RE: DATED 17 MARCH 2011 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. SB-28361 ENTITLED 'PEOPLE v. JOSELITO C. BARROZO' FORMER ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR JOSELITO C. BARROZO - DECISION
PER CURIAM: This disbarment case against former Assistant Public Prosecutor Joselito C. Bar rozo (respondent) is taken up by this Court motu proprioby virtue of its power to discipline members of the bar under Se ction I Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Factual Antecedents Jennie Valeriano (Valeriano) was a respondent in several cases fo r estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to Valerian, Barrozo promised can resolve the case s for the amount of 20,000 pesos. Valeriano February 15, 2005, respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents receiving the amount of P20,000.00 from Valeriano. Elements of Bribery that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his functions as a public officer; Balderama v. People, 566 Phil. 412,419 (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a c rime or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (4) that the crime or act relates to the e xercise of his functions as a public officer; Balderama v. People, 566 Phil. 412,419 (2008). The Sandiganbayan, in a Decision dated March 17, 2011, found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum, as m inimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P60,000.00. In addition, it imposed upon him t he penalty of special temporary disqualification. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) but was denied in a R esolution dated September 28, 2011. Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari At the SC but was denied in a Resolution dated December 14, 2011 on the ground that the Petition failed to sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error. Barrozo thrice moved for reconsideration. The first two MRs were denied, while the third one was ordered expunged from the records. In October 2013, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter dated August 14, 2013 from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong stating that its client in Hong Kong received a lette r from the Philippines signed by "Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for long service payment from the employers of domestic helper Anita
G. Calub who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law. Prompted by Wat & C o.'s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice (DOJ) whether respondent is still connected t hereat. In reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent had already resigned from his position effective May 3, 2005. On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of direct bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment. The Court through a Resolution dated December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
Issue: WON the act of signing the claimant form is a practice of law and WON: Conviction of a bribery case warrants disbarment
In his Comment, respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can engage in the practice of law despite his conviction. He then argued that he did not engage in the practice pract ice of law as his act of signing the claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any monetary consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the claimants. This therefore negates practice of law on his part. Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up with its February 20, 2015 Report and Recommendation recommending the disbarment of respondent. Ruling: Under Section 27, Rule 138 1 38 of the Rules of Court, one o ne of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondent's conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [It must involve] an an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted accepte d and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, o r good morals."
Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
'Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by t he Supreme Court for any
G. Calub who passed away on March 4, 2013. Upon checking online and discovering that said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law. Prompted by Wat & C o.'s letter, the OBC inquired from the Department of Justice (DOJ) whether respondent is still connected t hereat. In reply, the DOJ informed OBC that respondent had already resigned from his position effective May 3, 2005. On November 15, 2012, OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of direct bribery by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment. The Court through a Resolution dated December 11, 2013 required respondent to comment on why he should not be suspended/disbarred from the practice of law.
Issue: WON the act of signing the claimant form is a practice of law and WON: Conviction of a bribery case warrants disbarment
In his Comment, respondent identified the issue in this case as whether he can engage in the practice of law despite his conviction. He then argued that he did not engage in the practice pract ice of law as his act of signing the claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any monetary consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since there is no payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between him and the claimants. This therefore negates practice of law on his part. Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up with its February 20, 2015 Report and Recommendation recommending the disbarment of respondent. Ruling: Under Section 27, Rule 138 1 38 of the Rules of Court, one o ne of the grounds for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. And with the finality of respondent's conviction for direct bribery, the next question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves moral turpitude.
To consider a crime as one involving moral turpitude, the act constituting the same must have been "done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [It must involve] an an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted accepte d and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, o r good morals."
Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
'Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by t he Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a c ase without authority [to do so]. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.' Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also, fee fact that t he offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of t he trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, j ustice, honesty and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Clearly, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude which, as mentioned, is a ground for the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer from his office as an attorney. The Court is mindful that a lawyer's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude does not automatically call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment since it m ay, in its discretion, choose to impose the less severe penalty of suspension. As held, "the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion." Here, however, the c ircumstances surrounding the case constrain the Court to impose the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the OBC. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by re quiring that those who exercise this important function be com petent, honorable and reliable - lawyers in whom courts and [the public at large] m ay repose confidence. Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid profession of odious members. WHEREFORE, Arty. Joselito C. Barrozo is here by DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys Pedro Linsangan vs Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino 598 SCRA 133 – Legal Ethics – Unethical Solicitation of Legal Business
In 2005, Atty. Pedro L insangan filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s allegations. Atty. Linsangan also questioned questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card which appears as follows: FRONT
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO LAW OFFICE CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE Fe Marie L. Labiano Paralegal BACK SERVICES OFFERED: CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT, INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS ABROAD. In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied authorizing the printing of such calling cards. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan. 2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of Labiano. HELD: 1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s legal practice. 2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more favorable result. Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law office will finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to a client e xcept, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s c ase, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause. The phrase in the calling card which st ates “w/ financial assistance“, was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling cards, he c annot be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for one year. Joselano Guevarra v. Atty Jose Emmanuel Eala, AC No.7136, August 1, 2007
Facts: Wife of petitioner, Irene Moje was having an illicit affair with the re spondent. After leaving the conjugal home, petitioner found out that Irene and respondent was living together in a re sidential house few blocks away from the church they were married. Few months thereafter, Irene gave birth to a baby girl and wrote the name of the respondent as the father in the certificate of live birth. Petitioner filed a petition for annulment of marriage to Irene and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene. Petitioner also filed a complaint for disbarment before t he IBP-CBD on the ground of gross immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath which was dismissed by the I BP Board of Governors due to lack of merit. Hence, the petition of complaint before the Supreme Court. Issue: Would an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross immoral conduct? Ruling: Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. (Vitug v. Rongcal) Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of t he treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him. (Tucay v. Atty. Tucay) Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law. Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, obse rve mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Leda vs. Tabang [A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992]
Facts: Complainant Evangeline Leda and Respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang contracted marriage performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character. The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies and had taken the Bar examinations, allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife. Complainant, thereafter, filed a Petition for Disbarment against respondent alleging, among others, for having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam and for being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court. Respondent averred that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage for t he reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code thus he could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife and that when he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.
Issue: Whether or not Respondent lacks of good moral character and violated the C ode of Professional Responsibility Held: Yes, Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in dev ious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. Hence, respondent is subjected to suspension from the practice of law until further Orders. ATTY. DALLONG- GALICINAO V. ATTY. CASTRO
Facts: Atty. Dallong-Galicinao is the Clerk of Court of RTC and Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and VP of IBP-Nueva Vizcaya. Respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire whether the records of Civil Case No. 784 had already been remanded to the MCTC. Respondent was not the counsel of either party in that case. Complainant replied that the record had not yet been transmitted since a certified true copy of the CA decision should first be presented. To this respondent retorted, “You mean to say, I would have to go to Manila to get a copy?” Complainant replied that respondent may show instead the copy sent to the party he represents. Respondent t hen replied that complainant should’ve notified him. Complainant explained that it is not her duty to notify the respondent of such duty. Angered, r espondent yelled stuff in Ilocano and left the office, banging the door so loud. He then returned to the office and shouted, “Ukinnam nga babai!” (“Vulva of your mother, you woman!”) Later, complainant filed a manifestation that she won’t appear in the hearing of the case in view of the respondent’s public apology, and that the latter was forgiven already. Held: Respondent is fined the amount of 10k with a warning. Respondent was not the counsel of record of Civil Case No. 784. His explanation that he will enter his appearance in the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the counsel of record r espondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court. He violated Rule 8.02, because this was an ac t of encroachment. It matters not that he did so in good faith. His act of raising his voice and uttering vulgar invectives to the clerk of court was not only illmannered but also unbecoming considering that he did these in front of t he complainant’s subordinates. For these, he violated Rules 7.03 and 8.01 and Canon 8.
The penalty was tempered because respondent apologized to the complainant and the latter accepted it. This is not to say, however, that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the consequences o f the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. THE OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE IBP BAGUIO-BENGUET CHAPTER, CESAR G. ORACION, PRESIDENT, complainant, vs. FERNANDO VIL PAMINTUAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch III, Baguio City, respondent.
DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is the Administrative Complaint filed by the officers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio-Benguet Chapter against Judge Fe rnando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of B aguio City, for gross ignorance of the law, gross violation of constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, oppression and graft and corruption. In their Complaint, the complainants charge the respondent judge of gross ignorance of law stat ing that: 1. His decision in Criminal Case No. 14054-R . . . and in Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R, 15777 -R, 15778-R, 15779-R and 15780-R . . . show his complete ignorance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law; 2. He continues to violate the provision of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by immediately imposing a fine of P500.00 on any lawyer who does not answer the first call, w ithout giving the lawyer an opportunity to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt; 3. He fined Atty. Miguel B. Liceralde P500.00 for allegedly being absent during a hearing when in fact he was present; 4. He dismisses cases if the counsel or a litigant does not appear even for the first time, without giving the concerned party a chance to explain his absence; 5. He limits the period of appeal in criminal cases. In a case handled by Atty. George Florendo, he rendered a decision convicting the accused. After the promulgation of the decision, he told the accused that he was giving him three (3) days only within which to file his notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals or to file an application for probation. He further declared that in case the accused files his notice of appeal, he will double his bail bond and immediately order his ar rest; 6. In the case of PEOPLE VS. ANGELINA MAMARIL, Criminal Case No. 16187-R fo r THEFT of the amount of Fourteen Thousand One Hundred Pesos (P14,100.00), the ac cused, who was seventeen (17) years old, pleaded GUILTY to FRUSTRATED THEFT with the consent of the Prosecution. In his decision, Judge Pamintuan imposed a penalty one degree lower t han that which is imposed for Consummated Theft and ordered the accused to be recommitted to the DSWD Rehabilitation Center by virtue of her minority. However, he failed to reduce the penalty imposed by another degree by reason of said minority in accordance with the clear and explicit provision of Article 68 [2] of the Revised Penal Code. . .; 7. In the case of PEOPLE VS. BENJIE GOSE, MARK JOSEPH OCHARAN, ET AL., C riminal Case No. 14935-R for Robbery, the respondent did the same thing.[2]
The complainants likewise charge the respondent judge of gross violation of the constitutional rights of the accused alleging, as follows: 1. In PEOPLE VS. CEFERINO BANIQUED, Criminal Case No. 13 949-R, for alleged violation of Section 3 [e] of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corr upt Practices Act) the respondent has yet to act on a motion for the preventive suspension of the accused filed way back in 1 996 and which was reiterated after he took over the case in April 1998. The said incident was deemed submitted for resolution by then Acting Presiding Judge Joven F. Costales on Dece mber 2, 1997. When Judge P amintuan took over, the prosecution reiterated the motion which, on August 18, 1998, he ordered as deemed submitted for the resolution of the court. For more than one (1) year, and as of date, Judge Pamintuan has not resolved the motion; 2. In the case of SURLA VS. DIMLA, Civil Case No. 3322-R for Collection of Sum of Money, Judge Pamintuan dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff-witness arrived at about 8:32 in the mo rning or just two (2) minutes later, the counsel asked for reconsideration of the dismissal, manifesting that the witness was ready to testify. In the interest of justice and fair play, the adverse party even manifested his conformity to the reconsideration of the order of dismissal. However, Judge Pamintuan did not rule on the motion and simply considered the same submitted for re solution. For more than four (4) months, the respondent did not resolve the motion; 3. He refused to furnish a copy of the decision to the accused, but when notice of appeal was filed, he directed the counsel for the accused to amend the notice to reflect receipt of the decision although no such decision was really received. This was done in, at least, two (2) instances, particularly, in People vs. Remedios Malapit, et al. (Criminal Cases Nos. 15320, 15323 , 15327, 15570 and 15571) and in People vs. Alejandro Cas (Criminal Case No. 15306-R). The complainants also claim that the respondent judge is arrogant in that: 1. He waves at lawyers and tells them to approach his bench; if, by c hance, a lawyer touches a portion of his bench he shouts at him and berates him saying he has not given him permission to touch his bench; 2. He tells lawyers appearing before him to give priority to his court at the expense of their other court duties; 3. He insults lawyers by means of harsh and intemperate words in the presence of litigants and the public; 4. He impresses to the lawyers and parties litigants that he is a convicting judge. He boasts that since he sat as judge all his decisions in criminal cases ex cept two (2) were convictions; 5. He berates the lowly security guards in the Justice Hall of Baguio City every time they fail to salute him; 6. He insults litigants who want to settle their cases for allegedly wasting his time; 7. He insults doctors and other expert witnesses who cannot appear because of previous commitments; 8. In one occasion, he interrupted Atty. Federico J. Mandapat, Jr., in the c ourse of his cross-examination of a witness and told him: that is not the way to cross-examine, ask questions only that are answerable by yes or no. Atty. Mandapat explained that he was laying the basis for his succeeding questions. The
respondent curtly replied that he was giving him only te n (10) minutes to conduct his cr oss-examination, to which Atty. Mandapat countered by telling the r espondent that it was tantamount to obstruction of justice and violation of the right of the accused to cross-examine a witness being presented against him.[4] The respondent judge is also allegedly guilty of v iolating the Code of Judicial Conduct, as follows: 1. He is discourteous to lawyers, espec ially the new and inexperienced; 2. He tells the client in the presence of the lawyer to engage the services of another lawyer because his lawyer does not know anything or he does not deserve to be paid (Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi); 3. He verbally assaults lawyers; 4. He does not give even a little respect to old lawyers; 5. He insulted in open court retired Court of Appeals Justice Sixto Domondon because he came to court late once. For such act, he was even admonished by the Honorable Supreme Court for his unbecoming conduct towards a former Justice of the Court of Appeals, yet, his arrogance continues unabated and is more manifest, apparently in defiance to the admonition he received.[5] The respondent judge is allegedly guilty of oppressive conduct committed as follows: 1. He unreasonably limits the presentation of evidence to the detriment of party-litigants; 2. He scolds and insults lawyers who stand up and walk while propounding questions to witnesses. He pursues a strategy of assault and appeasement. He verbally assaults lawyers, and if they re-act, he tries to appease some of them in an effort to get them to his side; 3. He directed Atty. Reynaldo U. Agr anzamendez (immediate past President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter) to stand up, in lieu of the accused who jumped bail, during the promulgation of t he decision in absentia. Atty. Agranzamendez acting as de oficio counsel re quested that he be allowed to sit down because the people in court might think that he was the accused but the judge in utter disregard of elementary courtesy that befits a lawyer did not budge. Instead, he berated Atty. Agr anzamendez and told him to shut up and dont argue with the court. When Atty. Agranzamendez got tired during the reading of the long decision, he slightly leaned to his side. When the Judge noticed this, he shouted at him and told him to stand up properly. This he did in the presence of lawyers and litigants who could only look at Atty. Agranzamendez with sympathy and compassion; 4. He cited Atty. Nicasio M. Aliping, Jr., for contempt for not appearing as a witness in one case before his sala. When Atty. Aliping learned about this, he explained to the judge that he was not notified of the date of hearing and presented re cords clearly showing that indeed he was not notified. Atty. Aliping prayed that the order be lifted and set aside. The judge r efused and told Atty. Aliping that it was a different matter. To this day, the o rder citing him for contempt has not bee n lifted; 5. In one case where Atty. Cirilo Cawed is the private complainant, the latte r executed an affidavit of desistance praying, among others, for the dismissal of the case. The respondent did not act on it and instead issued an order threatening his arrest if he will not appear before him and explain.[6] Finally, the respondent judge is allegedly guilty of corruption:
Respondent had a certain EUFEMIO M. GULA, his long-time bodyguard, appointed as driver assigned to his branch despite his knowledge that Mr. Gula has no drivers license, and worse, he does not k now how to drive. This supposed driver draws his salary from the City of Baguio. The driver fills up the required itinerary forms, which indicate that he supposedly drives for the respondent from Baguio City to Manila and back, but the truth is that they commute by bus. It is a certain WILLIAM DANNANG, personnel from the maintenance department of the Baguio City Justice Hall, who actually drives for the respondent.[7] In his Comment, the respondent j udge vehemently denies the charges hurled against him. On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, the respondent judge avers: 1. Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R to 15 780-R, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Dumez, et al. are now pending appeal before the Court o f Appeals. . . Whether or not the decision of the Respondent Judge in the aforecited cases is correct will be a matter only the appellate [court] can decide. The perceived errors in the imposition of the penalty imposed should be addressed in the AccusedAppellants brief. Assuming arguendo that the Respondent Judge erred in applying the [I]ndeterminate [S]entence [L]aw, which of course he denies, the proper remedy would have been Appeal, and not to file Administrative Case against the Judge; 2. In Criminal Case No. 14054-R entitled People vs. Polic-ew, Respondent Judge submits the same argument . . . ; 3. In Criminal Case No. 16187-R entitled People vs. Mamaril and Criminal Case No. 14935 entitled People vs. Gose, the decisions of the Re spondent Judge had become final and executory without the Counsels appealing. Had the Counsels appealed their cases, or at least Moved for Reconsideration, they could have properly raised the mitigating circumstances, which they claim were not appreciated by t he Respondent Judge. Again the remedy is not t he filing of administrative case against the Judge; 4. The Administrative Case against the Respondent Judge in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483 was resolved by the Supreme Court in a Decision dated September 17, 1999 and received by the Respondent Judge on October 4, 1999. Respondent Judge has FIFTEEN (15) DAYS to file a Motion for Reconsideration, which he will comply with. Suffice it to say that in this case, the Respondent Judge believed, as he believes in good faith that he had no co gent reason to inhibit himself from the case . . .; 5. The imposition of fines for tardiness or non-appearance in scheduled cases is inherent upon any court as part of its disciplining authority. The remedy would have been to seek reconsideration and not an Administrative Case. The Court has never collected on the fine, provided the reasons cited in t he reconsideration are meritorious. The Complainants cite the case o f Atty. Miguel Liceralde. Said lawyer was never fined by the Respondent Judge. The fact is, as of date, the Respondent Judge never issued a writ of execution for the collection of fines from lawyers. . . There were only four (4) instances when fines were paid by lawyers who volunteered to pay the fine on their own without filing a motion for reconsideration. . .; 5. The dismissal of the case for failure of the parties or counsel to appear in their scheduled hearings is so provided by the Rules. Again the remedy is a motion for reconsideration and not an administrative case on petty grounds. . .;
