Allado v. Diokno
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994 Facts:
The crime alleged to petitioner Allado and Mendoza, by the PACC [Presidential Anti-Crime Commission], is heinous crime of kidnapping with murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national, who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice. o Other incidental crimes charged were illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, carnapping, and usurpation of authority. The whole investigation was triggered by an extrajudicial confession by a Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary. o Based on the confession of Umbal, Judge Barrios of RTC Br 11 issued a search warrant against petitioners. For the institution of criminal proceedings the DOJ took over the case, after a new panel of prosecutors were recommended and after preliminary investigation found probable cause that accused committed the crime and submitted the case for trial which was assigned to Judge Diokno of Br 62. Judge Diokno after finding probable cause issued warrant of arrest.
Issue: WON the judge erred in finding probable cause issuing the search warrant. Ruling: Yes, there is no probable cause in this case. The probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. There is serious doubt on Van Twest’s reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. We are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin, decided ninety-two years ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved. In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge.
The preliminary investigation proper – whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is a function of the prosecutor The extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In Lim v. Felix, where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal’s bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge’s personal examination of the report and its annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge’s examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor’s certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court’s probing questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
PEOPLE V. DEQUINA, G.R. No. 177570 January 19, 2011
Accused-appellants Nelida D. Dequina (Dequina), Joselito J. Jundoc (Jundoc), and Nora C. Jingabo (Jingabo) were charged with Violations of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Police Officer III Wilfredo Masanggue testified that he and SPO1 Anthony Blanco were instructed by their superior, Chief Inspector Romulo Sapitula to proceed at the corner of Juan Luna and Raxabago Sts., Tondo, Manila, where, according to the report given by the informant, three persons – a male and two female[s] would be coming from Baguio City to deliver unknown quantity of marijuana. After they arrived at the designated area, they parked their vehicle along Juan Luna near Raxabago Street. Then they waited. Suddenly, they noticed the arrival of a taxicab from where three persons – a man and two women – alighted. Each of them was carrying a bag. The trio fitted the descriptions given to them. She dropped the black bag she was carrying and the same was unzipped. The contents thereof consisting of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in transparent plastic bags came into view. They arrested the three suspects later identified as the accused herein and boarded them into their car. While on board the vehicle, [Dequina] and [Jundoc] confessed that the contents of the other two bags confiscated from them were also marijuana. Thus they were arrested.
DEFENSE: she transported the marijuana under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand, claim that they went along to accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend. RATIO: The accused-appellants were charged with and convicted of the offense of illegal transport of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
There is no question that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants and the warrantless seizure of the marijuana were valid and legal. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.[13] It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[14] Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.[15] On the other hand, Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances:
a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b)
When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c)
When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
“Transport” as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act is defined to mean “to carry or convey from one place to another.”[16] The evidence in this case shows that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
carrying/transporting dried marijuana leaves in their traveling bags. PO3 Masanggue and SPO1 Blanco need not even open Dequina’s traveling bag to determine its content because when the latter noticed the police officers’ presence, she walked briskly away and in her hurry, accidentally dropped her traveling bag, causing the zipper to open and exposed the dried marijuana bricks therein. Since a crime was then actually being committed by the accusedappellants, their warrantless arrest was legally justified, and the following warrantless search of their traveling bags was allowable as incidental to their lawful arrest. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although the same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.[21] Thus, as found by the RTC, conspiracy by and among accused-appellants was present in this case, as it may be inferred from the following acts of accused-appellants:
This was shown when by their account, the three accused left Iloilo together, stayed in Manila for a while, left for Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga and returned to Manila thereafter. They were together when the apprehending police officers pounced on them near the pier premises on their way back to Iloilo, each of them carrying a travelling bag which contained marijuana. x x x.
People vs. Ng Yi Bun, GR 180452 (2011) FACTS: Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province.
Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a Philippine National Police detachment, and, along with the operative, the team then proceeded to the said place.
