LegPhilo Finals Digest

San Beda College Alabang

Legal Philosophy – Atty. John R. Jacome

VI. REMEDIAL LAW ARIANZA VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION GR No. L-43352 February 28, 1978 Makaisar, J.: FACTS:

As of 1960, Manuel Arianza was employed in Central Azucarera De La Carlota, Inc. Before he entered his employment he was subjected to a thorough medical examination and was found fit to work. In his first and second assignments that is packing bagasse and as piler of bagasse, his work required strenuous physical effort and exertion. And in his last assignment as a water tender in the fire-room, his body was immersed in hot water up to his waist with the upper part of his body exposed to cold. Subsequently, Arianza became ill and was found to be suffering from liver cirrhosis. ISSUE: Whether or not the illness of Arianza is compensable under the Workmen‟s Compensation Act. RULING: Yes. Petitioner‟s first assignment was to pack bagasse because he was not provided with mask to protect

him from small particles of bagasse, he inhaled these particles from time to time. After for (4) years, he was assigned as bagasse filer which required strenuous s trenuous physical effort and exertion. He had to work either on day or night shift at 8 hours each shift. As water tender at the fire-room, his body was half immersed in hot water and the upper half was exposed to cold. All these duties of petitioner must have adversely affected his death. The presumption of casual connection remains unrebutted by substantial and credible evidence. Although his work might not be the direct cause of his illness, which is liver cirrhosis, yet his working conditions must have weakened his body resistance‟ and aggravated said illness. (Bacon’s Inductive Jurisprudence) APIAG VS JUDGE CANTERO A.M. NO. MTJ-95-1070 February 12, 1997 Panganiban, J.: FACTS:

Judge Cantero and Petitioner Apiag got married in 1947 and begot a daughter who was born the same year. On 1953, their son Glicerio was born. Thereafter, Judge Cantero left the conjugal home without any apparent cause, and leaving the petitioner to raise the two children with her meager income as a public school teacher. For several years, Judge Cantero was never heard of and his whereabouts unknown not until respondent resurfaced whereupon petitioner begged for support, however, they were ignored by respondent judge. Subsequently, petitioner learned that Judge Cantero has another wife, Nieves Ygay, whom he begot 5 children. Petitioner with her daughter and son charged the respondent, Judge Esmeraldo Cantero with gross misconduct for allegedly having committed bigamy and falsification of public documents.

ISSUE:

Contributors:

Accad, Alarilla, Canones, Cordero, Ignacio, Monje, Narvasa, Padilla, & Santuyo

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Whether or not Judge Cantero should be held liable for his acts. RULING: Yes. “Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more reverend that plausible, and more advised than confident. Above all things, integrity is their portion and proper virtue.” The eminent Francis Bacon wrote the forgoing

exhortation some 400 years ago. Today, it is still relevant and quotable. By the nature of their functions, judges are revered models of integrity, wisdom, decorum, competence and propriety. Human as they are, however, magistrates do have their own weaknesses, frailties, mistakes and even indiscretions. However, due to the death of Judge Cantero, the Court ordered the dismissal of the case.

VII. POLITICAL POLITICAL LAW: Reform, Reform, Revolution, Revolution, and Resistance Resistance

TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 148334 January 21, 2004 Carpio, J.: FACTS:

Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conducted by the COMELEC. Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with the 13 th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona who vacated a seat in the senate to become the Vice President. Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the declaration of the 13 th elected senator. Petitioners contend that Comelec is without jurisdiction because it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in special election hence the people voted without distinction in one election for 13 seats s eats irrespective of the term of office. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have standing to maintain the suit. RULING:

Yes. In questioning the validity of special election, petitioners assert harm classified as “generalized grievance.” They failed to establish direct injury they they suffered from the said governmental act. However, the Court relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised its discretion to give due course to voter‟s suit involving the right of suffrage. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN G.R. NOS. 183591, 183572, 183951 & 183951; October 14, 2008 FACTS:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Contributors:


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Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) 2. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA RULINGS:

1. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991). (Sec 7 Art III) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same selfexecutory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. 2. No. The MOA- AD provides that “any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework,” implying an amendment of the Constitution to accommodate the MOA -AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution . It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure p rocedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act. The “suspensive clause” in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards.

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Given the limited nature of the President‟s authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to

any third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested. RELATIONSHIP TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY PUNO, C.J., separate and concurring opinion: V. The Constitution as Compact of the People

The question may be asked: In the process of negotiating peace with the MILF, why cannot the Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the Constitution and seek their ratification later by its amendment or revision? Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in reply to this question. Yet, no theory has been as influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the social contract theory, articulated by John Locke, viz : For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is impossible it should ac t or continue one body, one community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so everyone is bound by that consent to be concluded by the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole. The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau stressed the non-derogability of this social contract, viz : But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence only from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind itself, even to others, in anything that derogates from the original act, such as alienation of some portion of itself, or submission to another sovereign. To violate the act by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is nothing produces nothing. Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law articulated these precepts in his seminal work, Philippine Political Law, viz : As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution is a written instrument which serves as the fundamental law of the state. In theory, it is the creation of the will of the people, who are deemed the source of all political powers. It provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, determines and limits their powers, and prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of the individual. xxxx Some authorities have also considered the constitution as a compact, an agreement of the people, in their individual capacities, reduced to writing, establishing and fixing certain principles for the government of themselves. This notion

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expresses the old theory of the social contract obligatory on all parties and revocable by no one individual or group less than the majority of the people; otherwise it will not have the attribute of law. (Emphasis supplied) In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate the Constitution on the part of any official of government. No one can claim he has a blank check to violate the Constitution in advance and the privilege to cure the violation later through amendment of its provisions. Respondents thesis of violate now, validate later makes a burlesque of the Constitution.

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID ELISEA RAMOS G.R. NO. 159402; February 23, 2011 FACTS:

Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands. Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions. The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorney‟s fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiff‟s counsel; (4)

The costs of this suit. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with modification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorney‟s fees is lowered to P10,000.00.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari . ISSUE:

Whether the ATO could be sued without the State's consent. RULING:

Yes. The decision of the Court of Appeals is sustained. POLITICAL LAW state immunity

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An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business. National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203 (1952) Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court, reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity. The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952) The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity from suit. We uphold the CA‟s aforequoted holding. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff‟s property. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991. RELATIONSHIP TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY BERSAMIN, J.:

But in the case at bar it did object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield. Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. "Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par nature de se donner loy." Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed. 1539, fol. 61 .

PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, ET AL. v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL. G.R. NO. 171396; MAY 3, 2006

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FACTS:

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arr est was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergencies contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president‟s calling out power, take care power and take over po wer. ISSUE:

Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. RULING:

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General‟s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the

issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escapes of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

Contributors:


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First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing „on their faces‟ statutes in fr ee speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily „freedom of speech‟ cases. Also, a plain reading of

PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that „reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.‟ Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered „harmful‟ and „constitutionally unprotected conduct.‟ Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only „spoken words‟ and again, that „overbreadth claims, if

entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct.‟ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the President‟s „call ingout‟ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that „this does not prevent an

examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in- Chief, a „sequence‟ of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling- out power is that „whenever it becomes necessary,‟ the President may call the armed forces „to prevent or suppres s lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.‟ And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause „to enforce obedience to all the laws an d to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.‟ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos

legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate „decrees.‟ Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that „[t]he legislative power shall be vested i n the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.‟ To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA‟s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be b ased on the following:

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1. There must be a war or other emergency. 2. The delegation must be for a limited period only. 3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. 4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president. RELATIONSHIP TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Doctrines of Several Political Theorists on the Power of the President in Times of Emergency

This case brings to fore a contentious subject -- the power of the President in times of emergency. A glimpse at the various political theories relating to this subject provides an adequate backdrop for our ensuing discussion. John Locke, describing the architecture of civil government, called upon the English doctrine of prerogative to cope with the problem of emergency. In times of danger to the nation, positive law enacted by the legislature might be inadequate or even a fatal obstacle to the promptness of action necessary to avert catastrophe. In these situations, the Crown retained a prerogative “power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the proscription of the law and sometimes even against it.” But Locke recognized that this moral restraint might not suffice to avoid abuse of prerogative powers. Who shall judge the need for resorting to the prerogative and how may its abuse be avoided? Here, Locke readily admitted defeat, suggesting that “the people have no other remedy in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth, but to appeal to Heaven.”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau also assumed the need for temporary suspension of democratic processes of government in time of emergency. According to him: The inflexibility of the laws, which prevents them from adopting themselves to circumstances, may, in certain cases, render them disastrous and make them bring about, at a time of crisis, the ruin of the State…

It is wrong therefore to wish to make political institutions as strong as to render it impossible to suspend their operation. Even Sparta allowed its law to lapse... If the peril is of such a kind that the paraphernalia of the laws are an obstacle to their preservation, the method is to nominate a supreme lawyer, who shall silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority. In such a case, there is no doubt about the general will, and it clear that the people‟s first intention is that

the State shall not perish. Rosseau did not fear the abuse of the emergency dictatorship or “supreme magistracy” as he termed it. For him, it would more likely be cheapened by “indiscreet use.” He was unwilling to rely upon an “appeal to heaven.” Instead, he relied upon a tenure of office of prescribed duration to avoid perpetuation of the dictatorship.

