Pale (Finals)

TOPIC: THE LAWYER AND THE MONEYS OR PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTS •

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CANON 16 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION. Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

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Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the the Rules of Court.

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Rule 16.04 - A lawyer s hall not borrow money from his c lient unless the client's interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. Rule 138 Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. fees. - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. xxx

Rule 138 Sec. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt . contempt . - When an attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution. Rule 138 Sec. 37. 37. Attorneys' liens. liens. - An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has s ecured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

LAWYER TOOK CUSTODY OF 2 CARS SUBJECT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT •

According to Atty. Salomon, Salomon, the attaching sheriff of Manila, instead of depositing the attached cars in the court premises, turned them over to Atty. Frial, Lo’s counsel.

TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

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Very patently, Atty. Frial was remiss in his obligation of taking good care of the attached cars. He also allowed the use of the Nissan Sentra car by persons who had no business using it. He did not inform the court or at least the sheriff of the destruction of the Volvo car. What is worse is that he took custody of them without so much as informing the court, let alone securing, its authority. Atty. Salomon Jr. v. Atty. Frial, A.C. No. 7820 [2008]

LAWYER WITHDRAW MONEY DEPOSITED TO THE BRANCH CLERK OF COURT WITHOUT INFORMING HIS CLIENT •

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Respondent’s failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter’s demands gives rise gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit. Almandrez Jr. v. Atty. Langit, A.C. No. 7057 7057 [2006]

BUSINESS TRANSACTION BETWEEN LAWYER AND CLIENT IS DISCOURAGE •

Complainant, through his new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent respondent on 30 June 2003 a final demand letter for the accounting and return of the P255,000. Respondent failed to reply. Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant.

As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith . The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard that is required in business dealings where the parties trade at "arms length." Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor. - Chua and Hsia v. Atty. Mesina Jr., A.C. No. 4904 [2004]

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court’s approval of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent could have ISSUING AND KEEPING OF RECEIPTS ARE PRACTICES OF collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his ACCOUNTABILITY legal services, provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money Ethical and practical considerations made it both natural and for himself by the mere fact that the c lient owes him attorney’s imperative for him to issue receipts, even if not demanded, and to fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the keep copies of the receipts for his own records. He was all too existence of any lien, or any other right that he had to retain the aware that he was accountable for the moneys entrusted to him by money. the clients, and that his only means of ensuring accountability was TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 2 •

by issuing and keeping receipts. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011] WHEN TO DELIVER FUNDS OF CLIENTS •

Thus, having obtained the funds from the [client] in the course of his professional employment, [a lawyer] had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. •

(a) when they became due, or (b) upon demand. demand. - Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011] LAWYER SHOULD NOT DEPOSIT THE FUNDS IN HIS PERSONAL ACCOUNT •

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For him to deposit the amount of P65,000.00 in his personal account without the consent of the Tarogs and not return it upon demand, and for him to fail to file the memorandum and yet not return the amount of P15,000.00 upon demand constituted a serious breach of his fiduciary duties as their attorney. He reneged on his duty to render an accounting to his clients showing that he had spent the amounts for the particular purposes intended. Tarog v. Atty. Ricafort, A.C. No. 8253 [2011]

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PURPOSE OF PROHIBITING LENDING OF MONEY TO CLIENT •

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Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

Ill-effects of lending money to clients

Depositing it in his personal account with the consent of client is ethical?

LENDING MONEY TO CLIENT

The rule is that a lawyer lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses ( such ( such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client. Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009]

If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may:

a. lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or


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b. to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. - Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, A.C. No. 6672 [2009] RULE 16.01 INCLUDES MONEY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CLIENT •

There is no question that the money or property received by a lawyer for her client properly belongs to the latter. Conformably with these canons of professional responsibility, we have held that a lawyer is obliged to render an accounting of all the property and money she has collected for her client. This obligation includes the prompt reporting and accounting of the money collected by the lawyer by reason of a favorable judgment to his client . client . Bayonla v. Atty. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808 [2011]

mindful of their fiduciary duty. - J.K. Mercado and Sons v. Atty. De Vera and Atty. Bandalan, A.C. No. 3066 [2001] MISUSE OF FILING FEE VIOLATES THE RULE THAT LAWYERS MUST BE SCRUPULOUSLY CAREFUL IN HANDLING MONEY ENTRUSTED TO THEM IN THEIR PROFESSIONAL PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY •

APPROPRIATING APPROPRIATING THE ENTIRE AWARD IS A VIOLATION OF CANON 16 AND RULE 16.01 •

LAWYER AND CLIENT MUST AGREE WITH THE AMOUNT BEFORE RETAINING LIEN IS VALIDLY APPLIED •

Central to this case are the following alleged acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his appropriation for himself of the money given for the filing fee. - Burbe v. Atty. Atty. Magulta, AC No. 99-634 99-634 [2002]

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer . - Rivera v. Atty. Angeles, A.C. No. 2519 [2000]

In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. fees . In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not OBLIGATION OF LAWYER ONCE THE MONEY OR PROPERTY arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of INTENDED FOR HIS CLIENT IS RECEIVED his fees ; instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with should be reported and accounted for promptly and the proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own hands in payment of his claimed compensation even when or there is a disagreement between him and his client would not be used by him. only be violative of the trust relationship between them but can also open the door to possible abuse by those who are less than TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 4 •

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- Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000

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MISAPPROPRIATION IS NOT REQUIRED •

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The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in fact, Mrs. Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show, however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of his professional responsibility. Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 6, 2000

LIMITATIONS OF CONTINGENT FEE •

AVOID KEEPING THE MONEY OF CLIENT •

Keeping the money in his possession without his client's knowledge knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This situation should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean; they must also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system would remain undisturbed. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr., A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000

Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by said prohibition under because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact, under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds and may apply so much thereof as may and property of his client and be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or imposition applied , or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion , a contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable. enforceable. Moreover, contingent fees were impliedly sanctioned by No. 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which governed lawyer-client relationships when the contract of services was entered into between the Fabillo spouses and Murillo. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

APPEARANCE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IF JUDGE PURCHASE PROPERTY AFTER LITIGATION

Finally, while it is true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his TOPIC: ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF LITIGATION court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENT DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be 1491 (5) OF THE CIVIL CODE free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 5 •

behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at the time of such transfer. - Macariola v. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J [1982]

judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Therefore Article 1491 of the New Civil Code did not apply . Consequently, respondent had not violated the said provision of law. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982] •

THE PROPERTY MUST BE THE VERY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION FOR ARTICLE 1491 TO APPLY APPLY •

It is true that Canon No. 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics prohibits the lawyer from purchasing any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting, and Article 1491, paragraph 5, of the New Civil Code prohibits him from acquiring by purchase or assignment the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession. But in those cases where these provisions were applied, the rights or properties purchased by the lawyer were the very subject of the litigation handled by him. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

It was not professional misconduct or unethical practice for the respondent to acquire the rights and interests of his client to the 439 square meter parcel of land subject of the administrative charges because the land was not involved in the litigation he was handling. The land was acquired by Bernabe Flores in an execution sale conducted to satisfy the judgment secured in the course of Civil Case No. 2171. The case handled by the respondent was for damages. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M. No. 681 [1982]

WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMOUNT DEPOSITED IN ORDER TO PAY ATTORNEY S FEES VIOLATES ARTICLE ARTICLE 1491 OF THE NCC NCC •

The withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to pay attorney ’s fees to petitioner ’s counsel, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., violates Article 1491 of the Civil Code which forbids lawyers from acquiring by assignment, property and rights which are the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession. Furthermore, Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides that “ the lawyer should not purchase

LEVIED PROPERTY IN SATISFACTION OF DAMAGES CAN BE PROPERLY ACQUIRED BY LAWYER •

any interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting.” The assailed transaction transaction falls within the prohibition

because the Deed assigning the amount of P672,900.00 to Atty. De In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired rights by Guzman, Jr., as part of his attorney ’s fees was executed during assignment was not the subject of Civil Case No. 2171 in which he the pendency of this case with with the Court of Appeals. In his Motion approved (sic) as counsel for Bernabe Flores and others. The said to Intervene, Atty. De Guzman, Jr., not only asserted ownership over case was purely one for damages and did not involve the lot in question. question. The lot was simply levied upon on execution after TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 6

said amount, but likewise prayed that the same be released to him. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]

of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his family partnership over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings. proceedings. - Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas, A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995

EVEN IF LITIGANT VOLUNTARILY ASSIGNED THE AMOUNT •

That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assigned the subject amount to his counsel did did not remove their agreement within the ambit of the prohibitory provisions. - Pabugais v. Sahijwani G.R. No. 156846 [2004]

MORTGAGE CONTRACT INCLUDED IN THE PROHIBITION •

ASSIGNMENT OF PROPERTY PROPERTY VIOLATES VIOLATES ARTICLE 1491 •

We agree with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that the prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time when the property is still the subject of a pending case. - Ordonio v. Atty. Eduarte, A.M. No. 3216 [1992]

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PROHIBITION STILL APPLIES EVEN IF LESSEE IS A SEPARATE JURIDICAL PERSON PERSON •

Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. part. To rule otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect, circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the heirs

To state that mortgages are not included within the prohibition is to open the door to an indirect circumvention of that statutory injunction, acquisition of the property being merely postponed till eventual foreclosure. foreclosure . Respondent asserts further that Article 1491[5] does not apply to judgment creditors of which, which, he claims, he was one. Under ordinary ordinary circumstances, the argument of respondent could be considered plausible. Unfortunately, however, as heretofore explained, the mortgage was executed in violation of Article 1491[5] so that this Article has a direct bearing on this case and respondent cannot escape its provision. Having violated the same, he cannot be considered in the general run of a judgment creditor. - Fornilda, et. al. v. RTC Branch 164, G.R.No. L-72306 [1989]

MERE DEMAND FOR DELIVERY OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RULE •

In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a prohibited transaction


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within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for delivery is unethical, respondent's act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. - Ramos v. Atty. Ngaseo, A.C. No. 6210 [2004] CERTIORARI PROCEEDING STILL BARS PURCHASE OF PROPERTY UNDER ARTICLE 1491 •

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge . - Valencia v. Atty. Cabanting, A.M. No. 1302, 1391 and 1543 1543 [1991]

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CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT. •

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CANON 11 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS. Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

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Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

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Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before before the Courts. Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case .

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

DUTY OF LAWYERS

TOPIC: CRITICISMS AGAINST THE COURTS AND JUDGES

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Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only .

