INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 THE NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS RELATION WITH THE COURTS FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003] Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis. Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution. When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. 83 The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. LAMBINO VS. COMELEC [G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006] Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameralpresidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions. Issue: Whether or Not the Lambino Group‘s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people‘s initiative. Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 ―incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions‖ to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution. Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino Group‘s petition. Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people‘s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition. 1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is ―deceptive and misleading‖ which renders the initiative void. 2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between ―amendment‖ and ―revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change, therefore a constitutes a revision. 3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735 Petition is dismissed.
SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC [270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997] Facts: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People‘s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through People‘s Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenorsoppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on people‘s initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The people‘s initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of people‘s initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of the Constitution. Held: Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to people‘s initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Court‘s decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. GONZALES VS. COMELEC [21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967] Facts: The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction. The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least, one (1) member; 2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and 3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967. Issue: Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution. Held: Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered. As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious: (1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar as the public is concerned. "The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof." Article XV of the Constitution provides: . . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification. From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC [78 SCRA 333; G.R. No. 90878; 29 Jan 1990] Facts: This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law. Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part in a plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act originally scheduled last December 27, 1989 which was, however, reset to January 30, 1990 by virtue of Comelec Resolution No. 2226 dated December 27, 1989. The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite Issue. It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner likewise maintains that if media practitioners were to express their views, beliefs and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as ventilate, all sides of the issue. Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period (2nd par. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless required to take a leave of absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory basis. Plebiscite Issue are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The people affected by the Issue presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. The instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and unconstitutional.
REPUBLIC ACT 6735, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE THE POLICE POWER ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 Phil 1117; G.R. No. L-7995; 31 May 1957] Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business‖ was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. LUTZ VS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955] Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional. Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the implement of the state‘s police power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA [122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983] Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of the ordinance would be enforced. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power. Held: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City. Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as follows: ―To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.‖ The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled‘. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.
Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919] Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the private cemetery and that the said lands are within their jurisdiction. Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons owing and interested in the graves and monuments that would have to be destroyed. The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus, the same filed an appeal. Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation. Held: The courts have the power of restricting the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have the right to inquire to. REPUBLIC VS. PLDT [26 SCRA 320; G.R. No. L-18841; 27 Jan 1969] Facts: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the govt offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or Not PLDT may be compelled to enter into such agreement. Held: Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, there is no reason why the state ma not require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just compensation is paid.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958] Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property. Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant‘s property without just compensation. We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
REPUBLIC VS. CASTELVI [58 SCRA 336; G.R. No. L-20620; 15 Aug 1974] Facts: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), entered into a lease agreement with Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. When Castelvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the expropriation proceedings for the land in question. Issue: Whether or Not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the ―taking‖ should not be reckoned as of 1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year. The requisites for taking are: 1) the expropriator must enter a private property, 2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period, 3) it must be under warrant or color of authorities, 4) the property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected, and 5) the utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, ―just compensation‖ is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The ―taking‖ of the Castelvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed. There is no basis to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a year-to-year basis can give rise to permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however, did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the obligation to pay arises from law independent of contract.
EPZA VS. DULAY [148 SCRA 305; G.R. No. L-59603; 29 Apr 1987] Facts: The four parcels of land which are the subject of this case is where the Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority in Cebu (EPZA) is to be constructed. Private respondent San Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are registered under, claimed that the lands were expropriated to the government without them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San Antonio would be P15 per square meter, which was objected to by the latter contending that under PD 1533, the basis of just compensation shall be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the commissioner‘s report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus enjoining the respondent from further hearing the case. Issue: Whether or Not the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD 1533 is unconstitutional. The method of ascertaining just compensation constitutes impermissible encroachment to judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the courts inutile in a matter in which under the Constitution is reserved to it for financial determination. The valuation in the decree may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation, but it may not substitute the court‘s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court‘s findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the justness of the decreed compensation. AMIGABLE VS. CUENCA [43 SCRA 360; G.R. No. L-26400; 29 Feb. 1972] Facts: Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of a particular lot. At the back of her Transfer Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On 1958, Amigable‘s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and possession of the lot. According to the defendants, the action was premature because it was not filed first at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the recovery of any amount had already prescribed, that the Government had not given its consent to be sued, and that plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. Issue: Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the government. Held: In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains the owner of the lot. She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation—price or value of the lot at the time of the taking.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995] Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information. Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies to donate ―Comelec space‖ amounts to ―taking‖ of private personal property without payment of the just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION [292 SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998] Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent domain. Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making body. Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect. RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an administrative rule which cannot amend the former. MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [252 SCRA 412; G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996] Facts: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land. Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a public purpose.
