting bail to a person accused of murder without ascertaining whether he was in custody and without any hearing and without even ascertaining if he was already in custody of the law. The grant of bail without hearing “effectively deprived the People of its right to due process.” The High Court castigated the judge and labeled what he had done as “arbitrary, capricious and whimsical action. Such inexcusable conduct reflects either gross ignorance of the law or a cavalier disregard of its requirements.” Respondent judge fined P20,000, censured and warned to be more diligent in his duties and repetition of the same in the future would be dealt with more severely. g) Medina vs. De Guia of 1993 to People vs. Nitcha of 1995 — Medina vs. De Guia, 219 SCRA 153 (1993) involves administrative complaints against Judge Romeo Maglalang, among others, filed by a fellow judge at the regional judicial district of Bataan. One of the charges (A.M. No. RTJ-89-306) pertained to the issuance of bail by Judge Romeo Maglalang to one accused of statutory rape

punishable with reclusion perpetua, a non-bailable offense. Said judge did not accord “the prosecution the opportunity to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.” The High Court faulted the judge on this score and once more reiterated the settled rule that: “where a person is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an opportunity to present, within a rea189

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sonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong, before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing bail amounts to a violation of due process. (Libarios vs. Judge Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991] and People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 [1981]).” People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993) is very pertinent to the case under annotation. In this case, the accused was convicted of rape of a 13 year-old rural girl and was found guilty thereof for which he was sentenced with reclusion perpetua and also ordered to pay money judgment. He appealed the ruling and filed a Petition for Bail pending his appeal which was denied by the trial court. On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the denial order of the trial court on the matter of bail and also affirmed the conviction. Citing Sec. 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the High Court declared that “if an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such a situation, the court would not have only determined that the evidence of guilt is strong—which would have been sufficient to deny bail even before conviction—it would have likewise ruled that the accused’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of conviction.” About the same holding was rendered by the High Court in People vs. Valeriano, 226 SCRA 694 (1993).

The case of Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778 (1994) repeated once more settled principles on bail issuances. This case involves the fixing bail in the warrant of arrest for murder (ambush-slaying in Bulacan) for accused Estelita Hipolito, et al. who were even at large at the time. The judge was charged with ignorance of the law, among others. It ruled that “the sua sponte grant of bail, without any motion or application therefor by any of the accused and without any notice to the prosecution or any hearing conducted therein” was stigmatized by the Court as “whimsical and arbitrary exercise of 190

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jurisdiction which calls for this Court’s exercise of disciplinary power.” The case of Lardizabal vs. Reyes, 238 SCRA 640 (1994) is another administrative complaint against a judge for issuing also bail to an accused in a rape of a 12 year-old girl and also reducing the same without affording the prosecution opportunity to be heard. The High Court took to task the respondent judge for such display of ignorance of the law. It held that the judge should have conducted a hearing on the question of strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused considering the charge of rape which calls for capital penalty. “Respondent (judge) could not have arrived at a fair conclusion that the evidence was not enough to deny bail to the accused when the prosecution had not been heard on the matter. Respondent’s unjustified haste in granting bail and thereafter reducing the amount thereof, in both instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution, speaks poorly of his competence in applying the law and jurisprudence on the matter.” A similar ruling was handed down by the Supreme Court in Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr., 240 SCRA 155 (1995) wherein it faulted a judge who in an application for bail “acted affirmatively thereon without conducting another hearing and, what is worse, his order concededly lacked the requisite summary or resumé of the evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support the grant of bail.” People vs. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995) is a case cited in the decision under annotation pertaining to the granting

of bail pending appeal. In this case, the accused was charged with murder for having shot at the back of the head a neighbor during a quarrel. He was convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua among others. The High Court affirmed the decision with modification and in the course thereof, it declared that: “The subsistence of a bail bond is no legal obstacle to accused-appellant’s immediate incarceration after promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion perpetua. It cited the case of People vs. Fortes, supra which ruled that bail cannot be granted after conviction of a capital offense because “conviction imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong” (en banc resolution of 15 191

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Oct. 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez). h) Concerned Citizen vs. Elma of 1995 to Gimeno vs. Arcueno also of 1995 — The case of Concerned Citizen vs. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995) is significant because a judge was dismissed through the complaint of an unknown complainant (Concerned citizen) for ignorance of the law in failing to observe settled guidelines in the grant of bail. In this case, a person accused of illegal recruitment in a large scale (a nonbailable offense) was granted bail by him upon a mere petition by the accused without hearing. The High Court ruled that while the judge has the discretion to weigh the strength of the evidence against the accused, “such discretion may be exercised only after hearing called to ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of determining whether or not she should be granted provisional liberty.” The judge claimed that he did ask the prosecutor to comment which the latter did and therefore there was substantial compliance with the requirement of hearing. This only infuriated the Court which rejected this pretense thus: “The stance of the respondent judge magnifies his ignorance of the law. Summary hearing is “such brief and speedy method of

receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is to determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of trial.”