6. Atty. George Florendo who is not even a signatory to this Petition is mentioned, albeitly [sic] without his consent regarding People vs. Joseph Santos, Criminal Case No. 15171-R for Illegal Possession of Marijuana where he appears for the accused. Nowhere in the records does it show that he limited the fifteen (15) day period to appeal.[8] On his alleged violation of the constitutional rights of the acc used, the respondent judge counters: 1. In Criminal Case No. 13949-R, People vs. Baniqued for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, which was inherited by the Respondent Judge, he submits that no violation was ever made as the complainants would want to imply. Complainants wanted the accused preventively suspended. The defense insisted that the entire prosecution evidence first be heard, as a pr e-suspension hearing which was granted by the respondent judges predecessor, Hon. Joven Costales, and by the re spondent judge himself. Thereafter, despite the opposition of the Accused to the preventive suspension, an order was issued on September 2, 1999. The move for suspension was complicated by the incomplete prosecution evidence as well as the constant absence of the Manila-based private prosecutor. The Court has given wide latitude to the accused and he has no cause to complain; 2. Civil Case No. 3322-R entitled S urla vs. Dimla for Sum of Money, is a continuing attempt by t he Complainants to mislead the Supreme Court. This case had been dismissed and the dismissal has become final and executory. The case was earlier dismissed for failure to prosecute on the part of the Plaintiff for failure to appear during the scheduled hearings of the case, but a Motion for Reconsideration was filed and granted by the Respondent Judge. Several postponements at the instance of the plaintiff were tolerably allowed but then again the plaintiff failed to appear during the scheduled hearing. The Respondent Judge dismissed the case on the same grounds. No motion for reconsideration was filed and the decision became final. Clearly no fault c an be attributed to the Respondent Judge; 3. Respondent Judge denies refusing to furnish copies of t he decision to the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 15321-R, 15323-R, 15327-R, 15770-R and 15771-R entitled People vs. Malapit, et al. as these are matters of public record available and accessible to the public. He could not and never will prevent or obstruct any litigant, much more a lawyer to access of records pertaining to a case; 4. Respondent Judge denies directing the defense counsel to amend his Notice of Appeal to allegedly reflect receipt of the decision in Criminal Case No. 15306-R entitled Pe ople vs. Alejandro Cas, as such an action will gain him nothing. The Manifestation of Apology by the concerned defense counsel says it all. Anent the charge that he is arrogant, the respondent judge declares: 1. The pettiness of the charges (3A to G) are completely wasteful of the Supreme Courts precious time as they are bereft of the specifics and are mere general allegations; 2. As to 3H involving Atty. Federico Mandapat, said defense counsel together with Atty. Juan Alberto and Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin were requested to approach the bench. Atty. Mandapat was advised by the respondent judge to ask questions answerable by yes or no as it w as observed that he was repeating questions asked on direct examination. Certainly, the court can advise counsel on how to conduct proper cross-examination so as not to tax the time of both the court and the witnesses. When the Respondent Judge said ten minutes, he was referring to the time left for him to conduct the crossexamination on that trial day, as there were other ready cases. It was not limiting his time to cross-
examine the witness, as the records would show that the next trial date, Atty. Mandapat was allowed to his hearts content to continue the cross-examination. On the charge of violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the respondent judge states: 1. Respondent Judge denies 4A to D on his non-support for new lawyers. The fact is he encourages old practitioners to help new lawyers and he announces this in open court as a matter of policy. . . ; 2. Atty. Primitivo Jularbal, 72 years old, a former Professor in the College of Law of Saint Louis University and a long time distinguished practitioner in the City of Baguio, and Atty. Juan Valdez, 70 years old, former City Legal Officer of Mayors Luis L. Lardizabal and Mauricio G. Domogan can affirm the respect, deference and dignified treatment he habitually accord these senior lawyers; 3. As to the case of former Justice Sixto Domondon for w hich the Respondent Judge was admonished by the Supreme Court, your Respondent Judge was barely one month in office when he asked the former justice, whom he did not know at that time to come on time for his hearings. Said justice was more than forty-five (45) minutes late for the pre -trial conference and Respondent Judge applied the rule on him, like he did to all lawyers. As to his alleged oppressive conduct, the respondent judge states as follows: 1. Respondent Judge denies 5A and B as they are mere general statements without basis in fact and in law; 2. In the case of Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, as defense counsel in Cr iminal Case No. 7304-R, entitled People vs. Liwayway Cruz, he re quired said counsel in the absence of the acc used to rise as a matter of procedure during the promulgation of decisions. This is by way of proper decorum and discipline, which the Respondent Judge submits as part of the inherent power of the court.The allegation that the Respondent Judge berated Atty. Agranzamendez and told him to shut up is a patent lie. The Respondent Judge recalls asking him politely not to ar gue with the Court, on matters like standing up to show decorum and respect to the judicial processes . . .; 3. Atty. Nicasio Aliping was never cited for c ontempt, contrary to what the complainants want to impress. No order was ever issued by the Court to the effect . . .; 4. Atty. Cirilo Cawed, who is not a signatory to the complaint, is the private complainant in Criminal Cases No. 13535-R entitled People vs. Licayayo for Estafa. Despite several orders for him to appear in the scheduled hearings, he refused, ignored and neglected the same. He was warned that his continued defiance would constrain the court to order his arrest. The Respondent Judge submits that it is the rule and practice and even the responsibility, and duty of the court to summon the complaining witness who executed an Affidavit of Desistance to det ermine the authenticity or genuineness of the affidavit. The Respondent Judge should not be condemned for ensuring the integr ity of affidavits submitted in court. Regarding the charge of corruption ag ainst him, the respondent judge asserts that: 1. As a public officer, he is ready to face all kinds of charges as an inherent risk that comes with the territory. It hurts him; however, to be accused of the baseless charge of Graft and Corruption, for he values his honor and his name, presumably like the Complainants themselves;
It is a matter of public and judicial knowledge that courts have no employment item for drivers. On this point alone, how could Respondent Judge appoint a driver as alleged in the complaint? Had the Complainants asked or in the least conducted a thorough investigation, they would have discovered that in the RTC, Baguio City, Branch 3, there was a vacant item for City-paid Utility Worker. In 1988, the RTC Clerk of Court, Atty. Delilah G. Muoz, made a project proposal to the City Government of Baguio for the revival of item. . . Almost a year later, the City Government approved the request, and it was Mayor Mauricio G. Domogan who appointed Mr. Eufemio Gula to the position and not the Respondent Judge. The item approved was for a driver and not as Utility Worker. A correction was sought and again Mayor Mauricio G. Domogan and the City Council of Baguio approved the amendment for the appointment of Utility Worker and not as Driver. . . Mr. Eufemio Gula is not a Court-paid Employee and performs his duty as a utility worker paid by the City Government of Baguio. He has no drivers license, as he did not apply as a driver. The respondent judge did not appoint Gula and no judiciary funds were used for his pay. Neither did the respondent judge screen his qualification as to whether or not it conforms to the minimum criteria set by the city for the item - utility worker.[13] The respondent judge prays that the administrative complaint against him be dismissed for lack of merit. In its Memorandum dated November 17, 1999, the Office of the Court Administrator revealed that since his appointment to the judiciary on February 23, 1998, four (4) administrative cases had been filed against the respondent judge: 1. RTJ-99-1450 Justice Sixto Domondon vs. Judge Fernando Vil P amintuan Respondent was REPRIMANDED by the Court on June 14, 1999; 2. RTJ-99-1483 Lauro Gacayan vs. Judge Fer nando Vil Pamintuan Respondent was FINED P10,000.00 and REPRIMANDED for Violation of Canon 2 of the Code o f Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the C ode of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming an officer of t he Judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and WARNED that a repetition of the foregoing or similar transgressions shall be dealt with more severely; 3. OCA IPI No. 99-808-RTJ The instant case under consideration; 4. OCA IPI No. 99-832-RTJ Mr. Galo R. Reyes vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan for willful violation of the Rules of Court and incompetence. Awaiting comment o f the respondent judge.[14] Considering the seriousness of the charges against t he respondent judge, the OCA recommended that an investigation be conducted thereon. In the Resolution of December 8, 1999, the Court referred the instant case, together with OCA IPI No. 99-832-RTJ (Mr. Galo R. Reyes vs. Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan), to the Presiding Justice of the Court o f Appeals for immediate raffle among the incumbent appellate court justices.[15] The cases were raffled to Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (Investigating Justice) who forthwith set the cases for preliminary conference in accor dance with Section 1, Rule 58 o f the Revised Rules of Court. Thereafter, hearings were held where the complainants and the respondent judge were allowed to present their witnesses in support of their respective allegations.