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John Stuart Mill concluded his ardent defense of representative government: “I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme necessity, the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship.”

Nicollo MachiavelliÕs view of emergency powers, as one element in the whole scheme of limited government, furnished an ironic contrast to the Lockean theory of prerogative. He recognized and attempted to bridge this chasm in democratic political theory, thus: Now, in a well-ordered society, it should never be necessary to resort to extra -constitutional measures; for although they may for a time be beneficial, yet the precedent is pernicious, for if the practice is once established for good objects, they will in a little while be disregarded under that pretext but for evil purposes. Thus, no republic will ever be perfect if she has not by law provided for everything, having a remedy for every emergency and fixed rules for applying it. Machiavelli -- in contrast to Locke, Rosseau and Mill -- sought to incorporate into the constitution a regularized system of standby emergency powers to be invoked with suitable checks and controls in time of national danger. He attempted forthrightly to meet the problem of combining a capacious reserve of power and speed and vigor in its application in time of emergency, with effective constitutional restraints. Contemporary political theorists, addressing themselves to the problem of response to emergency by constitutional democracies, have employed the doctrine of constitutional dictatorship.[91] Frederick M. Watkins saw “no reason why absolutism should not be used as a means for the defense of liberal institutions,” provided it “serves to protect established institutions from the danger of permanent injury in a period of temporary emergency and is followed by a prompt return to the previous forms of political life.” He recognized the two (2) key elements of the problem of emergency governance, as well as all constitutional governance: increasing administrative powers of the executive, while at the same time “imposing limitation upon that power.”

Watkins placed his real faith in a scheme of constitutional dictatorship. These are the conditions of success of such a dictatorship: “The period of dictatorship must be relatively short… Dictatorship should always be strictly legitimate in character… Final authority to determine the need for dictatorship in any given case must never rest with the dictator himself…” and the objective of such an emergency dictatorship should be “strict political conservatism.”

xxx In the final analysis, the various approaches to emergency of the above political theorists -- from Lock‟s “theory of prerogative,” to Watkins‟ doctrine of “constitutional dictatorship” and, eventually, to McIlwain‟s “principle of constitutionalism” --- ultimately aim to solve one real problem in emergency governance, i.e., that of allotting increasing areas of discretionary power to the Chief Executive, while insuring that such powers will be exercised with a sense of political responsibility and under effective limitations and checks.

ESTRADA VS SANIGANBAYAN ( STATE AUTHORITY AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY) GR NO. 148560, NOVEMBER 19, 2001

FACTS:

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Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by R.A. No. 7659 substantially provides that any public officer who amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, being prosecuted under the said Act, assailed its constitutionality, arguing inter alia, that it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code; and as such, a violation of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ISSUE

W/N the Plunder Law is constitutional HELD:

YES. As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense. JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its c ollective wisdom and inflict punishment for non- observance. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test. Contributors:


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VIII. LABOR LAW: Capitalism, Socialism, and Communism DE RAMAS VS CAR AND RAMOS ( SOCIALISM AND LAND TENANCY) FACTS:

Respondent Geronimo B. Ramos is the tenant of herein petitioner Mateo de Ramas on a 2-1/2 hectare land at Muzon Naic, Cavite, under a verbal share tenancy contract at 70-30. On June 22, 1960, or one month before the beginning of the agricultural year 1960-1961, Ramos informed petitioner of his desire to change their contract from that of share tenancy to leasehold tenancy. Petitioner refused to grant the request insisting on the former 70-30 sharing basis, so on May 23, 1961 Ramos filed a petition with the Court of Agrarian Relations praying that he be allowed to change their tenancy contract from share to leasehold, in accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. Petitioner opposed the petition as groundless and violating their gentleman's agreement. During the pendency of the case respondent Ramos moved to suspend the proceedings on the ground that the constitutionality of Section 14 Republic Act No. 1199 has been raised, among other issues, before the Supreme Court in the case of Juliano v. CAR, et al., G.R. No. L-17627, and that to continue with the case would only result in loss of time, money, etc., if the Supreme Court declare Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 unconstitutional. ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE SECTION 14 OR RA 1199 IS CONSTITUTIONAL RULING :

YES. The history of land tenancy, especially in Central Luzon, is a dark spot in the social life and history of the people. It was among the tenants of Central Luzon that the late Pedro Abad Santos, acting as a saviour of the tenant class, which for generations has been relegated to a life of bondage, without hope of salvation or improvement, enunciated a form of socialism as a remedy for the pitiful condition of the tenants of Central Luzon. It was in Central Luzon also that the tenants forming the PKM organization of tenants and, during the war, the Hukbalahap, rose in arms against the constituted authority as their only salvation from permanent thralldom. According to statistics, whereas at the beginning of the century we had only 19% of the people belonging to the tenant class, after 60 years of prevailing percentage has reached 39%. It is the desire to improve the condition of the peasant class that must have impelled the Legislature to adopt the provisions as a whole of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and particularly Section 14 of said Act. The section in question (See. 14, Rep. Act No. 1199) permits a tenant who has accumulated savings to free himself from obtaining the usurious loans for expenses needed in plowing, harrowing, planting, and harvesting. The tenant who has accumulated savings that would enable him to buy implements and farm animals is allowed by the provision in question to free himself from the bondage of permanent share tenancy by a change to lease-hold tenancy. The tenant who is used to cultivating riceland cannot conceive of any form or manner in which he can invest his meager savings other than by the purchase of farm implements and work animals. In other words, the only avenue left to him to improve his lot is by permitting him to change his contract to tenancy from that of share system to that of leasehold system. The increase that he receives in his share as a consequence of the change, is only 5% (under the share Contributors:


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system the landlord receives 30% and under leasehold he receives only 25% if the land is first class, and 20% if the land is second class). But by the change the tenant is released from the stranglehold of the landord, and becomes a semi-independent farmer. The provision in question is certainly justified by the directive contained in the Constitution to do justice to labor. By the change the laborer can improve his lowly lot. And if it cannot be justified as an act of social justice enjoined in the Constitution, it may be considered as an exercise of the police power of the State, which tries to improve the situation of a great percentage of the people and preserve the security of the State against possible internal upheavals that the tenant class might be forced to create to improve their lowly lot. The tenants uprising in Central Luzon from 1946 to 1952 must certainly have been the main cause or reason for the enactment of the Agricultural Tenancy Act in 1954 and of the particular section in question. The desire to improve the tenant class certainly has been impelled by the necessity of insuring the internal security of the country, a paramount aim and end justifying the exercise of the police power. CALALANG VS WILLIAMS FACTS:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads. On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted. Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. ISSUE:

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Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. HELD:

NO. The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." PEOPLE V. LAVA ET AL. G.R. NO. L-4974-8 MAY 16, 1969

FACTS:

Lava et al were charged with the commission of the crime of rebellion complexed with multiple murder, arsons and robberies. Seized documentary and other articles were placed in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary because they had to be presented as evidence in the trial of rebellion cases pending in other courts. Most of the originals of the documentary evidence were burned during the fire that gutted the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary on September 10, 1958. The Solicitor General filed a petition for the reconstitution of the burned exhibits. The petition for reconstitution was given by the Court. The appellants assail the reconstitution of the exhibits that were destroyed, and claim that the reconstituted exhibits should not be considered.