The High Court further explained the importance of a hearing: “On its result depends the right of an accused to provisional liberty as opposed to the duty of the State to protect its people against dangerous elements.” The Court noted that in 2 previous cases, “the respondent judge has run roughshod on the right of the prosecution to oppose bail of persons accused of capital offenses.” Accordingly, respondent judge was ordered dismissed from the judiciary. 192

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Tucay vs. Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 (1995) is another administrative case against a judge who granted bail on non-bailable offense of murder and justified his action by claiming that the fiscal had noted in the petition that it was not interposing objection thereto. Still the High Court found the action erroneous and a fine of P20,000 was imposed upon the judge. It ruled that a hearing should nonetheless be held to ascertain whether the fiscal was not really opposing the petition for bail and for the purpose of taking into account the guidelines set forth in Rule 114, Sec. 6 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. About the same thing happened in the subsequent case of Sule vs. Biteng, 243 SCRA 524 (1995) wherein the judge “granted with indecent haste the petition for bail at P50,000.00 without affording the prosecution an opportunity to be heard.” The High Court found “with his open admission that he granted bail to the accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity to be heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions of this Court holding that such an act amounts to a denial of due process.” Respondent judge was found guilty of ignorance of the law and imposed a fine of P20,000.00 along with the usual warning. A similar holding regarding another case of issuance of bail for murder and reduce the same illegal possession of firearm without hearing was made by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Santos vs. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56 (1995).

However in the administrative case entitled Alvarado vs. Laquindanum, 245 SCRA 501 (1995) the judge who issued bail to an accused in a dangerous drugs case was absolved by the High Court of charges of ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. It found the charges of ignorance of the law unfounded and that the judge was not remiss in her duties when she granted bail to the accused in question. The High Court found that: “She conducted hearings to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused” which was actively participated in by witnesses for the prosecution. Then again in De los Santos vs. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA 85 (1995) a judge with a record of incompetence was finally or193

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dered dismissed for gross ignorance of the law for having issued bail to Estelita Hipolito, et al., accused for another ambush-slaying in San Juan Del Monte, Bulacan, of a policeman and barangay captain even without the required petition for bail, without hearing and even as the accused were still free. The High Court cited settled jurisprudence on the matter, particularly on the need to conduct hearing to accord the prosecution the chance to prove the strength of the evidence regarding the guilt of the accused. It further concluded that: “the respondent judge wantonly ignored the due process requirement of hearing to afford the prosecution reasonable opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the applicants is strong.” Then came Chin vs. Gustilo, 247 SCRA 175 (1995) another administrative case against a judge for ignorance of the law. The judge in this case was reprimanded for issuing bail to an accused without giving “notice to the public prosecutor of the application for bail.” In Paderanga vs. CA, 247 SCRA 741 (1995) the High Court summarized the prevailing rule on admission to bail as it ruled on the propriety of granting or denying bail to a lawyer who was charged with others with multiple murders. A lawyer who was implicated in the crime of multiple murders by his client “in a bizarre twist of fate” during preliminary investigation was granted bail while he

was in the hospital recuperating from an illness. The issuance was questioned by the People in a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court. As to whether the accused was under the jurisdiction of the trial court when he asked for bail, the Court ruled that he was under “constructive custody of the law.” The prosecution was not accorded procedural due process since it was not represented by the authorized prosecutor and that it was not given “reasonable time” to oppose the application for bail. The Supreme Court after discussing the basic doctrines on bail applications disagreed. It found that there was the appearance by an authorized representative of the prosecution, there was hearing on the bail application, the order contained summary of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, and the records showed “scrupulous adherence to procedural rules.” 194

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Then finally, in Gimeno vs. Arcueno, Sr., 250 SCRA 376 (1995) the High Court reiterated the importance of holding a hearing for bail applications. In this Robbery In Band With Homicide case the accused were granted bail upon the filing of information after the prosecutor merely filed a comment on the petition for bail wherein no hearing was conducted. The High Court faulted the judge for this and categorically declared that hearing is mandatory for bail applications, after citing its earlier rulings in previous cases: “A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.” § VI. The State of the Law and Jurisprudence Culled from the Constitution, the law, circulars and the decisions of the High Tribunal, the principles, doctrines or holdings on bail are clearly summarized in Paderanga vs. CA, supra: “1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any

court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a case, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.” The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 195

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xxx xxx xxx 2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4, Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instance where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under the general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course,

grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.”