They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van.
Capt. Ibon asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles (bihon) were also found on the premises.
An Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In CA they questioned whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a valid search and arrest despite the absence of a warrant. CA affirmed RTC decision.
ISSUE: WHETHER THERE IS A VALID SEARCH AND ARREST DUE TO ABSENCE OF A WARRANT? YES. RATIO: In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accusedappellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.
Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accusedappellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. o Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants––who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended--––is valid.
When a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view.
o As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting officers. o Accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue before entering their plea.
Abraham Miclat vs. People, GR 176077 (2011) FACTS:
Petitioner Abraham C. Miclat, Jr. was charged for Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, illegal possession (shabu).
P/Insp. Jose Valencia received an INFOREP Memo from Camp Crame relative to the illicit and down-right drug-trading activities being undertaken along Caloocan.
Immediately, P/Insp. Valencia formed a surveillance team headed by SPO4 Ernesto Palting and is composed of five (5) more operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit. When the group arrived at the area they were [at] once led by their informant to the house of one Alias “Abe.”
PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. o Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw “Abe” arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. o Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio forthwith introduced himself as a police officer while “Abe,” on the other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over to the former the (4) pieces of small plastic sachets the latter was earlier sorting out. o PO3 Antonio immediately placed the suspect under arrest and brought him and the four (4) pieces of plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance to their headquarters and turned them over to PO3 Fernando Moran for proper disposition.
DEFENSE: They were at their house watching television when they heard the commotion downstairs. Men in civilian clothes introduced themselves as raiding police officers who were set out to arrest “Abe”, petitioner for drug pushing. o That he was immediately arrested; o That on their way to the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered by the raiding police team from their house. o At around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, [petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally detained.
RTC: convicting petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. CA affirmed.
ARGUMENTS: Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. o Arguing that the act of arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house was illegal, and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued search warrant. o Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the warrantless arrest unlawful.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s arrest and the subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous drugs valid? YES. RATIO: o At the outset, it is apparent that petitioner raised no objection to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. o Warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; o For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. o In this case, he was caught in flagrante delicto and the police authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest. o During the operation, PO3 Antonio, through petitioner’s window, saw petitioner arranging several plastic sachets containing what appears to be shabu in the living room of their home. The plastic sachets and its suspicious
contents were plainly exposed to the view of PO3 Antonio, who was only about one and one-half meters from where petitioner was seated. o When PO3 entered the house and introduced himself, petitioner voluntarily handed the sachets. Thereafter he was arrested and the sachet were marked as evidence. o Considering the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of the petitioner, petitioner was clearly arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the arresting officer. o It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine. o Since petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.
People vs. Rolando S. Delos Reyes, GR 174774 (2011) FACTS: Accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. Reyes, Emmanuel de Claro, and Mary Jane Lantion-Tom (Lantion-Tom) were all arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of shabu.
The arresting officers (RMG) claims that a confidential informant called up relative to a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel.
that they were dispatched to verify the reports and conduct police operations;
that about 2:00 p.m. after meeting with the confidential agent, they strategically positioned themselves at the vicinity parking area of said hotel;
that about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. “Botong,” arrived with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant.
accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes; accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes in turn handed the box in a plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes;
that the arresting officers accosted the accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted having in their possession illegal drugs;
In his “Sinumpaang Kontra-Salaysay,” accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes claims that he went to Buenas Market together with a neighbor, one Marlon David, to talk to Raymundo Reyes who was to pay his indebtedness; o that while looking for a parking space, several men with firearms suddenly appeared. Asking him to open the car then retrieved a SM plastic bag asking them who is the source of the shabu. They answered in negative thus they were taken blindfolded.
Rolando delos Reyes’ counter-allegation that he was not arrested at Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City, but he was illegally arrested without warrant at Buenas Market in Cainta, Rizal, as corroborated by Marlon David and Joel Navarro (Navarro) in their respective sworn statements (Sinumpaang Salaysay).