The Evidence of the Complainants The complainants presented Lauro Gacayan, Jurgenson Lagdao, Federico Mandapat, Jr., R eynaldo Agranzamendez, Reynaldo Cortes, Joris Karl Dacawi, Maria L igaya Rivera, Rogelio Daet and Edgardo Ancheta. Except for Ancheta, all the witnesses are lawyers and members of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter. Gross Ignorance of the Law and Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused Attorneys Lauro Gacayan and Jurgenson Lagdao were presented to substantiate the charges of gross
ignorance of law and violation of the constitutional rights of the accused against the respondent judge. Atty. Gacayan executed the Affidavit dated Marc h 15, 2000[16] and during his testimony affirmed the truthfulness of its contents. Atty. Gacayan stated that he is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio C ity. He was the counsel for the accused in People vs. Ceferino Baniqued (Criminal Case No. 13949-R) for Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for the defendant in Albert Surla vs. Nelson Dimla (Civil Case No. 3322-R) for collection of sum of money. These two cases were pending before the RTC, Branch 3 of Baguio City, presided over by the respondent judge. According to Atty. Gacayan, in Peo ple vs. Ceferino Baniqued, the prosecution filed a motion for the preventive suspension of the accused. The latter duly opposed said motion. In his Order dated August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted for resolution the aforesaid motion. However, it was only on September 29, 1999, or more than one (1) year after its submission for resolution, that Atty. Gacayan, as counsel for the accused, received an order resolving the motion. Upon further ver ification, Atty. Gacayan discovered that the said order was received by the RTCs Office of the Clerk of Court only on September 23, 1999, after the instant administrative complaint had already been filed against the respondent judge. Incidentally, the respondent judges failure to act on the motion for preventive suspension in the Baniqued case is one of the infractions raised in this administrative complaint.[17] Further, during the hearing of Surla vs. Dimla on May 18, 1998, the respondent judge dismissed the case on account of the fact that when the case was called at 8:30 in the morning, the plaintiffs first witness was not around. When the witness arrived at 8:32 a.m., or barely two (2) minutes afte r, the plaintiffs counsel manifested his readiness to present the witness. The respondent judge denied the same. On even date, the plaintiffs counsel moved for a reconsideration of the said dismissal, which was not opposed by Atty. Gacayan as counsel for the defendant. The motion for reconsideration was submitted for resolution at the hearing on June 5, 1998. However, it took the respondent judge almost four (4) months to resolve this simple and unopposed motion.[18] Atty. Gacayan likewise narrated that he w as in the sala of the respondent judge during the promulgation of his decisions in People vs. Danilo Dumez et al (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R up to 15780-R), People vs. Bernardo Polic-ew (Criminal Case No. 14054-R), People vs. Angelina Mamaril (Criminal Case No. 16187R), People vs. Benjie Gose et al. (Criminal Case No. 14935-R). The last case particularly caught Atty. Gacayans attention because the penalty imposed on the accuse d, who was then a minor, was t he same as that of all the other accused who were of legal age.
Atty. Lagdao, also one of the complainants in this case, executed an Affidavit dated August 27, 1999[19] and Reply-Affidavit dated March 17, 2000[20] and during his testimony, affirmed the truthfulness of the contents thereof. Atty. Lagdao is connected with the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) in Baguio City and handled People vs. Remedios Malapit (Criminal Cases Nos. 15321-R, 15323 -R, 15327-R, 15770-R and 15771-R) and People vs. Alejandro Cas (Criminal Case No. 15306-R) pending before the sala of the respondent judge. In these two cases, the respondent judge failed to immediately furnish the accused copies of the decisions after their respective promulgation. In the Malapit case, a copy of the decision was served on the accused seventeen (17) days after the judgment was promulgated; in the Cas case, fifteen (15) days after promulgation of judgment. Moreover, in the latter case, one of the court personnel approached Atty. Lagdao and told him that the respondent judge wanted the tenor of the notice of appeal changed by deleting therein the phrase copies of which [referring to the dec ision] the Honorable Court has yet to release. In order not to prejudice the accused, Atty. Lagdao did as instructed. Atty. Lagdao admitted that, to support their charge of gross ignorance of law, he sec ured certified true copies of the following decisions of the re spondent judge where he misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law: Decision in Criminal Case No. 11363-R is marked as Exhibit D; Decision in Criminal Case No. 15108-R is marked as Exhibit E; Decision in Criminal Case No. 15544-R is marked as Exhibit F; Decision in Criminal Case No. 3200-R is marked as Exhibit G; Decision in Criminal Case No. 7703-R is marked as Exhibit H; Decision in Criminal Case No. 13646-R is marked as Exhibit I; Decision in Criminal Case No. 14054-R is marked as Exhibit J; Decision in Criminal Case No. 14524-R is marked as Exhibit K; Decision in Criminal Case No. 15600-R is marked as Exhibit L; Decision in Criminal Case No. 14776-R is marked as Exhibit M; Decision in Criminal Case No. 15932-R is marked as Exhibit N; Decision in Criminal Case No. 15653-R is marked as Exhibit O; Decision in Criminal Case No. 13379-R is marked as Exhibit P; Decision in Criminal Case No. 13367-R is marked as Exhibit Q; Decision in Criminal Case No. 14929-R is marked as Exhibit R; Decision in Criminal Case No. 7304-R is marked as Exhibit S; and, Decision in Criminal Case No. 14925-R is marked as Exhibit T. Arrogance, Oppression and Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct Atty. Federico Mandapat, Jr. was presented to support the complainants charges of arrogance and
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct against the respondent judge. As one of the complainants in the instant case, Atty. Mandapat executed the Affidavit dated Decem ber 14, 1999[22] and affirmed the truthfulness of its contents. Atty. Mandapat, a councilor of Baguio City, is
also engaged in the practice of law. He appears in various courts in Baguio City, including that presided by the respondent judge. He recalled that during the hearing of People vs. Andrade presided by the re spondent judge, his (Atty. Mandapats) cross-examination of the witness was interrupted by the respondent judge. Atty. Mandapat, the other defense counsel and the prosecutor, were instructed to approach the bench. In a loud voice, the respondent judge directe d Atty. Mandapat to refrain from asking questions that were already asked in the direct-examination. Atty. Mandapat explained that he was j ust trying to test the credibility of the witness and in fact, t he witness gave different answers on cross-examination. The respondent judge then limited Atty. Mandapats time to cross -examine the witness to ten (10) minutes. When Atty. Mandapat inquired from the respondent judge whether he was limiting the right of the accused to cross-examine the witness, the respondent judge replied that he did not want to argue. Atty. Mandapat opined that in Baguio City, the re spondent judge had the reputation of being arrogant, and is known for treating litigants in an ar rogant and rude manner. To further substantiate the charges of violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and oppression against the respondent judge, the complainants presented Atty. Reynaldo Agranzamendez. He executed the Affidavit dated March 20, 2000[23] and during his testimony affirmed the truthfulness of its contents. Atty. Agranzamendez, also one of the complainants in this case, was the Past President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter. He narrated that he appeared as defense counsel for accused Liwayway Cruz in an estafa case pending before the sala of the respondent judge. D uring the promulgation of judgment on July 29, 1999, Atty. Agranzamendez manifested that the accused was not in court. The respondent judge ordered Atty. Agranzamendez to stand up in place of the accused during the reading of the decision. Atty. Agranzamendez requested that he be allowed to sit down because if he stood up, it would seem that he was the accused. The respondent judge curtly told him not t o argue with the court. During the reading of the decision, every time the clerk of court mentioned the word estafa, Atty. Agranzamendez would cringe in embarrassment. Since the decision was quite long, Atty. Agranzamendez leaned on his side at one point. The respondent judge immediately banged his gavel and sternly told Atty. Agranzamendez to stand up properly. Several lawyers witnessed the incident. In fact, Atty. Jose Molintas playfully stood beside Atty. Agranzamendez and pretended to be his counsel. Atty. Agranzamendez felt so humiliated at the t ime. Even after the incident, several people, including his students at the Baguio Colleges Foundation where he was Dean of the Collegeof Law, approached Atty. Agranzamendez and asked him why he was co nvicted for estafa. Atty. Joris Karl Dacawi was likewise pre sented, also to substantiate the charge of violations of t he Code of Judicial Conduct by the respondent judge. He executed the Affidavit dated March 23, 2000[24] and during his testimony, affirmed the truthfulness thereof. He worke d as an associate at the Sanidad and Villanueva Law Offices in Baguio City. One of the cases assigned to him was Alejo Cabreros vs. Sussie Edralin which was pending before the sala of the respondent judge. During one of the hearings of the said case, Atty. Dacawi manifested to the respondent judge that although he was ready to pre sent the plaintiff Mr. Cabreros as first witness, the latter was not feeling well. Atty. Dacawi t hus moved that the hearing be reset to another day. The respondent judge angrily remarked that Atty. Dacawi was just not ready to present his case and suggested that Mrs. Cabreros, who was also in the court, be presented as
