Adasa v. Abalos
Feb. 19, 2007 Chico-Nazario, J.:
Facts: Respondent alleged that petitioner, through deceit, received and encashed 2 checks issued in the name of respondent without his knowledge and consent and that despite repeated demands by the respondent, petitioner failed and refused to pay the proceeds of the checks. Petitioner filed a counter-affidavit admitting that she received and encashed the 2 checks. Then she alleged in a Supplemental affidavit claiming that it was instead Bebie Correa who received the 2 checks, but that Correa had already left the country. On April 2001, the City Prosecutor of Iligan ordered the filing of 2 separate Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document by a Private Individual. Consequently, Consequently, 2 separate criminal cases were filed against petitioner. This instant petition concerns only one of these criminal cases (Criminal Case No. 8782). The trial court then issued an order directing the Office of the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. reinvestigation. Afterwards, they issued a resolution affirming the finding of probable cause against petitioner. During her arraignment, petitioner entered an unconditional plea of not guilty. The, she filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ, with regard to the findings of the Office of the City Prosecutor. DOJ reversed and set aside the resolution and directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the Information for Estafa against petitioner. Said Officed filed a “Motion to Withdraw Information”. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that “DOJ should have dismissed outright the petition for review since Sec. 7 of DOJ Circular NO. 70 mandates that when an accused has already been arraigned and the aggrieved party files a petition for review before the DOJ, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead deny it outright.” On Feb. 2003, the trial court granted petitioner’s “Motion to Withdraw Information” and dismissed Criminal Criminal Case No. 8782. No action was taken by respondent respondent regarding this. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals regarding the DOJ resolution. CA granted the petition and reversed the resolution of the DOJ. CA ruled that “since petitioner was arraigned before she filed the petition for review with the DOJ, it was imperative for the DOJ to dismiss such petition,” that “when petitioner pleaded to the charge, she was deemed to have waived her right to reinvestigation and right o question any irregularity that surrounds it,” and that
“the order of the trial court dismissing the case pursuant to the assailed resolutions of the DOJ did not render the petition moot and academic.” Since the trial court’s order rested solely on the resolutions, it is void since it violated the rules which enjoins the trial court to assess the evidence presented before it in a motion to dismiss and not to rely solely on the prosecutor’s averment that the Secretary of Justice had recommended the dismissal. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, on the grounds that 1) the language of Sec. 7 and 12 of Circular No. 70 is permissive and directory such that the Secretary of Justice may entertain an appeal despite the fact that the accused had been arraigned; and that the contemporaneous construction by the Secretary of Justice be given great weight and respect. CA stood by its decision, construing Sec. 7 side by side with Sec. 12 and attempted to reconcile them. It stated that the word “shall not” in par. 2, sentence 1 of Sec. 7 denotes a positive prohibition. It renders the provision mandatory, meaning that the Secretary of Justice had no other course of action but to deny or dismiss a petition before him when arraignment of an accused had already taken place prior to the filing of the petition for review. Sec. 12, which read that “the Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed resolution”, should be read together with Sec. 7. Together, they meant that when an accused was already arraigned when the aggrieved party files a petition for review, the Secretary of Justice cannot, and should not take cognizance of the petition, or even give due course thereto, but instead dismiss or deny it outright.”CA added that “may” in Sec. 12 should be read as “shall” or “must” since such construction is necessary to give effect to the apparent intention of the rule. As to the other grounds presented by petitioner, CA found them to be erroneous/without merit/without evidence. Petitioner remained unconvinced and thus filed this current petition. Issue: Can the DOJ give due course to an appeal or petition for review despite its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned? Held: NO. Petition denied. Decision of the CA is affirmed. Reasoning:
1) Petitioner contends that yes, DOJ can give due course to an appeal despite its having been filed after the accused had already been arraigned. Petitioner relied on statements from other cases, Crespo v. Mogul, and Roberts v. CA, and Marcelo v. CA, all of which basically stated that it was still within the discretion of the DOJ to decide what to do with petitions presented to it, regardless of whether it was done before or after an arraignment. -
The Court is unconvinced by this argument. It states that the cases cited aren’t really talking about the same issue as the current case and that the given circumstances aren’t the same.