RTC adjudged that probable cause exists not only against accused-appellant Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro, but accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes as well.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 12, 2006, sustained the conviction of accused-appellants, and merely modified the penalty imposed upon them, from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua.
ARGUMENTS: Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecution’s version of the arrests of the suspects and seizure of the shabu shows that the same were effected in violation of accused-appellants’ fundamental rights. o The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest. o The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not because of any apparent criminal activity. o A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure incidental thereto. Thus, the shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST CONDUCTED BY THE POLICE IS VALID PURSUANT TO RULE 113, SECTION 5(A) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE? NO. RATIO:
To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accusedappellants and searched the latter’s persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes.
These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts “indicative of a felonious enterprise.” SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects’ identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the suspects.
None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession, contained shabu.
The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom “has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit” a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.
Deposition: CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt and they are ORDERED forthwith released from custody, unless they are being lawfully held for another crime.
Pollo vs. Constantino-David et al, GR 181881 (2011) FACTS: This case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was then charged administratively and was eventually dismissed from the service. The employee’s personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of his misconduct.
An anonymous letter-complaint was received by the respondent CSC Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division” of Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV) has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the CSC.
Chairperson David immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV] Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) and the Legal Services Division. o This was witnessed by several employees.
The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured. The diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were then turned over to Chairperson David.
It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.
Chairperson David thus issued a Show-Cause Order requiring the petitioner to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. o He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. o He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent [are] thus inadmissible as evidence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”
The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and Violation of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied this omnibus motion.
On March 14, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing both the January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction.
CSC issued a Resolution finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Violation of Republic Act 6713. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE with all its accessory penalties.
By a Decision dated October 11, 2007, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Was the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy – lawful?
RATIO:
[The Supreme Court DENIED the petition and AFFIRMED the CA, which in turn upheld the CSC resolution dismissing the petitioner from service. The High Tribunal held that the search on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files were both LAWFUL and DID NOT VIOLATE his constitutional right to privacy.]
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and seizures.
Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files?; and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which involved] the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?
(1) NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files. o Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. o Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. o On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of the CSCROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. o Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes. (2) YES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.
The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct prompted by an anonymous lettercomplaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering” for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.
Thus, petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities.
As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches defined in O’Connor.
People vs. Raquero, GR 186529 (2010) FACTS: o Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. o A confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. o The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant. o The agent gave the police appellant’s name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day. o Appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler. o When appellant arrived and on his way to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. o At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. o RTC convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and fines. ISSUE: Whether the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is admissible as evidence against him? NO. Acquitted in absence of evidence against him. RATIO:
Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler carrying shabu. o The rule that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest is applicable in this case. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. o Appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. o Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. o Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. o Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding." o Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted.
People vs. Aruta, GR 120915 (1998) Facts In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIAMARUYAMA, respondents G.R. No. 150185 May 27, 2004 FACTS: Cecilia Maruyama filed a complaint charging Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. Maruyama alleged, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal. During the preliminary investigation, the complainant submitted the affidavit of her witnesses and other documentary evidence. After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J. Vibandor came out with a resolution, finding probable cause for estafa against the petitioner w/c was subsequently approved by the city prosecutor. The trial court then issued a warrant of arrest with a recommended bond of P40,000. Petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. The petitioner left the Philippines for Japan on June 17, 2000 without the trial court’s permission, and returned to the Philippines on June 28, 2000. She left the Philippines anew on July 1, 2000, and returned on July 12, 2000. On July 14, 2000, the private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of the hold departure order. Trial court approved the same. Meanwhile, the petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the respondent’s counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not attached thereto. On July 19, 2000, the petitioner also filed a Very Urgent Motion To Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order dated July 17, 2000 and/or allow her to regularly travel to Japan for the reason that she have 3 minor children residing there relying on her for support. Petitioner also questioned the irregularity of the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation however the respondent judge ruled that the posting of bail and the filing motions for relief estopped the petitioner from questioning the same. Upon arraignment, petitioner refused to enter a plea and w/ leave of court left the court room. Petitioner filed w/ CA a petition for Certiorari. CA set aside the hold departure order however all the other motions were denied, hence this case.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent judge committed a reversible error in determining existence of probable cause despite lack of affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter’s documentary evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner.