witness instead. Atty. Dacawi explained that he could not do as suggested because it would destroy his manner of presenting the evidence. The respondent judge eventually cancelled the hearing that day but stated that the same be deducted from the number of trial dates allotted for the plaintiff. The respondent judge further ordered Mr . Cabreros to stand up and told the latter not to pay Atty. Dacawi as no service was rendered by him as counsel that day; hence, did not deserve to be paid. Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act The complainants likewise charge the respondent judge with graft and corruption. In support thereof, they presented Atty. Reynaldo Cortes who executed the Affidavit dated July 14, 2000.[25] Atty. Cortes is a practicing lawyer in Baguio City and also one of the complainants in this case. He averred that on July 1, 1999, a certain Eufemio Dula was appointed as driver by the City Government of Baguio City and was assigned to the r espondent judge. According to Atty. Cortes, he had observed that Dula accompanied the respondent judge everywhere he went.Despite his designation as driver, Dula never drove the car of the respondent judge. Upon verification by t he complainants, it was discovered that Dula had no license to drive. In September 1999, the RTC of Baguio City, through its clerk of court, requested that the item of Dula be amended from driver to utility worker. Other Corroborative Evidence Atty. Maria Ligaya Rivera, Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 3 of Baguio City, was also presented as one of the witnesses of the complainants. She testified that she received the notice of appeal filed in the case of People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Cas and, following the standard procedure, forwarded it to Edgardo Ancheta, the clerk-in-charge of the criminal docket, for submission to the respondent judge for his action. However, the respondent judge did not then act on the matter. Instead, he called Atty. Rivera to his chamber and instructe d her to tell Atty. Lagdao, the PAO lawyer handling the case, to change the notice of appeal; otherwise, he would not act on it. Atty. R ivera took the notice of appeal and talked to Ancheta regarding the respondent judges instructions. Thereafter, Atty. Lagdao told Atty. Rivera t hat he could no longer change the notice of appeal as the same already formed part of the records. The respondent judge insisted that the notice of appeal be changed. Atty. Lagdao maintained that he could no longer do so because a later date would be reflected as the date of its receipt. In such a case, it would appear as if the same was filed out of time. Atty. Lagdao was eventually constrained to change the notice of appeal by deleting the phrase copie s of which [referring to the decision] the Honorable Court has yet to release. According to Atty. Rivera, the decision on People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Cas was released fifteen (15) days after its promulgation. Atty. Rivera also confirmed that Dula was a part of the respondent judges staff. Dulas designation was originally as driver of the respondent judge but was later on changed to utility worker. Per the respondent judges instruction, Atty. Rivera signed Dulas accomplishment report. This report falsely stated that he drove for the respondent judge. Atty. Rivera admitted that, by signing Dulas
accomplishment report, she was abetting the crime of falsification of public document. However, she maintained that she could not go against the instruction of the respondent judge on the matter. Atty. Rivera was the one who read the decision in People v. Liwayway Cr uz during its promulgation. She corroborated Atty. Agranzamendez allegation that he was made to stand up to take the place of the accused during the promulgation of the judgment. She confirmed that Atty. Agranzamendez expressed his objection to this procedure but t he respondent judge merely told him to shut up. Atty. Rogelio Daet, the Regional Director of the Public Attorneys Office of the Cordillera Administrative Region including Baguio City, was presented to c orroborate the testimony of Atty. Lagdao regarding the changing of the notice of appeal in People vs. Remedios Malapit. Atty. Daet testified that as the immediate superior of Atty. Lagdao, he assigned the latter to handle the PAO cases before the sala of the respondent judge. At one time, Atty. Lagdao approached Atty. Daet to express his apprehension that they had not yet received the decision in the Malapit case despite the fact that almost fifteen (15) days had already passed since its promulgation. Atty. Lagdao informed Atty. Daet that he would file a notice of appeal even without receiving a copy o f the decision. Atty. Lagdao showed to Atty. Daet the notice of appeal and manifestation that were subsequently filed in co nnection with the Malapit case. Some time in July 1999, the respondent judge called Atty. Daet to his chamber and informed the latter that he disliked the tone of Att y. Lagdaos notice of appeal and manifestation. The respondent judge returned the said pleadings to Atty. Daet and instructed him to direct Atty. Lagdao to change them. Atty. Daet did as he was told and later on learned that Atty. Lagdao had complied with the respondent judges directive and deleted the phrase t hat he found objectionable so as not to pre judice the accused. Thereafter, upon the instance of the respondent judge, Atty. Daet transferred Atty. Lagdao to another sala. Atty. Daet did not assign another lawyer to t ake Atty. Lagdaos place because the re spondent judge insinuated that his approval should first be sought regarding the assignment of the PAO lawyer to his sala. Atty. Daet felt that this was an encroachment on his prerogative as regional directo r of the PAO. Edgardo Ancheta, clerk-in-charge of the criminal docket in the sala of the respondent j udge, testified to corroborate Atty. Lagdaos testimony. He recalled t hat at one time, Atty. Ma. Ligaya Rivera, his immediate superior, directed him to talk to Atty. Lagdao regarding the notice of appeal and manifestation that he filed in the Cas case. Atty. Rivera instructed Ancheta to t ell Atty. Lagdao to delete the phrase copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release in the notice of appeal in order that the respondent judge would act on it. Atty. Lagdao initially refused to change the notice of appeal but when he was told that the respondent judge would not act on the same unless the objectionable phrase was deleted, Atty. Lagdao was constrained to obey the respondent judges directive. In order that the second notice of appeal would not be considered as filed o ut of time, it was the date of receipt of the first notice of appeal that was stamped on the se cond notice of appeal. This was done presumably with the respondent judges knowledge and consent, s ince it was him who ordered the alteration. The Evidence of the Respondent Judge
On the other hand, to refute the charges against him, the respondent judge presented thirteen (13) witnesses: Atty. Victoria C.M. Sturch, Atty. Primitivo C. Jularbal, Atty. Ma. Inglay Capuyon-Fokno, Justice Sixto Domondon, Atty. Lourdes Maita Andres, Atty. Juan B. Valdez, Lina de Guzman Dalusong, Prosecutor Lilian Dris S. Alejo, Sister Mercedes del Rosario Nicolas, Atty. Johnico Alim, Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin, Ret. RTC Judge Concepcion B. Buencamino and Atty. Lyssa G.S. Pagano -Calde. Atty. Victoria C.M. Sturch, a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit dated January 18, 2001.[26] As a practicing lawyer, Atty. Sturch has appeared before the sala of the respondent judge. She averred that the respondent consistently starts the hearings at exactly 8:30 in the morning and that he is strict in t he observance of decorum inside the courtroom. S he has not witnessed any instance when the respondent acted in an arrogant or offensive manner. She was of the opinion that the respondent judge could not be influenced or bribed by anyone. Atty. Primitivo C. Jularbal also a member of t he IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, ex ecuted an Affidavit dated January 22, 2001.[27] He is seventy-one (71) years old and has bee n in the practice of law for over thirty-four (34) years and in the course thereof has appeared before the respondent judge. Atty. Jularbal revealed that he was asked to sign the complaint against the respondent judge but that he declined. He believed that filing an administrative charge against a j udge whenever he committed an error would set a bad precedent. He dismissed the charge of gr oss ignorance of the law against the respondent judge as very easy to make, but whether it can be proven is another matter. He knew of only one instance when the respondent judge imposed a fine of P 500 on the counsel for tardiness. But, according to Atty. Jularbal, the respondent judge did not make any effort to e nforce the payment of the fine. He has not witnessed any arrogant or oppressive conduct by the respondent judge. Neither has he seen the respondent judge act discourteously or disrespectfully towards senior lawyers like him (Atty. Jularbal). Atty. Ma. Inglay Capuyan-Fokno another member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit dated January 22, 2001.[28] Atty. Fokno admitted that in 1998, t he respondent judge, when newly-appointed, intimidated the lawyers who appeared before his sala, including herself. She noticed, however, that over the lapse of time, the respondent judge had bec ome more considerate towards the lawyers. Atty. Fokno maintained that the respondent judge is diligent and serious in the performance of his job as he starts the hearings at promptly 8:30 in the morning. Retired Justice Sixto Domondon, a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit dated May 24, 2000[29] in the respondents brief. Justice Domondon manifested that as a practicing lawyer, he has three (3) civil cases pending before the sala of the respondent judge. He confirmed that while he filed an administrative case against the r espondent judge for which the latter was sanctioned by this Court, he could vouch for the respondents integrity, capacity and moral will to dispense justice fairly. Atty. Lourdes Maita Andres executed her Affidavit in January 2001.[30] As a practicing lawyer, she has appeared several times before the respondent judge. Atty. Andres considered the respondent j udge to be fair and even-handed in dealing with the litigants. On one occasion, Atty. Andres approached the respondent ex-parte to ask for a resetting of a case. The respondent judge refused, explaining that the