In. GR. No. L-4974, in the course of the trial in the RTC, the evidence relied upon were only documents that were seized during raids on different places were Lava had been. Some of these documents were Lava's handwriting, or were signed by him using his alias names. These were clearly established by the testimony of a handwriting expert that was presented by the prosecution. The conclusion of the handwriting expert was based on the specimens of Lava's handwriting which were used as standards in comparing with the handwriting and/or signature (in alias) of the appellant that appear in the documents that were presented as evidence against him. Some documents were presented for comparison on Lava‟s signature are:

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1. An application for employment signed by Jose Lava. The signature thereon was testified to by witness Eduardo Romualdez (now Secretary of Finance) as looking "like the signature of Jose Lava." Eduardo Romualdez was acquainted with the handwriting of Jose Lava, having received reports, parts of which were in the handwriting of Jose Lava "not less than three or four times" while Jose Lava, was a bank examiner; and 2. A cardboard containing a list of books requested by Jose Lava while the latter was detained in Bilibid Prison. Buenaventura Villanueva, to whom the list was given, testified that he saw Lava writing the list on the cardboard. Lava‟s counsel contended that no genuine specimen of Lava's handwriting was presented as standard for

comparison.

ISSUE:

1. 2.

Would reconstituted documents be admitted as evidence? Would the conclusion of the handwriting expert that it was Lava‟s handwriting suffice?

HELD:

1. Yes. The reconstitution was made in accordance with the provisions of Act 3110, which provides for the procedure in the reconstitution of court records. Section 59 of said act provides that destroyed documentary evidence shall be reconstituted by means of s econdary evidence which may be presented to any Justice of the Supreme Court or any other officer commissioned by the Court. Section 14 of the act provides that the destroyed or lost documentary evidence shall be replaced by secondary evidence. A photostatic copy of an original document is admissible as a secondary evidence of the contents of the originals and they constitute evidence of a satisfactory nature. 2. Yes. The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. The handwriting expert who made the comparison in this case positively identified the handwriting of Jose Lava on the documents presented as evidence against Lava, especially the handwritten names of Gregorio Santayana, Gaston, Gaston Silayan, Gavino and Greg. LEGPHILO:

Existence and activities of the CPP and HMB We have thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence in the present cases, and We find it conclusively proved, as did the lower court, that as of the year 1950 when elements of the police and armed forces of the Government arrested the defendants in these five cases there was already a nation-wide organization of the

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Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and that said party had a well-organized plan to overthrow the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China. The Communist Party of the Philippines had as its military arm the organization known as the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB), otherwise or formerly known as Hukbalahaps (Huks). It is established that the rebellious activities of the HMB, and the commission of common crimes in different parts of the country by the HMB, were directed by the Communist Party of the Philippines through its Politburo (PB) and/or Secretariat (SEC). The Politburo and/or the Secretariat gave orders to the field through its general headquarters (GHQ) and its regional commands (RECOS), and reports to the Politburo and/or Secretariat were made regarding the activities of the HMB, giving accounts of the sorties or ambushes and attacks against elements of the police, the Philippine Constabulary and the army, and of killings, lootings and destructions of property. It is also established that the plan of the Communist Party was not only to overthrow the Philippine Government but also to kill officials of the Government and private individuals who refused to cooperate with the rebels, and orders to this effect were transmitted to the HMB.

The Communist Party of the Philippines has a flag, colored red, with the symbols of the hammer and the sickle (Exhibit A), and a newspaper organ called "TITIS". In the general plan to indoctrinate the masses into communistic ideas and principles, communist schools—some of them called "Stalin University" —were set up in a number of places in the mountain fastnesses, where trained instructors gave lectures and taught lessons in the principles of Karl Marx, Frederich Engels, Joseph Stalin and Nicolai Lenin.

As has been stated, the CPP has an armed force, which is the HMB. The predecessor of the HMB was the HUKBALAHAP, an organization created by the party during the Japanese occupation to resist the Japanese forces. Upon liberation of the Philippines, the members of the Hukbalahap continued their activities, the organization was renamed HMB, and its members were indoctrinated in communistic principles. The members of the HMB are known as "Huks".

PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ G.R. NO. L-6025, MAY 30, 1964

FACTS:

This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding, in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies. The appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings. The accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa, Jr. withdrew his appeal. Contributors:


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A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants-appelants are liable for the crime of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection under Art. 136 of the RPC?

HELD:

The court found defendants-appellants Hernandez, member of the Communist Party of the Philippines, President of the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its members, and others, guilty as principal of the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.

In the testimonies shown in court, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.

However, in their appeal, defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio.

But other defendants-appellants, namely, Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas, Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio were found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs.

Advocacy of Communism put into Action

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual Contributors:


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agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.

Legal considerations on the Appeal of the defendant-appellants

All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and one day of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.

Legal Considerations — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same. On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punish able by law.

LEGPHILO:

The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision reads:

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"ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection shall be punished, respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and by prision correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos."

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion, or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat; a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of the Supreme Court of the United States:

"In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly crimina l activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by this Court to be such a relationship . . .

"What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal organization, by that 'act' alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the k nowledge that others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever." (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)

The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of conditions of labor through his organization, the CLO. While the CLO, of which he is the founder and active president, has communist tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or against Contributors:


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Capitalism. The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance his political aspirations.

Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us, which would indicate that he had advocated action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders of the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to s how that he ever attended their meetings, or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others. It does not appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.

But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster the rebellion or the uprising.

IX. LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT

STA. MARIA VS. LOPEZ G.R. NO. L-30773, FEBRUARY 18, 1970

FACTS:

Directly under attack in this an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is the validity of the transfer of petitioner Felixberto C. Sta.Maria from his post of Dean, College of Education, University of the Philippines (UP), to the Office of respondent UP President Salvador P. Lopez, there to become Special Assistant in charge of public information and relations.

Petitioner, a professor of English and Comparative Literature (formerly Dean of the UP College in Baguio), was elected Dean of the College of Education on May 5, 1967 by the Board of Regents, on nomination of the UP President. His appointment as such Dean was for a five year term, "effective May 16, 1967 until May 17, 1972, unless sooner terminated, with all the rights and privileges as well as the duties and obligations attached to the

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position in accordance with the rules and regulations of the University and the Constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines.

In February 11, 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College of Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands having a bearing on the general academic program and the physical plant and services, with a cluster of special demands. In response, President Lopez created a committee which met with Sta. Maria regularly.

As a result of the dialogues and recommendations by Sta. Maria to the president, the students were not appeased. The students went on to boycott their classes which infected the other colleges and the newly installed members of the UP Student Council voted to support the education students‟ strike. Until the day that all academic activity in the

university came to a complete stand still so that the UP President called a meeting of the faculty of the College of Education. Those present gave him a vote of confidence (40 in favor, 7 abstained) to resolve the issue on hand as he sees fit.

Armed with the vote of confidence of the education faculty, President Lopez issued the transfer order herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. The order, addressed to Dean Sta. Maria and simultaneously appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as “acting Dean of the College of Education”, without additional co mpensation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the transfer of Sta. Maria constitutes removal.

HELD:

Yes. A transfer is a "movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary, without break in service." Promotion is the "advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary."

A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to "lure the employee away from his permanent position", cannot be done without the employee's consent. For that would constitute removal from office. Indeed, no permanent unless the officer or employee is transfer can take place unless the officer of the employee is first removed from the position held, and then appointed to another position. 1 2 e g a P

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When an officer is reduced in rank or grade and suffers a big cut in pay, he is demoted; and when he is demoted, he is removed from office. But a demotion means something more than a reduction in salary: there may be a demotion in the type of position though the salary may remain the same. A transfer that aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force resignation also is removal.

The transfer was a demotion. A demotion, because: First, Deanship in a university, being an academic position which requires learning, ability and scholarship, is more exalted than that of a special assistant who merely assists the President, as the title indicates. The special assistant does not make authoritative decisions. Second. The position of dean is a line position where the holder makes authoritative decisions in his own name and responsibility. A special assistant does not rise above the level of staff position. Third. The position of dean is created by law, the university charter, and cannot be abolished even by the Board of Regents. That of special assistant, upon the other hand, is not so provided by law; it was a creation of the university president.

It will not avail respondents any to say that Sta. Maria retained "the rank of Dean". In actual administrative practice, the terms "with rank of" dean is meaningless. He is no dean at all. He of course, basks, in the trappings of the dean. A palliative it could have been intended to be. But actually he is a dean without a college.

LEGPHILO:

But the respect due the integrity of the individual is by no means antithetical to the interests of society. On the contrary, one reinforces the other, as the philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr has so beautifully brought out in his book, "The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness." While bourgeois democracy, with its enshrining of the individual at the center stage of society, has now generally been replaced by a new social consciousness, its emphasis on liberty nevertheless contains an element of validity that transcends its excessive individualism. Perhaps it would be closer to the truth to say that the community requires liberty as much as does the individual and the individual requires community more than bourgeois thought c omprehended. As Dr. Niebuhr explains:

The man who searches after both meaning and fulfillments beyond the ambiguous fulfillments and frustrations of history exists in a height of spirit which no historical process can completely contain. This height is not irrelevant to the life of the community, because new richness and a higher possibility of justice come to the community from this height of awareness. But the height is destroyed by any community which seeks prematurely to cut off this pinnacle of individuality in the interest of the community's peace and order.