As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial m achinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of, and the public ’s trust in, the judicial system. – Fudot v. Cattleyla Land, Inc., G.R. No. 171008

October 24,

2008 REQUIREMENTS WHEN RAISING GRIEVANCES AGAINST JUDGES •

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so , so , precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained. - In re: Atty. Bagabuyo A.C. No. 7006 [2007]


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A SCURRILOUS ATTACK ATTACK •

by his charge that the respondent Judge was " a " a bit confused

We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process. – Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

FOUL LANGUAGE

OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE •

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that confusion which is the natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class. class. - Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

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They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a

“ court of

The loathsome epithets hurled by the complainant against the respondent justices, e.g., " Crooks " Crooks in Robe ," Robe ," " Swindlers in Robe ," " corrupt corrupt

justices

who

were

only

sowing

judicial

technicalities” for validly dismissing their defectively prepared

terrorism,’" as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom

petition.

he called " Chief-Swindler-in-Robe Chief-Swindler-in-Robe ," go beyond the bounds of

They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view,

acceptable behavior. – Complaint Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda

“ an incompetent judge. judge.”

against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005

The its

Court

of

Appeals ’ dismissal

of

the

case

shows

impatience and readiness to punish petitioners for a

PROSCRIBED LANGUAGE •

Proscribed then are, inter alia:

perceived slight on its dignity ” and such dismissal smacks of retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of the appellate court. ”- Asean Pacific Planners et. al. v. City of Urdaneta et. al., G.R. No. 162 525 [2008] INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE •

His characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been " crafted crafted in order to fool the winning party "; "; as a " hypocritical hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor "; favor "; one " you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it "; "; or one with " perfidious character ," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and

1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration or 2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court of offensive and abusive language or 3. abrasive and offensive language or 4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge judge or


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5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks. - Sps. Tiongco v. Hon. Aguilar, G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO CASE •

Senate floor:

NOT DISRESPECTFUL, ABUSIVE OR SLANDEROUS •

We cannot say that the use of the adjective "insufficiently-

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informed" is disrespectful, abusive or slanderous. – Francisco, Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Phil. Corp., et. al., G.R. Nos. 135688-89, October 18, 2007 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY •

“ A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No mem ber shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any

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speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. ” Article VI, Section 11 of of the Constitution

The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose [JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination . She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that nonsitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “ is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to

discharge his public trust with firmness and success ” for “ it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. offense.”

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

what she believed “ to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council

PURPOSE OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY •

Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago ’s speech delivered on the

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No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should courts should be allowed to erode the people ’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,

TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

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Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide: CANON 8, RULE 8.01. 8.01 .–– A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. CANON 11. 11.–– A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Questionable conduct on the part of those charged administration of justice does justice does little to foster respect for the law. - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974] STATEMENTS WERE MADE MADE AS A CITIZEN •

CASE AGAINST SEN. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO DISMISSED •

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Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court . In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in the lawyer ’s professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. – Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma, Adm. Case No. 2474, September 15, 2004

STATEMENTS OF AN ACCUSED LAWYER •

The critical statements made by Polk were remarks in response to the manner in which he was treated as a citizen and not as an attorney . At no time was Polk an attorney of record or in any way acting in his capacity as an attorney in the criminal proceedings against him , nor do the remarks purport to be made in his capacity as an attorney. - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. Supp. 784 [1974]

THERE IS NO DICHOTOMY OF A LAWYER’S PERSONALITY •

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with

Ed J. Polk was arrested and jailed and his bond revoked because of his failure to appear for a criminal trial wherein he was charged as a defendant with driving while intoxicated. Upon his release from jail Polk issued to the news media from his law office the following written statement:

I consider this one more awkward attempt by a dishonest and unethical district attorney and a perverse judge to judge to assure me an unfair trial.

VIOLATION OF RULE 11.03, CANON 11 •

Judge claimed that on July 24, 2008, during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration of Civil Case No. 2502, the respondent was shouting while arguing his motion. Judge advised him to tone down his voice but instead, the respondent shouted at the top of his voice. voice . When warned that he would be cited for direct contempt, the respondent shouted, “ Then cite me! .


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not mean what any reader must have understood them to mean. –

Judge cited him for direct contempt and imposed a fine of P100.00. The respondent then left. •

While other cases were being heard, the respondent re-entered the

Borromeo v. CA, G.R. No. L-39253 November 24, 1 978 MAKING THREATS

courtroom and shouted, “ Judge, I will file gross ignorance

system. When the respondent publicly berated and brazenly threatened Judge Baculi that he would file a case for gross ignorance of the law against the latter, the respondent respondent effectively acted in a manner tending to erode the public confidence in

In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon 11 of Rule 11.03 by threatening respondent judge that if his motions were not granted, respondent judge would be administratively charged . To be sure, the threat made against respondent judge was not a threat to do him bodily harm. Nonetheless, it was a threat. Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language, offensive personalities, unfounded accusations, or intemperate words tending to obstruct, embarrass, or influence the court in administering justice or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. – Prosecutor Tolentino v. Judge Cabral, A.M.

Judge Baculi s competence and in his ability to decide cases. cases .

No. RTJ-00-1528, March 28, 2000

against you! I am not afraid of you! Judge you! Judge ordered the sheriff to escort the respondent out of the courtroom and cited him for direct contempt of court for the second time. •

•

A lawyer who insults a judge inside a courtroom completely disregards the latter ’s role, stature and position in our justice

Incompetence is a matter that , even if true, must be handled with sensitivity in the manner provided under the Rules of Court ; an objecting or complaining lawyer cannot act in a manner that puts the courts in a bad light and bring the justice system into disrepute. – Judge Judge Baculi v. Atty. Battung, A.C. no. 8920, September

THREAT OF IMPEACHMENT •

28, 2011 INTENTION AND DISCLAIMER NOT A DEFENSE •

Atty. Abila's central theme in his written explanation is that he acted in good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to defend the interest of his client. His disclaimer of any intentional disrespect is not a ground for exoneration . His intent must be determined by a fair interpretation of the language employed by him. He cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did

It is reprehensible for the complainant to threaten the members of the Court with impeachment. To threaten a judge or justice with investigation and prosecution for official acts done by him in the regular exercise of official duty subverts and undermines the independence of the judiciary.

- Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda against Justices, A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, June 9, 2005 OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE AGAINST COMPLAINANT PROSCRIBED •

Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in describing complainant and her


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relatives. relatives. A lawyer ’s language should be forceful but dignified,

contempt is punishable summarily. - Re: Letter dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, Sorreda, A.M. No. 05-3-04-SC. July 22, 2005]

emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. The lawyer ’s arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a " sly manipulator of truth" truth" as well as a " vindictive " vindictive congenital prevaricator ", ", hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer. – N.H. N.H. Florido v. Atty. Florido, A.C. No. 5624,

POST LITIGATION CRITICISMS •

January 20, 2004 STATEMENTS IN FORM FORM OF QUESTIONS QUESTIONS STILL PROSCRIBED PROSCRIBED •

•

While most of her statements were in the form of questions instead of categorical assertions , the effect is still the same: same: they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land. She posed the query, " Nasaan " Nasaan ang katarungan? katarungan ? (Where is justice?)," implying that this Court failed to dispense justice in her case. - Bildner and Ilusorio v. Ilusorio, et. al., G.R. No. 157384, June 5, 2009

DIRECT CONTEMPT IF SUBMITTED IN THE SAME COURT •

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of justice would be im peded. – PP PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

CONTEMPT AND DISCIPLINARY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ARE NOT THE SAME •

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the court ; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such of fice. fice . The principal purpose of the exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and court and should thus be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending , it is direct contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Direct TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

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•

Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same m anner an attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent disbarment proceeding in proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be suspended from the practice of law , , considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court , whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law are governed by file 138 and 139 thereof . - PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

IS THE JUDICIARY ONION-SKINNED? ONION-SKINNED? •

shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of … . public opinion. For it is a prized … . privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect. ”- Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-271 (1941) ADMONITION TO JUDGES •

THE TEST OF ALLOWABLE CRITICISMS OF A JUDGE’S DECISION •

Whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. – Lorenzo Lorenzo Shipping Corp., et. al. v. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011

Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of phrase. – In In re: Complaint against Atty. Pilar, A.C. No. 263, October 28, 1958

More than once in the past, we had occasion to admonish judges not to be onion-skinned when confronted by dissatisfied lawyers or litigants. Their power to punish for contempt is not a bludgeon to be used for the purpose of exacting silent submission to their rulings and orders however questionable or unjust they may be. Sesbreño v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. RTJ-88-272 February 6, 1990

FREE SPEECH IN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT •

DEGREE OF LAWYERS REMARK OR COMMENT •

“ The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by

"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.“ - Texas v Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)

LIMITED FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? •

“ It cannot be seriously asserted that a private citizen surrenders

his right to freedom of expression when he becomes a licensed


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attorney in this state. The Supreme Court has built a substantial line of cases where the Constitution has been read to limit and restrain the state's power to prescribe standards of conduct for attorneys.” - Polk v. State Bar of Texas 374 F. F. Supp. 784 [1974]

TOPIC: DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATIONS IN PLEADINGS AND JUDICIAL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS CONCEPT OF

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION [SPEECH]”

client and his employer , concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity; ESSENTIAL FACTORS TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION COMMUNICATION (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,

1. Privileged communication as rule of evidence

(4) made in confidence

2. Privileged communication as basis to keep confidential the secrets or confidences of client

(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected permanently protected

3. Privileged speech in congress (7) from (7) from disclosure by himself himself or by the legal advisor advisor , 4. Privileged communications made in the course of juridical proceedings, including all all kinds of pleadings, petitions petitions and motions

- Ma. Luisa Hadjula v. Atty. Roceles F. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION AS RULE OF EVIDENCE •

Rule 130 Sec. 24.Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

•

(8) except the protection be waived.

(b)An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client , be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined , without the consent of the

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION COMMUNICATION AS BASIS TO KEEP CONFIDENTIAL THE SECRETS OR CONFIDENCES CONFIDENCES OF CLIENT CANON 21 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED. Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;


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(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;

•

Revelation of secrets. — In addition to the proper administrative action, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any attorney-at-law or solicitor ( procurador judicial) who, by any malicious breach of professional duty or of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, shall prejudice his client, or reveal any of the secrets of the latter learned by him in his professional capacity .

(b) When required by law; (c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend hims elf, his employees or associates or by judicial action. •

•

•

•

•

•

Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto. Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not , without the written consent of his client, give information information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.

•

•

Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates thereof unless prohibited by the client. Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the clients.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon an attorney-at-law or solicitor (procurador judicial) who, having undertaken the defense of a client or having received confidential information from said client in a case, shall undertake the defense of the opposing party in the same case, without the consent of his first client. Rule 15.02. - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.