Then in the event of conviction of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the bail bond of the accused shall be canceled and the latter shall be placed in confinement during the pendency of appeal. At this stage or after conviction, bail is no longer a matter of right on the part of the accused or of discretion on the part of the court because 196

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evidence of guilt is not only strong but in fact it was already proven beyond reasonable doubt. § VII. The Case of Robin C. Padilla vs. CA and Its Significance It is the unfortunate fate of Robin Padilla that from the facts of his case, he could not find any refuge under the prevailing law and well-entrenched jurisprudence as set forth above. As has been regularly reported in the media a few years ago, Mr. Robin Padilla, was on his way to Pampanga when he sideswiped a balut vendor which led to the local police to apprehend him. In the process, the police found assorted firearms in his vehicle. Hence, he was charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms which is punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. While the case was being tried before the regional trial court of Pampanga, Robin Padilla was granted bail for his temporary liberty.

After trial which has been closely watched and monitored by the media given the celebrity status of the accused, the trial court promulgated a decision convicting the latter. The penalty was for an indeterminate penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of reclusion perpetua. Robin Padilla immediately appealed to the Court of Appeals and in a few months the latter affirmed the conviction. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals canceled his bail bond and ordered his immediate imprisonment at the Muntinlupa National Penitentiary. After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision, Robin Padilla appealed to the Supreme Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari with an application for bail pending appeal. He further moved for a separate resolution on his plea for bail while the appeal pended with the High Tribunal. Hence, the High Court’s resolution of this plea for bail after conviction in the lower court and affirmance of the same by the Court of Appeals. As stated above the weight of law and authority militates against the plea for bail of petitioner 197

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Padilla. Relying upon clear provisions of law and its previous decisions on the matter, the High Tribunal held that where an accused is charged and thereafter convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua bail is no longer a matter of right or discretionary on the part of the court. There is no more issue as to strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused as in fact he was already found guilty. As the High Court concluded: “In this case, appellant was convicted of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua. Applying the aforequoted rule, we find appellant not entitled to bail as his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of guilt is strong.” In any case, there is a significant passage in American Jurisprudence: “However since constitutional provisions relative to bail do not prohibit bail after conviction and pending appeal, the matter is generally left to the sound discretion of the court in the absence of a statutory provision” (8 Am. Jur. 2d, p.

612). What is the significance of the Robin Padilla vs. CA case? As far as jurisprudence is concerned, no new trail was blazed by the High Court. All that can be said about this case is that it has adhered strictly to law and settled jurisprudence. Even the hope for deliverance in the case of De La Rama vs. People’s Court, supra, decided in 1946 proved to be unavailing. It will be noted that in that case, the accused as per Medical Report was suffering from “minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic granular pharyngities” of which they (the doctors) “have seen many similar cases later progressing into advanced stages when treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail.” The High Court saw no reason to apply the holding in this postwar decision because “appellant’s situation is not akin to De la Rama’s factual milieu.” § VIII. Steps in the Filing of Petition for Issuance of Bail Securing bail after conviction of a capital offense has been virtually foreclosed with the promulgation of Robin Padilla 198

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vs. CA, supra, consistent with earlier rulings ( People vs. Follantes & Jacinto, supra, and People vs. Nitcha, supra, which cited the Resolution in People vs. Cortes —“conviction imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong”). However, while at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings after the filing of the information for an offense which carries the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the chances of securing bail may still be brighter if the accused can establish that the evidence of his guilt is not strong. Of late, there has been a great interest in this matter of bail for the accused in view of sensational cases involving high officials in the government and their relatives who are either already incarcerated or are facing criminal prosecution. In this regard, we take the opportunity to reproduce the steps in securing bail when the charge is for

a capital offense as set forth by that brilliant courtroom tactician and legal authority, Don Vicente J. Francisco in his five-volume classic, entitled “Trial Technique and Practice Court.” There are no more copies on sale of this monumental work. Hence, it would be of immense benefit to lawyers if this important portion of the chapter pertaining to bail application were preserved in this inquiry (with pertinent Notes): “Procedure to secure release on Bail — (a) Filing of application for bail —The accused must of course file an application for bail. No standard form has been prescribed by the Rules of Court for such petition. However, in accordance with the constitutional provision aforecited, the petitioner must allege that there is no strong evidence of his guilt, and that therefore, he is entitled to be released on bail. Hereunder is an illustration for a petition for bail which may be filed. (Caption and Title) COMES NOW, the defendant x x x x 1. That the defendant is in custody for the alleged commission of a capital offense; 199

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2. That no bail has been recommended for his temporary release, on the assumption that the evidence of guilt is strong; 3. That the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution, and unless this fact is satisfactorily shown, the defendant may be bailed at the court’s discretion; WHEREFORE, upon prior notice and hearing, it is respectfully prayed that the defendant be admitted to bail in such amount as the Hon. Court may fix. -------------------, 196 --------xxx xxx xxx (Note: The petition does not allege/explain why evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong—for tactical reason).

