CASE DIGESTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
DUE PROCESS: (1) J ud udii cial Pr Pro oce cee edi ngs, (2) Adm Admini inist strat rative ive and Qua Quasi-J si-J ud udii ci al Pr oceedings, (3)Ac (3)A cademi c D iscipl isciplii ne ne,, (4)D (4) D epor ta tation tion Pro Pr oce cee edi ngs, ( 5)F i xi xing ng R ate tess and and R egulation of Pr P r ofe fessi ssio on, (6)C ( 6)C lo losur sure e Pr oce cee edi ngs, (7) Term Termii na nation tion Pr P r oce cee edi ngs BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA .......................................................................................................................................................... 2 JUAN CARVAJAL VS. CA, ET AL. .......................................................................................................................................................... 3 STATE PROSECUTORS V MUROS ........................................................................................................................................................ 4 WEBB V DE LEON ............................................................................................................................................................................... 5 PEOPLE VS. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. ............................................................................................................................................... 6 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, AND PEPITO KAWIT, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ........................................... 9 PEREZ V. ESTRADA ........................................................................................................................................................................... 10 PEREZ V. ESTRADA ........................................................................................................................................................................... 11 ANG TIBAY, REPRESENTED BY TORIBIO TEODORO, MANAGER AND PROPIETOR, AND NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD VS. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC. ................................................................................. 12 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. PASCUAL...................................................................................................................... 13 ATTY. NAPOLEON S. VALENZUELA V. JUDGE REYNALDO BELLOSILLO............................................................................................... 16 LUMIQUED VS. EXEVEA ................................................................................................................................................................... 17 FABELLA V. V . COURT OF APPEALS....................................................................................................................................................... 18 SUMMARY DISMISSAL B OARD V. TORCITA T ORCITA ...................................................................................................................................... 19 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OMB UDSMAN V CORONEL ...................................................................................................................................... 20 JUSTICE SECRETARY V. LANTION LANT ION...................................................................................................................................................... 22 GOV'T. OF THE USA VS. PURGANAN ................................................................................................................................................ 22 GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG V. OLALIA ....................................................................................................................................... 27 GUZMAN VS. NATIONAL UNIVERSITY .............................................................................................................................................. 28 ALCUAZ V. V . PSBA PSB A .............................................................................................................................................................................. 29 NON V. DAMES ................................................................................................................................................................................ 30 ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY UN IVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE JU DGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. G .R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993 ......................... 31 UP VS. LIGOT-TELAN ........................................................................................................................................................................ 33 LAO GI V CA (1989) .......................................................................................................................................................................... 35 PHILCOMSAT VS ALCUAZ ................................................................................................................................................................. 36 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS COM MUNICATIONS V NTC ................................................................................................................................................... 37 GLOBE TELECOM TEL ECOM VS NTC ................................................................................................................................................................. 39 CORONA VS. UHPAP ........................................................................................................................................................................ 40 CENTRAL BANK VS. VS . CA ..................................................................................................................................................................... 41 RURAL BANK B ANK VS. CA ........................................................................................................................................................................ 42 PHILIPPINE MERCHANT M ERCHANT VS. CA ........................................................................................................................................................ 43 AGABON VS. NLRC ........................................................................................................................................................................... 44 JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, VS. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO L ESCANO AND JONATHAN JON ATHAN CAGABCAB. ................................................................................................................................ 45
BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA 37 Phil. 921 FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt
amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio‟s property. Engracio however however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it‟d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio‟s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio E ngracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the su mmon mmons. s. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are; 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. 4. Judgmen Judgmentt must be rendered r endered only after lawful hearing.
BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA 37 Phil. 921 FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt. His debt
amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracio‟s property. Engracio however however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that it‟d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio‟s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio E ngracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the su mmon mmons. s. ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed. HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been met. The
requisites are; 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the matter before it. 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property subject of the proceedings. 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard. 4. Judgmen Judgmentt must be rendered r endered only after lawful hearing.
JUAN CARVAJAL vs. CA, et al. 280 SCRA 351 FACTS: This is a petition seeking the nullification of two Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals on August 3,
1999 and May 25, 2000. On October 9, 1997, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision, In G.R. No. 98328, penned by Justice Artemio V. Panganiban. Panganiban. denying Juan C. Carvajal's petition to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. The latter court upheld the trial court LRC Case No. 414(-A), LRC Record No. N-60084 filed before Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City, Branch 71. in dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title of a parcel of land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized respondent Solid Homes, Inc. as the r egistered owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873, situated in Antipolo City. On May 13, 1998, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a complaint for annulment of title with damages against private respondent. Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. N-7873 by inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal who came to possess the unregistered land in 1938, continuously, openly, adversely and peacefully in the concept of an owner up to the time of his death. On August 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioner's complaint. On August 3, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the questioned resolution. The decretal portion r eads: "WHEREFORE, "WHERE FORE, for being insufficient in form and substance, the petit ion for certiorari should be, as it is hereby, DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED." The petition revealed that petitioner failed to comply with Rule 46, Section 3, par. 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requiring the statement of the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for the new trial or reconsideration reconsideration,, if any, a ny, was filed, and when notice of the denial thereof t hereof was received. On May 25, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's p etitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition filed on July 7, 2000. HELD: The court ruled on denying the petition because the issues raised are factual. This Court is not a trier of facts. Blanco vs. Quasha, G.R. No. 133148, November 17, 1999. Well-settled is the rule
that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are entitled to great weight and respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts or circumstance which would substantially affect the disposition of the case. There would be no end to litigations if parties who unsuccessfully availed themselves of any of the appropriate remedies or lost them through their fault would still be heard. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Court further Resolves to: (a) GRANT the motion of private respondent for a second extension of five (5) days from September 5, 2000 within which to file a comment on the petition for review on certiorari; and (b) NOTE the said comment thereafter filed.