LIMIT OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER •

Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs even with members of his family. Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.

RPC Art. 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor. —

•

It is well settled that in order that a communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end . end . The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise of privilege , privilege , and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal


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purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge , divulge , but which the attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of “ – PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41 justice.“ –

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF JURIDICAL PROCEEDINGS, INCLUDING ALL KINDS OF PLEADINGS, PETITIONS AND MOTIONS •

July 16, 1997 PRIVILEGED SPEECH IN CONGRESS •

The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides:

“ A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses

punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof .” DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO CASE (Dismissed (Dismissed but with violation) PURPOSE OF PRIVILEGE SPEECH •

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL. Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts. CERTIFICATE OF MERITORIOUS CASECERTIFICATE OF MERITORIOUS CASE

“ is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to

discharge his public trust with firmness and success ” for “ it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the

Well-entrenched in the Philippine and American jurisprudence is the rule that for reasons of public policy, utterances made in the course of juridical proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions are absolutely privileged when pertinent and relevant to the subject under inquiry, however false or malicious such utterances may be. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

•

Rule 7 Section 3. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge , information , and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

exercise of that liberty may occasion offense. ”- Probe v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]


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•

“ Honest belief ”is a claim of “ good faith.”- Alfonso C. Choa

•

vs. Judge Roberto S. Chiongson, A.M. A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063. MTJ-95-1063. August 9, 1996 PLEADINGS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS ARE CONSIDERED PRIVILEGED •

Pleadings have become part of public record open to the public to scrutinize , but also due to the the undeniable fact that said...

Effect of privileged matters •

•

For as aptly observed in one case, while the doctrine of privileged communication is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater hardships. Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 3 1, 1976

Pleadings are presumed to contain allegations and assertions lawful and legal in nature , nature , appropriate to the disposition of issues ventilated before the courts for the proper administration of justice and, therefore, of general public concern. concern.

For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious , the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006

Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified •

Moreover, pleadings are presumed to contain allegations substantially true true because they can be supported by evidence presented in good faith, the contents of which would be under the scrutiny of courts and, therefore, subject to be purged of all improprieties and illegal statements contained therein. – Cuenco Cuenco v.

•

Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 197 6 COUNSEL, PARTIES OR WITNESSES ARE EXEMPTED FROM LIABILITY IN LIBEL OR SLANDER • •

It is the generally accepted rule that counsel, parties or witnesses are witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided that the statements are connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material to , to , the cause in hand or subject of inquiry.

Absolutely privileged matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact. In absolutely privileged communications, the mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an absolute bar to the action. Examples of these are speeches or debates made by Congressmen or Senators in the Congress or in any of its committees. committees. On the other hand, in qualifiedly or conditionally privileged communications , the freedom from liability for an otherwise defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice or malice in fact . The second kind of privilege, in fine, renders the writer or author susceptible to a suit or finding of libel provided the prosecution established the presence the presence of bad faith or malice in fact . To this genre belongs "private communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" falling under and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the


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statements were relevant and pertinent to the pleadings. pleadings. –

Revised Penal Code. - GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, et. al., G.R. No. 146848 October 17, 2006 IMPORTANCE OF DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS •

The doctrine of privileged communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice , though, as an incidental result it may in some instances afford an immunity to the evil disposed and malignant slanderer. PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

ALL DOUBTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR FAVOR OF ITS RELEVANCY RELEVANCY •

•

In order the matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings. All doubts should be resolved in favor of its relevancy or pertinency , and for the purposes of relevancy the court will assume the alleged slanderous charges to be true , true , however false they may have been in fact. - C uenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976

THERE IS •

NO

Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 (1986) ALL FORMS OF COMMUNICATION COMMUNICATIONS S ARE PRIVILEGED •

The privilege is not confined to verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to the attorney by other means. - PP v. Sandiganbayan, et. al., G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

PROFESSIONAL PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE MAY STILL APPLY •

•

ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE IN PLEADINGS

Although the privilege is absolute where it applies, we consider it to be a privilege narrowed closely by the "relevancy" and "pertinency" requirements , and we note that while the privilege will prohibit an attorney from being subject to litigation it will not make him immune from professional discipline , discipline , when it is appropriate. – Selby Selby v. Burgess, 712 S.W.2d 898 898 (1986) ...makes a lawyer liable for false allegations in a pleading since the rule states that a lawyer's signature on a pleading constitutes a certificate by him that to the best of his knowledge, there is good ground to support the pleading. – Pogue v. Cooper, et. al., 680

Absolute privilege attached to allegations made by an attorney in a pleading filed with the court, as long as the statements alleged to be defamatory were relevant and pertinent to the issues in the case. case. We relied heavily on our earlier decision xxx, in which we recognized the absolute privilege of an attorney to make statements in pleadings regardless of their truth or the existence of actual malice on the part of the attorney so long as the

S.W.2d 698 (1984) RESTRICTION TO THE PRIVILEGE •

The Court defined the restriction to the privilege enjoyed by pleadings thus:


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•

•

•

The pleadings should contain contain but the plain and concise statements of the material facts and not the evidence by which they are to be proved. ... If the pleader goes beyond the requirements of the statute and alleges an irrelevant matter which is libelous, he loses his privilege. privilege. The requirement of materiality and relevancy is imposed so that the protection given to individuals in the interest of an efficient administration of justice may not be abused as a cloak from beneath which private malice may be gratified . - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

•

ADMONITION TO LAWYERS •

•

While indeed lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold such remarks or comments should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety . Besides, the language vehicle does not run short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. –

EXAMPLE OF SLANDEROUS MATTERS IN A PLEADING •

The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants, expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of inquiry inquiry and have no place in a pleading. - Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

Gutierrez v. Abila, et. al., G.R. No. L-59161 January 30, 1982

Repeated litigations between the same parties might indeed be tiresome, even nettlesome but this alone is not sufficient cause for calling another "dirty-minded", and of a "limited mind", " twisted twisted mind " or to characterize his act as a " devise " devise of wickedness as earmarks of plaintiff's traits. traits .” It is noted that far from being isolated statements, these slanderous matters pervade the entire dimension of the defendants' answer , with almost every paragraph thereof scathing with spiteful imputations against the plaintiff. These imputations constitute a grave reflection upon the mental and moral character and reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainly achieve no purpose except to gratify the defendants' rancor and illwill.

PARTNERS WHO SIGNED THE PLEADINGS ARE LIABLE •

In view of the derogatory implications of that observation, which was couched in intemperate indecorous and vicious language and which was baseless, since it was belied by the resolution itself that stated the reason for requiring the Solicitor General to proceed with the investigation of the disbarment case, the Court in that aforementioned October 1 resolution required Attys. Salandanan and Zosimo G. Linato, who signed the motion under the firm name of name of "E. M. Salandanan, Aguilar, Linato & Associates" to show cause why they should not be adjudged in contempt of court. – Yangson v. Salandanan, A.C. No. 1347. November 12, 1975


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the subject of the inquiry in the course of the trial . trial . - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

BALANCING ACT •

While the doctrine is liable to be abuse and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to give legal action to such libel suits would give rise to greater hardships. hardships.

Legitimate answers to to accusations are privileged •

•

Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be pardoned some infelicities of language. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

TEST TO BE APPLIED •

Unprofessional conduct

A pleading must meet the test of relevancy to avoid being considered libelous. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

•

METES AND BOUNDS OF RELEVANCY OR PERTINENCY •

•

•

Although the language used by defendant-appellee in the pleading in question was undoubtedly strong , strong , since it was made in legitimate defense of his own own and of his client's interest , such remarks must be deemed absolutely privileged and cannot be the basis of an action for libel (Tolentino v. Baylosis, supra). - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matters privileged, the courts are inclined to be liberal . The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance and impropriety. In order that a matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged , it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the pleadings, I t must, however, be legitimately related thereto , or so pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become

Mutual bickering and recriminations between brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this Court. - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L62449 July 16, 1984

Proper conduct of lawyers •

•

•

Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants. Whatever may be the ill feeling existing between clients, it should not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct and demeanor toward each other or toward suitors in the case. All personalities between counsel should be scrupulously avoided. In the trial of a case it is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal peculiarities peculiarities and idiosyncracies of on the other side. counsel on Personal colloquies between counsel which cause delay and promote unseemly wrangling should also be carefully avoided.


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Lawyers owe respect not not only to the courts and their clients, but also to other members of the Bar . - PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July 16, 1984

statements made to the media. media. Statements made to the media "do little, if anything, to promote the truth finding process in a judicial proceeding.... [They] do not generally encourage open and honest discussion between the parties and their counsel in order to resolve disputes; indeed, such statements often do just the

DOCTRINE OF PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS NOT APPLICABLE WHEN THE COURTS ARE CRITICIZED USING ABRASIVE AND OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE •

Greater care and circumspection must be exercised in the preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from using abrasive and offensive language language (Yangson v. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty is a desirable trait also of

opposite.“ "Communications made to newspapers and during press conferences have been almost universally found to be excluded from the protection of absolute privilege. ”- Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d P.3d 1282 (2014) NOT RELATED TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

practising attorneys. – PP PP v. Atty. Sesbreno, G.R. No. L-62449 July •

16, 1984Privileged STATEMENTS MADE TO THE MEDIA •

•

Appellant sued respondent's companies for wrongful termination, making a number of allegations in the complaint against respondent personally . After respondent published a response to the allegations in the media , media , appellant sued him for defamation. Whether or not statements made to the media regarding ongoing or contemplated litigation are covered by absolute privilege. Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d P.3d 1282 (2014)

WHETHER OR NOT THE ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE APPLIES WHEN THE MEDIA IS THE RECIPIENT RECIPIENT OF THE THE STATEMENT •

These courts have concluded that the policy considerations underlying the absolute privilege rule are not applicable to

•

•

•

We have, however, recognized that communications are not sufficiently related to judicial proceedings when they are made to someone without an interest in the outcome. We conclude that assessing the significant interest of the recipient requires review of the recipient's legal relationship to the litigation, not their interest as an observer. Moreover, the nature of the recipient's interest in or connection to the litigation is a "case-specific, fact-intensive inquiry" that must focus on and balance the underlying underlying principles of the privilege. privilege. We conclude that the newspaper does not have a direct interest in, or connection to, the outcome of the proceedings, other than as a spectator. - Jacobs - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d P.3d 1282 (2014)

A FEW JURISDICTIONS JURISDICTIONS HAVE HELD THAT, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, AN ATTORNEY'S STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED


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•

•

•

extending the privilege to statements made by an attorney to a reporter after the dismissal of the first lawsuit . lawsuit . Other jurisdictions have found exceptions to the majority rule based on unique circumstances. , applying absolute privilege to a statement to a newspaper when all signs pointed to emerging litigation and the newspaper was a ); , potential party

or future litigation contemplated in good faith. - Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 1282 (2014) DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS NOT PRIVILEGED WHEN MADE ON RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS •

and television programs. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593

applying absolute privilege to a lawyer's statements to the press denying allegations and questioning the plaintiff's motives, where the plaintiff publicly solicited a response ; response ; ,

(2003) •

•

Stating the judicial proceedings privilege protects statements by parties and their attorneys related to litigation but does not extend to to protect allegedly defamatory statements made on radio

holding that an attorney's prelitigation statements to the press are absolutely privileged if a class action lawsuit is contemplated.