And what was the community interest involved here? If it was that of the community of students who massed in front of the University administration building, then it was obviously in their interest that the strike continued until the respondent Lopez yielded to their demand. If, on the other hand, it was that of the community of students who very much wanted to attend classes but were prevented from doing so, or that of the community of professors and other scholars who could not get inside the classrooms because they were barred by the demonstrating students, then the Contributors:


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protection of their rights is to be found in some solution of a police character and not in the summary removal of the petitioner. The issue would always thus narrow down to the vindication of a principle: the rational solution of any controversy.

Of more than passing relevance are these sentiments articulated by Dr. Sidney Hook of the Department of Philosophy of the New York University, a thoughtful commentator on the contemporary university scene: "Due process in the academic community is reliant up on the process of nationality it cannot be the same as due process in the political community as far as the mechanisms of determining the outcome of rational activity. For what controls the nature and direction of due process in the academic community is derived from its educational goal — the effective pursuit, discovery, publication, and teaching of the truth. In the political community all men are equal as citizens not only as participants in, and contributors to, the political process, but as voters and decision-makers on the primary level. Not so in the academic community. What qualifies a man to enjoy equal human or political rights does not qualify him to teach equally with others or even to study equally on every level. There is an authoritative, not authoritarian, aspect of the process of teaching and learning that depends not upon the person or power of the teacher, but upon the authority of his knowledge, the cogency of his method, the scope and depth of his experience. But whatever the differences in the power of making decisions flowing from legitimate differences in educational authority, there is an equality of learners, whether of teachers or students, in the rational processes by which knowledge is won, methods developed, and experience enriched."

And on the rule of reason in a liberal educational regimen, Professor Hook gives us pause with his incisive observations: "In a liberal educational regimen, everything is subject to the rule of reason, and all are equals as questioners and participants. Whoever interferes with academic due process either by violence or threat of violence places himself outside the academic community, and incurs the sanctions appropriate to the gravity of his offenses from censure to suspension to expulsion. The peculiar deficiency of the ritualistic liberal educational establishments is the failure to meet violations of rational due process with appropriate sanctions or to meet them in a timely and intelligent manner. There is a tendency to close an eye to expressions of lawless behavior on the part of students who, in the name of freedom, deprive their fellow students of the freedom to pursue their fell studies. It is as if the liberal administration sought to appease the challenge to its continued existence by treating such incidents as if they had never happened. ... There is no panacea that can be applied to all situations. It is not a question of a hard line or a soft line, but of an intelligent line. It is easy to give advice from hindsight, to be wise and cocksure after the event. But it is always helpful for the faculty to promulgate in advance fair guidelines for action, so that students will know what to expect. In general, no negotiations should be conducted under the threat of coercion, or when administrators or faculty are held captive." VARGAS vs. RILLORAZA G.R. No. L-1612. February 26, 1948 HILADO, J: FACTS:

Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Contributors:


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Judges to sit as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice. ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional. RULING:

No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional. Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court — as in this case — are replaced by judges of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for only one Supreme Court. Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the organic law. Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution. However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5). PERFECTO, J., concurring (Bernardo p. 45)

"According to Cicero 'in justice the brilliance of virtue is greater, and from her they receive their name just men' (De Ofic. 1. 1, tit. de Justitia); and Saint Thomas Aquinas maintains that 'justice excels all other moral virtues' and 'it is the most excellent among all other virtues' (Summa Theologica, Second Part, Cuestion XVIII, Article XII.) "Although the pseudo-progressives of new pattern, those intellectual renegades who spurn the wisdom of the ages, may not relish it, we have to quote from Aristotle that 'justice seems to be the most excellent virtue, and that neither the afternoon star nor the morning star inspires more admiration than her' (Ethics, 1. 5. c. 1), as 'the greatest virtues are necessarily those which are more useful to others, because virtue is a bene cent faculty' (Rhetor. 1, 1, c. 9). After all, those who look farther in the past will see better the future. Who can pull the farther back the string of a bow, he will send the arrow the farther. Robert Maynard Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago, one of the institutions which greatly contributed to the development of the atomic bomb, in the 1945 edition of his book 'The High Learning in America' could not avoid invoking several times the authority of the Stagirite. The Pleiad of great physicists who are responsible for the ushering of the Atomic Energy Era, the most revolutionary in the history of humanity — Becquerel, Curie, Hertz, Einstein, Bohr, Smyth, Rutherford, Meitner, Oppenheimer, and many others —

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themselves admitted that the ideas of Democritus and Aristotle on matter, on energy, on the elements of universe, expressed centuries before Christ, the philosopher's stone of the medieval alchemists, and the ideas of Galileo and Newton are direct progenitors and inspirers of the present concepts on matter and energy as the different expressions of the same thing and which permitted the discovery of that wonderful microcosmos where the constellations of electrons, protons, neutrons, deuterons, photons, alpha, beta and gamma rays, and other radiant particles are in play, offering to man the mastery it never had on physical nature with the harnessing of the basic forces of universe. "There are thoughts and ideas bequeathed to us by great thinkers which woolly mammoth, buried in the Russian tundras, which today can still be eaten, although the beasts died in the pre-historic darkness of remote antiquity. Those are the thoughts and ideas insuated with the vitality of eternal truth. They spring from the minds of the geniuses with which Nature, once in a while, blesses certain epochs, to be the intellectual leaders of mankind for all time. "The ignorants and retrogrades will never understand it; but it is a fact that in the summit of his glorious career, Justice Holmes, the greatest judge of modern times, continued reading Aristotle. To free themselves for the sorrows they feel with the surrounding market of vulgarity, where pygmies and riffraffs dominate, great minds seek enjoyment in the company of their kind. Eagles will not be happy in the society of fiies and mosquitoes. That explains the calibre of the friends Rizal had in Europe. "All these may sound esoteric to the unfortunate class of morons or mental degenerates. We cannot help it. Our words are addressed to persons with normal understanding. PERALTA vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS G.R. No. L-49. November 12, 1945 FERIA, J: FACTS:

William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused. ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a validity of the creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, and of the summary procedure adopted for that court 2. Whether or not the validity of the sentence which imprisonment during the Japanese military occupation; 3. if they were then valid, the effect on said punitive sentence of the reoccupation of the Philippines and the restoration therein of the Commonwealth Government RULING:

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1. The creation of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the summary procedure is valid. The existence of such court is to serve as a government instrumentality of the belligerent occupant, which in this case are the Japanese Imperial Army. It functions solely to apply the law to any case that falls within their jurisdiction. With regards to the summary of procedure adopted by the Special court, such procedure is also considered valid. An invader, the Japanese Army for this matter, can set up military courts and provide laws to ensure their safety and relations towards the inhabitants of the occupied territory to preserve public order. 2. The validity of the sentence that imposes life imprisonment depends on the competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate the penalties provided in Art. No. 65 of the National Assembly. In the present case, the sentence of life imprisonment is within the power and competence of the Japanese to promulgate such law. 3. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid by the principle of Postliminy. The sentence of life imprisonment is lifted and the writ of habeas corpus is granted. PERFECTO, J., concurring

THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED AS A MATTER OF ABSOLUTE RIGHT, TO IMMEDIATE RELEASE. After showing the absolute nullity of the judicial process under which petitioner has been convicted to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, the inevitable consequence is that he is entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to be immediately released, so that he can once again enjoy a life of freedom, which is the natural boon to law- abiding residents of our country, and of which he was unjustly deprived through means most abhorrent to human conscience. We must not hesitate for one moment to do our duty in this case. The sooner we comply with it, the better. The process and judgment under which petitioner has been convicted and is now undergoing an unjust imprisonment, is one of the hateful vestiges left in our country by the moral savagery of a people spiritually perverted and debased. The seriousness of this matter cannot be viewed with insouciance. We must not lose time to wipe out such vestiges if we must protect ourselves against their poisonous effects in our political, social and cultural patrimony. We must erase those vestiges if we want to keep immune from all germs of decay the democratic institutions which are the pride of our people and country, under which we are enjoying the blessings of freedom and with which we hope to assure the well-being and happiness of the unending generations who will succeed us in the enjoyment of the treasures accumulated by a bountiful nature in this Pearl of the Orient. If we allow such vestiges to remain we are afraid that some historian may write about Philippine democracy, Philippine race, and Philippine culture, what, on ancient art, Hegel said in the "Phenomenology of the Spirit", according to Kohler, the greatest work of genius that the nineteenth century has produced: The statutes set up are corpses in stone, whence the animating soul has flown; while the hymns of praise are words from which all belief has gone. The tables of the gods are bereft of spiritual food and drink, and from his game sand festivals, man no more receives the joyful sense of his unity with the Divine Being. The works of the muse lack the force and energy of the Spirit which derived the certainty and assurance of itself just from the crushing ruin of gods and men. They are themselves now just what they are for us — beautiful fruit broken off the tree, a kindly fate has passed on those works to us, as a maiden might offer such fruit off a tree. It is not their