State Prosecutors v Muros 236 SCRA 505, 19 September 1994 Facts: The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a complaint against respondent
Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violation of the provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos in violation of the Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The respondent judge dismissed all 11 cases solely on the basis of the r eport published from the 2 newspapers, which the judge believes to be r eputable and of national circulation, that the t he Pres. of the Philippines lifted all foreign f oreign exchange restrictions. Therespondent‟s decision was founded on his belief that the reported announcement of the Executive Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested the court of its jurisdiction to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed dismissed the case. He further contends that that the announcement of the President as published in the newspaper has made such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to ta ke judicial notice which is discretionary discretionar y on his part. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse a buse of discretion in taking notice on the statement sta tement of
the president lifting the foreign exchange published in t he newspaper as basis for dismissing the caes? Ruling: The Supreme Court held the respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law. It cannot comprehend his assertion that there is no need to wait for the publication of the circular no. 1353 which is the basis of the President‟s
announcement in the newspaper, believing that the public announcement is absolute and without qual ification and is announcement immediately immedi ately effective and such matter becomes a public knowledge which he can take a judicial notice upon in his discretion. It is a mand mandatory atory requirement that a new law should be published for 15 days in a news newspaper paper of general circulation before its effectivity. effectivity. When the President‟s President‟s statement statement was published in the newspaper, newspaper, the respondent admitted of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for him to take judicial notice on this matter matter which is merely based on his personal personal knowledge and is not not based on the public knowledge that the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of. For the court to take judicial notice, three material requisites should be presented: (1) The matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) It must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; (3) It must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The court ruled that the information he obtained from the newspaper is one of hearsay evidence. The judge erred in taking cognizant of a law that was not yet in force and a nd ordered the dismissal of the case without giving the pr osecution the right to be heard and a nd of due process. The court ordered for the dismissal of the ju dge from service for gross ignorance of the law and grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the case motu proprio and for erring in exercising his discretion to take judicial notice on matters that are hearsay and a nd groundless groundless with a reminder the power to take judicial notice is to be exercised exercised by the courts with caution at all times. times.
WEBB V DE LEON 247 SCRA 652 Facts: On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991. Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the r equired preliminary examination. Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation. ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide? (2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused? (3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation? (4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused? HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. (2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested committed it. Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that – “upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.” Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing warrants of arrest against them. (3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard. The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. (4) NO. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to prosecute their violators.
People vs. Claudio Teehankee, Jr. 249 SCRA 54 Facts: In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas
Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went with them. When they entered the village, Ma ureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “ Who are you? (Show me your) I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it. Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “ Why are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “ Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused‟s car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused‟s car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident. As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER. Defense: Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident,
he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother‟s house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it could still be used.
Ruling : The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the gunman. However, he vigorously assails his out- of-court identification by these eyewitnesses. He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of t he crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leino‟s identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leino‟s interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman‟s face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness‟ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness‟ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino‟s identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered the accused‟s face when the incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows that pr ecisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The natur al reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be because the accused was the real culprit. (1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victim‟s death; and, P1,000,000 as moral damages. (2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83
as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of sa id deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages. (3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary damages. (4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for attorney‟s fees and expenses of litigation; and (5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZIOLO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants G.R. No. 121039-45 October 18, 2001
FACTS: This is a review on the Pasig City Regional Trial Court‟s decision on the “Allan Gomez -Eileen Sarmenta rape-slay” case that drew strong condemnation from an outraged populace in the middle of 1993. After a protracted
and grueling 16-month trial, all those charged appellants herein were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the seven offenses or a total of seven reclusion perpetua for each accused. In addition, the Court ordered all the accused to jointly and severally pay the victims‟ respective families by way of civil indemnities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial of the appellants?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court cannot sustain their claim that they were denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials, but the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting enhances an accused‟s right to a fair trial. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the barrage of publicity. Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez, et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case.
Perez v. Estrada AM No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
FACTS: On March 13, 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an association representing duly
franchised and authorized television and radio networks throughout the country, sent a letter requesting the Supreme Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 5 April 2001 to the Chief Justice and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April 2001, the Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez formally filed the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not media coverage be allowed to air Estrada‟s trial to the public.
HELD: No. In Estes v. Texas, US SC held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial
of due process rights of the criminal defendant: "Witnesses might be frightened, play t o the cameras, become nervous. They are then subject to extraordinary out-of-court influences that might affect their testimony. Telecasting increases the trial judge's responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to excessive public exposure and distracts him from an effective presentation of his defense. Finally, the television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an accused and his case in the eyes of the public." The right of people to information does not prescribe that TV cameras be installed in the courtroom. This right might be fulfilled by less distracting, degrading and more judicial means. In a criminal case, a life is at stake, and the due process rights of the accused shall take pr ecedence over the people's right to information. The accused has the right to a public trial, and the exercise of such a right is his to make, because it is his life and liberty that is in the balance. A public trial is not the same as a publicized trial. IBP: "TV coverage can negate the rule on the exclusion of the witness intended to ensure a fair trial...could allow the 'hooting throng' to arrogate upon themselves the task of judging the guilt of the accused...will not subserve the ends of justice, but will only pander to the desire of publicity of a few grandstanding lawyers." Court is not unmindful of the recent technological advances but to chance forthwith the life and liberty of any person in a hasty bid to use and apply them, even before ample safety nets are provided and the concerns heretofore expressed are aptly addressed, is a price too high to pay.
Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners‟ request for permission to televise
and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage. ISSUE: Whether or not television and radio coverage of plunder case be allowed.
HELD: No. The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due deliberation,
finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6) of its member, the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial for documentary purposes. Seven (7) Justices vote against the audio-visual recording of the trial. Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC. G.R. No. 46496 February 27, 1940 FACTS: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were members of the
National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others, that Toribio dominates the National Workers‟ Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the company, and that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather and thus to disprove NLU‟s allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge NLU members. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations. ISSUE: Whether the CIR‟s freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe special requirements of
due process in administrative cases. HELD: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the
Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in pr oceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one‟s cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the part ies to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the r equirements set forth.
Office of the Court Administrator v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604 Facts: Sometime in February, 1993, a certain Ceferino Tigas wrote a letter, addressed to Hon. Reynaldo Suarez of the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court, charging that irregularities and corruption were being committed by the respondent Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan.