A privileged statement, s uch as one made in a judicial proceeding, is not privileged for all subsequent publications by virtue of initially being spoken in a privileged proceeding.

– Jacobs Jacobs v. Adelson, 325 P.3d P.3d 1282 (2014) •

COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS MADE TO THE MEDIA •

•

We adopt the majority view that communications made to the media in an extrajudicial setting are not absolutely privileged , , at least when the media holds no more significant interest in the litigation than the general public. In order for the absolute privilege to apply to defamatory statements made in the context of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, " (1) (1) a judicial proceeding must be contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration, and (2) (2) the communication must be related to the litigation. “

•

The privilege applies to communications made by either an attorney or a non-attorney that are related to ongoing litigation

Even an "absolute" privilege does not permit an individual to categorically republish possibly republish possibly defamatory statements without consequence. – Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (2003)

WHEN PLEADINGS ARE PUBLISHED IN NEWSPAPER •

We are firmly convinced that the correct rule on the matter should be that a fair and true report of a complaint filed in court without remarks nor comments even before an answer is filed or a decision promulgated should promulgated should be covered by the privilege. privilege.

This Court ruled before that: Utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions motions belong to the class of communication that are absolutely privileged. - Cuenco v. Cuenco, et. al., G.R. No. L-29560 March 31, 1976


23

STATEMENTS TO THIRD THIRD PARTY •

Can trigger a lawyer-client relationship

But we have also recognized that "[a]n attorney's statements to someone who is not directly involved with the actual or anticipated judicial proceeding will proceeding will be covered by the absolute privilege only if the recipient of the communication is



A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.



It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged ; neither is it material that the attorney consu lted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711 - July 3, 2007

“ significantly interested ” in the proceeding." - Jacobs v.

Adelson, 325 P.3d 1282 1282 (2014)

TOPIC: TERMINATING RELATIONSHIP

AND

ESTABLISHING

ATTORNEY-CLIENT

VERBAL AGREEMENT Nature of attorney-client relationship  



An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer acquiesces or voluntarily permits the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the lawyer on any previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received in matters pertinent to his profession. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009]

There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is is sufficient to create an attorney-client relationship. - Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]

Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists 

The relationship of complainant and [counsel] is mainly personal or business in nature, and that whatever legal services may have been rendered or given to them by Atty. Amorin for free were only incidental to said relationship. relationship. Noteworthy also is is the fact that complainant was not able to specify any act or transaction in which [counsel] acted as her or her husband's counsel. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. No. 7861 [2009]

There are instances, however, when the Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists between the parties, such as when the relationship stemmed from a personal transaction between them rather than the practice of law of respondent or TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 24 

when the legal acts done were only incidental to their personal transaction. - Virgo v. Atty. Amorin A.C. No. 7861 [2009] DUTY ONCE A LAWYER -CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EXIST 

it to its termination , termination , that is, until the case becomes final and executory. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007] 

Canon 18 of the CPR states states that “ a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. ”

NON-PAYMENT NON-PAYMENT OF FEES DOES NOT DIMINISH A LAWYER’S DUTYNON DUTYNON PAYMENT OF FEES DOES NOT DIMINISH A LAWYER’S DUTY 

Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important , or worse, to withhold vital information from her. development - Somosot v. Atty. Lara A.C. A.C. No. 7024 [2009]

TERMINATING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION 

CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at anytime with or without cause. cause .



ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Xxx He is not at liberty to abandon it without

REMEDY FOR DELIBERATE REFUSAL TO PAY 



It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation ensues in any transaction, the proper remedy is to institute an action action before the proper court and such actuation of the respondent herein did not constitute deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct . - Urban Bank Inc. vs. Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001] Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud . fraud .

IMPLIED DUTY TO FINISH THE CASE 

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry

Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.conclusion .- Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006

reasonable cause. A lawyer ’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client s written consent or from a good cause. cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14, 2006 CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case: (a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he is handling; [see Rule 19.02]


25

(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules ;

his appearance. Thus, it has been been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter retain another lawyer to represent him. That manner of changing a lawyer lawyer does not need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed . Nor does it require approval of the court. - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will will not promote the best interest of the client; (d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the employment effectively; (e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees fees for the services or fails or fails to comply with the retainer agreement ;

TERMINATION OF SERVICES WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF CLIENT 

(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office [see Rule 3.03] ; and (g) Other similar cases. 

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the f irm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.



Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body .



Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, s hall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.

A LAWYER MUST SEE TO IT THAT A NEW LAWYER IS RECORDED BEFORE TERMINATING HIS SERVICES 



An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing , in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case . - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

CESSATION OF LAW PRACTICE IS NOT A

GOOD CAUSE

TO

WITHDRAW 

CHANGING LAWYER DOES NOT NEED THE APPROVAL APPROVAL OF THE COURT

A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must must file a petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse party - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, AC 5303, June 15, 2006

Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for his failure to file the required brief . brief . Even if it were true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore the directives coming from the Court. It does not appear from the

[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

26

records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has withdrawn withdrawn his appearance in the the case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for counsel for the accusedappellant and he is expected to comply with all its orders and directives. - In Re: Atty. David Briones, A.C. No. 5486. 5486. August 15, 2001]

A SIMPLE TURNOVER OF THE RECORDS DOES NOT END A LAWYER S DUTY 

Contrary to respondent ’s contention, his professional relations as a lawyer with his clients are not terminated by the simple turnover of the records of the case to his clients. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7 421 [2007]

THE ONLY WAY TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL  

Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving him of the duties of counsel , in accordance with Rule 138, Section 26 of the Rules of Court. - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666, April 13, 2007

DUTY OF LAWYER ONCE HE IS DISCHARGED AS COUNSEL 

Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled , and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter , including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.



The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the name of the new counsel is properly recorded and the records properly handed over . - Balatbat v. Atty. Arias, A.C. No. 1666 [2007]

xxx and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter , including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter. - Rule 22.02

CLIENT REFUSAL REFUSAL TO GIVE

HIS CONSENT CONSENT IS STILL SUBJECT TO

COURT S DISCRETION 

A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client f iled in court and with a copy thereof served upon upon the adverse party. party. Should the client refuse to give his consent , the lawyer must file an application with the court. The court, on notice notice to the client and adverse party, shall party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be withdrawal must be based allowed to retire. retire . The application for withdrawal on a good cause. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

CONSENT TO WITHDRAW MUST BE GIVEN BY THE LITIGANT 

Respondent ’s defense completely crumbles in face of the fact that Salvador Ramirez is not even a party in Civil Case No. 981 and, hence, had no authority to withdraw the records of the said case from respondent or to terminate the latter ’s services. - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]


27

have ordered the counsel of record, Atty. Nueva, who was present during the hearing, to file the required comment or opposition. Requirme, Jr. v. Judge Judge Yuipco, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1427. November 27, 2000

PENDENCY OF PETITION FOR WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT RELIEVE LAWYER OF HIS DUTY 

The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will will be granted by the the court. Until his withdrawal withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record . record . Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [2007]

DEATH OF A PARTNER 

Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and petitioner.



Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer. - B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. L-41862 [1992]

A VALID CAUSE TO WITHDRAW MUST STILL BE SUBJECT TO FORMALITIES OF WITHDRAWING AS COUNSEL 

Without a proper revocation of his authority and withdrawal as counsel, respondent remains counsel of record for the complainants in Civil Case No. 981; and whether he has a valid cause to withdraw from the case, he cannot immediately do so and leave his clients without representation . - Venterez, et. al. v. Atty. Cosme, A.C. No. 7421 [ 2007]



A lawyer ’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication adjudication arises only from the client s written consent or

VERBAL SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL NOT ALLOWED 

GROUNDS TO WITHDRAW FROM A CASE BEFORE ITS FINAL ADJUDICATION

A verbal substitution of counsel, albeit impliedly granted by respondent judge, contravenes Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which prescribes the requirements for change of attorneys. attorneys. Said provision requires requires that the written consent consent of the client should be filed in court and the adverse party should be given written notice of the substitution. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, if her intention was to obviate delay, then she should

from a good cause. cause . - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006] WRITTEN CONTRACT IS NOT ESSENTIAL IN ESTABLISHING LAWYERCLIENT RELATIONSHIP - A - A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]


28

PERCEIVED INSUFFICIENCY OF REMUNERATION NOT A GROUND TO DIMINISH PROFESSIONAL ZEAL 

Hence, even if respondent felt under-compensated in the case he

HURT FEELINGS IS NOT A VALID GROUND TO AUTOMATICALLY WITHDRAW 

undertook to defend, his obligation embodied in the Lawyer ’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility still remains unwavering. The zeal and the degree of fervor in handling the case should neither diminish nor cease just because of his perceived insufficiency of remuneration. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006] CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WILL NOT BAR A LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

to sign his "Motion to Withdraw as Counsel.

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding notwithstanding the close personal relationship relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment of the former's fees. - Hadjula v. Atty. Madianda, A.C. A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

HEAVY WORKLOAD 

Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services. - Ceniza v. Atty. Rubia, A.C. No. 6166 [2009]

WITHDRAWAL MUST BE GRANTED BY THE COURT

Respondent's withdrawal was made on the ground that "there no longer exist[ed] the xxx confidence" between them and that there had been "serious differences between them relating to the m anner of private prosecution. ”- Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in terminating his services, he, however, cannot just do so and leave complainant in the cold unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.Orcino v. Atty. Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITY

LOST OF CONFIDENCE 

- Orcino v. Atty.

Gaspar, A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997

 

Complainant's words and actions may have hurt respondent's feelings considering t he work he had put into the case. But her words were uttered in a burst burst of passion. And even at that moment, complainant did not expressly terminate respondent's services. She made this clear when she she refused

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in c onnection therewith shall render him liable.


29

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client s request for information information.

TOPIC: GROUNDS LAWYERS



Certainly, respondent ought to know that he was the one who should have filed the Notice to Withdraw and not the accused. Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

HAVING AN ADDITIONAL LAWYER DID NOT NECESSARILY MEAN CONFORMITY 

The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent but to act as additional counsel. Mrs. Jalandoni’s conformity to having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondent s desire to withdraw as counsel . Respondent ’s speculations speculations on the

That

Mrs.