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actual life as they exist, that is given us, not the tree that bore them, not the earth and the elements, which constituted their substance, nor the climate that determined their constitutive character, nor the change of seasons which controlled the process of their growth. So, too, it is not their living world that fate preserves and gives us with those works of ancient art, not the spring and summer of that ethical life in which they bloomed and ripened, but the veiled remembrance alone of this reality." We wish a way could be found to free completely our people of the sense of shame, which they cannot help feeling, engendered by members of our race who justified such abhorrent summary procedure and allowed themselves to become a party to the execution of a scheme only acceptable to the undeveloped mentalities of the dark ages. It is a shame that makes our blood boil when we think that countrymen of Father Gomez, of Rizal, of Mabini, could accept procedures representing the brutal ideology which is the very opposite of the humane, lofty, and dignified ideology that placed said heroes and martyrs among the purest and noblest specimens that humanity produced in all countries, in all time, and for all eons and light years to come. It is with joy and pride that we agree with all our brethren in unanimously granting petitioner the redress he seeks in his petition. ESTRADA vs. ESCRITOR A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003 PUNO, J: FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor‟s husband, who had lived with anot her woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah‟s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract

Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the

congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah‟s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since

1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio‟s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch

Tower Central Office. ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be foun d guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement. RULING:

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A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state in terests.

The state‟s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA‟s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent‟s plea of religious

freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent‟s position that her conjugal arrangement

is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent‟s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. VITUG, J.:, separate opinion

The Common Origin of Morality and the Law That law and morals are closely intertwined is a traditionally held belief. One school of thought even go as far as calling a law without morality as not law at all; but naked power, and that human beings not only have a legal, but also the moral obligation to obey the law.[8] It suggests that where law clashes with morality, it can impose no obligation, moral or otherwise, upon anyone to obey it; one may actually be morally bound to disobey such law.[9] The ancient role held by the Christian Church as being the ruler of both spiritual and temporal affairs of men has laid that groundwork for the impression. The Judaic-Christian God is thought to be the source of both law and morality and man has come to know of His law and morals through the human soul, the human conscience and the human mind.[10] With the rise of the secular state in the 16th and 17th centuries and the corresponding decline in the authority of the Church, legal thinkers such as Pufendorf, Vattel, and Burlamaqui would establish legal systems based on scientific principles deduced from the nature of men and things, that would guide the behavior of the metaphysical man in directions that promote political order and assure a measure of protected individual dignity. Such treatises on natural law have offered model political systems based on scientific principles logically deduced from the nature of man and the nature of things, serving to give a kind of scientific legitimacy to the newly formed nation states emerging in the 17th and 18th centuries under human sovereigns. Not surprisingly, sovereigns of that era promulgated natural law codes consisting of religious commandments, quasi-human moral values and civic virtues all couched in the language of legal proscriptions proclaimed and enforced by secular states. Human conduct

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condemned by God's law and forbidden by the sovereign's law would be said to be morally, as well as legally, reprehensible or malum in se. JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA G.R. NO. 136351; JULY 28, 1999 FACTS:

This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction questioning the resolution of the Comelec En Banc. The aforementioned resolution of the Comelec reversed and set aside the earlier resolution of the First Division of Comelec dated May 16, 1998 dismissing private respondent's petition to declare the substitution of Jose `Pempe' Miranda by petitioner as candidate for the City of Santiago's mayoralty post void. The Court found neither lack of jurisdiction nor grave abuse of discretion attended the annulment of the substitution and proclamation of petitioner. In particular, the Court ruled that the Comelec's action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound because herein petitioner cannot substitute a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been canceled and denied due course. Moreover, Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in resolving SPA No. 98-288 in favor of private respondent. However, the Court ruled that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the city board of Canvassers of Santiago to reconvene, prepare a new certificate of canvass and proclamation and proclaim the winning candidate among those voted upon because this was inconsistent with the ruling applied in the case of Labo vs. Comelec. Accordingly, the petition is partly denied, insofar as the Comelec ruling to annul the election and proclamation of petitioner is affirmed. The petition is, however, granted so as to modify the resolution of the Comelec in SPA No. 98-288 by deleting the portion directing the city board of canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning candidate from among those voted upon during the May 11, 1998 elections. ISSUE:

Whether the annulment of petitioner's substitution and proclamation was issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction HELD:

No. In Bautista vs. Comelec . This Court explicitly ruled that "a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy". A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all cannot, by a ny stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

CO CHAM vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH G.R. No. L-5; September 17, 1945 FACTS:

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continue hearings on the case, saying that a proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur had invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and, without an enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines (the Philippine government under the Japanese). ISSUES:

1. Whether or not judicial proceedings and decisions made during the Japanese occupation were valid and remained valid even after the American occupation; 2. Whether or not the October 23, 1944 proclamation M acArthur issued in which he declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the courts; 3. And whether or not if they were not invalidated by MacArthur‟s proclamation, those courts could continue hearing

the cases pending before them. HELD:

(1) Political and international law recognizes that all acts and proceedings of a de facto government are good and valid. The Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines under the Japanese occupation may be considered de facto governments, supported by the military force and deriving their authority from the laws of war. Municipal laws and private laws, however, usually remain in force unless suspended or changed by the conqueror. Civil obedience is expected even during war, for “the existence of a st ate of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. And if they were not valid, then it would not have been necessary for MacArthur to come out with a proclamation abrogating them. (2) IF, according to international law, non-political judgments and judicial proceedings of de facto governments are valid and remain valid even after the occupied territory has been liberated, then it could not have been MacArthur‟s

intention to refer to judicial processes, which would be in violation of international law. A well-known rule of statutory construction is: “A statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”

Another is that “where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.” (3) Since the laws remain valid, the court must continue hearing the case pending

TEODORO R. REGALA vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 105938, 108113; September 20, 1996 FACTS:

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PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was a client of their firm, as well as other information regarding Cojuangco. ISSUE:

Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its client‟s name? HELD: NO. As a matter of public policy, a client‟s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general is that a

lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client. The court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood. The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client. The privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. “A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is.” He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces. Except when 1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client‟s name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer‟s advice. 2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged. 3) Where the government‟s lawyers have no case against an attorney‟s client unless, by revealing the client‟s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime, the client‟s name is privileged. That client identity is

privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity for which the lawyer‟s legal advice was obtained.

PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO G.R. No. L-1800. January 27, 1948 FACTS:

An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon pre vious utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place. ISSUE:

Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

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HELD:

Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

HILADO, J., dissenting:

I may that in the instant case the constitutional rights of free speech, assmebly, and petition are not before the court but merely the privilege of petitioner and the Coalesced Minorities to exercise any or all of said rights by using Plaza Miranda, a public place under the complete control of the city government. In other words, when the use of public streets or places is involved, public convenience, public safety and public order take precedence over even particular civil rights. For if the citizen asserting the civil right were to override the right of the general public to the use of such streets or places, just because it is guaranteed by the constitution, it would be hard to conceive how upon the same principle that citizen be prevented from using the private property of his neighbor for the exercise of the asserted right. The constitution, in guaranteeing the right of peaceful assembly and petition, the right of free speech, etc., does not guarantee their exercise upon public places, any more than upon private premises, without government regulation in both cases, of the owners' consent in the second.. In Davis vs. Commonwealth, 167 U. S. 43, 42 Law. ed., 71, 72, the United States Supreme Court, in affirming the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of the latter tribunal, quoted from said decision as follows:. "...As representatives of the public it (legislature) may and does excercise control over the use which the public may make of such places (public parks and streets), and it may and does delegate more or less of such control to the city or town immediately concerned. For the legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of the member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it in his house. When no proprietary right interferes the legislature may end the right of the public to enter upon the public place by putting an end to the dedication to public uses. So it may take the lesser step of limiting the public use to certain purpos es. See Dill. Mun. Corp. secs. 393, 407, 651, 656, 666; Brooklyn Park Comrs. vs. Armstrong, 45 N. Y. 234, 243, 244 (6 Am. Rep. 70)....". ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

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Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused. The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses. Part icularly, this terms are:

combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law. ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of plunder as defined in R.A. No. 7080 is a malum prohibitum. HELD:

No. The Supreme Court held that plunder is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, the legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. The predicate crimes in the case of plunder involve acts which are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, and are committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally” by the offender, alleging his guilty knowledge. Thus, the crime of plunder is a malum in se.