other party should be present para walang masabi. Atty. Andres realized that the respondent judge could not be easily approached for any favor. Atty. Juan Valdez also a member of t he IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, e xecuted the Affidavit dated January 11, 2001.[31] Atty. Valdez has been in the pract ice of law for over thirty (30) years and has appeared before the respondent j udge. According to him, the respondent judge str ictly requires the observance of proper decorum inside the courtroom. For example, the lawyers are enjoined to arrive at the hearings on time; otherwise, a fine is imposed on them for tardiness. Upon proper motion and explanation, however, the respondent judge would lift the fine. Further, the respondent judge requires that lawyers (1) wear the proper attire; and (2) refrain from making unnecessary noises when t he court is in session. In Atty. Valdez view, t he strictness of the respondent judge is necessary for orderly court proceedings. Aside from handling cases, Atty. Valdez acted as the City Legal Officer of Baguio City from 1992 up to 1996. As such, he confirmed the practice of the local government of Baguio Cityof hiring contractual employees and assigning them to the various courts in the city. Lina de Guzman Dalusong was one of the parties in a civil case that was pending in the sala of the respondent judge. She executed the Affidavit dated April 2, 2001.[32] She testified that prior to the respondent judges appointment to the court, the civil case where she was one of the parties had been pending for almost twelve (12) years. W hen the respondent judge took over the said sala, Dalusong noticed that he closely monitored the status of the cases pending therein. He enforced a strict system where the litigants, as well as their counsel, were enjoined to come on time. Consequently, the pending cases, including that of Dalusong, were resolved wit h dispatch. Dalusong also attested to the respondent judges fairness in dealing with the parties and deciding the cases assigned to him. Lilian Doris Alejo is a State Prosecutor in the Department of Justice. She executed the Affidavit dated February 23, 2001.[33] She has appeared before the respondent judge and found him to be accommodating. She noted that the respondent judge would see to it that both parties are present before he talked to either of them. Since Alejo and her opposing counsel were based in Manila, they often requested for cancellation of hearings and the respondent judge invariably granted the same. Sister Mercedes Nicolas is a nun belonging to the Franciscan Sisters, Immaculate Conception Congregation and resides at the Litt le Flower Convent in Baguio City. She e xecuted the Affidavit dated February 26, 2001.[34] Sister Nicolas knows the respondent judge because he used to visit their convent to pray and attend their retreats. There was likewise an occasion when Sister Nicolas appeared as witness in a case pending before the respondent judge. During the hearing, Sister Nicolas saw that the respondent judge treated the people with patience and kindness. Atty. Johnico Alim, a member of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter, executed the Affidavit dated December 18, 2000.[35] As a practicing lawyer, he has also appeared before the respondent judge. Atty. Alim claimed that he has personally observed the respondent judges deportment in and out of the courtroom, and that he could vouch for the latters neutrality, competence and integrity. Prosecutor Raymond Tabangin, a trial prosecutor assigned to the sala of the respondent judge, executed the Affidavit dated October 15, 1999.[36] Prosecutor Tabangin asserted that the respondent judge is a strict and idealistic judge, who starts the hearings promptly at 8:30 in the morning and ends t hem
at 12:00. He requires the lawyers to be punctual and imposes a fine on them if they are late. The orders and processes issued by the respondent judge are carried out promptly. The respondent judges strictness has resulted in the unclogging of the court docket as he reduced the same from over 300 cases to a manageable level. Civil cases that were pending for several years had been disposed of and in criminal cases, the accused would opt to enter into plea bargaining because the respondent judge has a reputation of being honest and incorruptible. According to Prosecutor Tabangin, the respondent judge, for all his strictness, has a soft spot for young lawyers as he patiently teaches them what to do. He takes great care not to arouse suspicion of partiality and bias in dealing with the parties. He carefully uses his words when admonishing lawyers and, contrary to the com plainants allegation, telling a lawyer to shut up is definitely not his style. Despite his stern and uncompromising countenance, the respondent judge is a God-fearing and deeply religious man. Retired Judge Concepcion Buencamino is eighty-three (83) years old and, upon her retirement from the judiciary, has engaged in the practice of law, albeit on a limited basis. She executed the Affidavit dated February 24, 2000.[37] She averred that she has appeared before the respondent judge in connection with a case involving a property dispute among siblings.Through the efforts of the respondent judge, the parties reached an amicable settlement sparing them from what could have been an expensive and long litigation. Judge Buencamino stated that the respondent judge possesses a good knowledge of the law. She observed that the respondent judge is never arrogant or overbearing. He listens to the witnesses and asks clarificatory questions in a polite manner. Judge Buencamino confirmed that the respondent judge is strict about the attendance of the lawyers during hearings. Through Atty. Lyssa G.S. Pagano-Calde, the respondent judge pre sented several documentary evidence to further refute the charges against him. The Investigating Justices Report and Recommendation Upon careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the complainants and the respondent judge, the Investigating Justice found that the charges against the respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law, violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, arrogance, oppression, impropriety and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct are well-grounded, while the charge of graft and corruption was unsubstantiated. The Investigating Justice made the following recommendation: On the basis of the foregoing evaluation on the evidence presented by both the complainants and the respondent, undersigned Investigating Justice recommends, for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance , Oppressive Conduct and Violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics that respondent Judge Fernando Vil P amintuan be meted the severest of administrative penalties, that is, he should be stripped of his robe. IN VIEW THEREOF, recommendation is hereby ma de that respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges with prejudice to reinstatement to re-employment in any branch of the government or its corporation for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Gross Violation of t he Constitutional Rights of the Accused, Arrogance, Oppressive Conduct, and Violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds the Report and Recommendation of t he Investigating Justice well-taken. On Gross Ignorance of the Law The respondent judges ignorance of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is palpable. In P eople vs. Dumez, et al. (Criminal Cases Nos. 15776-R up to 15779-R), the respondent judge sente nced the accused who were found guilty of theft to suffer imprisonment from seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum to eight (8) years and eight (8) months as maximum of prision mayor for each c ase. The penalty imposed by the respondent judge was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence Law which prescribes that the minimum of the imposable penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalty for theft is prision mayor, the minimum of the penalty imposable on the accused should have been within the r ange of prision correccional, the penalty next lower to prision mayor. A perusal of the other decisions rendered by the respondent judge shows that his erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalties was committed in not just one or two instances. Rather, as correctly raised by the complainants, the respondent judge had repeatedly misapplied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in at least seventeen (17) other cases, to wit: 1. People vs. Rose Dalmacio, et. al. Crim. Case No. 11363-R, for Theft (Exhibit D) The amount stolen was P10,000.00. Under Art. 3 09, Par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable is prision correccional in its medium and maximum period. However, the se ntence imposed by Respondent Judge was from four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Worse, he imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency when no fine was imposed as penalty. 2. People vs. Joel Ramos, et al. Crim. Case No. 15108-R, for Robbery With Violence (Exhibit E) As found by respondent, the provision applicable is Article 294, Par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code which provides a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. However, he imposed upon the accused imprisonment from six (6) year s and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum. Again, he disregarded Article 39 of t he Revised Penal Code and imposed subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 3. People vs. Manuel Carino Crim. Case No. 15544-R, for Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit F) The accused pleaded guilty to Attempted Homicide and thus, the imposable penalty is prision correccional (Art. 51 in rel. to Art. 249, RPC). Respondent, however, imposed the penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. Notably, it was imposed in its maximum period without any finding of aggravating circumstance. 4. People vs. German Abarquez, et al. Crim. Case No. 3200, for Robbery (Exhibit G)
As found by respondent, the penalty imposable is prision mayor. However, what he imposed was imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum. Again, the penalty imposed is in its maximum period without any express finding of aggravating circumstance. 5. People vs. Rolando Tawanna, et. al. Crim. Case No. 7703-R, for Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit H) The penalty imposed is prision correccional (Art. 50 in rel. to Art. 249, RPC) but respondent sentenced all accused to ten (10) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) ye ars, as maximum, without any express finding of aggravating circumstance. 6. People vs. Jose Tamo, et. al. Crim. Case No. 13646-R, for Frustrated Murder (Exhibit I) The imposable penalty is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period (Art. 50 in rel. to Art. 248, RPC) but the penalty imposed by respondent was fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as m inimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. 7. People vs. Bernardo Polic-ew Crim. Case No. 14054-R, for Frustrated Murder (Exhibit J) The penalty imposable is prision mayor (Art. 50 in rel. to Art. 249, RPC) but respondent fixed the sentence at eleven (11) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum. Note that the penalty is in the maximum period without any express finding of aggravating circumstance. 8. People vs. Johnson Simsim Crim. Case No. 14524-R, for Attempted Rape (Exhibit K) It being in its attempted stage, the penalty imposable is prision mayor. However, the penalty imposed by respondent was ten (10) years and one (1) (sic), as minimum, to twelve (12) years , as maximum. 9. People vs. Moses Polic-ew Crim. Case No. 15600-R, for Malversation of Public Property (Exhibit L) As found by respondent, accused violated Par. 2 o f Art. 217, RPC, which provides a penalty o f prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. However, what he imposed was seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum.