Jalandoni

continued

PROCEEDINGS

AGAINST

with

Atty.

Alminaza ’s

professional engagement on her behalf despite respondent ’s withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the consequences of his unprofessional conduct . - Atty. Jalandoni v. Atty. Villarosa, A.C. No. 5303 [2006]

Respondent must know that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor, much less, obliged to accept the same as a matter of course because as the Tribunal which has the final say on the proper sanctions to be imposed on errant members of both bench and bar, the Court has the prerogative of making its own findings and rendering judgment on the basis thereof rather than that of the IBP, OSG, or any lower court to whom an administrative complaint has been referred to for investigation and report. – Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000

CONTINUOUS DISPLAY AND USE OF THE TITLE

ATTORNEY-AT-

LAW AFTER DISBARMENT DISBARMENT 

professional relationship of Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case. 

DISCIPLINARY

Supreme Court is neither neither bound by the findings of the IBP

CLIENT SHOULD NOT FILE THE NOTICE TO WITHDRAW 

FOR

Complainant claims that respondent misrepresented himself as an "Atty." in the wedding invitation of his son, and a signboard hanging outside the respondent's office office display the title “ under "Attorney-at-Law “ respondent's name.



Lastly, complainant informs the Court that she had received reports that respondent continues in the practice of law by making other lawyers sign the pleadings that he prepares for cases involving his clients. – Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014


30

3) Upon the expiration expiration of the period of suspension, suspension, respondent respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension; suspension;

RESOLUTION 





On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty." preceding respondent's name in his son's wedding invitation, and the signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince this Court that respondent continues in the practice of law , , in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 30, 1999 that ordered his disbarment.

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;

Neither is is the Court swayed by the complainant's allegations allegations of respondent's continuous practice of law based on mere "reports." Without more, these reports are pure hearsay and are without evidentiary value.

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent ’s compliance with the order of of suspension; 6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted. Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

Nonetheless, respondent is hereby ORDERED to remove the signboard outside his office showing his name and the words "Attorney-at-Law.“ - Resolution A.C. No. 4500 (Ban Hua U. Flores vs. Enrique S. Chua) SEPTEMBER 9, 2014

LIFTING OF A LAWYER’ LAWYER S AUTOMATIC ’ SUSPENSION IS NOT AUTOMATIC

GUIDELINES TO BE OBSERVED IN THE MATTER OF THE LIFTING OF AN ORDER SUSPENDING A LAWYER FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW



end of the period stated in the Court ’s decision, and an order

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty; 2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof . The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

The lifting of a lawyer ’s suspension is not automatic upon the from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession. – Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

SUPREME COURT CAN CHOOSE NOT TO REFER COMPLAINT COMPLAINT TO IBP 

In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Administrative complaints that are prima


31

facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed by the parties need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation. They m ay be summarily dismissed for utter lack of merit. 

The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. Considering, however, that the question being raised is simple and that no further factual determination is necessary , the Court resolves to dispense with such referral and to decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings already on record, which all show the lack of merit of the Complaint. Manubay v. Atty. Garcia, A.C. No. 4700 [2000]

Suspension of attorney by CA and RTC 



Confidentiality 



Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases. Rules of Court Rule 140 SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. – Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator. - A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND JUDGES [took effect on October 1, 2001]

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Rule 138, Section 27 , until further action of the Supreme Court in the case. Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution Resolution dated February 13, 1992 1992 

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for:

1. any deceit, 2. malpractice, 3. other gross misconduct in such office, 4. grossly immoral conduct,


32

5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,



6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, 7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. 

The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The basis of the foreign court's action must include any of the grounds for disbarment disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction II 

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension suspension in this jurisdiction.



Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the

Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence 



The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

basis of the foreign court ’s action includes any of the grounds for

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

The basis of the foreign court's action must include any of the grounds for disbarment disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction I

disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006 2006 Defenses 



It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines.

Under Section 27,34 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. 793 [2004]

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:


33

x x x x (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. 

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these claims claims were presented. 

“ misconduct ” pertains to his accounting practice. 

Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of evidence of Maquera's unethical acts as a lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex parte. parte. - In re: Atty. Maquera B.M. No. No. 793 [2004]

Misconduct pertaining to another profession 

Even granting that respondent ’s misconduct refers to his accountancy practice , it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct , even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. - Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040 [1998]

Ex parte investigation valid 

Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before this Court as his alleged

Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil 

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly used the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of of such fraudulent fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction. fiction. - Cordon v. Atty. Balicante, A.C. No. 2797 October 4, 2002

Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation investigation

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the



The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City . It is enough that the records of this administrative


34

case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors , Governors , i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. - Tucay v. Atty. Tucay, A.C. No. 5170 [1999]

action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. - Ui v. Atty. Bonifacio, A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000 A single member of a collegial court cannot be charged for rendering unjust judgment 

Private phone call to litigant prohibited

Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is “ unjust ” cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges



If at all, the judge could have only been guilty of judicial indiscretion or impropriety when he admittedly made a private phone call to, or sent for, the complainant, and talked to him in the chambers.



It need not be overemphasized that making private phone calls

against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. inappropriate. - Bautista v. Ass. Justice Hakim S. Abdulwahid, Court of Appeals, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006 Anonymous complaints

to , sending for and talking to the complainant in the judge ’s



chambers, as in this case, undermines even more the people ’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. - Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1573. RTJ-00-1573. August 2, 2000 Marrying in good faith a married lawyer not immoral 

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral . For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary

Anonymous complaints, as a rule, are received with caution. They should not be dismissed outright, however, where their averments may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by other competent evidence. Sinsuat and Paps v. Judge Hidalgo, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2133, August 6, 2008

Forum shopping --- Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. proceedings . - Quirino Tomlin II v. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II, II, A.C. No. 6971, February 23, 2006 Retirement from office 

The Court emphasizes at this point that respondent ’s retirement from office does not render the present administrative case


35

moot and academic ; neither does it free him from liability. S ince complainant filed the case when respondent was still in the service, the Court retains the authority to investigate and resolve the administrative complaint against him. - City of Cebu v. Judge Gako Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2111, May 7, 2008

Indefinite suspension 

Infraction committed by judge before appointment 

This step finds support in Heck v. Santos where the Court held that while the infraction was committed before the respondent s appointment as judge , judge , the Court may still discipline him therefore. RE: Application for retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 22, 2008

Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a bar to administrative proceedings. proceedings. 

The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. proceedings . The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties penalties of x x x criminal law. law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case (Italics in the original). (Joselano Guevara v. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. no. 7136, August 1, 2007)

Censure or reprimand 



Indeed, we have held that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe. prescribe . (Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007)

Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer ’s duty to the court or the client. Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]

Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral 

Administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe

This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension , suspension , which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to [respondent] to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last . last . For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law. ( In In re: Atty Almacen, G.R. No. L -27654 February 18, 1970 )

Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by malice. malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to complainant also via


36

cellular phone text message. message . The exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent bears this out. 



Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant , he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely accomplish the same.

x x x Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n his DISBARMENT. 

In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]



Dispositions of this nature should be avoided . In the imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule that the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, not can such penalty be subject to a condition. condition . There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions. - Atty. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998]

All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent ’s acts are not grossly immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension. - Cynthia Advincula v. Atty. Ernesto M. Macabata, A.C. No. 7204 [2007]

Non-injured party can file a complaint 

The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. - Atty. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No. 313. January 30, 1998

Misconduct as a government official

As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official . However, if A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in that misconduct as a government official is of such a character as order. The dispositive portion thereof thereof provides that: to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency , then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 37 

Alternative penalty not allowed allowed 

on such ground. – Dinsay v. Atty. Atty. Cioco, Cioco, A.C. A.C. No.

violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. – Dinsay v.

2995.

Noveernment officialmber 27, 1996

Cioco and Atty. Belleza, A.M. No. R -252-P December 12, 1986

Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction 

Definition of Unprofessional conduct

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated [Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court]. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006



Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude 

The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude. turpitude .



In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing one ’s

Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding 

“ The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or

opinion on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of

quasi-judicial proceedings proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Court ’s] administrative powers. ”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996 1996 

While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct , it does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. - Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27, 1996

A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE would not be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent in a criminal proceeding 

The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously made an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning in

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession. - Velez v. Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697 July 25, 2006

respondent De Vera ’s alleged immorality. - In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003 No final judgment yet 

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge . He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue


38

the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof . It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative

employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act. Consequently, respondent was charged with committing “. - Estrada v. Escritor, "disgraceful and immoral conduct “

A.M. No. P-02-1651 P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

complaint affects respondent De Vera ’s moral fitness to run for governor. – In re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. De Vera, A.C. No.



6052. December 11, 2003 Sexual relations between two unmmaried unmmaried and consenting consenting adults

She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah ’s Witnesses





Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant administrative sanction for illicit behavior . The Court has repeatedly held that voluntary intimacy between a man and a woman who are not married, where both are not under any impediment to marry and where no deceit exists, is neither a criminal nor an unprincipled act that would warrant disbarment or disciplinary action.



Invoking the religious beliefs , beliefs , practices and moral standards of her congregation, she asserts that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable . - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003



Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent ’s conjugal arrangement cannot be

While the Court has the power to regulate official conduct and, to a certain extent, private conduct, it is not within our authority to decide on matters touching on employees

personal lives ,

especially those that will affect their and their family ’s future. We cannot intrude into the question of whether they should or should not marry. - Abanag v. Mabute, A.M. A.M. No. P-11-2922, 2011 2011 Estrada v. Escritor case 

and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent ass erted that their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her congregation.

penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion . The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. I n the absence of a showing that such state

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for living with a man not her husband , and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement . Complainant believes that [the court interpreter] is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

39

interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003 Penalties imposed in immediately executory 



administrative

cases

[judiciary]

are

We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect immediately", this Court means that the period of suspension should commence on the day respondent judge judge receives notice of the decision suspending him from office.

Administrative Case No. 3835 .

Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts 

Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530.



February 4, 2002

Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said said motion shall shall render the decision final and executory. - Maniago v. Atty. De Dios, A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010

Res Judicata “ Res

applies The Investigating Commissioner properly

dismissed the complaint in this case on the ground of res judicata, it appearing that it involves the same incident and the same cause of action as Administrative Case Case No. 3825. Indeed, it appears that on August 5, 1995, the First Division of the Court dismissed a similar complaint filed in

Under the same rule, a respondent “ may forthwith be required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinary sanctioned as

Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers] are NOT immediately executor 

AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled “ Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.