HELD: Yes, the rulings of this Court are now embedded in Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: SEC. 8. Records. – (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence and the resolution on the case. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. ______________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. FAUSTO YADAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. G.R. No. L-6835 - March 30, 1954 Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Augusto M. Luciano for appellant. Jose T. Cajulis for appellees. Bengzon (Jose), J.: The sole question for decision is whether the information filed against defendantappellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal sufficiently describes a violation of section 1 of Republic Act No. 145, which reads as follows: Any person assisting a claimant in the preparation, presentation and prosecution of his claim for benefits under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration, who shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, contract, for charge, or receive, or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for, charge, or receive any fee or compensation exceeding twenty pesos in any one claim, or who shall collect his fee before the claim is actually paid to a beneficiary or claimant, shall be deemed guilty of an offense and upon conviction thereof shall for every offense be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos or imprisoned not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court. Said information alleges that defendants conspiring together, willfully did “offer to assist one Floverto Jazmin in the prosecution and expeditious approval of his legitimate claim of $2,207 for benefits under the laws of the United States administered in the Philippines by the United States Veterans Administration, and as consideration for which, said accused directly solicited and/or charged said Floverto Jazmin as fee or compensation the sum of P800 which is in excess of the lawful charge of P20 in any one claim.” The Honorable Julio Villamor, Judge, upheld a motion to quash, on the
ground that the facts charged did not constitute a public offense. Hence this appeal by the prosecution, raising the juridical issue above stated. It is clear, in our opinion, that section 1 of Republic Act 145 punishes: (a) Any person assisting a claimant etc., . . . who shall directly or indirectly solicit . . . a fee exceeding twenty pesos; (b) Any person assisting a claimant . . . who shall attempt to solicit, . . . a fee exceeding twenty pesos; and (c) Any person assisting a claimant . . . who shall collect his fee before the claim is actually paid. In all the three instances the person must be one “assisting” the claimant.1 The principle “assisting” and the clause “assisting a claimant in the preparation etc.” qualify “any person” as antecedent of the pronoun “who” in the phrases, “who shall solicit”, “who shall attempt to solicit” or “who shall collect”. Examining the information, we find it does not aver that the defendants assisted or were assisting the claimant for veterans benefits. It merely asserts they offered to assist, and it is evident that violation is committed only when a person receives or attempts to solicit etc. more than is permitted by law. One who offers to assist, but does not assist, is not included within the penal prohibition, which by its nature must be restrictively interpreted, or strictly construed against the government.2 Of course there was an attempt to commit the offense described by Republic Act No. 145. But the said statute does not expressly punish attempts to commit the offense, and the provisions of the Penal Code about attempts (tentativas) do not apply.3 The prosecution relies upon Sanchez vs. U.S. 134 Fed. (2nd) 279, 63 S. Ct. 1325, 319 U.S. 768 wherein this was said: A showing that an excessive fee was solicited, contracted for, charged or received for assistance in preparation and execution of necessary papers in any application to Veterans’ Administration will support a conviction of violation of fee limitation for assistance in such application regardless of whether such assistance was in fact rendered. But such adjudication is not conclusive, because the statute therein construed differs materially from ours. It punishes “any person who shall directly or indirectly contract for, charge or receive, or who shall attempt to solicit, contract for excessive compensation.” The section does not contain the phrase “assisting a claimant” after the words “any person” and before the words “who shall etc”. That phrase conditions each and every violation of section 1 of Republic Act No. 145. The appealed decision quashing the indictment is, therefore, affirmed, without costs.