On March 10, 1993, the letter was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in order that an investigation on the alleged illegal and corrupt practices of the respondent may be conducted. Ordered to conduct a “discreet investigation” by the then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco were: SA Edward Villarta, team leader, SI Reynaldo Olazo, HA Teofilo Galang, SI Florino Javier and SI Jose Icasiano. They proceeded to Angat, Bulacan, in order to look for Ceferino Tigas, the letter writer. Tigas, the NBI team realized was a fictitious character. In view of their failure to find Tigas, they proceeded to the residence of Candido Cruz, an accused in respondent‟s sala. In his affidavit executed on March 23, 1993 before SA Edward Villarta, Cruz declared that he was the accused in Criminal Case No. 2154, charged with the crime of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge, after conducting the preliminary investigation of the case, decided that the crime he committed was only physical injuries and so, respondent judge assumed jurisdiction over the case. Cruz believed that he was made to understand by the respondent that, in view of his favorable action, Cruz was to give to respondent the sum of P2,000.00. Respondent judge is believed to be a drunkard and, in all probability, would need money to serve his vice. In view of this statement, the NBI agents assigned to the case caused respondent judge to be entrapped, for which reason, the judge was thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. NBI agents Villarta and Olazo filed the following report: “On 25 March 1993, at about 4:00 in the afternoon, CANDIDO CRUZ met with Judge PASCUAL at the Colegio de Sta. Monica, near the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan, where Subject is attending the graduation of his daughter. CANDIDO CRUZ told Judge PASCUAL that he already had the P2,000.00 which he (Judge PASCUAL) is asking him. However, Judge PASCUAL did not receive the money because according to him there were plenty of people around. He then instructed CANDIDO CRUZ to see him (Judge PASCUAL) at his office the following day.
At about 8:30 in the morning of the following day (26 March 1993), CANDIDO CRUZ proceeded to the office of Judge PASCUAL at the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, and thereat handed to him four (4) pieces of P500.00 bills contained in a white mailing envelope previously marked and glazed with fluorescent powder. In the meantime, the Undersigned stayed outside the court room and after about 15 minutes, CANDIDO CRUZ came out of the room and signaled to the Undersigned that Judge PASCUAL had already received the marked money. The Undersigned immediately entered the room and informed Subject about the entrapment. Subject denied having received anything from CANDIDO CRUZ, but after a thorough search, the marked money was found inserted between the pages of a blue book on top of his table. Subject was invited to the Office of the NBI-NCR, Manila wherein he was subjected to ultra violet light examination. After finding Subject‟s right hand for the presence of fluorescent powder, he was booked, photographed and fingerprinted in accordance with our Standard Operating Procedure (S.O.P.). On even date, the results of our investigation together with the person of Judge FILOMENO PASCUAL was referred to the Inquest Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman, with the recommendation that he be charged and prosecuted for Bribery as defined and penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.”
Issue: Whether or not the evidences presented against Judge Filomeno Pascual were strong enough to convict him. Held: We find that the evidence on record does not warrant conviction. We note that the only bases for the Report and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge Natividad G. Dizon consist of: The Complaint, the Answer, the Memorandum of the respondent, and the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open trial wherein respondent can confront the witnesses against him and present evidence in his defense.
This lapse in due process is unfortunate. The Rules, even in an administrative cases, demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence against him should be competent and should be derived from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after presentation of competent evidence, especially since the charge is penal in character.[7] The above-quoted Report and Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short of the requirements of due process. The evidence aforesaid admits of irreconcilable inconsistencies in the testimonies of principal witness, Candido Cruz, and NBI Agent SI Reynaldo Olazo on several material points. It will be remembered that the charge was intimated by someone who must have had an ax to grind against the respondent judge but who, by reason of cowardice or lack of evidence to put up a righteous case, did not come out in the open and instead wrote an anonymous letter. The letter-writer, naming himself as Ceferino Tigas, did not specify crimes committed or illegal acts perpetrated but charged respondent with anomalies in general terms. Respondent judge could not have been expected to make a valid answer or to otherwise defend himself from such vague accusations. While then NBI Director Epimaco Velasco, upon being apprised of the Tigas letter, ordered the NBI investigating team to make a “discreet investigation” of respondent, the NBI team had instead caused an instigation or the entrapment of respondent judge. Not having found letter-writer Tigas and concluding that no such person exists, they sought out an accused before respondent‟s court who could possibly be respondent judge‟s virtual victim. Approached by the NBI team was Candido Cruz, a person who had been brought before the Municipal Trial Court of Angat, Bulacan, for preliminary investigation on the charge of Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge gave judgment to the effect that the crime committed by Candido Cruz was that of physical injuries merely. He declared then that he had original jurisdiction to try the case. But, respondent‟s action in this regard was perpetrated some time before Candido Cruz was “persuaded to participate in what they (the NBI agents) called „entrapment operation.‟” The opportune time to bribe the respondent should have been before he acted in reducing Cruz‟ criminal liability from Frustrated Murder to Physical Injuries. No bribe was asked then. It was unlikely that respondent would ask for it on the date of the entrapment on March 26, 1993, the favorable verdict having been rendered already. It is significant to note that NBI Agent Olazo admitted[8] that, despite the fact that he “scoured” the table of the respondent in search of the envelope, with marked money in it, no envelope was found and so he had to call Candido Cruz who was already outside so that Cruz can locate the envelope.
In view of these antecedents, we find reason to favorably consider the allegations of respondent judge in his defense that, at around 9:30 o‟cloc k in the morning of March 26, 1993, Candido Cruz, along with the NBI agents, went to the Municipal Building of Angat, Bulacan. Candido Cruz, alone, went inside respondent judge‟s chambers, located thereat, and placed before respondent judge an envelope co ntaining marked money. Respondent judge thought that what was placed before him was a pleading for filing and so, he told Candido Cruz to file it with the Office of the Clerk of Court, that is, in a room adjacent to his chambers. Candido Cruz replied that it was the money the judge was asking for. Upon hearing this reply, respondent judge suddenly erupted in anger. He grabbed the envelope on the desk and hurled it at Candido Cruz. The
envelope fell on the floor. Respondent judge then picked it up and inserted it inside the pocket of Cruz‟ polo shirt and drove him out of his chambers. NBI Agents Villarta and Olazo immediately entered the door of the judge‟s chambers, introduced themselves, and told respondent judge that the money that Cruz gave him was marked. Respondent judge told them that he did not receive or accept money from Candido Cruz. After respondent judge said this, the NBI Agents nevertheless proceeded to search the room, examined tables, drawers, and every nook and cranny of respondent‟s chambers, and the pockets of the pants of respondent judge. Even after rigid search of the chambers of respondent, the NBI Agents failed to find the envelope containing marked money allegedly given by Candido Cruz to respondent judge.