While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a motion for reconsideration, the filing and pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order.

Halimao v. Atty. Villanueva, A.C. No.

3825. February 1, 1996

member of the Bar. ” xxx In other words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to give an explanation on why he should not be held administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but also as a member of the bar. 

This is the fair and reasonable meaning of

“ automatic

conversion” of administrative cases against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the rule.

Campos, et. al. v. Atty. Campos, A.C. No. 8644,

January 22, 2014


40

Definition of Unbecoming conduct 

Unbecoming conduct

“ applies



administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court ’s decision.

to a broader range of

Belga v. Buban, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1512. May 9, 2 000

transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method. ”- ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et. al.,A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J April 12, 2011

Breached of promise to marry not subject to sanction 

Complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her .



We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should

Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment 

“ A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,

even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of the bar . . -Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No. 5564, 5564, August 20, 2008



Xxx in view of the numerous changes in the law since 1959, respondent movant should offer some guarantee of his ability to render adequate service to his prospective clients; the Court resolved that respondent movant Carlos C. Rusiana be, as he is hereby required, to enroll in, and pass, regular fourth year review classes in a recognized law school. - In Re: Administrative Case Against Atty. Carlos C. Rusiana of Cebu City. A.C. No. 270 March 29, 1974

SC acting as an administrative tribunal, cannot review the trial court s decision

be entered into because of love, not for any other reason . reason . Figueroa v. Barranco, Jr., SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997 Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation 

To ensure competence after reinstatement

At the outset, it should be emphasized that this Court, acting as an

The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be "interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. - Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court

Ex-parte investigation allowed 

An ex parte investigation may only be conducted when respondent fails to appear despite reasonable notice . notice .

Cottam v. Atty. Laysa,

A.C. No. 4834 February 29, 29, 2000 

Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court Sec. 8. Investigation.

Upon

joinder of issues or u pon failure of the respondent to answer, the


41

Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.

WON the money should be returned to complainant 

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court OR whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. - Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. No. 9074 August 14, 2012



If the matter involves violations of the lawyer ’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court ’s disciplinary authority.

Affidavit stands in lieu complainant complainant s testimony 

As for complainant ’s failure to testify on her own behalf, this is of no moment.



Complainant ’s affidavit stands in lieu of her

testimony; the investigating judge even had her re-subscribe and re-affirm her sworn statement and let the same be adopted as part of complainant ’s evidence.

purview of the Court Court ’s disciplinary authority.

Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. No.

MTJ 98-1168. 98-1168. April 21, 1999



Disciplinary authority v. Judicial action 

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves violations of the lawyer ’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court ’s disciplinary authority. authority. However, if if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court ’s disciplinary authority.

However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the

Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Court ’s disciplinary authority. authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

SUI GENERIS PRINCIPLE PRINCIPLE 

I t should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent ’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively.

Felipe, et. al. v. Atty.

Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 02, 2013



In the same vein, the trial court ’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the


42

administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999





connotations by the complainant.

QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE 



“ The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be

established beyond reasonable reasonable doubt. Such is the rule rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rules in

The indefiniteness of respondent ’s suspension, far from being "cruel" or "degrading" or "inhuman" has the effect of placing, as it were, the key to the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer in his own hands. That sanction has the effect of giving respondent the chance to purge himself in his own good time of his contempt and misconduct by acknowledging such misconduct, exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct rightly demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the courts.

Atty. Aquino v. Justice

Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1. CTA-01-1. April 2, 2002

INDEFINITE SUSPENSION 

Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek were merely forms of greetings, greetings, casual and customary in nature. No evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious

regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. ”- OCA v. Judge Pascual, A.M. A.M. No. MTJ-93-783. July 29, 1996 

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.



The burden of of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension,

“ clearly

Xxx the indefiniteness of respondent ’s suspension puts in his

preponderant evidence ” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal

hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer. - Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya, A.C. No. 2614. June 29, 2000

prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative

Beso-beso nature

proceedings. – Gatchalian Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza, A.C. A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999

is merely a form of greeting, casual and customary in 

As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is


43

required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence:

misconduct.

Atty. Macalintal v. Judge the, A.M. No. RTJ-97-

1375 October 16, 1997

Sec 5. Substantial evidence. -- In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a

TOPIC: JUDICIAL CLEMENCY AND REINSTATEMENT

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. ”-

FORMS OF CLEMENCY

Liwanag v. Judge Lustre, A.M. A.M. No. MTJ 98-1168. April 21, 1999 

Reinstatement



Commutation



Lifting of disqualification

Absolute pardon 

An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the case of In re Marcelino Lontok, the Court, in dismissing the disbarment proceeding against the respondent therein, who had been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the ground that the respondent had been granted plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity. - In re:Atty. Rovero, A.M. No. 126 December 29, 1980

1. the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice of law 2. the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement, 3. his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment, 4. his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations

Application of Res Ipsa Loquitor doctrine 

REINSTATEMENTS TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION WERE ALLOWED UNDER THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or


44

5. the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local government officials and citizens of his community.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

6. the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. service.

family. – Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989 



Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements of reinstatement had been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original evidence. The decisive question on an application for reinstatement is

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. – Re: Letter of Judge Diaz, A.M. No. 07-717-SC September 19, 2007 ABSOLUTE AND UNCONDITIONAL UNCONDITIONAL PARDON PARDON

whether applicant is 'of good moral character ‘ . – In re: Vailoces, 

A.M. No. 439 September 30, 30, 1982 COURT LAYS DOWN THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES IN RESOLVING REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL CLEMENCY



1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to c ertifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of nonreformation.



On December 27, 1967, the President of the Philippines granted petitioner "absolute and unconditional pardon" pardon " and restored him "to full civil and political rights. True it is that the plenary pardon extended to him by the President does not of itself warrant his reinstatement .reinstatement .- In re: Vailoces, A.M. No. 439 September 30, 30, 1982

EFFECTS OF PARDON 

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty1 to ensure a period of reformation.

Thereafter, complainant in the criminal case, instituted before this Court disbarment proceedings against petitioner. The same culminated in his disbarment on April 12, 1961.

"When proceedings to strike on attorney ’s name from the rolls

are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 45

committed the offense. If granted before conviction , conviction , it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction , conviction , it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and

that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted .“ In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962 

A pardon reaches both the the punishment prescribed for for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full , it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense.

capacity.”- In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962 PARDON GRANTED AFTER CONVICTION 

EFFECT OF CONDITIONAL CONDITIONAL PARDON 



The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal consequences of his act , but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment , , especially so when he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had been convicted by final judgment. In re: Atty. Jose Avanceña, A.C. No. No. 407 August 15, 1967 Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. term. It does not reach the offense itself. - In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31, 1962

TOPIC: GROUNDS FOR VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

INHIBITION

AND

Judge’ Judge s ’ family Includes a judge’ judge ’ s: s: 1. spouse, 2. son,

PARDON GRANTED BEFORE CONVICTION 

If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. - In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L 363. July 31, 1962

“ A pardon reaches both the punishment punishment prescribed for the the offense

and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never

3. daughter, 4. son-in-law,

5. daughter-in-law, and TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

46

6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree , or 7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and judge and who

shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case. Rules contemplate - two kinds of inhibition

lives in the judge s household .

1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.

Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1 

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.



A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.



Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay

2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010] Proof that a specific act of bias or partiality was committed 

What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of proving bias and partiality under partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where a suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated . - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Evidence required 

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition , especially when the charge is without basis. Extrinsic


47

evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

A SUMMARY OF JUDICIAL JUDICIAL OBLIGATIONS OBLIGATIONS 

discharge of his judicial duties he should be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of public clamour , and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his office. office.”- Administrative Order No. 162, of the Department of

Proof of clear and convincing evidence 

The bare allegations of the judge ’s partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...." 

The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is "pecuniarily interested" as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases before the Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

3.1 A judge ’s conduct should be above reproach and in the

Justice, dated August 1, 1946. Sandoval 1946. Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996] Meaning of ruling in a lower court is the subject of review

or “ in in

which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review. 

Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the c ase in the court a quo, his was not the pen that finally rendered the decision therein. therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have have been placed in a position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was not legally bound to inhibit inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]



Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality, which axiom is


48

intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is our considered view that his active participation in the case below

of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. xxx We held that the fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the

constitutes a “ just or valid reason, ” under Section 1 of Rule 137

unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a judge would be barred from sit ting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared." - Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

disqualification

for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996] Automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition inhibition improper 

Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice. - Kilosbayan Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. Jr. G.R. No. No. 180543 [2010]

Utang na loob 

performance of one's duties as judge. – Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

said

judge.

To

allow

it

would

Personally approaching the judge to disqualify himself not contempt 

per se not a ground for inhibition

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration administration of justice . Nor should recognition of such value in Philippine society prevent the

of

We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which respondent Judge might consider just or valid. I t is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules, and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity of the court or judge . judge . - Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Former associate in practice of law 

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that

Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record is no ground for disqualification 

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one

Atty. Sicat was his former associate in his practice of law — is is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify


49

himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137.

try their case because they wanted “ to [avoid] any stigma and/or cloud of doubt on any order/decision ” which respondent may render on the case. 

In this case, respondent judge failed to take into account the loss of trust on the part of the complainant as to his impartiality.



When a judge exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit inhibit himself voluntarily. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt on his honest actuation and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should

Austria v. Hon. Hon. Judge Judge Masaquel, Masaquel, G.R. No. L-

22536 August 31, 1967 Father-in-law of the judge present in the proceeding 

The meat of this motion motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein respondent, was conspicuously present in the proceedings during which time he gave consultation to the complainant who was reportedly his political leader and protégée.

exercise his discretion in a way that the people ’s faith in the

In this case, however, respondent did not simply fail to recuse himself from cases in which his relatives were either involved or interested, the record shows he did so to favor or protect the parties.

courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. himself. - Latorre v. Judge Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ00-1563 [2001]

Siawan v. Judge

Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056. May 21, 2001 Judge s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counsel for



their motion, i.e., that respondent ’s nephew is the husband of the

the accused 

In any event, the grounds relied upon by complainants to support daughter of the counsel for the accused; that they lacked confidence in respondent ’s impartiality xxx have no merit.