2) Petitioner asserts that the CA interpretation of the DOJ Circular violated 3 basic rules of statutory construction. 1) That the provision that appears last in the order of
position in the rule or regular must prevail, 2) that contemporaneous construction of a statute or regulation by the officers who enforce it should be given great weight, 3) that the word “shall” had been construed as a permissive, and not a mandatory language (from Agpalo’s Statutory Construction). -
Court cites the rule that “when a statute or rules is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted to”. Since Sec. 7 clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary.
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Court states that Petitioner’s reliance on the aforementioned 1 st violated principle is not applicable because there is no irreconcilable conflict between Sec. 7 and Sec. 12 of the DOJ Circular No. 70. o
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Sec. 7 states that “If an information is filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.” Sec. 12 states that “He (Secretary of Justice) may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the ff. grounds: e) That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken.
- Sec. 7 pertains to the action that the DOJ must take, while Sec. 12 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition for review or of an appeal - Sec. 7 specifically applies to a situation on what the DOJ must do when confronted with an appeal or a petition for review that is either clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an accused has already been arraigned. - Sec. 12 applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the DOJ may reverse, modify, affirm or dismiss the appealed resolution. The grounds are provided for in Sec. 12 as to the dismissal of an appeal. - The DOJ, noting that the arraignment of an accused prior to the filing of an appeal or petition is a ground for dismissal under Sec. 12, must go back to Sec. 7 and act as mandated therein. Thus, it must not give due course to, and must necessarily dismiss the appeal. 3) Petitioner relies on the principle of contemporaneous construction
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However, Court affirmed CA reasoning that “contemporaneous construction by the officers charged with the enforcement of the rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the latter’s construction of such rules and
regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction necessarily controlling or binding. Equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously given the statute a different interpretation.” Also that “If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared null and void.” 4) Petitioner contends that Sec. 12 is permissive and thus the mandate in Sec. 7 is a transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ. He cites a passage from Agpalo’s Statutory Construction which did not use “shall” as mandatory.
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However, the cited passage was connected to certain conditions (subject to availability, etc). No such conditions are found in Sec. 7 and hence, “shall” remains mandatory. - CA reasoning: “If the intent of the Dept. Circular No. 70 were to give the Secretary of Justice a discretionary power to dismiss or to entertain a petition for review despite its being outrightly dismissible, the result would not only be incongruous but also irrational and even unjust. For then, the action of the Secretary of Justice of giving due course to the petition would serve no purpose and would only allow a great waste of time. Also, giving said section a directory application would not only subvert the objectives of the circular, but also render its other mandatory provisions nugatory.”
5) Petitioner contends that the issue of whether the DOJ rightfully acted had been rendered moot and academic by the order of dismissal of the trial court. - Trial court dismissed the case precisely because of the Resolutions of the DOJ, after it had, in grave abuse of discretion, took cognizance of the petition for review. Thus, having been rendered in grave abuse, the Resolutions of the DOJ are void. The order of dismissal of the trial court, pursuant to the void resolutions, is likewise void.
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Rule is “that a void judgment is a complete nullity and without legal effect, and that all proceedings or actions founded thereon are themselves regarded as invalid and ineffective for any purpose.” 6) Petitioner asserts that Sec. 7 of said Circular applies only to appeals from original resolution of the City Prosecutor and does not apply in this case.
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Sec. 7 does not give a qualification to limit its application to appeals from original resolutions. - Rule is that “when the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.” 7) Petitioner asserts that her arraignment was null and void
- Contention is without merit because the arraignment was without any restriction, condition, or reservation. - Rule is that “when an accused pleads to the charge, he is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.” - In this case, when petitioner unconditionally pleaded to the charge, she effectively waived the reinvestigation of the case by the Prosecutor as well as the right to appeal the result thereof to the DOJ Secretary