Atty. Napoleon S. Valenzuela v. Judge Reynaldo Bellosillo A.M. No. MTJ-00-1241 January 20, 2000 Facts: Respondent Judge is being charged with gross violation of the constitutional right of subject accused to
assistance by counsel of her own choice, gross misconduct, oppression, partiality and violation of the C ode of Judicial Ethics. In a BP 22 case, Judge allegedly granted bail to the accused despite not being accompanied and represented by her counsel at that time. It appears that Judge granted bail without the assistance of the counsel of record, Atty. Valenzuela and he even suggested that the latter should be replaced by another counsel. Aghast by such decision, Atty. V filed his Notice of Withdrawal, in conformity with his client‟s decision, Meriam Colapo. Sub sequently, he filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Judge. To support his position, he attached an Affidavit allegedly executed by his client Colapo. However, during the hearing of the case, he failed to present Colapo as Witness as she was allegedly out of the country although she was willing to testify at that time. Held: NOT GUILTY. On the issue of granting bail without the assistance of counsel, the Court held that it was valid
and sufficiently based on the Manifestation filed by Atty. Valenzuela. With regard to the alleged act of respondent Judge suggesting to the accused that she should change her counsel (complainant Atty. V) and recommending a different lawyer, the Court found that the evidence adduced by the complainant was insufficient to substantiate the charges against him. The only evidence offered by complainant was the Affidavit of his client Meriam Colapo, and it cannot be the basis of a finding of guilt even in an administrative case. The complainant‟s failure to pre sent his principal witness, in the absence of other evidence to prove his charges was fatal and said Affidavit cannot be given credence and is inadmissible without the said affiant being plac ed on the witness stand. The employment or profession of a person is a property right within the constitutional guaranty of due process of law. This applies also to Judges. Respondent judge cannot therefore be adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo. Otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed.
Lumiqued vs. Exevea G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997 FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for
dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under t he law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law.
Fabella v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256. FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to allpublic school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws.Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal. ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process? HELD: YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondent‟s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one‟s favor, and to defend one‟s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence sub mitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers‟administrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers‟ organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrativecharges against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher‟s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers‟ organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers‟ organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the teachers‟ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers‟ organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize them.
Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000] Facts: On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in the front
seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned by Congressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-up has overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speed and proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red Cortina Ford followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and the confrontation with del Rosario and Jesus Puey occurred. Torcita identified himself but the same had no effect. PO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNP Cadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July 1994, 12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 major complaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that the charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found that Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committed a simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance of duty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcita appealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, Region VI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled the dispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in the performance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty of irregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when the original
charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban. Held: Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges against him.
The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did not include charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular offense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found to have the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the time that he had a taste of liquor; he was on a privatetrip fetching his wife.
Office of the Ombudsman v Coronel G.R. No. 164460, June 27, 2006
In administrative cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty. In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value. Facts: Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor of the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. Board of Directors of Linamon Water District, by virtue of Resolution No. 056, Series of 1997, designated [respondent] as Officer-in-Charge, effective October 1, 1997 until a General Manager shall have been appointed. In the morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called for a meeting the officers of the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group opted to continue their meeting the luncheon meeting, attended by more or less ten (10) persons. [respondent] paid for the lunch in the amount of [P]esos (P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.[respondent] claimed for reimbursement of her expenses covered by Voucher No. 98-11-23, chargeable against the representation and entertainment account of her office. That very same day, the voucher was approved and [respondent] got her reimbursement in the amount of One Thousand Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P1,213.00). Pedro C. Sausal, Jr. was appointed General Manager of Linamon Water District filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a sworn letter-complaint against herein Coronel for dishonesty. The complaint alleges that [respondent] falsified the cash invoice she submitted for reimbursement by making it appear that the (P1,213.00) when in fact, it was only (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this office finds and so holds that respondent CARMENCITA D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from reemployment in the national and local governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent. Issue: Whether or not Coronel was deprived of due process Whether or not the administrative proceedings of the Ombudsman erred in the decision rendered. Held: The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due process. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain one‟s side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of notice or hearing. In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be heard. Significantly, her intelligible pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that she knew the bases for the ombudsman‟s Decision. In fact, she very ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it was reached, respondent‟s insistence on a denial of due process has no legal leg to stand on.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence;that is, such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified. That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party. The complainant‟s evidence t o prove falsification consisted of an unauthenticated45 photocopy of the original duplicate. He could have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and authenticity. Absent any proof of due
execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the actual bill incurred. While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently requires some proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of documents. Absent any such proof of authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered inadmissible and, hence, without probative value. Given the flimsy charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for her to present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by substantial evidence. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the charge against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
Justice Secretary v. Lantion [GR 139465, 17 October 2000] Facts: On 13 January 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". On 13 November 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. "The Senate, by way of Resolution 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the Requesting State). On 18 June 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale 0522 containing a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Jimenez was charged in t he United States for violation of (a) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States, 2 counts), (b) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax, 4 counts), (c) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television, 2 counts), (d) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries, 6 counts), and (E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; 33 counts). On the same day, the Secretary issued Department Order 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, Jimenez (on 1 July 1999requested copies of the official extradition request from the US Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith, and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. The Secretary denied the request. On 6 August 1999, Jimenez filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extra dition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside the Justice Secretary‟s letter dated 13 July 1999); and prohibition (to restrain the Justice Secretary from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to t he extradition of Jimenez to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court ruled in favor of Jimenez. The Secretary filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On 18 January 2000, by a vote of 9-6, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and ordered the Justice Secretary to furnish Jimenez copies of the,extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. On 3 February 2000, the Secretary timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. Issue: Whether Jimenez had the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. Held: Presidential Decree (PD) 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an
extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition court (Section 6). It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee. There is noprovision in the Treaty and in PD 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the Justice Secretary copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. The DFA and the DOJ, as well as the US government, maintained that the Treaty and PD 1069 do not grant the extraditee a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. It is neither an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Jimenez is, thus, bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the extradition process‟ evaluation stage. Further, as an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. The procedural due process r equired by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has been affected by governmental action." The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." Thus, the temporary hold on Jimenez's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the US. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Gov't. of the USA vs. Purganan
G.R. No. 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
In the case of Government of the United States v. Hon. Purganan the court had the occasion to resolve the issue as to whether or not extraditees are entitled tothe right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Private respondent (extraditee) invoked the constitutional provision under the 1987 Constitution, that persons are entitled to bail except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death when evidence of guilt is strong. The court, in rejecting the claim of private respondent held that said constitutional provision is applicable only in criminal cases but not to extradition proceedings.Again, the court reiterated its pronouncement in the Lantion case that the only to determine whether theextradition request c omplies with the Extradition treaty, and whether the person sought is Equally important, is the pronouncement that the courtof the requested state has the discretion to grant or deny bail and that as a rule bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. But the court enunciated that thereare exceptions to this rule if only to serve the ends of justice, (1) once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or danger to the community; (2) that thereexist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. Having no statutory basis the applicant bears the burden of proving t hese exceptions with clarity andprecision. Unfortunately, the court exercised its discretion in denying bail to pr United Statesafter learning of the criminal charges filed against him.