Issue: Whether or Not the taking or exercise of eminent domain may be granted. Held: Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.
THE POWER OF TAXATION PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS [110 PHIL 331; G.R. NO.L-10405; 29 DEC 1960] Facts: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works, providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in RA 920 are constitutional. Held: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation. The decision appealed from is reversed.
PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL 46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954] Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail Ordinance No. 3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of the same. The law authorizing said ordinance empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation. Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the law authorizing it.
LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14 SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965] Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated 10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias, Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose. On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which petitioner was the parish priest. Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for religious purpose is valid. Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the Constitution. A gift tax is not a property by way of gift inter vivos. The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious purpose.
CASSANOVAS VS. HORD [8 Phil 125; No. 3473; 22 Mar 1907] Facts: The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. The plaintiff is now the owner of those mines. The Collector of Internal Revenue imposed tax on the properties, contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it falls within the provisions of sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act. The plaintiff paid under protest. He brought an action against the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the sum of Php. 9, 600 paid by him as taxes. Judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant, so the plaintiff appealed. Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 164 is void or valid. Held: The deed constituted a contract between the Spanish Government and the plaintiff. The obligation of which contract was impaired by the enactment of sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law infringing sec. 5 of the Act of Congress which provides that ―no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be enacted‖. Sec. 134 of the Internal Revenue Law of 1904 is void because it impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the concessions of mine made by the Spanish Government. Judgment reversed.
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Art 3, Sec. 1. ―No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law…‖ ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957] Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as ―An Act to Regulate the Retail Business‖ was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. PHIL. PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER CORP. VS. TORRES [231 SCRA 335; G.R. NO.98050; 17 MAR 1994] Facts: Philphos Movement for Progress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. Mediator-Arbiter Rodolfo S. Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the supervisory employees of petitioner, excluding therefrom the superintendents and the professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition with the Mediator-Arbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory employees of petitioner but also its professional/technical and confidential employees. The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related documents. Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order granting the petition and directing the holding of a certification election among the "supervisory, professional (engineers, analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment who rendered a decision through Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the mediator-arbiter was under. Issue: Whether or Not there was denial of due process. Held: There was no denial of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and examine the witnesses of the other party. But it did not; instead it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the Secretary of Labor. ANIAG VS. COMELEC [237 SCRA 194; G.R. NO. 104961; 7 OCT 1994] Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2323, ―Gun Ban‖, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearm or other deadly weapons on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police
organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. COMELEC also issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the ―Gun Ban‖, Mr. Serrapio Taccad, Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote petitioner for the return of the two firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Petitioner then instructed his driver, Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner‘s house and return them to Congress. The PNP set up a checkpoint. When the car driven by Arellano approached the checkpoint, the PNP searched the car and found the firearms. Arellano was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner also explained that Arellano was only complying with the firearms ban, and that he was not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that ―gunrunning, using or transporting firearms or similar weapons‖ and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to petitioner, Resolution No. 2327 is unconstitutional. The issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner can be validly prosecuted for instructing his driver to return the firearms issued to him on the basis of the evidence gathered from the warrant less search of his car Held: A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate authority. However, a warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. In the case at bar, the guns were not tucked in Arellano‘s waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these circumstances, the PNP could not have thoroughly searched the car lawfully as well as the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. It was also shown in the facts that the PNP had not informed the public of the purpose of setting up the checkpoint. Petitioner was also not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election Code. He was not informed by the City Prosecutor that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation. Such constituted a violation of his right to due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was himself a respondent in the case. Thus, the warrantless search conducted by the PNP is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the search cannot be used as evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner. Resolution No. 92-0829 is unconstitutional, and therefore, set aside. YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987] Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626-A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work or breeding. Issue: Whether or Not EO No. 626-A is a violation of Substantive Due Process. Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ [180 SCRA 218; G.R. NO.84818; 18 DEC 1989] Facts: Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein respondent Jose Alcuaz Commissioner of the National Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen percent (15%) due to
Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing. Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative. But respondent‘s contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is erroneous. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, providing for the proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix rates, upon proper notice and hearing, and, if not subject to the exceptions, limitations or saving provisions. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE.
ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR) [69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940] Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993] Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students. Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Art 3, Sec. 1. ―…nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.‖ DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already received retirement benefits and is 65 years of age shall not be qualified to run for the same local elective office from which he has retired. Issue: Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal protection and due process rights. Held: No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age have been classified differently from younger employees. The former are subject to compulsory retirement while the latter are not. Retirement is not a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials because there can be retirees who are even younger and a 65 year old retiree could be as good as a 65 year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old elective official who is trying to run for office because there is the ―need for new blood to assume relevance‖. When an official has retired he has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work. WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY [22 SCRA 603; L-23794; 17 FEB 1968] Facts: On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries." Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7, 087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5, 000, or a total of P12, 087.50. On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, with service of a copy upon the Solicitor General, a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause (Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1]), Art. VI, Constitution). Answering, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city's power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations. After pre-trial and submission of the case on memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter. Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause under Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution. Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of Rights, Sec. 22[1], Art. VI, Constitution. Held: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to
future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon. Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of collection, the ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed constitutional until declared otherwise. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional and the defendants-appellees are hereby ordered to refund the P12,087.50 plaintiff-appellant paid under protest. No costs. So ordered.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
Art 3, Sec. 2. ―The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.‖ Art 3, Sec. 3. ―(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.‖ PEOPLE VS. MARTI [193 SCRA 57; G.R. NO. 81561; 18 JAN 1991] Facts: Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents. He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said packages. The contents , after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be marijuana flowering tops. The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Issue: Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized. Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied. Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages came to his possession. Held: No. ―The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.‖ No. ―The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.‖ No. ―Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.‖ STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO [20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967] Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Issue: Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or __________________________
1
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of Manila. 2 Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City. 3 Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck. U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation and Merconsel Corporation. 5
SOLIVEN VS. MAKASIAR [167 SCRA 393; G.R. NO. 82585; 14 NOV 1988] Facts: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President. Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause Held: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts. It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue. WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED. MORANO VS. VIVO [20 SCRA 562; G.R. L-22196; 30 JUN 1967] Facts: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on November 1961 to visit her cousin, Samuel Lee Malaps. She left China and her children by a first marriage: Fu Tse Haw and Fu Yan Kai both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China. Chan Sau wah arrived in the Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son also by the first marriage. Chan Sau Wah and her minor son Fu Yan Fun were permitted only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was Esteban Morano, Jr. To prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions. The last extension expired on September 10, 1962. In a letter dated August 31, 1962, the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son, Fu Yan Fun, to leave the country on or before September 10, 1962 with a warning that upon failure so to do, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond. Issue: Whether or Not the issuance of the warrant of arrest is unconstitutional. Held: Chan Sau Wah entered the Philippines on a tourist-temporary visitor's visa. She is a non-immigrant. Under Section 13 just quoted, she may therefore be admitted if she were a qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of Section 9. Therefore, first, she must depart voluntarily to some foreign country; second, she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must thereafter undergo examination by the officials of the Bureau of Immigration at the port of entry for determination of her admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too, that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of the Immigration Act. The gravamen of petitioners' argument is that Chan Sau Wah has, since her entry, married in Manila a native-born Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to thwart her deportation. Chan Sau Wah, seemingly is not one who has a high regard for such solidarity. Proof: She left two of her children by the first marriage, both minors, in the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the wording of the statute heretofore adverted to is a forbidding obstacle which will prevent this Court from writing into the law an additional provision that marriage of a temporary alien visitor to a Filipino would ipso facto make her a permanent resident in his country. This is a field closed to judicial action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's power of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with another man as husband and wife, and thereby skirt the provisions of our immigration law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious trade, marry a Filipino, and again throw overboard Sections 9 and 13 of the Act. Such a flanking movement, we are confident, is impermissible.Recently we confirmed the rule that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines. Reason: Discourage entry under false pretenses. HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840; G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988] Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences. The ―Operation Report‖ read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the ―after Mission Report‖ read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for sometime now. Seized during the petitioner‘s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3 month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence, another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3 petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised Administrative Code. Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. Issue: Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable cause. Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures by CID agents. Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to petitioners. Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In view of the foregoing, the search done was incidental to the arrest. The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such confinement was illegal at the beginning. The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure. Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a counsel if desired. Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of the people. SILVA VS. PRESIDING JUDGE [203 SCRA 140; G.R. No. 81756; 21 Oct 1991] Facts: Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an "application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner Nicomedes Silva and Martin Silva. Judge Nickarter Ontal, then the presiding judge of RTC of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for violation of RA 6425 Dangerous Drugs ACT of 1972. Such warrant states that there is a probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to make an immediate search at any time of the room of Mr. Tama Silva at the residence of his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and containers to look for said illegal drugs. In the course of the search, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No.1 on the ground that 1) it was issued on the sole basis of mimeographed 2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers. Issue: Whether or Not Search Warrant No.1 is invalid. WON the officers abused their authority in seizing the money of Antonieta Silva.
