G.R. No. L-45310, 14 April 1939 MARCOS J. ROTEA vs. FRANCISCA DELUPIO
FACTS: Simplicio Birondo, father of Josefina and Sofia Birondo, entrusted to Atty. Marcos J. Rotea the matter of obtaining the annulment of sale made by the moth mother er-in -in-la -law w of Simp Simplic licio io name named d Fran Franci cisc sca a Delup Delupio io and and the the issu issuan ance ce of a Torrens Certificate of Title of a piece of land, the right to buy the same in which it inherited by said minors from their deceased mother Beatriz Bartolome and its owner ownersh ship ip late laterr acqu acquire ired d by them them from from the the gove govern rnme ment nt by purc purcha hase se.. As payment for the services rendered by said Atty. Marcos J. Rotea, Simplicio bound himself to convey 1/3 of said land. Atty. Rotea took the necessary steps to disapprove or annul the sale made by Francisca Delupio in favor of Fabian Franco in which he was successful. successful. The Court of First Instance Instance acceded for the notation notation of Atty Atty.. Rote Rotea’ a’s s righ rightt of retent retentio ion n over over 1/3 1/3 of the the said said lot lot and and orde ordered red the the Register of Deeds of Rizal to note said right. Francisca Delupio, as guardian of the minors, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order directing the notation of the right of Atty. Rotea on the ground that Simplicio was not authorize to enter into agreement with said Atty. Rotea regarding the properties of the minors. After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal granted first by order and set aside the order for notation. Court of First Instance of Rizal issued another order direc directi ting ng the the nota notati tion on of the the righ rightt of reten retenti tion on of Atty Atty.. Rote Rotea a but but with withou outt specifying its value. Francisca Delupio accepted to this order and interposed this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Marcos J. Rotea is entitled to the compensation for the services he rendered by virtue of a contract entered into between him and the father of the minors.
RULING: The Court held that Atty. Rotea is considered a negotiorum gestor who is entitled to be indemnified for necessary and useful expenses incurred by him and the damages suffered in the discharge of his duties and to have his right of retention noted, it being immaterial that said minors or their guardian did not
notify his undertaking, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1893 of the Civil Code and to have his lien as attorney noted.
G.R. No. L-32364, 30 April 1979 RAMIE TEXTILES, INC. vs. HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, SR.
FACTS: Ramie Textiles, Inc. has been voluntary paying real estate taxes on its plant machinery and equipment used in Bagbaguin, Valenzuela, Bulacan, and since its existence in 1959, it reached the amount of P78,041.17. On 19 May 1967, the petitioner said that under the Assessment Law, said machineries are exempt from realty tax so they claim for refund through the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan the amount of P78,041.17. The Provincial Treasurer denied the claim on the ground that under Section 359 of the Revised Manual of Instructions to treasurers, “a claim for refund of taxes erroneously paid or illegally collected or assessed should be presented within two (2) years from date of payment. Petitioner replied alleging that Section 359 is inapplicable because said provision refers only to municipal ordinances which were subsequently declared illegally assessed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramie Textiles, Inc. is entitled for a refund.
RULING: The Court held that Ramie Textiles, Inc. is allowed to recover the amount paid thru error. The fact that petitioner paid thru error or mistake and the government accepted the payment, gave rise to the application of the principle of solutio indebiti under Article 2154 of the New Civil Code, which provides that, “if something is received when there is no right to demand it and it was unduly delivered through mistake, the obligation to return it arises”. There is, therefore, created a tie or juridical relation in the nature of solutio indebiti expressly classified as quasi-contract under Section 2, Chapter I of Title XVII of the New Civil Code.
The quasi-contract of solutio indebiti is one of the concrete manifestations of the ancient principle that no one shall enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. Hence, it would seem unedifying for the government that knowing it has no right at all to collect or to receive money for alleged taxes paid by mistake, it would be reluctant to return the same.