(b) Notice of Hearing —When admission to bail is a matter

of discretion, the court must require that reasonable notice of the hearing for the application for bail be given the fiscal. [Note: In the present provision under Section 15 of Rule 114, the following was added: “or require him to submit his recommendation.” It has been recently held that “although the provincial prosecutor interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the accused, respondent judge should nevertheless have set the petition for hearing and diligently ascertained from the prosecution whether the latter was not really contesting the bail application.” In fact, if the court has reason to believe that the stand of the prosecutor in not opposing or in merely leaving the matter to the sound discretion of the court is not justified it may inquire from the former “as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong.” (Paderanga vs. CA, supra, citing Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756)].

(c) Right to prompt hearing —The petitioner for bail has the right to have his application heard summarily and promptly, but his right can be waived. [Note: Since the right to bail may be waived (People vs. Donato, supra) the petitioner may also waive expeditious hearings on his petition through postponements and other dilatory procedure or incidents attributable to the accused (see Muñoz vs. Rilloraza, 83 200

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Phil. 609)].

(d) Hearing —There should be a hearing, for an application for bail calls for an exercise of judicial discretion, in determining the probability of the defendant’s guilt. This, of course, requires the submission of evidence. The hearing is for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion as to whether or not under the Constitution and laws in force the petitioner is entitled to provisional release under bail. Such hearing should be governed by existing laws and rules of court, the hearing and disposal of such applications being a mere part of the prosecution, trial and corresponding disposal of the corresponding cases before the court.

The court should hear all material and relevant evidence offered by either party, and should consider the evidence as a whole. The hearing should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court. By summary hearing is meant such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely for the purpose of determining the weight of the evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination of witnesses and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing. [Note: Hearing is mandatory, when grant of bail is a matter of judicial discretion. “On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exception to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be 201

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summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant.” (Paderanga vs. CA, supra)].

(e) Burden of proof —In this jurisdiction, the filing of a complaint does establish a presumption of guilt nor does it destroy the presumption of innocence. Hence, when a motion for bail is filed, it is the duty of the fiscal to prove that the accused is not entitled to be admitted to bail, because he is charged with capital offense and the proof of his guilt is strong.

xxx xxx The accused has the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence of guilt in rebuttal to establish his right to bail.” [Note: Under the new Rules of Criminal Procedure effective Oct. 1, 1988, Section 5, Rule 114, of the Rules of Court, it is clearly provided that in application for admission to bail for capital offenses, “the prosecution has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong.” ]

(f) Ex parte evidence not permissible —The court cannot examine the prosecutor’s evidence in a private inquiry without the presence of the petitioner and upon the basis of knowledge acquired therein deny the application for bail. This is improper, arbitrary and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. The determination whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This judicial discretion is directed to the weight of evidence, and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits 202

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are not sufficient since they are merely hearsay evidence, unless the petitioner fails to object thereto. (g) The fiscal (now, prosecutor) may or may not oppose the application.—Since the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution, the fiscal is free to satisfy or not that burden. He is free to oppose or not to oppose the application for bail according to what he believes to be in the interest of the State. Since the accused by proper procedure, may test the probative force of the evidence for the State in order to fully present his case for the purpose of hearing, the fiscal may prefer not to oppose the application for bail, in order not to disclose prematurely

his evidence. And “it is unnecessary to say that if the fiscal refuse to satisfy his burden because he does not oppose the application for bail, the usual course open to the court leads to the granting of the bail.” (Note: However, it appears that in light of the holding in Paderanga vs. CA, supra, the court may still inquire as to nature of the evidence of the prosecution even if the latter has manifested no desire to object to the petition for bail.)