It is alleged that respondent should have inhibited himself from Criminal Case No. 207096, entitled “ People v. Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Manuel M. Villasor, SG Fernando Tagle, and SG Ronan Guerrero” because respondent ’s nephew, Atty. Cris Pascua Zafra, is married to the daughter of Atty. P. M. Castillo, complainants’ defense counsel in that case. Complainants ’ claim that although respondent ’s relationship is to the husband



The first is not a ground for mandatory disqualification of judges under Rule 137, par. 1 since respondent is not even related to counsel for the accused. accused. - Yalung v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ01-1342 [2001]

Judge was the former public public prosecutor who handled handled the same case

of the daughter of their counsel, they did not want respondent to


50









The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the undersigned upon assumption to office as Presiding Judge of this sala last November 12, 1996. It was only after 4 months herein undersigned discovered and remembered that he handled the aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years back. Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his previous participation in the above-cited criminal case, up to the present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor conducted any full-blown trial in the same. Besides the private prosecutor did not interpose any objection. WON respondent sanctioned.

judge

should

be

administratively

The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas has done in the criminal case. xxx The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from November 12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing the written consent of both the prosecution and the defense and entering the same upon the record of the case. For almost one and a half years, he issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence for the prosecution and for the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he

sat in and acted on the case. - In Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC 98-6-185-RTC [1998] Justice of CA had acted as counsel counsel for respondent but no sanction 

Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the National Power Corporation in CA G.R. CV No. 34524 in his then capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have really begged off from any participation in the decision process by, indeed from being the ponente for, the appellate court.



In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained such failure to promptly inhibit himself as one of mere inadvertence inadvertence and oversight on his part, and when reminded that he, in fact, had acted as counsel for respondent NPC as the then Acting Solicitor General, he then forthwith disengaged himself from further involvement in the disposition of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R. No. 112884 August 30, 1994

Should a judge whose decision was reversed by the appellate court voluntarily inhibit herself when the case is remanded to her sala 

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against petitioner in the resolution of the motion to dismiss, which this Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason, absent any extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to conclude that the judge was biased and partial against petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, the remedy of erroneous interlocutory rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts


51

will close shop if we disqualify judges who err, for we all err. Barnes v. reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 179583 [2009] Is a former assistant or associate of the judge in the practice of law a ground for automatic automatic disqualification 

classmates (and he could have many) appeared . .



We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat was his former ass ociate in his practice of law — is is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat, admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said Rule 137 .



The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions involving a judge's disqualification here, a judge voluntarily inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a motion on the matter, it is another judge who insists that he continue with the case.



However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is transferred should not resist too much the order of recusation unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. - Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 26, 1987

22536 August 31, 1967



Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified because the counsel for plaintiffs-appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. disqualification. - Query of Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the decision of a judge, after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in the the case?

Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-

Is being a former classmate of the judge a ground for inhibition or disqualification?

Vda. De

Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R. No. L-26810. August 31, 1970

Judge attempted to make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin Judge attempted to make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering that they are brothers and the wife of t he accused is his first cousin 

Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent's counsel, the latter should


52

have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the judicial office on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the matter with his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than than enough for respondent respondent to make use of his good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement and using his moral influence on them without success, he should have inhibited himself from the case and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity.

Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not proper 

Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five (5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the respondent Judge from hearing subject cases.

Villanueva v.

Judge Almazan, A.M. A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221. March 16, 2000 

Judge is reprimanded.

Lazo v. Judge Judge Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98Rule 65 as remedy where the trial judge rules in favor of her competency

1173. December 15, 1998 Would mandamus lie to compel respondent Judge to proceed with hearing the case 

On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued an order denying the motion for inhibition but voluntarily inhibited himself and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the order of inhibition.



As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been imposed on him by the Rules of Court with regard to any matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature.



Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings where the trial judge rules in favor of her competency to sit in a case is not an absolute rule in civil cases, and has not precluded a resort in appropriate cases to the special civil action of certiorari before the higher courts for determination, this will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion for inhibition or disqualification was made ahead of the trial court ’s judgment on the merits and there is a clear showing that the case is an exceptional one. This is not true in the case of the present petitioner . Ong v. Basco, G.R. No. 167899 167899 August 6, 2008

Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own competency

Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R. G.R. No. 124760 July 8, 1998 

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor


53

of his own competency does not apply in criminal cases where such disqualification is sought by the prosecution or offended party. Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969 

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own competency does not apply in criminal cases where such disqualification is sought by the prosecution or offended party. Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

When the accused seeks inhibition or disqualification disqualification 

Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge, the general restriction provided in the rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his own competency would apply, as it does in civil cases. In such case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, could raise the correctness of the judge's ruling on his non-disqualification with his appeal from the decision on the merits; and were he to be acquitted, he would have no cause for complaint against the judge's acquittal verdict and ruling of non-disqualification of himself from trying the case and rendering such verdict . - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L23710 September 30, 1969

matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act such as to render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the part of a party, to timely interpose such an objection of disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal obstacle to raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969 When to file a motion for disqualification? 

The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that should be timely raised in the first instance, so that it may properly be raised and considered on appeal.



At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case, case, supra, if this Court were of the opinion upon a review of the case that the litigant had not had a fair trial, it would grant a new trial, although the judge may not have been disqualified under Rule 137, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but in the best interests of justice. This we did in Dais vs. Torres, where we ruled that: "Although a judge may not have been disqualified under said section, nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." Paredes justice." Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

Written consent of all the parties is required in

Remittal of

Disqualification” Disqualification” Disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction  

This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to petitioners' contention, holds that the disqualification of a judge is not a

From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.


54

The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by them and entered upon the record. - Lorenzo v. Judge Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988

Blood relatives Relatives by consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed the following: (1) an ascendant; (2) a descendant; (3) a legitimate, natural natural or adopted brother or sister - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 124303-05 February 10, 1998

Definition of affinity 

Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa.

No affinity 

brother. There is no affinity between the husband ’s brother and the wife’s sister. sister. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No.

PP v.

Raul Berana, G.R. No. 123544 July 29, 1999 

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like . like . - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

09-3243-RTJ [2013] Is the relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse , spouse , thus ending the marriage which created such relationship by affinity? 



Indeed, "there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wife ’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife ’s

If marriage gives rise to one s relationship by affinity to the

Affinity denotes "the relation that one spouse has to the blood blood relatives of one s spouse, does the extinguishment of relatives of the other spouse." It is a relationship by marriage or a marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a by affinity? fiction created by law in connection with the institution of  The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that marriage and family relations. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013] TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS 55

kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage produced children or not. Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a result of the death of one of the parties to the said marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an intent

Judge not disqualified 

to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “ tie of affinity ” between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. Intestate Estate of Gonzales vda. De Carung cong v. PP, G.R. No. 181409 February 11, 2010

Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not inlaws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]

Common law relationship not a relationship by affinity 

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him. PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

Being 

CASE 1 

Judge is respondent ’s second cousin by affinity, the former ’s [judge] aunt is married to an uncle of respondent. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge did not inhibit himself from hearing said electoral case.





Judge, as alleged, are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt of the judge is married to the uncle of respondent. WON the judge is related by affinity to respondent.

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge

magbalaes

is not a ground for automatic disqualification

Complainant contends that respondent judge is guilty of impropriety by refusing to inhibit himself from the case despite the fact that one of the accused, Lope Panti, Sr., is the father-in-law of respondent judge ’s daughter.



To be sure, respondent judge and accused Lope Panti, Sr. are not, strictly speaking, relatives within the meaning of Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, the close personal relations between them as parents of their respective children, being in our culture known as

“ magbalaes,” should have cautioned

respondent judge to inhibit himself from the case, lest his


56

impartiality be placed in doubt . .

Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles,

A.M. No. MTJ-99-1236. November 25, 1999

(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for dismissal.

’ wife Complainant is the judge’ judge s 

Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant, knowing that the private complainant therein was his wife, Atty. Ester Flor .

(b) for an alleged cause of action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and

•

Tenenan v. Judge Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1995

September 25, 2007

TOPIC: LEGAL ISSUES PERTAINING TO JUDGES AND JUSTICES Resolution to protect members of judiciary from baseless complaints •

•

First of all, we deem it necessary to determine the applicability of A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, a Resolution Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect Protect Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, which took effect on November 3, 2003.

Recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases against members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we issued said Resolution, which provides:

2. If the complaint is (a) filed (a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge;

If such is not the case, the Office of the Court Administrator must require the respondent to file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and recommendation not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the comment. The Court shall act on the recommendation recommendation before the date of compulsory retirement of the respondent, or, if it is not possible to do so, within six (6) months from such date without prejudice to the release of the retirement retirement benefits less such amount as the Court may order to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of action action alleged in the complaint. complaint.

When to file administrative case against judges •

Now, the established doctrine and policy is that disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial remedies, whether whether ordinary ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the corresponding action or proceeding, are prerequisites for the taking of other measures against the persons of the judges concerned , whether of civil, administrative, or or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality , that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil, or administrative liability may be said to


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have opened, or closed. - Bello III v. Judge Diaz, AM-MTJ-001311. October 3, 2003

Lack of verification is only a formal defect •

•

Prosecution of the judge can be had only if “ there be a final

was not verified , as required in Rule 139-B, §1 of the Rules of

declaration by a competent court in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the challenged judgment or order , and also evidence of malice or bad faith, ignorance of inexcusable negligence, on the part of the

Court on Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys, suffice it to say that such that such c onstitutes only a formal defect and does not aff ect the jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint . "The verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are true and correct — the court may simply order the

judge in rendering said judgment or order ” or under the stringent circumstances set out in Article 32 of the Civil Code. – Bello III v. Judge Diaz, Diaz, AM-MTJ-00-1311. October 3, 2003

correction of unverified pleadings or pleadings or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may be served." ( Fernandez Fernandez v. Atty. Novero Jr., A.C. No. 5394, December 02, 2002 )

Anonymous complaint •

First, we clear the objection of respondent judge that the lettercomplaint should not be given due course because it is only anonymous. anonymous. Section 1, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the disciplinary proceedings against judges and justices may be instituted instituted under either of three three ways:

Effect of retirement of respondent judge •

1. by the Supreme Supreme Court Court motu motu proprio; proprio; 2. upon a verified complaint; complaint; or 3. upon an anonymous anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. •

Re: Anonymous Complaint against Judge Gedorio, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1955, May 25, 2007

As to the contention of respondent that the Court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the letter-complaint

Respondent's retirement from office did not render the present administrative case moot and academic. Neither does it free him from liability. ( Lagcao Lagcao v. Judge Gako, A.M. RTJ-04-1840, August 2, 2007 )

Death of respondent judge •

The dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Butacan by reason of his demise is in accordance with Bote v. Judge Eduardo where the Court held that in view of the death of Judge Escudero, for humanitarian reasons, it is inappropriate to impose any administrative liability of a punitive nature; and declared the administrative complaint against the respondent Judge, dismissed, closed and terminated. RE: Application for