JOHN STUART MILL , in his essay On Liberty , unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the

individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its c ollective wisdom and inflict punishment for non- observance. The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.

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Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." PADUA VS. ROBLES AND BAY TAXI CAB G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975 FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are the parents of a young boy who was struck by the taxi driven by Romeo N. Punzalan during the New Year‟s Day of 1969. Gregorio N. Robles, defendant, is the owner of the Bay Taxi Cab. Spouses

Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua filed up on CFI of Zambales and sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo filed up the same court, charged Punzalan of homicide through reckless imprudence. There were two separate liabilities: the civil liability arising from crime or culpa \criminal and the liability arising from civil negligence or so called culpa aquiliana. ISSUE: W/N the judgment in the criminal case includes a determination andadjudication of Punzalan‟s civil liability arising from his criminal act upon whichRobles‟ subsidiary civil responsibility may be based HELD:

YES. Paduas' complaint in civil case states a cause of action against Robles whose concommitant subsidiary respon sibility, per the judgment in criminalcase,subsists. The said judgment states no civil liability arising from the offense c harged againstPunzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, the court a quo, on the contrary,recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from theoffense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefore. Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offendedparty (or his heirs) has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an actionfor recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the CivilCode. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal section 1of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminalaction, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by theoffended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.It is immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the CivilCode, which action proved ineffectual. Allowance of the latter application involvesno violation of the proscription against double recovery of

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damages for the samenegligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan tosatisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the Paduas in the civil case The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which itapplies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil liability arising fromthe judgment against Punzalan in the criminal case. Indeed, by including suchstatement in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court intended to adoptthe same adjudication and award it made in the civil case as Punzalan's civil liability in the criminal case. FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out the decisive issue and how to resolve it to achieve the desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels concurrence. I do so. What is more, there is to my mind a distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which the novel question raised was settled. If the trend manifest in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be followed, then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims of vehicular accidents, unfortunately of rather frequent occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That dissipates whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view of certain traditional procedural concepts about the correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of those hard cases which, if an old law is to be believed, may result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out with great persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the successor in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men in the field H.L.A. Hart. 1 The more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the law and settled principles of adjudication may not clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on an argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the sociological school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to indicate in this brief concurrence, the decision reached by us is in consonance with either approach. With the natural law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on moral justice, I am comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision reached deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice, or social control. 1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint of a right either granted or recognized by law. As was so clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment assessed no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor." 2 There is much to be said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatsoever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Padua's right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O." 3 Whatever misgivings therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-O the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not suffice,

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to my mind, to render nugatory the admitted subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case No. 1158-O which is necessarily attendant upon the conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a difficulty could have been avoided had greater care been exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may be had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law from being rendered illusory in fact. 2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It would conduce to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if there be recognition in the codes of the right of next kin to damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives being snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what had been accurately described as dealers of death on the road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure that it is nothing more than a barren form of words. This is what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as distinguished from law in action. To recall an expression from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent bequest in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay. The obvious answer is:' With what?" This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly lends itself to ambiguity considering the facts disclosed and found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the imposition of liability on the offending taxicab company. There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not place such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old boy being hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this tragedy could have been avoided. To say now that doubts engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit could nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary liability of the employer in the criminal case finding the accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious consequences. The party just as much responsible for the mishap, with his operation of the transportation service, would be absolved from liability. It need not be so, but certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful, not excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling public, it could be a green light for less vigilance over the conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety is not hard to imagine. Moreover, from the standpoint of the feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important a policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left unexplored to mitigate the harshness of fate. To paraphrase Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire world to compensate the parents for the loss of their child. 4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full concurrence.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, Maj. General Josephus Ramas et al GR No. 104768, July 21, 2003

FACTS:

The AFP Anti-Graft Board was created by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel. Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Ramas and his alleged mistress Elizabeth Dimaano. The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture against Ramas, but the same was amended to implead Dimaano as co-defendant. After so many postponements due to inability of petitioner to show further evidence, private respondents filed their motion to dismiss based on Republic vs. Migrino. In the Migrino case, the Court held that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos. The Sandiganbayan Contributors:


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dismissed the amended complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Dimaano. It remanded the records of the case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants and also referred the case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Dimaano. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review seeking to set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction to investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379. Whether or not it was proper to dismiss the case before the presentation of evidence and as to the legality of the search and seizure.

HELD:

NO. The Supreme Court affirmed the questioned resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The Court ruled that the PCGG had no jurisdiction to investigate Ramas as he was not a "subordinate" of President Marcos as contemplated under EO No. 1, which created PCGG. Mere position held by a military does not make him a "subordinate" as this term was used in EO No. 1, absent any showing that he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. The Court disagreed with the petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before the completion of the presentation of petitioner's evidence. According to the Court, the petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence; however, it still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete presentation of its evidence. The Court also ruled that the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized the subject items. The search warrant did not particularly describe the items seized. The seizure of these items was therefore, void, and unless these items are contraband per se, which they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding team seized them. PHILOSOPHICAL REFERENCE:

II. Natural Law and Natural Rights As early as the Greek civilization, man has alluded to a higher, natural standard or law to which a state and its laws must conform. Sophocles unmistakably articulates this in his poignant literary piece, Antigone. In this mid-fifth century Athenian tragedy, a civil war divided two brothers, one died defending Thebes, and the other, Polyneices, died attacking it. The king forbade Polyneices' burial, commanding instead that his body be left to be devoured by beasts. But according to Greek religious ideas, only a burial — even a token one with a handful of earth — could give repose to his soul. Moved by piety, Polyneices' sister, Antigone, disobeyed the command of the king and buried the body. She was arrested. Brought before the king who asks her if she knew of his command and why she disobeyed, Antigone replies: ". . . These laws were not ordained of Zeus, And she who sits enthroned with gods below, Justice, enacted not these human laws. Nor did I deem that thou, a mortal man, Couldst by a breath annul and override The immutable Contributors:


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unwritten laws of heaven. They were not born today nor yesterday; They die not; and none knoweth whence they sprang."

Antigone was condemned to be buried alive for violating the order of the king. Aristotle also wrote in his Nicomachean Ethics: "Of political justice part is natural, part legal — natural, that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal, that which is originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down is not indifferent, e.g. that a prisoner's ransom shall be mina, or that a goat and not two sheep shall be sacrificed, and again all the laws that are passed for particular cases, . . ." Aristotle states that "(p)articular law is that which each community lays down and applies to its own members: this is partly written and partly unwritten. Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as everyone to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other. It is this that Sophocles' Antigone clearly means when she says that the burial of Polyneices was a just act in spite of the prohibition: she means that it was jus t by nature."

Later, the Roman orator Cicero wrote of natural law in the first century B.C. in this wise:

"True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrongdoing by its prohibitions. And it does not lay its commands or prohibitions upon good men in vain, though neither have any effect on the wicked. It is a sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and at all times, and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. Whoever is disobedient is fleeing from himself and denying his human nature, and by reason of this very fact he will suffer the worst penalties, even if he escapes what is commonly considered punishment." This allusion to an eternal, higher, and universal natural law continues from classical antiquity to this day. The face of natural law, however, has changed throughout the classical, medieval, modern, and contemporary periods of his tory.

In the medieval times, shortly after 1139, Gratian published the Decretum, a collection and reconciliation of the canon laws in force, which distinguished between divine or natural law and human law. Similar to the writings of the earliest Church Fathers, he related this natural law to the Decalogue and to Christ's commandment of love of one's neighbor. "The law of nature is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel, by which everyone is commanded to do unto others as he would wish to be done unto him, and is prohibited from doing unto others that which he would be unwilling to be done unto himself." This natural law precedes in time and rank all things, such that statutes whether ecclesiastical or secular, if contrary to law, were to be held null and void.