10. People vs. Renato Bernal Crim. Case No. 14776-R, for Homicide (Exhibit M) The imposable penalty for Homicide is reclusion temporal. Again, in complete disregard of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, respondent imposed fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. 11. People vs. John Baliling Crim. Case No. 15932-R, for Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit N) The offense charged is punishable by prision mayor. However, respondent imposed eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum. 12. People vs. Melchor Bawalan, et al. Crim. Case No. 15653-R, for Robbery with Violence (Exhibit O) The offense charged is punishable under Par. 5, Art . 294, RPC, which provides a penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its me dium period. However, respondent imposed eight (8) years and one (1) (sic) as m inimum, to ten years, as maximum. 13. People vs. Paul Afiagan Crim. Case No. 13379-R, for Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit P) Accused pleaded guilty to Attempted Homicide punishable with imprisonment of prision correccional, but respondent fixed the penalty at four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) years, as maximum. 14. People vs. Edwin Longaquit, et. al. Crim. Case No. 13367-R, for Frustrated Homicide (Exhibit Q) The offense charged is punishable by imprisonment of prision mayor. Respondent imposed eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to t en (10) years, maximum. 15. People vs. Joseph Samir Kairuz, et al. Crim. Case No. 14929-R, for Estafa (Exhibit R)
The amount involved was P90,000.00. Under the first paragraph of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its m inimum period, plus one year for every P 10,000.00 since the amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. The se ntence imposed by respondent, however, is twelve (12) years, eight (8) months, and twenty (21) days, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. Note that aside from not applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty he imposed is beyond the penalty imposable under the law. 16. People vs. Liwayway Cruz Crim. Case No. 7304-R, for Estafa (Exhibit S) The amount involved is P29,470.00. Hence, pursuant to Art. 315 , Par. 1, Revised Penal Code, t he imposable penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. The penalty imposed by respondent was six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (21) days, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum. 17. People vs. Benjie Gose, et al.; Crim. Case No. 149935-R, for Robbery (Exhibit T) The penalty imposable is prision mayor there being no evidence that accused carried arms during the robbery (Art. 299, RPC). Respondent, however, imposed a sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as m aximum. Note, too, that he imposed the same penalty upon accused Mark Joseph Ocharan despite his findings that he was a minor during the commission of the crime. Minority is a privilege mitigating circumstance and thus, accused Ocharans penalty should have bee n lowered by one degree.[40] The application of the Indeterminate Sentence L aw in the imposition of penalties in crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code is a basic precept. The respondent judges repeated m isapplication thereof in quite a number of criminal cases he had rendered constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As this Court has consistently ruled, a judge is presumed to know the law and when the law is so elementary, not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[41] Indeed, judges are duty bound to have more than a cursory acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be exc used, not even a judge.[42] The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a j udge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.[43] It bears stressing that . . . Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with t he rules, he erodes the publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law. Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law.[44] The respondent judge has utterly failed to live up to the standard of competence re quired of him. His erroneous application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law committed not just once or twice but in at least seventeen (17) instances is a compelling evidence of his gross ignorance of the law.
On Gross Violation of the Constitutional Rights of the Accused In People vs. Ceferino Baniqued (Criminal Case No. 13949-R) for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the prosecution filed a motion for preventive suspension and the accused filed his opposition thereto. In his Order of August 18, 1998, the respondent judge submitted the said motion for resolution. However, it took the respondent j udge more than one (1) year to resolve the same. As correctly found by the Investigating Justice, t he delay in resolving this motion constituted violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In Surla vs. Dimla (Civil Case No. 3322-R), the respondent judge resolved an unopposed motion for reconsideration after almost four (4) months. Again, this contravened the mandate of the Constitution that "all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of cases. Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Co de of Judicial Conduct provide: Rule 1.02. A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay. Rule 3.05. A judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. SC Administrative Circular No. 13-87 enjoins that: 3. Judges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15 of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or m atters submitted in their courts. Thus, all c ases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from dates of submission by all lower collegiate courts while all other lower courts are given a period of t hree months to do so . . . Further, SC Administrative Circular No. 1-88 reads: 6.1. All Presiding Judges must endeavor to act promptly on all motions and interlocutory matters pending before their courts . . . Conformably with the foregoing mandate, this Court has pronounced The office of a judge exists for one solemn end to promote t he ends of justice by administering it speedily and impartially. The judge as the person presiding over that court is the visible representation of the law and justice. Failure to resolve cases submitted for decision within the period fixed by law constitutes violation of the constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.[45] The unreasonable delay of the respondent judge in resolving the motions submitted for his resolution clearly constituted a violation of the parties co nstitutional right to a speedy disposition of their cases. On Arrogant, Oppressive and Improper Conduct and Violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct As correctly enumerated by the Investigating Justice, the following incidents establish the respondent judges arrogant and oppressive conduct: a. Arrogance When he tried to limit the cross examination by Atty. Fernando Manapat Jr., who was re presenting the accused in People vs. Andrada, of the prosecution witness to ten (10) minutes with an advice of not repeating questions that were already asked during t he direct examination; b. Arrogance and Oppression Atty. J[o]ris Karl B. Dacaw[i], a young lawyer, who became the beneficiary of re spondents arrogance and oppressive conduct on 11 March 1999. On said date, Atty. Dacaw[i], as plaintiffs lawyer, moved for the cancellation of the hearing of the c ase entitled Alejo Cabre[r]os vs. Susie Edralin alleging although his witness Alejo Cabre[r]os was present, said witness however was not feeling well. This simple manifestation caught the ire of respondent judge who instantaneously ordered Alejo Cabre[r]os to stand and told him not to pay his lawyer his attorneys fees because he did not do anything for that day; c. Oppression and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct 1. Atty. Reynaldo U. Agranzamendez, while appearing as co unsel de oficio for Liwayway Cruz in Criminal Case No. 7304-R, for estafa last 29 July 1999, was extremely embarrassed when he was ordered by respondent judge to stand in behalf of ac cused, who was then absent despite due notice, and face the Clerk of Court during the reading of the full text of the decision when said case was called for promulgation. Accordingly, Atty. Agranzamendez asked respondent judge to allow him to t ake his seat as there were several people inside the courtroom who, being unmindful of the rules might t hink that he was the accused. But his pleas, however, got respondent mad, for inste ad of allowing him to sit down, respondent instead banged his gavel and told Atty. Agranzamendez not to argue with the court and to stand straight as he leaned ove r avoid the glances of the Clerk of Court. 2. Evidence on hand also reveals respondents casual disregard of procedural rules, that is, when he promulgated a decision that has yet to be released as shown in the case of P eople vs. Malapit, et al., docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 15320-R, 153 23-R, 15[327]-R and 15571-R and in People vs. Cas, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15306-R.[46] The behavior of the respondent judge towar ds Atty. Mandapat, i.e. berating the latter in his crossexamination for repeating the questions already asked during the direc t examination, betrayed his impatience in the conduct of the hearing. A display of petulance and impatience in the conduct of trial is a norm of behavior incompatible with the needful attitude and sobriety of a good judge.[47] The respondents statement to the client t hat Atty. Dacawi did not deserve to be paid as he did not do anything during the trial was uncalled for. Further, his act of requiring Atty. Agranzamendez to take the place of the accused during the reading of the decision at the promulgation thereof was improper. These actuations of the respondent judge cannot be countenanced as they clearly violated Rule 3.04 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct:
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before t he court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead o f the courts for the litigants. Apropos, this Court has held: . . . A judge should be courteous both in his conduct and in his language especially to t hose appearing before him. He can hold counsels to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court, their clients, and the public without being petty, arbitrary, overbear ing, or tyrannical. He should refrain from conduct that demeans his office and remember always that courtesy begets courtesy. Above all, he must conduct himself in such a manner that he gives no reason for reproach.[48] Clearly, the respondent judge has failed to observe courtesy and civility to the lawyers as w ell as to the litigants who appeared before him. Finally, the Court frowns upon the highly irregular practice of the respondent judge of promulgating a decision, copies of which were not then ready for release to the parties.Consequently, Atty. Lagdao of the PAO, who represented the accused, filed the notices of appeal stating as follows: In the Malapit case: . . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the Supreme Court decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 18 September 1999, copies of which the honorable Court has yet to release despite the fact that the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal is about to expire. . . In the Cas case: . . . hereby gives notice that she is appealing to the court of appeals the decision of the honorable Court promulgated on 22 June 1999, a copy of which the Honorable Court has yet to release.. .[49] What is even more reprehensible were the respondent judges directives to Atty. Lagdao to delete the phrase copies of which the Honorable Court has yet to release from the notices of appeal otherwise he (the respondent judge) would not act the reon. This conduct of the respondent judge was utterly unbecoming a magistrate and violated the following canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct: CANON 1 - A JUDGE SHOULD UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY Rule 1.01. A judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. CANON 2 - A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES Rule 2.01. - A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in t he integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. CANON 3 - A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE Rule 3.01. - A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