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the US Government requested the extradition of Mark Jimenez. A hearing was held to determine whether awarrant of arrest should be issued. Afterwards, such warrant was issued but the trial court allowed Jimenez to post bail for his provisional liberty. ISSUE:
1. Whether or not extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before issuance of warrant of arrest 2. Whether or not the right to bail is available in extradition proceedings RULING: Held: Five Postulates of Extradition 1. Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime.First, extradition treaties are entered into for the
purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to theother.With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of committing crimeand evading prosecution has become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcendinternational boundaries extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in thesuppression of crime. It is the only regular system that has been devised to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordancewith municipal and international law.xxxIndeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be anisolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country. 2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both p confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other stateto protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to therequesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or wouldhave been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality. 3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of theaccused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.To begin with, the process of extradition does not i nvolve the determination of the guilt or innocence of
an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in thecourt of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannotbe n proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminalproceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidenceunder less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case of the existence of a prima facie c uponbeing rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. TheUnited States adheres to a similar practice whereby the dent that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Suchdetermination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistancethrough which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function of theassisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determinewhether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable. 4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith .Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries thepresumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paintsa bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into tr eaties with us, particularly an extraditiontreaty that hinges on reciprocity.Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to therequesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is underobligation to it be found proper. 5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch: nothingshort of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would noteven begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting state right beforethe conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and thatthe crimes he is charged with are bailable -eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at allcost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once,what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time? Due Process
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest?It is significant to note that qualification would berendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts and argumentsfrom them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest sub could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest shou expected to make anexhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then availableto it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest anddetention of the accused. Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.”
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination - under oath or affirmation -- of complainantsand the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case, validating the actof respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the a ccused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entiresystem. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest,what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedurecould convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. Thisscenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions. That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of theaccused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -Right to Bail Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of theRules of Court, applies only when a person has been arr ested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as hereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds or directly connected with criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken tomean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature. That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court. Exceptions to the No Bail Rule
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion andtyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enoughto include the ing for its application. Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or adanger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highestcourt in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears theburden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically a n executive,not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistanceamongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution, sothat the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever protective ogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations. Bail is a Matter of Discretion on the part of Appellate Court.
Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470 April 19, 2007) Facts
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions: 1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government; 2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court; 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and 4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly. Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition. Issue
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail Ruling
A potential extraditee is entitled to bail. Ratio Decidendi
Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion a mounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extr aditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one‟s liberty. In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other. In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given t o the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
Guzman vs. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699 In Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. 68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, respondent school was directed to allow the petitioning students to re- enroll or otherwise continue with their respective courses, without prejudice to an y disciplinary proceedings that may be conducted in connection with their participation in the protests that led to the stoppage of classes. Facts:
Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University. The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners‟ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.” Held:
Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused reenrollment for poor scholastic standing. There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Alcuaz v. PSBA [GR 76353, 2 May 1988] Facts: Sophia Alcuaz, Ma. Cecilia Alindayu, Bernadette Ang, Irna Anonas, Ma. Remedios Baltazar, Corazon Bundoc,
John Carmona, Anna Shiela Dinoso, Rafael Encarnacion, et. al., are all bonafide students of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) Quezon City. As early as 22 March 1986, the students and the PSBA, Q.C. had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In spite of the agreement, the students felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. Subsequently dialogues proved futile. Finally, on 8 October 1996, the students received uniform letters from PSBA giving them 3 days to explain why the school should not take/mete out any administrative sanction on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on October 2, 3, and 7. On 22 October 1982, the letter was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the regular enrollment period, the students were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of SY 19861987. On 28 October 1986 the President of the Student Council filed a complaint with the Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the schools final decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the students Atty. Alan Romullo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients within 48 hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming. The students filed a petition for review on certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction. Issue: Whether the students were deprived of due process in the r efusal of PSBA to readmit them. Held: After the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students
or with the intervening teachers. The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by the Court, as it is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Such proceedings may be summary and crossexamination is not even an essential part thereof. Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of c ounsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. Herein, conditions 3, 4 and 5 had not been complied with. The Court, however, ordered an investigation to be conducted by t he school authorities in the interest of justice. Further, it is well settled that by reason of their special knowledge and expertise gained from the handling of specific matters falling under their respective jurisdictions, the Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless the factual findings are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. Herein, a careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, but in the light of compassionate equity, students who were, in view of the absence of academic deficiencies, scheduled to graduate during the school year when the petition was filed, should be allowed to re-enroll and to graduate in due time.
Non v. Dames [GR 89317, 20 May 1990] Facts: Ariel Non, Rex Magana, Alvin Agura, Normandy Occiano, Jorge Dayaon, Lourdes Banares, Bartolome Ibasco,
Emmanuel Barba, Sonny Moreno. Giovani Palma, Joselito Villalon, Luis Santos and Daniel Torres, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Daet (Branch 38) seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition in an order dated 8 August 1988. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by the trial court on 24 February 1989; stating that they waived-t heir privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges "to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid down by competent authorities in the College Department or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the school exclude students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken against them
relates to possible breaches of discipline. Held: The contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public interest,
considering the high priority given by the Constitution to education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. The authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired, cannot be justified. Still, institutions' discretion on the admission and enrollment of students as a major component of the academic freedom guaranteed to institutions of higher learning. The right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards, however, cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. Thus, an institution of learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right; and the court should not review the discretion of university authorities. Excluding students because of failing grades when the cause for the action taken a gainst them undeniably related to possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of fair play. Further, the failures in one or two subjects by some cannot be considered marked academic deficiency. Neither can the academic deficiency be gauged from the academic standards of the school due to insufficiency of information. Herein, the students could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with the mass actions, but the penalty that could have been imposed must be commensurate to the offense committed and it must be imposed only after the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with (Paragraph 145, Manual of Regulations for Private Schools). But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have become moot and academic; as the students have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and have been effectively excluded from for 4 semesters, have already been more t han sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when they led and participated in the mass actions that resulted in the disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose and would only further aggravate the strained relations between the students and the officials of the school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle.