Held: Search Warrant No. 1 is invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions and answers. The questions asked were leading as they are answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. The questions were already mimeographed and all the witness had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided. Judge Ontal is guilty of grave abuse of discretion when he rejected the motion of Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her money. The officers who implemented the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of money but only for marijuana leaves, cigarettes..etc. Search Warrant No. 1 is declared null and void. *** Sec 4 Rule 126 Rules of Court Examination of the complainant, record -the judge before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their affidavits.
PEOPLE VS. DEL ROSARIO [234 SCRA 246; G.R. NO. 109633; 20 JUL 1994] Facts: Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession and sale of drugs, particularly methamphetamine or shabu. After the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalia‘s, an entrapment was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its paraphernalia‘s and of a .22 caliber pistol with 3 live ammunition. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the firearms was proper. Held: No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must particularly describe the things to be seized. In herein case, the only objects to be seized that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalia‘s therein. The seizure of the firearms was unconstitutional. Wherefore the decision is reversed and the accused is acquitted. UMIL VS. RAMOS [187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991] Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols. Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested. Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes. PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]
Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado‘s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalado‘s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel. The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante. Issue: Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful. Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible. Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties. PEOPLE V. RODRIGUEZA [205 SCRA 791; G.R. No. 95902; 4 Feb 1992] Facts: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and ―a certain object wrapped in a plastic‖ later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.
Held: The NARCOM agents‘ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. Said raid also violated accused‘ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant: CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following: Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag. Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled "Robertson". Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil. Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams. Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe. Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of Rodrigueza‘s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted. GO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [206 SCRA 138; G.R. NO. 101837; 11 FEB 1992] Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner‘s plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation. Issue: Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful. Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted ―continuing crimes,‖ i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply. Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond. PEOPLE V. MENGOTE [210 SCRA 174; G.R. NO. 87059; 22 JUN 1992] Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation. An information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal
possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous tree. Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. Held: An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32 of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. Judgment is reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted. PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN [184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-63630; 6 Apr 1990] Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to lack of search warrant. Held; No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant. PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT [198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun 1991] Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada. At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles
coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof. During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport. Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. ACCUSED‘S DEFENSE During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station. The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt. Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence against him. Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed. Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances. Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee. The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant. PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN [163 SCRA 402; G.R. L-74869; 6 Jul 1988] Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained. Issue: Whether or not search of defendant‘s bag is legal. Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged. PEOPLE VS. MUSA [217 SCRA 597; G.,R. NO. 96177; 27 JAN 1993] Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to Musa‘s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00. The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‗cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.‘ They asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence. Held:
Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect‘s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the ‗plain view‘ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‗plain view‘ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‗plain view‘ of the object. In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‗plain view‘ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the ‗plain view‘ of said object. Therefore, the ‗plain view‘ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. RULE 113, RULES OF COURT Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. RULE 126, RULES OF COURT Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed . — An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. — The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein. Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon. (a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. (b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with. (c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL
Art 3, Sec. 6. ―The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.‖ MANOTOC VS. COURT OF APPEALS [142 SCRA 149; G.R. NO. L-62100; 30 MAY 1986] Facts: Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the petition. Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his liberty could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel. Issue: Whether or Not his constitutional right to travel has been violated. Held: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO. 88211; 15 SEPT 1989] Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SILVERIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [195 SCRA 760 ; G.R. 94284; 8 APR 1991] Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner‘s passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court. Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court. Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd par. ]). Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121). Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Art 3, Sec. 5. ―No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.‖ AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937] Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33 rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 ―advantageous to the government‖ does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words ―Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.‖ The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to ―to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists,‖ the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government. GARCES VS. ESTENZO [104 SCRA 510; G.R. L-53487; 25 MAY 1981] Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed: a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash donations. b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and until the election of his successor. The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint‘s feast day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay council, as it was the church‘s property since church funds were used in its acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, contends that Sec. 8 Article IV 1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated. Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated. Held:
No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman‘s custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers and novena. It was the council‘s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS. CITY OF MANILA [101PHIL 386; G.R. NO. 9637; 30 APR 1957] Facts: New York‘s Education Law requires local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to all students in grade 7 to 12, including those in private schools. The Board of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from removing appellant‘s members from office for failure to comply with the requirement and an order preventing the use of state funds for the purchase of textbooks to be lent to parochial schools were sought for. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants have standing but the law is not unconstitutional. Issue: Whether or Not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and worship of appellant). Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society. WHEREFORE, defendant shall return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45 unduly collected from it. . EBRALINAG VS. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF CEBU [219 SCRA 256 ; G.R. NO. 95770; 1 MAR 1993] Facts: Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and consolidated for raising same issue. Petitioners allege that the public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion. Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Bantayan, Pinamungajan, Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the ―Panatang Makabayan‖ required by RA1265. They are Jehovah‘s Witnesses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of Education. Gerona doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the church and state and the flag is devoid of religious significance and it doesn‘t involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not mean exception from non-discriminatory laws like the saluting of flag and singing national
anthem. This exemption disrupts school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of citizenship. Issue: Whether or Not religious freedom has been violated. Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on one‘s belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from the school is not justified. The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and religious profession and worship. Jehovah‘s Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesn‘t present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioner‘s request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizen‘s right to free education. The non-observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. Expulsion is ANNULLED. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR [492 SCRA 1 ; AM NO P-02-1651; 22 JUN 2006] Facts: Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a son with him as well. Respondent‘s husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act. Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the Jehovah‘s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a ‗Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness‘ under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Issue: Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held: No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The State‘s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus the State‘s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS [259 SCRA 529; G.R. NO. 119673; 26 JUL 1996] Facts: Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the President the classification of its TV Series No. 128 which allowed it through a letter of former Executive Secretary Edelmiro A. Amante, Sr., addressed for Henrietta S. Mendez reversing the decision of the respondent Board. According to the letter the episode in is protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no indication that the episode poses any clear and present danger. Petitioner also filed Civil Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board invoked its power under PD No. 19861 in relation to Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal translation of the bible and says that our (Catholic) veneration of the Virgin Mary is not to be condoned because nowhere it is found in the bible. The board contended that it outrages Catholic and Protestant's beliefs. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA however reversed it hence this petition. Issue: Whether or Not the "ang iglesia ni cristo" program is not constitutionally protected as a form of religious exercise and expression. Held: Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. This is true in this case. So-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. RTC‘s ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. ―attack‖ is different from ―offend‖ any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion. Respondent board cannot censor the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. It is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. It is inappropriate to apply the clear and present danger test to the case at bar because the issue involves the content of speech and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first allowed, its impact cannot be measured, and the causal connection between the speech and the evil apprehended cannot be established. The determination of the question as to whether or not such vilification, exaggeration or fabrication falls within or lies outside the boundaries of protected speech or expression is a judicial function which cannot be arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative agencies.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Art 3, Sec. 4. ―No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.‖ Art 3, Sec. 7. ―The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.‖ Art 3, Sec. 8. ―The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.‖ Art 3, Sec. 18. ―(1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.‖
US VS. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918] Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him. Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [178 SCRA 362; G.R. NO.80806; 5 OCT 1989] Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors,
newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiff‘s magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA. Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner. Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that; 1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge‘s sound discretion; AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-82380; 29 APR 1988] Facts: Petitioner McElroy an Australian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB as and other government agencies consulted. Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play, presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian have developed a script. Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation. petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to Enrile. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not freedom of expression was violated.