On Graft and Corruption While the Investigating Justice absolved, for insufficiency of evidence, the respondent judge of the charge of graft and corruption in connection with the appointment of Mr. Gula as driver, nonetheless, she found the respondent judge guilty of impropriety. As found by the Investigating Justice, the respondent judges recommendation of Mr. Gula to be his driver despite the latters lack of drivers license and inability to drive not only casts doubt in his integrity but also his honesty as a judge.[50] Indeed, the personal behavior of the judge, not only while in the performance of his duties but also outside the court must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of t he law and of justice.[51] The Court also notes that this is not the respondents first administrative case. In Gacayan vs. Pamintuan,[52] the Court found him guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Ethics which amount to grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming an officer of the judiciary and conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service. Despite the fact that the accused already filed a Demurer to Evidence, the respondent, without resolving the same and in blatant disregard for the rules of c riminal procedure, still called witnesses who were not listed in the information as well as those who had already testified to appear before him, resulting in the r e-opening of the case with respect to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. When the accused filed a motion for inhibition and a motion to suspend further proceedings, the respondent j udge denied the same. He was also seen conferring w ith the witnesses for the prosecution, and later set the case for hearing without notice to the co unsel of the accused. The respondent was mete d a fine of P10,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of similar transgressions would be dealt with more severely.[53] Considering all the foregoing, we find that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year is appropriate. WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Baguio City, is SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year effective immediately. He is sternly WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more sever ely. The respondent is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to the Court to enable it to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect. SO ORDERED. Berenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA 210
FACTS: Atty. Pedro B. Carranza was filed a complaint against his acts of deception practiced in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. The alleged deception was the introduction of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer of Title subscribed and sworn in Pasay City, which later turned out to be a falsity. Atty. Car ranza claimed that he took no part in the said falsified document. It was contested that due to the said falsehood, whether or not a lawyer took part from, must still be held liable for lack of prudence and meticulous take on the matter, and as it had caused unnecessary delays in the administration of justice. ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Carranza should be held responsible of the said falsehood committed in court. HELD: YES. Respondent was reprimanded. RATIO: There was a finding that there was nothing willful in the conduct pursued by the respondent in introducing the document that turned out to be false. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reminded that the lawyer’s oath is one impressed with utmost seriousness and should not be taken lightly. In its decision to issue reprimand, the respondent is warned that a more severe penalty will be imposed if the offense of the same character is repeated again. Noe-Lacsamana v. Busmente
Petitioner’s claim: Noe-Lacsamana alleged that she was the counsel for the plaintiff in a civil case while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of the said civil case was annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as c ounsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she discovered that D ela Rosa was not a lawyer. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’scollaborating counsel which recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than five years. The I BP Board of Governors, in its r esolution, adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD Respondent’s claim: Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Reg ine Macasieb(Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
ISSUE: Wether or not Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law RULING: YES. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso. Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 o f the Code of Professional Responsibility. We agree
with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months. G.R. NO. 156183, February 28, 2007 NICASIO I. ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE C. PONCE AND THE P E O P L E O F T H E P H I L I P P I N E S , RESPONDENTS.
Facts: In 1997, respondent Vicente C. Ponce filed a string of criminal complaints against petitioner Nicasio I. Alcantara and his family, hereafter the Alcantaras, including one for estafa against petitioner in the Makati Prosecutor's Office. In essence, respondent Ponce alleged that petitioner had swindled him out of 3,000,000 shares of Floro Cement Corporation. It was in the course of the preliminary investigation of the complaint for estafa that respondent Ponce, shortly after giving his sur-rejoinder affidavit, submitted to the investigating prosecutor a newsletter purporting to be a belated annex to the affidavit. It was prefaced with the quotation "For every extraordinary fortune there is a great crime” and the text: An example is Marcos. Second example is t he Alcantaras. a) Overshipment of log; b) Land grabbing; c) Corruption of public office; d) Corporate grabbing. In SEC Case No. 2507 which the Securities and Exchange Commission en banc decided against him, Ponce accused the Alcantaras of defrauding him of his shares in Iligan Cement Corporation On Dec ember 3, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for libel against respondent Ponce with the Makati Prosecutor's Office in connection with the aforesaid newsletter. He claimed that: (1) the statements ther ein were defamatory; (2) respondent had circulated it in the Makati Prosecutor's Office and (3) the newsletter could not be considered an annex to the surrejoinder because respondent had not attached it to the said affidavit but had given it thereafter The preliminary investigation was conducted by City Prosecutor Imelda P. Saulog. On March 17, 1998, Prosecutor Saulog issued a resolution finding probable cause for libel and recommending the filing of an information in court. Thereafter, the case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled to Judge Tranquil Salvador of Branch 63. However, respondent Ponce filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice, who reversed the City Prosecutor in a resolution dated February 28, 2000. This reversal was based on the finding that the newsletter was a privileged communication, having been submitted to the investigating prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista as an intended annex to respondent's sur-rejoinder. The Secretary of Justice thus directed the withdrawal of the information. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was de nied. Petitioner elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA. In a decision dated August 29, 2002, the CA found that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, set aside the latter's resolution and directed the reinstatement of the criminal case. After unsuccessfully moving for reconsideration in the Department of Justice, respondent Ponce attempted to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. In the meantime, however, before the case was decided, the Office of the Makati City Prosecutor, in deference to the resolution of the Justice Secretary, filed a motion to withdraw information, which the trial court granted on September 28, 2001. The trial court ruled that the absence of the essential element of publicity precluded the commission of the cr ime of libel. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the withdrawal but the trial co urt denied the motion in an order dated March 21, 2002. On June 17, 2002, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari in the CA. In this case, the CA rendered the assailed decision. Issue: whether or not the controversial newsletter constituted privileged communication, which would exempt it from libel. Ruling: Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written, known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself." Our Supreme Court has established the rule that when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does not amount to publication While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse can lead to gre at hardships, to allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this acco unt will give rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine itself rests on public policy which looks to t he free and unfettered administration of justice. It is as a rule applied liberally. The one obstacle that those pleading the defense of privileged communication must hurdle is the test of relevancy. Under this test, a matter alleged in the course of the proceedings need not be in every case material to the issues presented but should be legitimately related to the issues or be so pertinent to the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of trial. Here, the controversial statements were made in the context of a criminal complaint against petitioner, albeit for other, separate acts involving greed and deceit, and were disclosed only to t he official investigating the complaint. Liberally applying the privileged communication doctrine, these statements were still relevant to the complaint under investigation because, like the averments ther ein, they also involved petitioner’s alleged rapacity and deceitfulness. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the September 13, 2002 decision and November 21, 2002 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71189 AFFIRMED VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME
Facts: Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court r ule against Venterez and friends. They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or re fused to do so. Because of this, Venterez was constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR. Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he was withdrawing the case from him because he (t he son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned over the records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any longer.