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG 222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993 Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese
General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twentyfour (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Investigating Committee found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the r espondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. The Dean of the Ateneo Law
School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
The Minimum standards to be satisfi ed in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions i n academic institutions, such as petitioner universi ty herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in WR I TI NG of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official desi gnated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. While of the students mentioned in the February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements . Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20, 1991. 30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them . The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration Faculty- Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.
R espondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportuni ty to see and examine the wri tten statements which became the basis of petitioners' F ebruary 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An ADMI NI STR ATI VE PR OCE E DI NG conducted to investigate students' participation in a
hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that respondent students have no righ t to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling in Alcuaz . Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.
UP vs. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342 G.R. No. 110280 October 12, 1993
Facts: In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the University of the People, U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. After broad consultations with the various university constituencies, U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the implementation of the program. In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University. Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student's application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law. A team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal's aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between the report and Nadal's application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In compliance with the said Committee's directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. commercial rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation. Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying employment." U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) that he committed acts which find him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is living abroad and that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car. As such, the SDT imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be "effected” by the University thru outside legal action. The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. Board of regents modified the penalty from Expulsion to One Year- Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. However the BOR also decided against giving Nadal, a certification of good moral character. Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, in the next BOR meeting Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the "material importance" of the truth of Nadal's claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it ha d not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadal's claim on the matter. U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondent's dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation and the reviews."In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting, according to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the
BOR found Nadal "guilty." However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. Issue: Whether or not the Board of Regent violated Nadal's right to due process when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the March 29, 1993 meeting.
Held: With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said meeting, that imposition of sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," the phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting. However BOR ruled that in any event it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to respondent. University rules do not r equire the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that Nadal was not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge. Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28. Whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was "exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadal's mother. It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a ver ification of Nadal's claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from the AdeMU. The Court in this regard find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his July, 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well paying employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the help of another son. The court constitutes this as a sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. The court also sighted that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession. With this the court ruled that it sufficiently shown that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the latter's inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised. T herefore deciding that the BOR did not violate Nadal‟s right of due process. The lower court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
Lao Gi v CA (1989) 180 SCRA 756 Facts: Filomeno Chia Jr. was made a Filipino citizen by virtue of Opinion 191 by the Secretary of justice. However, this was revoked when his father‟s citizenship was cast aside due to fraud and misrepresentation. Charges of
deportation were filed against the Chias. Charges also alleged that they refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of undesirability. The Chias said that the CID has no authority to deport them which was denied by the CID. They filed a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of preliminary injunction which was dismissed for lack of merit. Their MFR was also denied. Earlier, Manuel Chia‟s case of falsifica tion of public documents in alleging he was a Filipino citizen. He was alleged to have done this for the sale of real property. The trial court acquitted him by saying that Opinion 191 was res judicata and cant be contravened by Opinion 147. The CID set the hearing for the deportation case against the Chias and told them to register as aliens. The Chias tooks further action. Their petition f or injunctive relief was denied by th e CFI of Manila. They also lost the appeal in the CA. The Chias was denied. In their SC petition, they seek to set aside the CA decision. They argued that they weren‟t subject to immediate deportation, the presence of fraud in the citizenship, the CA‟s overstepping of appellate jurisdiction, and the resolution of the SC didn‟t make a ruling that the petitioner entered the Philippines by false pretenses. Issue: Does the CID have the jurisdiction to determine the deportation? Held: Yes. Petition granted Hearing must be continued to determine if they are really aliens
Ratio: Section 37 of the Immigration act states: SEC. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien: (1) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ... There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal entry into the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be appositive finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as such. This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the public good. Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided t hat: No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person to be informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst must be in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure. On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of the state. There is no justification for a private party to intervene.
Philcomsat vs Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218 Facts: By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, the Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the authority to “construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals” in the Philippines.
PHILCOMSAT provides satellite services to companies like Globe Mackay (now Globe) and PLDT. Under Section 5 of the same law, PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control and regulation of the Public Service Commission later known as the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). However, Executive Order No. 196 was later promulgated and the same has placed PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of the NTC. Consequently, PHILCOMSAT has to acquire permit to operate from the NTC in order to continue operating its existing satellites. NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC based its power to fix the rates on EO 546. PHILCOMSAT now sues NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix rates for public service communications, does not provide the necessary standards which were constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue delegation of legislative power, particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC. PHILCOMSAT asserts that nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, providing for the creation of NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of EO 196, placing PHILCOMSAT under the jurisdiction of NTC, can it be inferred that NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. PHILCOMSAT subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial power to NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an undue delegation of power. HELD: No. There is no undue delegation. The power of the NTC to fix rates is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power
may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. However, in this case, it appears that the manner of fixing the rates was done without due process since no hearing was made in ascertaining the rate imposed upon PHILCOMSAT.
Radio Communications v NTC G.R. No. L-68729 May 29, 1987 Facts: RCPI operated a radio communications system since 1957 under legislative franchise granted byRepublic Act
No. 2036 (1957). The petitioner established a radio telegraph service in Sorsogon, Sorsogon (1968). in San Jose, Mindoro (1971), and Catarman, Samar (1983). Kayumanggi Radio, on the other hand, was given the rights by the NTC to operate radio networks in the sa me areas. RCPI filed a complaint in the NTC and sought to prohibit Kayumanggi Radio to operate in the same areas. The NTC ruled against the RTC‟s favor and commanded RCPI to desist in the operation of radio telegraphs in the three areas. RTC filed a MFR in 1984. This was denied. In the SC, Petitioner alleged that the Public Service Law had sections that was still in effect even if the Public Service Commission was abolished and the NTC was established. These were S13- the Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all public services and their franchises S 14- Radio companies are exempt from the commission‟s authority except with respect to the fixing of rates And S 15-no public service shall operate in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service Commission, known as "certificate of public convenience," Issue: Whether or not petitioner RCPI, a grantee of a legislative franchise to operate a radio company, is required to
secure a certificate of public convenience and necessity before it can validly operate its radio stations including radio telephone services in the aforementioned areas Held: Yes. Petition dismissed.