Held: Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through television. Furthermore the circumstance that the production of motion picture films is a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for availing of freedom of speech and of expression. The projected motion picture was as yet uncompleted and hence not exhibited to any audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any violation of any right to privacy. Subject matter is one of public interest and concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage in the history of the country. At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern, that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their right to privacy. The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of events. REYES VS. BAGATSING [125 SCRA 553; L-65366; 9 NOV 1983] Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves. Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble violated. Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Art 3, Sec. 10. ―No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.‖ RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN [93 PHIL 68; NO.L-3708; 18 MAY 1953] Facts: On August 20,1941 Rutter sold to Esteban two parcels of land situated in the Manila for P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as follows: P2,400 on or before August 7, 1942, and P2,400 on or before August 27, 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. Esteban failed to pay the two installments as agreed upon, as well as the interest that had accrued and so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation contracted and that he is a war sufferer, having filed his claim with the Philippine War Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war; and that under section 2 of RA 342(moratorium law), payment of his obligation cannot be enforced until after the lapse of eight years. The complaint was dismissed. A motion for recon was made which assails the constitutionality of RA 342. Issue: Whether or Not RA 342 unconstitutional on non-impairment clause grounds. Held: Yes. The moratorium is postponement of fulfillment of obligations decreed by the state through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts. The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end. However based on the President‘s general SONA and consistent with what the Court believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, declared that the continued operation and enforcement of RA 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged should be declared null and void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32, with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and effectivity of monetary obligations.
ORTIGAS VS. FEATI BANK [94 SCRA 533; NO.L-24670; 14 DEC 1979] Facts: Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public, particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as vendor, and Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles, as vendees, entered into separate agreements of sale on installments over two parcels of land of the Subdivision. On July 19, 1962, the said vendees transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favor of one Emma Chavez. Upon completion of payment of the purchase price, the plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the agreements (of sale on installment) and the deeds of sale contained the stipulations or restrictions that: 1. The parcel of land shall be used exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller. 2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be constructed at any time in said lot must be, (a) of strong materials and properly painted, (b) provided with modern sanitary installations connected either to the public sewer or to an approved septic tank, and (c) shall not be at a distance of less than two (2) meters from its boundary lines. Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the commercialization of western part of EDSA. Defendant began constructing a commercial bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not non-impairment clause violated.
Held: No. Resolution is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It should be stressed, that while non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. Issue: Whether or Not BP 22 impairs freedom of contract. Whether or not BP 22 transgresses the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. Held: The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
EX POST FACTO LAWS Art 3, Sec. 22. ―No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.‖ PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972] Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association. Issue: Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law. Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression. Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Act‘s focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a member‘s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of ―Freedom of Expression and Association‖ in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:
1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
BAYOT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [128 SCRA 383; NO.L-61776 TO NO.L-61861; 23 MAR 1984] Facts: Bayot is one of the several persons who was accused in more than 100 counts of estafa thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges started from his alleged involvement as a government auditor of the commission on audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees from the said ministry. The bureau of treasury and the teacher‘s camp in Baguio City for the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nom-existent obligations of the teacher‘s camp resulting in damage to the government of several millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980 Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision convicting the accused together with his other co-accused in all but one of the thirty two cases filed against them. On Mach 16, 1982 Batas Pambansa Blg 195 was passed amending RA 3019. Issue: Whether or Not it would be violative of the constitutional guarantee against an ex post facto law. Held: The court finds no merit in the petitioner‘s contention that RA 3019 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which violates the constitutional prohibition against the enactment of ex post facto law. Accdg to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. And does not violate the constitutional provision against ex post facto law. The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under RA 3019 for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or property or whatever stage of execution and mode of participation shall be suspended from office. The use of the word ―office‖ applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the particular office under which he was charged.
PEOPLE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [211 SCRA 241; G.R. NO. 101724; 3 JUL 1992] Facts: Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October 28,1986 and December 9, 1986, a political leader of Governor Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land subdivision in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur. He misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the lands subject herein are disposable lands, thereby inducing said inspector to recommend approval of his application for free patent. On August 10, 1989 an information for violation of RA 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was then filed in the Sandiganbayan after an ex parte preliminary investigation. A motion to quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years, therefore it has prescribed in 1986. Now the motion to quash was being assailed. Issue:
Whether or Not the motion to quash validly granted. Held: Yes. RA 3019, being a special law the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime is governed by Sec. 29 of Act No. 3326, which begins to run from the day of the commission of the crime and not the discovery of it. Additionally, BP 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending Sec. 11 of RA 3019 by increasing ten to fifteen years of the period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of RA 3019 may not be given retroactive application to the crime which was committed by Paredes, as it is prejudicial to the accused. To apply BP 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law 1 for it would alter his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was committed.
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Art 3, Sec. 20. ―No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.‖ SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG [67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975] Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiff‘s case. (Judge here committed gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.) Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt? Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986] Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Art 3, Sec. 18. ―(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.‖ CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949] Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave. Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave? Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one‘s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.
THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Art 3, Sec. 15. ―The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.‖ LANSANG VS. GARCIA [42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971] Facts: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were. Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant. It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A was issued as an amendment, inserting the word ―actually staging‖. Proc. 889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged JulyAugust Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after conclusive decision reached by majority. Issue: Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A. Held: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh. Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the CPP.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Art 3, Sec. 12. ―(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.‖ Art 3, Sec. 14. ―(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.‖ Art 3, Sec. 11. ―Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.‖ Art 3, Sec. 16. ―All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial, or administrative bodies.‖ Art 3, Sec. 17. ―No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.‖ Art 3, Sec. 19. ―(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.‖ Art 3, Sec. 21. ―No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.‖ GAMBOA VS. CRUZ [162 SCRA 642;L-56291; 27 JUN 1988] Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner‘s right to counsel and due process violated. Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989]
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos‘ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar). This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.‖ It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. 3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS [211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992] Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3. PEOPLE VS. MACAM [238 SCRA 306; G.R. NOS. 91011-12; 24 NOV 1994] Facts: Prosecution‘s version:
On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43 Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle‘s gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536, 700.00. Defense‘s version: Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito‘s house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying ―kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan‖. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things. After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case. Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible. Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A police lineup is considered a ―critical‖ stage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant‘s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up. The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial. The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside the house served as a looked out. Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other accused to suffer reclusion perpetua. Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes, betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money. PEOPLE VS. DY [158 SCRA 111; G.R. 74517; 23 FEB 1988] Facts: Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting incident at "Benny's Bar," at Sitio Angol, Manoc-Manoc Malay, Aklan (Boracay) situated on the Island which caused the death of Christian Langel Philippe, tourist, 24 years old and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed firearms. Appellant alleges that he carried the victim to the shore to be brought to the hospital to save the latter, and who facilitated the surrender to Pat. Padilla a gun which his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail which was granted. The accused denied having made any oral confession alleging that he went to Pat. Padilla not to report the incident but to state that a boy helper in the bar had found a gun on the sand floor while cleaning and that Pat. Padilla picked up the gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a confession, the same would be inadmissible in evidence. He was found guilty in the RTC. Hence the appeal. Issue:
Whether or Not the lower court correct in saying that the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case. Held: YES. Appellant's assertion that the gun he had surrendered was merely found by a boy helper while cleaning the bar deserves no credence for, if it were so, it would have been absurd for him to have placed himself under police custody in the early morning after the incident. Sworn Complaint for "Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm" signed by the Chief of Police also attests to Appellant's oral confession. That Complaint forms part of the record of the proceedings before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga, Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary surrender implies no violation as "no warrant of arrest is issued for the apprehension of the accused for the reason that he is already under police custody before the filing of the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation.
NAVALLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [234 SCRA 177; G.R. NO. 97214; 18 JUL 1994] Facts: Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds was filed. A warrant of arrest was issued, but accusedpetitioner could not be found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty. Issue: Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in favor of the accused violated. Held: No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites: (1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and (4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent. The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed. No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony. PEOPLE VS. ALICANDO [251 SCRA 293; G.R. NO. 117487; 2 DEC 1995] Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of rape with homicide of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand. The incident happened after appellant drank liquor. A neighbor, Leopoldo
Santiago found the victim‘s body and the parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house, Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution. He was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO. Appellant pleaded guilty. The RTC convicted him. Hence an automatic review for the imposition of death penalty. Issue: Whether or Not the death penalty proper. Held: No. The records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt. The RTC violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. There could be no presumption. The court must be sure. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8493 “THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT” The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a plea of not guilty is entered, the accused shall have at least 15 days to prepare for trial. Trial shall commence within 30 days from arraignment as fixed by the court. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed 180 days from the 1st day of trial, except as otherwise authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966] Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed. Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.
CITIZENSHIP
CITIZENSHIP
Art. 4 Sec. 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Sec. 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. Sec. 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. Sec. 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC [174 SCRA 245; G.R. NO. 87193; 23 JUN 1989] Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon. Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His
feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. MERCADO VS. MANZANO [307 SCRA 630; G.R. NO. 135083; 26 MAY 1999] Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of ViceMayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati. Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers‘ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter‘s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual‘s volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondent‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
TECSON VS. COMELEC [424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3 Mar 2004] Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen. Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. BENGZON VS. HRET [357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001] Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.‖ He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.‖ Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