58

retirement/gratuity benefits xxx., A.M. No. 12535-ret., April 22, 2008

Effect of reconciliation of the parties •

Judge also liable if court court employee fraternized with litigant litigant •

•

Unfortunately, these standards were not met by respondent Judge Alagar in this cas e having tolerated unknowingly his employee to fraternize, receive or give personal favors favors no matter how small, with party litigants in a case pending before his sala. Thus, while this Court finds the respondent Judge to have acted with impartiality and propriety in dealing with the complainants in Criminal Case No. 4252 , we find fault on his part in failing to supervise the conduct and behavior of his court employee

Conviction in a criminal case •

for the latter ’s improper use of his vehicle, to the detriment of the court ’s image. - Balderama v. Judge Alagar, A.M. No. RTJ-991449. January 18, 2002

•

Having lunch with counsel •

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong per se. se. The Canons, however, provides that as much as possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element in “ determining his judicial course. ” Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr.,

is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending before him, the respondent judge should have thought twice about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that. - Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003

The subsequent reconciliation of the parties to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that may have been committed against the public service. ( Flores ( Flores v. Judge Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499, October 6, 2008 )

Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent in an administrative case is not a ground for the dismissal of the administrative case. Conversely, conviction in the criminal case will not automatically warrant a finding of guilt in the administrative case. We emphasize the well-settled rule that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to it. In other words, the disposition in the first two will not necessarily govern the third, and vice versa. ( Velasco Velasco v. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles A.M. No. RTJ-05-1908, RTJ-05-1908, August 15, 15, 2007 )

Effect of resignation from office •

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by


59

the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its

Gross ignorance of the law

consequent acceptance – without prejudice – by this Court, has ceased to be in office during during the pendency of this case. case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. ( Non-disclosure Non-disclosure before the JBC of the administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC no. 013, August 22, 2007 )

•

GROUNDS FOR OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL •

Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a retiring judge or justice to justice to be dismissed outright, the following requisites must concur:

Rendering an unjust judgment •

(1) the complaint must have been filed within six months from the compulsory retirement of the judge or justice;

(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; and

(3) it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the respondent. (Miguel Colorado v. Judge Ricardo M. Agapito, A.M. no. MTJ-06-1658, July 3, 2007)

(d) the judge knows that his judgment is unjust. •

•

A warning, however, no matter how stern, is not a penalty. Rosauro M. Miranda v. Judge Cesar A. Mangrobang, Sr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1665, November 29, 2001

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is both a criminal and an administrative charge. charge . As a crime, it is punished under Art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code the elements of which which are: (a) the offender is a judge;

(2) the cause of action must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and

Warning is not a penalty

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, the subject decision, order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties must not only be contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption. In the case before us, the administrative complaint does not even allege that the erroneous decision of respondent was thus motivated. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

The gist of the offense therefore is that an unjust judgment be rendered maliciously or in bad faith, that is, knowing it to be unjust. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-991447. September 27, 2000


60

was not merely feigned to subserve an unworthy purpose. – Sps.

There is no liability at all f or a mere error •

•

•

An unjust judgment is one which is contrary to law or is not supported by evidence or both. The source of an unjust judgment may be error or ill-will. There is no liability at all for a mere error . It is well-settled that a judicial officer, when required to exercise his judgment or discretion, is not liable criminally for good faith. any error which he commits , commits , provided he acts in good Bad faith is therefore the ground of liability . liability . If in rendering judgment the judge fully knew that the same was unjust in the sense aforesaid, then he acted maliciously and must have been actuated and prevailed upon by hatred, envy, revenge, greed or some other similar motive. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

Complaint for gross ignorance of the law is impermissible if case is appealed •

We

need

not

belabor

•

In the present case, the complainants filed this administrative case against respondent judge while their appeal and petition for certiorari challenging his decision and order were still pending with the RTC . Following our settled pronouncements cited above, the instant complaint is impermissible. – Camacho v. Judge Gatdula, A.M. A.M. No. MTJ-00-1252. December 17, 2002

Period to decide or resolve the case submitted for decision jurisprudence

to

accommodate

•

respondent ’s argument which in effect posits that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction. So we have ruled and so we have acted, but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable judgment. • •

The main issue for our resolution is whether the instant administrative complaint for gross ignorance of the law is permissible in light of the filing by complainants of a notice of appeal and a petition for certiorari assailing respondent judge’s decision and his order of execution.

Mere error therefore in the interpretation or application of the law does not constitute the crime. - Sps. Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

When good faith will not be applied •

Daracan v. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000

Where, however, the issues are so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law which, law which, hopefully,

The 90-day period to decide or resolve the case submitted for decision, fixed no less by the Constitution, is a mandatory requirement . Hence, non-compliance thereof shall subject the erring judge to administrative sanction as this Court may deem appropriate. It is only in certain meritorious cases , i.e., those involving difficult questions of law or complex issues or when the judge is burdened by heavy caseloads, that a longer period to decide may be allowed but only upon proper application made application made with the Supreme Court


61

by the concerned judge.- Dr. Seares v. Judge Salazar, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1160 November 22, 2000

•

Judge attended the hearing hearing of his brother • •

Judge Dojillo “ sat beside the counsel of his brother ” and

Under Section 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, and Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. In filing such comment, respondent judge violated the provision in the Revised Rules of Court which which provides:

“ actively coached, aided, assisted, and guided said c ounsel by now

and then saying something, handing piece of writing, reminding, and or stopping the counsel from manifesting something to the court, and other similar acts. ” •

Respondent, in his defense, stated that he attended the hearing of his brother ’s election protest case just to give moral support and, in the process, also observe how election protest proceedings are conducted . Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr., A.M. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591. July 14, 2005

Comment on Certiorari filed by public respondent respondent judge in behalf of private respondent •

Further, respondent judge, in signing and filing a comment with the court on behalf of one of the parties , parties , engaged in the private practice of law.

“ Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the

petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition petition or any pleading therein. If either party elevates the case to a higher court, the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties. parties. However, unless otherwise specifically directed, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. Tuzon v. Judge Cloribel-Purugganan, Cloribel-Purugganan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1662 [2001] Can the members of the Supreme Court be removed from office only by impeachment? •

Justice Reyes maintains that Members of the Court may be removed from office only by impeachment . Since removal from office is a disciplinary or administrative sanction, it follows that there is no manner by which a Justice of this Court may be disciplined for acts done during his incumbency. Considering that the power to impeach a Justice of this Court is lodged in the legislative branch of the government, the Court is without authority to proceed against and discipline its former Member. He added that what constitutes impeachable offenses is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature, and that the misconduct of leakage is not one of the impeachable offenses. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Louis C. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and


62

Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

Quantum of evidence •

•

When Justice Reyes compulsorily retired upon reaching the mandatory age of 70 , his perceived mantle of protection and immunity, that the mode of his removal from office can be done only through impeachment, no longer exists. exists. His duties and responsibilities as a Justice having ceased by reason of his retirement, he is reverted to the status of a lawyer and, consequently, can be subjected to appropriate sanctions for administrative offenses, particularly, an act of misconduct. The fact that the Investigating Committee, created per Resolution dated December 10, 2008 of the Court, commenced the investigation during the incumbency of Justice Reyes is of no moment , as he was then not yet a respondent in an administrative matter against him. - In Re: Undated Letter of Mr. Biraogo, Petitioner in Biraogo v. Nograles and Limkaichong, G.R. No.179120 A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC : August 11, 2009

Res ipsa loquitor •

•

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-971375. October 16, 1997]

It is likewise a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint with substantial evidence falls on the complainant. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

Quantum of evidence required for removal of judge from office •

Jurisprudence dictates –

“ The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established

beyond reasonable doubt . Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence. The general rules with regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ02-1713 [2005] Acts of a collegial court •

It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered by Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate. inappropriate . - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J 06-97-CA-J [2006]

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, would show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law or misconduct. - Atty. Macalintal v. Judge The, A.M. No. RTJ-971375. October 16, 1997] TABINAS, EUNICE R. (PROBLEM AREAS AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS) REVIEWER - FINALS

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•

The act of a single member, though he may be its head, done without the participation of the others , others , cannot be considered

harassment of attorneys through the mere filing of numerous criminal cases against them.

the act of the collegial body itself. – ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. No. 08-19-SB-J August August 24, 2010

•

Rendering knowingly unjust judgment" does not apply to a collegial court •

Respondents should know that the provisions of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code as to "rendering knowingly unjust judgment" refer to an individual judge who judge who does so "in any case submitted to him for decision" and even then, it is not the prosecutor who would pass judgment on the "unjustness" of the decision rendered by him but the proper appellate court with jurisdiction to review the same, either the Court of Appeals and/or the Supreme Court. Respondents should likewise know that said penal article has no application to the members of a collegiate court such as this Court or its Divisions who reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. It also follows, consequently, that a charge of violation of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that such a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. - Bautista v. Justice Abdulwahid A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J [2006]

Existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence •

•

The mere existence of pending criminal charges against the respondent-lawyer cannot be a ground for disbarment or suspension of the latter. To hold otherwise would open the door to

It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues. - Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 31, 2008

Preventive suspension not applicable •

Preventive suspension pending resolution of the administrative case

By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such, she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence. innocence . - Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. No. 06-9-545-RTC January January 31, 2008

Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. – Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC January 31, 2008


64

Collegial court needs to act as one body •

•

CA or RTC may suspend an attorney

Respondent Justices contend that they preserved the collegiality of the Fourth Division despite their having separately conducted hearings, considering that the three of them were in the same venue venue and were acting within hearing and communicating distance of distance of one another. The information and evidence upon which the Fourth Division would base any decisions or other judicial actions in the cases tried before it must be made directly available to each and every one of its members during the proceedings. This necessitates the equal and full participation of each member in the trial and adjudication of their cases. It is simply not enough, therefore, that the three members of the Fourth Division were within hearing and communicating distance of one another at the hearings in question , as they explained in hindsight, because even in those circumstances not all of them sat together in session . - ASP Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justice Ong, et, al. A.M. No. 08-19-SB-J August 24, 2010

•

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named causes named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Judge acted as lawyer for complainant complainant and father-in-law •

Respondent acted as a lawyer for complainant and her father-inlaw when he drafted complainant ’s affidavit which became the basis of a complaint complaint for estafa filed against Heidi Navarra. By acting as counsel for complainant and the latter s father-inlaw in a case filed in his court, respondent compromised his neutrality and independence.

•

Respondent ’s misconduct in this case is further compounded by the fact that he rendered the legal services in question using government facilities during office hours. hours. - Biboso v. Judge Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356 [2001]

Preventive suspension for erring lawyer •

Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. After receipt of respondent's respondent's answer or lapse of of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the investigation until such such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court .


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Pale (Finals)

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