Ratio: Presidential Decree No. 1- the Public Service Commission was abolished and its functions were transferred to three specialized regulatory boards, as follows: the Board of Transportation, the Board of Communications and the Board of Power and Waterworks. The functions so transferred were still subject to the limitations provided in sections 14 and 15 of the Public Service Law, as amended. The succeeding Executive Order No. 546- the Board of Communications and the Telecommunications Control Bureau were abolished and their functions were transferred to the Nati onal Telecommunications Commission Section 15- b. Establish, prescribe and regulate areas of operation of particular operators ofpublic service communications; and determine and prescribe charges or rates pertinent to the operation of such public utility facilities and services except in cases where charges or rates are established by international bodies or associations of which the Philippines is a participating member or by bodies recognized by the Philippine Government as the proper arbiter of such charges or rates; c. Grant permits for the use of radio frequencies for wireless telephone and telegraph systems and radio communication systems including amateur radio stations and radio and television broadcasting systems; The exemption enjoyed by radio companies from the jurisdiction of the Public ServiceCommission and the Board of Communications no longer exists because of the changes effected by the Reorganization Law and implementing executive orders. The petitioner's claim that its franchise cannot be affected by Executive Order No. 546 on the ground that it has long been in operation since 1957 cannot be sustained. Today, a franchise, being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. Pangasinan transportation Co.- statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise by the State of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation . Executive Order No. 546, being an implementing measure of P.D. No. I insofar as it amends thePublic Service Law (CA No. 146, as amended) is applicable to the petitioner who must be bound by its provisions.
The position of the petitioner that by the mere grant of its franchise under RA No. 2036 it can operate a radio communications system anywhere within the Philippines is erroneous. Sec. 4(a). This franchise shall not take effect nor shall any powers thereunder be exercised by the grantee until the Secretary of Public works and Communications shall have allotted to the grantee the frequencies and wave lengths to be used, and issued to the grantee a license for such case. Thus, in the words of R.A. No. 2036 itself, approval of the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications was a precondition before the petitioner could put up radio stations in areas where it desires to operate. The records of the case do not show any grant of authority from the then Secretary of Public Works and Communications before the petitioner installed the questioned radio telephone services in San Jose, Mindoro in 1971. The same is true as regards the radio telephone services opened in Sorsogon, Sorsogon and Catarman, Samar in 1983. No certificate of public convenience and necessity appears to have been secured by the petitioner from the public respondent when such certificate,was required by the applicable public uti lity regulations. The Constitution mandates that a franchise cannot be exclusive in nature nor can a franchise be granted except that it must be subject to amendment, alteration, or even repeal by t he legislaturewhen the common good so requires.
Globe Telecom vs NTC 435 SCRA 110
FACTS: On 4 June 1999, Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC,praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection of Smarts and Globes GSM networks. Smart alleged that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to grant Smarts request for the interconnection of SMS. Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss on 7 June 1999, interposing grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smarts failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93,19 and its omission of the mandatory Certification of Non-Forum Shopping. On 19 July 1999, NTC issued the Order now subject of the present petition. Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for their lack of cooperation in the submission of the documentation required for interconnection and for having unduly maneuvered the situation into the present impasse. NTC held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of value-added service or enhancedservice given in NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-9-95) their implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory.The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have been providing SMS without authority from it. Globe filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking any further action in the case. Globe reiterated its previous arguments that the complaint should have been dismissed for failure to comply with conditions precedent and the non-forum shopping rule.They claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in declaring that it had no authority to render SMS, pointing out that the matter was not raised as an issue before it at all.They alleged that the Order is a patent nullity as it imposed an administrative penalty for an offense for which neither it nor Smart was sufficiently charged nor heard on in violation of their right to due process. The CA issued a TRO on 31 Aug 1999. In its Memorandum, Globe called the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated special feature and does not require the prior approval of the NTC. ISSUE: Whether or not the NTC’s order is not supported by substantial evidence. HELD: There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA; the assailed Order violates due process for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation to, and issuing a corresponding fine on, Globe despite the absence of due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to present evidence on its behalf. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 22 November 1999, as wel l as its Resolution dated 29 July 2000, and the assailed Order of the NTC dated 19 July 1999 are hereby SET ASIDE. No cost.
CORONA VS. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
FACTS: The Philippine Ports Authority [PPA] was created through PD 505, as amended by PD857 to “control,
regulate, supervise pilots and the pilot age profession”. After hearing from relevant government agencies, pursuant to said charter, PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued Administrative Order 04-92 [PPA-AO 04-92] and corresponding Memorandum Order in 1992, stating that all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only and that all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all pilot age districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance” to regulate and improve pilot services by instilling discipline and give better protection to port users. PPA-AO 04-92 replaces PPA-AO 03-85 which succinctly provides that, aspiring pilots must have a license and train as probationary pilots, and only upon satisfactory performance, are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself and to exercise harbor pilot age until they reach the age of 70.Upon learning of PPA-AO 04-92 only after publication in the newspaper, the United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines: (a) questioned said PPA-AO twice before the DOTC, which Secretary Garcia said twice that only the PPA Board of Directors [as governing body] has exclusive jurisdiction to review, recall or annul PPA-AOs, (b) appealed to the Office of the President, which first issued a restraining order to the PPA on the implementation of the PPA- AO, and after PPA’s answer, then dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted said order, stating, through Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona, that the PPA-AO (i) merely implements PPA Charter, (ii) issuance is an act of P PA, not of its General Manager, (iii) merely regulates, not forbids practice of the profession, recognizing that such exercise is property right, and (iv) sufficiently complied with the requirement in the PD to consult only with relevant Government Agencies and (d) finally finding affirmative relief with Manila RTC Br. 6. Court, which ruled that (i) said PPA-AO is null and void (ii) PPA acted in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion and (iii) imposed a permanent restraining order on PPA on its implementation.Assistant Executive Secretary Corona thus filed petition for review [of the Manila RTC Decision] to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have acted in excess of jurisdiction.