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The following century saw a shift from a natural law concept that was revelation-centered to a concept related to man's reason and what was discoverable by it, under the influence of Aristotle's writings which were coming to be known in the West. William of Auxerre acknowledged the human capacity to recognize good and evil and God's will, and made reason the criterion of natural law. Natural law was thus id quod naturalis ratio sine omni deliberatione aut sine magna dictat esse faciendum or "that which natural reason, without much or even any need of reflection, tells us what we must do." Similarly, Alexander of Hales saw human reason as the basis for recognizing natural law and St. Bonaventure wrote that what natural reason commands is called the natural law. By the thirteenth century, natural law was understood as the law of right reason, coinciding with the biblical law but not derived from it.

Of all the medieval philosophers, the Italian St. Thomas Aquinas is indisputably regarded as the most important proponent of traditional natural law theory. He created a comprehensive and organized synthesis of the natural law theory which rests on both the classical (in particular, Aristotelian philosophy) and Christian foundation, i.e., on reason and revelation. His version of the natural law theory rests on his vision of the universe as governed by a single, self-consistent and overarching system of law under the direction and authority of God as the supreme lawgiver and judge. Aquinas defined law as "an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated." There are four kinds of laws in his natural law theory: eternal, natural, human, and divine.

First, eternal law. To Aquinas, a law is a dictate of practical reason (which provides practical directions on how one ought to act as opposed to "speculative reason" which provides propositional knowledge of the way things are) emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Presupposing that Divine Providence rules the universe, and Divine Providence governs by divine reason, then the rational guidance of things in God the Ruler of the universe has the nature of a law. And since the divine reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, this kind of law is called eternal law. In other words, eternal law is that law which is a "dictate" of God's reason. It is the external aspect of God's perfect wisdom, or His wisdom applied to His creation. Eternal law consists of those principles of action that God implanted in creation to enable each thing to perform its proper function in the overall order of the universe. The proper function of a thing determines what is good and bad for it: the good consists of performing its function while the bad c onsists of failing to perform it.

Then, natural law. This consists of principles of eternal law which are specific to human beings as rational creatures. Aquinas explains that law, as a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, it can be in him that rules and measures; and in another way, in that which is ruled and measured since a thing is ruled and measured in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Thus, since all things governed by Divine Providence are regulated and measured by the eternal law, then all things partake of or participate to a certain extent in the eternal law; they receive from it certain inclinations towards their proper actions and ends. Being rational, however, the participation of a human being in the Divine Providence, is most excellent because he participates in providence itself, providing for himself and others. He participates in eternal reason itself and through this, he possesses a natural inclination to right action and right end. This participation of the rational creature in the eternal law is called natural law. Hence, the psalmist says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, thus implying that the light of natural reason, by which we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else Contributors:


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than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law." 22 In a few words, the "natural law is a rule of reason, promulgated by God in man's nature, whereby man can discern how he should act."

Through natural reason, we are able to distinguish between right and wrong; through free will, we are able to choose what is right. When we do so, we participate more fully in the eternal law rather than being merely led blindly to our proper end. We are able to choose that end and make our compliance with eternal law an act of self-direction. In this manner, the law becomes in us a rule and measure and no longer a rule and measure imposed from an external source. The question that comes to the fore then is what is this end to which natural law directs rational creatures? The first self-evident principle of natural law is that "good is to be pursued and done, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precept of the natural law as something to be done or avoided." Because good is to be sought and evil avoided, and good is that which is in accord with the nature of a given creature or the performance of a creature's proper function, then the important question to answer is what is human nature or the proper function of man. Those to which man has a natural inclination are naturally apprehended by reason as good and must thus be pursued, while their opposites are evil which must be avoided. Aquinas identifies the basic inclinations of man as follows:

1. To seek the good, including his highest good, which is eternal happiness with God. 2. To preserve himself in existence. 3. To preserve the species — that is, to unite sexually. 4. To live in community with other men. 5. To use his intellect and will — that is, to know the truth and to make his own decision." 28 As living creatures, we have an interest in self-preservation; as animals, in procreation; and as rational creatures, in living in society and exercising our intellectual and spiritual capacities in the pursuit of knowledge." God put these inclinations in human nature to help man achieve his final end of eternal happiness. With an understanding of these inclinations in our human nature, we can determine by practical reason what is good for us and what is bad. In this sense, natural law is an ordinance of reason. Proceeding from these inclinations, we can apply the natural law by deduction, thus: good should be done; this action is good; this action shou ld therefore be done. Concretely, it is good for humans to live peaceably with one another in society, thus this dictates the prohibition of actions such as killing and stealing that harm society.

From the precepts of natural law, human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determinations or specialized regulations to declare what is required in particular cases considering society's specific circumstances. These particular determinations, arrived at by human reason, are called human laws ( Aquinas' positive law). They are necessary to clarify the demands of natural law. Aquinas identifies two ways by which something may be derived Contributors:


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from natural law: first, like in science, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from principles; and second, as in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details like the craftsman determining the general form of a house to a particular shape. Thus, according to Aquinas, some things are derived from natural law by way of conclusion (such as "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man") while some are derived by way of determination (such as the law of nature has it that the evildoer should be punished, but that he be punished in this or that way is not directly by natural law but is a derived determination of it). Aquinas says that both these modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things derived as a conclusion are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but having some force also from the natural law. But those things which are derived in the second manner have no other force than that of human law. Finally, there is divine law which is given by God, i.e., the Old Testament and the New Testament. This is necessary to direct human life for four reasons. First, through law, man is directed to proper actions towards his proper end. This end, which is eternal happiness and salvation, is not proportionate to his natural human power, making it necessary for him to be directed not just by natural and human law but by divinely given law. Secondly, because of uncertainty in human judgment, different people form different judgments on human acts, resulting in different and even contrary laws. So that man may know for certain what he ought to do and avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a God-given law for it is certain that such law cannot err. Thirdly, human law can only judge the external actions of persons. However, perfection of virtue consists in man conducting himself right in both his external acts and in his interior motives. The divine law thus supervenes to see and judge both dimensions. Fourthly, because human law cannot punish or forbid all evils, since in aiming to do away with all evils it would do away with many good things and would hinder the advancement of the common good necessary for human development, divine law is needed. For example, if human law forbade backbiting gossip, in order to enforce such a law, privacy and trust that is necess ary between spouses and friends would be severely restricted. Because the price paid to enforce the law would outweigh the benefits, gossiping ought to be left to God to be judged and punished. Thus, with divine law, no evil would remain unforbidden and unpunished.

Aquinas' traditional natural law theory has been advocated, recast and restated by other scholars up to the

contemporary period. But clearly, what has had a pervading and lasting impact on the Western philosophy of law and government, particularly on that of the United States of America which heavily influenced the Philippine system of government and constitution,is the modern natural law theory.

In the traditional natural law theory, among which was Aquinas', the emphasis was placed on moral duties of man — both rulers and subjects — rather than on rights of the individual citizen. Nevertheless, from this medieval theoretical background developed modern natural law theories associated with the gradual development in Europe of modern secular territorial state. These theories increasingly veered away from medieval theological trappings and gave particular emphasis to the individual and his natural rights.

X. POSTMODERNISM AND THE FUTURE OF LAW

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Feminism On Women’s Rights and Domicile MARCOS V. COMELEC FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Paul‟s Colleg e now Divine Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a “Petition for Cancellation and Disqualifi cation" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoner‟s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of

7 months residency in the district for the following reasons: 1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda‟s domicile of origin by operation of law when

her father brought them to Leyte;

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2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. 3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband‟s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium. 4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother‟s house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention clearly

manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones. WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

DOCTRINE: (separate opinion) ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men. Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind; foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the law; whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers. Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The Contributors:


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wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. With respect to her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental authority over their children. Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave. All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of y ears evoked no protest from them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied) It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." (Emphasis supplied). CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human p erson and guarantees full respect for human rights" and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile ; concomitant to the spouses' being jointly re sponsible for the support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; the administration and the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child and several others.

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Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are: (1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as men; (2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; (3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and (4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under the sun. In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless? I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.

ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS OF UNBORN GENERATIONS OPOSA V. FACTORAN FACTS:

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A taxpayer‟s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa , et al., representing their generation and generations

yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. 2.

Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country; Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintif fs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country‟s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore

areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor‟s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. Contributors:


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DOCTRINE : (as provided in the readings)

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question: MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution? MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful ( sic ) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12 The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following s tatement of policy: Contributors:


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Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy . — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads: Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy . — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations. (2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides: Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources. Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the po wers and functions of the DENR. It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an Contributors:


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environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

THE QUASI-SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION OF HOMOSEXUALS ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC FACTS:

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT (lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgender) community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections . Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner‟s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on

moral grounds that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs, and advocates sexual immorality. Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it “or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.” Furthermore, states COMELEC, Ang Ladlad will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith. When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, COMELEC still, on December 16, 2010, upheld the First

Assailed Resolution. On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad a Petition, praying that the Supreme Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010. ISSUES: 1.

Whether or not the denial of accreditation by COMELEC, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma.

2.

Whether or not the Assailed Resolutions contravened the constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, of Ang Ladlad , as well as constituted violations of the Philippines‟ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

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HELD:

1. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental r eliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” The Supreme Court ruled that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad . Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. The government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. 2. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad . Even the Office of the Solicitor General agrees that “there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group‟s members have committed or are committing immoral acts.” Respondent have failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means. Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Absent of any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or the Supreme Court, to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors. This is in accord with the country‟s international obligations to protect and promote human rights. The principle of nondiscrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR should be recognized. The Constitution and laws should be applied uninfluenced by public opinion. True democracy should be resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate due to conflicting opinions. The Petition was GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) was SET ASIDE and the COMELEC was directed to GRANT petitioner‟s application for party-list accreditation. DOCTRINE: (separate concurring opinion)

PUNO, C.J.:

xxx The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government need only show that the challenged classification is rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest.

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I humbly submit, however, that a classification based on gender or sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect classification, as to trigger a heightened level of review. xxx If a legislative classification disadvantages a suspect class or impinges upon the exercise of a fundamental right, then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.[31] Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for equal protection purposes include classifications based on race, religion, alienage, national origin, and ancestry.[32] The underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken down.[33] In such a case, the State bears a heavy burden of justification, and the government action will be closely scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose.[34] On the other hand, if the classification, while not facially invidious, nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a quasi-suspect class, it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review.[35] To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.[36] Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.[37] If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be tested for mere rationality.[38] This is a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Courts awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one .[39] The presumption is in favor of the classification, of the reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if any such grounds exist, on which the State acted.[40] Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative classifications warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the United States Supreme Court has looked to four factors,[41] thus: (1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by the legislation;[42] (2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a typical class member's ability to contribute to society;[43] (3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is immutable or beyond the class members' control;[44] and (4) The political power of the subject class.[45]

These factors, it must be emphasized, are not constitutive essential elements of a suspect or quasisuspect class, as to individually demand a certain weight.[46] The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a flexible manner; it has neither required, nor even discussed, every factor in every case.[47] Indeed, no single

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talisman can define those groups likely to be the target of classifications offensive to the equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scr utiny; experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide.[48] In any event, the first two factors history of intentional discrimination and relationship of classifying characteristic to a person's ability to contribute have always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied.[49] They have been critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group is a suspect or quasi-suspect class.[50] However, the last two factors immutability of the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group are considered simply to supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny exists.[51] Guided by this framework, and considering further that classifications based on sex or gender albeit on a male/female, man/woman basis have been previously held to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classification on the basis of sexual orientation ( i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect classification that prompts intermediate review. The first consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of purposeful unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation.[52] One cannot, in good faith, dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been, and continue to be, the target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual orientation.[53]Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration for party-list ac creditation in fact state: 6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence perpetuated against the LGBT Community, among which are: (a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of behavior; (b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch lesbians to be raped[, so as] to cure them into becoming straight women; (c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school, NGOs, and choirs because of their identity; (d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused admission from (sic) certain schools, are suspended or are automatically put on probation; (e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work benefits once ones sexual orientation and gender identity is (sic) revealed; (f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age, are broken up by their parents or guardians using the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw; (g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on gays and lesbians to reform them; (h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric counseling and therapy to cure them[,] despite the de-listing (sic) of homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; (i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-identity as women and dress as such, are denied entry or services in certain restaurants and establishments; and (j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against gay men, but were not acknowledged by police as hate crimes or violent acts of bigotry.

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7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testified that as a young gay person in the Philippines, he was subjected to a variety of sexual abuse and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could not report to [the] police [or speak of] to his own parents. Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden placed on lesbian and gay people as a class is more likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.[54] A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to the persons ability to contribute to society.[55] Heightened scrutiny is applied when the classification bears no relationship to this ability; the existence of this factor indicates the classification is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice.[56] Insofar as sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health,[57] viz .: The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a person 's ability to participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts have acknowledged, as well. x x x If homosexuals were afflicted with some sort of impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire phenomenon of staying in the [c]loset and of coming out would not exist; their impediment would betray their status. x x x In this critical respect, gay persons stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-suspect class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in society.[58] Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, homosexuality bears no relation at all to [an] individual's ability to contribute fully to society .[59] Indeed, because an individual's homosexual orientation implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities;[60] the observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national origin -all suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional protection- are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy [61] is no less applicable to gay persons. (italics supplied)

Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to perform and contribute to society than is heterosexual orientation.[62] A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members of a class are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is whether the attribute or c haracteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or otherwise beyond their control.[63] Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay persons from others and qualifies them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism, namely, their attraction to persons of the same sex.[64] Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because the inability of a person to change a characteristic that is used to justify different treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather basic concept

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of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility .[65] However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not reserved to those instances in which the trait defining the burdened class is absolutely impossible to change.[66] That is, the immutability prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is satisfied when the identifying trait is so central to a person's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it].[67] Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity.[68] Consequently, because sexual orientation may be altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individuals sense of self, classifications based thereon are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable characteristic.[69] Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type of human trait that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or susceptible to self-help.[70] The final factor that bears consideration is whether the group is a minority or politically powerless.[71] However, the political powerlessness factor of the level-of-scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political powerlessness.[72] Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be whether the group lacks sufficient political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination through traditional political means.[73] Applying this standard, it would not be difficult to conclude that gay persons are entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress.[74] The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and severe even though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or perform in society that it is highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will suffice to eliminate that discrimination.[75] Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT community plays a role in the political process, it is apparent that their numbers reflect their status as a small and insular minority.[76] It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgenders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and stereotyping.[77] In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected [78] (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based classification undertaken for its own sake cannot survive.[79]

Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385 [December 6, 2000], 400 PHIL 904-1115 FACTS:

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This is a suit for prohibition and mandamus assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous People's Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Court en banc deliberated on the petition and the v otes gathered were equally divided with no majority vote obtained. Seven (7) members voted to dismiss the petition. Seven (7) other members voted to grant the petition. After redeliberation, the voting remained the same (7 to 7). Thus, the petition, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, was dismissed. Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People‟s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulation s (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State‟s ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution? HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

OCA vs Judge Floro FACTS:

It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations, suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge. Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floro's appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City, on 4 November 1998. Upon Judge Floro's personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999. After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-

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Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against him. In a Resolution 4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, as reported by the audit team Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative charges against him." He was barely eight months into his position. On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth both affirmative and negative defenses 6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on 26 August 1999. On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case for failure to prosecute. 7 However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez. 8 Subsequently, on 7 July 2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice Ramirez as investigator 9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11 July 2000. 10 Judge Floro's motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On 27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirez's inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 14 On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to comment on Judge Floro's motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should be denied. Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73. In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he perceived to have connived to boot him out of office. On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven, be dismissed. 25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.

HELD:

A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988

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Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge "h" is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit. Judge Floro's separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. As Judge Floro's separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled corporations. In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him to dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floro's favor that the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro's assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work environment. Thus: a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self-orga nization." 149 b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150 c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena . . . not detrimental to his role as a lawyer." 151 d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in moderate proficiency . . . . His concern for the details that make up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152 e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153 Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of endeavor. Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro's current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition. Finally, if Judge Floro's mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse environment — factors they have no control over.

Imbong vs Ochoa GR. NO. 204819 FACTS:

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Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. The RH Law violates the right to free speech. The RH Law is “void -for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one‟s family protected by the Constitution SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the: Right to life,Right to health,Freedom of religion and right to free speech,Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy),Freedom of expression and academic freedom,Due process clause,Equal protection clause,Prohibition against involuntary servitude HELD:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL: 1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s; 2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs. 3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse; 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures. 5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her religious beliefs;

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6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs; 7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; 8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional. LEGAL PHILO:

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable. At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor. POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medicallysafe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State. In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other. As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial

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