(h) Where evidence of guilt is strong —The judge must decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong or not, for the ruling to be made will depend upon that decision. This is a ministerial duty. (Note: In Montalbo vs. Santamaria, supra, a judge was compelled to make a finding on the weight of the evidence of the accused [a ministerial duty] for the purpose of determining whether bail may be allowed [a discretionary duty]. Thus it cited a US case which qualified that: “although the exercise of discretion will not be controlled by mandamus, yet writ will lie to compel the person or the body in whom the discretion is lodged to proceed to its exercise.” )

If a well-founded doubt of guilt can even be entertained, then the evidence of guilt cannot be said to be strong, and in such case bail shall be granted. 203

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If the evidence is clear and strong, leading a well-guarded and dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law be administered, bail is not a matter of right. The uncorroborated testimony of a self-confessed killer for reward, when tainted with contradiction and improbabilities, is not a strong evidence of a capital offense against his co-accused. Lone testimony from polluted sources appears not to satisfy the constitutional requirement that the evidence of guilt must be strong in a capital offense in order that a court may be justified not to grant bail.

Where bail is a matter of right and where discretionary — Where on a motion to admit bail the evidence of the witness does not make a prima facie case against the accused, the latter is entitled to bail. (Note: The authority for this holding regarding the sufficiency of making a prima facie case to deny bail is Bernabe vs. Ocampo, 77 Phil. 55, which merely quoted an excerpt from a US court decision. From the statement above, it would seem that if a prima facie case is established by the prosecution, bail would be denied. However, it would seem that the weight of authorities in our jurisdiction is that while a prima facie case warrants the filing of an Information, the quantum of evidence needed to show that “evidence of guilt is strong” sufficient to sway court discretion to deny bail application needs more than that. Otherwise, if a prima facie case were enough to deny a bail application, why further require a summary hearing to find out the nature/strength of the evidence of the prosecution? Apropos is a definition in the dissenting opinion of Justice Feria in Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756 [822]: “Strong evidence of guilt for purposes of bail means such evidence as would not be ‘of less efficacy’ than that which would sustain a conviction [6 American Jurisprudence, p. 53] ).”

When there is no strong evidence of guilt of the accused, the defendant may be admitted to bail as a matter of right. 204

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If the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is strong he may be admitted to bail at the discretion of the court. However, the discretion must be exercised with extreme caution because, as Clark says, “where the offense was a felony punishable by death, bail was scarcely even allowed, for it was not thought that any pecuniary consideration could weigh against the desire to live.” (Note: This is a significant statement on the part of the author, Don Vicente J. Francisco—that even though evidence of guilt is strong, the discretion to grant bail remains with the court, but to be exercised with extreme caution.)

In this jurisdiction, courts are controlled in the exercise of their discretion, first, by the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which the Supreme Court has promulgated under the authority of Article VIII, Section 13, of the Constitution; and third, those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. (Note: Don Vicente J. Francisco then cited the ruling in People vs. Alano, 81 Phil. 19 which clarified that the discretion of the court in such cases is neither absolute nor beyond control but subject to the Constitution, the laws and the rules of equity and justice. Then he also discussed and recited the facts of the case of Dela Rama vs. People’s Court, supra, which has been already reported earlier which he successfully handled during the early years of Liberation. He observed that: “Illness of the prisoner which would render his continued confinement in jail injurious to his health or endanger his life is a ground for his release on bail, although the Court has found that there is strong evidence of the prisoner’s guilt.” )

xxx xxx xxx In the petition of Senator Justiniano S. Montano for bail, our illustrative case for this chapter, the Supreme Court held (G.R. No. L-6352, Res. of January 29, 1953, XVIII, Lawyers 205

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Journal, 103): “Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of right. Besides, to deny bail, it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is strong, it must also appear that in case of conviction the defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before the Court has

been made. In the evaluation of the evidence, the probability of flight is one rather important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is to assure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution. The possibility of escape in this case bearing in mind the defendant’s official and social standing and his other personal circumstances, seems remote, if not nil.”

It is, therefore, the rule now in this jurisdiction that in cases of capital offenses, the Court should be fair and liberal in the appreciation of the evidence to determine the degree of proof and presumption of guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of the right to bail guaranteed by the Constitution; that in order to deny bail in such cases, it is not enough that the evidence of guilt be strong but (1) it must appear that in case of conviction, the defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for a capital punishment, and (2) that there must be satisfactory evidence of the probability of flight, that is, that the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the decision of the Court” (Italics supplied). 206

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( Acknowledgment: The writer reiterates that the foregoing portion beginning with “Procedure to secure release on bail” up to “Where bail is a matter of right and where discretionary” except the “Notes” were reproduced from “Trial Technique and Practice Court” by Don Vicente J. Francisco, Vol. IV, pp. 37-45. This 5volume legal treatise on trial technique took years to finish with Volume I published in 1955 and finally, Volume V was published in 1961. The precise language of Sen. Francisco was reproduced because as an acknowledged legal authority his every word would be crucial in every plea for admission to bail.)

Annotation Bail

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