t
Whether or not the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exe rcise their profession and heir right to due process of law.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that: Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders; PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared null and void; The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders. No costs. SO ORDERED
CENTRAL BANK VS. CA 220 SCRA 536 FACTS: Central Bank discovered that certain questionable loans extended by Producer’s Bank of the Philippines
(PBP), totaling approximately P300 million (the paid-in capital of PBP amounting only to P 140.544 million, were fictitious as they were extended, without collateral, to certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. Subsequently and during the same year, several blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its stockholders appeared in major newspapers which triggered a bank-run in PBP and resulted in continuous over-drawings on the bank’s demand deposit account with the Central Bank; reaching to P 143.955 million. Hence, on the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector, the Monetary Board (MB), placed PBP under conservatorship. PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB which proposed the transfer to PBP of 3 buildings owned by Producers Properties, Inc. (PPI), its principal stockholder and the subsequent mortgage of said properties to the CB as collateral for the bank’s overdraft obligation but which was not approved due to disagreements between the parties. Since no other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years its overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate and swelled to a staggering P1.023 billion. Consequently, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it considered a viable rehabilitation program for PBP. There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the MB issued a resolution instructing Central Bank management to advise the bank that the conservatorship may be lifted if PBP complies with certain conditions. Without responding to the communications of the CB, PBP filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the CB, the MB and CB Governor alleging that the resolutions issued were arbitraty and made in bad faith. Respondent Judge issued a temporary restraining order and subsequently a writ of preliminary injunction. CB filed a motion to dismiss but was denied and ruled that the MB resolutions were arbitrarily issued. CB filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders of the trial court but CA affirmed the said orders. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in not dismissing the case for lack of cause of action and declaring the MB
resolutions as arbitrary. HELD: The following requisites must be present before the order of conservatorship may be set aside by a court: (1)
The appropriate pleading must be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock of the bank in the proper court; (2) Said pleading must be filed within ten (10) days from receipt of notice by said majority stockholders of the order placing the bank under conservatorship; and (3) There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. In the instant case, the original complaint was filed more than 3 years after PBP was placed under conservator, long after the expiration of the 10-day period deferred to above. It is also beyond question that the complaint and the amended complaint were not initiated by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock.
RURAL BANK VS. CA 162 SCRA 288
FACTS: Petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi is a juridical entity existing under the laws of the Philippines. Buhi started its operations on Dec. 26, 1975. Under the law, Central Bank has charge of the supervision and examination of Rural Banks. However, Rural Bank of Buhi refused to be examined and as a result thereof, financial assistance was suspended. Upon general examination of Buhi’s affair and operations conducted by DRBSLA and represented by Consolacion Odra, director of DRBSLA, there was a massive irregularities in its operations (consisting of loans and fictitious borrowers). Thereby, Odra submitted a report recommending the Monetary Board of the Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Sec. 29 of the RA 285 as amended, the designation of the Director DRBSLA, as receiver thereof. Rural Bank of Buhi filed a motion to dismiss averring that the petition alleg ed a valid cause of action and that the respondents have violated the due process clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Monetary Board of C entral Bank is correct in placing the Rural Bank of Buhi under receivership in accordance with Sec. 29 of the RA 285.
HELD: The decision of the CA is hereby modified. There is lacking that “convincing proof” prerequisite to justify the temporary restraining order issued by the court. We hereby order the remand of this case to the RTC for further proceedings but we lift the temporary restraining order issued by the trial court in this order.
PHILIPPINE MERCHANT VS. CA GR 112844, June 2, 1995
FACTS: On May 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61, rendered a decision adverse to petitioner in
Civil Cases Nos. 90-3490 and 91-685, upholding the validity of an auction sale over a piece of land and ordering the issuance of a new Certificate of Title in favor of herein respondent. On August 15, 1996, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal from the adverse decision of the RTC. On March 26, 1998, petitioner received a Notice to File Appellant’s Brief from the Court of Appeals. Petitioner had 45 days or until May 10, 1998 to file its brief. Since May 10 was a Sunday and May 11 was a holiday, petitioner had until May 12, 1998 to file it. On May 7, 1998, or five days before its deadline, petitioner allegedly filed by mail an “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief,” praying for an additional period of 60 days or from May 13, 1998 to July 13, 1998 within which to file the brief. On July 13, 1998, the last day of the extension prayed for, petition er filed its appellant’s brief. On July 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals (Special Sixth Division) dismissed the appeal in a resolution, for failure to file the appellant’s brief within the required period of 45 days from receipt of notice to file the sam e. It was further noted by the CA that the appellant’s brief, received only on July 13, 1998, was without any accompanying moti on for leave to admit the same. The CA found that: Record shows that a notice to file brief dated March 17, 1998 was received by appellant on March 26, 1998. Consequently, the 45-day period within which to file appellant’s brief expired on May 10, 1998. On July 2, 1998, the Judicial Records Division (Civil Cases Section) submitted a report stating that no appellant’s brief has been filed in this case. However, the appellant’s brief was received by this court on July 13, 1998, without any accompanying motion for leave to admit the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions made by the CA are: filed out of time and and filed without a motion for leave
for its admission.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolutions dated July 23, 1998 and
February 26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. The denial of the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 56325 due to the late filing of the Appellant’s Brief pursuant to Rule 50 (e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is hereby declared FINAL. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
AGABON vs. NLRC G.R. No. 158693, November 17, 2004
Facts: Virgilio and Jenny Agabon were cornice installers of Riviera Home Improvements, a company engaged in the
business of selling ornamental construction materials. They were employed from January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999, when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. The Agabons filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA, who ruled in their favor. The NLRC reversed on appeal. The CA sustained the NLRC’s decision The Agabons further appealed to the SC, disputing the finding of abandonment, and claiming that the company did not comply with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Issue: WON the Agabons were illegally dismissed Held: NO. Substantive due process (EEs must be dismissed for just or authorized cause): SC upheld the finding of
abandonment, because the act of the Agabons in seeking employment elsewhere clearly showed a deliberate intent to sever the ER-EE relationship. Procedural due process (for just cause, there must be a written notice informing him of grounds for termination, a hearing or opportunity to be heard, and a final notice of termination stating the grounds therefor): There was no due process because ER did not send the requisite notices to the last known address of the EEs. ER only gave a flimsy excuse that the notice would be useless because the EEs no longer lived there. This is not a valid excuse, they should have still sent a notice as mandated by law. For not sending the requisite notices, the ER should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