G.R. No. L-25906, 28 May 1970 PEDRO DIOQUINO vs. FEDERICO LAUREANO
FACTS: Atty. Dioquino, a practicing lawyer, went to the office of the MVO, Masbate to register his car. He asked Laureano to introduce him to one of the clerks in the office who could facilitate the registration and the request was attended to. Laureano rode on the car of Atty. Dioquino. While about to reach their destination, the car was stoned by some mischievous boys and the windshield broke. Laureano refused to file any charges against the boy and his parents because he thought that stone-throwing was accidental and was due to force majeure. He refused to pay the damage caused and challenged the case for adjudication. The plaintiff tried to convince the defendant and even the latter’s wife to settle amicably by paying the damages but the defendant refused.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was fortuitous event and Laureano is liable for the damges.
RULING: The express language of Article 1174 of the Civil Code states that “except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be liable for those events which could not be foreseen, which, though foreseen were inevitable”. Authorities of repute are in agreement, more specifically concerning on obligation arising from contract “that some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito”. If it coud be shown that such indeed was the case, liability is ruled out. There is no requirement of “diligence beyond what human care and foresight can provide”. The throwing of the stone by the child was clearly unforeseen or if foreseen, was inevitable. Hence, the law being what it is, such a belief on the part of defendant Laureano was justified and he shall no held liable for the damages caused to the car.
G.R. No. L-21749, 29 Sept. 1967 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION
FACTS: The barge belonging to the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, while passing under the Nagtahan Bridge in Manila, rammed the bridge supports causing damage thereto. In this action for damages instituted by the government against the defendant corporation, the latter interposed the defense that there was no negligence or fault on its part and that the proximate cause of the accident was a fortuitous event.
ISSUE: Whether or not the collision of the barge with the supports of the Nagtahan Bridge was in law caused by a fortuitous event.
RULING: As far as the negligence of the defendant corporation is concerned, it is clear that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable. It is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled by defendant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of defendant of its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. In the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used.
As far as the defense of fortuitous event is concerned, caso fortuito by definition refers to those extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, “events that could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable” (Article 1174, NCC). It is therefore, not enough that the event could not have seen, foreseen, or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee the same. Hence, the proximate cause of the accident cannot be classified as a fortuitous event. Consequently, defendant is liable.
A.M. Matter No. 132-MJ, 31 May 1976 INES BANDIVAS vs. MUNICIPAL JUDGE FORTUNATO F. SALES
FACTS: On 6 October 1971, complainant Ines Bandivas was caught by a bad weather in Siayan and she thought of depositing with Judge Sales her 18 cavans of corn and 1 ½ cavans of palay but sometime later, she heard rumors that her corn was being sold at small stores by the judge so she requested the Chief of Police of Siayan to investigate and while the matter was under investigation, it was reported by the household of Judge Sales that during the absence of the latter, 15 cavans were stolen from the house. Respondent judge promised to indemnify Bandivas for the loss but the former failed to comply with his commitment and because Bandivas needed money to pay an outstanding loan of P2,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines, she filed an instant complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Sales acted in bad faith.
RULING:
The Court held that the alleged theft of 15 cavans of corn from the house of respondent judge is indeed incredible. There is no question that as a depository of the 18 cavans of corn and 1 ½ cavans of palay of the complainant, respondent was obliged to keep the thing safely, to take care of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family and to return the some when required. Respondent judge is legally and morally bound to be true to the trust and confidence reposed on him by the complainant, more so, as he is holding an office of which the highest degree of honesty and integrity are expected by public.
G.R. No. 134692, 01 August 2000 ELISEO FAJARDO, JR. and MARISSA FAJARDO vs. FREEDOM TO BUILD, INC.
FACTS: Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a house and lot and in the contract to sell, there contained a Restrictive Covenant providing for some prohibitions regarding the expansion to the house which the owners would like to do with their house. The controversy arose when the petitioner-spouses extended the roof of their house to a point directly above the original front wall wherein respondent filed an action to demolish the unauthorized structures on the RTC and when it favored the respondent, the spouses filed an appeal but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this petition. The petitioner-spouses argue that for lack of a specific provision, prescribing the penalty of demolition in the Restrictive Covenant, in the event of a breach thereof, the player of respondent to demolish the structure should fail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the structures built by the petitioner-spouses are legal and valid.
RULING: The Court held that since the extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the Restrictive Covenant, petitioner-spouses can be required to demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed floor area limits for as Article 1168 of the New Civil Code provides that “when the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his expense”.
G.R. No. L-19495, 02 February 1924 HONORIO LASAM vs. FRANK SMITH, JR.
FACTS: The defendant was the owner of a business garage in the town of San Fernando, La Union and engaged in the business of carrying passengers for hire from one point to another in the province of La Union and the surrounding provinces. Defendant undertook to convey the plaintiffs from San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte in an automobile. On leaving San Fernando, the driver allowed his assistant Bueno to drive the car, but has no license. The car functioned well until the crossing of the Abra River in Tagudin when defects developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate steering impossible and after zigzagging for a distance, the car left the road and went down under it.
ISSUE: Whether or not accident was due to a fortuitous event.
RULING: As seen, some extraordinary circumstances independent of the will of the obligor or of his employees, is an essential element of a caso fortuito. In the present case, this element is lacking. It is not suggested that the accident in question was due to an Act of God or to adverse road condition which could have been foreseen. As far as the record shows, the accident was caused either by defects in the automobile or else through the negligence of its driver. This is not a caso fortuito.
G.R. No. L-45310, 14 April 1939 MARCOS J. ROTEA vs. FRANCISCA DELUPIO
FACTS: The suit arose by reason of the death of Lolita De Jesus, 20-year old daughter of Valentin De Jesus and wife of Manolo Tolentino, in a head-on collision between petitioner’s bus, on which the victim was a passenger and a freight truck. The petitioner maintains that the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event and gives rise to no liability for negligence. The appellate court made no findings of any specified acts of negligence and confined itself to the question whether or not a tire blow-out would generate liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bus company acted with negligence and was liable for damages.
RULING: The Court held that in the present case, the cause of the blow-out was known. The inner tube of the left front (line) tire was pressed between the inner circle of the left wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. A mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to more thorough or rigid check-up before it took the road.
G.R. No. L-47851, 03 October 1986 JUAN NAKPIL & SONS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: The private respondent (Phil. Bar Association) hired the services of the petitioner to make the plans and specifications for the construction of their office building. The building was completed by the contractor but subsequently, an earthquake struck causing its partial collapse and damage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is liable for damages.
RULING: The Court held in the affirmative. The petitioner made substantial deviations from the plans and specifications and failed to observe requisite workmanship stands in the construction and failed to observe while their architect drew plans that contain defects and other inadequacies. Both the contractor and the architect cannot escape liability even if an Act of God may have intervened as in this case. As such, the liability of the contractor (herein petitioner) and the architect for the collapse of the building is solidary.
G.R. No. L-74387, 14 November 1988 BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: On an ascending curve at a highway in Tayabas, Quezon, a bus operated by Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB) and driven by Armando Pon overtook a Ford Fiera, which resulted to its collision with a Superlines bus coming from an opposite direction. Such caused the death of Aniceto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Romeo Neri and several injuries to Nena Rosales and Baylon Sales; all passengers of BLTB. The injured passengers and the surviving heirs of the ones who died instituted a compliant against the two (2) bus companies. The trial court exonerated Superlines and held BLTB to be solely liable. The decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the respondent is based on culpa contractual.
RULING: The common carrier’s liability for the death of or injuries to its passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely to their destination. That obligation is so serious that the Civil Code requires “utmost diligence of very cautious person” (Article 1755, Civil Code). They are presumed to have been at fault to have acted negligently unless they rove that they have observed extraordinary diligence. Indeed, this legal presumption was confirmed by the fact that the bus driver of BLTB was negligent.
